United States v. Chin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1574

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court resentencing Defendant while applying two sentencing enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, holding that both enhancements applied.

Defendant, a former supervising pharmacist at the New England Compounding Center (NECC), was convicted for his conduct in connection with a criminal investigation into a 2012 deadly nationwide outbreak of fungal meningitis that was traced to the NECC's shipments of contaminated drugs. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of ninety-six months. On appeal, the First Circuit vacated and remanded Defendant's sentence. On remand, the district court held that two enhancements applied to Defendant and resentenced him to a 126-month term of imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in applying the two enhancements.

United States of America v. Chappelle

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-3835

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: WILLIAM J. NARDINI,

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. Application Note 1 to Section 4B1.2 provides that, among other things, a conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is itself a crime of violence. The district court held that it was not obligated to defer to Application Note 1 because it was inconsistent with 4B1.2(a). The Government appealed.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court held that the Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a “crime of violence” under the career offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court explained that Hobbs Act robbery can be committed based solely on violence against property, whereas a “crime of violence” under Section 4B1.2 must be based on violence against people.
 
Here, the court explained it need not rule upon the validity of Application Note 1 in this context because the object of Defendant’s conspiracy offense (Hobbs Act robbery) was not a crime of violence as defined by Section 4B1.2. And if the object of the conspiracy is not a crime of violence, then the conspiracy itself cannot be one either (at least, not by virtue of Application Note 1).
 
 
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United States v. Scarfo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 15-2811

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: Jordan

Areas of Law: Corporate Compliance, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Four defendants, who have multiple ties to organized crime, were convicted for their roles in the unlawful takeover and looting of FirstPlus Financial, a publicly traded mortgage loan company. Their scheme began with the defendants’ and their co-conspirators’ extortion of FirstPlus’s board of directors and its chairman, using lies and threats to gain control of the company. Once they forced the old leadership out, the defendants drained the company of its value by causing it to enter into expensive consulting and legal-services agreements with themselves, causing it to acquire (at vastly inflated prices) shell companies they personally owned, and using bogus trusts to funnel FirstPlus’s assets into their own accounts. They ultimately bankrupted FirstPlus, leaving its shareholders with worthless stock.

Each defendant was convicted of more than 20 counts of criminal behavior and given a substantial prison sentence. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the investigation, the charges and evidence against them, the pretrial process, the government’s compliance with its disclosure obligations, the trial, the forfeiture proceedings, and their sentences. The government conceded that the district court’s assessment of one defendant’s forfeiture obligations was improper under a Supreme Court decision handed down during the pendency of this appeal and remanded that assessment.

Terrence Hyman v. Casandra Hoekstra

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-6852

Opinion Date: July 19, 2022

Judge: AGEE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Interim Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety (the “State”), appealed from the district court’s order granting state prisoner Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner’s sole claim in his Section 2254 petition is that his lead trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to withdraw and testify on his behalf to impeach one of the State’s key witnesses.
 
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that it is not free to reweigh evidence or interpose our own interpretations of the facts when reviewing a Section 2254 petition, even if we disagree with them or believe they are wrong. The court wrote that because the district court did just that, the court held that it must reverse its decision.
 
The court further explained that whether Sullivan or Strickland would supply the clearly established law, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden to secure habeas relief because he has no claim. He has failed to upend the state court’s conclusion that the alleged November 20, 2001, conversation between the key witness and his trial counsel never occurred, meaning he has not shown that she was operating under any conflict of interest during his trial. Nor has he demonstrated that his trial counsel possessed any information to impeach the key witness’s testimony had she withdrawn from her representation. In short, there is no factual support for the lone claim raised in Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition.

US v. Chandler Gist-Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4887

Opinion Date: July 18, 2022

Judge: BARBARA MILANO KEENAN

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). He appealed from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a firearm seized from his “fanny pack,” a small bag strapped around his waist. Defendant argued that the officers (1) lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him as he was walking at a fairground in Winston Salem, North Carolina, and (2) exceeded the scope of any permissible stop and frisk by placing him in handcuffs and by ultimately searching the fanny pack.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in denying the suppression motion. The officers had reasonable suspicion to think that Defendant, a convicted felon and gang member who had posted a recent incriminating statement on social media and whose residence had been the target of recent shootings, was engaged in criminal activity and was armed and dangerous. The court further concluded that the officers did not exceed the scope of the brief detention and frisk by handcuffing Defendant and, after feeling a hard object in his fanny pack, by opening the pack and seizing the firearm. Those actions were justified to ensure the safety of both the officers and other people nearby.

US v. David Miller

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-4095

Opinion Date: July 19, 2022

Judge: James Andrew Wynn, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from his convictions for conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to launder money, and eight counts of mail or wire fraud. He argued that his trial was constitutionally defective, his indictment was constructively amended, his jury instructions prejudiced him, and his conviction for conspiracy to launder money must be reversed for lack of sufficient evidence.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that his arguments—most of which were not properly preserved—are meritless. The court held that Defendant’s right-to-compel challenge falters, at minimum, at the third step of the plain error inquiry because he fails to show how the district court’s alleged Fifth Amendment error affected the outcome of his proceedings.


Further, even if the probable-cause finding for Count 2 were flawed, the Government would still have been well within its rights to seize Defendant’s properties based on the underlying and unchallenged probable-cause findings for these other counts.
 
Next, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show that his indictment contained an error, much less a plain error. It is well established that “[t]he allegation in a single count of conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for [t]he conspiracy is the crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects.” United States v. Marshall, 332 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2003).
 
Moreover, the court explained that even if it assumed that the district court’s concealment-money-laundering instructions were flawed, that error did not affect the outcome of Defendant’s proceedings because he was nevertheless convicted of conspiring to commit transactional money laundering.

USA v. Coulter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-10999

Opinion Date: July 18, 2022

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

An officer performed a traffic stop on Defendant in the middle of the night. Having been given reason to suspect that Defendant who revealed an aggravated robbery conviction, had a gun, the officer handcuffed him and asked where it was. Defendant answered, and the officer’s partner arrived later to find a .40 caliber pistol and .37 ounces of marijuana in Defendant’s backpack between the front seats of the van he drove. Before Defendant divulged that information, the officer did not provide Miranda warnings.
 
A grand jury indicted Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant then moved to “suppress all statements [he made] in response to the officer’s questioning once he was in handcuffs.” The district court granted the suppression motion. The government filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s judgment and the trial has been continued pending resolution of the appeal.
 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that the admissibility of Defendant’s unwarned statements, therefore, depends on whether he was “in custody” as contemplated by Miranda at the time he offered them.
 
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would not have equated the restraint on his freedom of movement with formal arrest. But even if Defendant could have reasonably thought that he was in custody for Miranda purposes after being handcuffed, the environment in which the officer questioned him was not tantamount to a station house interrogation as contemplated by Miranda.

United States v. Goliday

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-1326

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Officers executed a search warrant at Goliday’s Indianapolis home, recovering drugs and a loaded handgun. Goliday arrived during the search, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted that the drugs and gun were his. Goliday stated that he had bought two ounces of heroin every week for the last year from the same supplier, then resold smaller amounts. He pled guilty to three counts of possession with intent to distribute drugs—one count each for fentanyl, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and, based on his statement, to conspiring to distribute more than 1,000 grams of heroin. Without the conspiracy charge, he would have faced a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years; the conspiracy charge, enhanced by Goliday’s prior conviction, carried a statutory minimum of 15 years.

At sentencing, when the court asked Goliday if the facts relating to the conspiracy charge were accurate, Goliday indicated that his statement about how much he purchased was only intended to implicate his supplier. However, he subsequently agreed to the judge's recitation of the charge.

The Seventh Circuit vacated his 15-year sentence. Goliday’s statements suggested he did not understand how a conspiracy offense differed from just buying and selling drugs. The district court did not resolve the confusion and should have ensured that Goliday understood the nature of the charged conspiracy offense and that there was a factual basis for the plea.

United States v. Ingram

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-3305

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Granite City Police officers conducted a traffic stop in a known drug-trafficking area and found Ingram, a passenger in the vehicle, in possession of a loaded handgun and small quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine. Ingram pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. At sentencing, the district judge added four offense levels to the Guidelines calculation after finding that Ingram possessed the firearm “in connection with” another felony—namely, felony drug possession, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The judge then sentenced Ingram to 72 months in prison, an upward variance from the 46-57 months advisory range.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ingram possessed both the handgun and drugs as he left a known drug-trafficking area and fled on foot when the police initiated the traffic stop. From these facts, the judge found that Ingram’s handgun facilitated his drug possession. That finding was not clearly erroneous, making the application of the enhancement proper. Nor did the judge abuse his discretion with the upward variance, which was justified by Ingram’s criminal history and dangerous conduct during his arrest.

United States v. Olson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2128

Opinion Date: July 18, 2022

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Olson arrived in Madison, Wisconsin during the second night of violent civil unrest following the death of George Floyd and armed himself with a gun. Three Madison Police officers observed Olson take the gun from the trunk of his car, then apprehended Olson, who was a felon, retrieved the gun, and placed him under arrest, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Olson attempted unsuccessfully to suppress the gun.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. Olson’s initial seizure was a Terry stop, not a de facto arrest. Given the unique circumstances of the night, the officers’ use of force when approaching Olson “was eminently justifiable.” They saw Olson conceal a gun in the waistband of his pants; saw Olson drinking from a “tallboy” style, suggesting Olson could be intoxicated; and saw Olson carefully scrutinize his surroundings, which suggested avoiding detection. The officers reasonably suspected Olson was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity while the city was experiencing an almost complete collapse of civil order. Any omissions or inaccuracies in the officers’ contemporaneous reports are plausibly explained by their sleep deprivation and stress.

United States v. Peoples

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2630

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Peoples led a gang that robbed four Indiana banks in 1997-1998, brandishing an assault rifle. At least once, he pointed the gun at tellers and threatened to kill them. Peoples stole getaway cars; twice he burned them. A jury convicted Peoples on multiple counts of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(d)), using a firearm during a felony (section 924(c)) and to commit a felony (844(h)), and maliciously destroying a vehicle by fire (844(i)). The four 924(c) convictions required the imposition of consecutive minimum sentences totaling 65 mandatory years. The two 844(h) convictions required a sentence of at least 30 consecutive years. Peoples was sentenced to almost 111 years.

In prison, Peoples has successfully completed many classes and received no disciplinary infractions. Peoples, at substantial risk to his own safety, took steps to save another person’s life in prison. Nine correctional officers supported his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which cited his rehabilitation and the reality that, under the First Step Act’s amendments to 924(c), he would face a much shorter sentence today for the same armed bank robberies.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. In a compassionate release motion, the prisoner must identify an 'extraordinary and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction, but that reason cannot include, alone or in combination with other factors, consideration of the First Step Act. Peoples otherwise failed to identify an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting early release.

United States v. Protho

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2092

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: Kirsch

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Ten-year-old Amani, walking home, was grabbed by a man and pushed into a vehicle. The man hit her eye and lip, threatened to kill her, parked in an alley, pulled down her leggings, and touched her inside of her underwear. Amani escaped, ran away, and flagged down a passing car. The driver called 911. A week later, police arrested Protho, who was charged with kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and (g)(1)). During a nine-day jury trial, 29 witnesses, including Amani and Protho, testified. The trial focused on the kidnapper’s identity.

The jury found Protho guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 38 years’ imprisonment plus restitution, including $87,770 for Amani’s psychotherapy needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of testimony by three expert witnesses: an FBI photographic technologist who analyzed surveillance videos that were admitted at trial, an expert on fiber evidence, and a manager of Ford's Design Analysis Engineering Department, who identified the vehicle on the videos. The district court did not clearly err in handling either of Protho’s Batson challenges or in allowing Amani to testify via closed-circuit television, 18 U.S.C. 3509. The court rejected challenges based on the “interstate commerce” element of the statute and to the district court’s handling of an evidentiary question at trial. The court noted the “overwhelming evidence” of guilt.

United States v. Thayer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2385

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Thayer pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law for groping his 14-year-old daughter while she slept. Thayer later moved to Wisconsin without registering as a sex offender. The government indicted him for failing to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court dismissed the indictment, finding the relevant section of SORNA categorically misaligned with Thayer’s Minnesota statute of conviction. SORNA’s “Romeo and Juliet” exception excludes from the definition of “sex offense” consensual sex where “the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.” The Minnesota statute under which Thayer was convicted criminalizes sexual conduct both where “the complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant” and where “the actor is … in a current or recent position of authority over the complainant.”

The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal. Section 20911(5)(A)(ii), as applied through section 20911(7)(I), must be analyzed under the circumstance-specific method, not by a categorical approach. Section 20911(7)(I) directs courts to evaluate the nature of an individual’s conduct, not the nature of an offense or of a conviction.

Wilson v. Boughton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-2938

Opinion Date: July 19, 2022

Judge: Kirsch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Wilson rekindled a romantic relationship with Yegger, whose five children include FT, who was seven years old and had special needs. The Bureau of Child Welfare had received reports of physical abuse and unexplained injuries on Yegger’s children, who were eventually placed with foster families. Each child received a medical checkup. A pediatric nurse practitioner observed five genital lesions on FT. A pediatrician later observed genital and anal lesions; an antibody test later allowed her to diagnose them as herpes. In a recorded interview with a forensic interviewer, FT recounted eight times that she had been sexually assaulted by Wilson. Wilson was charged with Engaging in Repeated Acts of Sexual Assault of the Same Child, which requires at least three qualifying acts “within a specified period of time.” The judge instructed the jury that it could find Wilson guilty of the lesser-included offense of First-Degree Sexual Assault of a Child, which requires only a single qualifying act. The jury found Wilson guilty of the greater offense. The judge referred to “overwhelming testimony that you committed these outrageous assaults” and sentenced Wilson to 37 years’ imprisonment.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Wilson’s petition for habeas relief. Wisconsin courts reasonably rejected his arguments that the evidence could not support his conviction and that his counsel’s representation was constitutionally deficient.

United States v. Douglas Schneider

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1112

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant and the government reached a binding plea agreement whereby Defendant would plead guilty to transportation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2423(a) and receive a below-guideline sentence of 150 months. At a change-of-plea hearing in March, the district court rejected the plea agreement. At the end of the second hearing, the district court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea. The district court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
 
Defendant appealed arguing that the district court participated in plea negotiations in violation of Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring vacatur of his conviction and sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order.
 
The court explained that Defendant waived “all rights to appeal or collaterally attack . . . [his] conviction or sentence [and] all non-jurisdictional issues.” Because Defendant’s appeal requests vacatur of his conviction and sentence, it falls within the scope of the waiver. However, a violation of Rule 11(c)(1) is appealable unless the defendant specifically waives “an appeal challenging the voluntariness of his plea.” Here, Defendant did not waive his right to appeal, thus the court wrote that Defendant must show that the district court’s error affected his substantial rights. The court explained that although at least one factor favors Defendant, the particular facts and circumstances in the entire record here do not show that the Rule 11 violation affected Defendant’s substantial rights.

United States v. LaSamuel Richardson, III

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2741

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: GRUENDER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, two additional evidentiary rulings, and the application of a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(3).
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Richardson because the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest was sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that Defendant committed the offense of indecent exposure.
 
Further, the court concluded that the officers properly searched Defendant’s person and his car after he was arrested. The search of Defendant’s person was a proper search incident to arrest. The search of the CR-V was a proper probationary search because Defendant was subject to a probationary search condition and there was reasonable suspicion to believe that he possessed firearms based on the pistol magazine found in his pocket or that he violated the law by committing the offense of indecent exposure, both of which were prohibited by his probation conditions.
 
Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Government to introduce evidence about Defendant’s six prior convictions. Contrary to Defendant’s claim, the probative value of the evidence of his prior convictions was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Finally, the court explained it need not decide whether North Dakota robbery qualifies as a crime of violence because any alleged error was harmless.

THOMAS CREECH V. TIM RICHARDSON

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 10-99015

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: W. Fletcher

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

While serving two life sentences for multiple convictions for first-degree murder, Petitioner beat a fellow inmate to death. After pleading guilty, he was sentenced to death in Idaho state court. Petitioner obtained federal habeas relief with respect to his sentence and was resentenced to death in 1995. In a second petition, Petitioner thereafter unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief in the district court. The district court granted certificates of appealability (COAs) as to two issues.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s second amended habeas corpus petition challenging his death sentence. The court denied a COA as to Petitioner’s claims (1) that the district court erred in summarily denying his motion for reconsideration of its denial of his second habeas petition, (2) that the Idaho Supreme Court violated the Due Process Clause by refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea prior to his first resentencing, and (3) that the duration of Petitioner’s confinement for his murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
 
The court granted a COA as to Petitioner’s argument under Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010), that claims in his second federal habeas petition attacking his guilty plea are not “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b) and should be decided on the merits. The court concluded that because Petitioner’s original sentence was vacated and a new sentence was imposed, the claims are not barred as second or successive.

USA V. SEGUNDO DOMINGUEZ-CAICEDO

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-50268

Opinion Date: July 18, 2022

Judge: Milan Dale Smith, Jr.

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendants in three consolidated cases were convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine on board a vessel, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel, and aiding and abetting. They challenged the district court’s denial of their pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment. Defendants also argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument. The Defendants made individual claims as well.
 
Defendants argued that even if outrageous government conduct does not require dismissal of the indictment, the district court should have used its supervisory powers to provide the same remedy, asserting that the government should tread lightly in international waters, and the court should not condone mistreatment of foreigners with no connection to the United States. The Ninth Circuit wrote that pursuant to United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995), that is not a sufficient reason to hold that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the indictment. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictment.
 
Further, the court held that a court has the power to dismiss an indictment for egregious violations of Rule 5, and that the proper inquiry is whether transportation to the United States as a whole was unnecessarily delayed, rather than whether there was some other district in the United States in which the defendant could have been brought before a magistrate judge more quickly. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in its determination that 23 days was not an unreasonable delay.

USA V. SHANE NAULT

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-30231

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Nguyen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and felon in possession of a firearm, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motions. An officer stopped the vehicle after learning that the vehicle— whose registered owner had an outstanding arrest warrant—was in the parking lot of a gas station.
 
In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the officer unconstitutionally prolonged the vehicle stop when he asked Defendantto provide his license, registration, and proof of insurance because the suspicion that motivated the stop had evaporated once the officer determined that Ross was not in the vehicle. The government countered that the stop was supported by independent reasonable suspicion because the officer began to suspect that Defendant was intoxicated shortly after initiating contact.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motions to suppress. The panel wrote that the circumstances of the officer’s encounter with Defendant’s implicate the same vehicle safety purpose discussed in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), under which a routine document check would remain part of the officer’s mission even when the suspicion that justified a stop was based on an outstanding warrant rather than a traffic violation.
 
The court wrote that Defendant failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that any statement or omission in the affidavit was intentionally or recklessly false or misleading, where an expert report provided by Defendant at most establishes that the canine’s alert was unreliable on a single unrelated occasion.

United States v. Adams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-3043

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: Robert Edwin Bacharach

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Briar Adams was convicted of aggravated battery. The district court applied U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(a)(4) to defendant who had a prior conviction in Kansas for aggravated battery. In considering that conviction, the court classified aggravated battery as a crime of violence and sentenced Adams to 51 months’ imprisonment. Adams challenged this classification, arguing that Kansas’s crime of aggravated battery included conduct that wouldn’t create a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines. To this, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed: "in Kansas an aggravated battery could stem from battery against a fetus, and the guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence wouldn’t cover battery against a fetus. Because the Kansas crime of aggravated battery doesn’t constitute a crime of violence," the Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Babcock

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-4003

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Harris L. Hartz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Zachary Babcock appealed the denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate and correct his sentence on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued his counsel failed to object to a sentencing-guidelines enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) based on prior Utah convictions of a “controlled substance offense” as defined by USSG § 4B1.2(b). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously held Colorado and Kansas statutes that prohibited a "mere offer" to sell a controlled substance, without requiring proof of intent to actually distribute or complete a sale, did not satisfy the definition of "controlled substance offense." The Tenth Circuit found guideline commentary stated that an attempt to commit a controlled-substance offense was itself a controlled-substance offense, and the Court's opinions left open the possibility that an offer-to-sell statute could satisfy the conditions necessary to be considered an attempt-to-sell statute. Defendant contended his trial counsel should have argued at sentencing: (1) that an offer to sell under the Utah statute was not necessarily an attempt to commit a controlled-substance offense; and (2) that the guideline commentary stating that an attempt to commit a controlled-substance offense was also a controlled-substance offense improperly expanded the text of the guideline.The Tenth Circuit determined defense counsel's failure to make those two arguments did not constitute deficient performance because the first argument lacked merit and the second "would have been a stretch at the time."

Kidanemariam Kassa v. Antionette Stephenson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 20-12281

Opinion Date: July 18, 2022

Judge: JILL PRYOR

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics

An assistant district attorney (the “DA”) in Fulton County, Georgia obtained a material witness warrant requiring Plaintiff to appear as a witness at trial. Plaintiff voluntarily appeared at trial, making execution of the warrant unnecessary. After the trial ended, the DA failed to inform the trial judge that the warrant needed to be recalled. A few months later, a police officer arrested Plaintiff and placed him in jail because of the outstanding warrant. A judge eventually ordered Plaintiff’s release.
 
Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action alleging, among other things, that the DA’s failure to initiate the warrant’s cancelation violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The DA moved to dismiss the suit arguing that as a prosecutor she was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against her.
 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that absolute prosecutorial immunity does not extend to DA’s failure to take action to cancel the warrant. The district court thus erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint.
 
The court wrote that determining whether prosecutorial immunity applies requires the court to take a fact-specific functional approach. Here, the court found that applying Third Circuit precedent from Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008), results in the conclusion that the DA is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Thus the DA has failed to show that absolute immunity protects her post-trial conduct here.

USA v. Donald Watkins, Jr., et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-12951

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: TJOFLAT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A federal grand jury returned a sealed indictment against Defendant (“Senior”) and co-Defendant, his son, (“Junior”). The jury convicted Senior on all counts and Junior on counts one (conspiracy) and two (wire fraud). Both Senior and Junior again filed motions seeking a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. The district court denied the motions.
 
Both Senior and Junior appealed on various grounds. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants’ motions. The court held that the district court committed no reversible error nor did it abuse its discretion.
 
The court first considered whether the evidence was sufficient to support Senior and Junior’s convictions for wire fraud. The court explained that to be convicted of wire fraud, a person must “(1) intentionally participate in a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property and (2) use or 'cause’ the use of the mails or wires for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice.” The court held that here the Government presented substantial evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Junior knowingly and intentionally participated in Senior’s fraudulent scheme.
 
Further, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Senior’s proposed jury instructions on the “intent to harm” element of the wire and bank fraud charges. The District Court’s instruction addressed the substance of the instruction in its charge and Senior’s ability to present an effective defense was in no way impaired by the district court’s refusal to use his proposed instruction.

USA v. Tarek Abou-Khatwa

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-3036

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: MILLETT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

Appellant sought the dismissal of most of the counts of his indictment and a new trial on the remaining counts. In his view, the indictment failed to allege a convergence between the deceived entity, CareFirst, and those deprived of property— which, in Appellant’s view, were his clients. In other words, he claimed that the indictment did not allege that he defrauded CareFirst of any of its own property. He argued instead that the indictment and trial improperly relied on evidence that he defrauded his small business clients by overcharging them for health insurance premiums. He also brought a number of evidentiary challenges.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence. The court wrote that there is no convergence problem in this case. The indictment alleged that Appellant defrauded CareFirst, causing it to lose money. That is the same fraud that the government proved at trial. The differential between the falsely lowered premiums that Appellant tricked CareFirst into charging and those he billed his clients represented, at least in part, property fraudulently taken from CareFirst. That price difference also helped to show Appellant profit motive for the fraud, and demonstrated that he was neither acting as a Robin Hood nor at the behest of his clients to help reduce their premiums. None of Appellant’s other challenges on appeal succeed.

State v. Muhammad

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-21-0073-PR

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: King

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of thirteen felony counts of aggravated harassment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Defendant's jury-trial waiver.

At issue on appeal was whether, in a case where a criminal defendant's competency has been put at issue, a trial court must make a specific finding of heightened competency before determining that the defendant's waiver of the right to a jury trial is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding (1) Arizona law does not require a finding of heightened competency for a jury-trial waiver where a defendant's competency has been put at issue; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.

People v. Mataele

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S138052

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Cantil-Salauye

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder and sentencing Defendant to death, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court properly excluded two prospective jurors for cause; (2) the "substantial impairment" standard used for determining jury bias in capital cases did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury; (3) there was no constitutional violation in the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him; (4) there was no error in the court's evidentiary rulings; (5) the trial court erred by failing to provide the jury with a cautionary instructions defining confessions, but the error was harmless; (6) Defendant did not demonstrate any basis for the Court to find error in California's death penalty laws; and (7) a limited remand was appropriate for the sole purpose of allowing the trial court to consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the prior serious felony enhancement and the firearm enhancements.

California v. Beasley

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G060302(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: William W. Bedsworth

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Danny Beasley, who had a lengthy criminal history, was on parole from a 25-to-life sentence when he committed this first degree robbery. He used a knife in the commission of the offense, which exposed him to a maximum sentence of at least 35 years to life. The trial court dismissed all three of Beasley’s prior strike convictions, his three prior serious felony convictions and the weapon-use enhancement, and sentenced him to the low term of two years in prison. The district attorney objected and filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s order dismissing the prior strike convictions plainly “fell outside the bounds of reason under the applicable law and the relevant facts.” Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Beasley an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

California v. M.H.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E074452(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: Carol D. Codrington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After defendant-appellant M.H. was convicted of a criminal offense, she was committed to the California Department of State Hospitals at Patton as a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) under Penal Code section 2962. While committed, M.H. petitioned under section 2966 (c) challenging her commitment and requesting appointment of counsel and a hearing. The trial court appointed counsel for defendant, and defendant requested a bench trial. Toward the beginning of the bench trial, the trial court advised defendant of her right to a jury trial under section 2966 (b), but did not advise her of her right to call, confront, or subpoena witnesses. Defendant did not object, waived her right to a jury trial, and stipulated to the trial court’s ruling on her petition based on the parties’ papers. The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant qualified as a MDO and denied her petition. On appeal, defendant contended section 2966 (b) required the trial court to advise her of her right to call and confront witnesses and subpoena them if necessary, that the trial court erred in failing to do so, and that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her of her rights. To this the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the district court.

In re N.L.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D079759(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Buchanan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Minor N.L. appealed an order adjudging her a ward of the court. She argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that she willfully and maliciously committed felony arson of property; and (2) the case should have been remanded for the juvenile court to consider informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2, applying changes to the law that became effective on January 1, 2022 as a result of Senate Bill No. 383 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). After review, the Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to support the true finding, but the Court agreed that N.L. was entitled to a conditional reversal and remand for the trial court to consider informal supervision under the law as amended by Senate Bill No. 383.

P. v. Dunn

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F083390(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: HILL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with assault with a means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (“force-likely assault”) (Pen. Code,1 Section 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and misdemeanor violation of a protective order (Section 273.6, subd. (a); count 2).
 
Defendant contends on appeal that her sentence on count 1 must be vacated and her case remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567 because the trial court’s aggravating circumstances findings fail to meet the requirements of amended section 1170.
 
The Fifth Appellate District affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The court explained that the correct standard for harmless error lies between the standards articulated in Flores and Lopez. As such, the court applied a version of the standard articulated in Lopez, modified to incorporate Watson in the first step. Here, there was no error as to the first aggravating circumstance, Defendant had numerous convictions, meeting the requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), permitting the trial court to rely on certified records of Defendant’s prior convictions. Moreover, the court wrote there was also no error as to the trial court’s reliance on the third aggravating circumstance. Further, there is not a reasonable likelihood the jury would not have found the second aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt, thus, the error was harmless.

P. v. Lee

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Dockets: B300756(Second Appellate District) , B305493(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: Thomas L. Willhite, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Three defendants were tried on various charges arising from two shootings that occurred as part of a gang war. They were tried alongside two other co-defendants and ultimately convicted of multiple counts of murder and related charges. Defendants admitted to various enhancements and were ultimately sentenced to LWOP plus additional terms of imprisonment. Defendants appealed on various grounds, including a claim that there was insufficient evidence supporting the kill zone instruction on both counts of attempted murder.

The Second Appelate District determined that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the kill zone theory of attempted murder, but found the error to be harmless. The bulk of Defendants' remaining issues pertained to alleged sentencing errors. The court agreed with Defendants that certain errors were made, instructed the trial court to amend the relevant abstracts of judgment, but otherwise affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences.

Idaho v. Hollist

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48295

Opinion Date: July 19, 2022

Judge: Stegner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Brian Hollist challenged a district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Hollist was arrested in Idaho Falls after an officer approached him while he was sleeping on a canal bank. The officer was responding to check on Hollist's welfare. After advising the officer he did not need medical assistance, Hollist attempted to leave several times; however, each time the officer insisted that Hollist remain. When Hollist declined to identify himself, the officer handcuffed him and ordered him to sit down on the grass. The officer later discovered that Hollist had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Following his arrest, officers found a glass pipe with white residue and a bag with a small amount of methamphetamine inside. Before trial, Hollist moved to suppress the methamphetamine and pipe, arguing: (1) the officer was not performing a community caretaking function at the time he was detained; (2) the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him; and (3) the eventual discovery of the arrest warrant did not purge the taint of his unlawful seizure. The district court denied Hollist’s motion to suppress. Hollist timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to detain Hollist, and the officer's unlawful seizure of Hollist was not sufficiently attenuated from the discovery of contraband. The district court's denial of Hollist's motion to suppress was reversed and the matter reversed for further proceedings.

State v. Collier

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124047

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: Dan Biles

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's second pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence for offenses he committed in 1993, holding that the trial court correctly sentenced Appellant.

The sentencing court in this case ordered a hard fifteen life sentence with lifetime parole for Appellant's conviction of first-degree murder and a consecutive ninety-seven-month term of imprisonment for an aggravated robbery conviction. In his second pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence Appellant sought correction of a supervision term that he argued was required for the aggravated robbery sentence. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4720(b), when a defendant is sentenced for both off-grid and on-grid crimes, the sentencing court only has authority to impose the supervision period associated with the off-grid crime.

Commonwealth v. Gamboa

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13063

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.

Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial; (2) in no instance did the admission of polygraph evidence constitute reversible error; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter; and (4) this Court discerns no reason to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt.

Commonwealth v. Steeves

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12981

Opinion Date: July 18, 2022

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict to manslaughter or to order a new trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the exclusion of Defendant's recorded interview statements with police as inadmissible hearsay did not violate his constitutional rights; (2) the trial judge erred in instructing counsel that attorney-conducted voir dire is limited to questions solely related to apparent bias and does not include the opportunity to elicit information that may help counsel exercise a peremptory challenge, but the error was harmless; (3) the admission of relationship-related text messages between Defendant and a former romantic partner was not an abuse of discretion; and (4) the Commonwealth's cross-examination of Defendant did not result in reversible error.

State v. Conrad

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-0880

Opinion Date: July 13, 2022

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this sexual assault case, the Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Hope Coalition to prohibit the district court from requiring it to disclose records concerning the alleged victim's counseling to the district court for in camera review, holding that the district court's actions were unreasonable.

Hope Coalition invoked the sexual-assault-counselor privilege under Minn. Stat. 595.02, subdivision 1(k) to prevent Defendant's motion in his criminal prosecution seeking disclosure of records concerning the alleged victim's counseling. The district court concluded that compliance with the subpoena to produce the records protected by the sexual-assault-counselor privilege for in camera review was reasonable without addressing that privilege. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of the statute creates a privilege for sexual assault counselors that cannot be pierced in a criminal proceeding without the victim's consent; and (2) the district court's denial of Hope Coalition's motion to quash the subpoena seeking the records at issue was unauthorized by law.

State v. Epps

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A20-1151

Opinion Date: July 13, 2022

Judge: Chutich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court to deny Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that Defendant did not meet his burden of proving that his plea was invalid.

Defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of violating a domestic abuse no contact order. On appeal, Defendant argued that a manifest injustice occurred that required a plea withdrawal due to his failure personally to admit his previous convictions during his plea colloquy, which made his plea inaccurate. The court of appeals agreed and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant did not meet his burden to establish a manifest injustice requiring a plea withdrawal or that his plea was otherwise invalid; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals committed reversible error in reversing Defendant's conviction on the basis that his guilty plea was invalid.

State v. Hassan

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-0453

Opinion Date: July 13, 2022

Judge: G. Barry Anderson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction and that the sentence imposed upon Defendant was not unconstitutionally cruel.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the conviction; and (2) a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of release is not unconstitutionally cruel under Minn. Const. art. I, section 5 when imposed on a twenty-one-year-old defendant who has been convicted of first-degree premeditated murder.

State v. Miller

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-0221

Opinion Date: July 13, 2022

Judge: Lorie Skjerven Gildea

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for aiding an offender as an accomplice after the fact for her role in concealing evidence of a murder that her husband committed, holding that the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum.

Defendant pleaded guilty to aiding an offender to avoid arrest and being an accomplice after the fact. After a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to forty-eight months in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in sentencing Defendant to forty-eight months in prison for being an accomplice after the fact.

State v. Dewise

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 MT 145

Opinion Date: July 19, 2022

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of deliberate homicide and attempted deliberate homicide, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for new counsel.

Defendant was convicted of murdering his estranged wife and attempting to murder her roommate. The district court imposed a 100-year sentence for each count, to run consecutively, and imposed a ten-year consecutive weapon enhancement for each offense. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that Defendant's complaints regarding his counsel did not warrant a hearing on his motion to substitute counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request to substitute counsel.

State v. Anders

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 311 Neb. 958

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: William B. Cassel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of first-degree sexual assault and his sentence of twenty-five to thirty years' imprisonment, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.

Defendant's convictions stemmed from his conduct of exploiting his position as K.G.'s Olympic trainer and sexually penetrating her through coercion and deception. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction; (2) Defendant did not receive an excessive sentence; and (3) Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel either lacked merit or could not be addressed on the record.

State v. Roth

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 311 Neb. 1007

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the the district court revoking Defendant's probation and sentencing him to three years of imprisonment, holding that the district court plainly erred in failing to impose mandatory post-release supervision as part of Defendant's total sentence.

Defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person and a third degree domestic assault. The district court sentenced Defendant to a thirty-month term of intensive supervised probation. Later, the State amended the motion to revoke probation. The district court revoked Defendant's probation but did not impose post-release supervision. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below and remanded the case with directions to modify the sentences, holding that the trial court committed plain error by failing to impose post-release supervision.

State v. Thomas

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 311 Neb. 989

Opinion Date: July 15, 2022

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences resulting from his no contest pleas to charges of conspiracy to commit robbery and conspiracy to commit burglary, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.

The district court accepted Defendant's no contest pleas to conspiracy to commit robbery and conspiracy to commit burglary and sentenced him to consecutive terms of imprisonment of twenty-six to thirty-two years for conspiracy to commit robbery and fourteen to twenty years for conspiracy to commit burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not did abuse its discretion by placing undue weight on Defendant's criminal history or by failing to consider other relevant sentencing factors.

Bridges v. North Dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 ND 147

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

John Bridges appealed district court orders and judgments granting the State’s motions for summary judgment and denying Bridges’ applications for postconviction relief as untimely, barred by misuse of process and res judicata, and for lack of genuine issues of material fact. Bridges was convicted following guilty pleas to murder and kidnapping in 2012 and attempted murder in 2013. He did not appeal either conviction. Bridges previously applied for postconviction relief. Bridges argues summary disposition of his applications was inappropriate and he was entitled to evidentiary hearings in each case. Finding no reversible error however, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court orders.

Interest of Skorick

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 ND 141

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Edward Skorick appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Skorick argued the district court’s factual findings were insufficient to legally conclude he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. Specifically, Skorick contended because he did not receive negative behavioral acknowledgements over the review period, the State failed to meet its burden. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court made adequate findings to demonstrate Skorick had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The district court considered the testimony and evidence presented, including Skorick’s past and present conduct, in making its finding he has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The court noted Skorick’s history of negative behavior at the North Dakota State Hospital, including being oppositional to staff, cursing at staff, and calling staff stupid, to the point of having outside time cut short. The court found Skorick has threatened to commit an offense to get out of the State Hospital so he can return to the state penitentiary. The court stated these behaviors had occurred through October 2020, roughly one year before the hearing, but also indicated Skorick had engaged in inappropriate behavior in early 2021. The court found Skorick refused blood pressure medication in October 2020, and the record reflects Skorick has a history of refusing his medication, including a period in May 2021. The court found, although he did not recently receive negative behavioral write ups, Skorick had not implemented meaningful changes to interrupt his pattern of sexual offenses, Skorick continued to be impulsive and disregard the feelings of others, and Skorick’s behavioral issues remained unchanged and pervasive. Accordingly, the district court judgment was affirmed.

North Dakota v. Anderson

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 ND 144

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Richard Anderson appealed an order denying his motion challenging the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(4)(r) and seeking modification of his probation conditions. He argued the probation condition restricting his internet access violated his constitutional rights. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Anderson’s as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the statute was not ripe for review.

State ex rel. Barnette v. Hill

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2022-Ohio-2469

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Marion Correctional Institution, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.

Appellant was convicted of four counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murders. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging errors in the grand jury process that led to his indictment. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motion for an order compelling the Mahoning County Clerk of Courts to submit the complete record of his underlying criminal case for consideration on appeal, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed Appellant's petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

State v. Brooks

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2022-Ohio-2478

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Brunner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court held that 2018 Am.Sub.H.B. 228, which shifted the burden of proof on self-defense to the prosecution, applies to all trials conducted on or after its effective date of March 28, 2019, irrespective of when the underlying alleged criminal conduct occurred.

On September 20, 2018, Appellant was indicted for aggravated burglary and other crimes. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted. On appeal, Appellant argued that she was deprived of a fair trial when the trial court required her to bear the burden of proving that she had acted in self defense. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had properly instructed the jury because the burden-shifting changes to Ohio Rev. Code 2901.05 did not apply retroactively. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that H.B. 228 must be applied to all pending and new trials that occur on or after its effective date of March 28, 2019.

Stevens v. Hill

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2022-Ohio-2479

Opinion Date: July 21, 2022

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant's claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus.

In 1996, Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and other crimes and sentenced to a life term in prison. In 2021, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus demanding his release from prison on the grounds that the trial court lacked the authority to impose a life term of imprisonment under the circumstances and that certain counts should have been merged for sentencing. The court of appeals dismissed the action, concluding that the petition failed to state a valid claim for relief in habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus.

Pennsylvania v. Jones-Williams

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 27 MAP 2021

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: Mundy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On July 5, 2014, at around 4:42 p.m., Appellee Akim Jones-Williams drove his car at approximately two miles per hour across train tracks. An approaching train collided with the car and pushed it nearly one-quarter mile before it stopped. Upon arriving at the scene, emergency personnel found Appellee outside the vehicle. Appellee’s fiance, Cori Sisti, and their daughter, S.J., were still inside the car. Medics declared Sisti dead at the scene, but transported Appellee and S.J. to York Hospital for medical treatment. Several individuals told the investigating lieutenant that they smelled burnt marijuana coming from Appellee and the car. Therefore, at approximately 6:00 p.m., the lieutenant asked a sergeant to interview Appellee at the hospital and obtain a “legal blood draw.” When the sergeant arrived at the hospital, Appellee was restrained in a hospital bed fading in and out of consciousness and unable to respond to basic questions. As such, the sergeant could not communicate to Appellee the consent of the form. Nevertheless, the sergeant later learned that hospital personnel drew Appellee’s blood at 5:56 p.m. The record did not establish why that blood was drawn, but it is clear that it was drawn prior to the sergeant's arrival. The sergeant completed paperwork requesting the hospital's lab to transfer Appellee's blood sample to a police lab for testing for controlled substances or alcohol. The resulting toxicology report revealed that Appellee’s blood contained Delta-9 THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. Appellee was arrested in April 2015, and ultimately convicted of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence; homicide by vehicle; endangering the welfare of a child (“EWOC”); recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”); and related charges. Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, in which he moved to suppress the blood test results. He argued that police lacked probable cause that he was driving under the influence, that his blood was seized without a warrant and without satisfying the exigency exception, and that 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755 did not justify the seizure in the absence of exigent circumstances. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concurred with the superior court that evidence from the blood sample should have been suppressed at trial. The matter was remanded for a new trial.

Pennsylvania v. Pownall

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 17 EAP 2021

Opinion Date: July 20, 2022

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellee Ryan Pownall, a former Philadelphia Police Officer was charged with killing David Jones by gunfire while on duty in his capacity as a police officer. Anticipating Pownall might pursue at trial a peace officer justification defense under 18 Pa.C.S. §508, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (“DAO”), on behalf of the Commonwealth, filed a pretrial motion in limine seeking to preclude the trial court from using Suggested Standard Jury Instruction (Crim) §9.508B, which largely tracked Section 508. The DAO argued that since the justification statute supposedly violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), so too must the standard jury instruction based on the statute. The trial court disagreed, concluding the DAO’s pretrial motion, by itself, was “insufficient to establish the unconstitutionality of Section 508[.]” Moreover, the court believed the DAO’s suggested remedy — proposing that it rewrite several disjunctive “ors” within the statute to conjunctive “ands” — was an “inappropriate” request for it to “judicially usurp the legislative function of the Pennsylvania General Assembly and rewrite Section 508 out of whole cloth.” For those reasons it denied the DAO’s request to certify the case for interlocutory appeal. When the DAO appealed anyway, the superior court quashed, reasoning the trial court’s order was not collateral and did not substantially handicap or terminate the DAO’s prosecution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the superior court erred in quashing the appeal. Because the Supreme Court concluded it did not, the judgment was affirmed.

Vermont v. Sinquell-Gainey, Vaz

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 VT 19

Opinion Date: July 18, 2022

Judge: Carroll

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The State appealed a trial court order granting defendants Michael Sinquell-Gainey and David Vaz's motion to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement after an automobile stop. The State argued a Newport police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants because he observed a traffic violation and because the totality of the circumstances supported reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. After review of the trial court record, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed that the stop was justified based on reasonable suspicion of impairment. The Court therefore reversed and remanded.

Jewkes v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 WY 90

Opinion Date: July 18, 2022

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to the maximum term of fifteen to twenty years for aggravated vehicular homicide and a concurrent six months for driving under the influence, holding that the district court plainly erred when it considered Defendant's silence and community expectations in sentencing her.

On appeal, Defendant argued that her constitutional right to a fair sentence was violated when the district court "emphasized, and likely punished, her decision to exercise her constitutional rights at the time of her arrest" and when the court expressed that "the severity of the sentence depended upon the county in which it presided over her." The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing, holding that the district court erroneously incorporated constitutionally-prohibited factors into its sentencing decision and that the application of those constitutionally-prohibited factors in sentencing undermined the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings.

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SAMUEL ESTREICHER, ZACHARY G. GARRETT

NYU Law professor Samuel Estreicher and rising 3L Zachary G. Garrett propose two measures to improve the safety of public transportation in New York City. Specifically, Professor Estreicher and Mr. Garrett suggest that (1) stationing at least one police officer at each turnstile (or set of turnstiles), around the clock, and (2) installing weapons screeners at every subway station would reduce violence and crime.

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Twitter’s Lawsuit Paints Elon Musk as a Trump-Like Troll: That’s Potentially Good for Shareholders but bad for Everyone Else

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on Twitter’s lawsuit against Elon Musk over Musk’s announcement that he was terminating his April agreement to purchase the company for $44 billion. Professor Dorf describes how Musk’s bully-like behavior is reminiscent of Donald Trump’s and describes the possible (and likely) remedies the Delaware court might deem appropriate.

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