Foote v. Ludlow School Committee

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1069

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law

The case involves parents (the "Parents") of a student at Baird Middle School in Ludlow, Massachusetts, who challenged the school's protocol regarding the use of a student's requested name and gender pronouns without notifying the parents unless the student consents. The Parents argued that this practice interfered with their parental rights under the U.S. Constitution. The school, represented by the Ludlow School Committee and various school officials, defended the protocol as necessary to ensure a safe and inclusive environment for students.

In the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the Parents' complaint was dismissed. The court held that the Parents failed to state a plausible claim that the school's protocol violated their fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their child. Specifically, the court found that the Parents did not adequately allege that the school's actions constituted medical treatment or that the conduct was so egregious as to shock the conscience, which is required to establish a substantive due process violation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the protocol is a form of legislative conduct, not executive conduct, and thus did not require the shock-the-conscience test. The court determined that the Parents had identified a fundamental right but failed to plausibly allege that the school's conduct restricted that right. The court found that the school's actions, including the use of the student's chosen name and pronouns, did not constitute medical treatment and that the protocol did not restrict the Parents' rights to direct their child's upbringing.

The First Circuit held that the protocol was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of creating a safe and inclusive educational environment for students. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Parents' complaint.

Wadsworth v. MSAD 40/RSU 40

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1463

Opinion Date: February 19, 2025

Judge: Lara Montecalvo

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law, Labor & Employment Law

A high school student, Adrianna Wadsworth, filed a lawsuit against her principal, Andrew Cavanaugh, a school social worker, Chuck Nguyen, and the school district, MSAD 40/RSU 40, alleging constitutional violations and a Title IX claim. Wadsworth claimed that Cavanaugh sexually harassed her, Nguyen failed to protect her, and the school district was indifferent to the harassment.

The United States District Court for the District of Maine dismissed some of Wadsworth's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on others. The court dismissed the supervisor-liability claim against Nguyen, finding no control over Cavanaugh. It also granted summary judgment to Cavanaugh on the substantive due process claim, concluding that non-physical harassment did not violate Wadsworth's right to bodily integrity. The court found that Wadsworth's equal protection claim against Cavanaugh was valid but granted him qualified immunity. Nguyen was granted summary judgment on the state-created-danger claim, as his conduct did not shock the conscience. The court also granted summary judgment to MSAD on the § 1983 municipal liability claim, finding no deliberate indifference, and on the Title IX claim, concluding that the assistant principals did not have actual knowledge of the harassment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's decision on the substantive due process claim against Cavanaugh but reversed the summary judgment on the equal protection claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Cavanaugh's conduct was severe and pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the supervisor-liability claim against Nguyen and the summary judgment on the state-created-danger claim. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the Title IX claim against MSAD, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the assistant principals had actual knowledge of the harassment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

United States v. Poller

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 24-75

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Joseph Bianco

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Christopher Poller, who was convicted by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine base, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Poller pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle, which included the drugs and firearms forming the basis of his charges.

The District Court denied Poller's motion to suppress, concluding that the officers' use of iPhone cameras to see through the tinted windows of Poller's car did not violate his reasonable expectation of privacy. The court also found that even if the officers' physical touching of the car constituted a trespassory search, suppression was unwarranted because the trespass was not the but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Poller's expectation of privacy from all observation of the interior of his car was unreasonable. The use of iPhone cameras to view the car's interior did not transform those visual observations into "searches" under the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, assuming the officers' physical touching of the car constituted a trespassory search, suppression was unwarranted because the trespass was not the but-for cause of obtaining the evidence. Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Silvers

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5427

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Karen Moore

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Military Law

Victor Silvers was convicted of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, Brittney Silvers, who was an active member of the United States Army, and was shot and killed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Silvers was also found guilty of attempted murder, domestic violence, violation of a protection order, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and the use of a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to life in prison.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky took judicial notice that Fort Campbell was within the United States' special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. Silvers challenged this, arguing that the jury should have determined the jurisdictional status. He also moved to exclude a juror who wore a shirt supporting military veterans and had served in the Navy, claiming potential bias. Additionally, Silvers argued that his mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in taking judicial notice of the jurisdictional status of Fort Campbell, as it was a legal question rather than a factual one for the jury. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to deny Silvers's motion to exclude the juror, as the juror assured impartiality and the voir dire process was deemed adequate. Finally, the court upheld Silvers's mandatory life sentence, citing binding Supreme Court precedent and the Sixth Circuit's own precedent, which did not find such sentences to be cruel and unusual punishment.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed both Silvers's conviction and his sentence.

United States v. Devalois

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 24-1787

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Michael B. Brennan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Police stopped Martin Devalois for a traffic violation. During the stop, a drug-sniffing dog alerted to narcotics in Devalois’s rental vehicle. Instead of complying with the police request to exit the car, Devalois initiated a high-speed chase that ended in a crash. Police searched the vehicle and found a small amount of marijuana and a gun. Devalois, a convicted felon, was charged with illegally possessing a firearm. He moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the police unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop to conduct the dog sniff. The district court denied his motion, and a jury found him guilty.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held a suppression hearing where the court found the police officer’s testimony credible and determined that the officer did not extend the length of the stop. The district court denied Devalois’s motion to suppress the gun, and the jury subsequently found him guilty of the firearm charge. Devalois was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court’s factual finding that the officer did not prolong the traffic stop was not clearly erroneous. The court held that the officer’s actions during the stop were within the mission of the traffic stop and did not unlawfully extend its duration. The court also held that the dog sniff did not violate the Fourth Amendment as it was conducted while the officer was still diligently pursuing the stop’s mission. Consequently, the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the gun were lawful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision denying Devalois’s motion to suppress the gun.

USA v Jenkins

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2800

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Candace Jackson-Akiwumi

Areas of Law: Banking, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Shamond Jenkins, who was convicted of robbing a Centier Bank branch in South Bend, Indiana, in December 2020. Jenkins was identified as a suspect in three robberies in northern Indiana between December 2020 and January 2021. During a traffic stop on January 8, 2021, Jenkins was found with cash, including a bait bill from the South Bend robbery, and was wearing red-and-white Air Jordan sneakers similar to those worn by the robber. Jenkins was charged with multiple counts, including the South Bend bank robbery, to which he pleaded not guilty.

In the district court, Jenkins was found guilty of the South Bend bank robbery but not guilty of the Granger Centier Bank robbery. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision on the Check Into Cash robbery. Jenkins objected to the Presentence Investigation Report's recommendations, including an enhancement for obstructing justice by presenting false testimony and the inclusion of juvenile adjudications in his criminal history. The district court overruled these objections and sentenced Jenkins to 100 months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Jenkins's appeal. Jenkins argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated due to the face mask he had to wear during the trial, and that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for perjury and in counting his juvenile convictions. The Seventh Circuit found no error in the district court's decisions. The court held that the face mask did not render the in-court identifications unduly suggestive or violate Jenkins's confrontation rights. The court also upheld the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentencing decisions, affirming Jenkins's conviction and sentence.

State of Tennessee v. EEOC

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-2249

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Steven Colloton

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Tennessee and sixteen other states challenged a regulation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, which mandates reasonable accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions, including abortion. The states argued that the regulation unlawfully required them to accommodate employees seeking abortions, conflicting with their policies. They sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment against the rule, claiming it was arbitrary, exceeded EEOC's authority, violated the First Amendment and federalism principles, and was unconstitutional under Article II.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the case, ruling that the states lacked standing as they did not demonstrate an imminent injury or that the alleged injuries were redressable. The court found the risk of enforcement speculative and compliance costs not directly traceable to the rule. The court also dismissed the states' motion for a preliminary injunction as moot and for failing to show irreparable harm.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the states had standing as they were the direct objects of the EEOC's regulation, which imposed new obligations on them. The court found that the states were injured by the regulatory burden itself and that setting aside the rule would remedy this injury. The court concluded that the states' need to comply with the rule constituted an injury in fact, caused by the EEOC's action, and redressable by a favorable judicial decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings without addressing the merits of the claims.

USA V. KURNS

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-3779

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: David Hamilton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Brandon Wade Kurns, a convicted felon, began working at Modern Pawn & Consignment in Helena, Montana, in June 2021, where he sold firearms and ammunition. In July 2021, after an investigation linked stolen gunpowder to the shop, ATF agents searched Modern Pawn and found evidence that Kurns had possessed several firearms. Kurns was indicted and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The United States District Court for the District of Montana sentenced Kurns to 36 months in prison, applying a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(I) for possessing a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) for possessing eight or more firearms. Kurns objected, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these enhancements and that the court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his silence during sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the evidence, including surveillance footage and ATF transfer forms, supported the finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Kurns possessed a semiautomatic firearm with a large capacity magazine and at least eight firearms. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as there was no indication that the district court drew an adverse inference from Kurns' silence. Additionally, the court declined to consider Kurns' Second Amendment challenge based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, as it was raised for the first time after the completion of appellate briefing.

USA V. PHEASANT

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-991

Opinion Date: February 19, 2025

Judge: Eric D. Miller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

Gregory W. Pheasant was charged with driving an off-road vehicle on public lands at night without a taillight, violating 43 C.F.R. § 8341.1(f)(5). This regulation was issued by the Secretary of the Interior under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Pheasant allegedly refused to stop for Bureau of Land Management rangers, made obscene gestures, and sped away before being apprehended. He was indicted on three counts, including the taillight violation.

The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the taillight count, ruling that section 303(a) of the FLPMA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court held that the statute gave the Secretary of the Interior too much authority without sufficient guidance or restraint, violating Article I of the Constitution, which vests all legislative powers in Congress.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that section 303(a) of the FLPMA satisfies the "intelligible principle" test established by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit found that the FLPMA provides clear guidance by requiring the Secretary to manage public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, ensuring the land's value is realized sustainably. The court concluded that these constraints are sufficient to meet constitutional requirements, and thus, section 303(a) does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Griffith v. El Paso County, Colorado

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-1135

Opinion Date: February 19, 2025

Judge: Veronica Rossman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A transgender woman, Darlene Griffith, filed a civil rights lawsuit regarding her pretrial confinement at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado. She alleged that the jail's policies, which assigned housing based on genitalia and denied her access to female clothing and products, violated her constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed her complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), leading to this appeal.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Ms. Griffith’s complaint, concluding that she failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The court applied rational-basis review to her Equal Protection claim, finding that transgender individuals are not a protected class under existing precedent. The court also dismissed her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as she did not properly name the county as a defendant according to state law requirements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that remand was required for some of Ms. Griffith’s claims. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on her Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against Sheriff Elder in his official capacity, her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment cross-gender search claims against Sheriff Elder in his official capacity, and her Fourth Amendment abusive search claim against Deputy Mustapick. The court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Ms. Griffith’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because those claims were dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and that ruling was unchallenged on appeal. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the remaining claims.

USA v. Canario-Vilomar

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 22-12077, 22-13554

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Judge: Barbara Lagoa

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Two defendants, Antonio Lemus and Carlos Daniel Canario-Vilomar, were convicted of cocaine-related charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Lemus was apprehended on December 30, 2021, when U.S. Coast Guard officers intercepted a vessel north of Panama, found cocaine, and determined the vessel was without nationality after Colombia could not confirm its registration. Canario-Vilomar was arrested on December 6, 2021, when a similar vessel was intercepted north of Colombia, and the Dominican Republic could not confirm its registration. Both defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

In the Southern District of Florida, Lemus pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 87 months in prison. In the Middle District of Florida, Canario-Vilomar pled guilty to conspiracy, and his motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the MDLEA exceeded Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution and that their vessels were not stateless under international law. Canario-Vilomar also argued that his offense occurred in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which he claimed was beyond Congress's regulatory authority.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause is not limited by international law, affirming that the MDLEA's definition of a "vessel without nationality" and the inclusion of the EEZ within the "high seas" were constitutional. The court also rejected Canario-Vilomar's due process argument, citing precedent that the MDLEA does not require a nexus to the United States for jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of both defendants.

Bittner v. State of Alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18944

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Jude Pate

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

A resident of Alaska filed a lawsuit challenging amendments to the State’s predator control program. The resident claimed that after the changes were implemented, she observed a noticeable decrease in the brown bear population at Katmai National Park, where she frequently visited to view bears. She argued that the Board of Game violated its constitutional and statutory duties by not providing adequate notice and opportunities for public input before adopting the changes, which expanded the program to target bears.

The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, dismissed the complaint, concluding that the resident lacked standing and was not entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulatory change. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the Board of Game and the Commissioner of the Department of Fish & Game.

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that the resident had standing because she demonstrated an injury to her interest in viewing bears at Katmai National Park, which was sufficient to show standing. The court also concluded that she was entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of her complaint, vacated the associated award of attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Lovelace v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A168924(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Jon B. Streeter

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Lovelace was charged with multiple felonies, including rape and aggravated kidnapping, along with special sentencing enhancements and aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(c). Lovelace challenged the constitutionality of the rule 4.421(c) residual clause, which allows for consideration of any other factors that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed. He argued that this clause violated the separation of powers and due process principles.

The trial court denied Lovelace's motion to set aside the information, leading him to seek interlocutory review by petition for a writ of prohibition. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, issued an order to show cause and held oral arguments. Following the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Lynch, which provided guidance on the interpretation and application of Senate Bill 567 amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), the court took supplemental briefing.

The Court of Appeal granted writ relief, holding that the rule 4.421(c) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and exceeds the Judicial Council’s delegated authority to adopt rules promoting uniformity in sentencing. The court found that the clause grants prosecutors and juries open-ended power to define sentencing criteria on an ad hoc basis, violating the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Lovelace's section 995 motion and to enter a new order sustaining the motion to the extent it seeks to invalidate the residual clause. The court prohibited the trial court from allowing a jury to consider any findings based on the rule 4.421(c) residual clause.

People v. Richardson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B335039(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 19, 2025

Judge: Victor Viramontes

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In September 2022, Antoine Leon Richardson had an altercation with Mckyla Middleton at a liquor store in Lancaster, California. Richardson accused Middleton of cutting him off, threatened her, and flashed a gun at her from a satchel. In November 2022, police searched Richardson’s home and found ammunition but no firearms. Richardson admitted to brandishing the gun during the altercation and owning the ammunition.

The Los Angeles County Superior Court charged Richardson with being a felon in possession of a firearm, being a felon in possession of ammunition, and misdemeanor exhibiting a concealable firearm in public. The jury found Richardson guilty on all counts and confirmed his prior felony convictions. The court sentenced him to three years and eight months in prison for the firearm and ammunition charges, with a concurrent 364-day term for the misdemeanor.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Richardson argued that his convictions for firearm and ammunition possession violated the Second Amendment, citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. The court disagreed, stating that the Second Amendment protects law-abiding citizens, not felons. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Richardson had separate objectives for possessing and exhibiting the firearm, thus allowing multiple sentences under Penal Code section 654.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, upholding Richardson’s convictions and sentences.

Mayfield v. Secretary, Florida Department of State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2025-0162

Opinion Date: February 13, 2025

Judge: Jamie Rutland Grosshans

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Debbie Mayfield, a former member of the Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate, sought to run in a special election for Senate District 19 after the incumbent announced his resignation. Mayfield submitted the necessary paperwork to qualify for the ballot, but the Secretary of State and Director of the Division of Elections refused to place her on the ballot, citing a constitutional provision on term limits.

The Circuit Court did not review the case. Mayfield directly petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for writs of mandamus and quo warranto, arguing that the Secretary misinterpreted his authority and failed to fulfill his statutory duty.

The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and granted Mayfield's petition for mandamus relief. The court held that Mayfield had a clear legal right to appear on the ballot, as she had met all statutory requirements for qualification. The court found that the Secretary's role in reviewing candidate qualifications is ministerial and does not include the authority to assess a candidate's constitutional eligibility. The court also rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the term-limits provision, concluding that Mayfield's break in service meant she had not served more than eight consecutive years in the Senate. The court ordered the Secretary to place Mayfield on the ballot by a specified deadline and denied the petition for quo warranto as moot.

DIAS v. BOONE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0887

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Judge: Nels Peterson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law

A woman who had been in a long-term romantic relationship with a child's legal mother sought joint legal custody and parenting time under Georgia's Equitable Caregiver Statute, OCGA § 19-7-3.1, after the couple broke up. The statute allows a non-parent to seek custody or visitation rights if they have undertaken a parental role and developed a bonded and dependent relationship with the child, supported by a parent. The child's mother challenged the constitutionality of the statute and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's order.

The Superior Court granted the woman's request for equitable caregiver status, finding that she had established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child and that the child would suffer long-term emotional harm without continued contact. The court awarded joint legal custody and parenting time to the woman, despite the mother's objections.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and raised concerns about the constitutionality of the Equitable Caregiver Statute, particularly regarding the fundamental right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children. The court noted that any waiver of this constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary, and that conduct prior to the statute's effective date could not constitute such a waiver. The court concluded that the statute does not authorize trial courts to confer equitable caregiver status based on conduct by the legal parent that took place before the statute's effective date.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's order, holding that the Equitable Caregiver Statute does not apply to parental conduct occurring before its effective date. The court did not resolve the constitutional questions but based its decision on statutory construction and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.

GRIFFIN v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0086

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Judge: Sarah Warren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Terry Griffin was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of her boyfriend, Wesley Hudson, in their shared apartment. Griffin was present at the scene and arrested immediately. During the trial, her counsel initially pursued a self-defense strategy but later shifted to arguing for a lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter after Griffin decided not to testify. The jury found Griffin guilty on all counts, including malice murder and felony murder.

Griffin filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that her trial counsel violated her Sixth Amendment rights by abandoning her self-defense claim in favor of voluntary manslaughter without her consent, citing McCoy v. Louisiana. The trial court denied her motion, concluding that Griffin had not shown an "intransigent and unambiguous objection" to her counsel's strategy shift and that her counsel did not concede her guilt to the charges.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Griffin's claim under McCoy failed because she did not make a clear and persistent objection to her counsel's strategy, as required by McCoy. The court noted that Griffin's plea of "not guilty" and her counsel's initial self-defense argument did not amount to the type of "vociferous insistence" and "adamant objection" seen in McCoy. Therefore, the court concluded that Griffin's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, and her conviction was upheld.

Watkins v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1187

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Judge: John Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Roderick Watkins was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the March 14, 2012, shooting death of Ashley Clark and her unborn child. Watkins and Clark were in a romantic relationship that deteriorated over time, with Clark documenting physical, verbal, and emotional abuse in her diary. Clark became pregnant in late 2011, and despite Watkins's insistence on an abortion, she decided to keep the baby. On March 13, 2012, Clark wrote in her diary that Watkins planned to cause her to have a miscarriage. The next night, Watkins shot Clark, resulting in her death and the death of her unborn child.

A Fulton County grand jury indicted Watkins on multiple charges, including murder and possession of cocaine. A jury found him guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison for murder and feticide, among other sentences for related charges. Watkins moved for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and addressed several claims by Watkins. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Clark's diary entries under Rule 807, as they bore equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and were material and probative. The court also found no plain error in the admission of Watkins's pre-arrest silence or failure to come forward. However, the court concluded that the admission of testimony by a Georgia Bureau of Investigation analyst, who relayed the findings of a non-testifying analyst, violated the Confrontation Clause under Smith v. Arizona. Consequently, the court reversed Watkins's convictions for possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony predicated on possession of cocaine. The court affirmed the remaining convictions.

State v. Adams

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 126130

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Melissa Standridge

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Christopher Adams faced multiple counts of battery for allegedly assaulting two men and his girlfriend, Stephanie Lang, outside a bar. Lang initially identified Adams as the attacker but later claimed she did not remember the incident during a preliminary hearing. Due to her inconsistent statements, the State charged Lang with perjury and interference with law enforcement and warned her of additional perjury charges if she testified similarly at Adams' trial. Lang invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, citing the risk of incrimination in her pending perjury case and potential new perjury charges.

The Ellis District Court ruled that Lang could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege despite the State offering her use and derivative use immunity, which would make her trial testimony and any evidence derived from it inadmissible in her pending perjury case. The court found that the immunity did not protect her from a new perjury charge. A majority panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the immunity was insufficient to protect Lang's Fifth Amendment rights due to the imminent risk of a perjury charge. Chief Judge Karen Arnold-Burger dissented, arguing that the threat of a future perjury charge cannot be the basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that Lang's Fifth Amendment privilege was extinguished by the State's grant of use and derivative use immunity, which is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment protection. The court further held that the risk of a future perjury charge is not a valid basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. The case was remanded to the district court with directions to compel Lang's testimony under the State's grant of immunity.

State v. Smith

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 126844

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Evelyn Z. Wilson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2016, Robert Edward Smith was involved in a home invasion that resulted in the murder of Donna O'Neal. Smith was charged with first-degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. The case was delayed due to extensive pretrial litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to a mistrial in July 2021. Smith's retrial began in May 2023, where he was ultimately convicted on all charges.

The Sedgwick District Court initially handled the case, where Smith raised several issues, including a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, prosecutorial error, and the right to present a defense. The district court denied Smith's motions, including his motion to dismiss based on the speedy trial claim and his objections to the State's mid-trial amendment of the information.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed multiple issues. The court found that the 21.5-month delay between Smith's mistrial and retrial did not violate his right to a speedy trial, considering the complexity of the case and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also found no prosecutorial error in the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments and no violation of Smith's right to present a defense regarding the exclusion of third-party evidence and a probation violation warrant.

However, the court agreed with Smith that the district court erred in including his 2003 criminal threat conviction in his criminal history score, as the statute under which he was convicted had been declared unconstitutional in State v. Boettger. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Smith's convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without including the 2003 conviction in his criminal history score.

State of Maine v. Fleury

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2025 ME 18

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Valerie Stanfill

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Calixte Fleury was convicted of aggravated trafficking, unlawful trafficking, unlawful possession of scheduled drugs, and operating under the influence. On September 18, 2020, Fleury was driving on I-95 when he crashed his vehicle. A responding sergeant found Fleury with a bag of pills containing fentanyl and tramadol, and later discovered more fentanyl and cash on Fleury. Fleury's blood alcohol content was 0.093 grams per 100 milliliters. He was indicted and later charged with multiple counts, including aggravated trafficking and unlawful trafficking of scheduled drugs.

The trial court (York County, Martemucci, J.) held a jury trial, resulting in guilty verdicts on all four criminal counts. The court found in favor of Fleury on the criminal forfeiture count. Fleury was sentenced to seven years with all but four years suspended for aggravated trafficking, three years for unlawful trafficking, and 30 days for operating under the influence, with some sentences running concurrently. The court merged the unlawful possession count with the unlawful trafficking count.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. Fleury argued that the application of a repealed definition of "traffick" was unconstitutional. The court disagreed, stating that the repealed statute was rationally related to controlling opioids and its application was not unconstitutional. The court also noted that the amended statute did not apply retroactively to Fleury's case.

However, the court found that the trial court should have merged the aggravated trafficking count with the unlawful trafficking and possession counts for sentencing. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, affirming the convictions in all other respects.

Cuomo v New York State Commn. on Ethics & Lobbying in Govt.

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2025 NY Slip Op 00902

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Judge: Jenny Rivera

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the Ethics Commission Reform Act of 2022, which established the New York State Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government. The plaintiff, Andrew M. Cuomo, argued that the Act unconstitutionally vests executive power in the Commission without sufficient oversight by the Governor, violating the separation of powers doctrine. The Act was designed to address issues of public trust in government by creating an independent body to enforce ethics and lobbying laws, particularly to mitigate the risk of self-regulation by the Executive Branch.

In the lower courts, the Supreme Court of Albany County declared the investigation and enforcement provisions of the Act unconstitutional and enjoined proceedings against Cuomo. The Appellate Division stayed the order pending appeal but ultimately affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, concluding that the Act violated the separation of powers by expanding legislative power at the expense of the Executive Branch. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the Act does not unconstitutionally encroach upon the powers of the Executive Branch. The court held that the Act is not unconstitutional in every conceivable application, emphasizing the flexible nature of the separation of powers doctrine in New York. The court noted that the Governor does not have exclusive powers of appointment and removal under the state constitution and that the Act's structure is consistent with the state's constitutional tradition. The court also found that the Act addresses a paramount state interest in maintaining public trust in government by ensuring impartial enforcement of ethics laws. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order, with costs, and declared the Act constitutional.

McCormack v. Scott

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 VT 7

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: William Cohen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

Two state senators filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that Governor Phil Scott exceeded his authority by appointing Zoie Saunders as Secretary of Education on an interim basis without the Vermont Senate's advice and consent. The Governor appointed Saunders after the Senate rejected her initial nomination. The senators contended that the Governor's action bypassed the Senate's constitutional role.

The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the suit on the merits. The court found that the Governor had the constitutional authority to make interim appointments without the Senate's advice and consent. It concluded that the relevant statutes did not apply to interim appointments and rejected the senators' arguments about bad faith and the invalidity of Saunders' actions.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found it moot due to subsequent events. In November 2024, the Governor appointed Saunders as Secretary of Education while the Legislature was in recess, and her nomination was later submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. This appointment superseded the earlier interim appointment, rendering the controversy over the April 30 appointment no longer live. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that any opinion on the April 30 appointment would be advisory and that the case did not meet the criteria for the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception.

John Does v. Seattle Police Dep't

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 102,182-8

Opinion Date: February 13, 2025

Judge: Raquel Montoya-Lewis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Several members of the public requested records from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) regarding officers who attended the January 6, 2021, rally in Washington, DC. The officers involved filed a lawsuit to prevent the release of their identities, arguing that their identities should be exempt from disclosure based on statutory and constitutional privacy rights. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the release of their identities within those public records.

The King County Superior Court denied the officers' motion for a preliminary injunction, determining that the officers failed to show that the information in the public records was likely exempt from disclosure. The court also denied the officers' motion to proceed under pseudonyms. The officers appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding that the First Amendment prohibited the disclosure of the officers' identities. The Court of Appeals did not evaluate whether the disclosure would violate the officers' statutory right to privacy under the Public Records Act (PRA).

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the officers did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits that their identities were exempt based on either a statutory or constitutional right to privacy. The court concluded that the officers did not have a privacy interest in their identities as public employees who attended a highly publicized event. The court also held that the officers did not show a need to litigate under pseudonyms. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.