American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Rhode Island Turnpike and Bridge Authority

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 22-1795, 22-1796

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: William Kayatta

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Transportation Law

In 2016, Rhode Island enacted the RhodeWorks Act, which imposed tolls on tractor-trailers crossing thirteen bridges within the state. The toll revenue was intended for the replacement, reconstruction, operation, and maintenance of these bridges. The tolls were subject to three statutory caps: a truck could not pay more than once in each direction, more than $40 per day, or more than $20 for a single through trip from Connecticut to Massachusetts. The American Trucking Associations and several trucking companies challenged the tolls, arguing they violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce and failing to fairly approximate use of the bridges.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island permanently enjoined the tolls, finding that they discriminated against interstate commerce and did not fairly approximate use. The court concluded that the tolls' application solely to tractor-trailers and the statutory caps each violated the dormant Commerce Clause.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the statutory caps on tolls were unconstitutional because they disproportionately benefited in-state over out-of-state tractor-trailers, thus discriminating against interstate commerce. However, the court held that the tolls' application solely to tractor-trailers did not violate the fair-approximation test, as it was not wholly unreasonable for Rhode Island to rely on studies showing that tractor-trailers caused the most damage to the bridges.

The First Circuit concluded that the unconstitutional caps were severable from the rest of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for the entry of judgment consistent with its opinion.

Cerame v. Slack

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-3106

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Debra Livingston

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Two Connecticut attorneys, Mario Cerame and Timothy Moynahan, challenged Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(7), which prohibits harassment or discrimination by lawyers based on fifteen protected categories. They argued that the rule violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments by imposing content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech and being unconstitutionally vague. They claimed that the rule's broad language could potentially sanction their speech on controversial topics, thus chilling their First Amendment rights.

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed their complaint, ruling that Cerame and Moynahan lacked standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. The court found that they did not demonstrate a "real and imminent fear" of enforcement under Rule 8.4(7).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Cerame and Moynahan have standing to seek pre-enforcement relief. The court held that they had sufficiently alleged an intention to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by Rule 8.4(7) and faced a credible threat of enforcement. The court noted that the rule's broad language and the lack of clear guidelines for enforcement created a substantial risk of disciplinary action, which was sufficient to establish an injury in fact. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiffs' claims.

Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-2170

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Allison Jones Rushing

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The plaintiffs in this case are retail pet stores, a dog broker, and a dog breeder who want to sell dogs through physical retail stores in Maryland. However, a Maryland law restricts their ability to do so. The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the Maryland statute is preempted by the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that they failed to state plausible claims. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the AWA does not preempt the Maryland statute because the AWA expressly contemplates state and local regulation on the same subject. The court also found that the Maryland statute does not pose an impermissible obstacle to achieving the purposes and objectives of the AWA.

Regarding the Commerce Clause claims, the court held that the Maryland statute does not discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or effect. The statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state breeders and brokers, and it does not prohibit the flow of interstate goods or place added costs upon them. The court also found that the statute does not violate the Pike balancing test because the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the statute imposes a substantial burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to its putative local benefits.

In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that the Maryland statute is not preempted by the AWA and does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Siders v. City of Brandon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60381

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Jacques Wiener

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

Spring Siders, a Christian evangelist, sought to share her religious message outside a public amphitheater in Brandon, Mississippi. The City of Brandon had enacted an ordinance restricting protests and demonstrations near the amphitheater during events. Siders challenged the constitutionality of this ordinance after being directed by police to a designated protest area, which she found unsuitable for her activities. She argued that the ordinance infringed on her First Amendment rights.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Siders' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the ordinance. The court found that Siders had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim, relying on a similar case, Herridge v. Montgomery County, which upheld restrictions on street preaching near a concert venue for public safety reasons.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. It found that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest of public safety and traffic control during events at the amphitheater. The court also determined that the ordinance left open ample alternative channels for communication, as Siders could still engage in her activities in the designated protest area and other locations outside the restricted area.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that Siders had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction.

Gustilo v. Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3512

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: James Loken

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Dr. Tara Gustilo, an Asian American obstetrician-gynecologist of Filipino descent, was demoted from her position as Chair of the OBGYN Department at Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc. (HHS) in April 2021. Following her demotion, she filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently sued HHS, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), as well as a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment in favor of HHS, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the race discrimination, retaliation, and First Amendment claims. The court concluded that Dr. Gustilo failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and that there was no evidence she opposed an unlawful employment practice. Additionally, the court found no material fact dispute regarding whether the HHS Board considered her Facebook posts in its decision to demote her.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, finding that there was a material fact dispute regarding whether the HHS Board ratified the MEC's decision and the basis for it, which included consideration of Dr. Gustilo's Facebook posts. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the posts were protected speech and to apply the Pickering balancing test.

The court declined to review the district court's summary judgment rulings on the Title VII and MHRA claims at this time, as they are now interlocutory. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion.

United States v. Mims

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2884

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Ralph Erickson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A grand jury indicted Derek Mims, Elmer Mims, David Belton, and Anton Whitney for conspiracy to distribute pure methamphetamine. Whitney was also charged with possession of a firearm by a drug user, and Belton was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and drug user. Derek, Belton, and Whitney entered conditional guilty pleas, while a jury found Elmer guilty. The defendants appealed the district court's denial of motions to suppress evidence from wiretaps, a motion to recuse, and, in Belton's case, a motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle search. Elmer also appealed the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction and the length of his sentence, while Derek and Whitney challenged their sentences.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the motions to suppress evidence obtained from wiretaps, finding that the necessity and probable cause requirements were met. The court also denied Belton's motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle search, applying the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court found probable cause based on the suspicious circumstances and modifications observed on the vehicle. The district court also denied the motion to recuse, stating that a judge's authorization of wiretap warrants does not require recusal from subsequent motions to suppress.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the wiretap affidavits met the necessity and probable cause requirements, the vehicle search was justified under the automobile exception, and the denial of the motion to recuse was not an abuse of discretion. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Elmer's conviction and upheld the sentences of Derek, Whitney, and Elmer, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's sentencing decisions.

Napouk v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-15726

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Lawrence VanDyke

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Lloyd Gerald Napouk was fatally shot by two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers after they responded to reports of a man behaving suspiciously in a residential neighborhood with what appeared to be a long, bladed weapon. The officers attempted to engage Napouk, who refused to follow their commands and advanced towards them multiple times. When Napouk came within nine feet of one of the officers, both officers fired their weapons, killing him. The weapon turned out to be a plastic toy fashioned to look like a blade.

Napouk’s parents and estate sued the officers and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of familial relations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability based on Monell v. Department of Social Services, and Nevada state law claims. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the officers’ use of force was reasonable as a matter of law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Napouk posed an immediate threat to the officers, and no rational jury could find the officers’ mistake of fact regarding the weapon unreasonable. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim failed because there was no evidence that the officers acted with anything other than legitimate law enforcement objectives. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ Monell claims failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation, and the state law claims failed because the officers were entitled to discretionary-function immunity under Nevada law.

TikTok Inc. v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 24-1113

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Douglas Ginsburg

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Constitutional Law, International Law

The case involves the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which was signed into law on April 24, 2024. The Act identifies certain countries, including China, as foreign adversaries and prohibits the distribution or maintenance of applications controlled by these adversaries, specifically targeting the TikTok platform. TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd., along with other petitioners, challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that it violates the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection and takings clauses, and the Bill of Attainder Clause.

The lower courts had not previously reviewed this case, as it was brought directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The petitioners sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the Attorney General from enforcing the Act. The court had to determine whether the petitioners had standing and whether their claims were ripe for judicial review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that TikTok had standing to challenge the Act and that its claims were ripe. The court assumed without deciding that strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment claims and upheld the Act, finding that it served compelling governmental interests in national security and was narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. The court also rejected the equal protection, bill of attainder, and takings clause claims, concluding that the Act did not constitute a punishment, was not overinclusive or underinclusive, and did not result in a complete deprivation of economic value. The petitions were denied.

United States v. Burwell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 16-3009

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Robert Leon Wilkins

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Bryan Burwell and Aaron Perkins were involved in a series of bank robberies and were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, including mandatory minimum sentences for firearms-related convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which mandates enhanced penalties for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Burwell and Perkins argued that their convictions under § 924(c) were erroneous because federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is not categorically a crime of violence.

The District Court denied their post-conviction motions, which challenged the application of § 924(c) based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, which invalidated the residual clause of § 924(c) as unconstitutionally vague. Burwell and Perkins appealed, arguing that bank robbery by extortion does not involve the use or threat of force and thus cannot be considered a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c).

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is indivisible regarding the means of committing bank robbery—by force and violence, intimidation, or extortion. The court concluded that extortion, as a means of committing bank robbery, does not necessarily involve the use or threat of force. Therefore, bank robbery under § 2113(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c). Consequently, the court vacated Burwell's and Perkins's § 924(c) convictions and remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether to release them immediately.

Crenshaw v. Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: SC-2024-0081

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Tommy Bryan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

A minor, Iyana Crenshaw, was injured while working at Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc. Her father, Derrick Crenshaw, filed a negligence lawsuit against Sonic, alleging that the injury was caused by Sonic's negligence. The complaint did not seek workers' compensation benefits but solely pursued a negligence claim.

The Butler Circuit Court dismissed the negligence action, concluding that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act barred the claim. Crenshaw did not dispute that Iyana's injury was subject to the Act but argued that the Act itself was unconstitutional under Article I, § 13, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022. The attorney general and Sonic defended the constitutionality of the Act, and the circuit court rejected Crenshaw's constitutional challenges, leading to the dismissal of the negligence action.

The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act does not violate Article I, § 13, of the Alabama Constitution. The court applied both the vested-rights approach and the common-law-rights approach to determine the constitutionality of the Act. Under the vested-rights approach, the Act did not deprive Crenshaw of a vested right in a cause of action. Under the common-law-rights approach, the court concluded that the Act was a valid exercise of the legislature's police power, as it eradicated or ameliorated a perceived social evil. Therefore, the Act's exclusive-remedy provisions were upheld, and the dismissal of the negligence action was affirmed.

Nunez-Dosangos v. Superior Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A171177(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Carin Fujisaki

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jose Nunez-Dosangos filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his ongoing detention in county jail pending trial on a charge of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. He was later released on his own recognizance after pleading guilty to a new charge of accessory after the fact, rendering his petition moot. However, the court decided to address the case due to its broad public interest and likelihood of recurrence. The petitioner had accrued presentence time-served and conduct credits exceeding the maximum potential sentence for the charged offense, and a probation report assessed him with a low risk of recidivism.

The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco initially denied bail and set the case for a preliminary hearing. The magistrate judge found insufficient evidence to show the petitioner knew of his co-defendant's intent to use the firearm, leading to the dismissal of the murder charge against him. The People refiled the murder charge, which was again dismissed by the trial court. The petitioner filed multiple motions for release, arguing his prolonged detention violated due process, but the trial court denied these motions, citing public safety concerns and the possibility of refiling the murder charge.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioner's pretrial detention was excessive in relation to the government's public safety goals, constituting impermissible punishment in violation of due process principles. The court noted that the length of detention exceeded the maximum potential sentence and that the trial court erred in relying on the possibility of refiling the murder charge. The petition was ultimately dismissed as moot due to the petitioner's release.

People v. Robinson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C098299M(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Laurie M. Earl

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In March 2011, Prentice Robinson was indicted by a grand jury for multiple criminal counts, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He pleaded no contest to the charges and received a 22-year prison sentence. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that the trial court erred in considering grand jury testimony. The People agreed that the grand jury testimony was inadmissible hearsay but disagreed on the proper remedy. The San Joaquin County District Attorney, as amicus curiae, argued that the grand jury transcripts were part of Robinson’s record of conviction and admissible under section 1172.6.

The Superior Court of San Joaquin County denied Robinson’s petition for resentencing, finding that the grand jury transcripts were admissible and that Robinson was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. Robinson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury testimony and that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) created a hearsay exception for evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial, including grand jury testimony. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and that the procedural safeguards in place ensured the reliability of the testimony. The court also held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to section 1172.6 hearings, as they are postconviction collateral proceedings. The court concluded that Robinson’s due process rights were not violated, as he had the opportunity to present new evidence and challenge the grand jury testimony at the evidentiary hearing.

Sumrall v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1368

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Shawn Ellen LaGrua

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Ammon Sumrall was convicted in October 1992 by a DeKalb County jury of felony murder, armed robbery, and other crimes related to the shooting death of Wade Barrett, Jr. on April 7, 1991. He was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences plus five additional years. Over 30 years later, Sumrall filed a pro se petition in the Superior Court of DeKalb County seeking retroactive first-offender treatment based on an amendment to OCGA § 42-8-66. He also filed a motion to declare the statute unconstitutional.

The trial court initially dismissed Sumrall’s petition and motion, but later vacated this order and issued an amended order. The amended order dismissed the petition for failing to obtain the necessary consent from the prosecuting attorney and denied the motion to declare the statute unconstitutional, citing a lack of standing and insufficient supporting arguments.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The court held that Sumrall failed to meet the statutory requirement of obtaining the prosecuting attorney’s consent before filing his petition for retroactive first-offender treatment. The court also found no merit in Sumrall’s argument that the prosecuting attorney’s inaction constituted implied consent. Additionally, the court upheld the trial court’s denial of Sumrall’s motion to declare OCGA § 42-8-66 (a) (1) unconstitutional, concluding that Sumrall did not demonstrate a clear and palpable conflict with the Georgia or United States Constitutions. The court emphasized that the statute did not deprive Sumrall of his right to access the courts or to be heard.

Wood v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1063

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Andrew Pinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Tabitha Wood was convicted of malice murder and other crimes after killing her fiancé, Leroy Kramer. Wood claimed self-defense, citing a history of Kramer’s violence towards her and presented expert testimony that she suffered from battered person syndrome. Kramer’s body was found in their shared home two months after his death, and Wood was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and concealing the death of another. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and she was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, with additional sentences for other charges.

Wood appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing her to introduce testimony about Kramer’s violence towards other women under OCGA § 24-4-405 (b) and that this exclusion violated her constitutional right to a complete defense. The trial court had ruled that Wood could testify about her knowledge of Kramer’s violent acts to show her state of mind but could not introduce extrinsic evidence of specific acts through other witnesses. Wood’s motion for a new trial was denied, and she appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony about Kramer’s prior acts of violence under Rule 405 (b), as a victim’s violent character is not an essential element of self-defense. The court also found no plain error in the trial court’s application of the evidentiary rules, concluding that Wood’s constitutional rights were not violated. The court affirmed Wood’s convictions.

State v. Mumford

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-1075

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Christopher McDonald

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A police officer initiated a traffic stop of Ashlee Mumford because the vehicle's license plate was obscured by dirt and grime. During the stop, a drug detection dog conducted a sniff around the vehicle, briefly touching the passenger door and momentarily breaking the plane of the passenger window. The dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances, leading to a search that uncovered methamphetamine in the glove compartment and marijuana and a methamphetamine pipe in Mumford's purse. Mumford was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. She was acquitted of methamphetamine possession but convicted of marijuana and drug paraphernalia possession.

In the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Mumford moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, arguing it violated her constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court denied her motion, concluding the traffic stop was supported by probable cause and the use of the drug detection dog did not violate the Federal or State Constitution. Mumford was convicted of possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia following a bench trial.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause due to the obscured license plate, and the use of the drug detection dog did not constitute an unlawful search. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Mumford's conviction for possession of marijuana, rejecting her argument that lab testing was required to prove the substance was marijuana. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Mumford's motion to suppress evidence or her motion in arrest of judgment.

Cross v. State

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 303

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Health Law

The Montana State Legislature passed Senate Bill 99 (SB 99) in 2023, which prohibits the use of medications and surgeries to treat gender dysphoria in minors. The bill aims to protect minors from receiving harmful, experimental treatments and imposes professional consequences on healthcare providers who violate its provisions. Plaintiffs, including a transgender minor receiving treatment banned by SB 99, their parents, and healthcare providers, filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that SB 99 violates their constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection.

The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District granted a preliminary injunction, temporarily enjoining SB 99. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the bill and demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their privacy claim. The court applied the Armstrong standard, which protects an individual's right to obtain lawful medical procedures from licensed healthcare providers unless the state can demonstrate a bona fide health risk. The court concluded that the state did not clearly and convincingly show that the treatments proscribed by SB 99 posed such a risk.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of a violation of their right to privacy and demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted. The court also found that the balance of equities and public interest favored the plaintiffs, as the potential harm to minors with gender dysphoria outweighed the state's interests. The preliminary injunction was upheld, allowing the case to proceed to trial for a final determination on the constitutional issues.

In re J.O.

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 OK 82

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Dana Kuehn

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Native American Law

The State of Oklahoma sought to terminate the parental rights of Albert Parker, the natural father of J.O., a child who is a member of the Choctaw Nation. Parker was unaware of his paternity until genetic testing confirmed it in June 2022. The State filed a petition alleging that J.O. was deprived while in the mother's care, and the child was adjudicated deprived. Parker, who was incarcerated, had limited contact with J.O. and had not established a relationship with the child. The trial court terminated Parker's parental rights after a jury trial.

The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial, finding that Parker's due process rights were violated and that the State was not required to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements. Both Parker and the State petitioned for certiorari review, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and found that Parker's due process rights were indeed violated when the trial continued without his presence after his video feed was disconnected. The court also determined that the ICWA requirements apply in this case, regardless of whether Parker had a prior relationship with J.O. The court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for a new trial, ensuring compliance with ICWA and OICWA provisions.

State v. Bear Robe

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 77

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Scott P. Myren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the early morning of March 19, 2022, Quincy Bear Robe, his girlfriend, and her friends were in a hotel room when Myron Pourier and his friends entered uninvited. An altercation ensued, during which Bear Robe and Isaac Runningshield discharged their guns, resulting in Pourier's death from two gunshot wounds. Bear Robe was found nearby with a .40 caliber handgun and later bragged about the shooting to a friend. He was indicted on charges including second-degree murder and first-degree murder but accepted a plea agreement to plead guilty to first-degree manslaughter.

The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, accepted Bear Robe's guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI noted Bear Robe's lack of prior criminal record, his young age, and several mitigating factors from his childhood, including mental health issues and a chaotic home environment. Despite these factors and letters of support from family and community members, the circuit court sentenced Bear Robe to 75 years in the penitentiary without any time suspended.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. Bear Robe argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by focusing too heavily on general deterrence and not adequately considering mitigating evidence. He also contended that the sentence was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, as it had thoroughly considered Bear Robe's character and history, and the sentence was within the permissible range. The court also found that the 75-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense of first-degree manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision.