King v. Youngkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 24-1265

Opinion Date: December 5, 2024

Judge: Toby Heytens

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiffs Tati Abu King and Toni Heath Johnson were unable to register to vote in Virginia due to felony convictions. King was convicted of felony drug possession in 2018, and Johnson was convicted of multiple felonies, including drug possession, in 2021. Virginia's constitution disenfranchises individuals convicted of felonies unless their civil rights are restored by the Governor or other appropriate authority. King and Johnson argued that this disenfranchisement violated the Virginia Readmission Act, a federal statute from 1870, which they claimed restricted Virginia from amending its constitution to disenfranchise individuals for crimes that were not felonies at common law in 1870.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed three of the four counts in the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim but allowed one count based on the Virginia Readmission Act to proceed. The defendants, including various state election officials and the Governor of Virginia, moved to dismiss the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds, which the district court rejected.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs' claim met the requirements of the Ex parte Young doctrine, which allows suits for prospective relief against state officials to prevent ongoing violations of federal law. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow the claim to proceed against most defendants but reversed the decision regarding the Governor of Virginia and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, finding that they lacked enforcement responsibility for the challenged state action. The court concluded that the Governor and Secretary must be dismissed from the case on sovereign immunity grounds. The district court's order was thus affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Stearns v. Dean

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3448

Opinion Date: December 4, 2024

Judge: Raymond Gruender

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

After the death of George Floyd, large-scale protests occurred in Kansas City, Missouri. On May 30, 2020, the Kansas City Police Department requested assistance from the Missouri State Highway Patrol to manage the protests, which turned violent. Law enforcement used tear gas and other munitions to disperse the crowd. Sergeant Jeffrey Spire deployed various crowd control measures, including smoke grenades and projectiles. Around 11:47 p.m., Spire fired projectiles indiscriminately into the crowd, one of which allegedly struck Sean Stearns, causing him to lose vision in his left eye.

Stearns sued Sergeant Spire under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation and excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also brought claims under Missouri law and a Monell claim against the Board of Police Commissioners. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that Spire was entitled to qualified immunity and that Stearns could not establish a Monell claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Spire was entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliation claim because Stearns failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his injury and retaliatory animus. The court also found that Stearns waived his Fourth Amendment claim by not providing a meaningful argument. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court concluded that Spire's actions did not shock the conscience and thus did not constitute a substantive due process violation. Consequently, the Monell claim failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice, finding no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

ATKINS V. BEAN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-99008

Opinion Date: December 2, 2024

Judge: Consuelo Maria Callahan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Sterling Atkins, the petitioner, was convicted by a Nevada jury of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree kidnapping, and sexual assault, and was sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed all counts except for the sexual assault conviction, which it reversed. Atkins then sought state postconviction relief, which was denied, and subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

In the federal district court, Atkins raised several claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase for failing to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence, and for inadequately preparing a psychological expert. The district court denied these claims, finding that the Nevada Supreme Court's denial was reasonable under AEDPA standards. The court also found that Atkins's claim regarding the psychological expert was procedurally defaulted and that he could not meet the Martinez v. Ryan standard to excuse the default.

Atkins also challenged a jury instruction regarding the possibility of parole, arguing it was misleading and that the prosecutor improperly invited the jury to speculate about parole. The district court found this claim unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and Atkins failed to show cause to excuse the default.

Atkins sought to expand the certificate of appealability to include claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the guilt phase for failing to investigate his psychological background and a claim that trial counsel had a financial conflict of interest. The court denied these requests, finding that the claims were either procedurally defaulted or lacked merit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Atkins's habeas petition and denied his request to expand the certificate of appealability. The court held that the Nevada Supreme Court reasonably denied Atkins's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that Atkins failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural defaults of his other claims.

Matsumoto v. Labrador

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-3787

Opinion Date: December 2, 2024

Judge: Margaret McKeown

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The case involves Idaho's abortion trafficking statute, Idaho Code §18-623, which criminalizes procuring an abortion or obtaining an abortion-inducing drug for an unemancipated minor by recruiting, harboring, or transporting the minor with the intent to conceal the abortion from the minor’s parents or guardian. Plaintiffs, including an Idaho attorney and two advocacy organizations, sought to counsel pregnant minors and provide material support for accessing legal abortions in other states. They challenged the statute, arguing it violated the First Amendment and was void for vagueness.

The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction against the statute, finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Idaho attorney general was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment and void-for-vagueness claims. The district court also partially granted and denied Idaho’s motion to dismiss, dismissing only the claim regarding the right to intrastate travel.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Idaho attorney general was a proper defendant. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claims that the statute was void for vagueness or that it infringed on their rights to expressive association. However, the court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the statute’s “recruiting” prong unconstitutionally infringed on their protected speech. The court determined that the “recruiting” provision was overbroad and could be severed from the rest of the statute. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction against enforcing the “recruiting” prong but reversed the district court’s decision regarding the other claims and remanded for modification of the preliminary injunction.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD GREAT NORTHWEST, HAWAII, ALASKA V. LABRADOR

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-35518

Opinion Date: December 4, 2024

Judge: William Fletcher

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Health Law

The case involves Planned Parenthood and two physicians challenging the Idaho Attorney General's interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-622(1), which criminalizes performing or attempting to perform an abortion and imposes professional licensing penalties on healthcare providers who assist in performing or attempting to perform an abortion. The Attorney General issued an opinion letter stating that the statute prohibits medical providers from referring patients to out-of-state abortion providers. Plaintiffs argued that this interpretation violates their First Amendment rights by preventing them from providing information about abortion services in other states.

The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the Attorney General from enforcing his interpretation of the statute. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, the case was ripe and not moot, and the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had established Article III standing, as they demonstrated a credible threat of prosecution under the Attorney General's interpretation. The case was deemed ripe and not moot despite the Attorney General's withdrawal of the opinion letter, as the withdrawal did not disavow the interpretation. The court also held that the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young due to his authority to assist in the enforcement of the statute. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and affirmed the preliminary injunction. The request for reassignment to a different district judge was denied.

USA V. KING COUNTY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-35362

Opinion Date: November 29, 2024

Judge: Daniel Bress

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

State v. Chavez

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49953

Opinion Date: December 4, 2024

Judge: Gregory W. Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Gerardo Raul Chavez was convicted of second-degree murder for the 2016 killing of Vason Widaman. While in custody for a probation violation, Chavez made incriminating statements to a cellmate, Manuel Acevedo, who was acting as a confidential informant. The State sought to introduce these recordings at trial. Chavez moved to suppress the statements, but the district court only partially granted the motion, suppressing a few statements. The jury acquitted Chavez of first-degree murder but convicted him of second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. Chavez was sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence with a 42-year fixed term. Post-trial, Chavez's motions for a new trial and permission to contact jurors were denied.

Chavez appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, abused its discretion in sentencing, violated his constitutional rights by considering acquitted conduct at sentencing, and erred in denying his motion to contact jurors. The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case.

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the district court did not err in admitting Chavez's statements, as they were not deliberately elicited by Acevedo. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the 42-year fixed sentence, noting that it fell within statutory limits and was justified by the aggravating factors. The court further held that considering acquitted conduct at sentencing did not violate Chavez's constitutional rights. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to contact jurors, as Chavez failed to show good cause for suspecting juror misconduct.

State v. Pulizzi

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49710

Opinion Date: November 29, 2024

Judge: Robyn Brody

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Anthony Pulizzi was convicted of felony possession of methamphetamine and destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence. Pulizzi argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from warrantless searches and seizures of his trash, which he claimed violated his rights under the Idaho Constitution. He contended that the Twin Falls City waste collection ordinances created an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash.

The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho denied Pulizzi’s motion to suppress, finding that the waste collection ordinance did not create a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court concluded that the ordinance did not mandate participation in the city’s waste collection program and that the prohibition against collecting garbage for monetary gain did not apply to law enforcement officers. Pulizzi then pled guilty to the charges under a conditional plea agreement, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the waste collection ordinance did not create an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in Pulizzi’s trash. The court declined to reconsider its previous holdings in State v. Donato and State v. McCall, which aligned with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Greenwood, stating that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection in a public area. The court found that the ordinance’s purpose was to promote public health and safety, not to protect privacy interests in curbside garbage. Consequently, the court affirmed Pulizzi’s conviction.

Commonwealth v. Du

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13557

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Elizabeth Dewar

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

An undercover police officer, without a warrant, used his cell phone to make audio-visual recordings while purchasing drugs from the defendant. These recordings captured both the audio of their conversations and video footage of the defendant. The defendant was subsequently charged with multiple counts of drug distribution and moved to suppress the recordings, arguing they were unlawful interceptions under the wiretap act.

The Superior Court judge partially granted the motion, suppressing the audio but allowing the video footage to be used as evidence if shown silently. Both parties sought interlocutory appeal. The Appeals Court ruled that both the audio and video components must be suppressed under the wiretap act. The Commonwealth then sought further appellate review.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the wiretap act's suppression remedy extends to both the audio and video components of the recordings. The court reasoned that the video footage, even without audio, contains information about the identity of the parties and the existence of the communication, which falls under the statute's definition of "contents." Therefore, the entire recording must be suppressed to align with the legislative intent of protecting privacy and deterring unauthorized surveillance.

The court affirmed the suppression of the audio and reversed the decision allowing the video footage, ordering that both components be suppressed.

State v. Cahoon

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 289N

Opinion Date: December 3, 2024

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Nancy Jeanne Cahoon was pulled over on September 3, 2021, for expired vehicle registration. She was unable to produce her license, registration, or insurance information and indicated her license might be suspended. The state trooper confirmed her license was suspended and discovered a warrant for her arrest. The trooper noted items in the vehicle consistent with drug use and obtained Cahoon's consent to search the vehicle, finding methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Cahoon was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving with a suspended license, and failure to have liability insurance.

The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, denied Cahoon's motion to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged. Cahoon failed to appear at the suppression hearing, and her counsel did not object to the court deciding the motion based on the briefs. The District Court concluded the stop was permissibly extended due to Cahoon's active warrant and denied the motion. Cahoon pled guilty without a plea agreement, reserving her right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that Cahoon failed to preserve her argument regarding her constitutional right to be present at the suppression hearing because it was not properly raised in the lower court. The Court noted that the District Court decided the motion based on the briefs without objection from Cahoon's counsel and that the record was insufficient to address Cahoon's constitutional claim on appeal. The Court affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to suppress.

State v. Thesing

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 219

Opinion Date: December 5, 2024

Judge: Jon Jay Jensen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

James Thesing was charged with domestic violence in November 2022 and released under a pre-dispositional order prohibiting contact with the alleged victim. In March 2023, he was arrested for violating this order by initiating contact with the protected person while in custody. He was charged with two counts of violating the order, class A misdemeanors. In July 2023, the original domestic violence charge was dismissed, and the pre-dispositional order was terminated.

Thesing filed a motion to dismiss one count in November 2023, arguing that the order only applied while he was released from custody. The District Court of Cass County denied the motion in December 2023, concluding that the order remained in effect after his arrest, was not contingent on release, and met constitutional requirements. Thesing entered a conditional guilty plea in February 2024, preserving his right to appeal, and the other count was dismissed. He appealed in March 2024.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on statutory interpretation. The court found that the statute, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02, unambiguously allowed the pre-dispositional order to remain in effect even after Thesing was taken back into custody. The court also noted that the order itself explicitly prohibited contact by any means and was to terminate only upon case disposition unless modified by the court.

Thesing's argument that the order was a condition of release and did not apply while he was in custody was rejected. The court also dismissed his claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, noting that his brief lacked supporting arguments and citations. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment.