US v. Bullis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4184

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Berner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Stephen Bullis was convicted of six federal crimes, including two counts of using a firearm during and in relation to other crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After serving twenty-three years in prison, the United States Supreme Court struck down the “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as unconstitutional. This led the district court to set aside Bullis’s two Section 924(c) convictions and resentence him on the remaining four counts. Bullis argued that the resentencing violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had fully served his sentence on these counts at the time of the resentencing.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially sentenced Bullis to 235 months of imprisonment on each of Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, all to run concurrently. On Count 3, Bullis was sentenced to 360 months, and on Count 6, he received a lifetime sentence, both to run consecutively to the 235-month concurrent sentences. After the Supreme Court’s ruling, the district court vacated Counts 3 and 6 and resentenced Bullis to 450 months on Count 2 and 240 months on Counts 1, 3, and 5, all to run concurrently.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Bullis’s resentencing did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his sentences for Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 were part of a consecutive sentence package that had not been fully served. However, the court found that the district court committed reversible errors by imposing a special condition of supervised release that differed materially from the court’s oral pronouncement and by failing to incorporate clearly the Standard Conditions of Supervision as adopted in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case for resentencing.

Cocroft v. Graham

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-60086

Opinion Date: November 22, 2024

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

The plaintiffs, Clarence Cocroft and Tru Source Medical Cannabis, L.L.C., challenged Mississippi's restrictions on advertising medical marijuana, arguing that the First Amendment protects their right to advertise because the state permits the underlying commercial transactions. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court applied the Central Hudson test for commercial speech and held that because federal law criminalizes marijuana, including medical marijuana, the advertising of such transactions does not qualify for First Amendment protection.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that under the Central Hudson test, commercial speech must concern lawful activity to receive First Amendment protection. Since the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) prohibits marijuana nationwide, including in Mississippi, the underlying commercial conduct is illegal. Therefore, the state faces no constitutional obstacle to restricting commercial speech related to unlawful transactions. The court concluded that the First Amendment does not protect the advertising of medical marijuana in Mississippi due to its illegal status under federal law.

Texas v. Department of Homeland Security

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50869

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Duncan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The State of Texas placed a concertina wire fence along part of the border with Mexico in the Eagle Pass area to deter illegal crossings. The United States Border Patrol agents cut the wire multiple times, claiming it was necessary to fulfill their duty of patrolling the border to prevent illegal entry. Texas sued for an injunction, arguing that the Border Patrol was needlessly cutting the wire. The district court found that the Border Patrol was not hampered by the wire and had breached it numerous times without apparent purpose other than to allow migrants easier entrance. However, the court denied the injunction, citing the United States' sovereign immunity against Texas's claims.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, despite agreeing with Texas on the facts. The court believed that the United States retained sovereign immunity. A motions panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed and granted a temporary injunction pending appeal. The United States sought relief in the Supreme Court, which vacated the injunction without providing reasons. The case was remanded to the district court to investigate events in Shelby Park, where Texas's actions were alleged to have obstructed Border Patrol operations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Texas is entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court held that the United States waived sovereign immunity as to Texas's state law claims under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also rejected the United States' arguments that the injunction was barred by intergovernmental immunity and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court found that Texas satisfied the injunction factors from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and granted Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, with modifications based on the district court's supplemental fact findings.

Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50669

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Willett

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, International Law, Internet Law

The case involves six plaintiffs who are users of Tornado Cash, a cryptocurrency mixing service that uses immutable smart contracts to anonymize transactions. Tornado Cash was sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for allegedly facilitating money laundering for malicious actors, including North Korea. The plaintiffs argued that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by designating Tornado Cash as a Specially Designated National (SDN) and blocking its smart contracts.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of the Treasury, finding that Tornado Cash is an entity that can be sanctioned, that its smart contracts constitute property, and that the Tornado Cash DAO has an interest in these smart contracts. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether the immutable smart contracts could be considered "property" under IEEPA. The court concluded that these smart contracts are not property because they are not capable of being owned, controlled, or altered by anyone, including their creators. The court emphasized that property, by definition, must be ownable, and the immutable smart contracts do not meet this criterion. Consequently, the court held that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by sanctioning Tornado Cash's immutable smart contracts.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to grant the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment based on the Administrative Procedure Act. The court did not address whether Tornado Cash qualifies as an entity or whether it has an interest in the smart contracts, as the determination that the smart contracts are not property was dispositive.

Hale v. Cool

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3265

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2005, Delano Hale was sentenced to death by an Ohio court for the murder of Douglas Green. Green was found dead in a motel room, wrapped in plastic bags, and had been shot multiple times. Hale was arrested driving Green's stolen vehicle and later admitted to the shooting, claiming it was in self-defense against Green's sexual advances. Hale was convicted of aggravated murder and other charges, and the jury recommended the death penalty.

Hale's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio Court of Appeals. Hale filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. He then sought federal habeas relief, raising multiple claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing errors under Blakely v. Washington.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Hale's habeas petition. The court denied Hale's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that his trial counsel's decision not to call a forensic expert was a reasonable strategic choice. The court noted that Hale's counsel had considered hiring an expert but ultimately chose a different strategy, which did not constitute deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington.

The court also denied Hale's claim regarding his noncapital sentences, which were enhanced based on judicial factfinding in violation of Blakely. The Ohio Supreme Court had reviewed this claim for plain error and found no prejudice, concluding that a jury would have reached the same sentencing conclusions. The Sixth Circuit found this determination reasonable and upheld the Ohio Supreme Court's decision.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Hale's habeas petition, concluding that Hale's claims did not warrant relief under the deferential standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

RABADI V. USDEA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-70114

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Sidney Runyan Thomas

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Dr. Fares Jeries Rabadi, a licensed physician in California, had his certificate of registration to dispense controlled substances revoked by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA initiated an investigation into Rabadi in April 2018 due to his high-risk prescribing practices. In March 2020, the DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration, alleging that Rabadi issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose to seven individuals. Rabadi requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place in September 2020. The ALJ found Rabadi's testimony not credible and recommended revoking his registration. The DEA Administrator adopted the ALJ's recommendations with minor modifications and revoked Rabadi's registration.

Rabadi petitioned for review, arguing that the DEA's revocation was invalid because DEA ALJs are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by two layers of "for-cause" protections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rabadi's argument failed under Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, which found similar ALJ removal protections constitutional. The court noted that DEA ALJs perform purely adjudicatory functions, Congress does not mandate the use of ALJs for DEA hearings, and DEA ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo by the DEA Administrator, who is removable at will by the President.

Rabadi also argued that the DEA Administrator's order was arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected this argument, finding that the Administrator properly ignored Rabadi's unsupported defense regarding high dosages of prescribed drugs and appropriately analyzed the public interest factors, including Rabadi's lack of a conviction record. The Ninth Circuit denied Rabadi's petition for review, upholding the DEA Administrator's order.

Smith v. Albany County School District No. 1

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-8072

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: HARTZ

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law

Grace Smith, a high school junior, was repeatedly suspended from Laramie High School for refusing to comply with a COVID-19 indoor-mask mandate imposed by the Albany County School District No. 1 Board of Trustees. After her suspensions, she was arrested for trespassing on school grounds. Grace and her parents, Andy and Erin Smith, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming against the Board members, the superintendent, and the principal, alleging violations of Grace’s constitutional rights and state law claims.

The district court dismissed the federal claims for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that Grace did not suffer an injury in fact necessary for standing. The court reasoned that her injuries were hypothetical because the mask mandate had expired and she was no longer a student at LHS, and that her injuries were self-inflicted. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Grace had standing to bring her claims because she suffered concrete and particularized injuries from the enforcement of the mask mandate, including suspensions and arrest. The court found that her injuries were directly inflicted by the defendants’ actions and were not self-inflicted. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion.

United States v. Pinder

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-4154

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: ROSSMAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A police officer stopped Taylor Pinder for speeding. Pinder provided a driver's license that did not match his appearance. The officer arrested Pinder for providing false identification, a misdemeanor in Utah. During a search of the car incident to the arrest, the officer found methamphetamine and a handgun. Pinder was charged federally and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Pinder pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release.

The United States District Court for the District of Utah denied Pinder's motion to suppress, concluding the search was justified under Arizona v. Gant, which allows vehicle searches incident to arrest if it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. The court also suggested the search might be justified based on Pinder's supervised release conditions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit held that Pinder's real driver's license was relevant to the crime of providing false identification, even after the officer verified his identity. The court did not address the district court's alternative reasoning regarding supervised release conditions or the government's good faith argument raised for the first time on appeal.

Alpine Securities Corporation v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-5129

Opinion Date: November 22, 2024

Judge: Patricia Ann Millett

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Securities Law

Alpine Securities Corporation, a securities broker-dealer and member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), faced sanctions from FINRA in 2022 for violating its rules. FINRA imposed a cease-and-desist order and sought to expel Alpine from membership. Alpine challenged the constitutionality of FINRA in federal court, arguing that FINRA's expedited expulsion process violated the private nondelegation doctrine and the Appointments Clause.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Alpine's request for a preliminary injunction to halt FINRA's expedited proceeding. The court held that FINRA is a private entity, not subject to the Appointments Clause, and that the SEC's ability to review FINRA's decisions satisfied the private nondelegation doctrine.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Alpine demonstrated a likelihood of success on its private nondelegation claim, as FINRA's expulsion orders take effect immediately without prior SEC review, effectively barring Alpine from the securities industry. The court held that this lack of governmental oversight likely violates the private nondelegation doctrine. The court also found that Alpine faced irreparable harm if expelled before SEC review, as it would be forced out of business.

The court reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, instructing it to enjoin FINRA from expelling Alpine until the SEC reviews any expulsion order or the time for Alpine to seek SEC review lapses. However, the court did not grant a preliminary injunction on Alpine's Appointments Clause claims, as Alpine did not demonstrate irreparable harm from participating in FINRA's expedited proceeding itself. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's findings.

In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20995

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: D’Auria

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Election Law

Three registered electors from Bridgeport filed a writ of error challenging a trial judge's decision to deny their applications for arrest warrants for two individuals who allegedly violated election laws during the 2023 Democratic primary for the mayoral office. The plaintiffs claimed that the trial judge misinterpreted the relevant statute, General Statutes § 9-368, which they argued mandated the issuance of arrest warrants upon their complaint. The state of Connecticut, the defendant in error, argued that the writ should be dismissed because the plaintiffs were neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved by the denial of their applications.

The Superior Court for the judicial district of Fairfield, with Judge Thomas J. Welch presiding, denied the applications for arrest warrants. The judge concluded that § 9-368 was inconsistent with the federal and state constitutions and the rules of practice, as it allowed for the issuance of arrest warrants based on a standard less than probable cause and without coordination with the Division of Criminal Justice. The judge did not reach the substantive merits of the applications and suggested that the matter could be referred to a prosecuting authority.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs in error were not required to establish statutory aggrievement to bring a writ of error. However, the court dismissed the writ on the grounds that the plaintiffs were not classically aggrieved. The court determined that the plaintiffs lacked a specific, personal, and legal interest in the arrest and prosecution of those who allegedly violated election laws, as they were private citizens without a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Consequently, the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the trial judge's denial of their arrest warrant applications.

Creech v. Randy Valley

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 52373

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Thomas Eugene Creech, sentenced to death in 1995, faced a failed execution attempt earlier this year due to the inability to establish reliable peripheral intravenous access. The execution team spent nearly an hour attempting to establish venous access in various parts of Creech’s body, but each attempt resulted in vein collapse, leading to the procedure being halted. Following this, Creech sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the district court and affirmed on appeal.

While his post-conviction appeal was pending, Creech applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, arguing that any further attempt to carry out his death sentence would violate his constitutional rights. The district court summarily dismissed Creech’s application with prejudice. Creech appealed, contending that the State’s revised standard operating procedure and execution protocols constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. The court noted that the Idaho Department of Correction had modified its standard operating procedure for executions to allow a qualified physician to establish a central line if peripheral vein access is not attainable. Creech’s application for a writ of habeas corpus included three claims, but only Claim Two, which challenged the use of a central venous line as cruel and unusual punishment, was before the court on appeal.

The court held that Creech failed to establish a prima facie challenge to the State’s method of execution. The court found that the use of a central line catheter is a common medical procedure and does not rise to the level of indecency or cruelty prohibited by the United States Constitution. Additionally, Creech failed to propose an alternative method of execution, as required to assert a “method of execution” challenge. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s order of dismissal.

Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC v. Kasischke

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-1186

Opinion Date: November 22, 2024

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

A landowner in Hardin County, Iowa, refused to allow a surveyor for a pipeline developer to enter his private property. The developer, Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC, sought access under Iowa Code section 479B.15, which governs hazardous liquid pipelines. The district court ordered the landowner to allow the surveyor temporary access, rejecting the landowner’s claims that the statute was unconstitutional under the “takings” clauses of the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions and that carbon dioxide in a supercritical state is not a “hazardous liquid.”

The Iowa District Court for Hardin County ruled that the statute was facially constitutional and that Summit was a “pipeline company” with access rights under section 479B.15. The court found that Summit had provided proper statutory notice to the landowner and that the landowner’s claim of having a tenant who did not receive notice was not credible. The court granted Summit’s request for injunctive relief to compel access for surveying.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that section 479B.15 is a lawful pre-existing limitation on the landowner’s title, consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property rights, and does not constitute a taking under the Federal or Iowa Constitutions. The court also held that supercritical carbon dioxide is a “hazardous liquid” within the meaning of section 479B.2, making Summit a pipeline company with access rights under the statute. The court found that Summit had complied with the statutory notice requirements and that no additional showing of irreparable harm was required for the injunction. The judgment and injunctive relief granted by the district court were affirmed.

State of Maine v. Desrosiers

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 77

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Trevor I. DesRosiers was convicted by a jury in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket on three counts of sexual abuse of a minor and three counts of furnishing liquor to a minor. DesRosiers appealed, arguing insufficient evidence to prove he and the victim were not married during the sexual acts and to establish the victim’s age for Counts 1-4. He also claimed prosecutorial errors in closing arguments deprived him of a fair trial.

The trial court denied DesRosiers’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to concurrent terms of forty-two months for sexual abuse and three months for furnishing liquor, with all but twenty months suspended. DesRosiers appealed the conviction.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that DesRosiers and the victim were not married, based on the victim’s age, living situation, and the nature of their relationship. The court also found sufficient evidence to establish the victim’s age during the offenses, as she was fifteen throughout the relevant period.

Regarding prosecutorial errors, the court determined that most of the prosecutor’s comments did not constitute error. However, the prosecutor’s comment on DesRosiers’s invocation of his Fourth Amendment right was deemed error but not obvious error. The court concluded that this isolated comment did not undermine the trial’s integrity or affect the verdict.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Johnson v. Miller

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2024-FC-00419-SCT

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Beam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Mark Johnson sued the Clarksdale Public Utilities Authority (CPU) and its members in federal district court, alleging he was fired for reporting inefficiency and incompetence to the state auditor. His initial complaint asserted retaliation under the Mississippi Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), later amended to include First Amendment retaliation and breach of contract. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, holding that Johnson failed to comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) notice requirements and that the MWPA claim was barred by the MTCA’s one-year statute of limitations. The court also found Johnson’s First Amendment and breach-of-contract claims time-barred.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the MTCA’s procedural requirements apply to MWPA claims. The defendants argued that the MTCA’s broad application and limited immunity waiver necessitate compliance with its procedural requirements for MWPA claims. Johnson countered that the MWPA provides a separate right to monetary relief and should not be subject to the MTCA’s requirements.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the certified question from the Fifth Circuit. The court concluded that the MWPA is a remedial statute separate from the MTCA. The MWPA does not prescribe a statute of limitations or notice requirement, and the reference to the MTCA’s damages cap does not incorporate its procedural requirements. Therefore, the court held that MWPA claims are not subject to the MTCA’s statute of limitations and notice requirements. The certified question was answered accordingly.

Ibhawa v New York State Div. of Human Rights

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05872

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: HALLIGAN

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Victor Ibhawa, a Black, Nigerian Catholic priest, was hired by the Diocese of Buffalo in 2016 as the Parish Administrator of the Blessed Trinity Church. He was reappointed in January 2019 for another three-year term but was terminated on September 28, 2020. Ibhawa filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) in November 2020, alleging racial discrimination, including incidents involving racial slurs and xenophobic remarks. He claimed that Diocesan officials failed to investigate these incidents and made offensive remarks about foreign priests. Ibhawa's employment was terminated, and his priestly faculties were removed, preventing him from applying for another priest position in the Diocese. He alleged hostile work environment and unlawful termination based on race and national origin.

The DHR dismissed Ibhawa's complaint, citing the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment, which it interpreted as a jurisdictional bar. The New York Supreme Court partially reversed this decision, finding that while the unlawful termination claim was properly dismissed, the hostile work environment claim required further consideration. The Appellate Division, however, reinstated the DHR's dismissal, emphasizing deference to the agency's expertise and noting the lack of controlling precedent on the ministerial exception's applicability to hostile work environment claims.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the DHR erred in treating the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar rather than an affirmative defense. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and remitted the case to the DHR for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Matter of Jeter v. Poole

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05868

Opinion Date: November 25, 2024

Judge: Troutman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

In June 2019, the petitioner's 13-year-old daughter, T., disclosed to a friend, a teacher, a police officer, and a caseworker from the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) that the petitioner had struck her with an extension cord. The caseworker took photographs of T.'s injuries, and a physician confirmed that the injuries were consistent with being struck by an extension cord. ACS initiated a Family Court article 10 neglect proceeding against the petitioner and her husband. The Family Court authorized an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), and the case was dismissed in February 2020 after the petitioner complied with the court's conditions.

The police officer reported the incident to the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR). In July 2019, ACS determined the report against the petitioner was indicated. The petitioner challenged this determination, but the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) upheld it after an internal review. A fair hearing was held in August 2020, and OCFS concluded that the allegations were substantiated by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge OCFS's determination. The Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, which confirmed OCFS's determination, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Appellate Division held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR hearing and that the statutory changes to Social Services Law § 422 did not apply retroactively.

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR administrative hearing. It also concluded that the statutory amendments to Social Services Law § 422 (8) (b) (ii) did not apply retroactively to OCFS determinations rendered before the effective date of the amendments. The Court further held that OCFS's determination was supported by substantial evidence.

Kennedy v. W. Res. Senior Care

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5565

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: STEWART

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In this case, Claudia Kennedy, as the executor of Donald R. Gerres's estate, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Western Reserve Senior Care and Dr. Sataya Acharya, among others, alleging that substandard medical care led to Gerres's death in October 2013. Kennedy initially filed the lawsuit in September 2014, voluntarily dismissed it in January 2019, and refiled it within a year.

The trial court denied the healthcare providers' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which argued that the four-year statute of repose for medical claims barred Kennedy's refiled action. However, after the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Durrani, which held that the saving statute does not preserve claims refiled after the statute of repose expires, the healthcare providers sought summary judgment. The trial court denied this motion but later granted a directed verdict in favor of the healthcare providers after Kennedy's opening statements.

Kennedy appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 2305.15(A) tolled the statute of repose because Dr. Acharya had moved out of Ohio. The Eleventh District affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that applying the tolling statute to Dr. Acharya, who left Ohio for legitimate business purposes, violated the dormant Commerce Clause.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that R.C. 2305.15(A) does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to a physician who moved out of Ohio to practice medicine in another state. The court found that the tolling statute serves a legitimate local purpose and does not impose a burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to its benefits. The judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE v. STEAN

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 23-0468

Opinion Date: November 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In 2021, the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 8, known as the Texas Heartbeat Act, which prohibits physicians from performing abortions if a fetal heartbeat is detected. The Act allows enforcement only through private civil actions. Plaintiffs, including Allison Van Stean and various Planned Parenthood entities, alleged that Texas Right to Life (TRTL) organized efforts to sue those violating the Act. They filed multiple suits challenging the Act's constitutionality and sought injunctions to prevent TRTL from enforcing it. The cases were consolidated, and TRTL filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), both challenging the plaintiffs' standing. The trial court denied both motions.

TRTL appealed the denial of the TCPA motion, but the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed the trial court's order, stating that the TCPA did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims. The court did not address the standing issue raised by TRTL. TRTL then petitioned for review.

The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred by not addressing the standing issue, which is a prerequisite for subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdictional questions must be resolved before addressing the merits of a case. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue. If the plaintiffs lack standing, the case should be dismissed; if they have standing, the Court of Appeals should then address the merits of the TCPA motion.

FINLEY v. STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0634-22

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Barbara Hervey

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The appellant was charged with misdemeanor assault in County Criminal Court during the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court allowed the complainant to testify while wearing a surgical mask that covered her nose and mouth, over the appellant’s objections. The appellant argued that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him. The trial court overruled the objection, and the complainant testified with the mask. The jury convicted the appellant, and he was sentenced to 300 days’ confinement and fined $4,000.

The Second Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right was violated because the trial court did not make case-specific, evidence-based findings to justify the complainant wearing a mask while testifying. The appellate court found that the trial court’s general pronouncements about the COVID-19 pandemic were insufficient to meet the requirements set forth in Maryland v. Craig, which allows for the denial of face-to-face confrontation only if it furthers an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation was denied because the complainant’s mask covered a significant portion of her face, affecting the ability to observe her demeanor. The court found that the trial court’s findings were insufficient to justify the denial of face-to-face confrontation, as they did not provide a case-specific reason why the complainant needed to wear a mask. The court also concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the complainant was the sole witness to the alleged assault, and her testimony was crucial to the prosecution’s case.

Russell v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 126

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: GRAY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Joseph W. Russell entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the constitutionality of a warrantless search conducted as he entered the Uinta County Courthouse. The search, performed by Deputy Dan Jensen, involved a magnetometer alerting to metal in Russell's waist area, leading to a pat-down and the discovery of a snus can containing methamphetamine. Russell was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance.

The district court denied Russell's motion to suppress the evidence, finding the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Russell entered a conditional guilty plea, allowing him to appeal the suppression order. He was sentenced to one to three years of imprisonment, suspended in favor of two years of supervised probation. Russell timely appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court applied a three-part test to determine the reasonableness of the search: the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern, the efficacy of the search in addressing that concern, and the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes. The court found that courthouse security is a compelling governmental interest, the use of a magnetometer and follow-up searches are effective in addressing this concern, and the privacy interest in the snus can was minimal given the context of courthouse security.

The court concluded that the search was reasonable and affirmed the district court's denial of Russell's motion to suppress. The holding emphasized that the search was justified under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment, balancing the government's interest in courthouse security against the minimal intrusion on Russell's privacy.