Baltas v. Maiga

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-2895

Opinion Date: October 11, 2024

Judge: Lohier

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Joe Baltas, a Connecticut state prisoner, was transferred to the Virginia Department of Corrections (VADOC) under the Interstate Corrections Compact. While at Red Onion State Prison (ROSP) in Virginia, Baltas alleges he was threatened by VADOC officials for filing a grievance and was later attacked by inmates, resulting in his placement in restrictive housing. He also claims that Connecticut Department of Corrections (CTDOC) officials failed to review his administrative segregation (Ad Seg) status as required, violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, he alleges violations of his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights due to his treatment at ROSP.

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The court found that CTDOC had adequately reviewed Baltas’s Ad Seg classification and dismissed his due process claim. It also dismissed his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims, concluding that Baltas failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court’s ruling that CTDOC’s periodic reviews of Baltas’s Ad Seg classification satisfied due process requirements. However, it found that a genuine dispute of fact existed regarding whether VADOC’s administrative remedies were available to Baltas, making summary judgment inappropriate for his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims. The court vacated the summary judgment on these claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Baltas’s remaining claims in a concurrently issued summary order.

La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-50783

Opinion Date: October 15, 2024

Judge: Ho

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In response to challenges faced during the 2020 election, the Texas Legislature enacted S.B. 1 in 2021, which restricts paid "vote harvesting services." This law aims to protect the privacy of mail-in voters by prohibiting compensated interactions intended to influence votes. Plaintiffs, a coalition of organizations, challenged this provision on vagueness and First Amendment grounds, seeking injunctions against various Texas officials.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas enjoined the enforcement of the vote harvesting provision of S.B. 1 on September 28, 2024, nearly three years after the law took effect and just three weeks before voting was to begin. The State of Texas then moved to stay the district court's order pending appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and granted the State's request for a stay. The court emphasized the Supreme Court's guidance in Purcell v. Gonzalez, which advises against altering election laws close to an election due to potential voter confusion and administrative burdens. The court found that the district court's injunction, issued after mail-in ballots had already been distributed, could lead to significant confusion and disruption.

The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to S.B. 1 was not "entirely clearcut," failing to meet the criteria that might justify an exception to the Purcell principle. The court noted that the law's provisions were designed to protect voter privacy and security, similar to protections upheld by the Supreme Court for in-person voting. Consequently, the motion to stay the district court's injunction pending appeal was granted.

USA v. Martin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30917

Opinion Date: October 15, 2024

Judge: Leslie H. Southwick

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Dajuan Martin was arrested after being seen riding a stolen scooter in New Orleans. During the police pursuit, he discarded a Glock 26, 9mm semi-automatic handgun, which was later recovered with a magazine containing 16 rounds of ammunition. Martin pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated his offense level at 12, with a criminal history category of III, suggesting a sentencing range of 15 to 21 months. However, the government objected, arguing for a higher base offense level due to the firearm's large capacity magazine.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana accepted the government's argument, raising Martin's base offense level to 20, resulting in a new sentencing range of 30 to 37 months. Martin was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. The court also imposed conditions for supervised release, including participation in a drug and alcohol treatment program and submission to searches under certain conditions. However, the written judgment included additional requirements not stated during the oral pronouncement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Martin challenged the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines' commentary defining "large capacity magazine" and the discrepancies between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding supervised release conditions. The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's use of the commentary, finding it consistent with the Guidelines. However, it agreed with Martin that the written judgment improperly broadened the conditions of supervised release.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Martin's sentence in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for the district court to amend the written judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement. The court also rejected Martin's constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), citing consistent precedent upholding the statute's constitutionality.

United States v. Parham

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-5025

Opinion Date: October 17, 2024

Judge: GRIFFIN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant, Tarrence Parham, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. During sentencing, the district court increased his base offense level, concluding that his prior Tennessee conviction for attempted second-degree murder constituted a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Parham appealed this conclusion and the district court’s refusal to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied Parham’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. Parham then pleaded guilty to the single-count indictment. The Probation Office determined his base offense level was 22, considering his prior conviction for attempted second-degree murder as a crime of violence. Parham objected, but the district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to 108 months’ imprisonment, relying on an unpublished opinion from the Sixth Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the elements of attempted second-degree murder in Tennessee categorically match the Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence. The court also found that Parham’s Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by binding precedent, specifically United States v. Williams, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) both facially and as applied to individuals with a history of dangerous behavior. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, including the calculation of Parham’s base offense level and the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.

Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2135

Opinion Date: October 16, 2024

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In February 2020, a police officer in Wauwatosa, Wisconsin, shot and killed a Black teenager, Alvin Cole. Following the incident, community members organized protests against police violence and racism. Anticipating unrest after the district attorney decided not to charge the officer, the mayor imposed a curfew. Plaintiffs, affected by the curfew and police conduct, filed constitutional and state law claims against the City of Wauwatosa and individual defendants.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed most claims, allowing only First Amendment and Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) claims to proceed. The court later granted summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment claims, leaving only the DPPA claims for trial. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants on the DPPA claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the curfew was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction under the First Amendment. The court found that the curfew was content-neutral, served a significant government interest in public safety, was narrowly tailored, and left open ample alternative channels for communication. The court also upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against individual defendants, agreeing that the claims were inadequately pleaded and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying further amendments. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s response to a jury question regarding the definition of “personal information” under the DPPA. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

West v. State of Alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18458

Opinion Date: October 17, 2024

Judge: Henderson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the State, arguing that the statutory definition of "sustained yield" under AS 16.05.255(k) violates the Alaska Constitution’s sustained yield provision. The plaintiff contended that the legislature lacked the authority to define sustained yield and that the statutory definition contradicted the constitutional provision. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting the court to declare the statute unconstitutional and to enjoin the State from enforcing it.

The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, reviewed the case. The court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, which was based on res judicata and collateral estoppel, determining that the issues raised were not precluded by prior litigation. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the statutory definition of sustained yield in AS 16.05.255(k) complies with the Alaska Constitution.

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case on appeal. The court analyzed the plain meaning of the constitutional and statutory provisions, the intent of the framers of the Alaska Constitution, and relevant precedent. The court found that the legislature had the authority to define sustained yield in statute and that the statutory definition was consistent with the broad principle of sustained yield as intended by the framers. The court emphasized that the Constitution allows for legislative discretion in establishing management priorities for natural resources.

The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s judgment, holding that AS 16.05.255(k)’s definition of sustained yield does not violate the Alaska Constitution and that the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.

McGill v. Thurston

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 146

Opinion Date: October 14, 2024

Judge: HUDSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

Petitioners Jennifer McGill and Cherokee Nation Entertainment, LLC challenged the sufficiency of a proposed constitutional amendment regarding the Pope County casino license. They alleged that the Arkansas Secretary of State, John Thurston, improperly certified the amendment for the ballot. The petitioners claimed that the number of valid signatures was insufficient and that the popular name and ballot title were inadequate. Local Voters in Charge (LVC), the sponsor of the amendment, and Jim Knight intervened in the case.

The Arkansas Supreme Court had previously granted expedited consideration and bifurcated the proceedings into two counts. For Count I, the court appointed a special master to resolve factual disputes about the number of valid signatures. The special master found that LVC had properly certified that no paid canvasser had disqualifying offenses and that LVC did not violate the pay-per-signature ban. The special master disqualified some signatures but concluded that LVC still had enough valid signatures to meet the requirement.

The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the special master’s findings and determined that LVC complied with the statutory requirements for certifying paid canvassers. The court also found that the petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that LVC violated the pay-per-signature ban. As a result, the court denied the petition on Count I, allowing the proposed amendment to remain on the ballot. The court’s decision was based on the lack of clear error in the special master’s findings and the petitioners' failure to meet their burden of proof.

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E079078(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 11, 2024

Judge: RAPHAEL

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Consumer Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves a dispute between a taxpayers' association and a water district over the imposition of groundwater replenishment charges. The taxpayers' association alleged that the water district's charges violated constitutional provisions and unfairly benefited large agricultural businesses. The association sought a writ of mandate to stop the collection of these charges and to vacate the resolutions imposing them. They also claimed conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against the water district's board members, general manager, and consulting firms.

The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike several causes of action on the grounds that they arose from protected activities. The court found that the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute applied. Additionally, the court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the first amended petition and complaint, finding the claims time-barred under the validation statutes. The court also awarded over $180,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, deeming the anti-SLAPP motion frivolous.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the public interest exemption did not apply because the relief sought could only be provided by the water district, not the individual defendants. The court found that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted for most causes of action, except for conversion and the writ of mandate against the general manager. Consequently, the fee award was reversed. The court also affirmed the demurrer ruling, as the claims against the individual defendants were not legally sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings.

State v. Garrison

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20773

Opinion Date: October 15, 2024

Judge: Richard A. Robinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree after an altercation with a friend, during which he stabbed the friend multiple times. Following the incident, the defendant sought medical treatment at a hospital for injuries sustained during the fight. While at the hospital, he was questioned by several police officers without being advised of his Miranda rights. The defendant moved to suppress the statements made during these interactions, arguing that he was in custody and subject to interrogation without proper Miranda warnings.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant was not in custody during the hospital questioning. The court noted that the defendant was not handcuffed, was coherent despite his intoxication, and was not subjected to prolonged or aggressive questioning. The defendant was subsequently found guilty of assault in the first degree and sentenced to ten years of incarceration, suspended after seven years, with five years of probation.

The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned by the police at the hospital. The court reasoned that the presence of multiple officers, the defendant's physical condition, and the nature of the questioning created a custodial environment. The Appellate Court held that the trial court should have suppressed the statements and remanded the case for a new trial.

The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not in custody during the hospital interactions. The court emphasized that the defendant was not physically restrained by the police, the questioning was not aggressive or prolonged, and the defendant was informed that he was free to leave for police purposes. The court concluded that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Therefore, the police were not required to administer Miranda warnings, and the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed.

Richardson v. Secretary, Florida Agency for Health Care Administration

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2024-1314

Opinion Date: October 10, 2024

Judge: Couriel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Adam Richardson, a citizen and taxpayer, petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for writs of quo warranto and mandamus, alleging that the Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) violated section 104.31, Florida Statutes, by advocating against a proposed constitutional amendment (Amendment 4) related to abortion rights. Richardson claimed that their actions, including statements on an AHCA webpage and social media, as well as participation in a public call and opinion piece, unlawfully interfered with the vote on Amendment 4.

The lower courts did not review this case as it was directly brought to the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson argued that the respondents' actions violated a statute limiting political activities of state officers and employees, which he believed should be enforced through extraordinary writs.

The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition. The court held that the writ of quo warranto is traditionally used to test the right of a person to hold an office or exercise a state-derived power, not to compel criminal prosecution or enable private enforcement of a criminal statute. The court found that Richardson's grievances were more about the merits of the respondents' actions rather than their authority to act. Additionally, the court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that Richardson did not establish a clear legal right or an indisputable legal duty on the part of the respondents, nor did he show that there was no other adequate remedy available. The court concluded that no further relief was required to complete the exercise of its jurisdiction and denied the petition without permitting a rehearing.

BURNS v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23G1192

Opinion Date: October 15, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Derek Burns was convicted of aggravated assault and other crimes following a jury trial in 2019. During his detention, Burns made three recorded phone calls to his attorney, Daniel Daugherty, on the jail’s phone line. Each call began with a recorded message stating that the call was being recorded. Despite Daugherty’s requests to stop the recording, the calls continued. The conversations primarily involved procedural matters about obtaining a bond and personal topics. At trial, Detective Lisa Wells testified that she had listened to these calls, leading Burns to move for a mistrial, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.

The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, finding no harm to Burns as the calls did not contain privileged information. Burns filed a motion for a new trial, which was also denied. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for further consideration of the Sixth Amendment issue. On remand, the trial court again denied the motion for a new trial, concluding that the calls were not protected by attorney-client privilege and did not contain any prejudicial information.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the jail calls were not protected by attorney-client privilege because they did not involve the giving or receiving of legal advice. The court concluded that the procedural and personal nature of the calls did not warrant privilege protection. Consequently, there was no violation of Burns’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

WALLACE v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0422

Opinion Date: October 15, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

David Dajuanta Wallace was convicted of felony murder and a firearm offense related to the shooting death of Darius Bottoms. Wallace argued that the evidence was insufficient, that his due process rights were violated by being required to wear a leg iron and prison clothing during the trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

A Fulton County grand jury indicted Wallace and two co-defendants for various crimes, including felony murder and gang activity. Wallace pled guilty to some charges and went to trial on others. The jury found him guilty of felony murder and a firearm offense. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder and an additional five years for the firearm charge. Wallace's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support Wallace's convictions. The court held that the testimony of an accomplice was corroborated by other evidence, satisfying Georgia statutory law. Constitutionally, the evidence allowed the jury to find Wallace guilty as a party to the crimes rather than merely an accessory after the fact. The court also determined that any error related to Wallace wearing a leg iron was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given that the jury could not see the leg iron, Wallace used it strategically, and the strong evidence of his guilt.

Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court concluded that Wallace failed to show either deficiency or prejudice. The court affirmed Wallace's convictions and the trial court's rulings.

State v. Hoffman

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-23-0000185

Opinion Date: October 17, 2024

Judge: McKenna

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Randall Hoffman was observed by Officer Warren Tavares of the Hawai'i State Department of Land and Natural Resources dumping green waste from a trailer on a Kaua'i roadside. After a verbal exchange and a physical altercation, Hoffman was arrested and charged with assault against a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest, and criminal littering. During the encounter, Hoffman made several statements to Officer Tavares without being Mirandized.

The Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit suppressed all of Hoffman's statements, concluding they were made during custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. The court found that Officer Tavares's statements were likely to elicit incriminating responses from Hoffman. The State appealed, arguing that the statements were made in response to actions and words normally attendant to arrest and custody.

The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court's order. The ICA agreed that some of Officer Tavares's statements were likely to elicit incriminating responses and upheld the suppression of Hoffman's statement about being turned away from a county refuse station. However, the ICA ruled that other statements by Hoffman, including his expletive responses and his statement during the scuffle, were voluntary utterances not in response to interrogation.

The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and held that under Article I, Section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution, the ultimate inquiry is whether a law enforcement officer knew or should have known that their words or conduct were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The court affirmed the ICA's decision in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that some of Hoffman's statements were indeed responses to interrogation and should be suppressed, while others were not.

State of Iowa v. Miller

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-1122

Opinion Date: October 11, 2024

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A sixteen-year-old defendant, concerned that a poor Spanish grade might hinder his plans to study abroad, conspired with a friend to murder his Spanish teacher. They meticulously planned and executed the murder, later bragging about it to classmates. The defendant initially lied to the police but eventually pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, agreeing to challenge only his sentence. At sentencing, the State recommended life imprisonment with parole eligibility after thirty years, while the defendant argued against any minimum term. The district court sentenced him to life with parole eligibility after thirty-five years.

The Iowa District Court for Jefferson County rejected the defendant's argument that a minimum sentence required expert testimony. The court considered various factors, including the impact on the victim's family and community, the defendant's role in the crime, and his potential for rehabilitation. The court found that the severity and premeditation of the crime warranted a minimum term of thirty-five years before parole eligibility.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether sentencing juvenile offenders to a minimum term before parole eligibility violates the Iowa Constitution and whether expert testimony is required to impose such a sentence. The court upheld the district court's decision, ruling that the Iowa Constitution does not categorically ban minimum sentences for juveniles and that expert testimony is not mandatory. The court found that the district court properly considered the relevant factors and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to life with the possibility of parole after thirty-five years. The sentence was affirmed.

State ex rel. Spung v. Evnen

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 800

Opinion Date: October 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In the summer of 2024, the Nebraska Secretary of State announced he would not implement recent statutory amendments allowing individuals convicted of felonies to vote upon completing their sentences, deeming the amendments unconstitutional. In response, individuals who had completed their sentences filed for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary and county election commissioners to implement the amendments and allow them to register to vote.

The case was brought directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court. The relators argued that the amendments provided a clear right to vote and imposed a clear duty on the respondents to allow voter registration. The Secretary, supported by an Attorney General's opinion, argued that the amendments were unconstitutional, asserting that the power to restore voting rights lies with the Board of Pardons, not the Legislature.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case, noting that fewer than five judges found the amendments unconstitutional, as required by the Nebraska Constitution to invalidate a legislative act. Consequently, the court determined that the relators had established the prerequisites for mandamus relief. The court issued a peremptory writ directing the Secretary and election commissioners to use voter registration forms required by the amendments and to register the individual relators upon receipt of complete applications. The court also ordered the Secretary to remove any disqualification on registration not contained within the amendments and to comply fully with the new statutory provisions.

MASS LAND ACQUISITION, LLC VS. DISTRICT COURT

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 67

Opinion Date: October 17, 2024

Judge: Kristina Pickering

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Utilities Law

A Nevada limited liability company, Mass Land Acquisition, LLC, challenged the use of eminent domain by Sierra Pacific Power Company, d/b/a NV Energy, to take an easement across its property for a natural gas pipeline. NV Energy sought immediate occupancy of the property, while Mass Land argued that such a taking by a private entity violated the Nevada Constitution and requested a jury determination on whether the taking was for a public use.

The First Judicial District Court of Nevada denied Mass Land's motion to dismiss and granted NV Energy's motion for immediate occupancy. The court concluded that NV Energy, as a regulated public utility, was exercising delegated eminent domain powers and acting as the government, not as a private party. The court also found that the taking was for a natural gas pipeline, a statutorily recognized public use, and thus did not require a jury determination on public use before granting occupancy.

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied Mass Land's petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The court held that the Nevada Constitution's prohibition on transferring property taken by eminent domain to another private party did not apply to NV Energy's taking for a natural gas pipeline, as it was a public use. The court also determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact requiring a jury determination on whether the taking was actually for a public use. The court concluded that NV Energy's actions were lawful and consistent with the statutory and constitutional provisions governing eminent domain in Nevada.

State v. Edwards

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 62

Opinion Date: October 16, 2024

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A Sturgis police officer stopped a vehicle for a headlamp violation. The driver, who lacked identification, was found with methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia and was arrested. Wanda Edwards, the passenger, refused to hand over her purse during a vehicle search. Law enforcement forcibly took and searched the purse, finding methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Edwards was charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of marijuana, and obstructing a law enforcement officer. She moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, but the motion was denied, and she was convicted.

The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Meade County, South Dakota, denied Edwards' motion to suppress, ruling that the search of the vehicle and its contents, including Edwards' purse, was lawful as it was incident to the driver's arrest. The court concluded that the purse was a container within the vehicle at the time of the arrest, and Edwards' attempt to remove it did not change its status.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. Edwards argued that the search of her purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights, citing that probable cause to search a vehicle does not extend to a passenger's person. The State argued that the search was justified under the automobile exception and as a search incident to arrest. The court held that the search of Edwards' purse was lawful under the automobile exception, as probable cause to search the vehicle extended to all containers within it, including personal belongings of passengers. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, upholding Edwards' convictions.