O'Neil v. Canton Police Department

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-2062

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: LYNCH

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The appellants, Meredith O'Neil, Jessica Svedine, Deanna Corby, and Roberto Silva, sued various officials from the Canton Police Department and the Town of Canton, Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of Massachusetts witness intimidation statutes, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268 §§ 13A and 13B. They claimed that these statutes violated their First Amendment rights, fearing prosecution for their actions during a November 5, 2023 protest and alleging that their speech would be chilled for a planned protest on November 12, 2023. The appellants moved for emergency relief to enjoin the enforcement of these statutes.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the emergency motion on November 10, 2023. The court assumed the plaintiffs had standing but found they did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court held that the statutes served compelling interests in protecting the administration of justice and were narrowly tailored. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown they faced a risk of irreparable harm, noting that the plaintiffs had other public forums to express their views. The balance of harms and public interest considerations also weighed against granting the injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal as moot. The court noted that the state court had dismissed the charges against the appellants for lack of probable cause, and no ongoing conduct remained for the court to enjoin. The court also found that the appellants' general allegations of future protests did not show a credible threat of prosecution, failing to establish standing for their pre-enforcement challenges. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings as appropriate.

US v. Donovan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1328

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: Montecalvo

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Federal agents executed a search warrant at Corey Donovan's rural property in New Hampshire, discovering a shotgun, ammunition, and modified oil filters suspected to be homemade silencers. Donovan, a convicted felon, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. His girlfriend, Kelley Finnigan, claimed ownership of the shotgun but invoked her Fifth Amendment right when called to testify.

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire denied Donovan's motion to grant Finnigan immunity and allowed her to invoke a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege. The court also permitted the introduction of evidence related to Donovan's prior arrest and possession of non-firearm weapons, offering to provide limiting instructions if requested during the trial. Donovan did not object to the lack of contemporaneous limiting instructions or the final jury instructions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Donovan's appeal, which challenged the district court's decisions on Finnigan's Fifth Amendment invocation, the lack of limiting instructions, and the application of a sentencing enhancement for the modified oil filters. The appellate court found no clear or obvious error in allowing Finnigan to invoke her Fifth Amendment right, as her testimony could reasonably incriminate her. The court also determined that Donovan waived his right to challenge the lack of limiting instructions by failing to object during the trial.

Regarding the sentencing enhancement, the appellate court upheld the district court's finding that the modified oil filters qualified as homemade silencers under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25). The court affirmed Donovan's conviction and sentence, concluding that the evidence supported the application of the sentencing enhancement.

United States v. Suquilanda

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1197

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: LEE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Manuel Antonio Suquilanda was convicted of unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged his conviction on two grounds: first, that the initial removal proceedings were invalid because the Notice to Appear (NTA) he received lacked the place of hearing and address-of-filing information, thus stripping the Immigration Court of jurisdiction; and second, that § 1326 is unconstitutional as it discriminates against Latin Americans, violating the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Suquilanda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that any defect in the NTA did not deprive the Immigration Court of jurisdiction, referencing the Second Circuit’s precedent in Banegas Gomez v. Barr. The court also concluded that the address-of-filing requirement was a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. On the constitutional challenge, the court found that while the 1929 Act had discriminatory intent, Suquilanda failed to show that the 1952 reenactment of § 1326 was motivated by racial animus.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the missing hearing information in the NTA was cured by a subsequent notice, and the address-of-filing requirement was non-jurisdictional. On the constitutional issue, the court applied the Arlington Heights framework and found that Suquilanda did not demonstrate that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the 1952 enactment of § 1326. Consequently, the court concluded that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.

United States v. Smith

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4508

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: KING

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves defendants Aghee William Smith II and David Alcorn, who were convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for their roles in fraudulent schemes that defrauded investors of millions of dollars. The schemes included marketing and selling phony investments in a dental services marketing program and fraudulent spectrum investments. The fraudulent activities primarily targeted elderly victims, resulting in significant financial losses.

In the district court, Smith and Alcorn were tried together before a jury in February 2022. They raised three main issues on appeal: a joint constitutional challenge to the district court’s COVID-19 trial protocol under the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Smith’s separate challenge to the admission of videotaped depositions under the Confrontation Clause, and Alcorn’s challenge to the imposition of supervised release conditions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Smith and Alcorn’s joint contention that the COVID-19 trial protocol violated their rights under the Public Trial Clause, finding that the protocol did not constitute a partial courtroom closure and was justified by substantial public health reasons. The court also rejected Smith’s Confrontation Clause challenge, concluding that the government had made a good faith effort to secure the witnesses’ presence at trial and that the witnesses were unavailable due to health concerns.

However, the court found merit in Alcorn’s challenge regarding the imposition of supervised release conditions. The district court had failed to properly incorporate the standard conditions of supervised release during the oral pronouncement of Alcorn’s sentence, leading to a Rogers error. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing.

In summary, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentences, affirmed Alcorn’s convictions, but vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing.

Orellana v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60248

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Immigration Law

Astrid Dariana Lopez Orellana, a noncitizen, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2019, fleeing gang threats in Honduras. In 2022, she was convicted of accessory after the fact to armed robbery under Louisiana law. Subsequently, she was taken into ICE custody and designated as an aggravated felon, leading to expedited removal proceedings.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) and a Notice of Intent (NOI) to remove her, alleging her conviction was an aggravated felony. Lopez requested withholding of removal, and an asylum officer found she had a reasonable fear of persecution if returned to Honduras. Her case was referred to an Immigration Judge (IJ). DHS later issued a new NOI and FARO on the same day, claiming her conviction was an aggravated felony related to obstruction of justice. Lopez challenged this, arguing the Louisiana statute did not match the federal definition of obstruction of justice, and that DHS violated procedural regulations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Louisiana accessory-after-the-fact statute requires only general intent, whereas the federal obstruction of justice offense requires specific intent. Therefore, the state statute is not a categorical match for the federal offense. The court also determined that DHS violated Lopez’s due process rights by not following proper procedures, such as issuing the FARO and NOI on the same day and failing to serve the FARO in a timely manner.

The Fifth Circuit granted Lopez’s petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded the case to DHS for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court directed the government to facilitate Lopez’s participation in these proceedings.

United States v. Diaz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50452

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: Wiener

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On November 4, 2020, San Antonio police officers stopped a car driven by Ronnie Diaz, Jr. They detected a strong odor of marijuana and found empty baggies commonly used for narcotics. Diaz admitted to having ammunition in his pocket and being a convicted felon. A search of the vehicle revealed a .45 caliber pistol, methamphetamine, counterfeit Xanax, and heroin. Diaz had prior convictions, including theft of a vehicle and evading arrest in 2014, and possession of a firearm as a felon in 2018.

Diaz was charged in the Western District of Texas with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possessing firearms during a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge, arguing it violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Diaz was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 120 months for counts one and three, to run concurrently, and 60 months for count two, to run consecutively.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Diaz raised two claims: that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied, and that the statute exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The court dismissed the Commerce Clause argument as foreclosed by precedent. Applying the historical analysis required by New York Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the court found that the regulation of firearm possession by felons is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Diaz and facially. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Diaz’s conviction.

Diei v. Boyd

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5771

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: READLER

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Kimberly Diei, a pharmacy student at the University of Tennessee Health Science Center, maintained social media accounts under a pseudonym where she posted about song lyrics, fashion, and sexuality. Her posts did not identify her as a student or affiliate her with the university. Despite this, the College of Pharmacy's Professional Conduct Committee investigated her social media activity following anonymous complaints. The Committee found her posts "sexual," "crude," and "vulgar," and ultimately voted to expel her. Diei appealed, and the Dean reversed the expulsion decision.

Diei then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, asserting violations of her First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for emotional distress. The district court dismissed her complaint, ruling that her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot due to her graduation and that her remaining claims failed to state a claim for relief. The court also held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Diei's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot but found that her claims for damages were still viable. The court held that Diei plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation, as her social media posts were unrelated to her studies, caused no disruption, and were made under a pseudonym. The court also found that the district court improperly relied on documents not properly before it when dismissing Diei's complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Diei's claims for damages and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Diei's speech was protected by the First Amendment and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage.

Banyee v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2252

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Stras

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Immigration Law

Nyynkpao Banyee, a citizen of Ivory Coast and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was detained for a year while awaiting a decision on his deportation. His criminal history includes theft, lying to the police, and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, culminating in a robbery with a dangerous weapon conviction. This led federal authorities to initiate deportation proceedings. Initially, an immigration judge ruled the robbery conviction as a "crime of violence," disqualifying Banyee from certain discretionary relief. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Borden v. United States, the government argued the conviction was an attempted "theft offense." The immigration judge eventually canceled Banyee's removal, but the government successfully appealed, and Banyee's appeal is still pending.

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted Banyee's habeas petition, ruling that his year-long detention without individualized review violated due process. The court ordered a bond hearing, which resulted in Banyee's release after the government failed to prove he was a danger or flight risk. The government appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Eighth Circuit held that detention during deportation proceedings is constitutionally valid, as established in Demore v. Kim. The court emphasized that the length of detention does not determine its legality as long as deportation remains a possibility and the detention serves its purpose. The court found no evidence of dilatory tactics by either side and noted that Banyee's detention was not punitive. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case for the denial of Banyee's habeas petition.

Henderson v. Springfield R-12 School District

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1880

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In 2020, the Springfield R-12 School District mandated "equity training" for its employees. Two employees, Brooke Henderson and Jennifer Lumley, attended the training and later sued the school district and several officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They claimed that the training compelled them to speak on matters of public concern and engaged in viewpoint discrimination, violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The training included interactive sessions and online modules that required participants to discuss prompts and select "correct" answers to questions about equity and diversity.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not suffer an injury in fact. The court also deemed the lawsuit frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees to the school district. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not establish an injury in fact. The court found that the plaintiffs' fear of punishment for their speech during the training was speculative and not objectively reasonable. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' completion of online modules did not constitute a First Amendment injury. However, the Eighth Circuit reversed the award of attorney’s fees, determining that the plaintiffs' claims were not frivolous given the nuanced and unsettled nature of the constitutional issues involved.

United States v. Ruiz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-2027

Opinion Date: September 16, 2024

Judge: BALDOCK

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Customs and Border Patrol officers seized Sergio Ruiz at the Columbus, New Mexico port of entry with 20.8 kilograms of methamphetamine and an active GPS tracker hidden in his truck’s spare tire. The government used testimony from a confidential informant, Eric Weaver, who identified Ruiz as “Tire Man,” a known narcotics courier. Ruiz argued that the identification should be suppressed due to a suggestive pretrial photo array.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Ruiz’s motion to suppress the identification. The court found that although the photo array leaned toward not being impermissibly suggestive, Weaver’s identification was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Weaver had multiple opportunities to observe Ruiz closely and provided consistent and accurate descriptions of him before the photo array. The jury subsequently convicted Ruiz on all counts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied a two-part test to determine if the identification violated Ruiz’s due process rights. First, it assessed whether the photo array was unduly suggestive. Second, it evaluated the reliability of the identification using the Biggers factors. The court concluded that even if the photo array was suggestive, Weaver’s identification was reliable. Weaver had multiple encounters with Ruiz, paid close attention to his appearance, provided accurate descriptions, and expressed confidence in his identification. The court found no substantial likelihood of misidentification and affirmed the district court’s denial of Ruiz’s motion to suppress.

Jarrard v. Sheriff of Polk County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-10332

Opinion Date: September 16, 2024

Judge: NEWSOM

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

A member of the Church of Christ, Stephen Jarrard, participated in a county jail's volunteer ministry program but was later dismissed and denied reentry. He sued, claiming his dismissal violated his free speech rights under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment against Jarrard, rejecting his claims.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia initially reviewed the case. The court applied the Pickering test, typically used for government employees, and concluded that Jarrard's speech was not constitutionally protected. The court also found that even if his speech were protected, the law was not clearly established, granting qualified immunity to the jail officials.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the Pickering test was not appropriate for Jarrard, who was not a de facto government employee. Instead, the court applied the usual forum analysis and found that the jail officials engaged in viewpoint discrimination by excluding Jarrard based on his beliefs about baptism. The court also held that the jail's policies violated the First Amendment by giving officials unbridled discretion in evaluating volunteer applications. The court concluded that these actions could not survive strict scrutiny and that the law was clearly established, denying qualified immunity to the officials.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision granting summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on Jarrard's claims.

Meshal v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Public Safety

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-10128

Opinion Date: September 16, 2024

Judge: JILL PRYOR

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Amir Meshal, a professional truck driver, was stopped by Georgia State Police officers for a minor traffic infraction. During the stop, the officers discovered Meshal was on the FBI’s No Fly List. Despite instructions not to detain him based solely on this status, the officers handcuffed Meshal, placed him in a patrol car, and searched his truck. They questioned him about his religion and international travel while waiting for guidance from the FBI. After 91 minutes, the FBI cleared Meshal, and he was released with a warning citation for the traffic infraction.

Meshal sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights due to the extended detention and the search of his truck. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that Meshal failed to allege a violation of clearly established law. The district court denied the motion, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the officers detained Meshal without arguable reasonable suspicion and searched his truck without arguable probable cause.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, holding that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. The court found that the officers lacked even arguable reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to complete tasks related to the traffic infraction. Additionally, the court held that the search of Meshal’s truck was not supported by arguable probable cause. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

United States v. Butler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12798

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: JORDAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Andrew Butler III was convicted by a jury of knowingly and intentionally possessing five grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him to 84 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Butler appealed, arguing that the district court wrongly revoked his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

Initially, the district court appointed Assistant Federal Public Defender Elizabeth Vallejo to represent Butler, but he expressed dissatisfaction, leading to her replacement by Robert A. Morris. Butler continued to file pro se motions disparaging Morris, resulting in Morris’s replacement by Richard A. Greenberg. Butler then requested to represent himself, and after a Faretta hearing, the court allowed it, appointing Greenberg as standby counsel. However, Butler’s disruptive behavior, including refusing to attend hearings and threatening not to attend the trial, led the court to revoke his self-representation right and appoint Mutaqee Akbar as his counsel.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in revoking Butler’s right to self-representation due to his repeated and serious obstructionist misconduct, which spanned months and disrupted the trial schedule. The court emphasized that the right to self-representation is not a license to disrupt court proceedings and that the district court had given Butler multiple warnings and opportunities to comply.

Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit found that the evidence presented at trial, including the methamphetamine found in the safe in Butler’s hotel room and his incriminating post-arrest recorded call, was sufficient to support the conviction. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding Butler’s conviction and sentence.

People v. Valle

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A169080(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: Siggins

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with three felonies related to firearm and ammunition possession. During a traffic stop, police officers discovered a loaded handgun in his vehicle. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the traffic stop was unduly prolonged and pretextual, and dismissed the case.

The Sonoma County Superior Court found that the traffic stop was pretextual and unduly prolonged, as the officers could have issued the citation at the gas station where they first observed the defendant. The court also noted that new legislation would make pretextual stops illegal, although this law was not yet in effect. The court concluded that the stop was designed to allow time for a canine unit to arrive and conduct a search, which it deemed unreasonable.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court's finding of an unduly prolonged stop was unsupported by substantial evidence. The appellate court noted that the traffic stop began when the vehicle was pulled over, not when the officers first observed the defendant. The court found that the time taken to write the citation and conduct the canine search was within the normal duration for such activities. Additionally, the court clarified that the new Vehicle Code section 2806.5, which prohibits pretextual stops, was not in effect at the time of the stop and does not alter the federal constitutional analysis regarding pretextual stops. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence and remanded the case for further proceedings.

GONZALEZ v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0913

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Jesus Olvera Gonzalez, who was convicted of malice murder for the stabbing death of Jesus Arizaga. The incident occurred on September 8, 2019, when a 911 call reported a stabbing at a residence. Gonzalez and Arizaga had been drinking and arguing, leading to Gonzalez stabbing Arizaga. When officers arrived, they found Gonzalez with blood on his hands and shirt. He was handcuffed and asked about the location of the knife, which he indicated was inside the house. Arizaga was found with multiple stab wounds and later died. Gonzalez was arrested, and evidence, including photographs and DNA swabs, was collected.

A Forsyth County grand jury indicted Gonzalez on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. In May 2022, a jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Gonzalez filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in March 2024. He then filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Gonzalez argued that his statement to police about the knife should have been suppressed because it was made before he received Miranda warnings. The court held that the public safety exception to Miranda applied, as the officer's question was necessary to secure the scene and ensure safety. Gonzalez also challenged the admission of photographs and DNA evidence, claiming they were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and his right against self-incrimination. The court found no error, ruling that the evidence was lawfully obtained as part of a search incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate his rights.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decisions, upholding Gonzalez's conviction and sentence.

Davis v. Yenchko

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129751

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: O'Brien

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Aaron and Charles Davis were charged with felony reckless discharge of a firearm in July 2016, leading to the revocation of their Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) cards by the Illinois State Police under section 8(n) of the FOID Card Act. They later pleaded guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges and had their FOID cards reissued in 2017. Subsequently, they filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that section 8(n) is unconstitutional as applied to individuals charged but not convicted of a felony, and an injunction to prevent future suspensions of FOID cards under similar circumstances.

The Circuit Court of Madison County granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring section 8(n) unconstitutional as applied to individuals charged but not convicted of a felony, and issued a permanent injunction against the suspension of FOID cards under this section. The court found the case moot but applied the public interest exception to mootness, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing. The defendant's motion to stay the order was denied, and the plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees and costs.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and found that the plaintiffs lacked standing when they filed the action because their FOID cards had already been restored. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were moot and that the public interest exception to mootness did not apply to standing. Consequently, the court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the plaintiffs' first amended complaint. The order granting attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was also vacated.

People v. Turner

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129208

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: Rochford

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm, conspiracy to commit aggravated discharge of a firearm, and two counts of perjury following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The charges stemmed from a shooting incident in which the defendant was injured and subsequently treated in a hospital trauma room. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing his clothing from the trauma room without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the clothing was in plain view and that the defendant had consented to the seizure.

The Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress but vacated the defendant's conspiracy and one perjury conviction. The appellate court addressed the defendant's new argument that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trauma room, ultimately finding that he had forfeited this issue by raising it for the first time in his motion for a new trial. However, the court chose to address the issue and concluded that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trauma room.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that the defendant did not meet his burden of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trauma room. The court considered factors such as ownership, legitimate presence, possessory interest, prior use, ability to control or exclude others, and subjective expectation of privacy. The court found that the defendant had no ownership or possessory interest in the trauma room, did not introduce evidence of the ability to exclude others, and failed to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was upheld.

In the Matter of F.A.

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13515

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: Budd

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

F.A. has been involuntarily committed to state mental health facilities since 1999 after being found not guilty of a sexual offense due to mental illness. In 2020, a District Court judge renewed F.A.'s commitment and imposed a restriction confining F.A. to the buildings and grounds of the facility. F.A. challenged the constitutionality of this restriction.

Previously, the Worcester Division of the District Court Department had renewed F.A.'s commitment annually and imposed similar restrictions since 2013. In 2020, F.A. opposed the Commonwealth's motion for the restriction, but the judge granted it after an evidentiary hearing. The judge did not require the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the restriction was necessary. In 2021, a different judge imposed the same restriction without an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Division of the District Court affirmed the 2020 restriction but vacated the 2021 restriction due to the lack of a hearing. F.A. appealed the 2020 decision, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and found that the 2020 order violated F.A.'s substantive and procedural due process rights. The court held that a restriction under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (e) must be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest and be the least restrictive means available. The judge failed to make such findings and did not consider less restrictive alternatives. Additionally, the court found that the judge used an incorrect standard of proof and did not provide timely, specific findings to support the restriction. Consequently, the court vacated the 2020 order.

State ex rel. Brooks v. Evnen

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 581

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

Two relators challenged a ballot initiative proposing to amend the Nebraska Constitution to include a right to abortion. The initiative sought to establish a fundamental right to abortion until fetal viability or when necessary to protect the life or health of the pregnant patient, without state interference. The relators argued that the initiative violated the single subject rule of the Nebraska Constitution and contained confusing language.

The relators presented their objections to the Nebraska Secretary of State, who decided to certify the initiative for the ballot. The relators then filed petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to remove the initiative from the ballot. The Nebraska Supreme Court granted leave to file the actions and issued alternative writs of mandamus, ordering the Secretary of State to show cause why the initiative should not be removed.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the initiative did not violate the single subject rule. The court found that the initiative's provisions were naturally and necessarily related to the general subject of creating a constitutional right to abortion. The court also rejected the argument that the initiative's language was confusing and misleading. Consequently, the court denied the writs of mandamus and dissolved the alternative writs by operation of law.

State ex rel. Constance v. Evnen

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 600

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: Cassel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

A group of 29 physicians challenged a proposed ballot initiative in Nebraska that sought to add a new section to the state constitution, protecting unborn children from abortion in the second and third trimesters, except in cases of medical emergency, sexual assault, or incest. The physicians argued that the initiative violated the single subject rule and would create voter confusion.

The Nebraska Supreme Court had previously reviewed a similar initiative titled "Protect the Right to Abortion" and found it did not violate the single subject rule. The physicians conceded that if the first initiative was allowed, the second should be as well, given their structural similarities. They filed for a writ of mandamus to prevent the second initiative from appearing on the ballot, arguing it should be withheld based on the same principles applied to the first initiative.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the second initiative did not violate the single subject rule. The court applied the "natural and necessary" test and found that all parts of the initiative related to the same subject. The court also noted that arguments about potential voter confusion were not separate requirements for determining the legal sufficiency of the measure. Additionally, the court found that other arguments presented by the physicians were not ripe for review, as they were based on contingent future events.

Ultimately, the Nebraska Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus, allowing the second initiative to appear on the ballot. The court dissolved the alternative writ and concluded that the Secretary of State did not have a duty to withhold the initiative from the general election ballot.

State ex rel. Citizens Not Politicians v. Ohio Ballot Bd.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-4547

Opinion Date: September 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A proposed constitutional amendment in Ohio seeks to repeal Articles XI and XIX of the Ohio Constitution and add Article XX, changing the standards and procedures for drawing electoral districts. The amendment would create a 15-member redistricting commission responsible for adopting redistricting plans. Citizens Not Politicians, a coalition aiming to end gerrymandering, and other relators challenged the ballot language and title adopted by the Ohio Ballot Board and Secretary of State Frank LaRose, arguing they were misleading.

The Ohio Ballot Board approved the ballot language by a three-to-two vote. Relators filed for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to adopt new language and title. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ballot language and title would mislead, deceive, or defraud voters. The court found that sections five and eight of the ballot language were misleading. Section five inaccurately limited judicial review to a "proportionality standard," and section eight failed to mention the public's right to participate in the redistricting process through public meetings and hearings.

The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the Ohio Ballot Board and Secretary of State to reconvene and adopt revised ballot language addressing these defects. The court denied the writ in all other respects, finding the remaining sections of the ballot language and the ballot title to be factually accurate and not misleading. The motion for leave to withdraw the answer was granted, and the motion to strike was denied as moot.