Srour v. New York City

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-7549

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: LEE

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In 2019, Joseph Srour was denied a permit to possess rifles and shotguns in his home by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) License Division. Srour subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of the New York City Administrative Code and the Rules of the City of New York, particularly the requirement that an applicant have "good moral character" to be issued a permit.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Srour's motion for summary judgment regarding the New York City Administrative Code, enjoining the enforcement of the "good moral character" and "good cause" requirements, and declaring them unconstitutional. The district court did not decide the amount of damages. The City of New York and the NYPD Police Commissioner filed an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, seeking review of the district court's judgment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the case was moot because Srour had been granted the rifle and shotgun permit he sought. The court found that there was no reasonable expectation that the City would resume the challenged conduct, as Srour's permit was subject to automatic renewal unless he violated laws or was rearrested. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's judgment enjoining the enforcement of the "good moral character" requirement and declaring it unconstitutional, dismissed the appeal as moot, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Srour's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot.

Lumumba v. Kiser

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-7512

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: RICHARDSON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1999, a Virginia state court jury convicted Askari Lumumba of second-degree murder and other related charges, sentencing him to fifty-eight years in prison. While serving his sentence, Lumumba engaged in communications that led to disciplinary action. He spoke on the phone about organizing inmates and sent emails discussing potential group actions within the prison. As a result, he was charged with attempting to garner support for a group demonstration, violating Disciplinary Offense Code 128, which prohibits participating in or encouraging work stoppages or group demonstrations.

Lumumba's disciplinary hearing concluded with a finding of guilt, resulting in 30 days of disciplinary segregation and a loss of 180 days of good-conduct sentence credits. His appeals to the Warden and Regional Director were denied. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which was denied on jurisdictional grounds. Subsequently, Lumumba filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that Offense Code 128 was void for vagueness and violated the First Amendment. The district court dismissed his petition, finding the regulation clear and reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Offense Code 128 is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it reasonably relates to maintaining order and security in prisons. The court also found that the regulation is not void for vagueness, as it provides sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lumumba's petition.

Miller v. Nelson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50537

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

Independent candidates and minor political parties in Texas challenged several provisions of the Texas Election Code, arguing that these provisions, when combined, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing severe and unequal burdens on non-wealthy Independents and Minor Parties. The provisions in question include requirements for obtaining ballot access through primary elections, party nominations, or nominating petitions, as well as restrictions on petitioning methods and timelines.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found that the requirement for candidates to submit hardcopy signatures for ballot access petitions was unconstitutional, reasoning that it imposed an unequal burden on the plaintiffs compared to Major Parties, which could use electronic methods. The court enjoined the enforcement of the paper-petitioning process but stayed its injunction pending appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the Anderson-Burdick framework to evaluate the constitutionality of the ballot-access laws. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the challenged provisions imposed severe burdens on them. The court upheld the numerical signature requirement, the costs associated with obtaining signatures, the time constraints on petitioning, and the restrictive petitioning procedures as justified by legitimate state interests. The court also upheld the filing fee or petition requirement for Minor Party candidates and rejected the claim that the provisions imposed more severe restrictions on presidential Independents.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the paper-petitioning requirement was unconstitutional, noting that all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, must obtain petition signatures through hardcopy methods. The court affirmed the constitutionality of the challenged provisions and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.

Senn v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-10661

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Andrew S. Oldham

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Ray Senn was convicted in a Texas state court of sexual assault and prohibited sexual conduct with his intellectually disabled daughter, Brenda, who has an IQ of 64 and the competence of a preteen. In 2011, Senn raped Brenda, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child in January 2012. DNA testing confirmed Senn as the biological father. A Texas jury found Senn guilty and applied a sentencing enhancement under Texas Penal Code Section 22.011(f), which increased the maximum sentence to life imprisonment because Senn was already married at the time of the assault.

Senn's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the initial appellate decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Arteaga v. State. On remand, the appellate court initially found insufficient evidence for the enhancement but was later overruled by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Lopez v. State, which clarified that the enhancement applied if the defendant was married to someone other than the victim at the time of the assault. Senn's subsequent appeals, including an equal protection challenge, were rejected by the Texas courts.

Senn then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that the application of the sentencing enhancement violated the Equal Protection Clause. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied his petition, holding that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Senn failed to demonstrate that the state court's application of the law was unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law, specifically noting that the enhancement had a rational basis in protecting children and vulnerable individuals from sexual exploitation.

Josephson v. Ganzel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5293

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: MATHIS

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A psychiatrist employed at a public university's medical school participated in a panel discussion on childhood gender dysphoria, expressing views that were unpopular with his colleagues and supervisors. Following his remarks, he was demoted and his contract was not renewed after over fifteen years of employment. He sued several university officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, which argued for Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. The court found material fact disputes regarding whether the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff for his protected speech.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff's speech was protected under the First Amendment as it addressed a matter of public concern and was not made pursuant to his official duties. The court also found that the plaintiff's interest in speaking on the topic outweighed the university's interest in maintaining workplace efficiency. The court determined that the adverse actions taken against the plaintiff, including his demotion and contract nonrenewal, were motivated by his protected speech.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment, concluding that the defendants were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity or qualified immunity. The court held that the plaintiff's rights were clearly established and that a reasonable university official would have understood that retaliating against him for his speech was unlawful. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as moot.

United States v. Holt

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3106

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Johnathan Holt, just weeks before his eighteenth birthday, shot and killed a drug dealer, Quincy Battle, on behalf of the Short North Posse gang. Holt was later paralyzed from the chest down due to gun violence. A federal jury convicted him of murder in aid of racketeering and murder with a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime. The district court initially sentenced him to life imprisonment, but this was later vacated as it violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life sentences for juveniles. Holt was resentenced to 900 months in prison.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio initially sentenced Holt to life imprisonment, which was later vacated due to the Eighth Amendment violation. The district court then resentenced him to 900 months in prison. Holt appealed, arguing that his new sentence still violated the Eighth Amendment and was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court had adequately considered Holt’s youth, as required by Miller v. Alabama, and that the Eighth Amendment did not require a more lenient sentence based on his medical condition. The court also found that Holt’s procedural claims, including the district court’s handling of the presentence report and his right to allocute, did not demonstrate plain error. Finally, the court held that the 900-month sentence was substantively reasonable given the severity of Holt’s crime and the district court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing factors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.

Hotchkiss v. Cedar Rapids Community School District

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2708

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Russell Hotchkiss, a resident of Linn County, Iowa, began sending emails to the Cedar Rapids Community School District officials in September 2021, criticizing their COVID-19 masking and vaccination policies. His communications included threats of criminal charges against board members, particularly targeting Jennifer Borcherding, a board member. Hotchkiss attended board meetings in November and December 2021, where he voiced his opposition aggressively. Following these incidents, the District issued a no-trespass notice to Hotchkiss on January 10, 2022, barring him from District premises due to his disruptive and threatening behavior.

Hotchkiss filed a lawsuit on May 17, 2023, claiming First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a violation of the Iowa Open Meetings Act. He sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the no-trespass order. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied his motion, concluding that Hotchkiss failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The court noted that Hotchkiss had not attempted to return to District premises, had moved his child to another school district, and had not communicated with the District since the notice was issued.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction, agreeing that Hotchkiss did not show a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court emphasized that speculative harm does not justify a preliminary injunction and noted Hotchkiss's delay in seeking relief and lack of recent attempts to exercise his First Amendment rights. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction based on the failure to demonstrate irreparable harm.

ADAMS V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-15970

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Thomas

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Kate Adams, the former Chief of Police for the City of Rancho Cordova, was forced to resign over allegations that she sent racist text messages while working for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office. The messages, sent in 2013, included offensive images forwarded to two friends during a private conversation. Adams claimed she was merely expressing disapproval of the images. After her resignation, the messages were publicized, leading to further professional and personal repercussions for Adams.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Adams’s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims, ruling that her speech did not address a matter of public concern. The court found that the private nature of the text messages and their content did not relate to broader societal issues or public interest.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Adams’s private text messages, which were part of a casual conversation and not intended for public dissemination, did not constitute speech on a matter of public concern under the Pickering v. Board of Education standard. The court emphasized that the content, form, and context of the messages indicated they were of personal interest rather than public interest. Consequently, Adams’s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims were dismissed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved claims.

PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-55946

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Class Action, Constitutional Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles, challenging the constitutionality of a $63 late fee imposed for failing to pay a parking meter fine within 21 days. The plaintiffs argue that this late fee, which matches the amount of the original fine, violates the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The plaintiffs incurred at least one parking meter citation and late fee, and they assert that the late fee is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to individuals who cannot afford to pay it within the specified time frame.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the $63 parking fine was not "grossly disproportionate" to the offense of overstaying a parking meter. The court also rejected the challenge to the $63 late fee without providing a detailed rationale. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit previously upheld the initial fine but remanded the case to determine whether the late fee violated the Excessive Fines Clause.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment for the City regarding the late fee. The Ninth Circuit found that a genuine factual dispute exists about the City's basis for setting the late fee at 100 percent of the parking fine. The court noted that the City provided no evidence on how it determined the $63 late fee amount, making it impossible to conclude as a matter of law that the fee is not "grossly disproportional" to the harm caused by the untimely payment. The court declined to incorporate means-testing into the Excessive Fines Clause analysis, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the fee should consider individuals' ability to pay. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

United States v. Brewster

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-329

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Bennett

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Cenious Brewster led officers on a high-speed chase, which was recorded on the officers’ dashcam. Brewster crashed into a building shortly after the chase began. He was arrested, and a firearm was found in his vehicle. Brewster pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to 46 months’ imprisonment. Brewster challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying the reckless endangerment during flight enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, misunderstood his request for a downward departure based on circumstances that allegedly justified his flight, and violated his due process rights by finding that data from the Sentencing Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing INformation (JSIN) online tool was sufficiently reliable to consider at sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Brewster’s objections to the reckless endangerment enhancement, finding that his flight created a substantial risk of injury to at least one specific person. The court also rejected Brewster’s request for a downward departure or variance, characterizing it as a request for a variance only, which Brewster’s counsel confirmed. Additionally, the court found the JSIN data reliable and used it to determine Brewster’s sentence, noting that the data was consistent with information from another Sentencing Commission tool, the Interactive Data Analyzer (IDA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Brewster’s flight put at least one motorist at substantial risk of serious bodily injury. The court also found that Brewster forfeited his argument regarding the downward departure and failed to show plain error. Finally, the appellate court held that the district court did not err in finding the JSIN data reliable, as it came from a reliable source and was corroborated by other unchallenged evidence. The court denied Brewster’s motion for supplemental briefing on a Second Amendment challenge, as he could have raised it in the district court but did not. The sentence was affirmed.

WATANABE V. DERR

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-15605

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Paez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Kekai Watanabe, an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in Honolulu, was severely injured during a gang-related assault in July 2021. Despite his serious injuries, including a fractured coccyx and bone chips in surrounding tissue, the prison nurse only provided over-the-counter medication and refused to send him to a hospital. Watanabe was kept in solitary confinement for over two months and repeatedly requested medical attention, which was largely ignored. He was not properly diagnosed until February 2022 and had not seen a specialist by the time of the court proceedings.

The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii initially allowed Watanabe’s claim against the nurse to proceed but later dismissed it, concluding that no Bivens remedy existed for his Eighth Amendment claim. Watanabe appealed the dismissal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Watanabe’s claim did not present a new Bivens context, as it was not meaningfully different from the Supreme Court’s decision in Carlson v. Green, where an implied damages action was recognized under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. The court found that Watanabe’s allegations were sufficiently similar to those in Carlson, thus allowing his Bivens claim to proceed.

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit construed Watanabe’s request for injunctive relief related to his ongoing medical care as standalone claims for injunctive relief, not under Bivens. The court remanded the case to the district court to address whether Watanabe may amend his request for injunctive relief and to address any such claims in the first instance.

WOLFORD V. LOPEZ

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-16164

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Susan Graber

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In this case, several plaintiffs challenged Hawaii and California laws that restrict the carrying of firearms in various locations, arguing that these laws violate their Second Amendment rights. The laws in question generally prohibit carrying firearms in places such as parks, beaches, bars, restaurants that serve alcohol, financial institutions, and private property without explicit consent from the property owner.

The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted a preliminary injunction against Hawaii's law, enjoining the enforcement of the firearm restrictions in parking lots shared by government and non-government buildings, financial institutions, public beaches, public parks, bars, and restaurants that serve alcohol. The court also enjoined the new default rule for private property open to the public. The United States District Court for the Central District of California similarly granted a preliminary injunction against California's law, enjoining the enforcement of firearm restrictions in hospitals, playgrounds, public transit, parks, athletic facilities, places of worship, financial institutions, and private property open to the public.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed these decisions. The court affirmed the preliminary injunctions in part and reversed them in part. The Ninth Circuit held that some places specified by the Hawaii and California laws likely fall within the national tradition of prohibiting firearms at sensitive places, such as bars and restaurants that serve alcohol, parks, and similar areas. However, the court found that other places, such as financial institutions and places of worship, do not fall within this tradition. The court also held that the new default rule prohibiting the carry of firearms onto private property without consent is likely unconstitutional in California but not in Hawaii.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunctions to the extent that they enjoin restrictions on firearms at financial institutions, parking lots adjacent to financial institutions, and parking lots shared by government and non-government buildings. The court reversed the preliminary injunctions to the extent that they enjoin restrictions on firearms at bars and restaurants that serve alcohol, beaches, parks, and similar areas, and the new default rule prohibiting the carry of firearms onto private property without consent in Hawaii.

Chiles v. Salazar

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-1445

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: ROSSMAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Health Law

A licensed professional counselor in Colorado challenged the state's Minor Conversion Therapy Law (MCTL), which prohibits mental health professionals from providing conversion therapy to minors. Conversion therapy is defined as any practice attempting to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity. The plaintiff argued that the MCTL violates the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff had standing but failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claims. The court concluded that the MCTL regulates professional conduct that incidentally involves speech and is therefore subject to rational basis review, which it survives.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the MCTL regulates professional conduct by prohibiting a specific therapeutic treatment (conversion therapy) provided by licensed mental health professionals to minors. The court found that the MCTL does not target speech based on its content but regulates the practice of conversion therapy, which incidentally involves speech. The court concluded that the MCTL is subject to rational basis review and serves legitimate state interests in protecting minors from harmful and ineffective therapeutic practices and maintaining the integrity of the mental health profession. The court found that the MCTL is rationally related to these interests, as the record showed that conversion therapy is harmful to minors and lacks clinical utility.

United States v. Lewis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-3125

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Two defendants, Kevin Lewis and Otis Ponds, were involved in a large-scale drug trafficking conspiracy in Wichita, Kansas. Lewis was convicted at trial, while Ponds pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal on specific issues. Both defendants challenged the government's actions, including alleged violations of their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the validity of wiretap evidence used against them.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas initially set Lewis's trial for May 2020, but delays ensued due to the complexity of the case and the COVID-19 pandemic. The court declared the case complex, which extended the timeline for discovery. A significant delay was attributed to the FBI's use of a pole camera that recorded over 10,000 hours of footage, which defense counsel had to review. Ponds was arrested later and joined the case in March 2021. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds, which the district court denied, citing the complexity of the case and lack of specific prejudice to the defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that while the delay was presumptively prejudicial, it was not unreasonable given the case's complexity. The court held that the government was responsible for some delay due to the extensive pole-camera footage but noted that the defendants failed to show specific prejudice from the delay. The court also upheld the district court's denial of the motions to suppress wiretap evidence, finding that the wiretap application was properly authorized by a statutorily approved DOJ official, despite challenges to the legibility of the signature.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, including Lewis's 420-month sentence, finding it substantively reasonable given his significant role in the drug conspiracy and criminal history.

Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. Census Bureau

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-5140

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Wilkins

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A non-profit organization, Citizens for Constitutional Integrity, sued the Census Bureau, the Department of Commerce, and related officials, alleging that the Bureau failed to proportionately reduce the basis of representation for states in the 2020 Census as required by the Fourteenth Amendment's Reduction Clause. Citizens claimed this failure diluted the voting power of its members in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The organization sought relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and a writ of mandamus.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court found that Citizens could not demonstrate that its alleged vote dilution injury was traceable to the Bureau's actions. Specifically, the court noted that Citizens failed to show how the Bureau's failure to apply the Reduction Clause directly caused the loss of congressional representation for the states in question. The court also found the data scientist's declaration provided by Citizens unpersuasive, as it did not adequately account for the number of disenfranchised voters in the relevant states.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Citizens did not establish traceability under Article III standards. The court found that Citizens failed to present a feasible alternative methodology for apportionment that would have resulted in a different allocation of seats for New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The court also rejected Citizens's argument that it was entitled to a relaxed standing requirement for procedural-rights cases, concluding that the challenge was substantive rather than procedural. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court's ruling that Citizens lacked standing to pursue its claims.

City of Gridley v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C100191(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: BOULWARE EURIE

Areas of Law: Class Action, Constitutional Law, Utilities Law

The City of Gridley operates an electric utility and approved reduced electric rates for residential users in September 2020. Plaintiffs, residential ratepayers, challenged these rates, alleging they resulted in charges exceeding the reasonable cost of providing electric service, thus constituting a tax without voter approval in violation of article XIII C of the California Constitution. They also claimed the rates violated the state and federal takings clauses under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate and class action complaint, alleging the City set rates higher than necessary and transferred excess revenues to its general fund.

The Superior Court of Butte County denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact regarding whether the rates resulted in excessive charges and whether plaintiffs had a property interest in continued electric service. The court rejected the City’s argument that article XIII C was inapplicable because the City did not impose, extend, or increase a tax when it approved reduced rates. The court also found that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine could apply to plaintiffs' takings claim.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the City was entitled to relief. The court found article XIII C inapplicable because the City did not impose, extend, or increase any tax by reducing its electric rates. The court also found the unconstitutional conditions doctrine inapplicable, as it applies only in the land-use permitting context, not to user fees like the electric rates in question. Consequently, the court directed the trial court to set aside its order denying the City’s motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion. The City’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and the stay of proceedings in the trial court was vacated.

People v. Ingram

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C098000(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Earl

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, Michael Ingram was found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) and committed to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In 2020, he filed a petition for conditional release, arguing he was not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if released under supervision and treatment in the community. The trial court denied his petition, and Ingram appealed, challenging both the trial court’s decision and the constitutionality of the SVPA’s conditional release provisions.

The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially handled the case, where a jury found Ingram to be an SVP. Ingram then filed a petition for conditional release, which the trial court denied. The court found that Ingram had not made significant progress in his treatment program and that his risk to the community remained unchanged. The court also noted that while Ingram might receive better treatment in the community, the issue before the court was whether he could be safely released, not whether he could receive better treatment elsewhere.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that substantial evidence supported the denial of Ingram’s petition. The appellate court noted that all experts agreed Ingram continued to meet the definition of an SVP and that he had not yet learned to control his sexually violent behavior. The court also found that Ingram’s proposed alternative conditional release program, which included 24/7, one-on-one supervision, was neither reasonable nor required by the SVPA. Additionally, the court rejected Ingram’s constitutional challenges, noting that these issues were not properly raised in the lower court and that Ingram lacked standing to challenge potential delays in finding housing for conditionally released SVPs.

Sexton v. State of Florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0079

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Couriel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

John Sexton was convicted of the first-degree murder of Ann Parlato, a 94-year-old woman he knew from cutting her lawn. The crime was particularly brutal, involving severe physical trauma and post-mortem mutilation. A jury initially recommended the death penalty by a 10-2 vote, and the Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction but remanded for a new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida. On remand, Sexton waived his right to a jury, and the trial court sentenced him to death again.

In the lower courts, Sexton moved for the recusal of Judge Mary Handsel, citing a contentious pretrial exchange. Judge Handsel denied the motion but delegated funding decisions to Chief Judge Anthony Rondolino, who granted some requests and denied others, including funding for a PET scan and travel expenses for mitigation specialists. Sexton also waived his right to a jury trial and limited the mitigation evidence presented. The trial court took judicial notice of the original trial transcripts and sentenced Sexton to death, citing three aggravating factors and giving little weight to the mitigating factors.

The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and addressed eight issues raised by Sexton. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying funding for a PET scan and travel expenses, noting that Sexton failed to show a particularized need or prejudice. The court also held that the trial court erred in calling Sexton's mitigation specialist as a witness but deemed the error harmless. The court found no violation of Sexton's rights in the trial court's judicial notice of prior proceedings, denial of the motion to disqualify, or comments on Sexton's silence. The court concluded that the trial court properly considered mitigating evidence and understood its discretion in sentencing. Finally, the court rejected Sexton's constitutional challenge to Florida's capital sentencing scheme. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Sexton's death sentence.

IDHW v. Doe

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Dockets: 51562, 51565

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Juvenile Law

In this case, the State of Idaho removed five minor children from their parents' home following allegations of physical abuse. The children ranged in age from sixteen years to fourteen months. Law enforcement responded to a report of an altercation between the mother and the eldest child, during which the mother admitted to hitting the child with a plastic hanger. Other children reported frequent physical discipline, including being hit with belts and hands. The children were declared to be in imminent danger and were removed from the home.

The Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office filed a petition under the Child Protective Act (CPA) to place the children in the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW). The magistrate court held a shelter care hearing and found reasonable cause to believe the children were in danger, placing them in temporary custody of IDHW. The parents objected, arguing that the removal violated their constitutional rights and that the magistrate court’s findings were unsupported by substantial evidence.

The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the magistrate court’s adjudicatory decree. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the initial removal because the parents failed to raise the issue in the lower court. The Court also found that the challenge to the shelter care order was moot because it was supplanted by the adjudicatory decree. The Court held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the older children to remain in the courtroom during the hearing and found that substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s decision to vest legal custody of the children in IDHW. The Court also declined to consider the parents' argument under the Idaho Parental Rights Act because it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Gluba v. State Objection Panel

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 24-1426

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Three Libertarian Party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives were disqualified from the 2024 general election ballot by the State Objection Panel for failing to comply with Iowa's statutory nomination requirements. The candidates, Nicholas Gluba, Charles Aldrich, and Marco Battaglia, were nominated at a party convention after no Libertarian candidates filed for the primary election. However, the party did not follow the required process for selecting delegates to the convention, which included holding precinct caucuses and county conventions on separate days and notifying county auditors of the delegates.

The Iowa District Court for Polk County upheld the Panel's decision, finding that the Libertarian Party did not comply with Iowa Code section 43.94, which mandates that county convention delegates' terms begin the day after their election at precinct caucuses. The court ruled that strict compliance with this law was necessary, and the party's failure to follow the process invalidated the nominations. The court also rejected arguments that the objectors lacked standing and that the Panel's decision violated the candidates' First Amendment rights.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the statutory requirements for nominating candidates by convention must be strictly followed and that the Libertarian Party's failure to comply with these requirements justified the disqualification of the candidates. The court also found that the objectors had standing to challenge the nominations and that the Panel's decision did not violate the candidates' First Amendment rights. The court emphasized that the election laws are designed to ensure a fair and orderly process for candidate nominations.

In re A.S.

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125534

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: WILSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law

A father, H.S., was in federal custody during a hearing to terminate his parental rights to his child, A.S. He attended the hearing via Zoom, while the hearing was otherwise conducted in person. The father argued that his limited ability to participate in the hearing amounted to a due process violation.

The Leavenworth District Court held a permanency hearing and concluded that reintegration was no longer a viable plan for A.S., and that permanent custodianship or adoption was in the child's best interests. Subsequently, the State moved to terminate the parental rights of both parents. During the termination hearing, the father attended remotely but was unable to testify or meaningfully participate. The district court found the father unfit and terminated his parental rights. The father appealed, claiming insufficient evidence and a due process violation. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the father's claims.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the due process claim. The court held that the father's due process rights were violated because he was not given the opportunity to testify, communicate with counsel, or otherwise fully participate in the hearing. The court emphasized that a parent's right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest was high due to the procedures used, and that the State's interests did not justify the limitations placed on the father's participation.

The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court, and remanded the case for a new termination hearing that ensures the father's due process rights are protected.

Johnson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-CA-00117-SCT

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1998, Michael Johnson, then 17, conspired with Aaron Johnson to murder Aaron’s roommate, Dustin Sean Parker. They planned the murder for hours, eventually deciding to bludgeon Parker to death with a metal barbell. After killing Parker, they wrapped his body in plastic bags and buried it in the woods. Johnson later bragged about the murder, leading to his arrest and conviction for deliberate-design murder. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

The Rankin County Circuit Court initially sentenced Johnson to life without parole. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, which deemed mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles unconstitutional, Johnson sought post-conviction relief. The trial court vacated his sentence and held a new hearing, considering the Miller factors. Despite this, the court reinstated Johnson’s life sentence, ruling that the parole statute's application was not unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. Johnson argued that the trial court misapplied the law and facts and that Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101 required jury sentencing for juveniles. The court found that recent statutory amendments did not entitle Johnson to jury sentencing, as he was convicted before July 1, 2024. The court also upheld the trial court's application of the Miller factors, noting Johnson’s age, the premeditated nature of the crime, and the lack of evidence suggesting his immaturity or inability to understand the consequences of his actions. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, maintaining Johnson’s life sentence without parole.

State v. Jones

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 559

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law

A self-described "lay midwife" was charged by the State of Nebraska with practicing a profession without a credential after being ordered to cease and desist. The midwife, who did not hold a state-issued credential, provided prenatal and postnatal care and assisted with childbirth. The charges were based on her alleged violation of the Uniform Credentialing Act (UCA).

In Madison County, the district court sustained the midwife's plea in abatement, finding that "nurse midwives" were not required to hold credentials under the UCA. The court also suggested that the UCA would be unconstitutionally vague if it required a credential for practicing "nurse midwifery." Similarly, in Douglas County, the district court sustained a plea in abatement on the same grounds, dismissing the charges against the midwife.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district courts had misconstrued the UCA. The court held that the UCA requires individuals to hold a credential to engage in practices such as attending childbirth and providing related care, which fall under the scope of medicine and surgery, advanced practice registered nursing, and certified nurse midwifery. The court also found that the evidence presented was sufficient to show probable cause that the midwife had committed the charged crime.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district courts' orders sustaining the pleas in abatement and dismissing the charges. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including consideration of the midwife's motions to quash and demurrers.

Richard v. Governor

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-0097

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: MacDonald

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Election Law

The plaintiff, a registered voter in Auburn, New Hampshire, filed a complaint against the Governor, the Secretary of State, the State of New Hampshire, and officials from the Town of Auburn. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief regarding New Hampshire election laws, specifically challenging the use of electronic voting machines and other election-related statutes. The plaintiff alleged that he was denied the right to vote by hand on March 9, 2022, and claimed that various statutes were unconstitutional.

The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court did not address the issue of standing, despite the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing. The plaintiff appealed the decision.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiff had standing to bring his claims in Counts I and II, which related to his alleged denial of the right to vote by hand and the constitutionality of statutes allowing electronic voting machines. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of these counts to the extent they were based on the plaintiff's interpretation of Part II, Article 32 of the State Constitution. However, the court found that the plaintiff had standing to pursue his equal protection claim in Count II and remanded for further proceedings on that issue.

For Counts III through VI, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing as these claims raised generalized grievances rather than concrete, personal injuries. The court vacated the trial court's ruling on these counts and remanded with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision.

Senske Rentals v. City of Grand Forks

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 172

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Tufte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Senske Rentals, LLC, owns property in a subdivision affected by a City of Grand Forks improvement project to pave gravel roads and install street lighting. The city council approved a resolution creating a special assessment district for the project, and the City’s special assessment commission assigned benefits to the affected properties based on frontage, sideage, and square footage. Property owners were notified, and public input meetings were held. Despite protests from property owners, including Senske Rentals, the commission approved the special assessments.

The district court of Grand Forks County affirmed the city council’s decision to approve the commission’s determination on the special assessments. Senske Rentals appealed, arguing that the commission failed to perform the required benefit analysis under North Dakota law and that the special assessment amounted to an unconstitutional taking. The district court denied Senske’s motions to strike certain documents from the record and to supplement the record, ultimately affirming the city council’s decision.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the City’s special assessment commission did not properly determine the benefits accruing to Senske’s property as required by N.D.C.C. § 40-23-07. The court held that the statute requires a determination of special benefits independent of, and without regard to, the cost of the improvement project. The court found that the City had conducted a cost allocation rather than an independent determination of benefit, which was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case to the City for a proper determination of special benefits to Senske’s lots, independent of the project’s cost, and to apply that special benefit as a limit on assessments to each of Senske’s lots.

Candace Eidson v. South Carolina Dept. of Education

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28235

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: HILL

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the 2023 Act No. 8 (S. 39), known as the Education Scholarship Trust Fund (ESTF) Act, which establishes a fund to provide scholarships for qualifying educational expenses, including private school tuition. Petitioners argue that the Act violates South Carolina's constitutional prohibition against using public funds for the direct benefit of private educational institutions.

The lower courts did not review this case; it was accepted directly by the South Carolina Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction. Petitioners sought an injunction and declaratory judgment, claiming the Act violated several provisions of the South Carolina Constitution, including Article XI, Sections 2, 3, and 4, and Article X, Sections 5 and 11.

The South Carolina Supreme Court held that portions of the Act violate the state constitution's prohibition against using public funds for the direct benefit of private educational institutions. The court found that the ESTF funds are public funds and that using these funds for private school tuition constitutes a direct benefit to private educational institutions, which is unconstitutional under Article XI, Section 4. The court severed and declared unconstitutional the provisions of the Act that allowed payments from ESTF scholarships for tuition and fees at private educational institutions. The court enjoined the Department of Education from disbursing ESTF scholarships for these purposes. The court's decision was guided by the principle that legislative policy must conform to constitutional mandates, and it emphasized the importance of adhering to the plain meaning of constitutional text.