Table of Contents
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United States v. Jones
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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United States v. Briscoe
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Electric Reliability Council of Texas v. Phillips
Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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McRorey v. Garland
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Doe v. Trustees of Indiana University
Constitutional Law, Education Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Greenwald Family Limited Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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United States v. Betts
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Advance Colorado v. Griswold
Constitutional Law, Election Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Intellectual Tech LLC v. Zebra Technologies Corp.
Banking, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Intellectual Property, Patents
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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City of San Jose v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn.
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
California Courts of Appeal
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State of Florida v. Penna
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Florida Supreme Court
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Barrett v. State
Constitutional Law, Education Law, Election Law
Montana Supreme Court
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State v. Strommen
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Montana Supreme Court
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GILL v. HILL
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Supreme Court of Texas
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HOGAN v. SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY
Constitutional Law, Contracts, Education Law
Supreme Court of Texas
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A. M. B. v. Circuit Court for Ashland County
Constitutional Law, Family Law
Wisconsin Supreme Court
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Bolen v. State
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
Wyoming Supreme Court
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Constitutional Law Opinions
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United States v. Jones
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Docket:
22-2958
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Judge:
PARK
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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A U.S. citizen, Maalik Alim Jones, pleaded guilty to terrorism-related charges for his involvement with al-Shabaab, an Islamist military organization in Kenya and Somalia. The district court accepted his plea and sentenced him to 25 years of imprisonment. Jones challenged his plea agreement and sentence, arguing that a prior mandate of the court precluded the government from charging him in a superseding indictment, that the language of his plea agreement was ambiguous and inapplicable to him, and that his sentence was based on erroneous factual findings and constitutionally impermissible factors.
Jones was initially indicted on five counts related to his support and training with al-Shabaab. He later consented to a superseding information, which reduced the charges to three counts. Jones pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment. However, following a Supreme Court ruling that found a section of the law under which Jones was charged to be unconstitutionally vague, Jones appealed his conviction on one of the counts. The court vacated this conviction and remanded for resentencing on the remaining counts. On remand, the district court denied the government's motion to reinstate the initial indictment but did not preclude the government from seeking a superseding indictment. The government subsequently filed a superseding indictment, which Jones moved to dismiss.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected Jones's arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that the mandate did not preclude a superseding indictment, and that the plea agreement unambiguously allowed for new charges if a conviction was vacated. The court also found that Jones's sentence was not based on erroneous factual findings or constitutionally impermissible factors, and that his challenges were barred by the appeal waiver in the plea agreement.
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United States v. Briscoe
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
23-4013
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Stephanie Dawn Thacker
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Andre Ricardo Briscoe was involved in the purchase and sale of narcotics in Baltimore. He learned from a contact, Kiara Haynes, that Jennifer Jeffrey had received a large supply of heroin. Briscoe and Haynes decided to rob Jeffrey. Briscoe went to Jeffrey’s house, robbed her of at least 80 grams of narcotics, shot and killed her, and shot and killed her seven-year-old son, K.B., whom Briscoe feared might testify against him. Briscoe was arrested and initially charged with possession with intent to distribute narcotics, conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. A later superseding indictment added three new counts: two counts of murder with a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime and one count of killing a witness to prevent communication with law enforcement. After a twelve-day jury trial, Briscoe was convicted on all charges.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Briscoe's motion to dismiss the indictment as barred by the statute of limitations, concluding that the indictment related back to the earlier filed information. The court also denied Briscoe's motion to suppress evidence obtained through the use of a cell site simulator, finding that the police had obtained a tracking order which authorized them to use the simulator. The court further found that the police had obtained consent to search the apartment where Briscoe was found and that their subsequent actions were part of a lawful protective sweep of the apartment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the government properly tolled the statute of limitations by filing an information within the five-year period and that the subsequent indictment related back to that filing. The court also held that the police had authority to use a cell site simulator to obtain Briscoe's location information and to search the apartment where he was found. The court rejected Briscoe's arguments that the government committed a Brady violation by failing to follow up on whether any footage was contained on a broken camera and that the government knowingly relied upon false testimony to secure his conviction. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Briscoe on all counts.
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Electric Reliability Council of Texas v. Phillips
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
22-20603
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Judge:
Jerry E. Smith
Areas of Law:
Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law
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The case involves a dispute arising from the financial fallout of Winter Storm Uri, which severely impacted Texas's electrical grid in 2021. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), responsible for managing the grid, took measures including manipulating energy prices to incentivize production. This resulted in Entrust Energy, Inc., receiving an electricity bill from ERCOT of nearly $300 million, leading to Entrust's insolvency and subsequent bankruptcy filing. ERCOT filed a claim seeking payment of the invoice, which was challenged by Anna Phillips, the trustee of the Entrust Liquidating Trust. The trustee argued that ERCOT's price manipulation violated Texas law, that ERCOT was grossly negligent in its handling of the grid during the storm, and that ERCOT's transitioning of Entrust’s customers to another utility was an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The bankruptcy court declined to abstain from the case and denied ERCOT’s motion to dismiss all claims except for the takings claim. ERCOT appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the bankruptcy court should have abstained under the Burford doctrine, which allows federal courts to abstain from complex state law issues to avoid disrupting state policies.
The Fifth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to abstain under the Burford doctrine. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's denial of ERCOT’s motion to abstain and its denial of ERCOT’s motion to dismiss the trustee’s complaint. The court also vacated the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing the takings claim with prejudice. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss certain counts and stay others pending the resolution of related state proceedings.
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McRorey v. Garland
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
23-10837
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
Jerry E. Smith
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
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The case involves a challenge to the provisions of the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022, which expanded background checks for firearm purchases by individuals aged 18 to 20. The plaintiffs, Ethan McRorey, Kaylee Flores, Gun Owners of America, Inc., and Gun Owners Foundation, argued that the government failed to show a historical analogue for the Act's expanded background checks for this age group. They filed a lawsuit requesting a preliminary injunction after their attempts to purchase shotguns were delayed due to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) protocols.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that while adults aged 18 to 20 are protected by the Second Amendment, laws barring the mentally ill and felons from possessing firearms are constitutional, and restrictions to further those ends are presumptively lawful. Therefore, the plaintiffs lacked a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and were not entitled to preliminary relief.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that background checks preceding firearm sales are presumptively constitutional, and the plaintiffs failed to rebut that presumption. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown that the challenged regulations had been put towards abusive ends or had otherwise rebutted the presumption of lawfulness. The court concluded that a period of 10 days for background checks does not qualify as being put towards abusive ends or as a de facto prohibition on possession.
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Doe v. Trustees of Indiana University
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-1576
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
EASTERBROOK
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Education Law
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The case involves a medical student at Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis, referred to as John Doe, who was accused of physical abuse by a fellow student, Jane Roe. The University’s Office of Student Conduct found Doe culpable and suspended him for one year. Doe applied to the University’s MBA program and described his suspension as an exoneration. This led to an investigation by the University’s Prior Misconduct Review Committee, which concluded that Doe had withheld pertinent information and gave false or incomplete information to the business school. Dean Hess of the medical school, without inviting further response from Doe, expelled him from the medical school. Doe accused the University of violating both the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court found that the record did not support an inference of sex discrimination. The court also found that the University’s delay in launching an investigation into Doe’s complaint that Roe hit him on occasion did not contribute to the ultimate decision, and it was justified by the fact that Doe elected not to pursue this charge against Roe.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that Doe’s constitutional argument was stronger. The court held that Doe had a legitimate claim of entitlement to remain a student unless he transgressed a norm, which is a property interest in constitutional lingo and requires some kind of hearing. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court. If Doe elects to continue with the suit, his true name must be disclosed to the public, and the district court must decide what remedy is appropriate for Dean Hess’s failure to allow Doe an opportunity to present his position before expelling him. If Doe elects not to reveal his name, the complaint must be dismissed.
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Greenwald Family Limited Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
21-3237
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Judge:
Diane S. Sykes
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
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The Greenwald Family Limited Partnership, a landowner in the Village of Mukwonago, Wisconsin, had a longstanding positive relationship with the Village, collaborating on several development projects. However, this relationship soured after a failed land deal in 2014 and several other conflicts. The Partnership sued the Village, alleging that it had been irrationally singled out for unfavorable treatment, violating its Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Partnership pointed to several adverse municipal decisions, focusing primarily on the failed land deal and a new road that was rerouted from the Partnership’s property.
The case was initially filed in state court but was later removed to federal court. The district court concluded that the Village had a rational basis for its actions regarding the failed land deal, the new road, and other decisions affecting the Partnership’s properties. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the Village and relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the Partnership had failed to show that the Village’s actions lacked any conceivable rational basis. The court found that the Village’s decisions were rationally related to its legitimate interests in promoting its land-use objectives and protecting public funds. The court concluded that the Partnership was a disappointed landowner, but not a victim of unconstitutional discrimination.
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United States v. Betts
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
21-2572
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Judge:
Jackson-Akiwumi
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Shamar Betts was indicted for inciting a riot in violation of the Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101, after he posted a flyer on Facebook calling for a riot at a mall in Champaign, Illinois. The riot resulted in damage to several businesses. Betts moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Anti-Riot Act was overbroad and violated the First Amendment, but the district court denied his motion. Betts then pled guilty and was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $1,686,170.30 in restitution to 35 businesses under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
On appeal, Betts challenged the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, the application of a sentencing guideline by analogy, and the district court's order of restitution. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, finding no compelling reason to overrule its previous decision in United States v. Dellinger, which upheld the Act. The court also found no error in the district court's application of a sentencing guideline by analogy to the Anti-Riot Act.
However, the court agreed with Betts's argument that the government failed to meet its burden of showing that he directly and proximately caused damages to all businesses included in the restitution order. The court vacated the sentence with regard to the amount of restitution ordered and remanded the case for the limited purpose of reconsidering the amount of restitution.
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Advance Colorado v. Griswold
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
23-1282
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
MURPHY
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Election Law
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In 2021, the Colorado state legislature passed The Ballot Measure Fiscal Transparency Act, which required certain language to be included in state-imposed titles of citizen-initiated ballot measures. If the proposal contained a tax change affecting state or local revenues, the measure’s title had to incorporate a phrase stating the change’s impact on state and district funding priorities. In 2023, Advance Colorado proposed two tax reduction measures subject to the provisions of the Act. After Colorado’s Ballot Title Setting Board included the mandated transparency language in each initiative’s title, Advance Colorado filed suit challenging the Act as unconstitutionally compelling its political speech.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Advance Colorado's request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the titling process qualified as government speech and, therefore, Advance Colorado was not likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. The court considered the factors used for determining the boundary between government and private speech as outlined in Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 596 U.S. 243, 252 (2022). It concluded that the history of the expression, the public’s likely perception as to who is speaking, and the extent to which the government has shaped the expression all indicated Colorado’s titling system was government speech not subject to a First Amendment compelled speech claim.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the Act’s requirements did not result in improperly compelled speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court found that the Colorado initiative titling system squarely qualified as government speech and Advance Colorado had not otherwise shown its own speech was improperly compelled by the government speech. Therefore, it could not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.
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Intellectual Tech LLC v. Zebra Technologies Corp.
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Docket:
22-2207
Opinion Date: May 1, 2024
Judge:
Sharon Prost
Areas of Law:
Banking, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Intellectual Property, Patents
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The case revolves around Intellectual Tech LLC (IT), a wholly owned subsidiary of OnAsset Intelligence, Inc. (OnAsset), and its patent dispute with Zebra Technologies Corporation (Zebra). In 2019, IT asserted U.S. Patent No. 7,233,247 against Zebra, claiming that it was the owner and assignee of the patent. However, Zebra moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that IT lacked standing. The district court initially denied the motion, but later granted it based on its determination that IT lacked constitutional standing, leading to the dismissal of all claims without prejudice.
Previously, OnAsset had granted Main Street Capital Corporation (Main Street), a lender, a security interest in its patents, including the one in question, as part of a loan agreement. When OnAsset defaulted on the loan, Main Street gained certain rights. Subsequently, OnAsset assigned the patent to IT, which also defaulted on its obligations. The district court found that Main Street's ability to license the patent upon default deprived IT of all its exclusionary rights, leading to a lack of constitutional standing.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court found that IT retained at least one exclusionary right, even considering the rights Main Street gained upon default. The court clarified that a patent owner has exclusionary rights as a baseline matter unless it has transferred all exclusionary rights away. The court concluded that IT still suffered an injury in fact from infringement even if IT and Main Street could both license the patent. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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City of San Jose v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn.
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
H050889(Sixth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves the City of San José and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (HJTA). The city had a significant unfunded liability in its pension plans for city employees. To address this shortfall, the city council adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance and sale of bonds, provided they result in savings for the city. The HJTA argued that this action violated the constitutional debt limitation, which prohibits cities from incurring any indebtedness or liability exceeding the income and revenue provided for a given year without the assent of two-thirds of the voters.
The trial court upheld the city's actions, ruling that the bond issuance falls under the obligation imposed by law exception to the debt limitation. The HJTA appealed this decision, arguing that the city's actions violate the constitutional debt limitation and lack statutory authority.
The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment, but for different reasons than the trial court. The appellate court concluded that the city has not incurred any indebtedness or liability exceeding its annual income and revenue because the city's actions do not trigger the constitutional debt limitation. The court also found that the city has the authority under state law to issue the bonds.
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State of Florida v. Penna
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Court: Florida Supreme Court
Docket:
SC2022-0458
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Judge:
Grosshans
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In 2015, Zachary Penna committed a series of violent crimes in Florida, including two murders. After his arrest, Penna was read his Miranda rights and initially invoked his right to counsel. However, during his hospitalization, Penna voluntarily initiated several conversations with Deputy Michael Nettles, during which he made incriminating statements. Penna was subsequently charged with several crimes, including two counts of first-degree murder. Before trial, Penna moved to suppress the statements made to Deputy Nettles, arguing that they were obtained in violation of Miranda. The trial court denied the motion, and Penna was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.
Penna appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which found that the statements during the first two conversations were not obtained in violation of Miranda. However, the court ruled that Deputy Nettles violated Miranda by failing to re-read Penna his Miranda rights prior to the final three conversations. The court relied on its own precedent, which had interpreted a previous Florida Supreme Court decision to require a full re-reading of Miranda warnings under the circumstances of this case. The court found that the error was not harmless, despite the overwhelming evidence of Penna’s guilt.
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted the case for review. The court was asked to consider whether a defendant’s Fifth Amendment Miranda rights are automatically violated when an officer fails to re-read a Miranda warning following a defendant’s voluntary re-initiation of contact. The court held that there is no per se requirement that an officer remind or readvise a defendant of his Miranda rights. The court found that the Fourth District Court of Appeal had improperly expanded the requirements of Miranda and receded from its previous decision that had established a categorical rule requiring a full re-reading of Miranda warnings. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper standard.
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Barrett v. State
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 MT 86
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
Gustafson
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Education Law, Election Law
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A group of plaintiffs, including former members of the Montana Board of Regents, faculty organizations, student groups, and individual students, challenged the constitutionality of three bills passed by the Montana Legislature in 2021. The bills in question were HB 349, which regulated student organizations and speech on campus; HB 112, known as the "Save Women's Sports Act," which required sports teams to be designated as male, female, or coed based on biological sex; and § 2 of SB 319, which revised campaign finance laws and regulated the funding of certain student organizations. The plaintiffs argued that these bills infringed on the constitutional authority of the Board of Regents to supervise, coordinate, manage, and control the Montana University System.
The District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring HB 349, HB 112, and § 2 of SB 319 unconstitutional. The court also denied the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees. Both parties appealed this order.
The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims and that the challenged bills were unconstitutional. The court also upheld the District Court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees, as the justices could not reach a majority opinion on this issue.
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State v. Strommen
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 MT 87
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Sandefur
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case revolves around the defendant, Luke Strommen, who was charged with Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWC) and Sexual Abuse of Children. The charges stemmed from allegations made by two women, one of whom claimed that she had an ongoing sexual relationship with Strommen when she was a minor. The other woman alleged that Strommen possessed digital images of her engaged in sexual activity when she was 17. Strommen pleaded not guilty to both charges.
In the lower courts, the State of Montana sought to present the testimony of a sexual assault behavioral psychologist, Dr. Sheri Vanino, remotely via two-way video conferencing due to her unavailability to travel to Montana for the trial. The defense objected, asserting that personal in-court cross-examination was essential. The District Court granted the State's motion, allowing Dr. Vanino to testify remotely. The trial resulted in Strommen being found guilty of SIWC and sentenced to a 40-year prison term.
In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Strommen appealed his conviction, arguing that the District Court erroneously allowed the State to present adverse expert testimony remotely via two-way video conferencing at trial. The Supreme Court agreed with Strommen, holding that the allowance of Dr. Vanino's remote testimony violated Strommen's fundamental right to personal face-to-face confrontation of adverse prosecution witnesses in the courtroom at trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. The court reversed Strommen's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
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GILL v. HILL
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Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Docket:
22-0913
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
Huddle
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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The case involves successors in interest of mineral-rights holders who sued in 2019 to declare a 1999 judgment foreclosing on their predecessors’ property for delinquent taxes as void. They argued that there was constitutionally inadequate notice of the foreclosure suit, rendering the foreclosure judgment and the tax sale that followed both void. The current owners sought traditional summary judgment based on the Tax Code’s command that an action relating to the title to property against the purchaser of the property at a tax sale may not be commenced later than one year after the date that the deed executed to the purchaser at the tax sale is filed of record.
The trial court granted the current owners' motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The majority held that the sheriff’s deed conclusively established the accrual date for limitations, so the burden shifted to the successors to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a due-process violation that could render the statute of limitations inoperable. Because the successors relied only on their arguments and presented no evidence of a due-process violation, the majority concluded, the current owners were entitled to summary judgment.
The Supreme Court of Texas held that under Draughon v. Johnson, the nonmovant seeking to avoid the limitations bar by raising a due-process challenge bears the burden to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact about whether the underlying judgment is actually void for lack of due process. Because the nonmovant here adduced no such evidence, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment based on Section 33.54(a)(1). However, the court also noted that the law governing this case has undergone meaningful refinement since the summary-judgment proceedings took place. Given these recent and substantial developments in the relevant law, the court remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings in the interest of justice.
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HOGAN v. SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY
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Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Docket:
23-0565
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
Blacklock
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Contracts, Education Law
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In 2020, Luke Hogan, a graduate student at Southern Methodist University (SMU), found his final semester disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Like many institutions, SMU shifted to online classes in response to government lockdown orders. Hogan, feeling cheated out of the in-person educational experience he had paid for, sued SMU for breach of contract. He sought a refund of his tuition and fees, arguing that the shift to online learning constituted a breach of SMU's promise of in-person education.
The federal district court sided with SMU, and Hogan appealed. The Fifth Circuit then certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas: Does the application of the Pandemic Liability Protection Act (PLPA) to Hogan’s breach-of-contract claim violate the retroactivity clause in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution? The PLPA, enacted in 2021, protects schools from monetary liability for altering their activities in response to the pandemic.
The Supreme Court of Texas held that the application of the PLPA to Hogan's claim does not violate the Texas Constitution's prohibition on retroactive laws. The court reasoned that Hogan did not have a settled expectation of recovering damages from SMU under these circumstances. The court noted that the common law has traditionally excused a party from performing a contract when performance is rendered impossible by an act of God or government. The court also pointed out that Hogan voluntarily accepted SMU's offer to complete his degree online without a corresponding offer of tuition refunds or reduced fees. Therefore, any right of recovery that might have existed for Hogan was speculative and untested prior to the PLPA's enactment. The court concluded that the PLPA, enacted to resolve legal uncertainty created by the pandemic, did not upset Hogan's settled expectations and thus did not violate the constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws.
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A. M. B. v. Circuit Court for Ashland County
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Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Docket:
2022AP001334
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Bradley
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Family Law
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The case involves a non-marital couple, A.M.B. and T.G., who sought to adopt A.M.B.'s biological child, M.M.C. T.G. had been a father figure to M.M.C. for over a decade and had assumed various parental duties. The parental rights of M.M.C.'s biological father had been terminated. Despite a positive Home Study Report recommending the adoption, the Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition. The court cited Wisconsin's adoption statutes, which only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.
The Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition, citing Wisconsin's adoption statutes. The statutes only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. The court referenced a previous case, Georgina G. v. Terry M., which held that an adoption by a third party who is not the spouse of the parent is not permissible. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed the decision, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the adoption statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the statutes did not restrict a fundamental right or regulate a protected class. The court concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in promoting stability for adoptive children through marital families, which provided a rational basis for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt a child.
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Bolen v. State
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 WY 48
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Judge:
Fox
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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Solomon Bolen was convicted of multiple offenses, including attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery. Bolen appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights by not instructing the jury on his plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency (NGMI). He also claimed that his attorneys were ineffective for not seeking those instructions. Additionally, Bolen contended that his convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery violated his right against double jeopardy.
The district court had found Bolen mentally fit to proceed with the trial. Despite Bolen's NGMI plea, the court-designated examiner, Dr. Wilkinson, opined that Bolen did not meet the statutory criteria for an NGMI defense. She noted that Bolen's altered state of mind and psychosis at the time of the crimes were caused by self-induced intoxication, which is specifically excluded from the statutory definition of mental illness or deficiency. Bolen's attorneys did not pursue the NGMI defense and focused instead on the self-induced intoxication defense.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Bolen did not present competent evidence to support an NGMI defense, and thus was not entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense. The court also found that Bolen's attorneys were not ineffective for not pursuing the NGMI defense, as the instructions would not have been proper even if they had renewed their request for them. Lastly, the court held that Bolen's convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery did not violate his right against double jeopardy, as the crimes contained separate elements.
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