Table of Contents
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DeVillier v. Texas
Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law
US Supreme Court
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Sheetz v. El Dorado County
Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
US Supreme Court
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Bannon v. Godin
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
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Kim v. Hanlon
Constitutional Law, Election Law
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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B.P.J. v. West Virginia State Board of Education
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard
Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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United States v. Lester
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Estate of Wallmow v. Oneida County, Wisconsin
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Lickers v. United States
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Rodgers v. Rankin
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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United States v. Gay
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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USA v. Ostrum
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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United States v. Tyrone Cameron
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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United States v. Veasley
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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USA V. PAYNE
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Bustillos v. City of Artesia
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of America v. A-Quality Auto Sales
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Insurance Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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United States v. Wilson
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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United States v. Holroyd
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN RESERVATION v. US
Constitutional Law, Contracts, Native American Law, Real Estate & Property Law
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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CORBITT v. PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
Arkansas Supreme Court
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Dilbert v. Newsom
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
California Courts of Appeal
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Mosley v. Superior Court
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
California Courts of Appeal
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STRYKER v. THE STATE
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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In Re: West Maui Resort Partners LP v. County of Maui
Constitutional Law, Tax Law
Supreme Court of Hawaii
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CONN V. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Kentucky Supreme Court
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WOODALL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Kentucky Supreme Court
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State of Maine v. Ouellette
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Maine Supreme Judicial Court
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Nevadans for Reprod. Freedom v. Washington
Constitutional Law, Election Law
Supreme Court of Nevada
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Sisolak v. Polymer80, Inc.
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Nevada
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In re Aaron Manor Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., LLC v Zucker
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
New York Court of Appeals
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In re Walt Disney Company and Consolidated Subsidiaries v Tax Appeals Tribunal
Constitutional Law, Tax Law
New York Court of Appeals
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People v. Dunton
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New York Court of Appeals
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People v Franklin
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New York Court of Appeals
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State v. Fuglesten
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
North Dakota Supreme Court
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In the Matter of M.R.
Constitutional Law, Family Law, Native American Law
Oklahoma Supreme Court
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City of Lancaster v. PUC
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
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State v. Tavares
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Rhode Island Supreme Court
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Salt Lake Co v. Tax Commission
Aviation, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law, Transportation Law
Utah Supreme Court
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Constitutional Law Opinions
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DeVillier v. Texas
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Court: US Supreme Court
Docket:
22-913
Opinion Date: April 16, 2024
Judge:
Clarence Thomas
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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Richard DeVillier and over 120 other property owners in Texas alleged that the State of Texas had taken their property for stormwater storage without just compensation, in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The state had installed a barrier along a highway median to prevent stormwater from covering the road, which resulted in flooding on the petitioners' land during heavy rainfall. DeVillier argued that the Takings Clause itself authorized him to bring suit, even if the legislature had not affirmatively provided a cause of action.
The District Court denied Texas' motion to dismiss the federal inverse-condemnation claim, concluding that a property owner may sue a State directly under the Takings Clause. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not provide a right of action for takings claims against a state.
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found that Texas law provides a cause of action that allows property owners to vindicate their rights under the Takings Clause. Therefore, DeVillier's claims may proceed under Texas' state-law cause of action. The Court did not resolve the question of whether a property owner may sue for just compensation directly under the Takings Clause, as it was not necessary to do so in this case.
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Sheetz v. El Dorado County
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Court: US Supreme Court
Docket:
22-1074
Opinion Date: April 12, 2024
Judge:
Amy Coney Barrett
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
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George Sheetz sought to build a small, prefabricated home on his residential parcel of land in El Dorado County, California. However, to obtain a permit, he was required to pay a substantial fee to mitigate local traffic congestion. Sheetz challenged this fee as an unlawful “exaction” of money under the Takings Clause, arguing that the fee amount should be necessary to offset traffic congestion attributable to his specific development. The County’s predetermined fee schedule, Sheetz argued, failed to meet that requirement.
The trial court rejected Sheetz’s claim and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The Court of Appeal asserted that the Nollan/Dolan test, which requires permit conditions to have an “essential nexus” to the government’s land-use interest and “rough proportionality” to the development’s impact on the land-use interest, applies only to permit conditions imposed “on an individual and discretionary basis.” Fees imposed on “a broad class of property owners through legislative action,” it said, need not satisfy that test. The California Supreme Court denied review.
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of the California Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative permit conditions. The Court found no basis in constitutional text, history, or precedent for affording property rights less protection in the hands of legislators than administrators. The Court did not address the parties’ other disputes over the validity of the traffic impact fee, including whether a permit condition imposed on a class of properties must be tailored with the same degree of specificity as a permit condition that targets a particular development. The case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
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Bannon v. Godin
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1958
Opinion Date: April 22, 2024
Judge:
LYNCH
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Jennifer Root Bannon, who sued six law enforcement officers and the City of Boston on behalf of her brother's estate. Her brother, Juston Root, was fatally shot by the officers after a series of events that began with him pointing a gun at a hospital security guard and a responding police officer, leading the officers on a high-speed chase, and disregarding police instructions to drop his weapon. Bannon claimed that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances during the fatal shooting and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Bannon's other claims. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers acted unreasonably in employing deadly force against Root in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court also independently concluded that the officers were entitled to summary judgment on Bannon's § 1983 and MCRA claims based on qualified immunity.
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Kim v. Hanlon
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Docket:
24-1594
Opinion Date: April 17, 2024
Judge:
Jordan
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Election Law
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The case involves a challenge to New Jersey's primary election ballot design, known as the "county-line" ballot. The plaintiffs, Andy Kim, Sarah Schoengood, and Carolyn Rush, who are all Democratic candidates for various offices, argue that the county-line ballot design infringes their First Amendment rights. They contend that the design unfairly favors candidates endorsed by local party leaders, placing them in prime ballot positions, while disadvantaging those who are not endorsed or choose not to associate with certain candidates.
The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, where the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the use of county-line ballots and require the use of office-block format ballots instead. The District Court granted the injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had shown a severe burden on their First Amendment rights and that the state's interests did not outweigh these burdens.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed that the county-line ballot design imposed a severe burden on the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. It also found that the design likely violated the Elections Clause of the Constitution, which limits a state's power to regulate elections. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, and that they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court also found that the balance of harms and the public interest favored the plaintiffs.
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B.P.J. v. West Virginia State Board of Education
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
23-1078
Opinion Date: April 16, 2024
Judge:
Heytens
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law
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A West Virginia law, known as the "Save Women's Sports Act," stipulates that athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex, with "male" defined as an individual whose biological sex determined at birth is male. The law was challenged by a 13-year-old transgender girl, B.P.J., who has been taking puberty-blocking medication and has publicly identified as a girl since the third grade. B.P.J. argued that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX by preventing her from participating in her school's cross country and track teams.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia initially granted a preliminary injunction, allowing B.P.J. to participate in her school's sports teams. However, upon review of cross-motions for summary judgment, the court reversed its decision, rejecting B.P.J.'s claims and ruling that the law was constitutional and did not violate Title IX.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the law could not lawfully be applied to prevent B.P.J. from participating in her school's sports teams. The court found that the law's sole purpose and effect were to prevent transgender girls from playing on girls' teams, which was not substantially related to an important government interest. The court also found that the law violated Title IX by treating B.P.J. worse than people to whom she was similarly situated, depriving her of any meaningful athletic opportunities, and doing so on the basis of sex. The court dismissed the cross-appeal, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for B.P.J. on her Title IX claims.
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Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
23-3623
Opinion Date: April 19, 2024
Judge:
Karen Nelson Moore
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
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The case involves Norton Outdoor Advertising, a company that operates billboards within the Village of St. Bernard, Ohio. The Village revoked one of Norton's permits after it constructed two variable-message signs. The Village's ordinance regulates signs based on whether what is being advertised is located on or off the premises of the sign. The ordinance also has an exemption that functions beyond this on- and off-premises dichotomy, which is content based.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the Village, finding that Norton lacked standing to challenge any provisions of the ordinances other than the ban on variable-message displays. The court found these provisions to be content-neutral regulations under the Supreme Court precedent and that the regulations satisfied intermediate scrutiny.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court found that the Village's ordinance, which included a content-based exemption, must satisfy strict scrutiny. The court concluded that the Village's ordinance was not narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling interest and therefore could not stand as written. The court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings, including consideration of whether the unconstitutional provision is severable.
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United States v. Lester
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
22-6077
Opinion Date: April 16, 2024
Judge:
Thapar
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Travis Lester, a convicted felon, was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm after law enforcement officers found a stolen .40 caliber pistol in his motel room. The arrest occurred after Lester violated the terms of his supervised release from a previous conviction for possessing ammunition as a felon. During the arrest, officers found a baggie of crack cocaine and $869 in cash on Lester's person. Lester admitted to having marijuana in his motel room. Based on this information, officers obtained a search warrant for the room, where they found the pistol, a digital scale, and a small bag of marijuana.
Prior to his trial, Lester filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the officers' protective sweep of his motel room and his admission about the marijuana, arguing that these violated his Fourth Amendment and Miranda rights. The district court denied this motion, finding that the officers had not violated Lester's rights. At trial, the jury convicted Lester, and the district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison. The court also imposed an additional seventeen-month prison sentence to be served consecutively due to Lester's violation of the supervised-release conditions from his earlier conviction.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Lester argued that his Miranda and Fourth Amendment rights were violated, that there were evidentiary errors, and that there were mistakes in his sentencing. The appellate court disagreed with Lester's claims and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officer's question during Lester's arrest was not an interrogation under Miranda, and that the protective sweep of Lester's motel room did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The court also found no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings or in its sentencing of Lester.
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Estate of Wallmow v. Oneida County, Wisconsin
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
23-2141
Opinion Date: April 17, 2024
Judge:
St. Eve
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
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On July 4, 2021, Gavin Wallmow was arrested for violating his probation and was taken to Oneida County jail. During his booking, Wallmow denied any suicidal tendencies or mental health issues. Two days later, Wallmow's probation officer visited him and noticed a change in his behavior, including him hitting himself and expressing "demonic" thoughts. The officer reported this to a corrections officer at the jail, who then informed her superior. Despite these reports, Wallmow was observed behaving normally during routine checks. On July 8, Wallmow was found unresponsive in his cell, having committed suicide. His estate brought a series of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the jailers failed to protect Wallmow from himself.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the record did not support an inference that any defendant knew Wallmow faced a serious risk of harm. The court also found no reason to think the County's policies were inadequate, given the absence of any pattern of suicides to put it on notice.
Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the jail's employees had taken reasonable precautions, including checking on Wallmow at least 37 times per day. The court also noted that Wallmow had thrice disavowed any risk of suicide, and nothing indicated otherwise after his talk with his probation officer. The court concluded that the jail's actions complied with the Constitution's requirements.
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Lickers v. United States
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-1179
Opinion Date: April 12, 2024
Judge:
SCUDDER
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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The case involves Jacob Lickers, who was convicted for transporting and possessing child pornography. The conviction was based on evidence found on Lickers' devices, which were seized during a traffic stop and subsequent arrest for drug possession. The initial search of the devices was authorized by a state court warrant, which later suppressed the evidence due to the unconstitutionality of the initial stop and arrest. However, the case was referred to federal authorities who conducted a second search of the devices under a federal warrant. The federal warrant application did not mention the state court's suppression ruling.
In the lower courts, Lickers' attorney challenged the constitutionality of the initial stop and arrest, and the adequacy of the state search warrant. The state court agreed, suppressing all evidence seized during the stop and any statements made by Lickers. The state charges were subsequently dismissed. However, in the federal court, the same arguments were unsuccessful. Lickers pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 132 months' imprisonment on each count.
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, Lickers argued that his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the federal agent acted in bad faith by omitting the state court's suppression ruling from the federal warrant application. The court disagreed, finding that the link between the state court's suppression ruling and the federal warrant application was too attenuated to obligate the attorneys to explore the possibility of bad faith. The court affirmed the district court's denial of relief.
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Rodgers v. Rankin
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
23-1220
Opinion Date: April 23, 2024
Judge:
HAMILTON
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury
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The plaintiff, Richard Rodgers, a prisoner with a history of scoliosis and back pain, had steel rods implanted in his back prior to his incarceration. During his time in prison, the rods broke, but this went undetected for over a year due to two radiologists misreading his x-rays. The prison's primary care physician, Dr. William Rankin, discovered the broken rods and arranged for corrective surgery. Rodgers sued the radiologists and Dr. Rankin, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
The district court dismissed Rodgers' claims against the radiologists, finding that he did not state a viable constitutional claim against them. The court allowed Rodgers to proceed against Dr. Rankin but eventually granted summary judgment in his favor. The court found that Rodgers had not provided evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Dr. Rankin had violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate indifference toward Rodgers' serious medical condition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court agreed that Rodgers' allegations against the radiologists amounted to no more than negligence, which is insufficient to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Regarding Dr. Rankin, the court found that the evidence would not support a reasonable finding that he acted with deliberate indifference to Rodgers' serious medical condition. The court noted that Dr. Rankin was the one who discovered the radiologists' errors and arranged for Rodgers' corrective surgery.
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United States v. Gay
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
23-2097
Opinion Date: April 12, 2024
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case revolves around Anthony Gay, a convicted felon, who was found guilty of possessing firearms and ammunition, both of which he was prohibited from possessing due to his prior felony convictions. Gay was a passenger in a car that was stopped by the police, and upon being pursued, he fled on foot. The police testified that they found a gun where Gay had fallen and later discovered bullets in a motel room he had rented. Gay was subsequently indicted and convicted on one firearms count and one ammunition count, leading to a sentence of 84 months' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, plus three years' supervised release.
Previously, Gay had contested the admissibility of the bullets found in the motel room, arguing that their discovery violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the district court denied his motion to suppress the bullets, stating that Gay's right to occupy the room had expired, the motel manager had found the bullets before the police were involved, and the manager had the right to admit the police under state law. Furthermore, the court noted that Gay, being on parole, had a diminished expectation of privacy.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Gay argued that the evidence did not support his conviction on the firearms charge, suggesting that the weapon may have been planted. However, the court found that the evidence, including the bullets found in the motel room, supported the firearms charge. The court also dismissed Gay's argument that the reduction of two weeks in preparation time for his second trial was prejudicial, stating that the parties had just been through a trial and the evidence had been assembled.
Gay also contended that the prosecution was unconstitutional, arguing that the Second Amendment permits persons with felony convictions to possess firearms and ammunition. However, the court affirmed the lower court's decision, citing precedents that upheld the validity of "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons." The court concluded that Gay, having been convicted of 22 felonies and being on parole, did not fit the description of a "law-abiding, responsible citizen" who has a constitutional right to possess firearms.
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USA v. Ostrum
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
23-1364
Opinion Date: April 25, 2024
Judge:
St. Eve
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case revolves around Dylan Ostrum, who was under investigation for drug dealing and possession of firearms. During a search of his home, Ostrum revealed that he had moved his belongings, including his car, to his father's house. However, the car, which was reported stolen by a rental company, was found nearby with Ostrum's belongings inside, including a gun, methamphetamine, and marijuana, all stashed in two safes. The key issues on appeal were whether Ostrum had standing to challenge the search of the stolen car and whether the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The investigation into Ostrum began after law enforcement agents found text messages between him and another individual, Ricky Blythe, showing that they repeatedly sold each other methamphetamine and marijuana. Based on this evidence and information from confidential informants, law enforcement obtained a valid warrant to search Ostrum’s residence. However, the search turned up little, and Ostrum informed the officers that he had moved his belongings to his father's house. The officers later located the car, which was reported stolen, and discovered the safes inside.
Ostrum was charged with multiple counts related to drug possession and distribution, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence found inside the car, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal search. The district court denied the motion, finding that Ostrum lacked standing to challenge the search because the car was stolen, and that the search was valid under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Ostrum was convicted on all counts and received a 240-month sentence.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Ostrum failed to meet his burden on standing and that the existence of probable cause justified the search under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The court concluded that Ostrum had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen car or its contents, and thus no standing to object to its search.
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United States v. Tyrone Cameron
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
23-2839
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Tyrone Cameron was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition following a three-day trial. The district court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Cameron appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, that his conviction violated the Second Amendment, that the district court should not have admitted his prior felony convictions involving firearms into evidence, and that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.
The district court had reviewed the evidence, including surveillance footage and testimonies, and found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Cameron's conviction. The court also admitted Cameron's prior felony convictions into evidence, which were relevant to show that Cameron knew he was a felon and knowingly possessed ammunition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that a reasonable jury could have found there existed ample circumstantial evidence to support Cameron’s conviction. The court also rejected Cameron's Second Amendment challenge, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen did not cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons. The court found no error in the district court's admission of Cameron's prior felony convictions, as they were relevant to the case and not unfairly prejudicial. Lastly, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct, as the government's remarks during closing arguments were permissible interpretations of the evidence.
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United States v. Veasley
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
23-1114
Opinion Date: April 17, 2024
Judge:
Stras
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Devonte Veasley was charged with possessing a firearm while using a controlled substance, following an incident where he shot at his drug dealer. Veasley pleaded guilty to the charge. However, after the Supreme Court ruled in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen that a New York law requiring "proper cause" to carry a firearm violated the Second Amendment, Veasley sought to withdraw his plea or have the indictment dismissed. He argued that the federal statute under which he was charged, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which criminalizes the possession of a firearm by someone using or addicted to a controlled substance, was facially unconstitutional. The district court did not allow him to withdraw his plea or dismiss the indictment.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected Veasley's facial challenge to the statute. The court reasoned that the prohibition of firearm possession by drug users or addicts does not always violate the Second Amendment. The court drew analogies to historical regulations that restricted the rights of certain groups, such as the mentally ill and those who used firearms to terrorize others, to bear arms. The court concluded that, at least for some drug users, the statute imposes a comparable burden on the right to bear arms and serves a comparable justification. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
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USA V. PAYNE
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
22-50262
Opinion Date: April 17, 2024
Judge:
Tallman
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Jeremy Travis Payne, a California parolee, was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, fluorofentanyl, and cocaine. The charges stemmed from evidence obtained from a house in Palm Desert, California, and from Payne's cell phone, which was unlocked by police using Payne's thumbprint during a traffic stop. Payne moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search of his phone and the house violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
The district court denied Payne's motion. It found that the search of Payne's phone was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given Payne's parole status and the conditions of his parole, which allowed for suspicionless searches of his property. The court also determined that the use of Payne's thumbprint to unlock his phone was not testimonial and therefore did not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the search of Payne's phone did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It found that the search was authorized under a general search condition of Payne's parole, which allowed for the suspicionless search of any property under Payne's control. The court also held that the search of Payne's phone was not unreasonable under California law, which prohibits arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches.
Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the court held that the use of Payne's thumbprint to unlock his phone was not testimonial because it required no cognitive exertion. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment did not apply.
Finally, the court held that there was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant for the house in Palm Desert, California, without regard to observations made during a challenged protective sweep of the house.
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Bustillos v. City of Artesia
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
22-2046
Opinion Date: April 17, 2024
Judge:
Rossman
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Albert Bustillos, an independent journalist, was filming content for his YouTube channel outside the Navajo oil refinery in Artesia, New Mexico. He was approached by refinery security and later by officers from the Artesia Police Department, including Corporal David Bailey. Despite Bustillos asserting he was on public property and had not broken any laws, Bailey arrested him for failure to identify himself in violation of New Mexico law.
Bustillos sued Bailey and the City of Artesia, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights and New Mexico law. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Bailey was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, rejecting Bailey’s qualified immunity defense.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The court found that Bailey lacked reasonable suspicion of a predicate crime, which is required to lawfully arrest someone for concealing identity. The court also found that Bustillos had met his burden to show that Bailey violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court dismissed the portion of the appeal relating to Bustillos’s state-law claims, as the defendants had failed to meet their burden to support pendent appellate jurisdiction.
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Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of America v. A-Quality Auto Sales
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
23-2113
Opinion Date: April 23, 2024
Judge:
Carolyn Baldwin McHugh
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Insurance Law
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The case involves an insurance dispute between Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America and A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., along with its owners, Felicia and Shawn Richesin. The Richesins purchased a Subaru for resale through their dealership, A-Quality Auto Sales. After having the car inspected and repaired by RNS Auto Services, they experienced mechanical issues while driving it. Ms. Richesin was severely injured when she exited the vehicle on the side of the highway and was struck by another car. RNS had a garage insurance policy with Travelers, which provided commercial general liability coverage with a per-occurrence limit of $500,000 and a general aggregate limit of $1,000,000. The Richesins sought additional compensation from RNS and Travelers for Ms. Richesin's injuries.
In the lower courts, the Richesins filed a suit against Travelers and other parties in New Mexico state court. The state court dismissed all claims against Travelers, citing a lack of privity between the injured party and the insurer. Later, the Richesins and RNS entered into agreements that led to Travelers paying the Richesins $500,000, which Travelers believed to be the policy limit. The Richesins, however, argued that there were multiple occurrences and therefore the policy's aggregate limit of $1,000,000 was available. Travelers then filed a complaint in federal district court seeking a judicial declaration that the accident was a single occurrence and the policy coverage limit for the accident was $500,000.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of declaratory judgment. The court held that the dispute was ripe for resolution under Article III of the Constitution. It also ruled that the district court did not err by declining to abstain under the Brillhart and Younger abstention doctrines. The court further held that the district court did not err by denying the Richesins' Rule 56(d) motion, thereby denying them discovery needed to meaningfully oppose Travelers' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the accident was a single occurrence and the policy coverage limit for the accident was $500,000.
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United States v. Wilson
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
23-2073
Opinion Date: April 15, 2024
Judge:
PHILLIPS
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
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A California-based psychologist, Dr. Rick Q. Wilson, was investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for potential violations of the Controlled Substances Act. The DEA issued an administrative subpoena to obtain Wilson's medical, prescription, and billing records. Wilson challenged the subpoena on statutory, constitutional, and privacy grounds.
The district court initially dismissed the United States' petition to enforce the subpoena, finding it violated the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Fourth Amendment. However, upon reconsideration, the court granted the United States' motion to amend the petition and enforce a narrowed version of the subpoena.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the modified subpoena complied with HIPAA, was not unreasonably burdensome under the Fourth Amendment, and did not violate Wilson's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination due to the required-records exception. The court held that the subpoena was issued within the DEA's authority, was relevant to the DEA's investigation, and was not unreasonably broad or burdensome. The court also found that the records requested fell within the required-records exception to the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
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United States v. Holroyd
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
20-3083
Opinion Date: April 19, 2024
Judge:
Henderson
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case revolves around Wayne Holroyd, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 280 grams of crack cocaine. After his plea but before his sentencing, Congress amended the "safety valve" provision of the statute used to compute Holroyd's sentence, expanding the eligibility of a drug offender to be sentenced without regard to the statutory mandatory minimum. However, the district court sentenced Holroyd to the statutory minimum of 120 months' imprisonment. Holroyd argued that his counsel should have contended that he was eligible for sentencing without regard to the statutory minimum under the recently revised safety valve provision.
The district court sentenced Holroyd to the mandatory minimum of 120 months' imprisonment. Holroyd's counsel did not move for reconsideration. Holroyd contended that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in representing him at sentencing because counsel failed to give the correct interpretation to the safety valve provision. He argued that his two past convictions did not exclude him from the safety valve under the provision because the word "and" between subparagraphs must be read conjunctively so that only a defendant who has convictions satisfying all subparagraphs cumulatively is ineligible.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. The court held that Holroyd's counsel's decision not to argue at sentencing or to move for reconsideration on the basis of Holroyd's eligibility for the safety valve was not deficient representation. The court noted that the Supreme Court recently adopted a different construction of the safety valve provision, which held that a defendant satisfies the criminal-history requirement only when he does not meet any of the disqualifying criteria. As Holroyd had a 6-point criminal history based on two previous 3-point offenses, he did not satisfy the criteria and was therefore ineligible for the safety valve.
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UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN RESERVATION v. US
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Docket:
21-1880
Opinion Date: April 25, 2024
Judge:
Dyk
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Contracts, Native American Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation brought a suit against the United States, alleging various claims concerning water rights and water-related infrastructure. The Tribe claimed that the United States breached duties of trust by mismanaging water rights and infrastructure held by the United States and operated for the Tribe, breached contracts with the Tribe, and effected unconstitutional takings of the Tribe’s property. The Claims Court dismissed all the breach of trust claims, held that one breach of contract claim was barred by a 2012 settlement agreement, and found the remaining breach of contract and takings claims time barred.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the Claims Court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the Winters doctrine and the 1899 Act did not sufficiently establish trust duties to support Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction with respect to the Tribe’s claims that the United States has a duty to construct new infrastructure and secure new water for the Tribe. However, the Court found that the 1906 Act imposes trust duties on the United States sufficient to support a claim at least with respect to management of existing water infrastructure. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of one breach of contract claim, vacated and remanded another, and affirmed the dismissal of the takings claims.
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CORBITT v. PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 Ark. 65
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Judge:
Womack
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
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In Arkansas, attorney Chris Corbitt and other plaintiffs sought to challenge the prohibition of firearms in courthouses. Corbitt had previously attempted to bring a firearm into the Pulaski County District Courthouse and the Juvenile Justice Complex, but was denied. He filed a complaint, which was dismissed by the circuit court and later affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Despite this, Corbitt and other plaintiffs filed another complaint after encountering firearm restrictions in a different courthouse. This complaint was also dismissed.
The circuit court ruled that Corbitt was not entitled to injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, or a writ of mandamus. The court also found that even if issue preclusion were not applicable, it would rule similarly to Judge Wright’s decision regarding the interpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-122. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, stating that it was based on a flawed premise that misread the plain meaning of the statute and ignored the importance of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court emphasized that Amendment 80 gives the Arkansas Supreme Court the power to regulate court procedure, including the discretion to determine when weapons should be allowed in courtrooms.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Corbitt was collaterally estopped from pursuing his claims due to the previous litigation, but the remaining plaintiffs could proceed. The court further held that attorneys, as officers of the court, are authorized by statute to possess handguns in courthouses. The court reversed the circuit court’s denial of the petition for a declaratory judgment as it pertains to the remaining plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Dilbert v. Newsom
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
C096274(Third Appellate District)
Opinion Date: April 8, 2024
Judge:
HULL
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
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The case involves Clifford Alan Dilbert, who filed petitions for clemency and/or commutation of his prison sentence with the Governor's office in 2016, 2017, 2019, and 2021. Dilbert claimed that he had not received any communication from the Governor's office regarding the processing of his clemency petition. He sought a writ of mandate to compel Governor Gavin Newsom to process his applications and reapplications for clemency/commutation, render a decision on those applications, and notify him of the decision in a timely manner.
The Superior Court of Sacramento County sustained the Governor’s demurrer to the petition without leave to amend. The court concluded that Dilbert does not have a due process right to have his applications processed within a particular time frame and the law imposes no duty to process clemency applications within a particular time frame. Dilbert appealed this decision.
The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court found that neither the California Constitution nor any provision of Penal Code sections 4800 to 4813 contains an express requirement that the Governor process clemency applications within a specified time frame. The court also rejected Dilbert's argument that the application instructions created an obligation for the Governor to grant discretionary clemency within a certain amount of time. The court concluded that Dilbert does not have a due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution to have his application processed within a certain time frame.
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Mosley v. Superior Court
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
C099530(Third Appellate District)
Opinion Date: April 5, 2024
Judge:
RENNER
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case involves Jameal M. Mosley, who was charged with unauthorized possession and transportation of a machine gun, being a felon in possession of a firearm for the benefit of a street gang, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. These charges stemmed from warrantless searches of Mosley's car and person, which yielded a loaded magazine and a Glock handgun with an automatic switch. Mosley filed a motion to suppress the magazine and handgun, arguing that the searches were unsupported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
The trial court held a suppression hearing. The Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department had received a call about a group of men creating a music video in a parking lot, with one of them holding a handgun. The officers arrived at the scene and detained all members of the group, including Mosley. They found a firearm on one of the men, D.M., and another firearm in D.M.'s car. Mosley was detained for approximately 41 minutes before his car was searched, revealing a loaded magazine. A subsequent search of Mosley's person revealed a Glock handgun with a switch. The trial court denied Mosley's motion to suppress, finding that the officers had probable cause to search Mosley's car and that the detention was not prolonged.
Mosley filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District. The appellate court agreed with Mosley's argument that the trial court erred in finding the warrantless searches were supported by probable cause and reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to search Mosley's car and that the detention was unlawfully prolonged. The court granted Mosley's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying Mosley's motion to suppress and enter a new order granting the motion.
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STRYKER v. THE STATE
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S24A0125
Opinion Date: April 16, 2024
Judge:
Colvin
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Austin Stryker was convicted for malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting and stabbing death of Hannah Bender. Stryker was a member of a small gang, and the prosecution argued that he killed Bender because he suspected she was informing on the gang's activities. Stryker was charged with multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, possession of a firearm and knife during the commission of a felony, violating the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, concealing the death of another, and tampering with evidence. The jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, along with consecutive sentences for other charges.
Stryker appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense when it prevented his counsel from making a closing argument that co-defendants Issac Huff and Dylan Reid would have faced minimum sentences of life in prison had they not pled guilty. He also contended that the prosecutor personally attacked his defense counsel in closing argument and that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on “grave suspicion” after the prosecutor allegedly misconstrued the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in closing arguments.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Stryker's convictions, concluding that his claims failed. However, the court identified merger errors in Stryker’s sentencing that required correction, and thus vacated part of the judgment.
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In Re: West Maui Resort Partners LP v. County of Maui
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Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii
Docket:
SCAP-22-0000587
Opinion Date: April 23, 2024
Judge:
Mark E. Recktenwald
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Tax Law
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This case involves two appeals by West Maui Resort Partners LP and Ocean Resort Villas Vacation Owners Association against the County of Maui. The appellants, who manage nearly 700 time share units, challenged their Maui County tax assessments, arguing that the County's tax assessments were unconstitutional and violated the County's own code. They contended that the County's creation of a Time Share real property tax classification acted as an illegal tax on time share visitors. They also argued that time share units and hotel units have an identical "use" for real property purposes, and therefore, should be taxed in the same real property tax classification.
The Tax Appeal Court granted summary judgment for the County in both cases. The court concluded that the County acted within its constitutional authority to tax real property in creating the Time Share classification and taxing properties assigned to it. The court also found that the County had several legitimate policy purposes rationally related to the creation of the Time Share classification, including raising revenue for infrastructure maintenance and addressing time share properties' unique impacts on the community.
The appellants appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals, which transferred the cases to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Appeal Court's summary judgment for the County in both cases, concluding that the County did not exceed its constitutional authority when creating the Time Share classification, nor did it violate its own code in doing so. The court also held that the Time Share classification's creation and rates were constitutional under the equal protection clauses of the Hawai'i and U.S. Constitutions.
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CONN V. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD
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Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-SC-0198-DG
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Judge:
Vanmeter
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves four appellants who are parole-eligible inmates serving life sentences in the Kentucky Department of Corrections. They were denied any further opportunity at parole for the remainder of their sentences by the Kentucky Parole Board. The appellants challenged the Board's authority to issue a "serve-out," arguing that it violates the constitutional separation of powers.
The Franklin Circuit Court concluded that the Board was within its statutory authority to issue a serve-out on a life sentence and granted summary judgment to the Board. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning that the legislature had not prohibited the Board from authorizing serve-outs on life sentences.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Board has the power to issue a serve-out to an inmate serving a life sentence. The court reasoned that while the current statutory scheme may not explicitly authorize the Board to grant serve-outs, the relevant legislative and administrative history indicates that the legislature has condoned the Board’s use of this power. The court also held that the Board's power to issue a serve-out does not violate the constitutional separation of powers. The court concluded that a serve-out is authorized by the legislature and is not constitutionally impermissible.
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WOODALL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-SC-0232-MR
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Judge:
Keller
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In 1998, Robert Keith Woodall was sentenced to death for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a teenage girl. In 2015, Woodall filed a Motion to Vacate the Death Sentence Due to Intellectual Disability, arguing that he is intellectually disabled and thus the imposition of the death penalty would violate his constitutional rights. The trial court denied his motion without a hearing. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and again denied Woodall’s motion. The court found that Woodall had not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that he is intellectually disabled. Woodall appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decision of the trial court. The court found that the trial court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that Woodall had not proven that he is intellectually disabled by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also rejected Woodall's arguments that the trial court violated his due process rights and Confrontation Clause rights by admitting and relying on a report without requiring the report's author to testify at the hearing.
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State of Maine v. Ouellette
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Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Citation:
2024 ME 29
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Judge:
Stanfill
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case involves Roger Ouellette, who was convicted of Operating Under the Influence (OUI) following a police stop in his driveway. The police officer had observed Ouellette's vehicle crossing the center line of the road, which led the officer to suspect a violation of traffic laws. Ouellette entered a conditional guilty plea after his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop was denied by the trial court.
The trial court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Ouellette due to his observed traffic violation. Ouellette argued that the stop was unjustified as the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. However, the court determined that the stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that Ouellette had violated the motor vehicle statute requiring vehicles to be operated within a single lane.
On appeal, Ouellette argued that the stop was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment because it occurred within the curtilage of his home without a warrant and without any applicable exception to the warrant requirement. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the court's failure to grant Ouellette’s motion on that ground did not constitute obvious error and that the stop was justified based on reasonable suspicion. The court also found that Ouellette's argument regarding the stop occurring within the curtilage of his home was unpreserved and did not amount to obvious error.
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Nevadans for Reprod. Freedom v. Washington
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Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Citation:
140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 28
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Judge:
Stiglich
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Election Law
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The case revolves around an initiative petition proposed by Nevadans for Reproductive Freedom (NRF) to establish a constitutional right to reproductive freedom. The petition would grant every individual the right to make decisions regarding all matters related to pregnancy, including prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, birth control, vasectomy, tubal ligation, abortion, abortion care, management of a miscarriage, and infertility care. Respondents Donna Washington and Coalition for Parents and Children challenged the petition in district court, alleging that it failed to meet statutory and constitutional requirements and sought to prevent the Secretary of State from placing the initiative on the ballot. They argued that the initiative petition violated the single-subject requirement because it considered multiple medical procedures, instead of being limited to only pregnancy or abortion. The district court granted the injunction, finding the initiative petition invalid for three reasons: it does not contain a single subject, its description of effect is misleading, and it requires an expenditure of money without raising the necessary revenue.
The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's decision. The court found that all the medical procedures considered in the initiative petition concern reproduction and are germane to each other and the initiative's single subject of establishing a right to reproductive freedom. The court also concluded that the description of effect was legally sufficient and the initiative petition does not require an expenditure of funds. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in preventing the Secretary of State from placing the initiative petition on the ballot.
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Sisolak v. Polymer80, Inc.
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Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Citation:
140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 30
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Judge:
Stiglich
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of several Nevada statutes regulating "ghost guns," or unfinished firearm frames or receivers. The respondent, Polymer80, Inc., a manufacturer of gun-related products, argued that the definition of "unfinished frame or receiver" in the statutes was impermissibly vague, making the statutes unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Polymer80, concluding that the definition did not clearly explain key terms or notify individuals when raw materials would become an unfinished frame or receiver. The court also found that the definition allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the lower court's findings. The court found that the terms used to define "unfinished frame or receiver" had ordinary meanings that provided sufficient notice of what the statutes prohibited. The court also concluded that the statutes were general intent statutes that did not lack a scienter requirement and did not pose a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision, holding that the statutes were not unconstitutionally vague.
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In re Aaron Manor Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., LLC v Zucker
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Court: New York Court of Appeals
Citation:
2024 NY Slip Op 02126
Opinion Date: April 23, 2024
Judge:
RIVERA
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
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The case involves a dispute over the adjusted Medicaid reimbursement rates for for-profit residential health care facilities in New York. The New York State Department of Health and its Commissioner, in response to a legislative mandate, eliminated a component known as the "residual equity reimbursement factor" from the computation formula used to set these rates. This change was part of a broader effort to reduce Medicaid costs in the state. The petitioners, 116 for-profit nursing homes, challenged this adjustment, arguing that it was retroactively applied and violated their rights under the Public Health Law and the Equal Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court granted the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the clause pending a final determination of the proceeding. It also partially granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the petitioners' claims that the adjusted rates were not "reasonable and adequate to meet costs" under the Public Health Law and violated their equal protection rights. However, the court found that the adjusted rates were improperly applied retroactively. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision.
The New York Court of Appeals, in its review, held that the Department of Health did not violate the legislature's intent when it announced the recalculated rates for services provided on or after April 2, 2020. The court found that the legislature clearly expressed its intent for the elimination clause to be applied without delay, and that the initial implementing ratemaking was not subject to the usual 60-day advance notice requirement. The court also rejected the petitioners' claims that the adjusted rates were not "reasonable and adequate to meet costs" and violated their equal protection rights. The court modified the order of the Appellate Division in accordance with its opinion and, as so modified, affirmed it.
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In re Walt Disney Company and Consolidated Subsidiaries v Tax Appeals Tribunal
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Court: New York Court of Appeals
Citation:
2024 NY Slip Op 02127
Opinion Date: April 23, 2024
Judge:
Cannataro
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Tax Law
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The case involves the Walt Disney Company and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), both multinational corporations, and their dispute with the Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York. The corporations challenged the state's taxation scheme that was in effect from 2003 to 2013. The scheme allowed corporations that paid franchise taxes in New York to deduct income received as royalty payments from members of the same corporate group in calculating their taxable income. The deduction was only allowed if the royalty payment came from a related entity that had already paid a New York tax on the same income. The state Department of Taxation and Finance determined that both corporations improperly deducted royalty payments they received from affiliates in foreign countries that were not subject to New York franchise taxes. The corporations argued that the denial of the deduction was contrary to the statute and violated the Commerce Clause's prohibition on discrimination against foreign commerce.
The corporations challenged the denial of their royalty tax deductions and the notices of deficiency with the New York State Division of Tax Appeals. The Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) determined that the deduction authorized under the law only applied where the royalty came from a subsidiary that had been subjected to the add back requirement contained in the law. The ALJs denied the petitions and sustained the notices of deficiency. The Tax Appeals Tribunal subsequently affirmed both decisions. The corporations then commenced proceedings in the Appellate Division, which affirmed the determinations and dismissed the petitions. The corporations appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Appellate Division correctly interpreted the statutes as permitting a tax deduction only where a related subsidiary was subject to the add back requirement. The court also found that any burden on interstate or foreign commerce created by this tax scheme was incidental and did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court rejected the corporations' argument that the tax scheme was facially discriminatory against out-of-state commerce and failed the internal consistency test. The court concluded that the tax scheme treated groups with related members who did not pay taxes in New York the same as those with related members who did, and that the scheme did not result in duplicative taxation in all situations.
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People v. Dunton
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Court: New York Court of Appeals
Citation:
2024 NY Slip Op 02130
Opinion Date: April 23, 2024
Judge:
Jenny Rivera
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case revolves around Corey Dunton, who was convicted of attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and reckless endangerment after he opened fire at a skating rink, injuring two individuals. Dunton had a history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior, both in and out of the courtroom. During the announcement of the verdict, Dunton, who was handcuffed for security reasons, disrupted the proceedings with verbal outbursts directed at the jury. As a result, the court ordered his removal from the courtroom.
The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Dunton's conviction. However, following a similar case (People v Antoine), Dunton's appellate counsel contacted the Office of the Appellate Defender (OAD) regarding filing a writ of error coram nobis on Dunton's behalf. The OAD filed the writ, arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain claims, including that the trial court violated Dunton's constitutional and statutory right to be present during the rendering of the verdict when it removed him from the courtroom without prior warning. The Appellate Division granted the writ, reversed the judgment, and ordered a new trial.
The case was then brought before the Court of Appeals. The court held that the trial court's removal of Dunton from the courtroom was appropriate given his history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior. The court rejected the argument that any error was de minimis based on the timing of Dunton's removal from the courtroom. The court also held that the Appellate Division erroneously concluded that the trial court violated Dunton's right to be present, and therefore incorrectly granted Dunton's writ of error coram nobis on the sole ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim on direct appeal. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of issues raised but not determined by that Court.
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People v Franklin
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Court: New York Court of Appeals
Citation:
2024 NY Slip Op 02227
Opinion Date: April 25, 2024
Judge:
HALLIGAN
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case revolves around a defendant, Cid Franklin, who was arrested following a road rage incident that involved a firearm. The police searched the basement of Franklin's home, which he shared with his son and stepmother, and found a gun in a closet containing items belonging to both Franklin and his stepmother. Franklin was interviewed by an employee of the Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) while in Queens central booking prior to arraignment. The CJA employee recorded Franklin's address as the basement of his home. This information was central to the prosecution's case at trial, as no DNA or fingerprints were discernable on the gun, and no other direct proof was provided that Franklin lived in the basement.
The trial court admitted the CJA form as either "a public document" or "a business record," rejecting the defense's objections that it was hearsay and violated Franklin's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Franklin was convicted of one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the introduction of the report violated Franklin's Confrontation Clause rights.
The Court of Appeals of New York, however, reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the primary purpose of the CJA interview report was administrative, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and thus it was not testimonial. The court noted that the CJA report was introduced as a business or public record, and the pedigree information collected, including the defendant's address, was pertinent to establishing community ties; it was only incidentally relevant in this case. Therefore, the introduction of the CJA interview report did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that Court.
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State v. Fuglesten
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Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 ND 74
Opinion Date: April 19, 2024
Judge:
Tufte
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Michael Fuglesten was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor after a police officer entered his garage without a warrant. The officer had responded to a 911 call about a truck repeatedly driving by a house with loud music. The officer identified the truck as Fuglesten's, knew his license was suspended, and followed him to his home. The officer did not attempt a traffic stop or initiate his overhead lights. Upon reaching Fuglesten's home, the officer approached the garage on foot and interacted with Fuglesten, who was inside the garage. Fuglesten was subsequently arrested and charged.
Fuglesten filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer's entry into his garage was unlawful. The district court denied the motion, and Fuglesten conditionally pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court found that the officer had probable cause to believe Fuglesten had committed the offense of driving under suspension, but did not find evidence of exigent circumstances relating to dissipation or destruction of evidence.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court held that, under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lange v. California, exigent circumstances were required for law enforcement to enter Fuglesten's garage without a warrant. The court found that the facts presented to the district court did not establish exigent circumstances. The court concluded that the officer's entry into Fuglesten's garage, without exigent circumstances, constituted an illegal entry. The court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded the case to allow Fuglesten to withdraw his guilty plea.
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In the Matter of M.R.
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Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 OK 28
Opinion Date: April 23, 2024
Judge:
Douglas L. Combs
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Family Law, Native American Law
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The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the termination of parental rights of Victoria Rodriguez and Everardo Rodriguez, Sr., parents of four children who were adjudicated deprived. The children were removed from their parents' custody following allegations of severe sexual abuse against the eldest daughter, M.R., by her father over a two-year period, and the mother's failure to protect the children from this abuse.
The District Court of Oklahoma County terminated the parents' rights after a jury trial. Both parents appealed separately, and their appeals were considered together in this opinion. The mother argued that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was unconstitutional as it denied her equal protection under the law. However, the court found that she lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of ICWA. The court also held that the trial court did not violate her right to equal protection under the law by failing to apply a heightened burden of proof under ICWA.
The father argued that the trial court erred by not making certain required findings under federal and state law and by granting the State's Motion in Limine. The court found that the trial court did not err in these respects. The court affirmed the trial court's orders terminating the parental rights of both parents.
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City of Lancaster v. PUC
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Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Docket:
107 MAP 2022
Opinion Date: April 25, 2024
Judge:
Brobson
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
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The case involves the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) and the City of Lancaster, Borough of Carlisle, and Borough of Columbia (collectively referred to as the Municipalities). The dispute centers around Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations, which gives natural gas distribution companies (NGDCs) the authority to determine the location of gas meters in historic districts. The Municipalities argued that this regulation violates Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which vests legislative power in the General Assembly, not in private entities like NGDCs.
The Commonwealth Court agreed with the Municipalities, concluding that Section 59.18 unlawfully delegates legislative authority to NGDCs without providing adequate standards to guide their decisions. The court therefore declared Section 59.18 unenforceable.
The PUC appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The PUC argued that Section 59.18 does not delegate legislative power to NGDCs, but rather is a regulatory act under the PUC’s administrative authority. The PUC also contended that the Commonwealth Court failed to consider the safety issues related to meter placement, which is the primary concern of the regulation.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. The court found that the General Assembly never enacted a statute giving the PUC legislative authority to determine the location of gas meters in historic districts. Therefore, the PUC could not have unlawfully delegated this authority to NGDCs. The court concluded that the Municipalities' disagreement with the PUC's regulation does not amount to a constitutional violation. The case was remanded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings.
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State v. Tavares
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Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
Docket:
22-152
Opinion Date: April 22, 2024
Judge:
Goldberg
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The defendant, Victor Tavares, was convicted by a jury on two counts of first-degree sexual assault and one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred at a party in 2012, where Tavares and another man, Franklin Johnson, were accused of sexually assaulting a woman named Mary. The evidence against Tavares included Mary's testimony, a used condom found at the scene, and DNA evidence linking Johnson to the condom. Tavares, who represented himself at trial and on appeal, raised twelve issues for consideration.
Before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Tavares argued that the trial court erred in several ways, including by not dismissing the indictment based on the rule of consistency, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the General Assembly's lack of authority to enact criminal laws. He also claimed that the trial court improperly conducted voir dire and allowed the introduction of Johnson's DNA evidence.
The Supreme Court rejected all of Tavares's arguments. It held that the trial court properly conducted voir dire and correctly allowed the introduction of Johnson's DNA evidence. The court also found that the General Assembly had the authority to enact the criminal laws under which Tavares was charged and convicted. Furthermore, the court ruled that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and the rule of consistency did not apply in this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Tavares's conviction.
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Salt Lake Co v. Tax Commission
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Court: Utah Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 UT 11
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Judge:
Hagen
Areas of Law:
Aviation, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law, Transportation Law
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The case involves Salt Lake County's challenge to the constitutionality of the Aircraft Valuation Law, which provides a preferred method for determining the fair market value of aircraft for tax purposes. The County argued that the application of the law to Delta Air Lines' aircraft resulted in an assessment below fair market value, violating the Utah Constitution. The County also contended that the law, on its face, violated the Utah Constitution by divesting the Utah State Tax Commission of its power to assess airline property.
The Utah State Tax Commission had previously upheld the 2017 assessment of Delta's property, which was calculated according to the Aircraft Valuation Law. The Commission found that the County did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the legislature's preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah rejected the County's arguments. The court held that the County failed to fully utilize the statutory safety valve, which allows the Commission to use an alternative valuation method if the preferred method does not reasonably reflect fair market value. The court also rejected the County's facial challenge to the Aircraft Valuation Law, concluding that the County did not show that the law prohibits the legislature from prescribing a preferred method for valuing aircraft. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission's decision.
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