USA v. Davitashvili

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1024

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Davit Davitashvili, who was charged with violating federal law by transmitting threats to injure his ex-wife, Olga Volosevich, and other unnamed individuals. This was after a long history of abusive behavior towards Volosevich, culminating in threatening messages sent to her via the messaging app Viber. Davitashvili appealed his conviction, arguing that his threats towards unnamed individuals were constitutionally protected speech.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with Davitashvili's claim. It noted that Davitashvili's threats towards "others" were not protected speech under the First Amendment, as they targeted particular individuals, supporting a conviction. The court pointed out that the jury instructions required the jury to find that Davitashvili’s communication threatened to "injure a person or a group of people," which accurately reflected the relevant federal law.

As for the defendant's argument that his conviction was based on an invalid theory (threatening unspecified "others"), the court held that the jury likely would have convicted Davitashvili based on his threats to Volosevich alone, even if the "kill others" theory was excluded. The court concluded that the trial was error-free and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

United States v. Sanchez-Garcia

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4072

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: HARRIS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Immigration Law

The case involves six non-citizens who were indicted for illegally reentering the U.S. following their prior removal, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. They moved to dismiss their indictments on the ground that § 1326 is unconstitutional because it was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. The district court rejected their argument, finding that they had not shown racial discrimination was a motive for enacting § 1326.

The defendants argued that the 1929 Act, which was one of § 1326’s predecessor offenses, was enacted with racial animus against Mexican and Central American immigrants, and this animus carried forward to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or “1952 Act”) which enacted § 1326. The district court disagreed, stating that even if the 1929 Act had racist motivations, the case for racial bias with respect to the 1952 Act and § 1326 was much weaker, as they were focused on economic factors, labor market factors, and national security factors.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the defendants had not shown that § 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment because it was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. The court found that the defendants had not carried their burden of showing that racial bias against Mexican and Central American immigrants was “a motivating factor” for Congress when it enacted § 1326 in 1952.

Fouts v. Warren City Council

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1826

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Clay

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In this case, James R. Fouts, the former mayor of Warren, Michigan, brought a lawsuit against defendants including the Warren City Council and the City Election Commission. He claimed that they violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by applying a new term-limit provision retroactively, which prevented him from running for a fifth term as the city's mayor. The term-limit provision was part of an amendment to the city’s charter, passed by voters, that limited the eligibility of certain city offices to three complete terms or twelve years. Despite having already served four terms as mayor, Fouts attempted to run for a fifth term in 2023, but was disqualified.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Fouts’ claims. The court held that Fouts did not have a fundamental right to run for public office, and thus his First Amendment rights were not violated. The court also ruled that the term-limit provision did not apply retroactively, as it only prohibited Fouts from running for a fifth term, and did not impose new obligations or deprive him of any existing rights based on his past conduct. Therefore, his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were not violated. Lastly, the court found that Fouts failed to demonstrate that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated without any rational basis, and thus his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights were not violated.

United States v. Winder

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1829

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

In March 2021, Jeffrey A. Winder and Heather Durbin rented a room at a motel. During check-in, the motel manager, Gary McCullough, warned Winder that any illegal activity would result in eviction. The next day, McCullough entered the room for cleaning and discovered a backpack containing what appeared to be methamphetamine. He immediately called 911 and informed the responding officers about his discovery. Upon the officers' arrival, McCullough granted them permission to enter the room, which led to them finding more drugs and a handgun. Winder and Durbin were later arrested when they returned to the motel; another gun and more drugs were found in their vehicle.

Before trial, Winder moved to suppress all the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of the motel room, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. A magistrate judge recommended that the motion to suppress be denied. The district court adopted this recommendation, ruling that Winder had been evicted at the time of the search and that the officers had probable cause to search the backpack based on McCullough's account. Winder pleaded guilty conditionally to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The court found that Winder was lawfully ejected from the motel room prior to the officers' entry, thus eliminating his expectation of privacy. The court also ruled that the officers' search of the backpack did not violate the Fourth Amendment as it did not exceed the scope of McCullough's private search. Consequently, the use of a drug dog and the subsequent seizure of evidence did not violate Winder's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-56054

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny absolute and qualified immunity to two social workers, Gloria Vazquez and Mirta Johnson, in a case brought against them by Sydney Rieman and her child, K.B. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) failing to provide them with notice of a juvenile detention hearing where the County’s Child and Family Services sought custody of K.B., and (2) providing false information to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing.

The court rejected the defendants' claim that they were entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their quasi-prosecutorial role as social workers. The court determined that the failure to provide notice of the hearing and the provision of false information to the Juvenile Court were not similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute. Therefore, absolute immunity did not apply.

The court also held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for failing to provide notice of the hearing and for providing false information to the Juvenile Court. The court affirmed that Ms. Rieman had a due process right to such notice and that this right was clearly established. It was also clear that providing false information to the court constituted judicial deception. The court concluded that a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would have understood that their actions were violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

USA V. SAPALASAN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-30251

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: NELSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Markanthony Sapalasan was arrested and his backpack was searched. After the arrest, his backpack was taken into police custody, and Sapalasan was taken to the police station for questioning regarding a potential murder. After questioning, Sapalasan was released, but his backpack remained in police custody. Approximately six hours later, Officer Tae Yoon conducted an inventory search of the backpack and discovered methamphetamine. Sapalasan was subsequently convicted of two drug felonies and appealed the conviction, claiming that the search of his backpack violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the police may constitutionally conduct an inventory search of belongings when the property is lawfully retained and the search is done in compliance with police regulations, even after the individual has been released. The court found that the lawfulness of the initial separation of Sapalasan from his backpack was unchallenged, so the justification of an inventory search did not depend on whether he was headed to jail. The court also determined that Officer Yoon's inventory search substantially complied with the police department's policy. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's denial of Sapalasan's motion to suppress the methamphetamine found during the search.

AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Bonta

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B321875(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Judge: HOFFSTADT

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

In California, a lawsuit was brought against the state by the AIDS Healthcare Foundation and the City of Redondo Beach. The plaintiffs argued that Senate Bill 10, which allowed local governments to bypass housing density restrictions, violated the initiative power of the California Constitution. The trial court ruled against the plaintiffs, leading them to appeal.

Senate Bill 10 was enacted to address the severe shortage of housing in California. It provided local legislative bodies the authority to supersede local housing density caps, including those enacted by voter initiatives, in order to allow for more housing units per parcel of land. This power was not absolute; it could only be exercised in certain areas and required a supermajority vote to supersede caps adopted by local voter initiatives.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, concluding that Senate Bill 10 did not violate the initiative power of the California Constitution. The appellate court reasoned that the housing shortage was a matter of statewide concern and that the bill conflicted with, and hence preempted, local initiatives that mandated housing density caps. Furthermore, the court determined that the bill's mechanism of granting local legislative bodies the discretion to supersede such caps was not constitutionally problematic.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that existing voter initiatives constituted a preemptive exercise of the local legislative body’s discretion under Senate Bill 10, such that the body lacked the power to supersede such initiatives. The court found no textual support for this argument in the bill and concluded that such an interpretation would frustrate the purpose of Senate Bill 10.

Knudsen v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F085992(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: POOCHIGIAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Eric Bean Knudsen, who had his driver's license suspended following an administrative per se (APS) hearing. The hearing officer from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) concluded that Knudsen had driven his car with a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or greater. Knudsen challenged this decision through a writ of mandate in the Kern County Superior Court, which was denied, and the suspension was upheld.

Knudsen appealed the decision, arguing that his state and federal due process rights were violated because the hearing officer who conducted the APS hearing was not constitutionally impartial. He cited a previous case, California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. DMV, which held that a public hearing officer who acts as both an advocate and adjudicator violates a driver’s due process right to an impartial adjudicator.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reviewed the case. The court agreed with Knudsen, concluding that the public hearing officer acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate, which violated Knudsen's due process right to an impartial adjudicator. As a result, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new APS hearing.

State v. Sayles

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20575

Opinion Date: March 26, 2024

Judge: Robinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant, Dwayne Sayles, was convicted of felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, among other crimes, in connection with his role in the robbery of a convenience store and the shooting death of the store clerk. On appeal, Sayles challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress evidence of his cell phone and the data contained therein. He argued that the police had violated his rights under Miranda and the Connecticut constitution when they continued to interrogate him after he had invoked his right to counsel, and that the seizure of his cell phone violated the fourth amendment to the U.S. constitution and the Connecticut constitution.

However, the Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that any error in the admission of the contents of Sayles' cell phone was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming wealth of evidence against him. This evidence included surveillance footage from inside of the convenience store, detailed testimony from a co-conspirator about Sayles' and his own involvement in the events, testimony from a jailhouse informant that Sayles had confessed to his involvement in the crimes, and a corroborating statement made to the police by a friend of Sayles. The court also noted significant evidence of Sayles' consciousness of guilt, such as testimony that he had directed his cousin to assault a potential witness to force him to recant his testimony. Physical evidence, including a ski mask and gloves found during the search of Sayles' residence and cell phone location data, further corroborated the testimony and statements. Given this, the court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment and declined to address Sayles' constitutional challenges.

Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Adult Personal Use of Marijuana

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0682

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: GROSSHANS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Drugs & Biotech, Election Law, Health Law

The Florida Supreme Court was asked to review a proposed amendment to the state constitution legalizing the recreational use of marijuana. The court evaluated the amendment for adherence to the constitution’s single-subject requirement, the clarity of the ballot summary, and whether the amendment was facially invalid under the federal constitution. The amendment, titled "Adult Personal Use of Marijuana," aimed to modify the Florida Constitution to legalize the personal use of marijuana by adults and allow licensed centers to sell and distribute marijuana for personal use.

The court ruled that the amendment adhered to the single-subject requirement as it focused on a single dominant plan or scheme, which is the legalization of marijuana for personal use. The court disagreed with the argument that the amendment violated the single-subject requirement by both decriminalizing and commercializing recreational marijuana, stating that the sale and possession are logically and naturally related as part of a dominant plan or scheme.

The court also ruled that the ballot summary met the statutory standard for clarity. The court disagreed with the opposition that the ballot summary was misleading because it implied that there were already other state-licensed entities ready to engage in the sale of recreational marijuana.

Lastly, the court ruled that the amendment is not facially invalid under the U.S. Constitution. The court rejected the argument that the proposed amendment is preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act and thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause.

In conclusion, the court approved the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot, finding it complies with the requirements imposed by the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes.

Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re: Limiting Government Interference with Abortion

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-1392

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In this case, the Attorney General of Florida petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for an advisory opinion regarding the validity of a proposed citizen initiative amendment to the Florida Constitution, titled "Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion". The proposed amendment was sponsored by Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc., and sought to limit the government's ability to prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider.

The court approved the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot. In its ruling, the court held that the proposed amendment complied with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and that the ballot title and summary complied with section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes. The court also concluded that there is no basis for finding that the proposed amendment is facially invalid under the United States Constitution.

The court noted that the ballot summary, which essentially followed the language of the proposed amendment, was an "accurate, objective, and neutral summary of the proposed amendment." Therefore, it concluded that the summary did not mislead voters about what the proposed amendment would achieve.

Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida v. State of Florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Dockets: SC2022-1050, SC2022-1127

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: Grosshans

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Health Law

This case before the Supreme Court of Florida concerned a constitutional challenge to an amended Florida statute that prohibits abortions if the gestational age of the fetus is more than 15 weeks, with certain exceptions. The petitioners, a group of abortion clinics and a medical doctor collectively known as Planned Parenthood, alleged that the statute violated the Privacy Clause of the Florida Constitution, which guarantees the right to be let alone and free from government intrusion into private life.

While acknowledging the moral, ethical, and policy issues implicated in the subject matter of abortion, the court focused on the Privacy Clause’s text, its context, and the historical evidence surrounding its adoption. The court concluded that there was no basis under the Privacy Clause to invalidate the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the court receded from prior decisions in which it held that the Privacy Clause guaranteed the right to receive an abortion through the end of the second trimester.

As such, the court found that the petitioners were not entitled to the temporary injunction granted by the trial court. The court approved the outcome reached by the First District Court of Appeal, which had reversed the temporary injunction on the basis that Planned Parenthood could not establish irreparable harm. Therefore, the Florida statute prohibiting abortions after 15 weeks of gestational age, subject to certain exceptions, was upheld.

State v. Van Zanten

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48808

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Transportation Law

The case involves the defendant, Kevin James Van Zanten, who was convicted for felony possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor driving under the influence. Van Zanten challenged the conviction, arguing that the evidence was obtained unlawfully following a stop of the commercial vehicle he was driving. He claimed the stop was based on regulations adopted by the Idaho State Police, which he argued resulted from an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

In September 2020, an Idaho State Police Trooper observed a 2005 Kenworth truck driven by Van Zanten. The Trooper noted several violations, including an improperly displayed Department of Transportation number, unsecured hazardous material, and other items on the truck. The truck was stopped, and the driver was identified as Van Zanten, whose driving privileges were found to be suspended. A subsequent search of the truck resulted in the finding of drugs, leading to Van Zanten's arrest.

At the trial court, Van Zanten moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the Trooper had no legal basis to stop him. He asserted that the Trooper initiated the stop to investigate state regulations that were unenforceable because the statutes authorizing those regulations unconstitutionally delegated legislative power. The district court denied his motion, leading to his appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's judgment. It held that the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop Van Zanten due to specific, articulable facts, thus justifying the stop. The court noted that the inherent danger associated with unsecured hazardous waste and other violations fell within the community caretaking function of law enforcement, and given the nature of the vehicle Van Zanten was driving, the public interest in safety outweighed the limited intrusion of stopping the vehicle. Consequently, the court did not need to address the constitutionality of the statutes in question. The court affirmed Van Zanten’s judgment of conviction.

Wakefield v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CT-00187-SCT

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Coleman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Dwan Wakefield aided Byron McBride after McBride committed a car theft, kidnapping, and murder. Wakefield was convicted under Mississippi Code Section 97-1-5 for three counts of aiding McBride in the aforementioned crimes. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, arguing that being charged multiple times for being an accessory after the fact for each felony committed by the principal violated the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy.

The court found that, under the unit of prosecution test, the State may charge multiple violations of Section 97-1-5 for each felony committed. The court argued that each felony committed by the principal constitutes a separate unit of prosecution, allowing for multiple convictions under the statute. Wakefield's argument was based on the belief that he committed a single act (giving McBride a ride home) while McBride committed three distinct acts (auto theft, kidnapping, and murder). However, the court disagreed and upheld the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Madison County Circuit Court.

In conclusion, the court held that for the purposes of Mississippi’s accessory after the fact statute, Section 97-1-5, each felony committed by a principal offender constitutes a single unit of prosecution. Therefore, Wakefield was not put in jeopardy by being charged with three separate counts under Section 97-1-5. The court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights v. Knudsen

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 67

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana ruled on a case involving a dispute over a proposed ballot initiative related to reproductive rights. In the case, Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights and Samuel Dickman, M.D. (MSRR) sought a declaratory judgment arguing that the Attorney General’s proposed ballot statement for Constitutional Initiative 14 (CI-14) was argumentative, prejudicial, and inaccurate. MSRR also contended that their own proposed ballot statement was clear and impartial and should have been approved by the Attorney General.

The court considered whether MSRR could challenge the Attorney General’s ballot statement under relevant statutes and whether the Attorney General had violated certain sections of the Montana Code Annotated by submitting an argumentative, prejudicial, and/or inaccurate ballot statement for CI-14 and by declining to approve MSRR’s proposed ballot statement.

The court concluded that the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute led to an absurd result that abrogated due process. Therefore, MSRR could challenge the Attorney General’s ballot statement under the relevant statutes. The court also found the Attorney General’s ballot statement for CI-14 failed to comply with statutory requirements as it did not fairly present the voters with what was proposed within the Initiative.

However, the court disagreed with MSRR’s contention that the Attorney General was required to approve its ballot statement. The court concluded that while the Attorney General’s statement was deficient, he had the statutory authority to determine if MSRR's ballot statement complied with the requirements. The court then crafted a new ballot statement that complied with statutory requirements.

Whitetail Wave v. XTO Energy

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 52

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Contracts, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Whitetail Wave LLC, a Montana Limited Liability Company, sued XTO Energy, Inc., a Delaware corporation, the Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State of North Dakota, and the Department of Water Resources and its Director. Whitetail Wave claimed ownership of certain property in McKenzie County, North Dakota, and alleged that XTO Energy had breached their lease agreement by failing to make required royalty payments. Whitetail Wave also claimed that the State's assertion of an interest in the mineral interests associated with the property constituted an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.

The District Court of McKenzie County granted summary judgment in favor of the State and XTO Energy. The court concluded that the State owned certain mineral interests within the ordinary high watermark as defined by North Dakota law. The court also found that XTO Energy was within the safe harbor provision provided by North Dakota law and did not breach the parties’ lease agreement when it withheld the royalty payments. The court awarded XTO Energy recovery of its attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim of an unconstitutional taking against the State, as the State's actions were limited to a title dispute. The Supreme Court also found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim against XTO Energy for the non-payment of royalties, as XTO Energy fell within the safe harbor provision of North Dakota law. Finally, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in awarding XTO Energy a recovery of its attorney’s fees as the prevailing party.

State v. Carter

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1247

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: DEWINE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around a criminal defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant, Eli Carter, was found guilty of having sexual relations with his adopted daughter. He argued that his right to face-to-face confrontation was violated because the trial court allowed a witness to testify remotely via video conference.

The trial court had allowed the remote testimony due to the witness's unavailability to testify in person due to unpredictable winter weather and uncertain airline schedules. The court also noted the state's identification of the witness as important and found his testimony relevant and admissible. The defendant appealed this decision, arguing that the remote testimony violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.

The Third District Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's arguments and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court of appeals noted that the trial court had found that airline-labor shortages and other causes were creating unprecedented travel delays. The court further stated that even if it were to assume that the possibility of inclement weather was insufficient to warrant an exception for the witness's video testimony, the trial court's determinations were justified on a case-specific finding based on an important public policy involving the COVID pandemic.

The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed that the trial court erred by allowing the remote testimony. The court held that the trial court's generalized concerns about COVID-19 risks and travel delays did not constitute a "case-specific finding of necessity," sufficient to abridge the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation. However, the court also concluded that the trial court's error was harmless given the remaining evidence at trial. The court found that there was no reasonable possibility that the witness's testimony contributed anything to the jury's findings of guilt that it could not have gleaned from other witnesses. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals, albeit on different grounds than those relied upon by that court.

Stitt v. Treat

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 OK 21

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Rowe

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law

This case, decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, involved a dispute between the Governor of Oklahoma and the state's legislative leaders. The Governor sought a declaration that the legislative leaders did not have the authority to pass two bills related to Tribal compacts on behalf of the state.

The case has its roots in previous US Supreme Court decisions that allowed Oklahoma to tax tobacco products sold on Indian lands to non-tribal members and to enter into agreements with tribal nations regarding these taxes. Following these decisions, Oklahoma's governor negotiated and entered into compacts with tribal nations regarding excise taxes on tobacco products and motor vehicle licensing and registration fees.

The current dispute revolves around compacts negotiated in 2013. The Governor argued that the legislature lacked the authority to pass two bills extending the expiration of these compacts, alleging that the bills were the product of an unlawful concurrent special legislative session, that they violated the separation of powers by exercising powers that belong to the Executive branch, and that they contradicted his exclusive authority to negotiate state-tribal compacts.

The court held that the legislature had the constitutional authority to consider the bills during a concurrent special session, and that the legislation did not exceed the call of the special session. The court also held that the Governor's authority to negotiate state-tribal compacts is statutory, not constitutional, and that the passage of the bills was not an infringement on the Governor's statutory authority to negotiate and enter into state-tribal compacts. Therefore, the court denied the Governor's request for declaratory relief.

The State v. Collins

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28197

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Beatty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Randy Collins was tried and convicted for first-degree arson and criminal conspiracy, following a fire that resulted in the death of a 12-year-old boy. The conviction was based, in part, on Collins' statement to law enforcement, which was obtained during an interview where the officers assured Collins that his statements would remain confidential. Collins appealed his conviction, arguing that his statement to law enforcement was involuntary due to the officers' false assurance of confidentiality.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina, reviewing the case on certiorari, agreed with Collins. The court held that when law enforcement gave Collins Miranda warnings, but then negated them by falsely advising him that his statements would remain confidential, his statement became involuntary. The court noted that such a false assurance of confidentiality is inherently coercive because it interferes with an individual's ability to make a fully informed decision on whether to engage in an interview.

Moreover, the court found that the false assurance of confidentiality was not harmless error. Collins' statement was key evidence linking him to the arson scheme and placing him at the scene of the fire. His situation was distinguishable from cases where the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative to other properly admitted evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, albeit with modification, and held that Collins' statement was inadmissible and he was entitled to a new trial. The court also took the opportunity to unequivocally condemn the interviewing technique employed in this case.

State v. Van Der Weide

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 18

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Kern

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Keaton Van Der Weide, who was accused of raping S.O., his on-and-off partner and mother of his child. S.O. alleged that Van Der Weide sexually assaulted her after she returned home from a night out, while Van Der Weide maintained that the encounter was consensual and involved the use of sex toys. He was charged with second-degree rape.

Before trial, Van Der Weide sought to introduce evidence of the sex toys and text messages between himself and S.O. The circuit court ruled that unless the State alleged that a toy was used during the rape, Van Der Weide could not proffer evidence of the same. The court allowed the State to cross-examine Van Der Weide based on other texts surrounding the excerpted messages. Van Der Weide was found guilty and appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the sex toys and allowing the State to cross-examine based on unadmitted text messages.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the decision, finding that the circuit court had erred in excluding Van Der Weide's testimony regarding the sex toys, violating his constitutional right to testify in his defense. The court could not conclude that preventing the jury from weighing this important context was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Van Der Weide was entitled to a new trial.