FBI v. Fikre

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1178

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Neil M. Gorsuch

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The case involves Yonas Fikre, a U.S. citizen and Sudanese emigree, who brought a lawsuit alleging that the government unlawfully placed him on the No Fly List. Fikre claimed that the government violated his rights to procedural due process and placed him on the list for constitutionally impermissible reasons related to his race, national origin, and religious beliefs. In 2016, the government removed Fikre from the No Fly List, and argued in court that this action rendered Fikre's lawsuit moot. The district court agreed with the government's assessment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that a party seeking to moot a case based on its own voluntary cessation of challenged conduct must show that the conduct cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.”

The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision. It held that the government failed to demonstrate that the case was moot. The Court stated that a defendant's "voluntary cessation of a challenged practice" will moot a case only if the defendant can prove that the practice cannot "reasonably be expected to recur." The Court found that the government's declaration that it will not relist Fikre based on "currently available information" did not suffice to demonstrate that Fikre will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future if he engages in the same or similar conduct. Therefore, the government has not borne its burden of proving that the dispute is moot.

United States v. Gerrish

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1317

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: SELYA

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit examined a case where the defendant, Derek Gerrish, challenged the constitutionality of a search of his vehicle during his pretrial release on several state criminal charges. During this period, Gerrish was subjected to at least six different bail conditions, five of which allowed for searches of his person, vehicle, or residence at any time without reasonable suspicion. The search in question led to the discovery of fentanyl and other contraband, resulting in Gerrish pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl.

Gerrish argued that the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional, despite the terms of his bail conditions. The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, citing two reasons: the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and Gerrish's bail conditions permitted such a search.

On appeal, the defendant argued that both of the district court's reasons were incorrect. The appeals court, however, only focused on the bail condition rationale, as it found it conclusive. The court noted that Gerrish knowingly agreed to bail conditions authorizing searches without suspicion and did not challenge the reasonableness of these conditions. Furthermore, it emphasized that the issue at hand was not the search itself, but the bail conditions that authorized it.

The court rejected Gerrish's argument that such bail conditions could not be imposed pre-trial or pre-guilty plea, referring to precedent which stated that acceptance of such conditions significantly diminishes a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. It also dismissed Gerrish's claim of a conflict with a Ninth Circuit decision, stating that Maine law requires "least restrictive" bail conditions tailored to the defendant's individual circumstances, thereby eliminating the Ninth Circuit's concerns about mandatory waiver of rights.

The judgment of the district court was thus affirmed.

Goldstein v. Professional Staff Congress/CUNY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-384

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Six full-time professors at the City University of New York filed a lawsuit challenging New York’s Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act, known as the Taylor Law, alleging it violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and association. The professors argued that the law unfairly compelled them to be part of a bargaining unit represented exclusively by the Professional Staff Congress/CUNY (PSC), despite their vehement disagreement with PSC's political views, specifically on issues related to Israel and Palestine. They also challenged a specific section of the Taylor Law which allows PSC to decline representation of non-union employees in certain proceedings.

The defendants filed motions to dismiss the claims, which were granted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The professors appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the district court that the professors' claims were foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, and that the professors failed to allege that the contested section of the Taylor Law violates the First Amendment. Thus, the court concluded that the PSC's exclusive representation of the professors in collective bargaining did not violate the First Amendment, and that the limited fiduciary duty imposed by the contested section of the Taylor Law did not burden their First Amendment rights.

United States v. Oliveras

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2954

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: BIANCO

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant-appellant, Alex Oliveras, was sentenced to sixty-three months' imprisonment and a three-year supervised release term for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. On appeal, Oliveras challenged the imposition of a special condition of his supervised release that allowed for suspicionless searches by a probation officer.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the "special needs" doctrine of the Fourth Amendment permits, when sufficiently supported by the record, the imposition of a special condition of supervised release that allows suspicionless searches of the defendant's person, property, vehicle, place of residence, or any other property under their control by a probation officer. However, the court also found that the district court exceeded its discretion in imposing that special condition here. The court explained that the district court failed to make the individualized assessment required to support the special condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), including a sufficient explanation as to how the condition was reasonably related in this particular case to the applicable statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and involved no greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary under those factors. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the Search Condition and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of whether it is necessary to impose the Search Condition in this particular case and, if so, for the district court to explain the individualized basis for imposing the Search Condition.

Massaro v. Fairfax County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-1287

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Wilkinson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The plaintiff, Peter Massaro, a police officer with the Fairfax County Police Department, alleged that his employer retaliated against him by transferring him to an inferior position after he filed a complaint about discrimination in promotion practices within the department. He sought relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to Fairfax County, dismissing all of Massaro's claims. The court held that Massaro failed to establish a causal connection between his initial discrimination complaint and his subsequent job transfer.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that the time gap between Massaro's complaint and his transfer was too long to support a causal inference. It found no evidence that the transfer was a result of a scheme to punish Massaro for his complaint. Instead, the court concluded that Massaro's transfer was a result of his own subsequent behavior that led to a violation of departmental policy.

The court also dismissed Massaro's First Amendment claim, ruling that his promotion complaint made via an internal grievance process did not reflect a matter of public concern, and thus did not meet the threshold for First Amendment protection.

R J Reynolds Tobacco v. FDA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40076

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and other cigarette manufacturers and retailers challenged the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) new warning-label requirement for cigarette packages and advertisements, citing violations of the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the requirements of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA). The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs based on their First Amendment claim, without addressing the remaining claims.

The FDA appealed, and the appellate court reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the warnings were both factual and uncontroversial, thus qualifying for scrutiny under the standard set by the Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of Supreme Court of Ohio. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the government could constitutionally require advertisers to disclose purely factual and uncontroversial information, provided the requirements are reasonably related to a substantial government interest and not unjustified or unduly burdensome.

Applying the Zauderer standard, the court determined that the FDA's warnings were justified by the government's interest in promoting greater public understanding of the negative health consequences of smoking and were not unduly burdensome. As such, the court concluded that the warnings did not violate the First Amendment. The court remanded the case back to the district court for consideration of the remaining claims under the APA.

United States v. Alvarado

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5459

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: STRANCH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involved Ricardo Alvarado, who was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His crime was reported by officers who responded to a call that a man was carrying what appeared to be a machine gun in a mobile home park. Alvarado was found with a Ruger AR-556 semi-automatic rifle, and upon investigation, officers discovered that he had two prior felony convictions. He was sentenced to 104 months' imprisonment, including a four-level sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment.

Alvarado appealed his conviction and sentence. He contended that his conviction violated the Second Amendment based on the standard articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, an issue he raised for the first time on appeal. He also argued that the evidence did not support a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Alvarado’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The court found that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under Bruen was subject to reasonable dispute and would not disturb Alvarado’s conviction on plain error review. However, the court found that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment. Without record evidence of anyone in proximity to Alvarado’s line of fire, or otherwise facing an imminent risk of harm, the Government could not satisfy Tennessee’s zone of danger requirement. Consequently, Alvarado's sentence was vacated.

Edgewood High School of the Sacred Heart, Incorpor v. City of Madison, Wisconsin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1175

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

A private Catholic high school in Madison, Wisconsin, sued the city and other defendants, claiming that the city's decision to deny the school permission to install lights for nighttime athletic events violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The school also claimed a vested property right under Wisconsin law.

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the school argued that the city's actions amounted to unequal treatment and a substantial burden on its religious exercise. However, the court found that the school, as a master plan institution under the city's Campus-Institutional District ordinance, was not comparably situated to other institutions that had been granted lighting permits. The court also ruled that the city's denial of the permit did not amount to a substantial burden on the school's religious exercise under RLUIPA.

Furthermore, the court found that the school's Free Exercise claim provided no additional protections beyond those under RLUIPA and thus could be dismissed. Lastly, the court rejected the school's vested rights claim, as the lighting permit application did not conform to the municipal zoning requirements in effect at the time. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the city.

Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2683

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: ST.EVE

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case involves Janay Garrick, a former instructor at Moody Bible Institute, who alleged sex discrimination and other Title VII violations. Garrick claimed that she was subjected to hostile treatment due to her gender and the Institute's religious beliefs. Moody argued that her suit was barred by Title VII’s religious exemptions and the First Amendment doctrine of church autonomy. The district court denied Moody's motion to dismiss in part, leading to Moody's appeal.

However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that it could only review a small class of interlocutory orders under the collateral order doctrine, and Moody's appeal did not fit within this class. The court found that the district court's denial of Moody's motion to dismiss was not conclusive, did not resolve important questions separate from the merits of the case, and would not effectively be unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.

The appellate court also emphasized that Moody's defense, based on the doctrine of church autonomy, was not separate from the merits of Garrick's gender discrimination claims. Furthermore, the court noted that Moody's argument that it would experience irreparable harm without immediate review was unavailing, as the district court could limit discovery to instances of discriminatory treatment not implicated by Moody's religious beliefs. The court concluded that religious autonomy to shape and control doctrine would not be threatened by the further progression of Garrick's lawsuit.

SMITH V. HELZER

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-35612

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Murguia

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In this case, a group of individual donors and two independent-expenditure organizations challenged certain campaign finance regulations enacted in Alaska after voters passed Ballot Measure 2, aimed at shedding light on "dark money" in the state's elections. The plaintiffs argued that these regulations violated their First Amendment rights. The two regulations at issue were: (1) a requirement for individual donors to report contributions exceeding an annual aggregate of $2,000 to an entity making expenditures for a candidate in prior or current election cycles, and (2) a requirement for political advertisements to disclose certain identifying information about donors in any communications intended to influence the election of a candidate.

Applying exacting scrutiny, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that both regulations were substantially related and narrowly tailored to the government's interest in providing the electorate with accurate, real-time information. This interest was deemed sufficiently important in the campaign finance context. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' arguments that the reporting requirement was duplicative of existing criminal laws and overly burdensome. It also rejected their contention that the disclaimer requirement for political advertisements was unconstitutionally discriminatory against out-of-state speakers.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. Therefore, the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. The court, however, did not consider the remaining factors for a preliminary injunction as they were unnecessary for this holding.

United States v. Garcia

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50314

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: SANCHEZ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of a pretrial release condition that temporarily barred two defendants from possessing firearms pending trial. The defendants, Jesus Perez-Garcia and John Thomas Fencl, were charged with various felony offenses. The district courts imposed a condition barring them from possessing firearms as part of their pretrial release, arguing that the restriction was necessary for public safety. The defendants appealed, arguing that this condition infringed on their Second Amendment rights.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the firearm condition was constitutional. The court reasoned that the Bail Reform Act of 1984's firearm condition on pretrial release is consistent with how courts have historically balanced the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees with public safety considerations. The court also pointed out that the nation has a long history of temporarily disarming criminal defendants facing serious charges and those deemed dangerous or unwilling to follow the law. Therefore, the court held that the temporary disarmament of the defendants was justified by this historical tradition.

United States v. Mapson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11159

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: JORDAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of sisters Tierzah, Charis, and Elisa Mapson in connection with a shooting incident. The victims were Joshua Thornton, the father of Tierzah's daughter, and his wife. The government charged the sisters with interstate domestic violence, interstate stalking, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. The jury found that the shooting was part of a scheme by the sisters to kill Mr. Thornton over a child custody dispute.

In their appeal, the sisters argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Charis also challenged the admission of testimony that she once owned a firearm, claiming it was prejudicial hearsay. Elisa and Charis contested the admissibility of data obtained from automated license plate readers (ALPRs), arguing that its acquisition constituted a warrantless search in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.

The court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. The court also rejected Charis's challenge to the hearsay evidence, ruling it was admissible as an admission by a party opponent. The court further concluded that the ALPR data was admissible because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, and its introduction did not require expert testimony.

People v. Jackson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B328954(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: WILEY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Albert Jackson was alone in a parked car when two officers approached him. The officers boxed him in, shined flashlights on him, and questioned him, while observing that he was wearing a bulky jacket on a hot night and seemed nervous. The officers did not have any reason to suspect criminal activity, but they stopped and detained Jackson due to his behavior. The officers found a gun in Jackson's possession, leading to his arrest. Jackson challenged his arrest, arguing that his detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court disagreed and denied his motion to suppress the evidence.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight held that the officers' actions amounted to an unjustified detention. The court found that a reasonable person in Jackson's position would not feel free to leave due to the officers' display of authority. The court noted that the officers did not have any specific and articulable facts suggesting that criminal activity was afoot. Wearing a bulky jacket on a hot night, appearing surprised and nervous, and sitting awkwardly in a car do not amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court also rejected the prosecution's argument that the area was a high-crime area, stating that the officer's words did not suggest this.

The court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded the matter for the trial court to vacate its order denying Jackson’s motion to suppress the evidence and to enter a new order granting that motion. The court concluded that Jackson's detention was invalid and violated the Fourth Amendment.

West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. DeSantis

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-1333

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Sasso

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Gaming Law

In this case, two companies and an individual, all involved in Florida's gaming industry, petitioned against the Governor of Florida and others, challenging a gaming compact between the State and the Seminole Tribe. The petitioners argued that a sports betting provision in the compact violated the Florida Constitution, which limits the expansion of casino gambling to the citizens' initiative process. They claimed that the Governor and Legislature exceeded their constitutional authority by allowing the compact to be enacted. The petitioners requested a declaration that the law implementing the compact was unconstitutional and sought an injunction to stop the Seminole Tribe from continuing to operate mobile sports betting.

However, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected this petition on the grounds that a writ of quo warranto, which the petitioners used to challenge the compact, was not an appropriate means to question the substantive constitutionality of an enacted law. The court underscored that quo warranto is a common law remedy used to test the right of a person to hold an office or exercise some right derived from the state, not to challenge the constitutionality of a law. Therefore, the petitioners' claim was beyond the relief that quo warranto provides.

The petitioners' reliance on previous cases, where the writ of quo warranto was used to question the Governor's authority to bind the state to a compact without ratification by the Legislature, was also rejected. The court pointed out that these cases were fundamentally different as they did not challenge the substance of the agreement enacted by the Governor and ratified by the Legislature.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition, stating that the relief sought by the petitioners was beyond what quo warranto provides and declined to extend the scope of the writ to test the substantive constitutionality of a statute.

RICHARDSON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0179

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In January 2018, Matthew Richardson was convicted for felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Julius Aderhold, III. The incident occurred in a drive-by shooting when Richardson was allegedly upset with Jabari Johnson for his involvement in stealing a gun belonging to Richardson's cousin. Richardson, Johnson, and another individual, Young, were involved in the shooting. During the incident, Aderhold was shot and killed. Richardson was found guilty of all counts and sentenced to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive five-year term on Count 5, and 20 years in prison to run concurrent on Counts 2, 3, and 4.

Richardson later appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted testimony of a detective that improperly bolstered out-of-court statements by Johnson and Young, and that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to that same testimony.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction. The court held that the detective's testimony did not directly address the credibility of Johnson and Young and thus did not constitute improper bolstering. Additionally, the court found that Richardson's trial counsel's performance was not deficient, as it was not a clear case of improper bolstering, so no reasonable lawyer would have objected to such testimony on those grounds.

Kopf v. Kelly

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 127464

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: OVERSTREET

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case concerns a challenge to an Illinois statute that prohibits child sex offenders from living within 500 feet of a day care home. The plaintiff, Martin Kopf, who in 2003 had pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving a 15-year-old victim, argued that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Illinois determined that the statute did not violate Kopf's substantive due process and equal protection rights, as it was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting children. The court noted that while the law may create difficulties for sex offenders in finding compliant housing, it does not force them to leave their communities. The court reversed the lower court's decision that found the statute facially unconstitutional and remanded the case for further proceedings on the plaintiff's as-applied challenges.

City of Wichita v. Griffie

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124412

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Standridge

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, the appellant, Gabrielle Griffie, appealed her conviction for unlawful assembly under Wichita Municipal Code of Ordinances (W.M.O.) § 5.73.030(1). The conviction was premised on the City of Wichita's disorderly conduct ordinance, W.M.O. § 5.24.010, which defines disorderly conduct as "one or more of the following acts that the person knows or should know will alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or other breach of the peace", including "using fighting words or engaging in noisy conduct tending to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or resentment in others."

Griffie challenged the constitutionality of the "noisy conduct" provision, arguing it was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals held the provision constitutional. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas disagreed. Applying the substantial overbreadth doctrine used by Kansas courts to adjudicate First Amendment overbreadth challenges, the court concluded the "noisy conduct" provision within W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibits a substantial amount of protected activity in relation to the provision's plainly legitimate sweep.

However, the court found that it was not necessary to strike the entire subsection, as there was a satisfactory method of severing the unconstitutional "noisy conduct" provision from the constitutional "fighting words" provision within the same subsection. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court.

State v. Martin

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124607

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Kansas, Miles Loren Martin was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and possession of a controlled substance without a drug-tax stamp. Martin appealed, arguing that these convictions violated constitutional protections against double jeopardy and a Kansas statute prohibiting multiple convictions for the same conduct.

The Kansas Supreme Court rejected Martin's argument. It held that possession of methamphetamine and failure to affix a drug-tax stamp were not the same offenses under the Kansas statute, because the former carried a higher penalty than the latter, and because the latter required an element (failure to affix the stamp) not required for the former. Consequently, the legislature had not prohibited multiple punishments for these offenses.

The court also held that Martin's convictions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and Kansas Constitutions. It reasoned that the legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for the offenses because they targeted different conduct (possession of an illegal narcotic versus failure to pay a drug tax) and carried different penalties.

On Martin's challenge to the search of his pill bottle, the court found that the search fell within the exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest. The court noted that the officer had a legitimate basis to arrest Martin before the search and that the arrest followed shortly after the search. The court also found that the search of the bottle did not exceed the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest.

State ex rel. Dorsey vs. Vandergriff

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Dockets: SC100388, SC100486

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: Powell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On December 13, 2023, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued an execution warrant for Brian Dorsey, who is serving a death sentence for two counts of first-degree murder. Subsequently, Dorsey filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he is innocent as he was incapable of deliberation due to drug-induced psychosis at the time of the offenses, that his trial counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest resulting from a flat-fee arrangement, and that his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment as he belongs to a unique class of persons for whom the penological goals supporting capital punishment are no longer met.

The Court found that Dorsey failed to present any legally cognizable claims for habeas relief. He did not deny committing the murders and failed to establish that he was actually innocent of first-degree murder. The Court had previously found Dorsey's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest to be without merit, and he was procedurally barred from raising this claim again. Lastly, Dorsey's Eighth Amendment claim was deemed without merit and was interpreted as a plea for clemency, which is beyond the Court's review and authority. Therefore, both petitions for writ of habeas corpus were denied.

Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights v. Knudsen

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 54

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, petitioners Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights and Samuel Dickman, M.D., sought a declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction against the Montana Attorney General and the Montana Secretary of State. The petitioners argued that the Attorney General wrongly determined that their proposed ballot issue was legally insufficient, had no authority to attach a fiscal statement to the ballot issue, and that their ballot statements complied with Montana Code Annotated sections 13-27-212 and -213.

The Supreme Court of Montana held that the Attorney General did err in concluding that the proposed ballot issue was legally insufficient, as it did not violate the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. The proposal effects a single change to the Montana Constitution on a single subject: the right to make decisions about one's own pregnancy, including the right to abortion.

The court also found that the Attorney General exceeded his authority by appending a fiscal statement to the proposed ballot issue because the budget director's fiscal note did not indicate that the issue would have a fiscal impact.

Finally, the court declined to rule on the compliance of the petitioners’ ballot statements with Montana Code Annotated sections 13-27-212 and -213, directing the Attorney General to prepare a ballot statement in line with statutory requirements and forward it to the Montana Secretary of State.

The court essentially concluded that the proposed ballot issue was legally sufficient and did not require separate votes for its multiple components, as they were all closely related to the central issue of reproductive rights. The court also confirmed that the Attorney General had overstepped his authority by attaching a fiscal statement to the ballot issue.

State v. R. Gibbons

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 63

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: McKinnon

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Montana, Robert Murray Gibbons was found guilty of driving under the influence, his fifth or subsequent offense. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, Gibbons raised three issues. First, he argued that the District Court incorrectly instructed the jury that he did not need to be conscious to be in actual physical control of his vehicle. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the instruction was consistent with the preventative purpose of the state's DUI statute.

Second, Gibbons argued that the State’s rebuttal argument, which suggested that he could have introduced photographic evidence that was available to him during discovery, violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the State was entitled to respond to Gibbons’ accusation that it had improperly withheld evidence.

Finally, Gibbons challenged the constitutionality of the statute that imposed a mandatory minimum $5,000 fine for his offense, arguing that it did not take into account a defendant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court agreed with Gibbons on this point, finding that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it required the imposition of a mandatory fine in every case without considering constitutionally required proportionality factors, such as the financial burden on the defendant and the defendant’s ability to pay.

Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed Gibbons’s DUI conviction, but reversed the $5,000 fine and remanded the case to the District Court for recalculation of the fine in line with its opinion.

State v. Glaum

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 47

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: McEvers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Defendant Joseph Glaum, who appealed an amended criminal judgment and the denial of his request to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. Glaum claimed that the court had abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his pleas, arguing that the court had misapplied the factors for considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. He also made claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted that the six issues preserved for appeal by his conditional pleas were wrongly decided by the court.

The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors outlined in State v. Lium, and did not clearly err in determining that Glaum did not meet his burden to show a fair and just reason to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. The court also concluded that the record was inadequate to determine Glaum’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Glaum further argued that his right to a speedy trial under the federal constitution was violated. The court applied the balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo to evaluate this claim, considering the accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether there was any prejudice to the accused. Upon balancing these factors, the court found that Glaum had not shown a violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the State’s motion to amend the information and denied Glaum’s motion for continuance, finding that the court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or misinterpret or misapply the law.

THE CITY OF DALLAS v. THE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT FUND OF THE CITY OF DALLAS

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 22-0102

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Young

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case before the Supreme Court of Texas concerned the City of Dallas and the Employees’ Retirement Fund of the City of Dallas. The issue at hand was whether a city ordinance could confer a third party the perpetual right to veto categories of future lawmaking. The Court of Appeals held that the City of Dallas could not amend Chapter 40A of its code of ordinances unless the board of trustees of the Employees’ Retirement Fund agreed to the amendment. However, the Supreme Court of Texas found that such delegation of lawmaking authority was not permissible.

The Supreme Court of Texas based its ruling on the principle that a legislative body cannot bind its successors, and on the constitutional principle forbidding the city council from giving away its authority to legislate. The court determined that the board’s veto in § 40A-35(a) was unenforceable and cannot prevent an otherwise valid ordinance from taking effect.

However, the court did not resolve whether the City must hold an election that submits § 8-1.5(a-1) to the voters before it can enforce that provision. The court declined to address this question and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.

Board of Education v. Cabell County Public Library

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 23-691

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: WOOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the Board of Education of the County of Cabell challenged two state laws that required the Board to include funding for the Cabell County Public Library and the Greater Huntington Park and Recreation District in its excess levy proposals. The Board argued that these laws violated the equal protection guarantees of the West Virginia Constitution because they imposed funding requirements on the Board that were not required of other county boards of education.

The court agreed with the Board, finding that the laws did indeed create a discriminatory classification. The court noted that 53 other county boards were free to seek voter approval of excess levy funding without such restrictions. The court could not find a compelling state interest to justify this unequal classification.

The court also addressed a second issue related to equalization payments for fiscal years 2024 and 2025. The court concluded that although the Board was required to make annual payments to the Library and the Park District, it was not required to make equalization payments for these fiscal years.

The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the respondents’ Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Justia Webinars: Confronting Racial Bias in Jury Selection

Justia Team

Our legal system is built upon the fundamental principle of a right to a fair trial by a jury of one’s peers; but can we consider the trial fair if the jury is not? Can an underrepresentation of marginalized communities of color in the jury truly deem a trial as fair, accurate, and reliable?

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