Dutra v. Trustees of Boston University

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1385

Opinion Date: March 13, 2024

Judge: GELPÍ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law

This appeal, heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, centered on the constitutionality of Massachusetts' Law 80, which retroactively provided immunity to higher education institutions for monetary damages due to actions taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs, students at Boston University (BU), had sued the university for breach of contract and unjust enrichment following BU's transition to remote learning during the Spring 2020 semester. They contended that they had paid for in-person instruction and services, which BU failed to provide.

The lower court ruled in favor of BU, holding that the university was entitled to the defense of impossibility as it had to comply with COVID-19 emergency orders. On appeal, the court was required to consider whether the retroactive application of Law 80 to the case violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

The appellate court found that Law 80 served reasonable public interests related to public health, safety, future compliance, and economic consequences beyond the control of the universities. The court also determined that the plaintiffs' alleged implied contract rights did not constitute vested rights. Furthermore, the court noted that the scope of Law 80 was appropriately limited and did not excessively burden the plaintiffs.

Consequently, the court held that Law 80 does not violate due process and affirmed the lower court's judgment, ruling in favor of BU. The court did not need to consider the merits of the lower court's decision to exclude the plaintiffs' expert witness's testimony.

Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, New York

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-2722

Opinion Date: March 13, 2024

Judge: Jacobs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs, Ben and Hank Brinkmann and their company Mattituck 12500 LLC, had alleged that the Town of Southold, New York's use of eminent domain to take their land for public park purposes was a pretextual and bad faith exercise of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the real motive was to prevent them from constructing a hardware store on the property.

The Court of Appeals ruled that if a property is taken for a public purpose, in this case, the creation of a park, courts do not inquire into alleged pretexts and motives. The court found that a public park serves a public purpose, and thus, the taking of the property was permissible under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of pretext and bad faith did not violate the Takings Clause as the intended use of the property was for a public park. The court stated that a pretextual taking would only violate the Takings Clause if the actual purpose of the taking was for a non-public (i.e., private) use, which was not the case here.

Kareem v. Cuyahoga County Board of Elections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3330

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Clay

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Alison Kareem brought a case against the Ohio Secretary of State, the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections, and the Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney. Kareem challenged two Ohio state election laws, which prohibited her from displaying her marked ballot to others as a violation of her First Amendment rights. Kareem refrained from displaying a photograph of her marked ballot online due to these laws. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, arguing that Kareem lacked Article III standing.

The Appeals Court, however, reversed the district court's order and remanded it for further proceedings. The court held that Kareem had demonstrated a credible threat of enforcement of the Ohio laws, which constituted an injury in fact, a requirement for Article III standing. The court found that Kareem's fear of enforcement, given the possible criminal punishment, the defendants' public statements that displaying marked ballots was illegal, and past instances of enforcement, was not merely subjective or self-imposed. The court also found that Kareem's alleged violation of her First Amendment rights was fairly traceable to the defendants and that the relief she requested was likely to remedy her alleged injury, thus meeting the causation and redressability requirements of Article III standing. The court did not rule on the merits of Kareem's First Amendment claims, leaving that for the district court to decide.

United States v. Mitrovich

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1010

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: SCUDDER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant, Deny Mitrovich, was indicted for possession of child pornography following a multinational investigation that used a software program to unmask his computer. Mitrovich requested detailed technical information about the software program, which was used by Australian and New Zealand authorities, to aid his defense. However, the United States government did not have this information and was unsuccessful in obtaining it despite repeated efforts. Mitrovich argued that the government was obligated to provide this information under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The court disagreed with Mitrovich, stating that Rule 16 does not require the production of documents held exclusively by foreign authorities. Furthermore, Mitrovich was unable to demonstrate that the government's inability to provide the requested information resulted in prejudice, a necessary condition to establish a Brady violation. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision not to impose sanctions on the government for failure to disclose the requested information.

The court also clarified that while the doctrine of constructive possession could extend to co-participants in a joint international investigation under the Due Process Clause, this would not apply if the U.S. lacks the capacity to access or obtain the information through reasonable means. The court also emphasized that mere speculation about the content of the missing information is not sufficient to establish prejudice under Brady.

Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs of America v. McClain

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3675

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Melloy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was asked to determine whether Arkansas Code § 23-92-604(c), also known as Act 1103, was preempted by federal law. Act 1103 prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from limiting the ability of healthcare providers, who are eligible for drug pricing discounts under the Section 340B Program, to contract with outside pharmacies for drug distribution.

The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) sued the Commissioner of the Arkansas Insurance Department, arguing that Act 1103 was unconstitutional because it was preempted by the Section 340B Program and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, under theories of field, obstacle, and impossibility preemption.

The court, however, disagreed with PhRMA's arguments. The court found that Act 1103 did not create an obstacle for pharmaceutical manufacturers to comply with 340B, rather it assisted in fulfilling the purpose of 340B. The court also found that Act 1103 did not make it impossible for drug manufacturers and wholesale distributors to comply with the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) Program under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

Therefore, the court held that Act 1103 was not preempted by either the Section 340B Program or the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. As such, the court affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the Intervenors and against PhRMA.

LEWIS V. ANDES

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-99001

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Christen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a federal habeas corpus petition by Raymond Anthony Lewis, who was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California jury convicted him of the first-degree murder of Sandra Simms. Lewis argued that the state trial court's admission of his juvenile confession to a prior murder was unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of his innocence of the prior murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's affirmance of the trial court's admission of Lewis's juvenile confession was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and that Lewis's trial counsel’s litigation of the evidence of the prior murder did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Lewis also contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate, develop, and present certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The court found that Lewis failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. His counsel made reasonable strategic decisions to ask for the jury’s mercy and to appeal to any lingering doubt the jurors may have had about Lewis’s guilt. The court also concluded that much of the evidence Lewis argued his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing would have been cumulative of evidence his counsel did introduce.

Lewis also raised uncertified claims on appeal, but the court denied a certificate of appealability on these claims.

United States v. Markovich

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 22-10978, 23-11835

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Pryor

Areas of Law: Banking, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involved an appeal by two brothers, Jonathan and Daniel Markovich, who were convicted for operating fraudulent drug rehabilitation clinics in Florida. They were found guilty of various charges, including health-care fraud, wire fraud, kickbacks, money laundering, and bank fraud, resulting in fraudulent claims of over $100 million.

The brothers appealed their convictions on several grounds. They argued that the district court violated their constitutional rights by denying their motion to compel the prosecution to obtain and disclose confidential medical records possessed by third parties. They also claimed that the court violated Federal Rules of Evidence by admitting unreliable and confusing expert testimony about the clinics' medical and billing practices. Additionally, they argued that the court abused its discretion by admitting lay summary testimony about medical and billing records.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court ruled that the prosecution had no duty to seek out potentially exculpatory evidence not in its possession. It also determined that the expert testimony was clear and reliable, and the summary testimony was proper. The court found that any challenge to bank-fraud counts was forfeited due to a lack of explanation or supporting legal authority. Finally, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the brothers' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Bello v. Gacki

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-5036

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Henderson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the designation of Samark Jose Lopez Bello as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker (SDNT) by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. OFAC had simultaneously designated Bello and Tareck Zaidan El Aissami as SDNTs under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act), which authorizes sanctions against individuals playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking and those materially assisting in such trafficking.

Bello sued OFAC and its Acting Director in the district court, alleging that his designation was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded OFAC's statutory authority, deprived him of fair notice and resulted in an unconstitutional seizure of property. Bello also claimed that OFAC failed to provide sufficient post-deprivation notice. The district court dismissed his claims, and Bello appealed.

The appeals court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the Kingpin Act does permit simultaneous designation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 Traffickers and that this did not deprive Bello of fair notice of prohibited conduct. The court also found that OFAC had provided sufficient post-deprivation notice to satisfy due process, given the government's strong interest in preventing asset dissipation.

State of Alaska v. Mckelvey

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17910

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Borghesan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether law enforcement officers violated the Alaska Constitution by conducting warrantless aerial surveillance of a private property with high-powered optics to investigate a tip about marijuana cultivation. The property was located in an isolated area near Fairbanks and was surrounded by trees that obstructed ground-level view. The officers' aerial surveillance aided by a high-powered zoom lens led to a search warrant, which uncovered marijuana plants, methamphetamine, scales, plastic bags for packaging, a loaded AK-47 rifle, and a large amount of cash. The defendant, McKelvey, was subsequently charged with criminal offenses.

The Superior Court denied McKelvey's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the aerial surveillance, holding that although McKelvey had a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation was objectively unreasonable given the visibility of his property from the air. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that under the Alaska Constitution, a warrant was required for law enforcement to use high-powered optics for aerial surveillance of a private property.

The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that conducting aerial surveillance of a person's property using high-powered optics constitutes a search that requires a warrant under the Alaska Constitution. The court reasoned that such surveillance has the potential to reveal intimate details of a person's private life and could discourage Alaskans from using their private outdoor spaces. The court concluded that the chilling effect of such surveillance outweighed the utility of the conduct as a law enforcement technique.

WHITESIDE v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 30

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Hiland

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed an appeal from Lemuel Whiteside, who was challenging the denial of his petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. Whiteside was previously convicted of capital felony murder, aggravated robbery, and a firearm enhancement, receiving respective sentences of life, thirty-five years, and fifteen years. He argues that his constitutional rights were violated and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Whiteside claimed that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated due to the jury's consideration of a life-sentence option on the aggravated-robbery charge. However, the court noted that this argument could have been raised during his direct appeal and, as such, was ineligible for consideration in a Rule 37 proceeding.

Whiteside further claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his attorneys failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment claim and failed to offer the testimony of a co-defendant as mitigating evidence. The court rejected these allegations, noting that failure to make a meritless argument is not deficient performance and that the decision to call a witness is typically a matter of trial strategy.

Whiteside also argued that his counsel failed to investigate or offer evidence regarding his mental state and history of psychiatric treatment for mitigation purposes. The court upheld the trial counsel's strategic decision not to introduce this evidence due to the potentially damaging counter-evidence the state could have presented. The court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, rejecting Whiteside's claims.

In re Seumanu

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A169146(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 11, 2024

Judge: STREETER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, considered a habeas corpus request by Ropati Afatia Seumanu, a capital case convict. Seumanu sought a certificate of appealability (COA) after his habeas corpus petition was dismissed, as he sought to challenge the superior court's decision on nine points. The court agreed to issue a COA on one claim but declined to do so for the remaining claims. The court also addressed three unprecedented issues: whether the 10-day time limit for granting or denying COA requests was mandatory or directory; how strong a showing a COA applicant must make to meet the “substantial claim for relief” test; and whether an as-applied attack on the constitutionality of section 1509, subdivision (d) was appealable under section 1509.1(c). The court found that the 10-day time limit was not mandatory, a “substantial claim to relief” required a strong enough showing for reasonable jurists to debate whether the trial court erred, and as-applied attacks on the constitutionality of section 1509(d) were appealable under section 1509.1(c). The court also discussed the need for a COA applicant to provide an adequate record for review.

P. v. Santos

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C096979(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Renner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case revolves around the appeal of Timothy Marvin Santos, who was originally sentenced in 2007 under California's Three Strikes law and other enhancement provisions. The appeal concerns a resentencing order issued in 2022, where the trial court struck Santos' prior prison term and drug conviction enhancements but maintained his sentence of 25 years to life under the original Three Strikes law.

Santos argued that the court did not apply the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 to reduce his sentence and that the resentencing was held without his presence, violating his federal and state constitutional rights. The People initially supported the trial court's decision but later changed their stance, suggesting that the court should have resentenced Santos under the current penalty provisions specified by the Reform Act.

However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, disagreed with this assertion. The court held that the Reform Act's revised penalty provisions could not be retroactively applied to Santos' sentence outside of the specific mechanism provided for in the Act itself. The court further concluded that if the resentencing statute was interpreted to authorize retroactive application of the revised penalty provisions without adhering to the criteria in the Reform Act, it would unconstitutionally amend the initiative statute.

Concerning Santos' absence during resentencing, the court concluded that any error in accepting his counsel's waiver of his presence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Santos could not have offered any help since he was not eligible for a reduction of his term under the Three Strikes law based on the resentencing statute. Consequently, his absence could not have influenced the proceeding's outcome. The court affirmed the judgment.

Godinez v. Williams

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 14

Opinion Date: March 11, 2024

Judge: Gabriel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case involves the interpretation of a provision in the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) that dictates the factors parole boards must consider when deciding whether to release a convicted sex offender on parole. The Supreme Court of Colorado was asked by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether SOLSA requires, permits, or prohibits parole boards from considering maturity and rehabilitation of an offender.

The case arose from the sentencing of Omar Ricardo Godinez, who was convicted of several serious offenses committed when he was fifteen years old. Godinez argued that SOLSA violated the Eighth Amendment as applied to him, claiming that the Act does not allow parole boards to consider an offender's maturity and rehabilitation. This, he contended, renders the Act unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Florida, which mandates that young offenders must be given "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."

The Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that although SOLSA does not expressly require parole boards to consider an offender's maturity, it does not prevent them from doing so. Hence, SOLSA permits consideration of maturity. As for rehabilitation, the Court held that it is a necessary part of the factors the parole board is required to consider under SOLSA. Thus, the Court concluded that SOLSA requires consideration of rehabilitation. Therefore, the Court held that SOLSA permits consideration of maturity and requires consideration of rehabilitation.

A. W. v. State of Indiana

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-JV-00040

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Massa

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

This case before the Indiana Supreme Court concerns a juvenile, A.W., who was adjudicated for possession of a machine gun and dangerous possession of a firearm. The court was asked to determine if these adjudications violated the principle of double jeopardy under Indiana law. A.W. asserted that he did not know the firearm he possessed had been modified to function as a machine gun.

The court found that A.W.'s exclusive possession of the modified gun, along with his abrupt flight from police, supported the conclusion that he knowingly or intentionally possessed a machine gun. This satisfied the first part of the court's inquiry.

On the issue of double jeopardy, the court noted that while the Indiana Constitution could apply in juvenile proceedings, it avoided deciding that issue. Instead, it focused on whether possession of a dangerous firearm is a lesser-included offense of possession of a machine gun under the test set out in the case Wadle v. State. The court found that it was, meaning A.W.'s adjudications for both offenses violated his rights under the principle of double jeopardy. Therefore, the court affirmed the finding that A.W. knowingly possessed a machine gun but reversed the adjudication that he committed dangerous possession of a firearm.

State v. Guebara

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 120994

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Kansas, the appellant, Paul Guebara, was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon by a felon. Guebara had stipulated that he had previously been convicted of "a felony crime" without further detail. The Court of Appeals reversed the criminal-possession conviction, finding that a generic stipulation did not establish that a defendant had been convicted of a felony that would prohibit him from possessing a weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, explaining that because Kansas' possession-of-a-weapon ban applies only to people who have committed certain felonies, a generic stipulation to "a felony" is insufficient. The court also noted that the district court failed to obtain a jury-trial waiver before accepting Guebara's stipulation, which it deemed to be a constitutional error. However, both errors were found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as Guebara did not contest his status as a prohibited felon, and the State had conclusive evidence to prove this element. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Guebara's convictions.

State v. McDonald

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123797

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed a lower court's decision, holding that a warrantless traffic stop and subsequent search of a vehicle was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The case involved Tyler Brandon McDonald, who was stopped by a sheriff's deputy while parked at a public park. The deputy, citing concern for public safety based on a previous murder-suicide in the same area, initiated a public welfare stop. Upon approaching the vehicle, the deputy smelled marijuana, leading to a search of the vehicle and McDonald's subsequent conviction for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

According to the court, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. A public safety stop is considered a seizure and an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, but it must be justified based on specific and articulable facts that indicate a threat to public safety. Suspicion of criminal activity does not justify a public welfare stop.

In this case, the court found that the deputy's reasons for the stop (the late hour, the secluded location, the fact that McDonald was alone, and the deputy's knowledge of past criminal activity in the area) were insufficient to support a public safety stop. The court pointed out that McDonald was parked legally in an open public park, was not in an adverse physical state, and did not appear to be at risk of self-harm. The court concluded that the stop was unconstitutional, reversed the judgment of the lower courts, and reversed McDonald's convictions.

Six Brothers, Inc. v. Town of Brookline

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13434

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Wendlandt

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2018, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the "Tobacco Act," which prohibited the sale of tobacco products to anyone under 21 years old. The town of Brookline later passed an ordinance that divided potential tobacco consumers into two groups based on birth year: those born before January 1, 2000, and those born on or after that date. Retailers could sell tobacco products to the first group, but not the second. This effectively created an incremental prohibition on the sale of tobacco products in the town. Several retailers filed a lawsuit, claiming that the local law was preempted by the Tobacco Act and violated the equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the local law was not preempted by the Tobacco Act. The court reasoned that the Tobacco Act expressly permitted local communities to limit and ban the sale of tobacco products. Furthermore, the local law did not conflict with the Tobacco Act's prohibition on sales to persons under 21; instead, it augmented this prohibition by further limiting access to tobacco products.

The court also held that the local law did not violate the equal protection guarantees of the state constitution. The court found that the birthdate classification in the local law was rationally related to the town's legitimate interest in mitigating tobacco use, especially among minors. The court affirmed the dismissal of the retailers' complaint.

State of Minnesota vs. Malecha

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1314

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: ANDERSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Minnesota, a defendant, Rebecca Julie Malecha, was arrested on a warrant that had been quashed but was still appearing as active in law enforcement databases due to a clerical error by court administration. During the arrest, police discovered controlled substances on Malecha's person and charged her with four controlled substance crimes. Malecha moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the search was unconstitutional due to the quashed warrant. The district court granted her motion, based on the violation of Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution, but the court of appeals reversed this decision.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained during a search on a quashed warrant that appears active to law enforcement because of a clerical error by court administration. The court reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule would serve to deter unlawful government conduct generally, not just police misconduct. The court emphasized that the benefits of excluding illegally obtained evidence outweighed the costs in this case, particularly in situations where the constitutional violation stemmed from a court clerical error. Therefore, the charges against Malecha were dismissed.

Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Murray

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 14

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada ruled on the constitutionality of assigning senior justices to temporarily serve on the Supreme Court in the event of a disqualified justice. The appellant, Valley Health System, LLC, argued that only the governor has the authority to replace a disqualified justice based on Article 6, Section 4(2) of the Nevada Constitution. However, the court disagreed, noting that Article 6, Section 19(1) authorizes the chief justice to recall any consenting retired state court justice or judge not removed or retired for cause or defeated for retention of office, and assign them to appropriate temporary duty within the court system.

The court thus concluded that the Nevada Constitution authorizes both the governor's designation of lower court judges and the chief justice's temporary assignment of senior justices to replace disqualified justices. Therefore, the chief justice's assignment of senior justices to the case was constitutionally authorized, and the appellant's objection was overruled and its motion to designate lower court judges was denied. The court noted that this dual-method system is not completely unique and is also present in other states such as Tennessee.

Thompson v. Fhuere

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070162

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this Oregon Supreme Court case, the appellant Matthew Dwight Thompson challenged his death sentence, arguing that it was unconstitutional due to changes in the law under Senate Bill (SB) 1013. Thompson also argued that two of the penalty-phase questions presented to the jury at his sentencing were unconstitutional. The post-conviction court vacated Thompson's death sentence and modified it to life without the possibility of parole. It also ruled that Thompson's claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were procedurally barred.

While Thompson's appeal was pending, Oregon Governor Kate Brown commuted his death sentence to life without the possibility of parole. After this action, the Supreme Court concluded that Thompson was not entitled to a resentencing, despite any earlier error by the post-conviction court. The commutation had the legal effect of treating the sentence of life without parole as if it had been originally imposed. As a result, Thompson's challenge to his death sentence was rendered moot.

Furthermore, Thompson's claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were not preserved for appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Associated General Contractors Of Washington v. State

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,997-1

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: MCCLOUD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Construction Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, several construction industry associations challenged a 2018 law (RCW 39.12.015(3)) that changed the method for determining prevailing wage rates on public works projects. Prior to the law, the State used wage and hour surveys to establish the prevailing wage rates. The 2018 law directed the State to adopt the wage rates established in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) for those trades and occupations that have CBAs.

The plaintiffs argued that the new law violated a provision of the Washington Constitution (article II, section 37) because it conflicted with an older law (RCW 39.12.026(1)) that restricted the use of wage data collected by the State to the county in which the work was performed. The Court of Appeals agreed and declared the new law unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the older law's restriction on the use of wage data applied only to data collected through wage and hour surveys, not to wage rates adopted from CBAs. Therefore, the older law did not conflict with the new law, and the new law did not violate the state constitution. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Docket: 2020AP002007

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Bradley

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Non-Profit Corporations

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin was asked to review a decision by the state's Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) and determine whether Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. (CCB) and its four sub-entities were operated primarily for religious purposes, and thus exempt from making contributions to Wisconsin's unemployment insurance system. The Court decided that in determining whether an organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" according to Wisconsin Statute § 108.02(15)(h)2, both the motivations and activities of the organization must be examined.

Reviewing the facts of the case, the court determined that while CCB and its sub-entities professed to have a religious motivation, their activities were primarily charitable and secular. The services provided by the sub-entities, which included job training, placement, and coaching, along with services related to daily living, could be provided by organizations of either religious or secular motivations, and thus were not "primarily" religious in nature.

The court also rejected CCB's argument that this interpretation of the statute violated the First Amendment, as it did not interfere with the church's internal governance nor examine religious dogma. Instead, it was a neutral and secular inquiry based on objective criteria. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.