Trump v. Anderson

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 23-719

Opinion Date: March 4, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In this case, a group of Colorado voters contended that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits former President Donald J. Trump from holding the Presidential office again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed, ordering the state to exclude Trump from the Republican primary ballot and to disregard any write-in votes cast for him.

The case centered around the interpretation of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which disqualifies any person from holding a federal or state office who has previously taken an oath to support the Constitution and subsequently engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States. The voters claimed that Trump's actions following his defeat in the 2020 Presidential election, particularly the incitement of the crowd that breached the Capitol on January 6, 2021, constituted such insurrection.

The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, ruling that the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates. The Court maintained that while the States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office, they lack the power to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices, including the Presidency. The Court argued that permitting state enforcement of Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates would invert the Fourteenth Amendment’s rebalancing of federal and state power and would raise serious questions about the scope of that power. The Court concluded that such enforcement would lead to chaos and inconsistency in the electoral process. Therefore, the responsibility for enforcing Section 3 rests with Congress, not the States.

Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1072

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: KAYATTA

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined an appeal against a district court's refusal to issue a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a Rhode Island law banning certain large-capacity ammunition magazines. The plaintiffs, a group of gun owners and a registered firearms dealer, argued that the law infringed upon their Second Amendment rights, as well as their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Court of Appeals, however, upheld the district court's decision. It noted that the law did not impose a significant burden on the right of armed self-defense, as it did not prevent gun owners from owning other forms of weaponry or ammunition, and the banned magazines were rarely used in self-defense situations. Furthermore, the court found that the law was consistent with a longstanding tradition of regulating firearms in the interest of public safety.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the law was retroactive and vague, violating their Fourteenth Amendment rights. It concluded that the law was not retroactive as it did not impose new liability on past actions, and it was not unconstitutionally vague as individuals of ordinary intelligence could understand what it prohibited. The court also found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their Fifth Amendment claims, as the law did not effect a physical or regulatory taking of their property.

Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50627

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Constitutional Law

The case involved a challenge to Texas House Bill 1181 (H.B. 1181), which imposed new standards on commercial pornographic websites. The law required these sites to verify the age of their visitors and display health warnings about the effects of consuming pornography. The plaintiffs, which included an adult industry trade association, several corporations involved in the production and distribution of pornography, and an individual adult content creator, challenged the constitutionality of the law. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of H.B. 1181, concluding that the law likely violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and was preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, vacated the injunction against the age-verification requirement, holding that the requirement was rationally related to the government's legitimate interest in preventing minors' access to pornography and did not violate the First Amendment. Furthermore, the court ruled that Section 230 did not preempt H.B. 1181. However, the court upheld the injunction concerning the health warnings, concluding that they constituted compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment.

United States v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-6048

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Mathis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In November 2018, Marlon Johnson was arrested after a vehicle he was driving crashed during a police pursuit. The police found over 1,000 grams of pure methamphetamine and a loaded semiautomatic pistol in the vehicle. A jury convicted Johnson of firearm and drug trafficking offenses, and he was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. Johnson appealed his convictions and sentence on four grounds.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Johnson's convictions and sentence. Firstly, the court rejected Johnson's claim that his jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the Jury Selection and Services Act. The court found that Johnson failed to show that the underrepresentation of African Americans in the jury pool was due to systematic exclusion.

Secondly, the court dismissed Johnson's claim that his felon-in-possession conviction violated the Second Amendment. The court noted that there was no precedent explicitly holding that the law under which Johnson was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was unconstitutional.

Thirdly, the court upheld the district court's decision to admit testimony about Johnson's prior drug sales as "res gestae" evidence. This type of evidence is considered to be part of the story of the charged offense and is not subject to Rule 404(b), which generally prohibits the admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts.

Finally, the court found that Johnson's sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment was not substantively unreasonable. Johnson had argued that the district court erred in using a 10:1 weight ratio between methamphetamine mixtures and actual methamphetamine to determine the offense level. The court noted that a district court’s use of the 10:1 ratio is a discretionary decision and cannot, by itself, render a criminal sentence invalid.

Gerlach v. Rokita

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1792

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: ST.EVE

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The case concerns the plaintiff, Tina Gerlach, who claimed that Indiana officials violated her right to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Gerlach's unclaimed property had been taken into custody by the state under the Revised Indiana Unclaimed Property Act. She asserted that Indiana did not compensate her for interest accrued while the state held her property.

Gerlach filed a lawsuit against several state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensation. The defendant officials moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Gerlach's claim for prospective relief was moot and her claims for retrospective relief were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The district court granted the defendants' motion, and Gerlach appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court found Gerlach's claim for prospective relief was moot due to Indiana's new legislation requiring the payment of interest on all recovered property. The court also held that Gerlach could not obtain compensation in federal court from the Indiana officials because no exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applied, and Indiana state courts were open to hear Gerlach's claims. Lastly, the court concluded that Gerlach's claim for compensatory relief was actually against the State of Indiana, and therefore barred by sovereign immunity and Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, which does not create a cause of action against a state.

Martin v. Goodrich Corporation

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2343

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff, Candice Martin, represented herself and the estate of her deceased husband, Rodney Martin. The defendants were Goodrich Corporation and PolyOne Corporation, both of which Rodney had worked for. Rodney had been exposed to a hazardous chemical, vinyl chloride monomer (VCM), during his employment and was later diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver, a disease allegedly linked to VCM exposure.

The case revolved around the interpretation and application of the Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (ODA), which provides compensation for employees who contract diseases through their employment. The Act also has an exclusivity provision, which restricts employees from seeking compensation outside of the statutory scheme.

The plaintiff argued that her claim was not subject to the ODA's exclusivity provisions due to an exception introduced by the Illinois legislature in 2019, which allows claims to proceed outside the ODA if they would be barred by any period of repose or repose provision. The defendants argued that this exception did not apply in this case, as Rodney's exposure to VCM had occurred decades prior to the enactment of the exception.

Due to the complexity of the statutory provisions and the implications of their interpretation, the Court of Appeals decided to certify three questions to the Illinois Supreme Court. The questions pertained to whether a specific provision of the ODA constituted a period of repose, whether the 2019 exception applied retrospectively, and whether the application of this exception to past conduct would violate the due process protections of the Illinois Constitution.

Noon v. Smedley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3668

Opinion Date: March 4, 2024

Judge: Grasz

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Two former police officers, Thomas Noon and Christopher Skidmore, were dismissed from their jobs in Platte Woods, Missouri, after submitting a letter of grievances about the police chief, James Kerns, to the city's mayor and Board of Aldermen. The officers filed a lawsuit against the mayor and police chief, claiming their First Amendment rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied their motion. The defendants then brought an interlocutory appeal.

Noon and Skidmore had raised several concerns about Kerns's performance as Chief of Police, including issues with department vehicles, radar equipment, personnel, and Kerns's use of department time for personal business. After their concerns were not addressed, the officers sent a document outlining their grievances to the mayor and the Board of Aldermen. After the officers admitted to authoring the document, they were both removed from the department's schedule and eventually fired.

In reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the officers had established a First Amendment violation. The court determined that the officers' speech, criticizing the police chief's leadership and alleging corruption and financial mismanagement, was made as citizens on matters of public concern. The court also concluded that the defendants failed to show that the officers' speech had an adverse impact on the department's operations. Finally, the court determined that the officers' First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for protected speech was clearly established. Therefore, the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court affirmed the district court's decision.

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3326

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Stras

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Non-Profit Corporations

The case involves the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, a nonprofit organization that sought to unseal court filings from federal criminal investigations. The District Court in Minnesota dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, and the case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

The Reporters Committee's application aimed to unseal electronic-surveillance filings, which were required to be filed under seal by a local rule. The District Court believed the request was too broad since the majority of the materials requested become unsealed after six months. The court suggested negotiations with the United States Attorney’s Office to reach a solution.

The Reporters Committee subsequently filed an amended application, seeking an order directing the clerk of the court to presumptively unseal warrants and related documents after 180 days and to begin docketing the government’s applications for electronic surveillance regardless of whether a judge granted them. The Committee claimed these duties arose under the First Amendment and the common-law right of access to public records and documents.

The District Court dismissed the application, concluding that the Committee lacked standing because all it had was a “generalized, abstract interest” in unsealing the records. This decision was affirmed by the Appeals Court, which held that the Committee failed to establish it suffered a “concrete” and “particularized” injury. It was also noted that the Committee did not sue anyone who could provide the relief it sought, hence there was a lack of adversity necessary for federal court adjudication.

Sanimax USA, LLC v. City of South St. Paul

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1579

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: SHPEHERD

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The case involves Sanimax USA, LLC, who sued the City of South Saint Paul, Minnesota, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the city's zoning and odor ordinances violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause. Sanimax contended that the city enacted these ordinances in retaliation for Sanimax challenging prior ordinances and that the ordinances unfairly singled out Sanimax. The district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on all counts.

Sanimax operates a rendering plant in South Saint Paul that processes animal carcasses and organic byproducts, emitting pungent, foul odors that have drawn numerous complaints from nearby residents and businesses. Sanimax was designated as a "Significant Odor Generator" by the city, and later challenged the constitutionality of the city's odor ordinance, alleging that it was unconstitutionally vague.

The United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Court found that Sanimax failed to show that the city's actions were a direct retaliation for Sanimax's prior lawsuits challenging the city's ordinances. Additionally, the Court rejected Sanimax's argument that it was unfairly singled out, finding that Sanimax was not similarly situated to other businesses due to the significantly higher number of odor complaints it generated. Lastly, the Court rejected Sanimax's argument that the city's odor ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, finding that the ordinance provided sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct and did not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement.

Apache Stronghold v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-15295

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Native American Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the United States in a dispute over the planned transfer of a site, Oak Flat, of spiritual importance to the Apache tribe to a mining company, Resolution Copper. The nonprofit Apache Stronghold had sought to block the transfer, arguing that it would infrely violate its members’ rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and an 1852 treaty between the U.S. and the Apaches. The court, however, disagreed.

Applying the precedent set in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the court held that while the transfer of Oak Flat would significantly interfere with the Apache tribe's religious practices, it would not coerce them into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, and therefore did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

Further, the court held that RFRA did not abrogate the holding in Lyng, and thus the planned land transfer did not "substantially burden" the Apache tribe's exercise of religion under RFRA.

Finally, the court rejected the argument that an 1852 treaty created a trust obligation that would be violated by the transfer of Oak Flat. It interpreted the Land Transfer Act as abrogating any contrary treaty obligation. Consequently, the court held that Apache Stronghold was unlikely to succeed on the merits of any of its claims and therefore was not entitled to a preliminary injunction blocking the land transfer.

PERIDOT TREE, INC. V. CITY OF SACRAMENTO

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-16783

Opinion Date: March 4, 2024

Judge: Mendoza

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

The case involves Peridot Tree, Inc. and Kenneth Gay, who filed suit against the City of Sacramento and Davina Smith, alleging that the city's requirement for individuals applying for permits to operate storefront marijuana dispensaries to be Sacramento residents violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution. The clause prevents states from discriminating against interstate commerce.

The District Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the claim due to the conflict between state and federal law regulating marijuana use and distribution, and directed the plaintiffs to seek relief in California state court. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. The court found that abstention was not warranted under any of the established abstention doctrines, including the Pullman, Burford, Thibodaux, and Colorado River doctrines. The court reasoned that the case did not present "exceptional circumstances" warranting abstention, and that the district court effectively imposed an exhaustion requirement on the plaintiffs by requiring them to first identify and litigate potential state-law claims before raising their federal constitutional concerns.

The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings on the dormant Commerce Clause claim.

United States v. Pemberton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-7028

Opinion Date: March 4, 2024

Judge: TYMKOVICH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

In this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, Paul Curtis Pemberton, contested his federal conviction for a murder committed in McIntosh County, Oklahoma in 2004. The case was influenced by the Supreme Court decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020), which confirmed that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation covered a larger area of eastern Oklahoma than previously acknowledged by state and federal governments. This ruling impacted many crimes that had been prosecuted in state courts but were actually committed within tribal jurisdictions. Pemberton, an enrolled member of the Creek Nation, argued that his crime fell within this category and should have been prosecuted in federal court under the Major Crimes Act.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, ruling that the state officers involved in Pemberton’s arrest and the subsequent collection of evidence had acted in good faith, based on the prevailing legal understanding at the time. The court noted that the officers could not have known that the Major Crimes Act barred state jurisdiction over the crime as the reservation boundaries were not clarified until the McGirt decision in 2020.

The court also rejected Pemberton’s argument that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation during his sentencing. The court found that Pemberton's request to represent himself was made with the intention to delay the proceedings and was not related to the sentencing hearing. Therefore, the lower court's decision to deny his request was affirmed.

Honeyfund.Com Inc v. Governor, State of Florida

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13135

Opinion Date: March 4, 2024

Judge: Grant

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiffs, Honeyfund.com Inc, Chevara Orrin, Whitespace Consulting LLC, and Primo Tampa LLC, challenged a Florida law known as the Individual Freedom Act. This law bans certain mandatory workplace trainings that espouse or promote a set of beliefs related to race, color, sex, or national origin deemed offensive by the state. The plaintiffs asserted that the Act violated their rights to free speech and was both vague and overbroad. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, with the understanding that the Act was both unconstitutionally vague and an unlawful content- and viewpoint-based speech restriction. Florida appealed this decision.

The appellate court held that the Act was indeed a violation of the First Amendment. The court rejected Florida's argument that the Act regulated conduct, not speech, noting that the Act's restrictions were based on the content and viewpoint of the speech in the prohibited meetings. The court applied strict scrutiny, determining that the Act was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. It also rejected Florida’s attempt to tie the Act to Title VII, a federal law prohibiting employment discrimination, stating that having similar asserted purposes did not make the two laws equivalent. The plaintiffs' claim of irreparable injury due to an ongoing violation of the First Amendment was also acknowledged. The court thus affirmed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining the operation of the provision.

USA v. Dubois

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10829

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Pryor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

The case involves Andre Dubois, who was convicted on several federal firearm offenses. These offenses arose when Dubois attempted to ship a box containing firearms from Georgia to Dominica. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was asked to address five issues on appeal.

Firstly, the court dismissed Dubois's argument that a recent Supreme Court case overturned the precedent upholding a ban on felons possessing firearms. The court held that the Supreme Court case did not abrogate the precedent, and therefore Dubois's argument failed.

Secondly, the court affirmed that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Dubois knew he was in possession of a firearm.

Thirdly, the court found that Dubois's prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana under Georgia law qualified as a "controlled substance offense" under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, triggering a higher base offense level.

Fourthly, the court rejected Dubois's argument that the application of a sentencing enhancement for possession of a stolen gun violated his due process rights.

Finally, the court held that the district court had not erred in imposing a $25,000 fine on Dubois, as there was sufficient evidence to suggest that he could afford to pay the fine.

Therefore, Dubois's convictions and sentence were affirmed.

Vazquez v. Dahlstrom

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18619

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Henderson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

This case revolves around the eligibility of Jennie Armstrong, the winning candidate of Alaska’s House District 16 2022 general election. The losing candidate, Liz Vazquez, along with four House District 16 voters, challenged Armstrong's eligibility, arguing that she had not been a resident of Alaska for at least three years before filing for office, as required by the Alaska Constitution. Armstrong maintained that she became a resident on May 20, 2019, while Vazquez argued that her residency did not begin until June 7, 2019. The superior court ruled in favor of Armstrong, declaring her eligible to serve in the legislature.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's determination that Armstrong established her residency on May 20, 2019, but disagreed with the lower court's use of Title 15 to determine state residency. Instead, the Supreme Court held that Title 1, which states a person establishes residency in the state by being physically present with the intent to remain indefinitely and to make a home in the state, governs the state residency requirement for determining the eligibility of a legislative candidate. The Supreme Court found that Armstrong met the requirements of Title 1 and was therefore eligible to serve in the legislature.

P. v. Hardin

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S277487

Opinion Date: March 4, 2024

Judge: Kruger

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In California, the People v. Hardin case involves the defendant, Tony Hardin, who is serving a life sentence without parole for a special circumstance murder he committed at age 25. Hardin challenged the constitutionality of a California statute that provides parole hearings for most young adult offenders but excludes those serving life sentences without parole for crimes committed after turning 18.

The Supreme Court of California found that the legislature acted rationally in distinguishing between young adults serving life sentences without parole and those serving parole-eligible sentences for crimes committed when they were young. The court reasoned that the legislature's decision to exclude certain offenders from parole hearings reflected a balance of multiple considerations, including the seriousness of the offender's crimes and the capacity of all young adults for growth.

The court stated that while the primary purpose of the statute was to provide opportunities for early release to certain young adults, the legislature also considered other factors. It could rationally balance the seriousness of the offender's crimes against the capacity of all young adults for growth, and determine that young adults who have committed certain very serious crimes should remain ineligible for release from prison.

The court also noted that it is the legislature's prerogative and duty to define degrees of culpability and punishment and to distinguish between crimes. Therefore, Hardin's argument that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee by irrationally discriminating against young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole was dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed.

People v. Felix

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B317938(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: GRIMES

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case involved Jason Felix, who was arrested for a traffic violation in Utah where a consensual search of his car led to the discovery of a handgun, ammunition, and over five kilograms of methamphetamine. Felix became a suspect in two murders in Southern California while in custody in Utah on drug charges. Upon his return to California, Felix invoked his right to counsel during an interview about one of the murders. He was then placed in a cell with an undercover detective, to whom he made incriminating statements about both murders. The trial court denied Felix's motion to suppress the evidence from the Utah traffic stop and admitted his incriminating statements made to the undercover agent. He was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.

On appeal, Felix contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence from the warrantless search of his car and in admitting his statements to the undercover agent as he had previously invoked his right to counsel. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed and affirmed the judgment of conviction in its entirety. The court held that the traffic stop was lawful and not unduly prolonged, and Felix's consent to the car search was voluntary and free from coercion. It also held that Felix's incriminating statements to the undercover detective were properly admitted, as they were made freely to someone he believed to be a fellow inmate. However, the court agreed that Felix should be awarded an additional day of presentence custody credits and remanded the case to the superior court for correction.

MCCULLUM v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0927

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In November 2019, Samuel Earl McCullum was convicted of the 1998 rape and murder of Monica Blackwell and the 1999 rape of another woman identified as C.C. McCullum appealed, asserting that the evidence presented in court was insufficient to support his convictions for the murder and rape of Blackwell. He claimed that there was no evidence showing that he intoxicated Blackwell or was connected to the drugs she took before her death, nor that the sexual encounter with Blackwell was non-consensual. McCullum also argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the count of rape against C.C. on constitutional speedy trial grounds and in denying his motion to sever that count from the counts related to Blackwell’s murder and rape.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to convict McCullum of Blackwell’s rape and murder. The medical examiner's testimony established that while Blackwell died of cocaine intoxication, the combination of the cocaine, the head injuries inflicted by McCullum, and the rape materially accelerated her death. The court also found that McCullum's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and it did not abuse its discretion in denying McCullum's motion to sever the counts.

PALMER v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1091

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Willie Williams Palmer appealed his 2023 convictions for malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting deaths of his estranged wife, Brenda Jenkins Palmer, and his 15-year-old stepdaughter, Christine Jenkins. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated, that the loss or destruction of potential biological evidence from the crime scene required dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct or an instruction allowing the jury to draw an adverse inference against the state, that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding evidence of bias against him from local law enforcement and prosecutors, and that he was unfairly targeted as the shooter to the exclusion of other possible suspects. He also claimed that the cumulative effect of the court’s errors deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial.

However, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his convictions. The court found that the delay in bringing Palmer to trial did not violate his right to a speedy trial. Regarding the potential biological evidence, the court found that the State did not act in bad faith in failing to preserve it and that it lacked exculpatory value. It also ruled that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of historical bias against Palmer as it was tangential to the issues at trial. The court found no basis for Palmer's claim of being unfairly targeted as the shooter to the exclusion of other possible suspects. Lastly, the court ruled that cumulative error analysis was inapplicable as Palmer did not show any error by the trial court.

Davis v. Bissen

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCAP-22-0000368

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: McKENNA

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, four plaintiffs, Sonia Davis, Jessica Lau, Lauralee Riedell, and Adam Walton, challenged the actions of the County of Maui, the County of Maui Office of the Mayor, and other related defendants. The dispute arose from a sweep of a large encampment of houseless individuals in Maui County in September 2021. The plaintiffs had requested a contested case hearing before the sweep, which was ignored, and the sweep proceeded as planned, leading to the seizure of Davis and Lau's personal property.

The plaintiffs asserted they were denied procedural due process under the state and federal constitutions when the county seized their personal property without proper notice or an opportunity to be heard. The County moved to dismiss, arguing the plaintiffs did not have a protected property interest in continuing to store their belongings on County land. The circuit court granted the motion as to Riedell and Walton, who had not lost property during the sweep, but denied the motion as to Davis and Lau, who had.

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that plaintiffs possessed a property interest in their personal items protected by the Constitution of the State of Hawaii. Therefore, the due process clause required a hearing before the County could seize the plaintiffs’ property. The circuit court properly granted the County’s motion to dismiss Riedell and Walton’s claims because they did not lose property during the sweep and properly denied the County’s motion to dismiss as to Davis and Lau, who did.

Morales v. Rust

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-PL-00371

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: Massa

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In a case before the Indiana Supreme Court, John Rust sought the Republican nomination for U.S. Senator for Indiana in 2024. Rust was concerned that he may be denied access to the primary ballot because he did not meet the state's Affiliation Statute's criteria. The Affiliation Statute required that a candidate either have voted for the party in the two most recent primary elections in which they voted or have party affiliation certified by the county party chair. Rust had not met either of these conditions. A lower court blocked enforcement of the law, deeming it unconstitutional.

The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, finding that the Affiliation Statute was constitutionally sound. The court determined that the law imposed a minor, reasonable, and non-discriminatory restriction on Rust's First Amendment rights. It held that the law reasonably balanced the rights of candidates and parties, enabling the Republican Party to limit its candidates, protect its identifiability, and ensure stability in the political system. The court also rejected Rust's arguments that the law violated the Seventeenth Amendment, was vague and overbroad, improperly amended the Indiana Constitution, or allowed for invalid use of discretion under the Affiliation Statute.

State v. G.O.

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124676

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Luckert

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Juvenile Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, the appellant, the State of Kansas, challenged a trial court's decision to suppress the confession of a minor identified as G.O. The trial court had determined that the confession was not voluntary, and therefore inadmissible. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, prompting G.O. to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of Kansas considered whether G.O.'s waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights and his confession were voluntary. Under the Fifth Amendment, an individual has the right to remain silent and not incriminate themselves. This right can be waived if the individual voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently chooses to speak. The court also examined whether G.O.’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, which protect against involuntary confessions being used as evidence.

The court found that while G.O. had been read his Miranda rights, the detective conducting the interview had made misleading statements that suggested G.O. was not in trouble and would not be arrested. The detective further suggested that the purpose of the interview was to help G.O.'s stepsister, which the court found was deceptive.

The court also took into account G.O.’s age, his mental health issues, his lack of experience with law enforcement, and his educational struggles. The court concluded that these factors, in combination with the detective’s misleading statements, induced G.O. to confess involuntarily.

Therefore, the court held that the trial court was correct in suppressing G.O.'s confession. It reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

State v. Gnewuch

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 316 Neb. 47

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Heavican

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case before the Nebraska Supreme Court involved an appeal by Nathaniel L. Gnewuch, who was convicted of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. Gnewuch had requested a deferred sentence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-2292, but the district court refused to consider his request, deeming the statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court examined the language of § 29-2292, which allows for a deferred judgement and probation for a guilty defendant, without the entry of a final judgement of conviction, under certain circumstances.

The court rejected the district court's assertion that it lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence of probation before the entry of a judgement of conviction, finding nothing in the Nebraska Constitution that prevented the Legislature from granting the district court such jurisdiction. The court also disagreed with the argument that § 29-2292 violates the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution by allowing the judiciary to invade the charging function, an inherent executive power. It concluded that the power to define criminal conduct and fix punishment is vested in the legislative branch, while the imposition of a sentence within these legislative limits is a judicial function.

Therefore, the court held that § 29-2292 does not violate the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution and remanded the case back to the district court for consideration of Gnewuch's request for a deferred judgement.

State v. Ross

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-34-22

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Pierre-Louis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, defendant Shlawrence Ross was indicted for attempted murder and other offenses following an alleged exchange of gunfire with police officers. During the incident, he was wounded and a bullet lodged in his abdomen. In 2022, on advice of his counsel, he underwent elective surgery to remove the bullet. The state applied for a search warrant to obtain the removed bullet from the hospital and sought all medical records regarding the defendant’s treatment. The trial court denied the applications, reasoning that the bullet was shielded from the State’s access as it resulted from defence counsel’s “conscious litigation choice”. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the Fourth Amendment, concerning search and seizure, rather than the Sixth Amendment and reciprocal discovery rules, was the appropriate legal framework.

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the proper analysis for determining whether the State can obtain this physical evidence rests within the principles of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment would preclude issuing a valid search warrant for the bullet in this case, and the trial court should have determined whether there exists probable cause on which to issue such a warrant. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of probable cause.

Town of Pawlet v. Banyai

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 13

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Eaton

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The case involves a zoning enforcement action initiated by the Town of Pawlet against landowner Daniel Banyai. Banyai launched a firearms training facility on his property in 2017, which was found to be in violation of the town's Uniform Zoning Bylaws. The Environmental Division issued a judgment in 2021, ordering Banyai to remove unpermitted structures and have his property surveyed within 30 days. Banyai failed to comply with these orders, leading to the imposition of contempt sanctions.

The contempt sanctions included fines of $200 per day until all violations were rectified, and the potential for Banyai's arrest. The court also granted the town permission to enter Banyai's property to remove the unpermitted structures if he continued to ignore the orders.

Banyai appealed, arguing that the sanctions were punitive and violated the excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision, deeming Banyai’s arguments an impermissible collateral attack on a final order. The court stated that Banyai had failed to challenge the February 2023 contempt order or denial of reconsideration by a timely direct appeal, which would have been the appropriate channel for his grievances. As a result, his attempt to challenge the determinations now were considered an impermissible collateral attack on the February 2023 contempt order.