McBreairty v. Miller

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1389

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: Barron

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, plaintiff Shawn McBreairty claimed that a local school-board policy violated his First Amendment rights by restricting what he could say at the board's public meetings. McBreairty sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the policy. The defendants were the School Board of Regional School Unit 22 in Maine and Heath Miller, the Board's chair. The policy in question prohibited public complaints or allegations against any school system employee or student during board meetings. It also allowed the Chair to terminate any presentation that violated these guidelines or the privacy rights of others.

McBreairty had been stopped from criticizing school employees during two separate board meetings. Each time, after he mentioned a teacher's name and criticized their practices, the Chair warned him to stop, the video feed was cut, and the police were contacted to remove him from the premises. He was not arrested or charged with any crime on either occasion.

The District Court denied McBreairty's request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. He then appealed this decision. While this appeal was pending, the School Board amended the policy in question.

The Court of Appeals vacated the decision of the District Court, not on the merits of McBreairty's First Amendment claims, but on the grounds that he lacked standing to seek the injunctive relief at issue. The Court reasoned that McBreairty did not sufficiently demonstrate an intention to engage in the allegedly restricted speech at future board meetings, which is necessary to establish a concrete, live dispute rather than a hypothetical one. The Court thus concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case under Article III of the Constitution. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.

Rhode Island Truck Ctr v. Daimler Trucks North America

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1913

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Barron

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In Rhode Island Truck Center, LLC v. Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was asked to determine whether a Rhode Island truck dealer could challenge a ruling by a Rhode Island state agency that it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief for alleged violations of a Rhode Island law regulating motor-vehicle dealers and manufacturers. The violations in question were committed by an out-of-state truck manufacturer. The plaintiff, Rhode Island Truck Center, LLC ("RITC"), argued that the manufacturer's establishment of a dealership outside of Rhode Island violated the law and harmed RITC's business. The District Court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer, Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, arguing that the state agency lacked authority to apply Rhode Island law extraterritorially.

The Court of Appeals concluded that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case under the federal-question jurisdiction. The court then certified a question of state law to the Rhode Island Supreme Court concerning whether a "relevant market area" specified in Rhode Island law could extend beyond Rhode Island's borders. The court affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on another claim, where RITC challenged the Board's dismissal of a claim related to Daimler's denial of a Western Star franchise to RITC. The court held that the District Court did not err in concluding that the relief requested would have an extraterritorial effect that violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.

US v. Crater

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1159

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Rikelman

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant, Randall Crater, was convicted of wire fraud, unlawful monetary transactions, and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business based on his involvement in a cryptocurrency scheme. The trial lasted eight days and was based on Crater's management of My Big Coin (MBC), a cryptocurrency company that allegedly misrepresented itself as a gold-backed digital currency and claimed a partnership with MasterCard. The defendant appealed two of the district court's rulings.

Firstly, Crater argued that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process by refusing to enforce subpoenas against three federal agency witnesses due to Crater's non-compliance with the agencies' Touhy regulations. Secondly, Crater contended that the district court did not perform its gatekeeping duty by admitting testimony from the government's cryptocurrency expert without holding a Daubert hearing.

However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Crater's arguments could not be reconciled with controlling precedent or the record in the case. The court found that Crater's failure to show how the excluded testimony of the federal agents would have been both material and favorable to his defense invalidated his Sixth Amendment claim. Furthermore, the court held that Crater's objections to the expert witness's qualifications and methodology were insufficient to necessitate a Daubert hearing.

US v. Katana

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1867

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Rikelman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Grace Katana appealed his conviction for conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act. He argued that the indictment accused him of conspiring to rob Joseph Wilson, while the government only proved at trial that he had planned a break-in at Wilson's home. Katana claimed that this constituted a constructive amendment to the indictment in violation of his constitutional rights, that there was a prejudicial variance from the charge in the indictment, and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Katana's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the offense charged in the indictment was the same offense on which the court instructed the jury and on which the government presented evidence. The court also held that the identity of the robbery target was not an element of a robbery or conspiracy to commit robbery under the Hobbs Act, so focusing on Wilson's home business as the target at trial did not amount to a constructive amendment. The court further concluded that Katana failed to demonstrate that any variance from the indictment was prejudicial, as the record showed he had sufficient notice of, and was able to defend himself against, the government's theory at trial. Finally, the court ruled that a rational jury could have concluded that Katana and his co-conspirators planned to rob Wilson's home business, so there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

United States v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1086

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Livingston

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a decision from the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. The defendant, Cory Johnson, had been convicted for the production of child pornography and challenged his conviction on the basis of a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to dismiss the indictment.

The evidence in question was a video depicting the sexual abuse of a toddler, which had been found following a review of digital data seized from Johnson's devices. This review had taken place after his sentencing for an earlier prosecution. Johnson argued that this review violated his Fourth Amendment rights, as it had taken place after the sentencing and had looked for evidence of a new crime. The court disagreed, ruling that the review was within the scope of the original search warrant and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Johnson also argued that his second prosecution was barred by his earlier plea agreement. He contended that the plea agreement prohibited future prosecution for offenses "known to the United States as of the date it signed the agreement." The court, however, found that the government had not been aware of Johnson’s sexual abuse of his daughter and his production of child pornography at the time of the agreement. Thus, the plea agreement did not preclude his subsequent prosecution for these crimes.

In conclusion, the court affirmed Johnson's conviction.

Kim v. Board of Education of Howard County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-2294

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Quattlebaum

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was asked to determine the constitutionality of a process for selecting a student member of a county school board in Howard County, Maryland. Two parents sued the board, arguing that allowing public-school students to elect the student member diminishes adults’ voting power, violating the Equal Protection Clause, and that the selection process violates the Free Exercise Clause as it excludes students who opt not to attend public schools, including those who do so for religious reasons.

The court affirmed the dismissal of both claims. It held that the selection process was "basically appointive rather than elective," therefore, the one-person, one-vote principle derived from the Equal Protection Clause was not applicable. The court also found that the selection process was neutral and generally applicable, thus it did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The process excluded students who chose not to attend public school for any reason, not just those who did so for religious reasons.

Grisham v. Valenciano

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50915

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled on a civil rights lawsuit filed by James Everard and Christopher Grisham against the City of Olmos Park and several police officers. Everard and Grisham, self-identified "Second Amendment protestors", claimed their arrests on March 27, 2018, violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They were arrested after 911 operators received several calls about a man "with an AK-47" around his neck, standing on a busy street corner in Olmos Park. The officers arrived and found Everard with a large gun in a holster in front of his chest, and Grisham with a handgun in a holster on his hip. Everard and Grisham were charged with disorderly conduct and interference with the duties of a public servant respectively, but all charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the officers, a decision that Everard and Grisham appealed. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the officers had probable cause to believe that Plaintiffs were engaging in criminal activity and that the officers were not objectively unreasonable in believing such probable cause existed.

The court also rejected the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, stating that officers cannot execute their law enforcement duties while someone is engaging in speech, where probable cause exists. The court ruled that the officers had probable cause to make the arrests for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, thus precluding the arrestees’ retaliatory arrest claims. The court further rejected the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims, stating that the officers are protected by qualified immunity since both Everard and Grisham could not point to any clearly established law that such force was unreasonably excessive under the circumstances. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' municipal liability claims, as they failed to establish that there were constitutional violations.

United States v. Donavan White Owl

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2431

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Colloton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Donavan Jay White Owl, appealed an order of the district court denying his motion to dismiss an indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. White Owl had been indicted for felony murder and arson within Indian Country. A mistrial was declared during the initial trial after a dispute over White Owl’s access to information about a prosecution witness. White Owl argued that a new trial would violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.

The Appeals Court, however, ruled that White Owl had impliedly consented to the mistrial. The court noted that while the defendant did not expressly request a mistrial, his actions and responses during the proceedings indicated his implicit agreement. Specifically, when the district court declared its intention to declare a mistrial and asked the parties for their views, White Owl did not object but instead emphasized the need for more time to prepare for cross-examination of a prosecution witness.

In light of this, the court concluded that White Owl's lack of objection amounted to implied consent to a mistrial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying White Owl's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause.

United States v. Doolin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2421

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: Gruender

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Tony Doolin was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release for distribution of crack cocaine. After his release, Doolin lived in Iowa and possessed a medical-marijuana card, which permitted him to obtain medical marijuana under Iowa law. However, his supervised release was revoked due to his ongoing marijuana use and his distribution of medical marijuana to his girlfriend. Doolin appealed this decision, arguing that it violated the Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitution, due to the Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA) of 2023. This act prohibits the Department of Justice (DOJ) from using funds to prevent states from implementing their own medical marijuana laws.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, holding that the revocation of Doolin's supervised release did not violate the Appropriations Clause or the CAA of 2023. The court noted that marijuana possession remains illegal under federal law, regardless of any state laws or limits on prosecutorial funding. Federal courts are required to impose a prohibition on a defendant’s unlawful possession or use of all controlled substances, including marijuana, as a condition of any term of supervised release. Even if section 531 of the CAA prohibits the DOJ from funding marijuana-related prosecutions or revocations, where doing so prevents a state from implementing its medical marijuana laws, the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Doolin’s supervised release. Doolin engaged in unlawful conduct, even under Iowa’s medical-marijuana regime, as private distribution of marijuana is illegal under Iowa law, as is smoking marijuana, even for medical purposes. Therefore, the court found that the revocation of Doolin's supervised release was not prohibited by the CAA, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Doolin's supervised release.

United States v. Jesse Sierra

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1345

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Jesse and Dustin Sierra, convicted of various charges including kidnapping, interstate domestic violence, and aiding and abetting both offenses, respectively, appealed their convictions. Jesse Sierra challenged the district court’s decision to exclude evidence of the victim’s other traumatic experiences, arguing that it violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. He also argued that the government suppressed exculpatory or impeachment material, violating the Brady v. Maryland precedent. Dustin Sierra challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions and argued that his trial should have been severed from Jesse's trial due to the prejudicial nature of the testimony and evidence presented. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that the exclusion of the victim's other traumatic experiences did not violate Jesse's constitutional rights, and that no Brady violations had occurred. The court also found that the evidence against Dustin was sufficient for the convictions and that there was no severe prejudice warranting a separate trial.

CREECH V. BENNETTS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 24-1000

Opinion Date: February 24, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In the case under review, the plaintiff-appellant, Thomas Eugene Creech, currently on death row for the 1981 murder of David Dale Jensen, had sought commutation of his death sentence. The State of Idaho had granted Creech a commutation hearing before the Commission of Pardons and Parole, which ultimately denied his petition. Consequently, Creech filed a § 1983 action in federal court, alleging various due process violations during the commutation proceedings and sought a preliminary injunction. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied his motion, and he appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the state had met the minimal procedural safeguards required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the commutation proceedings. It rejected Creech's arguments that he was not given adequate notice of the issues to be considered by the Commission and the evidence to be presented at the commutation hearing. Additionally, the Court found that Creech was not entitled to the appointment of a replacement commissioner when one Commissioner recused himself. The Court also refuted Creech's claims that the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office violated his due process rights by suggesting to the Commission that Creech had committed another murder and got away with it, and by introducing misleading or fabricated evidence during the hearing. The Court found no violation or arbitrariness that would warrant judicial intervention.

Creech v. Richardson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 24-275

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by Thomas E. Creech, a death row inmate in Idaho. Creech was sentenced to death in 1981 for killing a fellow prisoner while serving two life sentences for first-degree murder. In his habeas corpus petition, Creech raised an Eighth Amendment claim, arguing that societal standards have evolved since Ring v. Arizona (2002) to deem a death sentence imposed by a judge rather than a jury as unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that Creech's claim was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), which mandates the dismissal of most claims filed in "second or successive" federal habeas petitions. The court held that Creech's claim was ripe and could have been brought in his prior petition challenging the same judgment, making his current petition second or successive. The court also dismissed as moot Creech's motion to stay his execution while the appeal was pending.

CREECH V. TEWALT

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 24-978

Opinion Date: February 24, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to deny a preliminary injunction requested by Thomas Eugene Creech, a death row inmate. Creech raised constitutional claims concerning his execution method, arguing that the State failed to provide sufficient information about its lethal injection drug, pentobarbital, and that the execution protocol was deficient. The Court, however, found that Creech was unlikely to succeed on his claims, noting that the State had adequately disclosed the planned execution method and that Creech's arguments about the drug's provenance were speculative. Creech's Eighth Amendment claims, which focused on potential unnecessary pain during execution, were rejected as he had not identified an alternative execution method and did not have any known conditions that create a substantial risk of severe pain. Additionally, Creech's argument about the protocol's lack of requirement for an anesthesiologist and a brain monitor were dismissed as they were against Supreme Court precedent. The Court also found that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor Creech. Thus, the Court affirmed the lower court's denial of Creech's request for preliminary injunctive relief.

Linthicum v. Wagner

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-4292

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In this case, two state senators from Oregon, Dennis Linthicum and Brian Boquist, challenged a recent amendment to the Oregon Constitution that disqualifies any state senator or representative from the next election if they have accrued ten or more unexcused absences from legislative floor sessions. In 2023, the senators engaged in a legislative walkout spanning several weeks, each accumulating more than ten unexcused absences. As a result, Oregon's Secretary of State disqualified them from appearing on the ballot for the 2024 election. The senators sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that their walkout was a form of protest protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that the senators' walkout was not protected by the First Amendment, as it was not a form of expression, but an exercise of legislative power. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, which held that the First Amendment does not protect the exercise of official legislative power, even if it could be characterized as expressive. The court also noted that the power of a legislator to be absent from legislative sessions, and thereby frustrate legislative action, is not personal to the legislator but belongs to the people. Therefore, the senators could not claim a personal First Amendment right to walk out. The court concluded that the senators were unlikely to prevail on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed the denial of their request for a preliminary injunction.

United States v. Kent

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13068

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: BRASHER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case relates to the admission of an investigator's testimony from a preliminary hearing in a subsequent trial. The appellant, Maurice Kent, was a member of a violent gang and was charged with RICO conspiracy and five other substantive crimes, including the attempted murder of Shadeed Muhammad. The government alleged that the gang murdered a former member, Qualeef Rhode, for cooperating with the police’s investigation into the attempted murder. The government introduced an investigator’s testimony from a preliminary hearing in a related case, which identified Rhode as cooperating with law enforcement to implicate Kent in the attempted murder. Kent argued that this testimony was hearsay and its admission violated his Confrontation Clause rights.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Kent's arguments and affirmed the decision of the district court. The court held that the investigator's testimony was not hearsay because it was offered for the effect it had on the listeners (other gang members) and not for the truth of the matter asserted. It was relevant because it influenced Kent and the other gang members who heard the testimony at the preliminary hearing, providing them with a motive to murder Rhode. The court also determined that the district court had sufficiently reduced the risk that the jury would improperly consider the out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter asserted by redacting the most prejudicial portions of the testimony and instructing the jury to consider the testimony only for its effect on the listeners. Therefore, the admission of the testimony did not violate Kent's rights under the Confrontation Clause.

Miller v. State of Florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2022-0745

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2024, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convictions and death sentences of Everett Glenn Miller for the first-degree premeditated murders of Kissimmee Police Officers Matthew Baxter and Richard “Sam” Howard. In August 2017, Miller had interrupted a conversation Officer Baxter was having with three individuals, requesting the presence of a superior officer at the scene. After Sergeant Howard arrived, Miller shot both officers twice in the head from close range. At the time of his arrest later that night, Miller was found carrying two firearms, including the murder weapon.

Prior to the murders, Miller, a former Marine, had been posting hateful anti-police and race-based comments on social media. At trial, Miller did not dispute that he had killed the officers, but his defense argued that premeditation was lacking and that the murders should be considered second-degree. The jury convicted Miller of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and unanimously recommended death for each murder.

Miller raised seven issues on appeal, including arguments about the admissibility of certain evidence, the qualifications of an expert witness, the presence of the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravating factor, and the constitutionality of Florida's capital punishment scheme. The court found no merit in any of these arguments and affirmed Miller's convictions and death sentences.

Smith v. Iowa District Court for Polk County

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0401

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Oxley

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

The Supreme Court of Iowa was asked to consider whether the Iowa Constitution supports a legislative privilege that protects legislators from compelled production of documents related to legislation. The court concluded that the Iowa Constitution does indeed contain a legislative privilege that protects legislators from compelled document production, particularly in relation to communications with third parties about the legislative process. The case arose from subpoenas served on several Iowa legislators by the League of Latin American Citizens of Iowa (LULAC). LULAC sought discovery of communications related to recent legislative changes to voting procedures. The legislators objected to the subpoenas, arguing they were protected from compelled document production by a legislative privilege under the Iowa Constitution. The court ruled that the privilege extends to communications with third parties where the communications relate directly to the legislative process of considering and enacting legislation. However, the court did not decide whether this legislative privilege was absolute or qualified, as it concluded that the requested documents were not relevant to LULAC's claims and were therefore protected by the legislative privilege, regardless of its extent. The court reversed the district court's judgment granting in part LULAC's motion to compel and remanded with instructions to quash the subpoenas.

State v. Showalter

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124535

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Standridge

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Kansas, Richard Daniel Showalter was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and aggravated burglary. Showalter appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain autopsy photographs, deposition testimony from an unavailable witness, and statements made by one of his co-conspirators. Regarding the autopsy photographs, Showalter argued they were gruesome and prejudicial, but the court found the photographs were relevant and their probative value outweighed any potential prejudice. As for the deposition testimony, Showalter claimed the court erred in finding the witness was unavailable to testify at trial, but the court ruled that the State made sufficient efforts to establish the witness’s unavailability. Regarding the co-conspirator's statements, Showalter argued they were irrelevant because the State did not prove he was aware of the co-conspirator’s claims, but the court found the statements were relevant to explain the motive and intent behind the murders. Lastly, Showalter argued that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors violated his constitutional right to a fair trial, but the court found no cumulative error as it did not find any individual errors. Accordingly, the court affirmed Showalter’s convictions.

State v. Rowe

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 37

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: McKinnon

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Montana overturned the conviction of Daniel Christopher Rowe for sexual assault, a felony. Rowe was initially charged with the offense for multiple instances of abuse that allegedly took place over several years against H.B., who was under sixteen years of age at the time of the offenses. The case was remanded for a new trial due to two significant issues.

First, the court found the lower court erred in admitting a subsequent uncharged act of sexual assault as proof of motive or plan to commit the earlier sexual assaults charged under a "common scheme." The court reasoned that the State had charged Rowe with a non-existent offense not recognized under Montana law, which led to the improper admission of other bad acts evidence.

Second, the court found that the lower court erred in giving the jury both conduct-based and result-based definitions of "knowingly" for the sexual assault charge without specifying to the jury which definition applied to which elements of the offense. The court determined that this lowered the State's burden of proof, which violated Rowe's right to due process. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed Rowe's sexual assault conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.

State v. Tran

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 7

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Pohlman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this appeal of a criminal case, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah concluded that the police officers' warrantless entry and search of Alexander Hung Tran’s home were reasonable and justified under the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court also declined to recognize broader protection under the Utah Constitution in the emergency aid context. The case arose when Tran appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police officers obtained during a warrantless entry and search of his home. The officers had entered Tran's home due to their belief that two individuals inside were in need of immediate aid, which was supported by a range of factors. The court held that the totality of the circumstances known to the police officers at the time they entered Tran’s home supported an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the two individuals were in need of immediate aid, thus falling within the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.