Table of Contents
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Children's Health Defense Inc. v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association v. Attorney General New Jersey
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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Rosemond v. Hudgins
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Timms v. U. S. Attorney General
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Rhone v. City of Texas City
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Moorer v. City of Chicago
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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USA v. Johnson
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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PEACE RANCH, LLC V. BONTA
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Sherman v. Gittere
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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USA V. PARKINS
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Speech First v. Shrum
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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United States v. Morales-Lopez
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Baughcum v. Jackson
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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GREAT NORTHERN PROPERTIES, L.P. v. US
Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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People v. Cartwright
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
California Courts of Appeal
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Creech v. State
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal
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State of Iowa v. Laub
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Iowa Supreme Court
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State of Iowa v. McMickle
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Iowa Supreme Court
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Couch v. Commonwealth
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Kentucky Supreme Court
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Growe v. Simon
Constitutional Law, Election Law
Minnesota Supreme Court
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Faatz v. Ashcroft
Constitutional Law, Election Law
Supreme Court of Missouri
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Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region vs. Knodell
Constitutional Law, Health Law
Supreme Court of Missouri
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Falconi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law
Supreme Court of Nevada
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Willson v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Nevada
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State v. Maxi
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
New Hampshire Supreme Court
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Schaad v. Alder
Constitutional Law, Tax Law
Supreme Court of Ohio
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Ivy Hill Cong. of Jehovah Witnesses v. DHS
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
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Constitutional Law Opinions
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Children's Health Defense Inc. v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Docket:
22-2970
Opinion Date: February 15, 2024
Judge:
Krause
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law
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In the case at hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by a group of students and Children’s Health Defense, Inc. against Rutgers University. The plaintiffs challenged the university's COVID-19 vaccination policy, which required in-person students to be vaccinated or else enroll in online programs or seek exemptions for medical or religious reasons. The court found that the university's policy did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory rights.
The court held that there is no fundamental right to refuse vaccination. It applied the rational basis review and concluded that Rutgers University had a rational basis for its policy given the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the policy was ultra vires under New Jersey law, determining that Rutgers was authorized to require COVID-19 vaccinations under state law. Furthermore, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, concluding that Rutgers had a rational basis for its differential treatment of students and staff, as well as vaccinated and unvaccinated students.
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Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association v. Attorney General New Jersey
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Docket:
22-2209
Opinion Date: February 14, 2024
Judge:
Freeman
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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This case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA), which allows certain qualified retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms, and its relation to New Jersey’s more restrictive retired police officer permitting law. The retired law enforcement officers from various agencies claimed that LEOSA provided them with a federal right to carry concealed firearms in New Jersey, superseding the state law. The State of New Jersey argued that LEOSA did not provide an enforceable right and, if it did, it would only apply to officers who retired from federal or out-of-state law enforcement agencies—not to officers who retired from New Jersey law enforcement agencies.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that LEOSA does provide certain retired officers who meet all the statutory requirements with an enforceable right, and that right extends equally to officers who retired from New Jersey agencies and those who retired from federal or out-of-state agencies. The court held that the federal statute also preempts contrary aspects of New Jersey law. Therefore, the court affirmed the District Court’s order granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the retired officers, allowing them to carry concealed firearms.
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Rosemond v. Hudgins
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
22-7188
Opinion Date: February 13, 2024
Judge:
Agee
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In a federal case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the petitioner, James Rosemond, appealed a district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. Rosemond, who was serving multiple life sentences for offenses related to drug trafficking and murder, claimed that his continued detention was unconstitutional because then-President Donald Trump had commuted his sentence to time served during a phone conversation with two of Rosemond's supporters, Jim Brown and Monique Brown. The Browns signed declarations stating that during the December 2020 call, they believed President Trump had decided to commute Rosemond's sentence. However, no clemency warrant or official record of clemency for Rosemond exists, and his clemency petition is still listed as "pending" on the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney website.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Rosemond’s petition. The court held that while a written document is not constitutionally required for a presidential commutation, the evidence provided by Rosemond, namely the Browns' declarations, did not establish that President Trump actually commuted his sentence. The court found that President Trump's alleged statements during the phone call were forward-looking and indicative of a desire to commute Rosemond's sentence in the future, rather than a declaration of a completed act of clemency. The court also noted the established practice of documenting acts of presidential clemency, which was consistently followed by President Trump throughout his presidency, and emphasized the constitutional separation of powers, which vests the clemency power exclusively in the President.
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Timms v. U. S. Attorney General
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
22-6338
Opinion Date: February 14, 2024
Judge:
QUATTLEBAUM
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a case involving Gerald Wayne Timms, who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, following his sentence for a child pornography conviction. During his civil commitment, Timms was convicted of and sentenced for two separate federal crimes. After serving the prison terms for these offenses, his civil commitment continued. Timms argued that his civil commitment should have ended when his first criminal sentence started, and he claimed that certain conditions of his criminal confinement violated the requirements of the Act. He also contended that the application of the Act violated his constitutional rights.
However, the court held that a person ordered to be civilly detained after a finding of sexual dangerousness remains committed until a court finds that he is no longer sexually dangerous and that an intervening criminal sentence has no impact on the civil commitment. The court also held that the Attorney General did not fail to meet his statutory obligation to detain Timms in a suitable facility and that the Attorney General was not required to seek recommitment following Timms' sentences. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Timms' petition for habeas corpus relief.
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Rhone v. City of Texas City
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
22-40551
Opinion Date: February 14, 2024
Judge:
Southwick
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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Thomas Rhone, a property owner in Texas City, Texas, had his apartments declared a nuisance by a Municipal Court of Record. Rhone disputed this decision in state court, but the City moved the case to federal district court. There, Rhone's claims were dismissed on summary judgment. Rhone appealed the district court's decision, challenging the standard of review and its conclusions regarding his constitutional claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered a limited remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the role of the City Attorney in finalizing the Municipal Court’s order of abatement.
Rhone's property, three apartment buildings, passed a city inspection in 2013 without any issues regarding a lack of a certificate of occupancy being raised. However, following an inspection in 2020, Texas City informed Rhone that his buildings were substandard and that he would need a certificate of occupancy to operate them. Rhone argued that city officials interfered with his efforts to remedy the violations claimed by the City and imposed conditions that made it impossible for him to preserve the value of his property by repairing the apartment buildings to bring them into compliance with the Texas City Code instead of demolishing the structures.
After the city filed an administrative action in its Municipal Court of Record, the court ordered the demolition of the apartment buildings, finding them to be "dilapidated, substandard, unfit for human habitation, a hazard to the public health, safety, and welfare," and a nuisance. Rhone appealed this order in the 122nd Judicial District Court of Galveston County, but the City removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Galveston under federal-question jurisdiction. The federal district court ultimately granted partial summary judgment in favor of Texas City.
The Court of Appeals held that any of Rhone's claims that would only interfere with the demolition of the buildings on his property were moot due to the demolition of the buildings. However, the court also held that the demolition did not eliminate a potential takings claim. The court ordered a limited remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the role of the City Attorney in finalizing the Municipal Court’s order of abatement. The court also held that Rhone has not shown that an initial inspection by a city fire marshal and an issuance of a citation that has consequences on his use of the property violate federal law.
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Moorer v. City of Chicago
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-1067
Opinion Date: February 9, 2024
Judge:
ROVNER
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In this federal case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Thomas Moorer, who had been arrested and indicted on charges including murder and attempted murder, challenged the constitutionality of his pretrial detention, claiming that there was no probable cause for his arrest. Moorer was ultimately acquitted by a jury of all charges. The defendants in the case were officers of the Chicago Police Department.
The case arose from a fatal shooting that took place in an apartment shared by multiple people. Multiple witnesses, including Edwin Ramos, whose brother Edward was killed in the shooting, identified Moorer as the perpetrator. Edwin informed the police that the man who entered the apartment was nicknamed “Boom.” Moorer was subsequently arrested and charged with first-degree murder and other crimes, and a grand jury returned a 135-count indictment against him.
Moorer claimed that the witness identifications were unreliable and that police failed to properly investigate his alibi. He argued that the prosecutors would have concluded there was no probable cause if they had been properly informed of all the facts known to the officers.
However, the Court of Appeals found that the officers did have probable cause to arrest and detain Moorer, based on seven independent witness identifications. The court noted that the question for pretrial detention is not whether the officers have proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime, but whether a reasonable person would have a sound reason to believe the suspect committed a crime. The court concluded that Moorer had not identified any facts known to the defendants that would eliminate probable cause.
Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the district court, which had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
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USA v. Johnson
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-2932
Opinion Date: February 15, 2024
Judge:
Wood
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Adrian L. Johnson was pulled over by a Deputy Sheriff for driving with a suspended license. The officer's trained dog indicated the presence of a controlled substance in Johnson's car, leading to a search of the vehicle. The officer found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and two handguns. Johnson was subsequently charged with possession of drugs with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He moved to suppress all evidence, arguing that the search of his car violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, and Johnson pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that the officer did not unconstitutionally prolong the stop to conduct the dog sniff, and that the subsequent search of Johnson's car did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officer had probable cause to search the car because the dog's alerts indicated the presence of contraband. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.
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PEACE RANCH, LLC V. BONTA
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
22-16063
Opinion Date: February 13, 2024
Judge:
McKeown
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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In the case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Peace Ranch LLC challenged the constitutionality of California AB 978, a mobilehome-rent-control statute. Peace Ranch alleged that if it increases mobilehome rents more than AB 978 permits, the California Attorney General would enforce AB 978 against it. However, Peace Ranch also alleged that AB 978 does not apply to its mobilehome park. The Court of Appeals concluded that Peace Ranch had adequately established standing based on a pre-enforcement injury. The court reasoned that Peace Ranch was trapped between complying with a law that it believes does not apply to it or risking enforcement proceedings by raising rents. This dilemma, the court ruled, is the precise predicament that supports pre-enforcement standing. As such, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of standing.
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Sherman v. Gittere
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
16-99000
Opinion Date: February 9, 2024
Judge:
Bumatay
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In the case of Donald Sherman, who was convicted of robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder in Nevada, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decision to deny Sherman's habeas corpus petition. Sherman had argued that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated when the trial court excluded certain impeaching evidence about Dr. Bauer’s daughter, whom Sherman had dated.
Sherman claimed that this evidence would have countered the prosecution's narrative that Sherman had murdered Dr. Bauer out of spite for his daughter after their breakup. Instead, he argued, the evidence would have shown that he was manipulated into confronting Dr. Bauer.
The Ninth Circuit found that Sherman's argument was not presented to the district court and, in any case, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) deferential standard of review was applicable because Sherman did not rebut the presumption that the Nevada Supreme Court adjudicated his federal constitutional claim on the merits.
On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that Sherman did not show that the Nevada Supreme Court's denial of his right-to-present-a-complete-defense claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The panel found that the Nevada Supreme Court's rulings on the exclusion of the evidence were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The panel also concluded that the Nevada Supreme Court's alternative conclusion that any error was harmless was not unreasonable.
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USA V. PARKINS
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
22-50186
Opinion Date: February 14, 2024
Judge:
Owens
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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A man named Brett Wayne Parkins was convicted of aiming a laser pointer at a police helicopter. Police officers searched Parkins's apartment without a warrant after obtaining consent from his girlfriend. Parkins, who was present but not at the doorway of his apartment, verbally objected to the search. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must be physically present and expressly refuse consent to nullify a co-tenant’s consent to a warrantless search. The court clarified that physical presence does not require the defendant to stand at the doorway — presence on the premises, including its immediate vicinity, is sufficient. The court ruled that Parkins was physically present on the premises and had expressly refused consent, so the search of his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court upheld the district court's denial of Parkins's motion to suppress his pre-arrest and post-arrest statements because Parkins was not subject to interrogation for his pre-arrest statements and his post-arrest statements at the police station were not a product of the unlawful search of his apartment. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings.
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Speech First v. Shrum
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
23-6054
Opinion Date: February 9, 2024
Judge:
Hartz
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
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In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff organization, Speech First, Inc., challenged three policies implemented by Oklahoma State University (OSU) that allegedly suppressed the freedom of speech of its student members. The organization provided declarations of three pseudonymous students, Student A, Student B, and Student C, describing how these policies stifled their constitutionally protected expression. The main issue in this case was whether pseudonymous declarations could establish Article III standing for Speech First to bring the action. The defendant, OSU President Kayse Shrum, had successfully argued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma that the plaintiff lacked standing because it failed to identify its members by name, as required by the Supreme Court in Summers v. Earth Island Institute.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of Summers, stating that the Supreme Court had not intended to require legal names for standing and had not suggested that it was overruling decades of precedent allowing anonymous plaintiffs. The Tenth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court in Summers had simply required that there be a specific person who is injured, not just a statistical probability that some member would suffer an injury. The appeals court found that this requirement could be satisfied by identifying an injured member as “Member 1” just as well as by a legal name. It also pointed to previous cases where standing was granted based on pseudonymous or anonymous declarations.
The Tenth Circuit ultimately concluded that an organization can establish standing to bring a suit if at least one of its members, even if identified by a pseudonym, would have standing to sue in their own right. The court therefore reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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United States v. Morales-Lopez
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
22-4074
Opinion Date: February 9, 2024
Judge:
BALDOCK
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit overturned the United States District Court for the District of Utah's decision to dismiss the charge against Jonathan Alexander Morales-Lopez, who was accused of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). This statute prohibits any person who is an unlawful user of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm.
The district court held that the phrase "unlawful user" in the statute is unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to the facts of Morales-Lopez's case. However, the appellate court disagreed on both counts.
First, the appellate court held that the district court erred in considering whether § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional on its face. The court cited longstanding precedent that a defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot pose a facial challenge to it.
Second, the appellate court held that the district court erred in finding § 922(g)(3) unconstitutional as applied to Morales-Lopez's conduct. The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence of a temporal nexus between Morales-Lopez's drug use and his possession of a firearm.
The facts of the case are as follows: Morales-Lopez and another man were caught stealing firearms and ammunition from a store in Utah. Morales-Lopez was found with a stolen gun and methamphetamine. He also admitted to using drugs regularly in the month prior to his arrest.
The appellate court concluded that the phrase "unlawful user" in § 922(g)(3) is clear in its application to Morales-Lopez's conduct and that the district court should reinstate the jury’s verdict. The case was remanded back to the district court with instructions to proceed accordingly.
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Baughcum v. Jackson
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
22-13444
Opinion Date: February 9, 2024
Judge:
BRASHER
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
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In this case, three individuals and the Firearms Policy Coalition (FPC), an advocacy group, challenged a Georgia law that prohibits individuals under the age of 21 from obtaining licenses to carry firearms. They sued three county probate judges, who issue carry licenses, and Georgia’s Commissioner of Public Safety, who designs the carry license application form. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue any of the defendants and that the case was both moot and unripe. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs have standing to sue the probate judges, but not the Commissioner of Public Safety. The court found that the plaintiffs' alleged injury - the inability to carry firearms due to their age - is traceable to the actions of the probate judges who issue the licenses, and could be redressed by a court order directed at them. However, the court held that the plaintiffs' injuries are not fairly traceable to, nor redressable by a court order against, the Commissioner of Public Safety, who merely designs the application form and lacks enforcement authority. The court also held that the case was neither moot nor unripe with respect to the probate judges, reversing the district court's dismissal of the case in part and remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings.
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GREAT NORTHERN PROPERTIES, L.P. v. US
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Docket:
22-2086
Opinion Date: February 15, 2024
Judge:
Dyk
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The plaintiff, Great Northern Properties, L.P. ("GNP"), filed a lawsuit against the United States, alleging a Fifth Amendment taking of its coal leases on the Otter Creek property in Montana. GNP claimed that the federal government, through the Montana state regulatory authority, denied the necessary permits for coal mining. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that GNP could not establish that Montana's actions were coerced by the federal government or that Montana acted as an agent of the federal government. The court also noted that the federal government did not dictate the outcome in individual permitting cases and that state law governed the permitting process. Therefore, the federal government was not responsible for the permit denial, as Montana was not coerced to enact its own regulatory program following the passage of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Furthermore, the court rejected GNP's claim that the existence of federal standards created an agency relationship between the federal government and Montana.
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People v. Cartwright
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
D080606M(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: February 15, 2024
Judge:
DATO
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In this case, the defendant, Kevin Eugene Cartwright, was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances, robbery, burglary, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and being a prohibited person owning or possessing ammunition. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus 50 years to life, and a determinate prison term of 20 years four months. On appeal, Cartwright contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress video footage from the City of San Diego’s “City IQ” streetlight camera program and evidence derived from that footage. The Fourth Appellate District Division One of the Court of Appeal for the State of California affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that Cartwright did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when he traversed a public right of way in downtown San Diego in the middle of a business day. The court found that accessing the recordings from the City’s streetlight cameras did not amount to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, consequently, did not require a warrant. The court distinguished the cameras in this case from the aerial surveillance images and integrated police department systems addressed in other precedents, stating that the City's camera program stands alone and does not reveal the transit patterns of people throughout the county. The court concluded that the police did not conduct a "search" when they accessed footage from the City's streetlight cameras and, accordingly, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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Creech v. State
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Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal
Docket:
51229
Opinion Date: February 9, 2024
Judge:
Bevan
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the dismissal of a successive post-conviction petition for relief filed by Thomas Eugene Creech, an inmate sentenced to death in 1995 for the murder of fellow inmate David Jensen. The district court had dismissed Creech's petition as untimely under Idaho Code section 19-2719, which requires capital defendants to file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known within forty-two days of the filing of the judgment imposing the death sentence. Creech argued that his death sentence, which was imposed by a judge without the participation of a jury, was unlawful based on the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the U.S. Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. He also claimed that societal norms have evolved to the point where his judge-imposed death sentence is now deemed cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Supreme Court held that Creech failed to articulate a claim based on information he did not know or could not have reasonably known within the forty-two day period, thus upholding the district court's dismissal of his petition as untimely.
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State of Iowa v. Laub
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Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Docket:
22-1530
Opinion Date: February 9, 2024
Judge:
McDonald
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In the state of Iowa, a police officer investigated a suspected case of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The officer pulled over the suspect, Colby Laub, and obtained a search warrant to collect a breath specimen for chemical testing after Laub refused to participate in field sobriety testing. The chemical testing showed that Laub had a blood alcohol content well above the legal limit, and he was subsequently arrested. Laub moved to suppress the evidence of the chemical breath test, as well as statements he had made to the officer, arguing that the officer was required to invoke the statutory implied consent procedure and give him the opportunity to refuse to provide a sample, rather than proceed with a search warrant. The district court agreed with Laub and granted his motion on the grounds that the officer had no statutory authority to obtain a search warrant to collect and test bodily specimens, and that doing so violated Laub's constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. The state appealed this decision.
The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court erred in holding that the statutory implied consent procedure is the only way a law enforcement officer can obtain a bodily specimen and conduct chemical testing in investigating an OWI case. The court noted that the officer's decision to obtain a search warrant instead of invoking the statutory implied consent procedure did not violate the defendant's rights to equal protection or due process. The court also disagreed with the district court's interpretation of the statute, stating that the statutory implied consent law is not the exclusive means by which a law enforcement officer can obtain a breath sample in an OWI case. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's suppression ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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State of Iowa v. McMickle
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Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Docket:
22-1531
Opinion Date: February 9, 2024
Judge:
McDonald
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In this case heard by the Supreme Court of Iowa, the defendant, Morgan Marie McMickle, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). McMickle was stopped by law enforcement after rear-ending another vehicle and leaving the scene. The investigating officer obtained a search warrant to collect a blood sample from McMickle for chemical testing, which showed a blood alcohol content over three times the legal limit. Additionally, McMickle repeatedly asked to speak to her lawyer but was denied. She later filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the use of a search warrant instead of the statutory implied consent procedure violated her rights, and that her right to counsel was violated under Iowa Code section 804.20.
The district court granted McMickle's motion, determining that the officer's use of a search warrant was not authorized, that the officer had no statutory authority to collect and test bodily specimens, and that the officer's actions violated McMickle's constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. Additionally, the court found that the officer's refusal of McMickle's requests to speak to her lawyer violated her rights under section 804.20. As a result, the court ordered the suppression of McMickle's statements and the results of the blood test.
However, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the statutory implied consent procedure was not the exclusive means by which an officer can investigate suspected OWI offenses, and that a law enforcement officer's decision to obtain and execute a search warrant did not violate a suspect's constitutional rights. The court also ruled that although McMickle's rights under section 804.20 were violated, the blood test results should not have been suppressed because they were obtained through a legally issued search warrant, independent of any violation of section 804.20. The case was remanded back to the lower court.
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Couch v. Commonwealth
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Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Docket:
2023-SC-0237-MR
Opinion Date: February 15, 2024
Judge:
VANMETER
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In this case, Bennett D. Couch was convicted by the Kenton Circuit Court for possession and transfer of child pornography in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 531.335 and 531.340. The conviction was based on evidence procured through search warrants for Couch's Tumblr account, apartment, cell phones, and computers. The investigation was initiated after the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) reported that three pornographic images of children were being circulated online, which were traced back to Couch's IP address. Couch challenged the constitutionality of KRS 531.330’s presumption as to minority and the legality of the search of her apartment.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice VanMeter, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Couch's constitutional challenge was not considered as she failed to provide the required notice to the Attorney General. Regarding the legality of the search, the court determined that the search warrant affidavits provided substantial basis for the issuing judge to conclude that probable cause existed to issue the original search warrant, despite Couch's claims that the affidavits lacked probable cause, failed to identify the criminal statutes violated, and did not establish a nexus between the criminal activity and her apartment. The court also dismissed Couch's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and failure of the trial court to properly consider the Presentence Investigation Report due to lack of procedural compliance.
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Growe v. Simon
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Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Docket:
A23-1354
Opinion Date: February 7, 2024
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Election Law
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In Minnesota, a group of voters sought to prevent former President Donald Trump from appearing on the 2024 presidential primary and general election ballots, arguing that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which disqualifies anyone from holding office who has engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the U.S., rendered him ineligible. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that it would not be an error to place Trump's name on the 2024 Republican Party presidential nomination primary ballot. The court reasoned that the nomination primary is an internal party election, and the state law does not prohibit a major political party from placing an ineligible candidate on the primary ballot. However, the court did not decide on the issue of Trump's name on the general election ballot, stating that the matter was not yet ripe for adjudication as it was not "about to occur" under the relevant state law. The court did not foreclose the possibility of petitioners bringing such a claim at a later date.
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Faatz v. Ashcroft
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Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Docket:
SC100277
Opinion Date: February 14, 2024
Judge:
BRONIEC
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Election Law
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In this case, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed a lower court's decision that a redistricting plan for the Missouri Senate, which was prepared by a judicial redistricting commission, met constitutional requirements. The appellants, residents of districts impacted by the redistricting, argued that the plan violated the community preservation requirement of the Missouri Constitution by splitting certain communities into different senatorial districts. The court found the appellants did not meet their burden of proving the plan was clearly and undoubtedly unconstitutional. The court noted that the constitution allows for some flexibility in the redistricting process and that the plan need not achieve absolute perfection. The court concluded that the redistricting plan did not violate the constitutional requirements and was not the result of partisan or racial gerrymandering.
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Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region vs. Knodell
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Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Docket:
SC99966
Opinion Date: February 14, 2024
Judge:
Powell
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Health Law
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In Missouri, Planned Parenthood and other affiliated health organizations sought a declaratory judgment declaring House Bill No. 3014 (HB 3014) unconstitutional and requested injunctive relief to prevent its implementation and enforcement. HB 3014 was a bill passed by the Missouri General Assembly that would cut Medicaid funding for abortion providers and their affiliates, including Planned Parenthood. The plaintiffs alleged that the bill violated the single subject requirement and the equal protection clause of the Missouri Constitution. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had ruled in favor of Planned Parenthood on both constitutional claims. The state appealed on procedural grounds, alleging that Planned Parenthood failed to exhaust administrative remedies, lacked standing, and waived its right to bring these claims. The state also argued the bill did not violate the single subject or equal protection provisions of the Missouri Constitution. However, the Supreme Court dismissed these arguments, affirming the lower court's ruling.
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Falconi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.
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Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Citation:
140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 8
Opinion Date: February 15, 2024
Judge:
Herndon
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law
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In the State of Nevada, Alexander M. Falconi, operating as the press organization Our Nevada Judges, petitioned against the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, and parties in interest, Troy A. Minter and Jennifer R. Easler. Falconi challenged local rules and a statute that required certain court proceedings to be closed to the public.
Falconi filed a media request for camera access in a child custody proceeding between Minter and Easler. Minter opposed the request, arguing it was not in the child's best interest to have his personal information publicly available. The district court denied Falconi's request, citing that the case was sealed and thus required to be private according to local rules.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the public has a constitutional right to access court proceedings. The local rules and the statute, NRS 125.080, requiring the district court to close proceedings, bypassed the exercise of judicial discretion and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Thus, the court held that these local rules and NRS 125.080 were unconstitutional to the extent they permitted closed family court proceedings without exercising judicial discretion.
The court instructed the district court to reverse its order denying media access in the underlying child custody case. The court emphasized the importance of public access to court proceedings, including family court proceedings, which historically have been open to the public. The court rejected the automatic closure of such proceedings and emphasized the necessity of case-by-case judicial discretion in deciding whether to close proceedings.
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Willson v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.
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Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Citation:
140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 7
Opinion Date: February 8, 2024
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada was reviewing a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging an order from the district court. Petitioner Lina Marie Willson had been convicted of obstructing a public officer. This conviction arose from an incident where Willson had yelled at police officers from her front yard while they were attending to a separate incident involving a potentially suicidal juvenile. Willson appealed her conviction, arguing that the law under which she was convicted, NRS 197.190, was unconstitutionally vague or overly broad.
The court held that NRS 197.190 was not unconstitutionally vague or overly broad, either on its face or as applied to Willson. The court interpreted the law to apply only to physical conduct or fighting words that are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the performance of their duties. Although the court found that Willson's claims failed, it did acknowledge that her claims implicated the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190.
The court therefore granted the petition and directed the clerk of the court to issue a writ of certiorari upholding the constitutionality of NRS 197.190 and instructing the district court to reconsider Willson's direct appeal. The purpose of this reconsideration was to determine whether, given the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190, sufficient evidence existed to support Willson's conviction.
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State v. Maxi
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Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-0613
Opinion Date: February 13, 2024
Judge:
DONOVAN
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled in a case where the defendant, Jean M. Maxi Jr., was convicted and sentenced for two crimes: attempted felonious sexual assault (FSA) and certain uses of computer services prohibited. Maxi appealed, arguing that the two charges constituted the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The defendant also argued pro se that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the appellate defender failed to consider his research or argue a double jeopardy violation under the U.S. Constitution.
The court found that, as charged, the two offenses required different evidence to prove different elements and did not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The court also dismissed the defendant's pro se arguments as insufficiently developed for review. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision and affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence for both charges.
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Schaad v. Alder
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Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation:
2024-Ohio-525
Opinion Date: February 14, 2024
Judge:
DeWine
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Tax Law
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ohio General Assembly passed a temporary law (H.B. 197) stating that for a limited time, Ohio workers would be taxed by the municipality that was their “principal place of work” rather than the municipality where they actually performed their work. Josh Schaad, who primarily worked from his home in Blue Ash during the pandemic, challenged this law after his employer withheld municipal taxes from his wages and forwarded them to Cincinnati, the location of his employer's business. Schaad's principal argument was that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids an Ohio municipality from taxing a nonresident for work performed outside of that municipality. The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Schaad's argument and affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals, holding that the Due Process Clause did not prohibit the General Assembly from directing that an Ohio citizen pay taxes to the municipality where the employee’s principal place of work was located rather than to the subdivision of the state where the employee actually worked. The court also held that the General Assembly's power to pass emergency legislation did not expand its substantive constitutional powers.
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Ivy Hill Cong. of Jehovah Witnesses v. DHS
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Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Docket:
65 MAP 2022
Opinion Date: February 13, 2024
Judge:
Todd
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the Ivy Hill Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, finding that the Commonwealth Court violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule by dismissing the Congregation's petition against the Department of Human Services. According to the faith's tenets, congregation elders are obligated to maintain the confidentiality of confessions, which might include confessions of child abuse. The Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) identifies certain individuals, including clergymen, as mandated reporters of child abuse. The Congregation filed a petition for review, asking for a declaration on whether their elders are entitled to the clergyman privilege, which would protect them from the mandatory reporting requirements of the CPSL. The Commonwealth Court dismissed the petition, reasoning that the Department of Human Services was not a proper defendant and that declaratory relief would not terminate the controversy. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that this dismissal violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule as it directly contradicted the Commonwealth Court's prior determination on the same issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
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