Table of Contents
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Reese v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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Sonda v. West Virginia Oil & Gas Conservation Commission
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Pak v. Biden
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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United States v. Ivey
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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Lodge v. U.S. Attorney General
Constitutional Law, Immigration Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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Savage v. DOJ
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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People v. Underwood
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
California Courts of Appeal
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Idaho State Athletic Commission v. Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
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State v. Labbe
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Maine Supreme Judicial Court
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Commonwealth v. A.Z.
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
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City of St. Louis v. State
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Missouri
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Forward Montana v. State
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
Montana Supreme Court
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Hardy v. Chester Arms, LLC
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
New Hampshire Supreme Court
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Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Oregon Supreme Court
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Allegheny Reprod. Health v. PA DHS
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Health Law
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
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Commonwealth v. Taylor
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
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In Re: Senior Health Ins. Co. of PA
Constitutional Law, Insurance Law
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
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State v. Paule
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Utah Supreme Court
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City of Laramie, Wyoming v. University of Wyoming
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Wyoming Supreme Court
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Constitutional Law Opinions
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Reese v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Docket:
22-751
Opinion Date: January 26, 2024
Judge:
LOHIER
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a dispute involving the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA) and several plaintiffs who had been fined for failing to pay tolls at TBTA crossings. The plaintiffs claimed that the fines were unconstitutional under the Eight Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause and that TBTA was unjustly enriched under New York law. The court considered the case on appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which had granted summary judgment in favor of TBTA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
The plaintiffs had failed to pay their tolls for various reasons, such as receiving bills at old addresses or having malfunctioning transponders. They then received substantial fines, which they eventually paid at reduced amounts. The main issue was whether these fines were excessive in relation to the seriousness of the offenses. The court applied the four-factor test from United States v. Bajakajian, which considers the nature of the offense, whether the defendant fits into the class of persons the law was designed for, the maximum potential sentence and fine, and the harm caused by the defendant's conduct.
The court found that the fines were not excessive. It pointed out that the plaintiffs' violations were not willful or fraudulent, and that the fines were in line with those for similar offenses in other states. The court also noted that the fines helped TBTA prevent the harms it would suffer if people did not pay their tolls.
Regarding the unjust enrichment claim, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown that it was inequitable for TBTA to retain the fines. The plaintiffs' non-payment of tolls had violated TBTA regulations, and it was not inequitable for such violations to result in fines. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TBTA on the unjust enrichment claims as well.
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Sonda v. West Virginia Oil & Gas Conservation Commission
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
22-2271
Opinion Date: January 31, 2024
Judge:
NIEMEYER
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law
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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, plaintiffs Scott Sonda and Brian Corwin, both mineral rights owners in West Virginia, challenged Senate Bill 694, which amended the State's oil and gas conservation law to permit the unitization of interests in horizontal well drilling units, even for nonconsenting mineral rights owners. The plaintiffs claimed that this law constituted a taking of their property and deprived them of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The West Virginia Oil and Gas Conservation Commission filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the Commission was immune under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
However, the district court abstained from ruling on the federal constitutional claims, citing the Pullman abstention doctrine, and ordered the proceeding stayed pending the outcome of a state court action that the plaintiffs may file. The Commission appealed the district court's abstention order.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings, noting that the district court had erred by applying the Pullman abstention doctrine without first ensuring it had jurisdiction. The court directed the district court to first address the Commission's argument challenging the plaintiffs' Article III standing. The court did not express an opinion about the merits of the standing issue or any others before the district court.
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Pak v. Biden
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
23-1392
Opinion Date: January 31, 2024
Judge:
WOOD
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law
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Four Iranian nationals, who had previously completed mandatory military service in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), were denied visas to enter the United States. Their family members, three U.S. citizens and one lawful permanent resident, filed a suit against the President and several federal officials responsible for visa applications. They alleged that the defendants unlawfully deprived visa applicants the opportunity to establish eligibility for terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds (TRIG) exemptions, violating their rights under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which bars judicial review of consular decisions. The Plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applied, and that the plaintiffs failed to show any evidence of bad faith that could overcome this doctrine. The court also held that the applicants were not entitled to any more explanation for their visa denials than the citation to the section of the law on which the denial was based.
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United States v. Ivey
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
23-1706
Opinion Date: January 26, 2024
Judge:
COLLOTON
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision to deny defendant Ki-Jana Kolajuan Ivey's motion to suppress evidence retrieved from his cell phone. Ivey, a convicted felon, was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm following a traffic stop in which officers discovered a gun under his seat. Officers also obtained a warrant to search Ivey's phone, finding photos and videos of him with other firearms. Ivey argued that the search of his phone was not supported by probable cause and that the warrant was too general, violating the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause given the circumstances of the traffic stop, Ivey's possession of the phone, and his prior social media activity displaying firearms. Additionally, the court concluded that the warrant was sufficiently particular, as it specified the phone to be searched and the information to be seized. The court noted that the presence of unrelated information on Ivey's phone did not transform the warrant into an impermissible general warrant.
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Lodge v. U.S. Attorney General
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
22-10416
Opinion Date: January 26, 2024
Judge:
PRYOR
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Immigration Law
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Robert Franklyn Lodge, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was brought to the United States by his father, who became a naturalized U.S. citizen. After Lodge was convicted of aggravated felonies, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him. Lodge argued that he had derived citizenship from his father under a statute that has been repealed. The immigration judge ordered Lodge removed to Jamaica, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. Lodge argued that the former statute discriminated against unmarried fathers based on sex and against black children based on race, and that he should have been granted citizenship if the statute were free of these constitutional defects. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Lodge's petition for review, concluding that he lacked standing to raise these constitutional challenges. The court found that Lodge's injury (removal from the U.S. due to non-citizenship) was not traceable to the sex classification in the statute, because even under a sex-neutral version of the statute, Lodge would not have derived citizenship from his father, because his mother's maternity was established. The court did not address the merits of Lodge's arguments about race and sex discrimination or whether he had third-party standing to assert his father's right to equal protection. Lodge's motion to transfer was denied as moot.
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Savage v. DOJ
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
22-5240
Opinion Date: January 26, 2024
Judge:
GINSBURG
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
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Kaboni Savage, a federal prisoner, brought a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice arguing that the department was infringing upon his First Amendment rights by limiting his communication with family and friends. Savage claimed that the restrictions imposed under the Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) were unjust. However, Savage did not complete the Justice Department's Administrative Remedy Program (ARP), a process designed to seek relief from such restrictions. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Savage's lawsuit, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA), a law requiring prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a lawsuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Savage did not fully pursue all available administrative remedies and hence, his lawsuit was barred under the PLRA.
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People v. Underwood
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
A162356(First Appellate District)
Opinion Date: January 30, 2024
Judge:
Miller
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In the early hours of New Year's Day in 1987, O'Neal Underwood and an accomplice mugged a pedestrian in Richmond, California. During the mugging, Underwood's accomplice stabbed the victim, who subsequently died from his wounds. Underwood was convicted of first degree murder and robbery and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Years later, the Legislature amended the murder statutes to limit felony murder liability for persons who were not the actual killers. Underwood petitioned for resentencing under the new law. The trial court denied the petition, finding Underwood ineligible for relief because he aided and abetted murder with intent to kill and was a major participant in the underlying robbery, acting with reckless indifference to human life. Underwood appealed, arguing that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof, the prosecution's evidence does not prove he is guilty of first degree murder under current law, and his attendance at the evidentiary hearing by speakerphone and without a means of confidentially communicating with his counsel violated his constitutional and statutory rights. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, agreed with Underwood that the prosecution failed to prove he is guilty of first degree murder under current law because no substantial evidence supports a finding that he intended to kill or acted with reckless indifference for human life. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and instructed it to vacate the murder conviction and resentence Underwood in accordance with the appropriate section of the Penal Code.
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Idaho State Athletic Commission v. Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator
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Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
Docket:
51211
Opinion Date: January 29, 2024
Judge:
ZAHN
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In this case, the Idaho State Athletic Commission and the Idaho Division of Occupational and Professional Licenses sought a declaratory ruling that provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requiring legislative approval of pending administrative fee rules violated the Idaho Constitution. They also sought a Writ of Mandamus directing the Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator to publish the Athletic Commission’s 2022 administrative rules in the Idaho Administrative Code. The Idaho Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the case, but dismissed the petition for a declaration of unconstitutionality and denied the petition for a Writ of Mandamus. The court concluded that the APA requirement for legislative approval of pending administrative rules did not violate the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers, enactment, presentment, or administrative rules provisions. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that administrative rulemaking authority was a legislative delegation, not a constitutional power, and that the legislature was free to modify the process by which administrative rules were enacted.
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State v. Labbe
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Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Citation:
2024 ME 15
Opinion Date: January 31, 2024
Judge:
DOUGLAS
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In this case, Jacob R. Labbe Sr. was convicted by the trial court on one count of domestic violence stalking and two counts of violation of a protective order. Labbe appealed arguing that the stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague, the evidence was insufficient to convict him of domestic violence stalking, the court erred in denying his request to dismiss the charges as de minimis, and the court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction. It held that the stalking statute was not unconstitutionally vague. The court found that the statute provided a clear definition of "course of conduct" and enough evidence supported a conviction for domestic violence stalking. It further held that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Labbe's request to dismiss the charges as de minimis. The court also found no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The court concluded that the First Amendment did not require the State to prove reckless disregard on the part of Labbe for the effect of his statements on the victim, as the charge was not based on the content of Labbe's communications but rather on his persistent unwelcome contact with the victim. Therefore, the court found no error in the trial court's instructions to the jury. The conviction was affirmed.
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Commonwealth v. A.Z.
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Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Docket:
SJC-13455
Opinion Date: January 25, 2024
Judge:
LOWY
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The case concerns the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, A.Z., who was involuntarily hospitalized for a competency determination under Massachusetts law, G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the involuntary commitment of a criminal defendant for a competency determination infringes upon a defendant's fundamental right to liberty and thus must satisfy strict scrutiny under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the United States Constitution. To pass strict scrutiny, the involuntary commitment must be the least restrictive means available to vindicate the governmental interest at stake. Therefore, it is unconstitutional for a court to hospitalize a pretrial defendant for a clinical evaluation and observation of competency, absent a finding by the judge, by clear and convincing evidence, that hospitalization is the least restrictive means available to adequately determine a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial. The judge in this case did not make such findings, so the court concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated.
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City of St. Louis v. State
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Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Docket:
SC99876
Opinion Date: January 30, 2024
Judge:
BRONIEC
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In the case of City of St. Louis and Heather Taylor (“Appellants”) versus State of Missouri (“State”), the Supreme Court of Missouri analyzed Senate Bill No. 26 (“SB 26”) that was challenged for being unconstitutional. SB 26, introduced in December 2020 and signed into law in July 2021, contained 88 sections related to public safety, including procedures for imposing discipline on law enforcement officers and provisions for the offense of “unlawful traffic interference.”
Appellants argued that SB 26 violated the Missouri Constitution on several grounds, including that it violated the original-purpose and single-subject rules, that it created an unfunded mandate, that it imposed additional duties on officers and employees of a constitutional charter city, that it used public funds for private purposes, and that it created unequal treatment between law enforcement officers and other city employees.
The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the City had sufficiently pleaded the elements of a Hancock Amendment violation, which prohibits the state from requiring new or expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions without full state financing. Therefore, the circuit court's judgment was reversed on this point and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
However, the court affirmed the judgment with respect to Appellants' other points. It found that SB 26 had the same purpose as enacted as introduced, did not impose new duties on city employees or allocate funds for public purposes, and had a rational basis for treating law enforcement officers differently from other city employees. The court also found that SB 26 did not violate the original-purpose and single-subject rules, did not impose additional duties on officers and employees of a constitutional charter city, did not use public funds for private purposes, and did not create unequal treatment between law enforcement officers and other city employees.
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Forward Montana v. State
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 MT 19
Opinion Date: January 31, 2024
Judge:
McGRATH
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
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In Montana, a group of plaintiffs, including Forward Montana, Leo Gallagher, Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Gary Zadick, challenged two amendments to Senate Bill 319 (SB 319) on the grounds that they violated Article V, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution. The amendments, added in the final days of the legislative session without public comment, expanded the bill's scope beyond its initial focus on campaign finance to include regulations on political activities on college campuses and judicial recusal requirements. The District Court found that the amendments violated the Single Subject Rule and Rule on Amendments of the Montana Constitution, and permanently enjoined their enforcement. However, the court declined to award attorney fees to the plaintiffs under the private attorney general doctrine, reasoning that the case was a "garden-variety" constitutional challenge.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana disagreed, reversing and remanding the decision regarding attorney fees. The court held that the plaintiffs had satisfied all three factors required for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine: the societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation (constitutional limitations on legislative power), the necessity for private enforcement and the burden on the plaintiffs, and the large number of people standing to benefit from the decision. Despite the District Court's finding that the case was a "garden-variety" constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court determined that the Legislature's willful disregard of constitutional duties and legislative rules and norms in adopting these amendments justified the award of attorney fees. The case was remanded to the District Court for calculation of attorney fees.
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Hardy v. Chester Arms, LLC
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Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-0348
Opinion Date: January 30, 2024
Judge:
BASSETT
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In a case before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the plaintiffs, two police officers injured in a shooting, filed a suit against Chester Arms, LLC (the seller of the firearm used in the shooting), and the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) (which conducted the background check for the sale of the firearm). The suit accused Chester Arms of negligent entrustment and DOS of negligent entrustment and negligence per se. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on the basis of immunity under state law. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
The court of appeals found that the state law barring lawsuits against firearms manufacturers and sellers for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful use of their products by a third party was constitutional and not preempted by federal law. The court found that the law was designed to safeguard citizens' fundamental right to bear arms by limiting suits against the firearms industry, thereby protecting its solvency and ensuring law-abiding citizens have access to firearms. The court also found that the law did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal protection or right to a remedy.
Regarding the suit against DOS, the court found that DOS had not been negligent in its background check as the shooter was not disqualified from owning a firearm at the relevant time under federal law. Therefore, the court concluded that any alleged error in the trial court's immunity analysis was harmless as DOS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
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Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Docket:
S070456
Opinion Date: February 1, 2024
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In 2022, Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 113, amending the state constitution to disqualify any state legislator who accumulates 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative session from holding office "for the term following the election after the member’s current term is completed." The Secretary of State interpreted this to mean that the disqualification applies to a legislator’s immediate next term. However, a group of legislators challenged this interpretation, arguing that the disqualification should apply one term later.
The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that the measure's disqualification applies to the legislator’s immediate next term of office. The Court found that the text of the amendment was capable of supporting the Secretary's interpretation. This interpretation was also supported by the ballot title and the voters’ pamphlet, which repeatedly described the disqualification as occurring immediately following the legislator’s current term. The Court concluded that voters would have understood the amendment in light of these materials. Therefore, the Court upheld the Secretary's rules implementing the amendment.
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Allegheny Reprod. Health v. PA DHS
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Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Docket:
26 MAP 2021
Opinion Date: January 29, 2024
Judge:
DONOHUE
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Health Law
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In the case at hand, a group of reproductive health centers and Planned Parenthood affiliates in Pennsylvania challenged the constitutionality of sections of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act and corresponding regulations which prohibit the use of state Medicaid funds for abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or to avert the death of the mother. The petitioners argued that the exclusion of abortion from Medicaid coverage violated the Equal Rights Amendment and equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the health centers had standing to bring the lawsuit on behalf of their patients who are enrolled in or eligible for aid under Pennsylvania's Medical Assistance program but whose abortions are not covered because of the exclusion. The court further held that the Commonwealth Court erred in permitting individual members of the Pennsylvania Senate and House of Representatives to intervene in the case.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's order dismissing the petition for review. The court concluded that the providers' petition for review was legally sufficient to survive demurrer. The court noted that its precedent may have misstated the breadth of the exclusion and remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not rule on the constitutionality of the challenged provisions.
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Commonwealth v. Taylor
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Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Docket:
40 MAP 2022
Opinion Date: January 29, 2024
Judge:
TODD
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether a violation of a juvenile defendant's Fifth Amendment right is subject to appellate review for harmless error. The case involved Nazeer Taylor, who was charged with several serious felony offenses as a juvenile. The juvenile court transferred Taylor's case to adult criminal court, considering Taylor's refusal to admit guilt for his alleged offenses as a factor in its decision. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania previously held that such consideration violated Taylor's Fifth Amendment right. In this appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the violation constituted a structural error, not subject to a harmless error review. Given Taylor's current age of 27, neither the juvenile nor the adult criminal court had the statutory authority to conduct a new certification hearing. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court reversing Taylor's conviction and discharging him.
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In Re: Senior Health Ins. Co. of PA
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Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Docket:
71 MAP 2021
Opinion Date: January 29, 2024
Judge:
TODD
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Insurance Law
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In a case concerning the Senior Health Insurance Company of Pennsylvania ("SHIP"), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a rehabilitation plan devised by the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner. SHIP, which sold long-term care policies in multiple states, became insolvent due to the high cost of care against inadequate premiums. The rehabilitation plan was designed to correct the company’s financial condition by adjusting the premiums and benefits of the existing policies. However, insurance regulators from Maine, Massachusetts, and Washington ("Regulators") objected to the plan, arguing that it exceeded the Insurance Commissioner's statutory authority and violated their states' regulatory authority over rates. The court rejected these claims, finding that the plan did not exhibit a "policy of hostility" to the public acts of other states and thus did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court concluded that the Commonwealth Court, holding exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of SHIP's assets, did not abuse its discretion by approving the plan.
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State v. Paule
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Court: Utah Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 UT 2
Opinion Date: February 1, 2024
Judge:
Matthew B. Durrant
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the petitioner, Elbert John Paule, was charged with murder, obstruction of justice, reckless endangerment, and assault following a fatal shooting incident involving a friend. The jury acquitted Paule on all charges except obstruction of justice. Paule challenged his conviction, arguing that the obstruction of justice conviction was legally inconsistent with the jury’s determination that he was not guilty of the other crimes. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the lower court's ruling.
The Supreme Court held that to be convicted of obstruction of justice, a defendant need only perform an obstructive act with the requisite intent. Proof of a separate crime is not necessary. The court concluded that because a violation of Utah’s obstruction of justice statute requires only that a defendant act with the requisite intent—it does not require proof of a separate criminal offense—the jury’s verdict was not legally impossible. Furthermore, the court found that Paule's counsel was not constitutionally ineffective in failing to seek a more detailed unanimity instruction.
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City of Laramie, Wyoming v. University of Wyoming
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 WY 13
Opinion Date: January 31, 2024
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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In this case, the City of Laramie, Wyoming, sued the University of Wyoming and its Board of Trustees, challenging the drilling and operation of certain water wells. The city argued that the university was in violation of a 1965 deed covenant prohibiting the drilling of one of the wells and was also in violation of a city ordinance. The city also claimed that legislation exempting the university from this city ordinance was unconstitutional. The district court dismissed some of the city's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the university on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the university was protected by sovereign immunity from the city's attempts to enforce the deed covenant. It also held that the state law exempting the university from the city ordinance was constitutional. The court further noted that the law precluded the city from enforcing its ordinance against the university.
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