Barlow v. Service Employees International Union

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3096

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

This case involves Bradley Barlow, Frances Biddiscombe, and others who were members of either the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 668 or the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Council 13. They all signed union membership agreements authorizing the deduction of membership dues from their paychecks. The authorizations were irrevocable, regardless of union membership status, unless they provided written notice of revocation within a specified annual window. After resigning from their respective unions, their membership dues continued to be deducted until the next annual revocation window. They sued, claiming that the continued collection of dues after their resignations constitutes compelled speech, violating their First Amendment rights. They relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, which held that public-sector unions charging fees to nonmembers is a form of coerced speech that violates the First Amendment. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of their complaints, holding that Janus was focused on nonmembers who never elected to join a union, not members who voluntarily join a union and later resign. The court also rejected their due process claims for failure to provide procedures for notice and the ability to object to how their dues were spent, as these procedures were based on avoiding subjecting nonconsenting individuals from subsidizing a political agenda, which was not the case for these appellants. The court also rejected the appellants' contract defenses.

Lara v. Commissioner PA State Police

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-1832

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In a case involving the Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds in Pennsylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that these individuals are included in "the people" whose right to bear arms is protected under the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs, including three individuals who were aged 18 to 20 when the case was filed, along with two gun rights organizations, challenged Pennsylvania's statutory scheme that effectively bans 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying firearms outside their homes during a state of emergency. The Court found that the term "the people" in the Second Amendment presumptively encompasses all adult Americans, including 18-to-20-year-olds, and there was no founding-era law that supported disarming this age group. The Court reversed the District Court's decision dismissing the case and denying the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief, and remanded the case with instructions to enter an injunction forbidding the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police from arresting law-abiding 18-to-20-year-olds who openly carry firearms during a state of emergency declared by the Commonwealth.

American Precision v. Mineral Wells

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-10558

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law

This case involves a dispute between American Precision Ammunition, L.L.C. (APA) and the City of Mineral Wells in Texas. APA and the City entered into a Tax Abatement Agreement ("Agreement") where the City promised to gift APA $150,000 and provide APA ten years of tax abatements. However, the City terminated the Agreement, claiming that the $150,000 gift was illegal under the Texas Constitution. APA sued the City for breach of contract, violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), and denial of federal due process and due course of law under the Texas Constitution. The district court dismissed all claims, and APA appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the Agreement was illegal and unenforceable under Texas law because the City's contractual obligation to "gift" APA $150,000 constitutes a gratuitous payment of public money. The court also dismissed APA's TOMA claim as moot because there was no "agreement" to reinstate given that the Agreement was unenforceable. Furthermore, the court found that APA's due process claims failed because the promise for the $150,000 gift was void and did not constitute a contract, and therefore, APA had no protected property interest in the gift. Even assuming that APA had a property interest in the tax abatements, the court held that APA's due process and due course of law claims still fail because Texas law affords APA sufficient opportunity to pursue that claim in state court.

Book People, Inc. v. Wong

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50668

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law

In 2023, the Texas Legislature passed the Restricting Explicit and Adult-Designated Educational Resources Act (READER), which requires vendors selling books to Texas public schools to issue sexual-content ratings for all library materials they have ever sold or will sell. Certain Texas bookstores, trade associations, and a legal defense organization sued for injunctive relief, alleging that READER violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, which Texas appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction against the Commissioner of the Texas Education Agency, vacated the preliminary injunction against the Chairs of the Texas State Library and Archives Commission and the Texas State Board of Education, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the suit against them. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that READER unconstitutionally compels speech. The court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted, the balance of equities tipped in their favor, and an injunction was in the public interest.

Consumers’ Research v. Consumer Product Safety Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40328

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case was an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit against a lower court's decision that the structure of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs, By Two, L.P., and Consumers’ Research, argued that the CPSC's structure violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because the President could only remove the CPSC's commissioners for cause. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, but the appellate court reversed this decision.

The appellate court held that the CPSC's structure was constitutional and did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The court based its decision on the Supreme Court's precedent in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which allowed for-cause removal protections for commissioners of independent agencies like the CPSC. The court noted that while the CPSC does exercise substantial executive power, this alone does not remove it from the protection of the Humphrey’s Executor exception. The court also pointed out that the CPSC's structure was not novel or lacking historical precedent, which further supported its constitutionality.

The court emphasized that any changes to the Humphrey’s Executor exception would have to be made by the Supreme Court, not the lower courts. Until such a change occurred, the CPSC's structure remained constitutional. Thus, the court reversed the district court's decision and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings.

United States v. Hays

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3294

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed an appeal related to a Fourth Amendment issue involving a warrantless search of a vehicle. The defendant, Charles Hays, was stopped by the police while driving, and his passenger was found in possession of methamphetamine. The police officers then searched the vehicle's interior but found no drugs. However, under the hood of the car, inside the air filter, they discovered more methamphetamine.

Hays was indicted and later moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the officers did not have probable cause to search under the hood and in the air filter. The district court denied his motion, and Hays subsequently pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, including all parts of the vehicle where there is a fair probability contraband could be concealed, as long as there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of illegal activity. The court found that given the totality of the circumstances, including the passenger's possession of methamphetamine, Hays's previous drug-related arrest, and the presence of a screwdriver in the car - a tool known to be used for hiding drugs in vehicles - officers had a fair probability to believe that methamphetamine could be concealed in the car, including under its hood.

USA V. MARIN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50154

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed two defendants’ convictions for violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), which prohibits the possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while on board a covered vessel. The defendants were arrested after their speedboat, which was carrying at least 1,000 kilograms of cocaine, was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard off the coast of Ecuador. The vessel carried no nationality flag, but both defendants verbally claimed Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel. The Ecuadorian government neither confirmed nor denied the nationality. The United States treated the vessel as stateless and exercised jurisdiction. The defendants challenged the government’s jurisdiction, arguing that the relevant provision of the MDLEA under which jurisdiction was exercised is unconstitutional because it conflicts with international law regarding when a vessel may be treated as stateless. The court held that the definition of “vessel without nationality” under the MDLEA does not conflict with international law, and thus affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment.

USA v. Pugh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-13136

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerns Tia Deyon Pugh, who was charged with impeding law enforcement during a civil disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) during a protest in Mobile, Alabama. She smashed a police car window with a baseball bat, thus obstructing law enforcement officers in their official duties during the civil disorder. Pugh challenged the constitutionality of Section 231(a)(3) on four grounds, arguing that it: (1) exceeds Congress’s power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, (2) is a substantially overbroad regulation of activities protected by the First Amendment, (3) is a content-based restriction of expressive activities in violation of the First Amendment, and (4) is vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court rejected these arguments, and Pugh was found guilty by a jury.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Pugh’s conviction. The court held that Section 231(a)(3) does not exceed Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as the statute's jurisdictional element is sufficient to limit its scope to constitutional applications. The court also found that the statute does not violate the First Amendment as it does not broadly prohibit protected speech and expressive conduct. Furthermore, the court ruled that the statute is not a content-based restriction and does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause due to vagueness. The court concluded that the statute constitutionally applies to Pugh's conduct, and she may not challenge the statute on vagueness grounds based on its application to others.

People v. Frias

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B322762A(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Alexander Alberto Frias, was convicted of stalking. Frias appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice by denying his four requests to substitute the Castaneda Law firm as his counsel. The trial court denied the first three requests on the grounds that the firm's attorneys were not ready for trial and the case had been pending for three years, with four different attorneys had handled Frias’s defense at his request. However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Frias's fourth request. At the time of the fourth request, the case had been pending for three-and-a-half years, the case was set for trial, and the prosecutor and deputy public defender had announced they were ready for trial. An attorney from the Castaneda firm announced he was ready for trial. The trial court's concerns that the Castaneda firm was not prepared for trial and that Frias would seek to substitute new counsel were not sufficient grounds to deny Frias's request to have retained counsel of his choice. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment based on the trial court's denial of Frias's right to counsel of his choice. However, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Frias's conviction for stalking and remanded for a new trial.

STATE v. RANDALL

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1118

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Georgia, the State appealed a lower court's decision to suppress evidence of Antonio Rodrick Randall's refusal to submit to a blood test following his arrest for driving under the influence. The lower court had suppressed this evidence on constitutional grounds. In a previous appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the lower court's order suppressing the evidence, finding that the lower court unnecessarily resolved Randall’s constitutional challenge. On remand, the lower court again suppressed the evidence on constitutional grounds. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided that the lower court should have first evaluated Randall's argument that exclusion of the evidence was warranted under Georgia's Rule 403 (which allows relevant evidence to be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice) before reaching his constitutional claims. The Supreme Court of Georgia therefore vacated the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State v. Crudo

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123559

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the State of Kansas v. Frank Raymond Crudo, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, ruling against Crudo on all five arguments he presented. Crudo was pulled over for a non-functioning license plate light, and upon approaching the vehicle, officers smelled marijuana, leading to a search of Crudo's truck and attached camper. They found varying amounts of marijuana in different locations, leading to multiple charges against Crudo.

Crudo's arguments included: (1) the search of his camper was unconstitutional as it should not be considered part of his vehicle for the purposes of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, (2) the testimony of Lieutenant Ricard at his second trial should have been considered expert testimony and therefore inadmissible due to non-compliance with expert testimony rules, (3) the use of a permissive inference instruction was in error and affected the trial outcome, (4) his second trial for possession with intent to distribute marijuana violated double jeopardy principles, and (5) cumulative error.

On the first point, the court ruled that probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception does not need to be "localized" to a specific area of the vehicle and therefore extended to the camper. On the second point, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Lt. Ricard's testimony as lay opinion testimony. On the third point, the court agreed that the permissive inference instruction was in error, but found it harmless. On the fourth point, the court found that Crudo's convictions for possession and distribution were based on separate acts and thus did not constitute double jeopardy. Lastly, because there was only one error (the permissive inference instruction), the doctrine of cumulative error did not apply.

Commonwealth v. Mattis

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-11693

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the defendant, Sheldon Mattis, was convicted of first degree murder among other charges, and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. At the time of the murder, Mattis was eighteen years old. He appealed his sentence, arguing that it was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was an "emerging adult" (defined in this case as eighteen, nineteen, or twenty years old at the time of the crime), and should be entitled to the same protection as juvenile offenders, who receive a term of life with the possibility of parole.

The court considered whether their previous ruling in Diatchenko I, which concluded that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole in any circumstance would violate the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, should be extended to apply to emerging adults. The court reviewed scientific evidence showing that the brains of emerging adults are not fully mature and are similar to those of juveniles, and also considered the treatment of emerging adults in Massachusetts and elsewhere.

The court concluded that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for emerging adult offenders violates the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. As a result, the court invalidated the provisions of Massachusetts law that deny the possibility of parole to emerging adults. The court remanded the matter to the lower court for resentencing consistent with the court's opinion. The court also noted that this ruling does not suggest that emerging adults receiving the benefit of resentencing should be paroled once they have served a statutorily designated portion of their sentences. Instead, the parole board should evaluate the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, including the age of the offender, together with all relevant information pertaining to the offender's character and actions during the intervening years since conviction.

Commonwealth v. Robinson

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-09265

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Jason Robinson, was convicted of first-degree murder on a joint venture theory of felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate offence, in connection with the shooting death of Inaam Yazbek. Robinson appealed his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, claiming insufficient evidence and trial errors.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Robinson's conviction of murder in the first degree and the order denying his motion for a new trial. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict Robinson of felony-murder, as there was enough to permit an inference that Robinson knew that his co-defendant was armed during the commission of the armed robbery.

The court also found no error in the admission of certain evidence, rejected Robinson's claim that he was prejudiced by being tried with his co-defendant, and found no error in the jury instructions, the exclusion of certain third-party culprit and police failure to investigate evidence, or in the prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument.

However, the court ruled that Robinson's sentence of life without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional because he was nineteen years old at the time of the offense. The case was remanded for re-sentencing in line with the court's decision in Commonwealth v. Mattis.

Commonwealth v. Watt

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13279

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this Massachusetts case, the defendant, Nyasani Watt, was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses. After his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that his trial counsel had slept during critical portions of the trial, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to counsel. This motion was denied by a lower court judge without a hearing, and the denial was appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court.

The Supreme Judicial Court determined that Watt had presented a new, substantial issue that it could not have considered in its previous review - namely, that his trial counsel had been sleeping during significant parts of the trial.

Upon reviewing the evidence, which included affidavits from several people who had observed the trial counsel sleeping, the Court found that the trial counsel did indeed sleep through a significant portion of the trial and possibly during an important aspect of the trial. The Court held that this constituted a constructive deprivation of Watt's right to counsel under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

The Court further ruled that this error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and thus the defendant's convictions were vacated, the verdicts were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.

State v. Fair

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-20-22

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case State v. Calvin Fair, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had to decide whether a prosecution for terroristic threats under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), based on a mens rea of recklessness, is constitutional. The defendant, Calvin Fair, following a conflict with the police, had made threatening statements on Facebook, including knowledge of where the police officers lived and what cars they drove. He was charged under a statute which made it a crime to threaten to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.

The court held that a mental state of recklessness is constitutionally sufficient for a “true threats” prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), as defined in this context as “morally culpable conduct, involving a 'deliberate decision to endanger another.’” The state must also prove that a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have viewed the message as threatening violence. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded the case for a new trial.

The court also held that the jury must unanimously agree on whether the defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both. This was because the terroristic threats statute listed in the disjunctive two separately enumerated, alternative crimes of terroristic threats.

State v. Hill

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-41-22

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the State's witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a), is not unconstitutionally overbroad, but it may have been unconstitutionally applied to the defendant, William Hill, in this case. Hill was initially convicted of first-degree carjacking and third-degree witness tampering. While detained awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to the carjacking victim, A.Z., asserting his innocence and asking her to reconsider her identification of him as the perpetrator. A.Z. reported the letter to the police, resulting in a charge of witness tampering. The court concluded that Hill's letter did not explicitly ask A.Z. to testify falsely or withhold testimony, leading the Supreme Court of New Jersey to rule that it may have been unconstitutionally applied in Hill's case. The court vacated Hill's witness tampering conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge, but did not vacate his carjacking conviction.

Applied Building Sciences v. SC Dept of Commerce

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28184

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that limits reimbursement of reestablishment expenses in condemnation proceedings to $50,000. The appellant, Applied Building Sciences, Inc., an engineering firm, was forced to move its operations when its leased building was condemned for public use by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. The company sought reimbursement for reestablishment expenses exceeding $560,000 but was limited by state statute to $50,000. The company argued that the cap was unconstitutional under the Takings Clauses of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. The court found that reestablishment expenses are separate from damages awardable as just compensation under both constitutions, thus upholding the constitutionality of the statutory cap. The court affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways.

State v. Benton

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28185

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the decision by the court of appeals in the case of Tommy Lee Benton, who was convicted for the murder of Charles Bryant Smith, two counts of first-degree burglary, one count of first-degree arson, and one count of third-degree arson. Benton's first trial was declared a mistrial due to his failure to disclose his alibi, which he intended to support via his great-grandmother's testimony. Benton claimed that his second trial and ensuing convictions were barred by double jeopardy. The court, however, found that the mistrial was declared due to "manifest necessity," hence, there was no double jeopardy violation.

Benton also argued against the admissibility of gruesome crime scene photographs and certain text and Facebook messages. The court upheld the trial court's decision, asserting that the photographs provided important context to the testimony and other key evidence. The court noted that while the photographs were disturbing, any error in admitting them was harmless as they did not significantly contribute to the verdict. The court also affirmed the admissibility of the text and social media messages.