Restaurant Law Center v. City of New York

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-491

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

In the case involving the Restaurant Law Center and the New York State Restaurant Association against the City of New York and the Commissioner of the City’s Department of Consumer and Worker Protection, the plaintiffs challenged a New York City law prohibiting the wrongful discharge of fast-food restaurant employees. The plaintiffs argued that the law was preempted by federal law and violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which had granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The appellate court concluded that the city's Wrongful Discharge Law did not violate federal law nor the United States Constitution.

The court held that New York’s Wrongful Discharge Law was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it established minimum labor standards that regulated the substance, rather than the process, of labor negotiations. The court also held that the law did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which acts as a safeguard against economic protectionism. The court found that the law did not discriminate against interstate commerce either on its face, in its purpose, or in its practical effect.

Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lierman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-2275

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Internet Law, Tax Law

In this case, the United States Chamber of Commerce and three other trade associations sued to stop the enforcement of a new state tax in Maryland known as the Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax Act. The law requires large technology companies to pay a tax based on gross revenue they earn from digital advertising in the state. The plaintiffs alleged that the Act violates the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed three of the counts as barred by the Tax Injunction Act, which prevents federal courts from stopping the collection of state taxes when state law provides an adequate remedy. The court dismissed the fourth count on mootness grounds after a state trial court declared the Act unconstitutional in a separate proceeding. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the first three counts, but vacated the judgment to the extent it dismissed those counts with prejudice, ordering that the dismissal be entered without prejudice. The appellate court also vacated the dismissal of the fourth count and remanded for further proceedings, as the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to the Act's prohibition on passing the tax onto consumers was not moot.

US v. Maynard

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4178

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerned Everett Maynard, a police officer in West Virginia, who was convicted of deprivation of rights under color of law. This conviction was based on his use of excessive force against an arrestee, Robert Wilfong, which resulted in Wilfong being hospitalized with a broken nose and lacerations on his upper head. During the trial, witnesses were required to wear face masks due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Maynard appealed his conviction, arguing that the mask requirement violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and that the district court erred in applying sentencing enhancements for obstruction of justice and for causing "serious bodily injury."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that the mask requirement did not violate Maynard's Sixth Amendment right, as the protection against the spread of COVID-19 is an important public policy interest and the reliability of the witnesses’ testimony was assured. This was because the witnesses were under oath, cross-examined, and the jury could observe their demeanor. The court also found no error in the application of sentencing enhancements. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the injuries inflicted on Wilfong constituted "serious bodily injury," and affirmed the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement, finding that a defendant's perjurious testimony at trial is relevant to sentencing because it reflects on a defendant’s criminal history, willingness to obey the law, and general character.

US v. Ortiz-Orellana

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 16-4844

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law, White Collar Crime

The court case involves defendants Juan Alberto Ortiz-Orellana and Minor Perez-Chach, who were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (VICAR). Ortiz and Perez were part of a gang known as MS-13 and were separately charged with murders related to their involvement in the gang in Maryland. Ortiz was also convicted of VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and murder resulting from the same crime. Perez, on the other hand, was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government seizure of historical cell site location information (CSLI) without a warrant did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights due to the good faith exception. The court also upheld the use of summary exhibits and denied the defendants' claim that their sentences were substantially unreasonable. The court agreed with Ortiz that his firearm convictions must be vacated because the underlying offenses for each VICAR count could not qualify as a "crime of violence" after a recent ruling. The court also rejected Ortiz's claim that his RICO and VICAR convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. As a result, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for resentencing on certain counts.

United States v. O'Lear

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3835

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Thomas O’Lear, was convicted of healthcare fraud, making a false statement in connection with healthcare services, and aggravated identity theft. O’Lear ran a company that provided mobile x-ray services to residents in nursing homes. However, he used the company to defraud Medicare and Medicaid programs by billing for fictitious x-rays using the identities of nursing-home residents. When an audit revealed the fraud, O’Lear attempted to conceal it by forging staff names and duplicating x-rays in the patient files.

On appeal, O’Lear raised several questions. Firstly, he questioned whether his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated by excluding individuals who had not been vaccinated against COVID-19 from the jury pool. The court ruled that the unvaccinated do not qualify as a “distinctive group” that can trigger Sixth Amendment concerns. Secondly, O’Lear questioned whether the nursing-home residents were “victims” of his fraud under a “vulnerable victims” sentencing enhancement, even though the monetary losses were suffered by Medicare and Medicaid. The court ruled that the residents were indeed victims, as O’Lear had used their identities and health records without their permission, which constituted taking advantage of them.

O’Lear also challenged his two aggravated-identity-theft convictions and objected to his 180-month sentence on various grounds, but these arguments were also dismissed by the court. Ultimately, the court affirmed O’Lear's conviction and sentence.

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3464

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in a case concerning a law in Iowa that penalized anyone who, while trespassing, knowingly placed or used a camera or surveillance device on the trespassed property. The law was challenged by five animal-welfare groups who argued that it unconstitutionally punished activity protected by the First Amendment. The lower court agreed with the plaintiffs, ruling that the law was unconstitutional on its face because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's substantial interests. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the part of the law that penalized the use of cameras while trespassing (the "Use Provision"), but not the part penalizing the placement of cameras on trespassed property (the "Place Provision"). The court also disagreed with the lower court's conclusion that the law was unconstitutional, holding that it survived intermediate scrutiny against a facial challenge and was not unconstitutionally overbroad, as it did not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1830

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Constitutional Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a lower court's decision that an Iowa law violated the First Amendment. The law prohibited accessing an agricultural production facility under false pretenses or making a false statement or misrepresentation as part of a job application at such a facility, with the intent to cause physical or economic harm or other injury to the facility. Various organizations challenged this law, arguing it was unconstitutional as it was "viewpoint-based", targeting speakers with negative views of agricultural production facilities. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa agreed and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining officials from enforcing the law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that the law was constitutional as it restricted intentionally false speech carried out to cause a legally recognized harm. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the judgment, vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

McDonough v. Garcia

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11421

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Internet Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit partially affirmed and partially reversed a lower court's ruling in a case involving James McDonough, a citizen activist, who was banned from future meetings and arrested for disorderly conduct and cyberstalking by the City of Homestead, Florida. McDonough claimed these actions violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights.

The court determined that the city council meetings were designated public forums, and the ban was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest as required, thus violating McDonough's First Amendment rights.

The court also found that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest McDonough for disorderly conduct, which involved swearing at officers and making obscene gestures. The court stated that such actions do not constitute disorderly conduct and are protected under the First Amendment. However, the court ruled that the City had probable cause to arrest McDonough for cyberstalking, as it was not unreasonable for the City to interpret Florida’s cyberstalking statute as barring McDonough from targeting one of its officers with his series of posts.

The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion.

USA v. Gatlin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 19-14969, 20-14149

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case reviewed, Jason Gatlin was convicted of sex trafficking of a minor, production of child pornography, and witness tampering in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The appeal focused on several issues including the evidence supporting the convictions, the district court's action in directing the jury to continue deliberating after they reached an inconsistent verdict, the proper application of sentencing enhancements and the reasonableness of the sentence, and whether the order of restitution violated Gatlin's constitutional rights.

The court affirmed Gatlin's convictions and sentences for sex trafficking of a minor and production of child pornography. The court found there was sufficient evidence to support these convictions. However, the court reversed Gatlin's conviction for witness tampering, finding that the evidence only established a remote or simply hypothetical possibility that the witness's recantation statements would reach a federal officer.

Regarding the sentencing, the court affirmed the district court's application of the custody, care, or supervisory control enhancement and the repeat offender enhancement. It also found Gatlin's life sentence was reasonable.

As to the restitution order, the court also affirmed it, holding that it did not violate Gatlin's Sixth Amendment rights. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its calculation of the restitution amount and did not violate Gatlin's rights.

Warren v. DeSantis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-10459

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

A decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concerned whether the Governor of Florida, Ron DeSantis, violated the First Amendment rights of Andrew Warren, a state attorney for Florida’s Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, when he suspended Warren from office. Warren, a vocal advocate for criminal justice reform, had been elected to his position twice. During his time in office, he implemented several policies and signed onto advocacy statements related to issues such as transgender health care and abortion rights. Governor DeSantis suspended Warren from his position, justifying the decision on the basis of these activities. Warren sued, claiming that the suspension was retaliation for his First Amendment-protected activities. The district court found that six factors motivated DeSantis to suspend Warren, two of which were protected by the First Amendment. However, the court concluded that DeSantis would have suspended Warren regardless of these protected activities, basing this conclusion on the other four factors. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred in not considering all of Warren's activities as protected by the First Amendment. The court emphasized that, as an elected official, Warren had a right to express his views on policy matters of public concern and that his suspension based on these expressions violated his First Amendment rights. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Warren v. DeSantis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-10459

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded a decision by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, which had ruled against Andrew Warren, a Florida State Attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Warren had filed a lawsuit against Governor Ron DeSantis, claiming that DeSantis had suspended him in retaliation for his First Amendment activity. The circuit court agreed with the district court that Warren had satisfied his initial burden of showing that he had engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse action, and that DeSantis's actions were motivated by Warren's protected activity. However, the circuit court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the First Amendment did not protect certain activities that motivated DeSantis's decision, and found that the district court erred in concluding that DeSantis would have suspended Warren based solely on unprotected activities. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider whether DeSantis would have made the same decision based solely on the unprotected activities.

P. v. Hall

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165406M(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In California, a defendant, Gary Marcus Hall, convicted of two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years, challenged his sentence on several grounds. He argued that the court (and the parties) mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation, that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded, and that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the defendant's 10-year prison sentence, rejecting all his arguments. The court found that the defendant had waived his objections by failing to raise them at trial. It also held that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated by the trial court's reliance on a properly established aggravating factor—namely, the defendant's prior convictions.

Hudson v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 303, 2022

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, defendant Kwesi Hudson, who was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, first-degree robbery, second-degree rape, and other crimes, appealed on two grounds. First, he challenged the Superior Court's decision to deny his pre-trial motion to exclude the State’s expert testimony on DNA mixture interpretation and technology. He argued that the STRmix software used to process the DNA was not scientifically reliable. Second, he contended that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress cell-site location information collected from cell tower dumps via ten search warrants. He claimed that these warrants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, and Delaware statutory law. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found Hudson’s challenges to be without merit and affirmed his convictions and the decisions of the Superior Court. The court ruled that the DNA evidence was reliable and admissible, and that a Daubert hearing to test its admissibility was not necessary. Additionally, the court concluded that the cell tower warrants were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, as they were sufficiently particular and based on probable cause.

People v Messano

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 00097

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In New York, a man named Joshua Messano was indicted for second-degree criminal possession of a weapon after police officers discovered a loaded handgun in his car. Messano moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that it was found as a result of an unlawful detention and search. The police had initially detained Messano on suspicion of a drug transaction based on their observations of him engaging in a conversation with another man in an empty parking lot. They did not, however, observe any actual exchange of drugs. After detaining Messano, the police saw what they believed to be drug-related contraband in plain view on the driver's seat of his car, which led them to search the car and find the gun.

The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Messano based on their observations. The court also held that the drug-related contraband was not in plain view, as the officer only saw it after unlawfully detaining Messano. Therefore, the court concluded that the seizure of the gun was unconstitutional and the evidence should be suppressed. The indictment against Messano was dismissed.

State v. Gietzen

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 5

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed a decision from the District Court of Burleigh County, which had granted a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal trial. The defendant, Matthew Gietzen, was charged with possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia that were found in a locked bag within a backpack during a vehicle search. The driver of the vehicle had consented to the search, but Gietzen, a passenger, did not give explicit consent. The district court held that the driver's consent did not extend to the search of Gietzen's backpack, particularly the locked bag containing contraband, because it was unreasonable to believe the female driver had authority to consent to a search of a locked bag containing men’s items. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with this assessment, stating that it is the officer's burden to obtain affirmative consent for a search when a constitutional protection applies and consent alone serves as the basis for the search. The court therefore affirmed the district court's order to suppress the evidence found in the backpack, upholding the principle that a third party's consent to a search does not necessarily extend to personal items belonging to another individual.

Commonwealth v. Dobson

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 24 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the appellant, Jeff Dobson, was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police in a high crime area due to a minor traffic violation. The driver of the vehicle had a suspended license and the other passenger had an active arrest warrant. Dobson had no outstanding warrants and did not exhibit any suspicious behavior. However, the police officer, Officer Duncan, conducted a pat-down search of Dobson solely on the basis of the high crime area designation. During the search, Officer Duncan found a firearm and subsequently arrested Dobson.

Dobson was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license, persons not to possess firearms, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial, he filed a suppression motion challenging the constitutionality of the pat-down and the subsequent seizure of the gun and drugs. The trial court denied Dobson's suppression motion. Dobson was subsequently convicted on all charges and sentenced to an aggregate of six to fifteen years in prison.

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of Dobson’s suppression motion. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, held that the officer's justification for the frisk, being the high crime area designation, was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion that Dobson was armed and dangerous. The fact that Dobson was a passenger in a vehicle that was lawfully stopped in a high crime area for a minor traffic violation did not, by itself, establish reasonable suspicion. The court held that the evidence found should have been suppressed and the convictions vacated. The case was remanded for a new trial without the unconstitutionally obtained evidence.

Larsen v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 4

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Wyoming, Remi Larsen was facing a misdemeanor charge for possession of a controlled substance. Larsen moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her apartment. The trial court granted Larsen's motion, ruling that she did not voluntarily consent to the search. The State appealed this decision, resulting in the district court reversing the trial court's order. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the district court abused its discretion when it initially granted the State's petition for an interlocutory writ of review. The Supreme Court explained that the district court should only grant such a review in "rare and unusual" cases that present questions of first impression, constitutional magnitude, and great public import. The court found that Larsen's case did not meet these criteria. The court's order was reversed, and the lower court was directed to reinstate the original suppression order.