Clark v. Hanley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-302

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In 2011, Veronica-May Clark, an incarcerated transgender woman, was repeatedly sexually assaulted by corrections officer Thomas Hanley. More than seven years after the abuse, Clark filed a lawsuit against Hanley and other officers, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment rights and seeking equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to the traumatic effects of the abuse. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of equitable tolling, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) denied Clark's claim for equitable tolling and dismissed her case as untimely. Clark appealed, claiming that the court improperly conducted factfinding at the pleading stage and violated her Seventh Amendment rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the court properly resolved Clark's equitable tolling claim and did not infringe her Seventh Amendment rights.

Netflix v. Babin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40786

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction against a Texas state prosecutor, Lucas Babin, who had initiated criminal charges against Netflix for promoting child pornography through its film, Cuties. The court found that Babin had acted in bad faith, as he multiplied the initial indictment into four after Netflix asserted its First Amendment right, selectively presented evidence to the grand jury, and charged Netflix for a scene that involved an adult actress. The court rejected Babin's argument that the indictments were validated by grand juries, finding that Babin's selective presentation of evidence undermined the independence of the grand juries. The court also noted that Netflix had shown that the prosecution was likely a bad faith prosecution, which constituted an irreparable injury, and that an injunction protecting First Amendment rights was in the public interest. The court ruled that these factors justified the district court's decision not to abstain under the Younger doctrine, which generally requires federal courts to refrain from interfering in ongoing state proceedings.

Alicea v. County of Cook

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2863

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined the constitutionality of Cook County, Illinois's use of cameras to record holding cell toilets in courthouses throughout the county. The plaintiffs, pretrial detainees, claimed that the cameras infringed upon their Fourth Amendment privacy interests and also constituted an intrusion upon seclusion under Illinois law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Cook County and Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, and the plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using the toilets in courthouse holding cells. While it acknowledged that there are questions around the extent to which detainees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bodies while in a holding cell, it found that any privacy rights are substantially diminished. The court further held that Cook County's use of cameras in courthouse holding cells was reasonable due to the security risks inherent in the setting. The court also determined that one of the plaintiffs, Alicea, had standing to sue, but the other plaintiffs did not.

Furthermore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for intrusion upon seclusion. It held that the plaintiff had not met his burden on the fourth element of the claim, anguish and suffering.

Lastly, the court affirmed the district court's decisions related to discovery and attorneys' fees. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in these decisions. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

USA v. Underwood

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1303

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, the defendant, Henry Underwood, had chosen to represent himself in a trial where he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. During the trial, Underwood refused to answer a question during cross-examination and was subsequently held in criminal contempt. He was convicted of the charged offense and appealed against the conviction, arguing that his pretrial waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary and that the criminal contempt finding was improper.

The court rejected both arguments. First, it found that the defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. It took into consideration the extent of the court's formal inquiry into the defendant's waiver, evidence in the record showing the defendant understood the dangers of self-representation, the defendant's background and experience, and the context of the choice to proceed pro se.

Secondly, the court found that the criminal contempt finding was appropriate because the defendant had improperly refused to testify on cross-examination in the judge’s presence, which met the literal requirements of Rule 42(b) that permits summary disposition of criminal contempt. Furthermore, the court held that by choosing to testify, the defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and could not refuse to answer questions relevant to his testimony.

The decision of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Martinez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-1167

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Domingo Martinez Jr. was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenged the admission of a narcotics detective’s testimony about Santa Muerte shrines, claiming the testimony violated his First Amendment rights. He also objected to the district court’s instruction to the jury to disregard a robocall inadvertently played during the trial, rather than declaring a mistrial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court found no error in the admission of the detective's testimony relating to Santa Muerte, noting it was based solely on the detective's law enforcement experience, not personal self-study. Moreover, the testimony was relevant to the issue raised by Mr. Martinez's entrapment defense, whether he was predisposed to drug trafficking. The court also found no error in the district court's treatment of the robocall interruption. The district court had instructed the jury to disregard the interruption twice and recessed the trial briefly to ensure it would not happen again. The court of appeals found no indication that the jury had time to process the robocall or that it affected the outcome of the trial.

United States v. Ramos

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-6071

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that impounding a vehicle from a private property without a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale violates the Fourth Amendment. The defendant, Isaac Ramos, was arrested after an altercation at a convenience store. His truck was impounded from the store's parking lot, and a subsequent inventory search revealed a machine gun and ammunition. Ramos was charged with unlawful possession of a machine gun and being a felon illegally in possession of ammunition. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the impoundment of his truck violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied his motion, and he appealed.

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding that the impoundment was not supported by a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale. The court considered five factors: whether the vehicle was on public or private property; if on private property, whether the property owner had been consulted; whether an alternative to impoundment existed; whether the vehicle was implicated in a crime; and whether the vehicle’s owner and/or driver had consented to the impoundment. The court found that all of these factors weighed against the reasonableness of the impoundment, and thus, it violated the Fourth Amendment. The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to grant Ramos’s suppression motion and conduct any further necessary proceedings.

Soul Quest Church of Mother Earth, Inc. v. Attorney General of the United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11072

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the United States District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) denial of a church's petition for a religious exemption from the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The Soul Quest Church of Mother Earth, Inc. petitioned the DEA for an exemption to the CSA so it could lawfully use and handle a sacramental tea known as ayahuasca, which contains a controlled substance, Dimethyltryptamine (DMT). The DEA denied the petition, concluding that the church had not met its burden under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to show that its members' beliefs were sincerely held and that its use of ayahuasca was part of a religious exercise. The DEA also found compelling governmental interests in maintaining public safety and preventing diversion of the tea into improper channels. The DEA's denial of the petition was deemed a final decision made under the CSA, thereby triggering the jurisdictional bar of 21 U.S.C. § 877. The court ruled that because the DEA's decision was made under the CSA, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the denial on the merits. The court also held that Soul Quest's additional constitutional, statutory, and procedural claims were "inescapably intertwined" with the DEA's final decision, making the CSA's jurisdictional bar applicable to those claims as well.

USA v. Hurtado

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-12702

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The case involved Asdrubal Quijada Marin and Juan Carlos Acosta Hurtado, two Venezuelan nationals who were apprehended by the United States Coast Guard in the Caribbean Sea. They were convicted after a bench trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, pursuant to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.

On appeal, Marin and Acosta Hurtado challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the indictment should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the evidence should have been suppressed due to violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They also contended that their detention at sea for 48 days prior to indictment constituted unnecessary delay and outrageous government conduct.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over Marin and Acosta Hurtado under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act because Cameroon, the flag nation of the vessel, had consented to United States jurisdiction over the crew of the vessel. It also held that the Northland’s stop and search of the Zumaque Tracer did not violate the Fourth Amendment, so the District Court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence based on a Fourth Amendment violation. The Court also held that the District Court did not err in denying Acosta Hurtado’s motion to dismiss based on unnecessary delay arguments. Lastly, the Court held that Acosta Hurtado's claim of outrageous government conduct was meritless.

WELCH ex rel. ESTATE OF AARON WELCH v. GIPSON

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 192

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

In September 2021, Aaron Welch died intestate, leaving behind a widow, Kristin Welch, and two minor children from his previous marriage. Kristin Welch, appointed as the administratrix of Aaron Welch's estate, filed an application for reservation of homestead & dower with the Pope County Circuit Court, claiming a homestead interest in the mortgaged home she had lived in with her late husband. Katelyn Gipson, the natural guardian of the minor children, argued that Kristin Welch did not have such an interest based on Arkansas Code Ann. § 28-39-201. This statute requires a surviving spouse to have been continuously married to the deceased for more than a year to have a homestead interest. Kristin Welch challenged the constitutionality of this statute, but the circuit court found it constitutional and ruled that she did not have a homestead interest in the property.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that the Arkansas Constitution's provision on homestead rights was gender-based and had been previously declared unconstitutional for violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the statutory provision, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-39-201(d), which is gender-neutral and requires the continuous marriage condition, stands as the controlling law. The court found no error in the circuit court's application of this statute and concluded that Kristin Welch, having been married to the decedent for less than a year, did not have a statutory homestead interest in the property.

P. v. Rojas

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S275835

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case of The People v. Fernando Rojas, the Supreme Court of California addressed the issue of whether the application of Assembly Bill 333 to the gang-murder special circumstance in section 190.2(a)(22) of the California Penal Code constituted an unlawful amendment of Proposition 21, which had previously defined the term "criminal street gang".

The defendant, Fernando Rojas, was convicted of first degree murder and was found to have committed the crime while being an active participant in a criminal street gang, which made him subject to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under section 190.2(a)(22). While Rojas's appeal was pending, the state legislature passed Assembly Bill 333, which substantially narrowed the definition of "criminal street gang" for the purposes of section 190.2(a)(22).

The lower courts disagreed on whether the application of Assembly Bill 333 would constitute an unlawful amendment of Proposition 21, which had been passed by the voters and was therefore protected from legislative amendment without a two-thirds majority vote of each house of the legislature or approval by the voters.

The Supreme Court of California concluded that the application of Assembly Bill 333 to the gang-murder special circumstance did not violate the limitation on legislative amendment in Proposition 21. The Court reasoned that the voters who enacted Proposition 21 intended to impose a specific punishment for gang-related murder while relying on an existing statutory provision to define "criminal street gang". The Court found no indication that the voters intended to adopt a fixed definition of "criminal street gang" and held that applying Assembly Bill 333's narrower definition did not change the punishment for those convicted of the gang-murder special circumstance. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

P. v. Trammel

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166756M(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a criminal case in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, the defendant, Terrell Trammel, was convicted of multiple charges arising from his violent relationship with his former girlfriend, M.T. Trammel first appealed his aggregate 12-year prison term sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously failed to stay the punishment for two convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The appellate court agreed and remanded the case for a full resentencing. On remand, the trial court corrected its errors and resentenced Trammel to a total prison term of 12 years, four months.

Trammel then filed a second appeal arguing that his new sentence violated the prohibition against double jeopardy in the California Constitution. The appellate court agreed with Trammel, finding that the addition of four months to his sentence upon resentencing violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because the errors in his original sentence were not the result of "unauthorized leniency" that might have warranted a harsher sentence under the exception outlined in People v. Serrato. The court also found that the amended abstract of judgment did not accurately reflect Trammel's total custody credits at the time of resentencing.

The court remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to modify the sentence and impose a total aggregate sentence of 11 years, four months, and to determine Trammel's actual total custody credits as of the time of his resentencing. The court also instructed the trial court to order the clerk of the superior court to prepare a second amended abstract of judgment reflecting these changes.

People v. Frias

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B322762(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

The case involved an appeal by Alexander Alberto Frias, who was convicted of stalking. Frias argued that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice by denying his four requests to substitute the Castaneda Law firm as his counsel. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Frias's first three requests as the firm's attorneys were not ready for trial and the case had been pending for three years, during which time four different attorneys had represented Frias at his request. However, the court ruled that the trial court's denial of Frias's fourth request was an abuse of discretion. At the time of the fourth request, an attorney from the Castaneda firm announced he was ready for trial, subject to a few witness scheduling issues. The appellate court noted that while the trial court was concerned the Castaneda firm’s attorneys would seek a further continuance or that Frias would yet again seek to substitute in new counsel, nothing in the record showed that the Castaneda firm was not prepared for trial. Therefore, the court’s concerns were not sufficient grounds on which to deny Frias’s request to have retained counsel of his choice. The court held that the denial of Frias’s constitutional right to counsel of his choice was structural error, and thus reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Anderson v. Griswold

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 63

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In a case brought by a group of Colorado electors, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado considered whether former President Donald J. Trump could appear on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot. The electors claimed that Trump was disqualified under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits anyone who has engaged in insurrection against the U.S. Constitution from holding office. The district court found that Trump had engaged in insurrection on January 6, 2021, but concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the presidency.

Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Election Code allows the electors to challenge Trump's status as a qualified candidate based on Section Three. The court found that Congress does not need to pass legislation for Section Three's disqualification provision to apply, and that the provision encompasses the office of the Presidency. The court further held that the district court did not err in finding that Trump had engaged in insurrection, and that his speech inciting the crowd was not protected by the First Amendment. As a result, the court concluded that Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President under Section Three, and it would be a wrongful act under the Election Code for the Secretary of State to list him as a candidate on the presidential primary ballot. The court stayed its ruling until January 4, 2024, to maintain the status quo pending any review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

People v. Sanders

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 62

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the district court's order to suppress inculpatory statements made by the defendant, John J. Sanders Jr., in a case involving alleged sexual assault on a child. The district court concluded that Sanders's statements were elicited during a custodial interrogation without proper Miranda warnings and were not voluntary. The People appealed, challenging the district court's ruling on custody but failing to sufficiently challenge the court's separate ruling on voluntariness. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, stating that even if they agreed with the People on the issue of custody, they must affirm the district court's suppression order due to the unchallenged finding of involuntariness.

Alico, LLC v. Somers

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20748

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Tax Law

The case involves Alico, LLC, a Massachusetts-based company with offices in both Massachusetts and Connecticut. The company's vehicles, used for business, were registered in Massachusetts, and taxes were paid in that state. However, the vehicles were primarily used and garaged in Somers, Connecticut, where the company's sole member and his wife, who also works for the company, reside. In 2018, the tax assessor in Somers, Connecticut, became aware of the presence of these vehicles and retroactively placed them on the town's 2017 and 2018 grand lists, assessing property taxes on them. The plaintiffs, Alico and its sole member, appealed this decision, arguing it was unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause of the United States constitution. They claimed that because the vehicles were used in interstate commerce and already taxed in Massachusetts, the Connecticut property tax led to impermissible double taxation.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut disagreed with the plaintiffs' arguments. The court ruled that the property tax authorized by Connecticut's statute did not violate the dormant commerce clause. The court applied the test set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, which determines the constitutionality of a state tax that is facially neutral but may impose a disproportionate burden on interstate commerce. The court found that the Connecticut tax was applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the state, was fairly apportioned, did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and was fairly related to the services provided by the state. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment declaring the assessments unconstitutional. The court also noted that any double taxation was not the result of a discriminatory tax scheme, but rather the plaintiffs' business decisions.

CLEMENTS v. THE STATE (two cases)

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S23A0857, S23A1030

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the appellants, London Clements and Eric Velazquez, were jointly tried for murder and other offenses connected to the shooting death of Hall County Deputy Sheriff Blane Dixon on July 7, 2019. Clements was convicted of felony murder, and Velazquez was convicted of malice murder and other crimes. On appeal, Clements argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary count and the felony murder count predicated thereon and that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to grant his motion for new trial on the general grounds. Velazquez contended on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for malice murder and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault on a peace officer, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict as there was insufficient corroboration of his co-conspirators’ testimony, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The court affirmed the convictions in both cases.

GATES v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1158

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether the State violated Joseph Robert Gates's right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution by obtaining his medical records through an ex parte court order. The records, which were obtained after a car accident involving Gates, contained results of blood alcohol content (BAC) tests performed by the hospital where Gates was treated. The State used these records to charge Gates with several offenses, including driving under the influence. Gates filed a motion to suppress his medical records, but the trial court denied the motion, leading to this appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that Gates's medical records, including the BAC test results, were protected by the right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution. The court further concluded that the State's use of an ex parte court order to obtain Gates's medical records was more akin to the use of an ex parte subpoena, which had previously been held to violate the right to privacy, rather than an ex parte search warrant, which had been deemed permissible. The fact that the court order was not based on probable cause, nor did it comply with the statutory requirements for the issuance of a search warrant, further supported this conclusion. Therefore, the court concluded that the State had violated Gates's right to privacy by obtaining his medical records through an ex parte court order. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's denial of Gates's motion to suppress.

SCOTT v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0861

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the convictions of Milton Nathaniel Scott for felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Jerrica Porter. Scott had appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence one of his custodial statements in which he admitted to shooting Porter but claimed the shooting was an accident. He also contended that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling a hearsay objection to testimony that characterized his initial statement that Porter shot herself as implausible and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to testimony and evidence that suggested he was involved in a gang.

The Supreme Court found that even if there was error in the admission of Scott's custodial statement, Scott failed to show harm from the admission because the State introduced into evidence a recording of a jailhouse phone call in which Scott repeated his claim that his shooting of Porter was an accident. The court also found that because Scott's defense was accident and the admission of the hearsay testimony and the evidence to which his trial counsel did not object was not relevant to that defense, these claims did not warrant a reversal.

Lastly, the court determined that even if Scott's trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to evidence and testimony suggesting Scott's gang involvement, Scott failed to establish that this alleged deficiency prejudiced him. Therefore, the court affirmed Scott's convictions.

League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124378

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Election Law, Non-Profit Corporations

In the state of Kansas, a number of non-profit groups, including the League of Women Voters of Kansas and the Kansas Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, challenged a law which made it a felony to engage in conduct that gives the appearance of being an election official or that would cause another person to believe a person is an election official. The non-profits argued that the law was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague, as it could criminalize their voter education and registration activities. They also claimed that the law violated their rights to free speech and association. The district court denied their request for a temporary injunction and the Court of Appeals dismissed the non-profits' claims for lack of standing, arguing that they were not at risk of prosecution under the statute. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed these decisions, finding that the non-profits did have standing to challenge the law. The Court held that when a law criminalizes speech and does not clearly demonstrate that only constitutionally unprotected speech is being criminalized, the law is unclear enough to confer pre-enforcement standing on a plaintiff challenging the law. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: G.A.H. and S.T., Parents

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Dockets: A22-1065, A22-1066

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts to terminate a mother's parental rights due to her failure to appear for the final day of a multiple-day termination of parental rights trial. The mother, identified as S.T., had argued that the district court violated her procedural due process rights by refusing to reschedule the trial to allow her to testify, offer additional witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses. However, the Supreme Court found that S.T. failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the trial was materially affected by her absence. The Supreme Court noted that although S.T.'s absence was troubling, the district court's refusal to continue or reschedule the hearing did not automatically violate due process. The court concluded that S.T. did not make a sufficient case that her testimony or that of her proposed witnesses would have materially affected the outcome of the trial. Therefore, the court upheld the termination of S.T.'s parental rights.

Byrd v. State of Missouri

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100045

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Non-Profit Corporations

The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court's ruling and held that the Truly Agreed and Finally Passed House Bill 1606 (2022) (“TAFP HB 1606”) violated the single subject requirement of article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution. The bill was initially proposed to reduce the amount of information certain counties had to publish in their financial statements. However, the bill underwent several modifications, including the addition of section 67.2300, which imposed restrictions on the expenditure of state funds for combating homelessness and made unauthorized sleeping and camping on state-owned lands a class C misdemeanor. The appellants, including a group of individuals and a non-profit organization, argued that the addition of section 67.2300 altered the bill's original purpose, introduced a second subject to the bill, and rendered the bill's title unclear, thereby violating the single subject, clear title, and original purpose requirements of the Missouri Constitution. The court agreed, finding that the provisions of section 67.2300 did not fairly relate to or have a natural connection with the bill's general subject of "political subdivisions," but rather related to the completely different subject of homelessness. Consequently, the court declared TAFP HB 1606 invalid in its entirety.

People v Butler

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 06468

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, two police officers observed Devon T. Butler, the appellant, engage in what they believed was a hand-to-hand drug transaction. After observing Butler fail to stop at a stop sign, the officers initiated a traffic stop. When Butler stepped out of his vehicle, the officers noticed a bulge in his pants, which Butler claimed was $1,000 in cash. When Butler refused the officers' request to search his vehicle, an officer used a Belgian Malinois, a narcotics-detection dog, to sniff-test the vehicle for drugs. The canine sniffed Butler's body, indicated the presence of narcotics, and the officers arrested Butler after a pursuit. The officers found a bag containing 76 glassine envelopes of heroin, which Butler admitted belonged to him. Butler moved to suppress evidence of the drugs, arguing that the officers' use of the canine to search his vehicle and person was unlawful. Following a hearing, the County Court denied the motion.

On December 19, 2023, the New York Court of Appeals held that the use of a narcotics-detection dog to sniff a defendant's body for evidence of a crime is considered a search and thus falls under the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remitted the case back to the County Court for further proceedings. The court ruled that the Appellate Division erred in affirming the judgement based on a ground not decided adversely to the defendant by the suppression court. The court also expressed uncertainty on whether the County Court's conclusion that the defendant "abandoned" the narcotics was based on its holding that the canine sniff was not a search and was "perfectly acceptable." As a result, the case was remitted back to the County Court for further proceedings and consideration of whether the abandonment of narcotics was lawful or unlawful.

State v. Alvarez

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 278PA21

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina heard a case regarding a traffic checkpoint where the defendant, Alvarez, was stopped, searched, and found in possession of illegal drugs. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was collected at an unconstitutional checkpoint. The trial court agreed with the defendant, ruling that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment as the State failed to provide a valid primary programmatic purpose for it. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed, holding that the officers at the checkpoint had an independent reasonable suspicion to stop Alvarez's vehicle, thus no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights occurred. This suspicion was based on Alvarez's behavior and driving, including his failure to maintain lane control. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion is an issue separate from the constitutionality of the checkpoint.

The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order. As a result, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court declined to comment on the constitutionality of the traffic checkpoint due to the presence of independent reasonable suspicion.

State v. Woolard

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 208PA22

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In North Carolina, Melvin Woolard Jr. was arrested by Captain Rodney Sawyer for driving while impaired (DWI). Before his trial, Mr. Woolard filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the arrest, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause to suspect him of drunk driving. The District Court agreed and granted his motion. The State appealed the decision to the Superior Court, which also found that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. The case was then taken to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina examined the evidence and found that Captain Sawyer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Woolard for impaired driving. The court noted that Mr. Woolard had been driving erratically, swerving over the centerline multiple times, and veering onto the road's shoulder. Additionally, the officer smelled alcohol on Mr. Woolard's breath and inside his truck, observed his red and glassy eyes, and heard his admission to having consumed some beers before driving. Mr. Woolard also exhibited all six possible indications of impairment on a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test administered by the officer.

Based on these facts, the court concluded that an objectively reasonable officer in Captain Sawyer’s position would have suspected Mr. Woolard of impaired driving. Consequently, Mr. Woolard’s arrest satisfied the Fourth Amendment. The court therefore reversed the District Court's decision to suppress the evidence and remanded the case for further proceedings.

State v. Wilcox

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070063

Opinion Date: December 21, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the defendant, Jason Thomas Wilcox, who was taken into police custody for public intoxication under ORS 430.399, a noncriminal statute. During this process, the police seized and inventoried his backpack, discovering a butterfly knife. As Wilcox had a prior felony conviction, he was charged and convicted for being a felon in possession of a restricted weapon under ORS 166.270(2). Wilcox appealed, arguing that the seizure of his backpack was unlawful under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the seizure was unlawful, and based its decision on a previous case, State v. Edwards.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had erred in its analysis because it treated the seizure as a criminal one rather than an administrative one. The Court pointed out that when a person or their property is seized under ORS 430.399, the seizure is administrative, not criminal, and such seizures must comply with a different set of constitutional standards. The Court also clarified that the state’s interference with a person’s possessory or ownership interests constitutes a seizure, regardless of whether the person objects to the interference.

The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the backpack was indeed a seizure. However, it did not decide whether the seizure was lawful, instead remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether ORS 430.399, or some other source of authority, authorized the seizure of defendant’s backpack and if so, whether that seizure was effectuated in accordance with the requirements of State v. Atkinson, which set the framework for assessing the constitutionality of an administrative search or seizure.