United States v. Facteau

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 21-1080, 21-1082

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

Former executives of medical device manufacturer Acclarent, Inc., William Facteau and Patrick Fabian, were found guilty of multiple misdemeanor violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) for commercially distributing an adulterated and misbranded medical device. They appealed their convictions, claiming First Amendment violations, due process violations, and insufficiency of evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected all of these claims and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the use of promotional speech as evidence of a device's intended use did not implicate the First Amendment. The court also found that the term "intended use" was not unconstitutionally vague and that Facteau and Fabian had fair warning of the conduct prohibited under the FDCA. Finally, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that Fabian's fine did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

US v. Cowette

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1534

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a drug trafficking case, the defendant, Amanda Cowette, appealed the district court's denial of her motion to suppress statements she made to law enforcement officers on July 16 and 17, 2018. Cowette argued that she unequivocally invoked her Fifth Amendment right to counsel and any subsequent questioning by law enforcement officers was in violation of that right. She contended that the district court's ruling to the contrary was in error. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with Cowette and held that she properly invoked her Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The court found that the phrase "I guess" used by Cowette did not create any ambiguity in her clear invocation of her right to counsel. The court vacated the decision of the district court in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Antonyuk v. Chiumento

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-2908

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In a consolidated case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, plaintiffs Ivan Antonyuk, Corey Johnson, Alfred Terrille, Joseph Mann, Leslie Leman, Lawrence Sloane, Jimmie Hardaway Jr., Larry A. Boyd, Firearms Policy Coalition Inc., Second Amendment Foundation Inc., Brett Christian, Micheal Spencer, and His Tabernacle Family Church Inc., sought to challenge certain provisions of New York's Concealed Carry Improvement Act ("CCIA"). The CCIA regulates the public carriage of firearms and includes licensing requirements and prohibitions on carrying firearms in "sensitive" and "restricted" locations. The plaintiffs argued that the provisions violated their First and Second Amendment rights.

The court affirmed the preliminary injunction against the enforcement of certain provisions of the CCIA, but vacated the injunction in other respects. Specifically, the court upheld district court's injunctions with respect to the social media disclosure requirement, the application of restricted locations provision to private property open to the general public, and the application of the same provision to Pastor Spencer, the Tabernacle Family Church, its members, or their agents and licensees.

However, the court vacated the injunctions in all other respects, concluding that either the district court lacked jurisdiction or that the challenged laws do not violate the Constitution on their face. The court rejected the plaintiffs' challenges to the CCIA's licensing requirements and sensitive locations provisions, holding that the laws did not infringe on the plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights.

The court also held that the CCIA's restricted locations provision, which makes it a crime to possess firearms in a "restricted location", did not violate the plaintiffs' First and Second Amendment rights. Instead, the court found the provision to be a reasonable regulation consistent with the Second Amendment's protection of the right to keep and bear arms.

The court's decision affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands the case for further proceedings.

Gazzola v. Hochul

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-3068

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law

The case involved a group of firearm and ammunition dealers and a business organization who appealed a decision by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The appellants claimed that New York's commercial regulations on the sale of firearms and ammunition violated their customers' Second Amendment rights and that several provisions of New York law conflicted with federal law. Additionally, they claimed they lacked standing to challenge New York’s licensing scheme for semiautomatic rifles, its background-check requirement for ammunition purchases, and its firearm training requirement for concealed-carry licenses. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the appellants failed to present evidence to support their claims. The court also affirmed that the appellants lacked standing to challenge the regulations as individuals.

Short v. Hartman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-1396

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court's dismissal of claims brought by Charles Willis Short, the husband and estate administrator of Victoria Christine Short, who died by suicide while in custody at the Davie County Detention Center. Mr. Short filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees of the Davie County Sheriff’s Department, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference to Ms. Short’s risk of suicide. The district court dismissed all of Mr. Short's claims, applying a subjective standard for determining deliberate indifference.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's application of the subjective standard, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, which established an objective standard for determining deliberate indifference in cases involving pretrial detainees. The court decided that pretrial detainees can state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to an excessive risk of harm on an objective standard, finding that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim under any standard. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims and remanded the case for further proceedings.

USA v. Jones

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-10198

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Derrick Durrell Jones, a convicted felon, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Jones argued that the law under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment. Addressing the Commerce Clause argument, the court stated that their circuit precedent has consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), and that Jones had not presented any Supreme Court decisions that had expressly overruled this.

In response to the Second Amendment argument, the court noted that Jones' challenge came in light of a new test for assessing the constitutionality of a statute under the Second Amendment as set forth by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. However, the court pointed out that it had previously held that § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment, and a concurring opinion in Bruen had stated that the decision should not cast doubt on prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons. The court also observed that there was no binding precedent holding that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional, and that two other federal circuits have reached conflicting conclusions on the issue.

Given these considerations, the court concluded that Jones had failed to demonstrate that the district court’s application of § 922(g)(1) constituted clear or obvious error, and thus affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Heyward v. Cooper

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3781

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, a prisoner named Lyle Heyward filed a complaint alleging that prison officials frustrated his attempts to celebrate Ramadan, a holy month for Muslims, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). He also alleges that officials retaliated against him for filing grievances in violation of the First Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Heyward’s Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim, as RLUIPA does not permit money damages claims against state prison officials in their individual capacities, and his requests for injunctive relief were mooted by his transfer to a different prison facility.

However, the court reversed the dismissal of Heyward’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Guise, finding that Heyward had adequately pleaded a retaliation claim. Specifically, Heyward alleged that after he filed a grievance against Guise, she threatened members of the Cultural Awareness Inmate Group to kick Heyward out of the organization or else the organization would be shut down. The court found these allegations sufficient to suggest that Guise's action was motivated at least in part by Heyward’s grievance-filing.

The court also reversed the dismissal of Heyward’s Equal Protection Clause claim against Defendants Cooper, Smith, Davis, and Factor. Heyward alleged these officials treated members of other faith traditions differently than they treated Muslims. The court found that Heyward’s allegations of a facially discriminatory distinction between different religious groups sufficiently alleged an equal-protection violation.

The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Fulks v. Watson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3308

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Inmate Chadrick Fulks filed a lawsuit against several prison officials at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging constitutionally deficient medical care, the use of excessive force, and a sexual assault. The district court concluded that he had successfully exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to only two claims. During the course of the litigation, the court found that Fulks had knowingly submitted a forged document and provided perjured testimony. As a sanction for this misconduct, the court dismissed the entire action with prejudice.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court noted that even though dismissal prevented Fulks from litigating his allegation of sexual assault, there were other remedies available to him, such as through the Bureau's Office of Internal Affairs or under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. The court concluded that while the district court's decision was severe, it was not unreasonable given the circumstances. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the entire action as a sanction for Fulks's submission of a forged document and perjured testimony.

USA v. Krahenbuhl

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3264

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

In 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the disorderly conduct convictions of Jamison Krahenbuhl, an Air Force veteran. Krahenbuhl had been convicted following an incident at the Milo C. Huempfner Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic in Green Bay, Wisconsin. During a respiratory therapy appointment, Krahenbuhl became agitated and engaged in abusive language and disruptive behavior that led to the clinic staff summoning VA police. He was subsequently charged with two counts of disorderly conduct under 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(5), (b)(11) and was found guilty on both counts.

On appeal, Krahenbuhl argued that his convictions violated his First Amendment rights, and that the government failed to prove all the elements of the crimes. The appellate court, however, disagreed. It determined that the clinic was a nonpublic forum, where greater regulation of speech is permissible. The court found that the regulation under which Krahenbuhl was convicted was viewpoint neutral and reasonable, given the clinic's primary aim of providing medical care to veterans. The court also rejected Krahenbuhl's argument that the government failed to prove that the clinic was under the charge and control of the VA and not under the charge and control of the General Services Administration, finding that this was an invited error. Consequently, Krahenbuhl's convictions were affirmed.

United States v. Ackerman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1298

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Darren J. Ackerman’s motion to suppress evidence of firearms discovered in his basement. The police had entered his home on the information that Ackerman had tried to choke his girlfriend, was possibly on drugs, and might be holding their infant daughter hostage. They found him at the bottom of the basement stairs, holding his daughter, and upon arresting and handcuffing him, they performed a protective sweep of the basement, during which they found firearms in a room adjoining the area of his arrest.

Ackerman argued that the search was not a valid protective sweep as the rooms searched did not adjoin the place of his arrest. The court, however, determined that the arrest occurred at the bottom of the stairs, where Ackerman first submitted to the officers' authority. The court concluded that the room where the firearms were found immediately adjoined the area at the bottom of the stairs, and thus, the protective sweep complied with the Fourth Amendment.

The court followed the "protective sweep" exception to the Fourth Amendment, which allows officers to conduct a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. The court used the two-prong test from the Supreme Court case Maryland v. Buie to determine the constitutionality of the protective sweep. The first prong allows officers to look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from where an attack could be launched, and the second prong allows officers to search areas where they believe a danger may be present based on articulable facts.

United States v. Bermel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3092

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit heard an appeal from Jacob Bermel, who had pleaded guilty to two child pornography offenses following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was found on a camera he had hidden in his daughter's bathroom. Bermel argued that the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of the camera and its memory card violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the district court found that the seizure was justified by exigent circumstances and that the search was lawful due to the daughter's consent.

On appeal, Bermel made three arguments: (1) minor children cannot consent to a search of their parents' property, (2) even if minors can consent, his daughter lacked such authority, and (3) the district court erred in finding that his daughter had consented to the search of the camera and memory card.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It rejected Bermel's first argument, stating that there is no legal precedent for a per se rule that minors cannot consent to a search of their parents' property. The court also found that the daughter had apparent authority to consent to the search given her joint access and control over the camera and its memory card. Finally, the court determined that the daughter had indeed consented to the search of the camera and its memory card. The court noted that lack of verbal response did not negate consent and the scope of her consent reasonably extended to the camera's memory card.

United States v. Betts

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1012

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Chad Betts's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop. Betts, a felon, was found in possession of a firearm and ammunition after a drug dog alerted to his vehicle during a traffic stop. He appealed the district court's decision, arguing that reasonable suspicion did not exist to extend the traffic stop.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on a combination of factors: Betts’s quick speaking, profuse sweating, and rapid, shallow breathing; his possession of a torch-style lighter, which the officer knew was often used to heat drugs like methamphetamine; Betts’s unusual travel plans and his history of drug-related offenses. These factors, viewed as a whole, justified the officer's suspicion that Betts was in possession of illegal drugs by the time the officer left Betts seated in the patrol car and walked back to Betts’s vehicle to question the passenger. As a result, the court concluded that the extended stop was justified, and the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained during this stop.

MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-16004

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In this case, Randon L. Miller, the owner of Sushi Brokers, LLC, a sushi restaurant in Scottsdale, Arizona, was cited and arrested by Scottsdale Police Officer Christian Bailey for violating a COVID-19 emergency executive order prohibiting on-site dining issued by the Arizona Governor. The charges were later dismissed. Miller subsequently brought a lawsuit against Officer Bailey and the City of Scottsdale, alleging constitutional violations including retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment, and false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Officer Bailey and the City of Scottsdale. The court held that Officer Bailey had probable cause to arrest Miller under Arizona Revised Statutes § 26-317 for violating the emergency order, given that officers had observed on-site dining at the restaurant and there were prior calls reporting violations. The court also rejected Miller’s argument that the warnings he received prior to the enactment of an executive order requiring notice and an opportunity to comply before any enforcement action did not qualify. The court found that Miller had sufficient notice and opportunity to comply given the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.

USA V. ESQUEDA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50170

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the Central District of California, defendant-appellant Christopher Esqueda was convicted for possession of a firearm as a felon, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence collected during an undercover operation. Undercover agents, with Esqueda's consent, entered his motel room to conduct a controlled purchase of a firearm. The agents secretly recorded the encounter using audio-video equipment concealed on their persons. Esqueda argued that the secret recording of the encounter exceeded the scope of the "implied license" he granted when he consented to the officers' physical entry, hence infringing upon his Fourth Amendment rights.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred. It relied on longstanding Supreme Court precedents asserting that an undercover officer who physically enters a premises with express consent and secretly records only what he can see and hear by virtue of his consented entry does not trespass, physically intrude, or otherwise engage in a search violative of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Jones, which outline a property-based, trespassory test for Fourth Amendment violations, do not disturb this principle.

Consumers' Research, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13315

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Constitutional Law

This case concerns a petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by a group of petitioners including a non-profit organization, a corporation that resells telecommunications services, and various individuals. They challenge the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 254, also known as the Telecommunications Act of 1996’s universal service requirements, arguing that it violates the nondelegation doctrine. They also argue that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency Congress put in charge of § 254, has impermissibly delegated authority over the universal service fund to a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), in violation of the private nondelegation doctrine.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that § 254 provides an "intelligible principle" for the FCC to follow in its regulation of the universal service fund, and that the FCC maintains control and oversight of all actions by the private entity, USAC. Therefore, the court held that there were no unconstitutional delegations and denied the petition.

In terms of the facts leading to the case, the FCC was created in 1934 to regulate interstate commerce in communication and was instructed by Congress in 1996 to establish and maintain a universal service fund. This fund was created with the goal of making communication services available to all the people of the United States, without discrimination. To manage this, the FCC relies on the USAC, a private entity, to determine the amount each contributor must provide to the fund. However, the petitioners argued that the actions taken by both the FCC and the USAC in creating the 4th Quarter 2022 Contribution Factor were unconstitutional. The court rejected these arguments and upheld the constitutionality of the FCC's and USAC's roles in managing the fund.

USA v. McCoy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-13838

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Reginald McCoy, who was charged in 1990 with conspiracy to possess and possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2019, McCoy filed a motion to reduce his sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act, which allows some defendants to have their sentences reevaluated under reduced statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses that were implemented after their sentences became final. He argued that he should be able to object to the drug-quantity finding made at his original sentencing as he did not have reason to do so at the time because he did not know that the statutory sentencing thresholds would be lowered in the future. However, the district court denied McCoy's motion, concluding that it lacked the authority to reduce the sentence because McCoy was already serving the lowest statutory penalty available to him under the Fair Sentencing Act, which was life imprisonment. The court also ruled that it would not have exercised its discretion to reduce the sentence even if McCoy was eligible due to the large quantity of crack cocaine attributable to him and his "ongoing and excessive disciplinary infractions" while incarcerated.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the First Step Act does not grant authority to relitigate a drug quantity finding made at the original sentencing. It also rejected McCoy's argument that the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act via the First Step Act violates due process. The court reasoned that it is impossible for courts to provide notice of a hypothetical future law whose passage is uncertain and whose operative text is uncertain. The court concluded that McCoy was not entitled to notice in 1991 of what the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act would provide decades later.

Langeman v. Merrick Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-5264

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

In this case, Michael W. Langeman, a former Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), appealed against the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. Langeman was terminated from his position after an investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ) revealed his mishandling of the investigation into sexual abuse allegations against USA Gymnastics Physician Lawrence Gerard Nassar. Langeman claimed that his termination violated his constitutional rights protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. He argued that his termination violated a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued employment and deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his reputation, thereby damaging his future employment in law enforcement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with Langeman's arguments. The court held that Langeman failed to sufficiently plead deprivation of a property interest or liberty interest without due process. The court found that the FBI had explicitly retained the discretion to summarily terminate employees, and this did not create a legitimate property interest sufficient to state a claim under procedural due process. As for Langeman's claim of deprivation of a liberty interest, the court found that Langeman did not establish that any allegedly defamatory conduct accompanied his dismissal from government employment.

Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Langeman’s complaint for failure to state a claim. It also found that Langeman could not demonstrate a clear right to relief for his mandamus claim due to his deficient due process allegations, therefore mandamus relief was not available to him.

USA v. Donald Trump

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3190

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Election Law

In a case involving former U.S. President Donald J. Trump, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has partially upheld and partially vacated a lower court's order restricting Trump's public statements about the trial. The case stems from Trump being indicted for conspiring to overturn the 2020 presidential election through unlawful means and for obstructing the election’s certification. Trump had posted numerous statements on social media attacking potential witnesses in the case, the judge, and the prosecution team. The lower court issued an order restraining the parties and their counsel from making public statements that "target" the parties, counsel and their staffs, court personnel, and "any reasonably foreseeable witness or the substance of their testimony." On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the order insofar as it prohibited all parties and their counsel from making public statements about known or reasonably foreseeable witnesses concerning their potential participation in the investigation or in the criminal proceeding. The court also upheld the order to the extent it prohibited parties and their counsel from making public statements about counsel in the case other than the Special Counsel, members of the court’s staff and counsel’s staffs, or the family members of any counsel or staff member, if those statements were made with the intent to materially interfere with the trial or with the knowledge that such interference was highly likely to result. However, the court vacated the order to the extent it covered speech beyond these categories. The court found that the order was justified by a sufficiently serious risk of prejudice to an ongoing judicial proceeding, that no less restrictive alternatives would adequately address that risk, and that the order was narrowly tailored to ensure the fair administration of justice while also respecting Trump's First Amendment rights.

HARMON v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 179

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Rodney Dale Harmon was convicted of multiple drug-related felonies and sentenced to forty years in prison. During the execution of a search warrant at Harmon's residence, an HBO documentary film crew was present. The footage of the search, however, could not be obtained. Harmon, in his appeal, claimed that the presence of the film crew violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He filed a petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, which was denied by the circuit court.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court stated that although Harmon argued that the presence of the HBO documentary film crew violated his Fourth Amendment rights, a constitutional violation alone does not trigger the application of Rule 37. The court also stated that issues related to the legality of evidence obtained are not of such a fundamental nature as to void the judgment. The court further noted that Harmon's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this argument as the remedy for such a violation in the context of a criminal trial is not established law. The court concluded that Harmon's petition conclusively showed that he was entitled to no relief and therefore, the circuit court did not err by dismissing the petition without a hearing.

P. v. Hall

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165406(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerns Gary Marcus Hall, who was convicted on two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years. Hall was a registered sex offender and lived with the victims' grandfather. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison, which included the upper term on one of the two counts. Hall challenged his sentence on three grounds. Firstly, he claimed the court mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation. Secondly, he argued that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded. Lastly, he contended that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to a jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District held that Hall's sentence was not constitutionally or statutorily infirm due to failure to allege sentencing factors in aggravation. The court also ruled that Hall knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to jury trial, including as to aggravating facts, and his aggravated sentence is constitutionally permissible for that reason. The court further concluded that even if Hall did not sufficiently waive his constitutional jury trial right, the trial court found at least one aggravating factor—recidivism—on a basis consistent with the Sixth Amendment and therefore his aggravated sentence is not constitutionally infirm. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment.

Gonzalez v. State of Florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0740

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Florida denied a petition brought forward by Leonard P. Gonzalez, Jr., who requested a review of a nonfinal order by the circuit court. Gonzalez was convicted of home-invasion robbery and two counts of first-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to death. The circuit court set aside his death sentences, but denied any further relief. Following changes in Florida's death-penalty laws, Gonzalez sought an order declaring that the amended statute does not apply in his case, arguing against its application as unconstitutional and inconsistent with the presumption that substantive statutes apply prospectively. The circuit court disagreed and ruled that the amended statute would apply at his upcoming penalty phase.

Gonzalez then petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida, invoking its all-writs authority and authority to issue writs of prohibition, arguing against the circuit court's ruling that the new statute could be lawfully applied at his upcoming penalty phase. However, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the relief sought is not available by way of prohibition or its all-writs authority. The court concluded that the circuit court has jurisdiction to conduct the new penalty phase and that its decision to apply the new statute does not affect this jurisdiction. The court also clarified that its all-writs provision does not add appellate jurisdiction and is restricted to preserving jurisdiction that has already been invoked or to protect jurisdiction that likely will be invoked in the future. As such, Gonzalez's petition was denied.

State of Iowa v. Arrieta

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 21-1133

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Iowa, the defendant, Stephen Arrieta, a truck driver, was pulled over at a weigh station after his vehicle failed a "PrePass" check. During the stop, an Iowa Department of Transportation officer requested a K-9 unit to conduct a free air sniff of the truck and trailer. The drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the sleeper compartment of the cab, and Arrieta admitted to having marijuana inside. Arrieta was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance.

Arrieta appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the marijuana. His main argument was that the officer unlawfully extended the time of his stop, known as a Level 3 inspection, to allow the K-9 handler to arrive and search his truck. Arrieta cited Rodriguez v. United States, a Supreme Court case that ruled such extensions of traffic stops without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity are unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with Arrieta, finding that he was detained longer than necessary to complete the Level 3 inspection, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the officer had effectively completed his tasks before the arrival of the K-9 unit and that the 25-minute delay until the K-9 unit's arrival was unjustified. As such, Arrieta was improperly detained when the free air sniff occurred, and any evidence obtained as a result of the search should have been suppressed.

The court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed and remanded the judgment of the district court.

GRAHAM V. ADAMS

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0522-TG

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In a case concerning the constitutionality of the Kentucky General Assembly's legislative and congressional reapportionment plans, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court's decision that the plans were constitutional. The appellants, which included the Kentucky Democratic Party and several individual voters, challenged the plans, alleging that they were the result of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, violated the Kentucky Constitution's guarantees of free and equal elections, equal protection, and freedom of speech and assembly, and violated Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution, which sets forth requirements for the reapportionment process. The court held that the apportionment plans did not involve an unconstitutional level of partisan gerrymandering and did not violate the state constitution's guarantees of free and equal elections, equal protection, freedom of speech and assembly, or Section 33's requirements for the reapportionment process. The court applied a substantially deferential standard in its review, given the political nature of the apportionment process. It found that the plans did not involve a clear, flagrant, and unwarranted deviation from constitutional limitations, nor did they threaten the state's democratic form of government. The court also found that the appellants had standing to bring their claims and that the claims were justiciable.

Commonwealth v. Hart

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13217

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Joshua Hart, and his girlfriend, Brittany Smith, entered the home of an elderly couple, Thomas Harty and his wife, Joanna Fisher, intending to steal their car and money. The couple ended up fatally attacking both Harty and Fisher, and then fled the state in the victims' vehicle. Hart was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder, and he appealed on several grounds.

Hart argued that his confession to law enforcement was involuntary and should have been suppressed, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed. The court found that Hart's confession was voluntary based on the circumstances of the interrogation, his experience with the criminal justice system, and his own actions and statements during the interrogation.

Hart also argued that the trial should have been moved to another venue due to pretrial publicity. The court disagreed, stating that the defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the pretrial publicity caused either presumptive or actual prejudice. The court found that less than 20% of potential jurors were excused due to pretrial publicity, and the judge took extensive steps to protect Hart's right to a fair trial.

Hart further contended that a statement made by the deceased victim, Fisher, to her nurse, which was relayed to the jury through the nurse's testimony, should have been excluded from evidence as it was hearsay and violated his right to confront witnesses. The court determined that Fisher's statements were non-testimonial and thus did not violate the confrontation clause. The court also found that even if Fisher's statements were admitted in error, there was no prejudice because the Commonwealth presented other compelling evidence of the facts relayed in Fisher's statements.

Finally, Hart argued that his sentences of life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel or unusual punishment because he was under 25 years old at the time of the crimes. The court rejected this argument, finding no reason to extend the prohibition of life sentences without parole for juveniles to individuals under the age of 25.

Accordingly, the court affirmed Hart's convictions.

Dampier v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CT-00280-SCT

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In 2004, De’Andre Dampier was convicted of a capital murder committed during an auto-dealership robbery when he was 16 years old. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole, which was the only statutory sentence available at the time. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled that imposing mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. Based on this ruling, the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted Dampier’s request to seek post-conviction relief from his life-without-parole sentence. However, before the trial court addressed any of the factors from the US Supreme Court decision, it vacated Dampier’s life-without-parole sentence. Dampier then requested that a jury be convened to decide if he should be sentenced to life with or without parole, but the trial judge denied this request. After a hearing in which the trial judge considered the factors from the US Supreme Court decision, the judge reimposed a sentence of life in prison without parole.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that Dampier did not have a statutory right to be sentenced by a jury. The court emphasized that the decision to be made by the trial court was whether Dampier was entitled to post-conviction relief from his life-without-parole sentence, imposed for a crime committed when he was a juvenile. The court also agreed with the lower courts that the trial judge did not err by denying Dampier’s request for jury sentencing. Furthermore, the court agreed with the lower courts that the trial court did not err by ruling that, after a careful consideration of the factors from the US Supreme Court decision, life without parole was an appropriate sentence for Dampier’s crime.

State v. Buttolph

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 238

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Tylor Buttolph who appealed his conviction of stalking. Buttolph had been charged with eight counts of felony stalking, allegedly occurring between October 17, 2019, and April 6, 2020. For each count of stalking, the State listed only one act of misconduct. However, the stalking statute requires a "course of conduct" involving two or more acts. The State used evidence of prior, uncharged conduct to prove the "course of conduct" element.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the conviction. The court held that Buttolph's constitutional right to due process was violated when the State used an act not charged in the information to prove "course of conduct" for the offense of stalking. The court reasoned that the State cannot shift its theory of criminality on the day of trial without violating Buttolph's fundamental right to due process. The charging document was silent as to the second act constituting the course of conduct element of the offense, and thus, there was no "statement of facts constituting the offense charged".

Brown v. Secretary of State

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0629

Opinion Date: November 29, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Election Law

In this case, a group of New Hampshire voters challenged the constitutionality of the state's new boundaries for state senate and executive council districts. The plaintiffs claimed that the legislature violated the New Hampshire Constitution by drawing districts that unfairly benefitted one political party at the expense of another. They sought a declaration that the districts violated various parts of the state constitution and an injunction preventing the implementation of the new boundaries.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the issue of partisan gerrymandering raised a non-justiciable political question because the New Hampshire Constitution committed the task of redistricting to the legislature and did not provide any legal standard for the courts to review such decisions. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not claim that the redistricting plans violated any mandatory requirements of the state constitution.

The court also rejected the argument that the constitution's guarantees of free speech, equal protection, and association were violated by the alleged gerrymandering. The court found that these constitutional provisions did not provide clear and manageable standards for adjudicating claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering.

The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that the challenge to the constitutionality of the districts based on claims of excessive political gerrymandering presented non-justiciable political questions.

Matter of Hoffmann v New York State Ind. Redistricting Commn.

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 06344

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Election Law

The New York Court of Appeals held that the New York State Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) failed to fulfill its constitutional duties for redistricting maps after the 2020 census. The court affirmed a lower court decision ordering the IRC to reconvene and deliver a second set of lawful redistricting maps.

In 2014, New York voters amended the state constitution to mandate that the IRC, not the courts or the legislature, draw legislative districts. However, the IRC failed to deliver the required maps, resulting in a court-ordered redistricting plan for the 2022 elections.

The court clarified that such court-directed plans are limited to the "extent" that the court is "required" to do so, and are not meant to last longer than necessary to remedy a violation of law. Therefore, the existing court-drawn districts are limited to the 2022 election.

The court dismissed arguments that it was too late to compel the IRC to act, explaining that the court-ordered maps were not required to last a decade and that the IRC's constitutional obligation could be enforced at any time, unless barred by laches. The court also rejected arguments that the lawsuit was a collateral attack on an earlier decision, which dealt with a different issue.

The ruling orders the IRC to submit a second set of redistricting maps and implementing legislation to the legislature as soon as possible, but no later than February 28, 2024.

IN RE STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 23-0994

Opinion Date: December 11, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Health Law

In this case handled by the Supreme Court of Texas, the parents of two children, Kate Cox and Justin Cox, along with their doctor, Dr. Damla Karsan, filed a suit to challenge the enforcement of Texas laws that prohibit abortion. Mrs. Cox was about 20 weeks pregnant with a baby diagnosed with trisomy 18, a serious genetic disorder. The suit sought to apply a medical-necessity exception provided in the Texas law, which allows an abortion if a woman's life is threatened or she faces a serious risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily function due to her pregnancy.

The court, in its decision, clarified that the exception to the abortion prohibition is based on the reasonable medical judgment of a doctor, not a court. It was noted that Dr. Karsan presented a "good faith belief" that Mrs. Cox meets the exception's requirements but did not assert that her belief meets the objective standard of "reasonable medical judgment."

The court held that judges lack the authority to broaden the statutory exception by interpreting it and held the trial court erred in applying a different, lower standard instead of requiring reasonable medical judgment. The court emphasized that the exception requires a doctor's decision whether a pregnant woman’s complications pose the required risks.

The court conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate the temporary restraining order that had restrained the Attorney General from enforcing the abortion laws against Dr. Karsan and others related to the case, based solely on the verified pleading. The court also noted that nothing in their opinion prevents a physician from acting if, in that physician’s reasonable medical judgment, they determine that the pregnant woman has a life-threatening physical condition.

State v. Valdez

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 UT 26

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the defendant, Alfonso Valdez, was arrested and charged with kidnapping and assaulting his ex-girlfriend. During the arrest, officers seized Valdez’s cell phone. The police later obtained a search warrant for the phone, but were unable to access the contents as they could not decipher Valdez's passcode. When asked to provide his passcode, Valdez refused. At trial, the State elicited testimony about Valdez's refusal to provide his passcode and argued that this refusal undermined one of his defenses. Valdez was subsequently convicted.

On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the conviction, agreeing with Valdez that he had a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to provide his passcode, and that the State violated this right by using his refusal against him at trial.

The State petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Utah for certiorari, arguing that providing a passcode is not a testimonial communication, that the “foregone conclusion” exception applies in this case, and that the prosecutor's comments were permissible as a fair response to an issue that Valdez initiated.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the State on all counts. The court held that verbally providing a cell phone passcode is a testimonial communication under the Fifth Amendment and that the "foregone conclusion" exception, which arises in cases where an “act of production” implicitly communicates information, does not apply. The court also rejected the State's "fair response" argument, concluding that the State had elicited the testimony about Valdez's refusal to provide his passcode before Valdez had raised any issue involving the contents of his phone. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.

Vlaming v. West Point School Board

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 211061

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law, Labor & Employment Law

In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in favor of Peter Vlaming, a high school French teacher who was terminated by the West Point School Board for refusing to use a transgender student's preferred pronouns. Vlaming had chosen to use the student's preferred name but avoided using any third-person pronouns to refer to the student as it conflicted with his religious beliefs. The School Board fired Vlaming for not complying with its policy to use government-mandated pronouns.

Vlaming sued the School Board, alleging that his termination violated his constitutional, statutory, and breach-of-contract rights. The Circuit Court dismissed Vlaming's claims, holding that they failed to state legally viable causes of action. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court concluded that Vlaming's complaint sufficiently alleged that the School Board substantially burdened his right to free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution and that his claims under the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act should not have been dismissed. Moreover, the Court held that Vlaming has alleged a viable compelled speech claim under the free speech provision of the Virginia Constitution. The Court rejected the School Board's argument that it could compel Vlaming's speech as part of his official duties as a teacher. The Court concluded that Vlaming's refusal to use certain pronouns did not interfere with his duties as a French teacher or disrupt the school's operations.

The Court's decision reaffirmed the fundamental right to free speech and the free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution, emphasizing that these rights extend to public school teachers in their interactions with students. It clarified that although the government has a legitimate interest in ensuring non-discrimination and respect for all students, this interest must be balanced against individual rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. The Court also clarified that a public school teacher's speech in the classroom is not entirely within the control of the school board and that teachers cannot be compelled to express views that conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs.

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