US v. Cardona

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 22-1415, 22-1416

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions of Rafael Cardona Sr. and Isaac Cardona for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. Isaac Cardona was also convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering with intent to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity. The defendants raised several arguments on appeal.

Rafael Cardona Sr. argued that his two convictions were multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that this argument was not reviewable because it was raised for the first time on appeal and not supported by good cause, as required under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) and 12(c)(3).

Isaac Cardona argued that the money laundering statute under which he was charged is unconstitutionally vague. The court determined that this argument was not reviewable because it was not raised before trial, as required by Rule 12(b)(3). Isaac Cardona also argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his money laundering conviction and that the court gave erroneous jury instructions on this charge. The court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction and concluded that the erroneous instructions did not affect his substantial rights.

The case arose from surveillance footage, recorded communications between the defendants and other co-conspirators, and other evidence showing that the defendants conspired to distribute cocaine and heroin and that Isaac Cardona conspired to commit money laundering by using the proceeds of cocaine distribution to procure and resell heroin.

United States of America v. Mendonca

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-826

Opinion Date: December 6, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Anthony Christopher Mendonca was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for one count of possession of child pornography. He appealed, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated due to the public being excluded from substantial portions of his jury selection due to restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. He also argued that his inculpatory statements were coerced by law enforcement’s suggestion that he had “failed” a polygraph exam. Both challenges were not properly preserved in the lower court and therefore the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a plain-error review, ultimately affirming the judgment of the district court. The court emphasized the unique challenges posed by the pandemic and the effort made by the lower court to conduct a fair trial under these constraints. The court also found no clear or obvious error in the lower court's decision to admit Mendonca's incriminatory statements.

Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Product Studio, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1006

Opinion Date: December 5, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Intellectual Property, Trademark

In the case between Vans, Inc., VF Outdoor, LLC (collectively "Vans") and MSCHF Product Studio, Inc. ("MSCHF"), the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against MSCHF. MSCHF had created a sneaker, the Wavy Baby, which appeared to mimic Vans' Old Skool shoe. Vans sued MSCHF for trademark and trade dress infringement. MSCHF argued that its use of Vans' marks was protected by the First Amendment. However, the Court of Appeals applied the recent Supreme Court decision in Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, which held that special First Amendment protections do not apply when trademarks are used as source identifiers. The Court of Appeals concluded that Vans was likely to prevail in arguing that MSCHF's Wavy Baby shoes used Vans' marks and trade dress as source identifiers, and that there was a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the Wavy Baby shoes. The court also affirmed the district court's decisions requiring MSCHF to escrow its revenues from Wavy Baby sales and not requiring a bond determination because MSCHF never requested security.

USA v. Hunter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3316

Opinion Date: December 5, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A traffic stop conducted by Pennsylvania State Trooper Galen Clemons resulted in the arrest of Jamar Hunter after a loaded Glock-45 semi-automatic handgun was discovered in Hunter's waistband. This discovery followed a routine license and warrant check and an additional computerized criminal history check on Hunter and his passenger, Deshaun Davis. Hunter was later indicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Hunter moved to suppress the firearm evidence claiming that the computerized criminal history check extended the traffic stop beyond its constitutional authority.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Hunter's motion to suppress. The court reasoned that the computerized criminal history check was unrelated to the traffic stop's mission and, without reasonable suspicion, prolonged the stop, therefore violating the Fourth Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, finding that the lower court had applied a subjective standard of review, thereby erring as a matter of law. The appellate court held that the criminal history check, which lasted approximately two minutes, was an objectively reasonable safety precaution related to the mission of the traffic stop under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) and the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals found the check to be a negligibly burdensome officer safety precaution that fell within the stop's mission. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Independence-Alliance Party of Minn. v. Simon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1074

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the Independence-Alliance Party of Minnesota, a minor political party, challenged a Minnesota statute that required voters to swear an oath before signing a minor-party nominating petition. The party argued that this requirement violated the First Amendment as it deterred voters from signing nominating petitions, thus, burdening the expressive associational rights of minor political parties, their members, and their candidates.

The court, applying the Anderson-Burdick framework, held that the burden imposed by the oath requirement was insubstantial at most and did not warrant strict scrutiny. The court reasoned that the oath only required potential signatories to express their present intent not to vote at the primary election for the office for which the nominating petition is made, and did not preclude them from changing their intentions in the future. The court also reasoned that voters were expected to understand the law, and therefore, understand the oath's actual meaning. It also noted that the party's complaint did not plausibly allege that the oath requirement prevented signatories from signing nominating petitions with any meaningful frequency.

The court held that any insubstantial burden imposed by the oath requirement was justified by legitimate state interests, such as protecting the democratic voting process by requiring a preliminary showing of support for a candidate, preventing the distortion of the electoral process, promoting election integrity and reliability, and discouraging party raiding. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Independence-Alliance Party's complaint.

United States v. Cutler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3589

Opinion Date: December 6, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas's decision to sentence Jordan Cutler to 180 months in prison for distributing child pornography, a sentence that exceeded the Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months. Cutler appealed, arguing that the district court made a procedural error in calculating the Guidelines range and asserting that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Cutler claimed that the district court erred in assessing one criminal history point under the Sentencing Guidelines for a set of uncounseled misdemeanors from 2010.

The appellate court rejected this argument, explaining that Cutler's uncounseled misdemeanors were not voided by his lack of counsel, as the fines associated with these misdemeanors were constitutionally valid and could be used to enhance his punishment. The court clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for misdemeanor defendants only applies where the defendant receives a prison sentence, not when the defendant is merely fined.

In terms of the substantive reasonableness of Cutler's sentence, the appellate court again affirmed the district court's decision. The court explained that although the Guidelines captured certain aspects of Cutler's offense, they did not reflect the "heinous" nature of his crimes, including threats to kidnap, rape, torture, and kill young girls. Cutler also argued that the district court improperly considered its reputation and public perception when determining his sentence. However, the appellate court disagreed, noting that the district court was considering the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.

Therefore, the appellate court found no procedural or substantive error in Cutler's sentencing and affirmed the district court's judgment.

Blassingame v. Trump

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-5069

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled on an appeal by former President Donald J. Trump regarding his claim of presidential immunity from civil damages liability related to the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot. Plaintiffs included Capitol Police officers and members of Congress who alleged that Trump, through his actions and speech, incited the riot that resulted in physical injuries and emotional distress.

The court determined that, at this stage in the proceedings, Trump has not demonstrated an entitlement to presidential immunity. It distinguished between actions carried out in a president’s official capacity, which are protected by immunity, and those carried out in a private or unofficial capacity, which are not. The court rejected Trump's argument that presidential speech on matters of public concern is always an official function, stating that such speech can be either official or unofficial depending on context.

The court also rejected Trump's claim that his actions leading up to and on January 6 were official because they were under his Article II duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," stating that this claim is not independent of his ability to show that he engaged in the relevant actions in his official capacity as President rather than his unofficial capacity as a presidential candidate.

The court held that Trump's actions as alleged in the complaints, if proven to be true, were carried out in his capacity as a presidential candidate, not as the sitting President. Therefore, he is subject to civil suits like any private citizen. However, the court specified that Trump must be allowed to present facts and make arguments in the district court that his actions were taken in his official capacity.

Vote Yes for Alaska's Fair Share v. Resource Development Council for Alaska, Inc.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18044

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, a group of trade associations (Resource Development Council for Alaska, Inc., Alaska Trucking Association, Inc., Alaska Miners Association, Inc., Associated General Contractors of Alaska, Alaska Chamber, and Alaska Support Industry Alliance) sued the State and a ballot initiative group "Vote Yes for Alaska’s Fair Share" (Fair Share), seeking to invalidate the State’s approval of a ballot initiative petition. The litigation primarily revolved around the constitutionality of a statute limiting the compensation that could be paid for obtaining signatures on ballot initiative petitions. The superior court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional and dismissed the trade associations’ claims that a large number of petition signatures should be invalidated because the statutory compensation limits had been exceeded.

Following this ruling, Fair Share moved for an attorney’s fees award against the trade associations, contending that it was a qualified prevailing constitutional claimant entitled to full reasonable attorney’s fees under AS 09.60.010, or at least an award of partial attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82. The trade associations responded that Fair Share could not be a constitutional claimant because it was not a “plaintiff, counterclaimant, cross claimant, or third-party plaintiff.”

The superior court concluded that Fair Share was a constitutional claimant because its claim was effectively a counterclaim. However, it also concluded that the Trade Associations did not have sufficient economic incentive to bring their claim, and thus were constitutional claimants protected from an award of full attorney’s fees under AS 09.60.010. The court nonetheless awarded Fair Share partial attorney’s fees under Rule 82.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s determination that the trade associations did not have a sufficient economic incentive to bring their claims. Thus, the trade associations are qualified, non-prevailing constitutional claimants and the Rule 82 attorney’s fees award must be vacated.

MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CV-22-0176-PR

Opinion Date: December 5, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, Phoenix Police Sergeant Stefani McMichael-Gombar appealed against her suspension for posting content on Facebook that violated the Phoenix Police Department’s Social Media Policy. She argued that the policy was overbroad and violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or that she reasonably believed she had a First Amendment right to make the post. The Phoenix Civil Service Board upheld the suspension, and McMichael-Gombar sought relief in the superior court. The superior court dismissed her complaint, stating that the Phoenix City Charter neither requires nor authorizes the Board to consider the constitutionality of the City’s policies, and this is only tasked with determining if the allegations against an employee are true and if the level of discipline was appropriate. The court of appeals vacated this ruling, determining that the Board must consider whether the disciplinary action properly regards McMichael-Gombar’s constitutional rights.

The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the Board does not have the authority to decide whether a city policy is unconstitutional, as this power is not explicitly granted to it by the Phoenix City Charter, the rules governing disciplinary proceedings, or the Peace Officers Bill of Rights. However, the court did agree that McMichael-Gombar was entitled to argue and introduce supporting evidence that she reasonably believed she was acting within her First Amendment rights. The court concluded that McMichael-Gombar did not meet her burden to show that the Board precluded her from doing so. Thus, the court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing McMichael-Gombar’s special action complaint.

HARMON v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 179

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Rodney Dale Harmon, who was convicted of multiple drug-related felonies and sentenced to 40 years in prison, appealed the denial of his petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. The appeal was mainly based on the presence of an HBO documentary film crew while a search warrant was executed at his home, and he argued that this violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The court ruled that claims related to the presence of the film crew during the search could not be used to void the judgment, as even constitutional violations are not in themselves enough to trigger application of Rule 37. The court further noted that issues of evidence, including those possibly obtained by illegal search or seizure, are not of such a fundamental nature as to void the judgment.

Harmon also claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Fourth Amendment violation as an independent ground to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The court disagreed, stating that even though the violation was established law, the remedy was not, and that counsel was not deficient for failing to raise a novel argument.

Thus, the court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Harmon's petition for postconviction relief.

STACY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 176

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the appellant, Cordale Stacy, was convicted of three counts of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on each count, along with a consecutive fifteen years’ imprisonment for a firearm enhancement. The appellant argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the capital-murder charges due to an alleged overlap of capital, first-degree, and second-degree murder statutes.

The case arose from a shooting incident in a Forrest City apartment where three individuals, an adult and two children, were found deceased. Witnesses identified Stacy fleeing the scene and further investigations led to his arrest. Stacy was charged with three counts of capital murder, possession of a firearm by certain persons, and a felony-with-a-firearm enhancement.

Stacy filed two motions to quash the felony information, arguing that the capital murder statute overlapped with the first-degree murder statute for the adult victim, and overlapped with the first-degree and second-degree murder statutes for the minor victims. He contended that this overlap exposed him to an impermissible uncertainty in the offenses, which should have led to their dismissal. The circuit court denied both motions.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that there was no constitutional infirmity in the overlap of these statutes. The Court noted that each offense set forth different elements to be proved by the State, and thus, any alleged overlap presented no constitutional issues. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the discretion of the prosecutor to choose between overlapping offenses did not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Therefore, the Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Stacy's motions to quash the felony information and dismiss the charges. As a result, Stacy's conviction and sentence were upheld.

State v. Kimbley

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49207

Opinion Date: December 5, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In June 2021, Kenneth Bernard Kimbley, III, was convicted on four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct and sentenced to four concurrent sentences, each for a determinate period of not less than fifteen years and an indeterminate period of not more than fifteen years, for a total unified sentence not to exceed thirty years. Kimbley appealed his conviction, presenting multiple arguments to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.

The court rejected Kimbley's argument that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated when his trial was livestreamed due to COVID-19 restrictions. The court determined that Kimbley had not objected to the livestreaming at the time and had therefore waived his right to object to it on appeal.

Kimbley also argued that his right to counsel was violated as he was unable to communicate with his attorney during pretrial hearings in which his attorney appeared remotely. However, the court noted that Kimbley hadn't raised this issue at the lower court, nor had he demonstrated how this alleged violation affected the outcome of his trial.

Kimbley further contended that the lower court erred by admitting evidence of his flight from prosecution and his firearm possession. The Supreme Court found that evidence of Kimbley's flight was relevant and admissible as it indicated a consciousness of guilt. Evidence of Kimbley's firearm possession was also deemed admissible as it was introduced by Kimbley's own counsel for the purpose of impeachment.

Lastly, Kimbley argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments by discrediting a witness who had invoked her Fifth Amendment right. However, the court declined to consider this argument as Kimbley hadn't objected to the prosecutor's comments at the time and had not adequately argued that these comments constituted a fundamental error on appeal.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the judgment of the lower court, rejecting all of Kimbley's arguments on appeal.

Sims v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 55

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Tashami J. Sims, the appellant, had pleaded guilty to assault with the use of a deadly weapon in the Eighth Judicial District Court. At one of his sentencing hearings, Sims expressed a desire to represent himself, stating, "I'll go pro per." However, the district court did not allow him to do so at that time. Sims did not reiterate his request at subsequent hearings, and he was eventually sentenced to 20 to 72 months in prison.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, Sims argued that the district court erred by not conducting a canvass to determine whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California. The Court of Appeals, in a decision of first impression, held that a defendant can abandon an unequivocal request to represent themselves where the district court has not conclusively denied the request and the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's conduct, demonstrates that the defendant has abandoned their request.

Applying this standard, the court found that Sims had abandoned his request to represent himself. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered factors such as Sims' failure to reassert his request at subsequent hearings, his collaboration with his counsel to obtain his mental health records, and the fact that he waited until after his conviction to raise the issue. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

State v. Ayon

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Citation: 2023-NMSC-025

Opinion Date: September 5, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case arises from an incident in which Ricky Anthony Ayon was stopped by police while walking on the street. The police officer, recognizing Ayon from past encounters and knowing he had a warrant, immediately handcuffed Ayon and later discovered a small bag of a substance that tested positive for opiates. During a preliminary hearing, Ayon successfully argued that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, leading the district court to refuse to bind Ayon over for trial on a heroin possession charge. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to this appeal.

The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that a district court judge presiding over a preliminary hearing does not have the authority to decide whether evidence was obtained from an unconstitutional search or seizure. The Court remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Court reasoned that even though preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings have different procedures and afford different rights to the defendant, they share a common goal of providing a neutral evaluation of whether the state has demonstrated probable cause to prosecute a serious crime. Additionally, the Court noted that allowing suppression of evidence at the preliminary hearing stage would be largely duplicative and not necessary for effective screening, as a motion to suppress evidence could still be utilized to gain a pretrial ruling excluding the evidence and precluding a trial. The Court also held that the New Mexico Constitution does not provide the right at a preliminary hearing to exclude evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search or seizure.

State v. Vasquez-Salas

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Citation: 2023-NMSC-023

Opinion Date: August 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico affirmed a lower court's decision denying a defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The case involves Hugo Vasquez-Salas, a passenger in a car that was pulled over for a broken rear license-plate light. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Stacy noticed a partially open backpack containing bolt cutters, protective eyeglasses, gloves, and a face mask. After determining that the driver was an unlicensed minor, Officer Stacy asked Vasquez-Salas for his identifying information. Vasquez-Salas provided inconsistent answers about his age and was later found to have given a false name.

The court held that the officer's inquiry into Vasquez-Salas's identifying information was permissible under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The court found that Officer Stacy had reasonable suspicion to expand the investigation beyond the initial traffic stop based on the totality of the circumstances, which included the time of the stop, the items found in the backpack, the driver's and Vasquez-Salas's unusual behavior, the driver's status as an unlicensed minor, and Vasquez-Salas's false identifying information.

The court further clarified that the primary inquiry under the Fourth Amendment in cases where the legality of the initial stop is uncontested is whether the officer's questions extended the time that a driver was detained, regardless of the questions’ content. The court also overruled a previous case, State v. Affsprung, which held that an officer's questions about a passenger's identifiers violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer had no reasonable suspicion that the passenger was engaged in criminal activity. The court stated that this holding no longer aligns with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

State v. Haney

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 227

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the State of North Dakota, the defendant, Demetris Haney, was involved in a shooting in a bar's parking lot. Haney was charged with reckless endangerment and terrorizing, among other charges. The trial took place in August 2022, where the state presented surveillance footage showing Haney firing multiple rounds at an individual before they returned fire. Haney testified that he only returned fire when shot at. After the state rested its case, Haney moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the district court denied. The jury found Haney not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of two counts of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault and guilty of reckless endangerment and terrorizing.

On appeal, Haney argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the terrorizing charge. He claimed that the state failed to prove the terrorizing charge because he did not "threaten" to commit any violent crime or dangerous act. The State of North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that a rational fact-finder could find Haney guilty of terrorizing based on the evidence presented at trial, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

Haney also argued that the district court violated his constitutional right to a public trial by conducting in-chamber conferences without the necessary findings or obtaining a waiver from Haney. The Supreme Court concluded that these conferences were not closures implicating Haney's public trial right and that Haney did not establish obvious error in the district court's failure to create a record of these conferences.

Lastly, Haney argued that the district court denied his right to due process, but he did not provide any factual or legal analysis to support this claim. The Supreme Court declined to consider this claim, as Haney did not provide relevant authority or meaningful reasoning to support it.

As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Haney's convictions.

Bennett v. United States

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,300-1

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In the case presented, plaintiff Bette Bennett alleged that she suffered a traumatic brain injury due to medical negligence by the defendant, the United States. However, the cause of her injury was not diagnosed until after the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under Washington law had expired, making it impossible for her to timely commence her lawsuit. The United States moved to dismiss her complaint as time-barred.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to decide whether the statute of repose violates certain provisions of the Washington Constitution. The court held that while the legislature has broad authority to set time limits for commencing an action, the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under RCW 4.16.350(3) violates the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that the statute implicates the fundamental right of state citizenship by limiting the pursuit of common law claims against certain defendants, but it does not satisfy the "reasonable ground" test under the state constitution. Therefore, the court concluded that the statute of repose is unconstitutional under independent state law. The court declined to reach the second certified question regarding whether the statute of repose unconstitutionally restricts a plaintiff's right to access the courts in violation of the Washington Constitution.

State v. Charlton

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,269-1

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Shawn Charlton was arrested and charged with third-degree child rape, third-degree child molestation, and indecent liberties. He appeared in preliminary hearings without counsel, which he argued on appeal was a denial of his constitutional right to counsel at critical stages of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while the absence of counsel was indeed a constitutional error, it did not constitute a critical stage of litigation requiring automatic reversal. The court reasoned that nothing in the record suggested that Charlton's rights were lost, defenses were waived, privileges were claimed or waived, or that the outcome of the case was otherwise substantially affected by the absence of counsel. Furthermore, the court concluded that any error in not having counsel present was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This is because there was no evidence to suggest that the lack of counsel affected the verdict in any way. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

State v. Heng

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,159-8

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the State of Washington, a man named Mitchell Heng was charged with murder, arson, and robbery. He was brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing without counsel, during which the judge set bail among other things. Heng argued that counsel should have been present at this hearing. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington agreed, noting that a person charged with a crime has a right to counsel under the state and federal constitutions and under court rules. However, the court found that Heng did not demonstrate that the hearing was a critical stage of the prosecution, and it believed that the absence of counsel did not contribute to the verdict. Consequently, the court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.

The facts of the case reveal that Heng was implicated in a robbery at Sifton Market during which Amy Hooser was killed. Surveillance footage showed Heng at the scene with a blood-stained shirt and a lighter in his hands. He was charged the next day with first degree murder, first degree robbery, and first degree arson. Heng was held in jail for 31 months before his trial, during which time he made inconsistent statements during recorded phone calls about the events of the night of the crime. He was eventually convicted of first degree murder and first degree arson and was sentenced to 374 months in prison.

Heng appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to counsel had been violated at a critical stage of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while Heng should have had counsel present at his preliminary hearing, this did not constitute a critical stage of the prosecution. The court also noted that in order for an error to be considered structural and thus necessitate automatic reversal, it must have substantively affected the outcome of the case. The court determined that Heng’s case was not demonstrably affected by his counsel’s absence. As such, the court applied constitutional harmless error analysis, which requires the court to reverse unless it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. The court concluded that the failure to have counsel present at Heng’s preliminary hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.

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