Table of Contents
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Assoc of Club Exct v. City of Dallas
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Baker v. City of McKinney
Civil Rights, Commercial Law, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Galaviz v. Reyes
Constitutional Law, Family Law, International Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Johnson v. Harris County
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Lewis v. Danos
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Murphy v. Nasser
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Murphy v. Nasser
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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O'Connor v. Eubanks
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Perez v. Simpson
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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United States v. Lundy
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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United States v. Schumaker
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Alcorn v. City of Chicago
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Whitaker v. Dempsey
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Mark Nieters v. Brandon Holtan
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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United States v. Arondo Harris
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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United States v. Lamar Bertucci
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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United States v. Nicholas Jackson
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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AROLDO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Immigration Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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DOUGLAS CLARK V. RON BROOMFIELD
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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LEON MEYERS V. EDWARD BIRDSONG, ET AL
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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VIRGINIA DUNCAN, ET AL V. ROB BONTA
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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United States v. Nunez-Carranza
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Wyoming Gun Owners v. Gray, et al.
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Karyn D. Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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Ricky J. Johnson v. Dr. Sharon Lewis, et al
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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USA v. Robert Dunn
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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Ark. Dep't of Education v. Jackson
Constitutional Law, Election Law
Arkansas Supreme Court
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Wilder v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Arkansas Supreme Court
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Wofford v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Arkansas Supreme Court
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Martin v. Delaware
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Delaware Supreme Court
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Thomas v. Delaware
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Delaware Supreme Court
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Bowman v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Caldwell v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Georgia v. Cook, et al.
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Jones v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Kimbro v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Kinlaw v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Maynor v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Pauldo v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Priester v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Rivera v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Sosebee v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Steele v. Georgia
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Georgia
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Davis v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Indiana
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Galloway v. Mississippi
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Mississippi
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State v. Bristow
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Montana Supreme Court
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North Dakota v. Hatzenbuehler
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
North Dakota Supreme Court
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North Dakota v. Whitetail
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
North Dakota Supreme Court
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State v. Williams
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Ohio
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Ingle v. Matteucci
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Oregon Supreme Court
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Oregon v. B. Y.
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
Oregon Supreme Court
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Oregon v. Hubbell
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Oregon Supreme Court
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State v. Ogden
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Utah Supreme Court
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Castellanos v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Wyoming Supreme Court
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Constitutional Law Opinions
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Assoc of Club Exct v. City of Dallas
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
22-10556
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Stuart Kyle Duncan
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
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Communities can therefore regulate the so-called “secondary effects” of sexually oriented businesses (or “SOBs”), like crime and blight, without running afoul of the First Amendment. The City of Dallas passed Ordinance No. 32125 in 2022. The Ordinance requires licensed SOBs, such as cabarets, escort agencies, and adult video stores, to close between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.. Plaintiffs, a group of SOBs and their trade association, challenged the Ordinance under the First Amendment. After a hearing, the district court found that the City lacked reliable evidence to justify the Ordinance and that the Ordinance overly restricted Plaintiffs’ speech. It therefore preliminarily enjoined the Ordinance.
The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded. The court explained that under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, the Ordinance is likely constitutional. The City’s evidence reasonably showed a link between SOBs’ late-night operations and an increase in “noxious side effects,” such as crime. The court explained that it cannot say that the Ordinance substantially or disproportionately restricts speech. It leaves SOBs free to open for twenty hours a day, seven days a week, while also, in the City’s reasonable view, curtailing the violent crime and 911 calls with which the City was concerned.
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Baker v. City of McKinney
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
22-40644
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Stephen A. Higginson
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Commercial Law, Constitutional Law
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When an armed fugitive held a 15-year-old girl hostage inside Plaintiff, City of McKinney (the “City”), police officers employed armored vehicles, explosives, and toxic-gas grenades to resolve the situation. The parties agree the officers only did what was necessary in an active emergency. However, Plaintiff’s home suffered severe damage, much of her personal property was destroyed, and the City refused to provide compensation. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The district court held that, as a matter of law, the City violated the Takings Clause when it refused to compensate Baker for the damage and destruction of her property. The City timely appealed.
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that as a matter of history and precedent, the Takings Clause does not require compensation for damaged or destroyed property when it was objectively necessary for officers to damage or destroy that property in an active emergency to prevent imminent harm to persons. Plaintiff has maintained that the officers’ actions were precisely that: necessary, in light of an active emergency, to prevent imminent harm to the hostage child, to the officers who responded on the scene, and to others in her residential community.
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Galaviz v. Reyes
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
22-50203
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Priscilla Richman
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Family Law, International Law
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Plaintiff and Defendant had two children together. After the couple separated, the children remained in Mexico with Galaviz. In July 2021, Defendant took the children to El Paso and refused to return them. Plaintiff filed an action in the district court requesting the return of the children to Mexico under the Hague Convention. Defendant raised two affirmative defenses claiming that returning the children would violate their fundamental right to an education and would expose them to a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation. The district court concluded that Defendant had satisfied his burden and denied Plaintiff’s request for the return of the children. Plaintiff appealed.
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that in the present case, the district court’s findings regarding the children’s healthcare, including the children’s cognitive decline, the fact that they remained non-verbal, or their regression to using diapers, may be supported by evidence that would be sufficient in a custody dispute. However, this evidence falls short of meeting Defendant’s clear and convincing burden. Finally, Defendant presented no evidence that unsuitable childcare would expose the children to a grave risk of harm. He merely expressed concern that Plaintiff often left the children with her older daughters, and they did not take care of the children. This is not clear and convincing evidence of a grave risk of harm.
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Johnson v. Harris County
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
22-20549
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Jerry E. Smith
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
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Plaintiff was arrested and charged with interfering with the duties of a public servant. Eight hundred fifty-six days later, she brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Harris County and a number of law enforcement officials, asserting a series of alleged constitutional rights violations. The district court found the applicable statute of limitations barred all claims and granted all Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and failure to train, supervise, and discipline. She also asserted the district court erred in denying leave to amend her complaint. Finally, Plaintiff requested reassignment to a different district judge.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a false arrest claim accrues when charges are filed. Similarly, because a Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment is “based upon 'detention without legal process,’” limitations run once “legal process [is] initiated.” Limitations had long lapsed by the time Plaintiff sued. The false arrest and false imprisonment claims are time-barred, and she concedes that no basis for tolling applies. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment includes twenty-three examples of arrests conducted by Precinct Seven officers that resulted in criminal charges later dismissed for lack of probable cause. They are of no use. All twenty-three lack critical factual detail. That, in turn, precludes Plaintiff from showing that the pattern of examples is sufficiently similar to her incident. Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint—even as amended—would not survive a motion to dismiss.
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Lewis v. Danos
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
22-30670
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Jacques L. Wiener, Jr
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
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Plaintiff, then an Assistant Athletic Director at Louisiana State University (“LSU”)— internally reported Head Football Coach Les Miles for sexually harassing students. LSU retained outside counsel—Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP (“Taylor Porter”)—to investigate the matter, culminating in a formal report dated May 15, 2013 (the “Taylor Porter Report”). Matters were privately settled, and Miles stayed on as head coach until 2016. Lewis alleges that Defendants, members of LSU’s Board of Supervisors (the “Board”), leadership, and athletics department, along with lawyers at Taylor Porter (“Taylor Porter Defendants” and, collectively, “Defendants”), engaged in a concerted effort to illegally conceal the Taylor Porter Report and Miles’s wrong-doings. Plaintiff also alleged workplace retaliation for having reported Miles. She brings both employment and civil RICO claims. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO-related allegations as time-barred and inadequately pleaded as to causation.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court considered when Plaintiff was first made aware of her injuries. It matters not when she discovered Defendants’ “enterprise racketeering scheme”—she alleges that this happened in March 2021 with the release of the Husch Blackwell Report. Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that she was made aware of her injuries much earlier. She was subject to overt retaliation after “Miles was cleared of any wrongdoing” by the Taylor Porter Report in 2013. Plaintiff alleged numerous harmful workplace interactions from that point forward. Given that Plaintiff filed her original complaint on April 8, 2021, her claims for injuries that were discovered—or that should have been discovered—before April 8, 2017, are time-barred.
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Murphy v. Nasser
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
23-70005
Opinion Date: October 9, 2023
Judge:
Leslie H. Southwick
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Plaintiff was convicted of the 2000 murder of an 80-year-old woman. After the jury found him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of another vicious crime who identified Plaintiff as her attacker. Plaintiff was not tried for that offense . Plaintiff is now seeking DNA testing of evidence from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him. The State of Texas filed an emergency appeal seeking to vacate a stay of execution entered by the district court. The issue on which the district court decided to enter a stay is whether the inmate is entitled to have DNA testing performed on certain evidence. The district court granted a stay because similar issues were pending before the Fifth Circuit in a case brought by a different Texas prisoner. That related case is fully briefed and has been orally argued, and a decision in the case is pending.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a stay is appropriate, at least until a decision in that related pending case. The court explained that here the district court order bars Texas officials from carrying out “lawful and important conduct” because it prevents them from performing Plaintiff’s execution. Moreover, the district court’s order does not operate on the judicial proceeding but restricts the actions of specific defendants. That is the function of an injunction. The court entered no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time. Therefore, the stay of execution will remain in effect.
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Murphy v. Nasser
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
23-70005
Opinion Date: October 10, 2023
Judge:
Leslie H. Southwick
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Plaintiff was convicted of the 2000 murder of an 80-year-old woman. After the jury found him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of another vicious crime who identified Plaintiff as her attacker. Plaintiff was not tried for that offense. Plaintiff is now seeking DNA testing of evidence from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him. A different district court agreed with a similar argument and declared that Texas must provide testing if a sufficient basis is shown that it would have affected sentencing and not just the finding of guilt. The district court relied on the pendency of a decision in Gutierrez as a reason to grant Plaintiff a stay of execution. The State of Texas sought to vacate the stay of execution.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a stay is appropriate at least until a decision in that case. The court explained that at that time it will order additional briefing. Accordingly, the court entered no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time. The related appeal has similar issues that could affect the proper resolution in this case. Waiting for that decision is not required by any general procedural rule or by rules of the court. Nonetheless, the court explained that it should wait for that decision unless there is some basis to distinguish the present appeal.
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O'Connor v. Eubanks
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
22-1780
Opinion Date: October 6, 2023
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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Michigan’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (UUPA) allows the state to take custody—not ownership—of unclaimed property “in trust for the benefit of the rightful owner” After publishing required notices, the state sells or liquidates the unclaimed property within three years of receiving it, unless the owner brings a valid claim, then deposits the proceeds into its general fund, subtracting reasonable administration costs; the owner can no longer reclaim his property, but can still recover the “net proceeds” from its sale. UUPA apermits owners to recover the interest earned on their property and post-liquidation interest if the property accrued interest before the state took custody of it.
Two companies delivered O’Connor’s properties—checks collectively worth no more than $350— to the state after he failed to claim them. The state liquidated them. O’Connor filed a claim for compensation. Michigan reimbursed O’Connor for the value of his property, but not any post-liquidation interest. O’Connor alleges that neither the state nor the third-party holders provided him with the statutorily required notices. O’Connor sued Michigan under the Fifth Amendment; Michigan’s Treasurer, and the Administrative Manager of the Unclaimed Property Program, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit held that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on O’Connor’s taking claims but not his due process claims. The district court correctly dismissed O’Connor’s claims against the state but should not have dismissed them with prejudice.
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Perez v. Simpson
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
23-5193
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Thapar
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Officers Simpson and Patrick drove to Perez’s house to execute seven felony arrest warrants. Simpson approached Perez behind the house. After a brief exchange, Perez bolted. Perez wove her way through the neighborhood—including across a two-way street—in a chase the length of two football fields. Patrick ordered her to stop. Perez did not comply. Patrick fired his taser but missed. Perez kept fleeing, heading toward another two-lane street, intending to cross. A row of moving cars stood in her way, so she stopped. Perez alleges she raised her hands and stood still, expecting to be handcuffed. Patrick claims she did not raise her hands and instead took off running. Patrick made the split-second decision to fire his taser again. It connected. Perez fell forward and hit her chin on the ground, fracturing her jaw. She later pled guilty to evading police and resisting arrest.
Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Patrick’s request for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment, 28 U.S.C. 1291, where the decision depended on issues of fact.
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United States v. Lundy
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
22-3686
Opinion Date: October 10, 2023
Judge:
Thapar
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Alyssa was visiting her friend when Lundy, intoxicated forced his way into the house. A neighbor called 911 after hearing “a woman crying” and someone “being thrown around.” Lundy left before officers arrived. The women stated that Lundy left in a red Pontiac. Officers, looking for Lundy, received another call. Lundy had returned with a gun. Officer Martin returned to the house in about two minutes, activated his bodycam, and recorded the women saying that Lundy pointed the gun at them, loaded it, and threatened to kill them in front of Alyssa and Lundy’s young children. Officer Brown found Lundy near the house and looked through the window of the red Pontiac. A loaded pistol sat on the passenger’s seat. During booking, Lundy stated that he’d take the gun charge because “it’s mine.”
Lundy was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The prosecution introduced Martin’s bodycam footage and Martin’s testimony about that conversation. Lundy argued that because Alyssa did not testify, her out-of-court statement was barred. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence. The excited-utterance exception applied because there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and the statement was made while Alyssa was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. The statement was nontestimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply.
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United States v. Schumaker
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
21-6250
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Mathis
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In 2016, Schumaker pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. Schumaker had 14 prior convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary, involving separate structures, occurring on 13 different dates. In 2017, the Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee aggravated burglary was not a violent felony and did not qualify as an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e) predicate offense. The district court sentenced Schumaker to 54 months’ imprisonment in 2020. While the government’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that Tennessee aggravated burglary qualified as an ACCA predicate offense. Schumaker then argued that his prior offenses “did not occur on separate occasions” under ACCA. The Sixth Circuit rejected his argument after considering the charging documents.
On remand, Schumaker cited the Supreme Court’s 2022 grant of certiorari in “Wooden” and unsuccessfully argued that, in conducting the occasions-different inquiry, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibited the court from relying on the dates and locations of the aggravated-burglary offenses found in the judgments associated with those convictions because the dates and locations are non-elemental facts that the government had to prove to a jury. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The limited remand required the district court to sentence Schumaker under the ACCA. Circuit precedent bars Schumaker’s argument that the non-elemental facts in Shepard documents must be charged in an indictment and found by a jury before a court may rely on those facts in the occasions-different inquiry.
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Alcorn v. City of Chicago
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-2948
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Frank Hoover Easterbrook
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Lumar caused a disturbance at a Chicago clinic. Called to the scene, police discovered that Lumar was wanted on an arrest warrant and took him into custody. About 19 hours later he committed suicide. His estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 argued that Lumar should have been released without a bond hearing, and, had he been released swiftly, Lumar would not have killed himself.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit. While the warrant set bond at an amount Lumar could have posted, it had been issued in Lee County, so a local order required a local bond hearing. Even if the order is inconsistent with state law, in denying arrestees the right to waive local bond hearings, a violation of state law does not permit an award under section 1983. Federal law does not prohibit presenting the arrestee to a local judge, within a reasonable time not to exceed 48 hours. The time Lumar spent in custody, including six hours in a hospital to address breathing problems, and the discovery of 12 rocks of crack cocaine in his cell and ensuing return to the Police Department, was reasonable under the standard set by the Supreme Court. Lumar was screened for suicide risk shortly after his arrest and again at the hospital. Illinois law offers a remedy for suicide during custody only if the jailers do something that makes suicide foreseeable.
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Whitaker v. Dempsey
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
23-1086
Opinion Date: October 10, 2023
Judge:
Diane Pamela Wood
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Whitaker, an Illinois prisoner, had $573 when he filed a notice of appeal in his Section 1983 lawsuit; he subsequently spent most of his money at the prison commissary and on postage. The district court denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1).
The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court did not adequately consider the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) balance between the need to collect fees and a prisoner’s discretionary use of his funds. The PLRA mandates that a court apply a statutory formula and collect an initial partial filing fee, then collect the remainder of the fees in installments. Whitaker had enough money to pay the fees in full when they were due and when this court sent him a notice informing him as much but the statute does not mandate that prisoners prioritize their filing fees above all other expenses. Drawing the line for in forma pauperis eligibility at the mere ability to pay the full fee can lead to odd, unintended results. There is nothing suggesting that Whitaker deliberately depleted his account to avoid payment. Whitaker should be permitted to prepay the prescribed portion of the fee with the rest to be collected from his future income, as Congress envisioned.
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Mark Nieters v. Brandon Holtan
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-2600
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
GRASZ
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
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Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 after he was pepper-sprayed and tackled by a Des Moines Police Officer while photographing a protest. Plaintiff, who was covering the protest as a journalist, claimed that the officer and other city officials violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the city officials’ motion for summary judgment after concluding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the unlawful seizure and excessive force claims but affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment dismissing the retaliation claim. The court explained that viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are genuine issues of material fact on whether there was an excessive use of force. To begin, they arrested Plaintiff for failure to disperse—a misdemeanor. Second, while the officer focuses on the fact there had been “hours of criminal activity occurring” and that he was “under constant threat of harm from active rioters,” he cannot point to any facts suggesting an immediate threat to his safety or the safety of others. Further, the court wrote that numerous cases show that the identified general constitutional rule applies with obvious clarity to the conduct in question.
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United States v. Arondo Harris
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-1106
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
STRAS
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant used fake deeds to gain possession of three houses. On appeal, Defendant challenged the loss calculation but began by disputing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his identity theft convictions.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Defendant argued that the government said too much in the closing argument. According to Defendant, two of the prosecutor’s statements qualify. The court explained that the prosecutor’s comment was a fleeting reference that immediately followed an accurate statement of the government’s burden—proof beyond a reasonable doubt— and the district court repeatedly instructed the jury that the burden was on the government.
However, the court explained that while Defendant’s convictions stand, his 41-month sentence cannot. For identity theft and other property crimes, the recommended sentencing range depends in part on the amount of the “actual” or “intended” losses from the crime. Defendant ended up with a total offense level of 22 and a range of 41 to 51 months in prison. The court explained that on remand, the district court must adopt “a reasonable estimate of the” fair market value at the time of the transfer, either by using a measure that reflects the value at that point or by accounting for Defendant’s post-fraud improvements and market changes during the intervening period.
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United States v. Lamar Bertucci
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
23-1513
Opinion Date: October 10, 2023
Judge:
ARNOLD
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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After Defendant violated the conditions of his supervised release, the district court sentenced him to 24 months in prison even though the Sentencing Guidelines recommended 5–11 months. He maintains that the district court failed to explain the sentence adequately and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when explaining a sentence, a court need only set forth enough to satisfy us that it considered the parties' arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its legal decision-making authority. The district court provided ample reason for imposing an upward variance, including the fact that Defendant stayed at the sober-living house only briefly, previously received leniency, frequently violated court orders, and absconded for months on end. The court explained that the court isn't required to discuss or recite each statutory sentencing consideration before imposing a sentence; when, as here, the court mentions some of them, we presume it is aware of them all.
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United States v. Nicholas Jackson
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-3666
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
LOKEN
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant, a native and resident of Iowa, was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of possessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment and 240 months supervised release. In January 2022, the district court revoked supervised release after Defendant admitted to viewing pornography on computers at public libraries in Des Moines, which violated conditions of his supervised release and Iowa Sex Offender Registry requirements. The court imposed a revocation sentence of 14 months imprisonment followed by 19 years of supervised release. The district court revoked supervised release and imposed a revocation sentence of 24 months imprisonment followed by 19 years supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing the revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court expressly acknowledged Defendant’s need for sex offender treatment and agreed to recommend that Defendant be confined in a BOP facility that has treatment programming. The court considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) sentencing factors and carefully explained its decision to give greater weight to protecting the community from a high-risk offender with a long criminal history that included hands-on sexual abuse of young children than to the possibility that the needed treatment would be less available or less effective in prison. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
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AROLDO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
20-16245
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Paez
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Immigration Law
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The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which the panel: (1) reversed a judgment of the district court granting Petitioner's habeas petition challenging his continued immigration detention after an initial bond hearing; and (2) held that due process does not require a second bond hearing.
Judge Paez issued a statement regarding the court's denial. Judge Paez joined by Judges Murguia, Wardlaw, Gould, Berzon, Koh, Sung, Sanchez, H.A. Thomas, Mendoza, and Desai, wrote that the panel opinion conflicts with Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).
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DOUGLAS CLARK V. RON BROOMFIELD
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
21-99008
Opinion Date: October 10, 2023
Judge:
Sidney R. Thomas
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Petitioner was convicted in 1982 of first-degree murders. He was also convicted of one count of mutilation of human remains and one count of attempted murder and mayhem. The jury found a multiple murder special circumstance allegation and sentenced Petitioner to death. The California Supreme Court reversed Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder and mayhem and affirmed Petitioner’s murder convictions and death sentence.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition challenging his California conviction and capital sentence for six counts of first-degree murder. The panel held that Petitioner’s pre-AEDPA October 1992 pro se filing seeking appointment of counsel was not an “actual application” that sought “adjudication” on the merits and that AEDPA applied to the habeas petition filed by appointed counsel in April 1997. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner’s July 1982 pre-trial Faretta request to represent himself was equivocal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s August 1982 Faretta request was untimely was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the district court properly concluded that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that Petitioner’s Marsden rights were not violated was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court
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LEON MEYERS V. EDWARD BIRDSONG, ET AL
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
17-16907
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
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Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, moved to recall the mandate and reinstate his 2017 appeal of the dismissal of his civil rights action against state agencies and Salinas Valley Prison medical staff and officials.
The Ninth Circuit denied the motion to reinstate the appeal but directed that his filing fees be refunded. The panel first determined that Plaintiff’s motion to recall the mandate, filed 661 days after the mandate became effective, was untimely. The panel next held that the extraordinary remedy of recalling the mandate and ordering reinstatement to prevent injustice or address exceptional circumstances was not necessary given that Plaintiff did not dispute that he had three strikes, was ineligible to proceed IFP under Section 1915(b)’s payment plan, and had not timely paid the filing fee. The appeal therefore was properly dismissed. The panel held that Section 1915 neither permits nor requires the collection of fees from a prisoner who is ineligible for IFP status because he has struck out under Section 1915(g). Plaintiff purported IFP appeal therefore was barred by 1915(g), and the district court was without authority to collect the filing fees from Plaintiff’s prison account.
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VIRGINIA DUNCAN, ET AL V. ROB BONTA
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
23-55805
Opinion Date: October 10, 2023
Judge:
MURGUIA
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Plaintiffs—five individuals and the California Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.—filed this action in the Southern District of California challenging the constitutionality of Section 32310 under the Second Amendment. On September 22, 2023, the district court issued an order declaring Section 32310 “unconstitutional in its entirety” and enjoining California officials from enforcing the law. Defendant Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California, filed an emergency motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The Attorney General seeks to stay “all portions of the order except those regarding Sections 32310(c) and (d), which relate to large-capacity magazines that were acquired and possessed lawfully prior to the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction.”
The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. First, the court concluded that the Attorney General is likely to succeed on the merits. The court explained that the Attorney General makes strong arguments that Section 32310 comports with the Second Amendment under Bruen. Second, the Attorney General has shown that California will be irreparably harmed absent a stay pending appeal by presenting evidence that large-capacity magazines pose significant threats to public safety. Third, it does not appear that staying portions of the district court’s order while the merits of this appeal are pending will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings. Finally, the court concluded that the public interest tips in favor of a stay.
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United States v. Nunez-Carranza
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
22-2100
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
David M. Ebel
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant Alfredo Nunez-Carranza, a Mexican citizen, challenged his fifty-one-month sentence for unlawfully reentering the United States after previously being removed. The fifty-one-month sentence fell at the
bottom of Nunez-Carranza’s properly calculated advisory guideline range. On appeal, he contended the district court plainly erred in not explaining why it imposed that sentence instead of a below-guideline sentence that he requested. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
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Wyoming Gun Owners v. Gray, et al.
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
22-8019
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
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Wyoming Gun Owners, a non-profit gun rights advocacy group, aired a provocative radio ad in the run-up to Wyoming’s 2020 primary election. The ad extolled the pro-gun credentials of one candidate while branding the other as out of touch with Wyoming values. Under Wyoming law, an advertisement that refers to a candidate and advocates for his victory or defeat—or can only be reasonably understood in that way—generally constitutes an electioneering communication. The Wyoming Secretary of State’s Office flagged Wyoming Gun Owners’ advertisement as an electioneering communication. The organization subsequently sued the Secretary of State (and related parties) in federal district court, arguing that various provisions of the Wyoming statute were void for vagueness and that the disclosure scheme was not constitutionally justified. The district court agreed and determined that the disclosure regime failed exacting scrutiny as applied to WyGO and found a provision within the scheme void for vagueness as applied to WyGO. The Secretary appealed the latter two rulings and WyGO cross-appealed the rest. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on most claims: the disclosure regime failed exacting scrutiny as applied to WyGO for lack of narrow tailoring; and the regime’s requirement that expenditures for speech “related to” candidate campaigns must be disclosed was void for vagueness as applied to WyGO. The district court did, however, erroneously deny WyGO’s request for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court reversed and remanded for an accounting of fees.
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Karyn D. Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
22-10002
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
BRASHER
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
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Plaintiff became a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, in 1999. At the age of 47, Plaintiff took disability retirement on November 1, 2018. When Plaintiff retired, she continued to receive free health insurance through the City. Under a policy in effect when Plaintiff first joined the fire department, employees retiring for qualifying disability reasons, such as Plaintiff’s Parkinson’s disease, received free health insurance until the age of 65. But, unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the City changed its benefits plan in 2003. Under the new plan, disability retirees such as Plaintiff are entitled to the health insurance subsidy for only twenty-four months after retiring. Her complaint alleged various claims, including violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The district court entered judgment for the City.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff cannot establish that the City committed any discriminatory acts against her while she could perform the essential functions of a job that she held or desired to hold, her Title I claim fails. For the same reason, so do her claims under the Rehab Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Further, the court held that the City’s s benefits plan does not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Disabled persons are not a suspect class, and government-paid health insurance is not a recognized fundamental right. Thus under rational basis review, the City’s benefits plan advances the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving funds.
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Ricky J. Johnson v. Dr. Sharon Lewis, et al
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
20-10150
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
GRIMBERG
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
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Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody and care of the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC). Plaintiff was diagnosed with Hepatitis C (HCV) in 2009 but did not receive medication for it until nine years later. By then, Plaintiff’s HCV had progressed to stage F4 cirrhosis with indications of severe liver inflammation. Plaintiff sued numerous prison doctors, three of whom are the subject of this appeal, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors and dismissed all claims against them. Plaintiff appealed both the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its denial of his motion to amend the complaint.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment but affirmed its denial of the motion to amend. The court explained that the bar to proving an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim is high, but it is not insurmountable. The court explained that Plaintiff has raised a number of factual disputes regarding the denial of his HCV treatment for over eight years. These disputes are sufficiently material to be decided by a jury.
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USA v. Robert Dunn
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
22-11731
Opinion Date: October 10, 2023
Judge:
HULL
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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After entering a conditional guilty plea, Defendant appealed his convictions on four counts related to child pornography. At the start of the COVID-19 global pandemic, Defendant was arrested on a criminal complaint on March 10, 2020. Thereafter, the district court entered a series of pandemic-related administrative orders that continued grand jury sessions five times at the ends of justice, spanning March 26, 2020, to November 16, 2020. Due to the pandemic, a grand jury did not formally indict Defendant until December 1, 2020. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment for failure to indict him within thirty days from his arrest, as required by the Speedy Trial Act. Defendant does not challenge the time between indictment and his guilty plea, but only between his arrest on March 10 and grand jury indictment on December 1, 2020.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The court concluded that the pandemic-related continuances in 2020 were not an abuse of discretion and were within the ends-of-justice exception to the Speedy Trial Act. The court explained that the magistrate judge was not required to expressly consider each statutory factor in its order or recite specific language from the statute. The court explained that not every statutory factor will be relevant to the circumstances warranting the continuance. Instead, it is sufficient if the record shows, as it does here, that the magistrate judge considered the pertinent factors.
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Ark. Dep't of Education v. Jackson
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 Ark. 140
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Webb
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Election Law
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The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court finding that the emergency clause contained within Act 237 of 2023 (the LEARNS Act) did not receive a separate roll-call vote as required under the Arkansas Constitution, rendering the clause procedurally invalid, holding that Arkansas General Assembly complied with Ark. Const. V, 1 when it enacted the LEARNS Act emergency clause.
After the General Assembly passed the LEARNS Act the legislation was sent the Governor, who signed it into law. Appellees brought the underlying complaint seeking a declaration that the Act's emergency clause, under which certain provisions became effective on the date of the Governor's approval, was invalid. Upon remand, the circuit court declared the LEARNS Act emergency clause invalid because it did not receive a separate roll-call vote. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the emergency clause was passed in compliance with article 5, section 1.
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Wilder v. State
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 Ark. 137
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Kemp
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of rape, three counts of first-degree sexual assault, and two counts of sexual indecency with a child and sentencing him to two terms of life imprisonment, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.
On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting testimony of a certain witness under the pedophile exception to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's first argument was not preserved for appellate review; (2) Defendant's argument that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial was not preserved; and (3) the circuit court did not err in excluding evidence of the victims' prior sexual conduct pursuant to the rape-shield statute set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-42-101(c).
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Wofford v. State
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 Ark. 138
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Womack
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of capital murder and his sentence to life in prison, holding that substantial evidence supported the conviction.
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the murder of his ex-wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. As his sole point on appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support Defendant's capital murder conviction, and there was no error with respect to the jury's rejection of Defendant's affirmative defense argument.
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Martin v. Delaware
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Court: Delaware Supreme Court
Docket:
112, 2021
Opinion Date: October 9, 2023
Judge:
LeGrow
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In 2013, defendant-appellant Darnell Martin received an unconditional gubernatorial pardon for his previous criminal convictions, which included several felony convictions. Several years later, Martin was arrested and charged with new offenses. After his convictions for those charges were affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. More than two years passed as the parties briefed Martin’s motion and the trial court considered it. During that time, Martin served his prison sentence and his term of probation. He was discharged from probation while the postconviction motion was under advisement with the Superior Court. After Martin’s probation was discharged, the Superior Court dismissed his postconviction motion as moot, concluding that he no longer was “in custody” as required by Rule 61(a) and, given his extensive criminal history, he would not suffer any collateral consequences as a result of the convictions he was challenging. When the Superior Court dismissed the motion, it was not aware that Martin’s previous convictions had been pardoned. Martin appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court remanded to the Superior Court to further consider the effect of Martin’s pardon, including whether a pardoned defendant suffers collateral consequences in the same manner as a first-time felon and therefore should not have his postconviction motion mooted if he is released from custody before the motion is resolved. The Superior Court concluded the collateral consequences doctrine, which the Supreme Court adopted more than 50 years ago based on United States Supreme Court precedent, has no continuing application in postconviction proceedings in Delaware. Martin’s appeal then returned to the Supreme Court, where he again challenged dismissal of his motion and the Superior Court’s application of the mootness doctrine. Having carefully considered the Superior Court’s decision and the parties’ submissions, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in dismissing Martin’s postconviction motion as moot.
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Thomas v. Delaware
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Court: Delaware Supreme Court
Docket:
268, 2022
Opinion Date: October 2, 2023
Judge:
Karen L. Valihura
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant-appellant Shamayah Thomas (“Thomas”) was convicted after a bench trial of Stalking and related acts of intimidation and harassment. Before his bench trial, Thomas filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss Current Counsel and/or to Appoint New Counsel on grounds that his then-current counsel was not following his instructions regarding his pretrial defense (the “First Motion to Dismiss Current Counsel”). Also before trial, Thomas’ counsel filed a motion to suppress digital evidence (the “Motion to Suppress”) collected from Thomas’s pink iPhone (“Pink iPhone”), alleging that law enforcement seized the phone without a warrant and, alternatively, that the search warrant issued following the seizure of the Pink iPhone (“Search Warrant”) was constitutionally defective. The trial court denied Thomas’ motion for new counsel pursuant to Superior Court Rule 47; the court granted in part, and denied in part, the Motion to Suppress, ultimately admitting certain evidence extracted from the Pink iPhone. After trial, but before his sentencing, Thomas filed a second motion to dismiss current counsel and/or appoint new counsel. Although the Superior Court prothonotary’s office failed to direct the second motion to dismiss counsel to defense counsel or to the trial judge, the trial court addressed the motion at Thomas’ sentencing hearing. Given the option of either delaying sentencing and proceeding pro se, or proceeding with his then-current counsel, Thomas chose to proceed with sentencing as scheduled, represented by his then-current counsel. On appeal, Thomas argued the Superior Court: (1) erred when it categorized the Pink iPhone Search Warrant as an overbroad warrant as opposed to an unconstitutional general warrant; and (2) failed to adequately address Thomas’ Motions to Dismiss Counsel. Thomas asked the Delaware Supreme Court to reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.
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Bowman v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0682
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Pinson
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Appellant Torry Bowman and his friend, Maurice Goodman, got into an argument in a bar with brothers Alec and Britian Price. They confronted the Price brothers again outside the bar, and Alec was shot and died as a result of his injuries. Bowman was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with Alec’s death. On appeal, Bowman contended the trial court erred by: (1) instructing the jury on party to a crime, conspiracy, and provocation by words alone; and (2) failing to allow him to stipulate to his prior conviction to prove the required elements of Count 9 without stipulating that the conviction involved the possession or use of a firearm. He also argued that these errors, taken together, deprived him of a fair trial under Georgia v. Lane, 838 SE2d 808 (2020). Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
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Caldwell v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0987
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Peterson
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Javion Caldwell was charged with: felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 1), felony murder predicated on possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 4). These charges arose in connection with the shooting death of Jaleen Harrell during a drug deal. Caldwell was found guilty of Counts 2 and 4 and not guilty of Counts 1 and 3. On appeal, Caldwell argued the trial court failed to charge the jury that it had to find that he shot Harrell with a handgun in order to find him guilty on Count 2. Caldwell alternatively argued that the jury’s verdicts on Counts 1, 2, and 3 were repugnant, because the jury’s verdicts on Counts 1 and 3 reflected a finding that he did not shoot Harrell, even as a party to the crime, which Caldwell argued also meant that it had to acquit him on Count 2. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
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Georgia v. Cook, et al.
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Dockets:
S23A0702, S23A0703, S23A0704, S23A0705, S23A0706, S23A0707
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Bethel
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Antonio May died from injuries he sustained inside the Fulton County (Georgia) Jail while in the custody of the Fulton County Sheriff. The defendants, Aaron Cook, Jason Roache, Guito Dela Cruz, Omar Jackson, Kenesia Strowder, and William Whitaker, were employed as jailers by the Fulton County Sheriff and were on duty at the Jail when May died. The State alleged through indictments of the defendants for felony murder and other crimes the defendants beat, pepper sprayed, and repeatedly shocked May with an electronic taser, thereby causing his death. Claiming the pre-indictment protections afforded to “peace officers” under OCGA § 17-7-52, the defendants sought to quash their indictments on the basis that they did not receive preindictment notice and an opportunity to be heard. The trial court found that, while none of the defendants were empowered to make arrests, they were nevertheless charged with maintaining the public peace. To that end, the trial court reasoned that “within the community of over 3,000 inmates in the Fulton County Jail (which is accessible to the public in various controlled ways), detention officers are the maintainers of public order” in the event that “there is a fight in the mess hall over bad beans or a brawl in the common space over which channel the TV should be on[.]” On that basis, the trial court quashed the indictments. The State appealed. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by finding that the defendants’ duty to control and supervise inmates within the jail constituted a duty to maintain the public peace. Accordingly, the judgments were reversed.
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Jones v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0684
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Carla Wong McMillian
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Xavier Jones appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2010 shooting death of Christopher Crumby. On appeal, Jones argued the trial court erred: (1) in not granting his motion for directed verdict at trial; (2) in not granting his motion for new trial on the general grounds; (3) by admitting a video recording of Jones’s interview in which Jones remained silent in response to some of the investigators’ questions and comments; (4) denying his motion for mistrial on that ground, and (5) by failing to meaningfully respond to a question submitted by the jury during deliberations. Jones also argued the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The Georgia Supreme Court vacated Jones' conviction for aggravated assault as it should have merged into his felony murder conviction. The Court affirmed Jones' convictions in all other respects.
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Kimbro v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0678
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Warren
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Appellant Torrey Kimbro was convicted of malice murder and rape in connection with the strangling death of Diamond Shepherd. On appeal, Kimbro contended the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to support his convictions. He also claimed the trial court erred: by denying his motion for new trial on the “general grounds” set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21; by denying his motion for a continuance; by denying his motion to dismiss his indictment; by denying his motion for a mistrial; and by overruling his objections to certain statements that the prosecutor made during her closing argument. In addition, he claimed his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in several respects. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
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Kinlaw v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0547
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Bethel
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Harold Kinlaw was convicted by jury of the malice murder of Felipe Herrera, the aggravated stalking and kidnapping of Kinlaw’s former wife Damaris Kinlaw, and other related crimes. Kinlaw appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated stalking; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to provide an interpreter for a witness at trial; (3) the trial court erred by excluding evidence that Herrera had threatened Kinlaw; (4) the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter and self-defense; and (5) the trial court erred by employing an improper remedy after finding that the State had violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
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Maynor v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0753
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Colvin
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Appellant Reginald Maynor appealed his convictions for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and other crimes related to the 2015 shooting death of Marti Stegall, Sr. This case stemmed from f a romantic affair involving two couples residing in the Trestle Tree Village Apartments. The conflict caused by this affair ultimately resulted in Appellant shooting and killing Stegall during a neighborhood Fourth of July celebration. At trial, Appellant admitted that he shot Stegall but claimed that he did so in self-defense. On appeal, Appellant argued the evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional and statutory law to disprove his claim of self-defense. Appellant also contended he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine a witness and failed to move for a mistrial when the trial evidence did not substantiate a factual claim made by the prosecutor in his opening statement. Appellant also asked that the Georgia Supreme Court consider the prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s errors cumulatively. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
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Pauldo v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0654
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
LaGrua
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Appellant Raekwon Pauldo was convicted of malice murder in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Jacquel Smith. On appeal, Pauldo contended his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to adequately prepare the defense of accident; (2) failing to limit testimony concerning the registration of Pauldo’s gun; and (3) failing to adequately inform him of the State’s plea offer. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
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Priester v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0728
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Warren
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In 2020, Darnell Priester was convicted of malice murder, aggravated battery, and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Thomas Robinson and the non-fatal shooting of Timothy Nelson. He appealed, arguing: (1) the
evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support them; (2) the trial court erred by denying him a new trial on the general grounds; and (3) the trial court committed plain error by not giving jury instructions related to justification and perjury. Priester also argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the lack of jury instructions related to justification and perjury; failing to object to testimony that implicated Priester’s right to remain silent; failing to cross-examine Shane Godsey; requesting an instruction on the necessity of corroboration of accomplice testimony; failing to file a pretrial motion for immunity; and failing to object to narrative testimony, to “asked and answered” testimony, and to the prosecutor “testifying.” Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
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Rivera v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0429
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
LaGrua
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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On May 19, 1996, the body of Bridgett Parker was discovered near an abandoned mobile home. Parker’s throat had been cut, and she had been raped. Soon after, law enforcement officers identified Appellant Octavious Rivera as a possible suspect, and over the next few weeks, they interviewed Rivera regarding Parker’s death, executed a search warrant for his car and residence, and obtained a sample of his DNA; however, they did not arrest Rivera at that time. In February 2018, following the GBI’s reexamination of Parker’s sexual assault kit using new DNA testing methods and technology, Rivera’s DNA was identified as a match for DNA found inside Parker’s vaginal area, and he was arrested. Rivera was later convicted of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, as well as rape. On appeal, Rivera contended the trial court erred: (1) by denying Rivera’s motion for directed verdict on the ground that the State failed to allege the applicable tolling provision or exception to the statute of limitation with respect to Count 3 (aggravated assault) and Count 4 (rape) in the indictment, and on the ground that the statute of limitation on those counts was not tolled; and (2) by permitting the State to admit other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) and OCGA § 24-4-413 at trial. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Rivera’s felony murder conviction and reversed his rape conviction.
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Sosebee v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0589
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Ellington
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Christopher Sosebee was convicted by jury of felony murder in the 2020 death of Brian Hayes resulting from a car wreck. A sheriff’s deputy was looking for a black car that had been spraypainted and was missing its front grill, in order to serve arrest warrants on a person who, the day before, had reportedly been driving a vehicle matching that description. After a few minutes of following a SUV at 45 to 50 mph in a 45 mph zone, the deputy activated his blue lights and siren. The SUV accelerated and pulled away from the patrol car. At a curve, the SUV’s right rear tire
left the road, then the SUV veered sharply to the left, crossed the oncoming lane, traveled up an embankment, hit some boulders, flipped, landed on top of an approaching truck, and then rolled off. The driver of the truck (Hayes) showed no signs of life when the deputy reached him, and Sosebee’s girlfriend, Tiffany Franklin, who had been a passenger in the SUV during the incident, was very badly injured. A test of Sosebee’s blood after the wreck revealed methamphetamine, at an impairment level, as well as marijuana. Sosebee contended felony murder (Count 1), and homicide by vehicle in the first degree (Count 4), which were both predicated on Count 6, fleeing or attempting to elude, defined exactly the same criminal conduct. Sosebee argued that the rule of lenity therefore required that he be sentenced within the range for homicide by vehicle in the first degree, rather than for felony murder. He also contended his sentence of life without parole violated the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment because neither felony murder nor homicide by vehicle in the first degree, when predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude as in this case, requires malice or specific intent to harm, and because the prior felonies that triggered his sentencing as a recidivist were nonviolent. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
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Steele v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0460
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Carla Wong McMillian
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Donald Steele appealed his convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the stabbing death of Kevin McGruder. Steele argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction and that the trial court should have merged his conviction for aggravated assault into his conviction
for felony murder, which was based on aggravated assault. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support Steele’s convictions, but the State conceded his conviction for aggravated assault should have merged into his felony murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Steele’s conviction for felony murder and vacated his aggravated assault conviction.
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Davis v. State
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Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Docket:
22S-CR-00253
Opinion Date: October 3, 2023
Judge:
Molter
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal of the sentence imposed in connection with his plea of guilty to four theft-related charges, holding that Defendant's written plea agreement with the State, which both he and his attorney signed, unambiguously waived his right to appeal his sentence.
In exchange for a more lenient sentence, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to four theft-related charges and waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. The trial court accepted Defendant's plea and sentenced him to four years for burglary and thirty months for theft, ordering the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeals with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this Court could not nullify Defendant's appeal waiver through direct appeal based on the claim that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary, but Defendant could still seek relief through post-conviction proceedings.
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Galloway v. Mississippi
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Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi
Citation:
2013-DR-01796-SCT
Opinion Date: October 5, 2023
Judge:
Beam
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Leslie “Bo” Galloway’s was convicted by jury of the capital murder of Shakeylia Anderson. Galloway’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court on direct appeal. His motion for rehearing was subsequently denied, and he sought relief from the United States Supreme Court by way of a petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied on May 27, 2014. Galloway returned to the Mississippi Supreme Court with a Motion for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court with a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and his subsequently filed Motion for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court with Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The Supreme Court treated both filings together as one and referred to it as Galloway’s amended petition for post-conviction relief. Finding no error, the Court denied his amended petition.
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State v. Bristow
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 MT 188
Opinion Date: October 6, 2023
Judge:
Gustafson
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to seventy years in Montana State Prison for deliberate homicide, a felony, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's claim that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance when he advised Defendant and the court that mitigated deliberate homicide was not a lesser-included offense of deliberate homicide was more appropriate for postconviction relief; and (2) the district court did not err when it concluded that the State's offer of proof provided sufficient evidence to accept Defendant's Alford plea.
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North Dakota v. Hatzenbuehler
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Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 ND 192
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Jensen
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Dean Hatzenbuehler appealed an order revoking sentencing and judgment imposing a new sentence. In August 2022, Hatzenbuehler pled guilty to conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, a class B felony; delivery of a controlled substance, a class B felony; possession of a controlled substance-methamphetamine, a class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor He argued the district court’s findings of fact on the revocation of his probation were clearly erroneous and the court erred by not adequately considering the statutory sentencing factors. The North Dakota concluded the court’s findings supporting revocation were not clearly erroneous, the court adequately considered the statutory factors, and the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence upon revocation.
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North Dakota v. Whitetail
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Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 ND 196
Opinion Date: October 11, 2023
Judge:
Daniel J. Crothers
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Milo Blaine Whitetail was convicted by jury of intentional or knowing murder. Whitetail argued on appeal the
evidence is insufficient to prove that he was not in a dissociative mental state at the time of the murder due to his post-traumatic stress disorder. Whitetail also argued the State did not prove he acted knowingly or intentionally. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.
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State v. Williams
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Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation:
2023-Ohio-3647
Opinion Date: October 10, 2023
Judge:
Donnelly
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In this case concerning how an Ohio prisoner is to enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial on an untried indictment the Supreme Court held that a prisoner satisfies the "causes to be delivered" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.401 when he delivers the written notice and the request to the warden where he is imprisoned, even if the warden fails to deliver the notice and the request to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court.
Appellant, who was indicted on counts of aggravated robbery and robbery, moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant had strictly complied with section 2941.401 when he provided written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition and that the 180-day speedy trial time was not tolled by the warden's failure to comply with his duty to send out Appellant's written notices and requests to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant had not strictly complied with the requirements of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant caused to be delivered his written notice and request for final disposition under the statute when he provided them to the warden.
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Ingle v. Matteucci
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Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Docket:
S069222
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Duncan
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Petitioner Matthew Ingle waived his right to a jury trial and raised an insanity defense. The trial court found petitioner “guilty except for insanity” on all charges and placed him under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board and committed him to the Oregon State Hospital. More than eight years after his convictions became final, petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner requested and received court-appointed counsel, who amended the petition. In the operative petition, petitioner acknowledged that the limitations period had run but asserted that an “escape clause” applied. Specifically, he asserted that the escape clause applied because, during the limitations period, he was disabled by “diagnosed schizophrenia” and the “forced consumption of extremely powerful psychotropic medications” and that those conditions “deprived him of the ability” to file a timely petition. The State moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that petitioner’s mental impairments were irrelevant to whether the escape clause applied. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded petitioner’s allegations were sufficient to raise a triable issue on the applicability of the escape clause. Consequently, the post-conviction court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings. That judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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Oregon v. B. Y.
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Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Docket:
S069640
Opinion Date: October 5, 2023
Judge:
Garrett
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
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While on juvenile parole related to a commitment to Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) in an earlier case, B.Y. was adjudicated to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for interfering with a peace officer. Based on that conduct, the juvenile court imposed a new disposition, which also committed B.Y. to OYA custody, to commence at the conclusion of his existing commitment. B.Y. challenged that order, contending that the juvenile court lacked authority to impose consecutive commitments. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with B.Y. and reversed the juvenile court. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: “the statutory text neither expressly permits nor expressly prohibits the imposition of consecutive commitments. The statutory scheme does, however, confer broad authority on the juvenile court to fashion appropriate dispositions; that stands in contrast to the criminal code, where courts’ sentencing authority is more circumscribed. Given that contrast, the fact that the legislature did not explicitly provide for consecutive commitments in a circumstance such as this is unsurprising. In light of the wide latitude that the legislature has chosen to give juvenile courts, it is more reasonable to expect that if the legislature had intended to limit the juvenile court’s ability to impose consecutive commitments in this circumstance, the legislature would have indicated as much.”
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Oregon v. Hubbell
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Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Docket:
S069092
Opinion Date: October 5, 2023
Judge:
Garrett
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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A trial court convicted defendant Brian Hubbell of delivery under ORS 475.752 based on evidence that defendant’s extended-stay hotel room contained a large quantity of fentanyl, a portion of which was packaged in a manner consistent with an intent to sell it to individual users or dealers. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court ruled that that evidence was sufficient to convict him of delivery under Oregon v. Boyd, 756 P2d 1276 (1988). In Boyd, the Court of Appeals construed the phrase “attempted transfer” in ORS 475.005(8) by applying principles of liability for the inchoate crime of attempt, ORS 161.405(1), whereby a person who intentionally takes a “substantial step” toward committing a crime is liable for attempting the crime. Boyd held that possessing a controlled substance in a quantity too large to be consistent with personal use, combined with evidence of an intent to transfer that substance, constitutes a substantial step toward transferring it and hence is sufficient to show an “attempted transfer.” On appeal in this case, defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to show delivery even under Boyd. The Court of Appeal, on its own initiative, re-examined Boyd, overruled it, and held that possession plus an intent to deliver, without more, was insufficient to show an “attempted transfer” for purposes of the completed crime of delivery of controlled substances, though it could establish a “substantial step” for purposes of the inchoate crime of attempt. To this, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the appellant court.
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State v. Ogden
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Court: Utah Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 UT 23
Opinion Date: October 12, 2023
Judge:
Hagen
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which allows a court to grant relief from a judgment under certain circumstances, holding that Defendant's challenge to his conviction could have been brought in a petition for post-conviction relief.
Defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Defendant did not file a direct appeal and did not challenge his conviction under Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) but later filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion, ruling that Rule 60(b)(6) was not the appropriate vehicle for Defendant to bring his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PCRA applied to Defendant's request to set aside his conviction based on his trial counsel's alleged conflict of interest.
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Castellanos v. State
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 WY 97
Opinion Date: October 10, 2023
Judge:
Fenn
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for interference with a peace officer, holding that the district court did not violate Defendant's due process rights by conducting a hearing under Asch v. State, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003), in Defendant's absence after he refused to attend the hearing.
Defendant, who was serving three consecutive life sentences at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, was charged with interference with a peace officer. Before the scheduled trial date, the State moved to require Defendant to be restrained during trial. The district court conducted an Asch hearing without Defendant and decided to impose restraints at trial. Defendant was convicted of one count of felony interference with a peace officer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived any right he had to be present at the Asch hearing by knowingly and voluntarily failing to appear at the hearing due to circumstances within his control.
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