United States v. Davila-Reyes

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 16-2089

Opinion Date: October 5, 2023

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit granted the government's petition for rehearing en banc in these consolidated appeals regarding Defendants' 2016 convictions for violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70501 et seq. (MDLEA), holding that 46 U.S.C. 70503(e)(1) does not limit the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts under Article III of the United States Constitution.

Defendants pleaded guilty unconditionally to the underlying charges, but a panel of the First Circuit vacated the convictions and ordered the underlying charges dismissed. The government petitioned for rehearing en banc. The First Circuit granted the petition, vacated the panel's ruling, and affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that section 70503(e)(1) merely limits the substantive reach of the MDLEA and that Defendants' claims on appeal failed.

Dooley v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-995

Opinion Date: October 5, 2023

Judge: Guido Calabresi

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

While riding a bicycle, Plaintiff ran into an open car door being operated by a recruiter for the U.S. Marines. Plaintiff brought
a claim for negligence against the United States, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found the United States liable but concluded Plaintiff was also negligent and, therefore, partially liable.

On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the evidence of Plaintiff's negligence was "dubious," and, even if Plaintiff was negligent, the district court failed to make the findings necessary to any holding that the plaintiff’s negligent conduct sufficiently caused the collision so as to make Plaintiff 40% responsible for the damages.

United States v. Pastore

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 18-2482

Opinion Date: October 2, 2023

Judge: RICHARD J. SULLIVAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction on charges including attempted murder in aid of racketeering and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Defendant argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses on which the conviction was based are not “crimes of violence” in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022).
 
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction remains valid even after Davis and Taylor because one of the predicate offenses underlying the conviction – attempted murder in aid of racketeering – is a categorical crime of violence. The court explained that here, unlike Hobbs Act robbery, the crime of second-degree murder cannot be committed through the mere threat of force and must instead involve the actual use of force. Since attempted murder requires both an intent to use physical force and a substantial step towards the use of physical force, it satisfies the “attempted use . . . of physical force” element under section 924(c), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3)(A), and thereby qualifies as a crime of violence.

In Re: Jeff Landry

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30642

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law

Louisiana’s Attorney General filed a request for mandamus relief seeking to vacate the district court’s hearing scheduled to begin on October 3 and require the district court to promptly convene trial on the merits of this congressional redistricting case.
 
The Fifth Circuit granted in part and ordered the district court to vacate the October Hearing. The court explained that redistricting based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. Section 10301, is complex, historically evolving, and sometimes undertaken with looming electoral deadlines. The court explained that the district court did not follow the law of the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit court. Its action in rushing redistricting via a court-ordered map is a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no alternative means of appeal. Issuance of the writ is justified “under the circumstances” in light of multiple precedents contradicting the district court’s procedure here. The court held that the state has no other means of relief and is not seeking to use mandamus as a substitute for appeal. Further, the court noted that if this were ordinary litigation, the court would be most unlikely to intervene in a remedial proceeding for a preliminary injunction. Redistricting litigation, however, is not ordinary litigation. The court held that the district court here forsook its duty and placed the state at an intolerable disadvantage legally and tactically.

Perry v. Mendoza

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20436

Opinion Date: September 29, 2023

Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Defendant Officer arrested Plaintiff for telephone harassment after she witnessed Plaintiff call in false complaints about her neighbors’ supposedly loud music. The harassment charges were dropped, however. Plaintiff then sued Defendant for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Her claim was dismissed based on qualified immunity. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the magistrate judge erred by (A) concluding Defendant reasonably believed she had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for telephone harassment and (B) determining no issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that, before arresting Plaintiff, Defendant called the district attorney’s office to ensure that a telephone harassment charge was proper. The court wrote that as the magistrate judge observed, nothing about the circumstances taints Defendant’s beliefs as unreasonable: (1) Plaintiff called multiple times to report loud music that day; (2) other officers found no loud music playing when they arrived; (3) the alleged noisemakers claimed they were not playing loud music; (4) no music was playing during the several hours Defendant was on the scene; and (5) while Defendant stood behind the neighbors’ fence hearing no noise, she received reports Plaintiff was still calling in complaints. Thus the court wrote that it sees no error in the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Defendant reasonably believed probable cause supported Plaintiff’s arrest.

Sacks v. Texas Southern University

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20541

Opinion Date: October 3, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff resigned from her tenured professorship at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University (TSU) in August 2020. She then sued TSU and several TSU employees for Title VII constructive discharge, Equal Pay Act (EPA) retaliation, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed all her claims, holding that res judicata barred her Section 1983 claims and that she failed to state Title VII and EPA claims.
 
The Ffith Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff alleges that TSU investigated her for discrimination but found no evidence that Plaintiff discriminated, that defendant “threw her hair into Plaintiff’s face in the law school lobby,” and that defendant yelled at Plaintiff that she couldn’t park in a church parking lot. But no facts suggest that these were more than personal disputes between the parties. Indeed, their parking lot confrontation was not even on school property. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant “has made comments about [her] race,” but she does not identify the comments or their context. The court explained that Plaintiff does not allege conduct by TSU that plausibly—not just possibly—states a constructive discharge claim. Further, the court held that Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant acted under color of state law and thus fails to state a Section 1983 claim.

State of Missouri v. Biden

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30445

Opinion Date: October 3, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The Plaintiffs—three doctors, a news website, a healthcare activist, and two states —had posts and stories removed or downgraded by the platforms. Their content touched on a host of divisive topics like the COVID-19 lab-leak theory. Plaintiffs maintain that although the platforms stifled their speech, the government officials were the ones pulling the strings. They sued the officials for First Amendment violations and asked the district court to enjoin the officials’ conduct. The officials argued that they only “sought to mitigate the hazards of online misinformation” by “calling attention to content” that violated the “platforms’ policies,” a form of permissible government speech. The district court agreed with the Plaintiffs and granted preliminary injunctive relief.
 
The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the injunction in part, and modified the injunction in part. The court affirmed with respect to the White House, the Surgeon General, the CDC, the FBI, and CISA and reversed as to all other officials. As to the NIAID officials, it is not apparent that they ever communicated with the social media platforms. Instead, the record shows, at most, that public statements by Director Anthony Fauci and other NIAID officials promoted the government’s scientific and policy views and attempted to discredit opposing ones—quintessential examples of government speech that do not run afoul of the First Amendment. Further, as for the State Department, while it did communicate directly with the platforms, so far, there is no evidence these communications went beyond educating the platforms on “tools and techniques” used by foreign actors.

USA v. Shah

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-10292

Opinion Date: October 2, 2023

Judge: Priscilla Richman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Seven codefendants appeal their various convictions stemming from a multi-million-dollar healthcare conspiracy involving surgery-referral kickbacks at Forest Park Medical Center in Dallas, Texas. They challenge convictions under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”), the Travel Act, and for money laundering. The defendants in this case are, with three exceptions, the surgeons whom Forest Park paid to direct surgeries to the hospital—Won, Rimlawi, Shah, and Henry. One exception is Forrest— she is a nurse. Another is Jacob—he ran Adelaide Business Solutions (Adelaide), a pass-through entity. The other is Burt—he was part of the hospital’s staff. Defendants raise many of the same issues on appeal, often adopting each other’s arguments.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the state law at issue here is the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute (TCBS). Here, it does not matter if the physician was acquitted because there could still be sufficient evidence in the record that defendants “offer[ed]” a benefit in violation of the TCBS regardless of whether any physician accepted it.  Further, the court explained that even assuming no rational jury could have found a single conspiracy, the surgeons fail to show that this error “prejudiced their substantial rights.” Henry and Forrest do not raise this point at all. Won and Shah address it only briefly and fail to provide any record citations to support the proposition that “clear, specific, and compelling prejudice” resulted in an unfair trial.

FemHealth USA, Inc. v. Williams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5915

Opinion Date: September 29, 2023

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Carafem provides abortion care, birth control, and STD testing in several states. One clinic was in a medical office building in a Nashville suburb. Carafem filed suit under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 248, alleging that on July 26, 2022, the OSA defendants refused to move from the building's front doors and blocked the entrance for several minutes before police ordered them to move to the sidewalk. The defendants allegedly stated that they would return each day and 'escalate’ activities. During an alleged incident on July 28, approximately 60 people associated with OSA attempted to enter Carafem’s clinic by pretending to seek services. After being denied entry, one stated that “either they [are] gonna let us in or we take this whole building down.”

The district court granted a temporary restraining order and, later, a preliminary injunction under the Act. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal and later moved the court to take judicial notice of Carafem’s announcement that it was pausing in-person services at the clinic due to Tennessee’s new abortion ban. The Sixth Circuit dismissed and remanded, The issue of whether the court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction has been overtaken by a dispute over whether intervening events warranted modifying or dissolving that injunction, raising new factual and legal issues that the district court is best positioned to resolve.

Lichtenstein v. Hargett

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5028

Opinion Date: October 5, 2023

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Election Law

Since 1979, Tennessee has made it a crime for anyone other than election officials to distribute the state’s official form for applying to vote absentee. During much of this time, Tennessee kept close guard of this form to deter fraud. Election officials now make the form widely available online so that eligible voters may easily apply. According to the Plaintiffs, this change has rendered the ban on distributing the application form “outdated.” They want to distribute the form while encouraging absentee voting at their get-out-the-vote drives. They allege that the First Amendment gives them the right to do so and that, because they seek to distribute the form while expressing a political message, the ban is subject to strict scrutiny.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Tennessee’s ban prohibits an act--distributing a government form--that qualifies as conduct, not speech. While the First Amendment provides some protection to “expressive conduct,” strict scrutiny does not apply to Tennessee’s ban because it neutrally applies no matter the message that a person seeks to convey and because it burdens nobody’s ability to engage in actual speech. At most, the Supreme Court’s lenient First Amendment test for neutral laws that regulate conduct applies and the ban survives that nondemanding test,

McMullen v. Dalton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-3273

Opinion Date: October 4, 2023

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

McMullen was convicted under Indiana law of possession of cocaine and marijuana. In preparation for sentencing, McMullen’s attorney, Lewis, said he “really didn’t do anything independently to develop any mitigation” and “just relied” on the PSR although he knew McMullen “came from a seriously troubled background.” Lewis did not consider having a mental health professional evaluate McMullen, who was given a 50-year sentence, largely based on his criminal history. State courts rejected his claim of ineffective assistance. The district court denied his petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.

The Seventh Circuit vacated. Although in 2021, an Indiana trial court modified McMullen’s sentence and placed him on probation, the issue was not moot. The Indiana Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to “Strickland.” Given that the state was asking for the statutory maximum prison term, Lewis’s investigation should have gone beyond reliance on the PSR, and talking to a relative. The state appellate court failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence, which is significant and compelling. On remand, the district court must consider evidence and argument as to whether Lewis had any strategic reasons for the limits of his investigation into McMullen’s mental health and background and the presentation of mitigating circumstances.

Willow Way, LLC v. Village of Lyons, Illinois

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1775

Opinion Date: October 5, 2023

Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Willow purchased a house that needed repairs. Bids for the work exceeded $100,000. Renovations began in 2017 but soon halted. After several years passed, with the house remaining empty, the Village proposed its demolition as a nuisance. The Village published notice, posted notices on the house, and mailed notice to Willow, which concedes having actual knowledge of the impending demolition. Willow did not respond until the week scheduled for the demolition when its lawyer proposed a meeting. The parcel was sold at auction to satisfy the Village’s lien for demolition expenses.

Willow sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming a taking without compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Village. Demolition of a dilapidated structure that constitutes a public nuisance is not problematic under the Due Process Clause and does not require compensation. The protection that the federal Constitution offers to property owners is notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The Village gave such a notice to Willow, which did not ask for a hearing. Illinois law offers procedures that are constitutionally adequate; someone wanting to stop a demolition need only file suit in state court, which automatically blocks action until the judge decides whether the building meets the statutory criteria for demolition. The district court was not required to decide a state law inverse-condemnation claim.

Parents Defending Education v. LinnMar Community School Dist., et al

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2927

Opinion Date: September 29, 2023

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

Parents Defending Education, an association of parents, brought this action to challenge a policy adopted by the Linn Mar Community School District in Iowa. The disputed policy is entitled “Administrative Regulations Regarding Transgender and Students Nonconforming to Gender Role Stereotypes.” The policy sets forth regulations for the District that “address the needs of transgender students, gender-expansive students, nonbinary, gender nonconforming students, and students questioning their gender to ensure a safe, affirming, and healthy school environment where every student can learn effectively.” The parents who seek to participate in this case are anonymous; the pleadings identify them by a letter of the alphabet. The district court determined that Parents Defending failed to establish Article III standing because the organization did not show injury, causation, or redressability on its claims.
 
The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part as moot and reversed on one claim. The court concluded that at least Parent G has alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. Parent G asserts that her son wants to “state his belief that biological sex is immutable.” Because of the policy, however, Parent G states that her son remains silent in school “when gender identity topics arise” to avoid violating the policy. This student’s proposed activity “concerns political speech” and is “arguably affected with a constitutional interest.” Thus, Parent G has standing to bring a claim challenging the policy based on the First Amendment. Therefore, Parents Defending has standing as an association to pursue the claim on behalf of a member.

Stephanie Gasca v. Anne Precythe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 20-3447

Opinion Date: October 5, 2023

Judge: KOBES

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Parolees sued the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), claiming that its parole revocation system violated the Due Process Clause. Recognizing the system’s flaws, MDOC rewrote its policies and consented to summary judgment. Later, MDOC moved to dismiss for failure to join a required party—the Missouri Public Defender Commission (Commission). The district court denied MDOC’s motion and held a hearing to determine whether MDOC’s revised policies satisfied due process. Finding additional problems, the district court issued a remedy order instructing MDOC to make changes.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that the state must hold a revocation hearing “within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.” The court wrote that MDOC has a policy requiring a revocation hearing within 30 days, but it does not always follow that policy. The district court ordered MDOC to follow its 30-day policy. The court wrote that because it has held that longer delays may be reasonable in some cases, the remedy is not tailored to the violation and was an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Jade LaRoche

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2969

Opinion Date: October 4, 2023

Judge: LOKEN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

Defendant’s mother called local dispatch and said an officer needed to come by because her son was “acting up.” A Bureau of Indian Affairs Officer was dispatched to the home, learning on the way that Defendant had an active tribal arrest warrant. Defendant’s mother invited Defendant into the living room and told Defendant to join them. The officer told Defendant he was “going to have to take you because you got that warrant.” Defendant fled to the garage, pursued by the officer, where Defendant knocked the officer down and escaped. Defendant was charged with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury. The jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of forcible assault of a federal officer involving physical contact. The district court sentenced Defendant to 44 months’ imprisonment. He appealed, raising numerous evidentiary issues and challenging the assessment of a two-level sentencing increase.


The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the amicable conversation -- dominated by Defendant-- occurred in his mother’s home, a non-custodial atmosphere. The officer testified he did not know what the warrant was based on. Defendant fled only after the officer later told him he would be arrested, confirming that Defendant initially believed or at least hoped that he could avoid immediate arrest. Further, the court explained that even if Defendant was in custody, follow-up questions to clarify ambiguity do not amount to “interrogation” unless “their point is to enhance the defendant’s guilt.” The court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.

United States v. Kevin Green

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2919

Opinion Date: October 5, 2023

Judge: WOLLMAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant and co-Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of mixtures and substances containing a detectable amount of fentanyl, as well as individual counts of possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl. Co-Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their request for a jury instruction on multiple conspiracies. Co-defendant contends that the district court erred by ordering him to be handcuffed and shackled throughout the trial and by admitting into evidence portions of a post-arrest interview. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his possession with intent to distribute conviction.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the lack of any substantial prejudice stemming from the absence of a multiple-conspiracies instruction and the presence of sufficient single-conspiracy supporting evidence leads the court to conclude that no reversible error occurred with respect to the drug quantity finding. Further, the court wrote that given co-Defendant’s noncompliant behavior in jail and during transport, the district court acted well within its discretion by ordering that co-Defendant be shackled and handcuffed during trial and by taking appropriate precautions to minimize any prejudice to co-Defendant.

United States v. Paul Swehla

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3443

Opinion Date: October 2, 2023

Judge: LOKEN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of distributing morphine within 1,000 feet of a school. He was sentenced to 262 months imprisonment followed by 6 years of supervised release. Defendant began supervised release in September 2021. He was arrested and charged in Iowa state court with Domestic Abuse Assault for pushing his fiancée into a wall while inebriated. His fiancee requested a no-contact order, The United States Probation Office filed a petition to revoke supervised release that day. Probation filed an amended petition to revoke supervised release. He now appealed the revocation sentence, arguing the district court erred in imposing an overly broad no-contact order restricting communication between Defendant and his fiancée. At the end of the hearing, the court stated it would modify Special Condition 8. The court directed Probation to prepare and circulate revised language to counsel for both parties and stated, “If the parties object when it’s finally written out, please let me know, and we’ll try to arrive at appropriate wording.” Defendant made no objection to the final wording of Special Condition 8, either before or after Judgment was entered.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant, with a long history of alcohol abuse, admitted he assaulted his fiancee while he was literally falling down drunk. By limiting contact, Special Condition 8 seeks to protect the victim from further harm. Fiancee had requested a no-contact order from the state court, subject to a specific exception the district court incorporated in Special Condition 8.

United States v. Warren Mackey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1590

Opinion Date: October 2, 2023

Judge: KELLY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12 and one count of abusive sexual contact. He appeals, challenging two evidentiary rulings at trial and the restitution order.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions but remanded to the district court for further proceedings to resolve the parties’ disputes about the amount, if any, of restitution owing. The court wrote that the government argued that restitution for lost wages was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. Section 2248 and that the amount was supported by documentation submitted in advance of sentencing. The district court did not hold a hearing. Instead, it entered an order that stated that it had “reviewed the presentence report concerning restitution” and the parties’ briefs and found that “the government’s requested restitution is authorized by law and is unrebutted by any evidence.” The court explained that the burden lies with the government to “demonstrate[e] the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense.” Without any findings from the district court to resolve Defendant’s objections, the court wrote that it was unable to review whether the government met its burden of establishing restitution by a preponderance of the evidence.

GREG MOORE, ET AL V. SEAN GARNAND, ET AL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-16236

Opinion Date: September 29, 2023

Judge: Bennett

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against several officers of the Tucson Police Department. Two officers (collectively, “Defendants”) are the only remaining defendants. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged First Amendment retaliation claims arising from Defendants’ investigation of two arsons that occurred at properties connected to the husband. Defendants appealed from the district court’s order denying without prejudice their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the First Amendment claims. The panel concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show that Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. It was not clearly established that Plaintiff has a First Amendment right to remain silent when questioned by the police. Nor was it clearly established that a retaliatory investigation per se violates the First Amendment. Defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims based on the husband's silence and Plaintiffs’ lawsuits and requests for public disclosures.

MICHAEL HAMPTON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-15481

Opinion Date: October 3, 2023

Judge: Friedland

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the California Institution for Men (“CIM”) suffered a severe COVID-19 outbreak. In an attempt to protect CIM inmates, high-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from CIM to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that infected over two-thousand inmates and ultimately killed over twenty-five inmates and one prison guard. The wife of one of the deceased inmates sued, claiming that the prison officials had violated her husband’s constitutional and statutory rights. The officials moved to dismiss, asserting that the claims were barred by various federal and state immunities, including immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and qualified immunity. The district court held that the officials were not entitled to immunity at this stage of the proceedings, and the officials filed this interlocutory appeal.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity under the PREP Act and qualified immunity in an action brought against California prison officials arising from the death of a San Quentin inmate from COVID-19; and (2) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Defendants’ claims asserting immunity under state law. The panel held that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, which adequately alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of San Quentin inmates, including Hampton.

USA V. JOHN BARLOW

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-30030

Opinion Date: October 4, 2023

Judge: Callahan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He was sentenced to 77 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant raised three challenges to the district court’s sentencing calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”).
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court’s application of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States. The panel wrote that the determination of a sentencing enhancement based on a new offense can be made by a judge without a jury and by a standard of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is no mandatory minimum sentence at play, and the enhancement still placed Defendant’s Guidelines range within the maximum possible sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty; and that Defendant received all the notice that is required for the enhancement.
 
The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that he used or possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense under Montana law for purposes of applying the enhancement. The panel concluded that the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.

USA V. JUAN CABRERA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-50259

Opinion Date: September 29, 2023

Judge: Milan D. Smith, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of attempted illegal entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1325 and attempted illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. On appeal, he argued that the district court violated his rights to a fair trial and sentence.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a statement he made to a Border Patrol agent about coming to the United States to find work. Defendant argued that the statement, which he made while between border fences, should have been suppressed because he was “in custody” and was not given a Miranda warning prior to his admission. The panel held that the stop here met the requirements of Terry, and the agent’s question about Defendant’s purpose for being in the United States did not exceed the scope of allowable inquiry during such a stop. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403, the testimony of Defendant’s only proposed witness, a Tijuana immigration attorney, whom Defendant intended to call as a lay witness to testify about the “factual situation in Tijuana in November 2019”. The panel wrote that neither the record nor the witness’s testimony could establish that Defendant knew of the long lines, and the district court’s concern about distracting the jury was reasonable. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions on the requisite intent for a Section 1326 conviction.

USA V. STATE OF IDAHO

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-35440

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: VanDyke

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Supreme Court “heed[ed] the Constitution and returned the issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives.” After Dobbs, Idaho, exercised that prerogative to enact abortion restrictions. In response, the federal government sued Idaho, claiming that a federal law unrelated to abortion preempts the will of the people of that state, through their elected representatives, to “protect fetal life,” as Dobbs described it.
 
The Ninth Circuit granted Idaho’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The court held that there is no preemption and the traditional stay factors favor granting the Legislature’s motion. The court explained that Dobbs triggered section 622, after which the federal government challenged Idaho’s law, arguing that it is preempted by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1395dd (EMTALA).  The court reasoned that each of the four Nken factors favors issuing a stay here. The Legislature has made a strong showing that EMTALA does not preempt section 622. EMTALA does not require abortions, and even if it did in some circumstances, that requirement would not directly conflict with section 622. The federal government will not be injured by the stay of an order preliminarily enjoining enforcement of a state law that does not conflict with its own. Idaho, on the other hand, will be irreparably injured absent a stay because the preliminary injunction directly harms its sovereignty. The balance of the equities and the public interest also favors judicial action ensuring Idaho’s right to enforce its legitimately enacted laws during the pendency of the State’s appeal.

United States v. Streett

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-2056

Opinion Date: October 5, 2023

Judge: David M. Ebel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-Appellant Bentley Streett was arrested for, and eventually pleaded guilty to, various counts of child pornography and sexual activity with minors. His actions were discovered by the mother of one of the minors from whom Streett attempted to solicit pornography, prompting the mother to contact the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. An investigation ensued, resulting in the production of Streett’s cell phone records, followed by his arrest and a search of his home, computers, and phones. Streett appealed, arguing: (1) the search warrant permitting the search of his home lacked probable cause, and that the search could not be justified by an exception to the requirement that officers obtain a legitimate warrant; and (2) the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss counts 3 through 7 of his indictment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Streett's motion to suppress and motion to dismiss.

Marques A. Johnson v. James Dunn

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-10670

Opinion Date: October 2, 2023

Judge: TJOFLAT

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Defendant is a Pasco County, Florida, Sherriff’s Office deputy. Chris Nocco, the Pasco County Sheriff, is a codefendant. Plaintiff’s initial complaint in this case consisted of twelve counts. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, the complaint at hand, contains ten counts. Count I of the amended complaint, which replicates verbatim Count I of the initial complaint, was brought against Defendant in his individual capacity and is the only count before the Eleventh Circuit in this appeal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity.
 
At issue on appeal is whether the Fourth Amendment precluded a law enforcement officer—who had stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation—from asking a passenger in the vehicle to identify himself unless the officer had reason to suspect that the passenger had committed, was in the process of committing, or was likely to commit a criminal offense. The second question is whether binding precedent clearly established, at the time relevant here, that an officer could not ask a passenger to identify himself absent this reasonable suspicion.
 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that it doubts that the Florida Supreme Court would hold that a passenger is free to resist an officer’s request for identification in the setting this case presents. At the very least, it is arguable that the court would uphold the request and find the officer had at least arguable cause to arrest the passenger for resisting an officer without violence in violation of Section 843.02.

USA v. Henry Martin Steiger

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10742

Opinion Date: October 3, 2023

Judge: COOGLER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 20 years of imprisonment following the revocation of his probation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3565. Defendant argued that, where the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 12 to 18 months of imprisonment, his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. One of his arguments is that the district court failed to give a specific reason for imposing an upward variance to the statutory maximum.
 
The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The court wrote that upon finding that a defendant violated a condition of probation, a district court may revoke the term of probation and impose a term of imprisonment as long as the court considers the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), such as the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the “seriousness of the offense” and “afford adequate deterrence,” among others. The court noted that a district court commits a “significant procedural error” in imposing a sentence if it calculates the guidelines incorrectly, fails to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or, of particular relevance here, “fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” The court explained that the record reflects that the district court did not give any reason for why it was imposing an above-guideline sentence. The court explained that the district court’s statements at the conclusion of the revocation proceeding were not sufficiently specific to allow the court to understand why the district court imposed an above-guideline sentence.

Stimson Lumber Co. v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-1201

Opinion Date: October 2, 2023

Judge: Cunningham

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Transportation Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

In 1907, the then-owner executed the “Stimson deed,” transferring to the Railroad “its successors and assigns, the right to cross said right of way at any point or points where such crossing is desired” the land at issue. POTB later took ownership of the railroad. A 2007 storm caused severe damage to the railroad tracks. POTB did not repair the damage, resulting in the disbandment of the Oregon Tillamook Railroad Authority. POTB, with governmental entities, established the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency, to construct “a new multi-use trail” that would “connect[] to a wide network of existing recreation[al] trails and parks, educational opportunities, and heritage sites” over portions of the railroad line. In 2016, POTB filed a notice of intent to abandon service of the portions of the railroad line at issue with the Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking under the National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d).

The Claims Court and Federal Circuit rejected Stimson’s claim that the creation of the trail constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Railbanking and interim trail use are within the scope of the easement. Stimson failed to show abandonment for all purposes and had no compensable property interest in the land to which the deed pertained.

California v. Trent

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C096306(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 3, 2023

Judge: Krause

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1999, a jury convicted defendant Patrick Trent of first degree murder and street terrorism, but found not true the enhancements that defendant had personally used a knife and that the murder had been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus eight months, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that judgment. Defendant’s first degree murder conviction was later reduced to second degree murder in light of California v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (2014), resulting in the reduction of defendant’s aggregate term to 15 years to life plus eight months. Thereafter, in July 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now 1172.6), which the trial court granted in a written ruling issued February 28, 2022. On March 28, 2022, the trial court redesignated the murder conviction as assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury with a great bodily injury enhancement and resentenced defendant. Defendant timely appealed, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) failing to retroactively apply Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to his substantive gang conviction; and (2) imposing a great bodily injury enhancement to the redesignated offense. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the abstract of judgment needed to be corrected to reflect conviction by jury. The Court also agreed with defendant that he was entitled to the retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333, requiring reversal of his section 186.22 conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed in all other respects.

Hansen v. Volkov

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B311524(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 4, 2023

Judge: PERLUSS

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Plaintiff and Defendant both members of the State Bar, represent opposing parties in a dissolution/annulment proceeding pending in Los Angeles Superior Court. Following an incident at Plaintiff’s office relating to the canceled deposition of Defendant’s client, Plaintiff obtained a three-year civil harassment restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 protecting her, as well as her paralegal and office receptionist, from further harassment by Defendant.
 
On appeal Defendant argued, in part, that all of the conduct upon which the trial court based its findings of harassment was constitutionally protected activity and there was insufficient evidence his actions, to the extent not constitutionally protected, were directed at Plaintiff, caused Plaintiff substantial emotional distress, or would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress as required to support issuance of the restraining order. Defendant also argued that the court erred in including in the order members of Plaintiff’s office staff as protected individuals.
 
The Second Appellate District reversed and directed the trial court to enter a new order denying Plaintiff’s request for a restraining order. The court explained that Defendant’s Emails regarding his client’s deposition constituted constitutionally protected activity. The court explained that because the emails were constitutionally protected, it was an error for the trial court to conclude they were properly considered part of a course of conduct of harassment. Further, the court found that the evidence of Defendant’s nonprotected conduct did not support the court’s findings of a willful or knowing course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person and did cause Plaintiff substantial emotional distress.

In re Casey

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B321709(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: GILBERT

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner is serving a life term for the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Petitioner served 23 years and three months, the parole board granted him parole. The Governor reversed the parole board’s decision and denied Petitioner parole on the ground that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime. The superior court granted Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The People appealed from the court’s order granting the petition.
 
The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the Governor may rely on the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for his decision to deny parole, but the aggravated circumstances do not in themselves provide some evidence of current dangerousness. The failure to gain insight into the cause of the crime is a factor that shows a continuing threat to public safety.
 
The court wrote that here, there can be no dispute that the circumstances of the murder were aggravated. Petitioner and his companions brutally murdered a 15-year-old girl. The Governor found that Petitioner remains a current risk to the safety of society because he lacks insight to the cause of the crime. Petitioner explained that at the time he committed the murder, he was hurt and angry. He thought that violence against someone who could not hurt him was an appropriate response. Nothing Petitioner said explains the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. The Governor could reasonably conclude that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime

Caswell v. Colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 50

Opinion Date: October 3, 2023

Judge: Samour

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Pursuant to a request from Lakewood Animal Control, a deputy with the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office (“LCSO”), conducted a welfare check on the animals at Constance Caswell’s residential property in Limon, Colorado, on March 15, 2016. Approximately two weeks later, LCSO deputies executed a search warrant at Caswell’s property. Based on the deputies’ search, the State filed a complaint charging Caswell with forty-three class 6 felony counts of cruelty to animals. Cruelty to animals was generally a class 1 misdemeanor, § 18-9-202(2)(a), but pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(I) of the statute, it was a class 6 felony if the defendant had a prior conviction for that crime. Each of the counts brought against Caswell identified her prior cruelty-to-animals conviction as a fact that elevated the classification of the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony and enhanced the applicable sentence. Before trial, defense counsel moved for bifurcation to prevent the jury from hearing about his client’s prior conviction for cruelty to animals. The trial court denied the motion as moot, however, ruling that the fact of a prior conviction was a sentence enhancer, not an element of the crime, which meant that it didn’t have to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Caswell guilty of all forty-three counts. During the sentencing hearing, Caswell conceded that she had previously been convicted of cruelty to animals. The trial court accordingly entered forty-three class 6 felony convictions. It then sentenced Caswell to eight years of probation, forty-three days in jail, and forty-seven days of in-home detention. The Colorado Supreme Court held that where, as was here, a cruelty-to-animals (second or subsequent offense) case (1) includes notice in the charging document of the prior conviction for cruelty to animals and (2) is treated as a felony throughout the proceedings—including in terms of its prosecution in district court (not county court), the right to a preliminary hearing (if eligible), the number of peremptory challenges, and the number of jurors - the Sixth Amendment doesn’t require that the misdemeanor - felony transforming fact in subsection (2)(b)(I) be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. "In sum, there was no error, much less plain error, here. Caswell’s right to a jury trial under the Colorado Constitution was not violated."

Dorsey v. Colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 51

Opinion Date: October 3, 2023

Judge: Samour

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Charles Dorsey was convicted in 1997 of criminal attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree. As a result, Dorsey was required to register as a sex offender, which he did. Dorsey was obligated to re-register as a sex offender every year. In 2010, Dorsey was charged with a class 6 felony for failure to register as a sex offender. He ultimately pled guilty to a class 1 misdemeanor failure-to-register offense. Dorsey failed to re-register as a sex offender for a second time in 2017. This time, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The trial court reasoned the prior-conviction provision of subsection (2)(a) was a sentence enhancer that could be proved to the judge in the event of a conviction, not an element of the offense that had to be proved to the jury. After the jury found Dorsey guilty of the substantive charge, the trial court ruled, at the sentencing hearing, that the State had proved the fact of his prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence. Consequently, it entered a judgment of conviction on a class 5 felony. The Colorado Supreme Court concurred that the legislature intended to make the fact of a prior conviction a sentence enhancer, and that the Constitution did not require the fact of a prior conviction to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Idaho v. Monroe

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49255

Opinion Date: October 4, 2023

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

While a passenger during an unrelated traffic stop, defendant-appellant Audrey Monroe was recognized by a Bingham County Sheriff’s deputy as having an outstanding warrant. Pursuant to the warrant, the deputy attempted to take her into custody. In the course of the arrest, Monroe refused to release her phone, which was secured on her finger by a phone ring holder. As Monroe’s resistance escalated, she fell to the ground and began violently kicking, making contact with the officer. Ultimately, she was secured in the police cruiser. The incident was captured on video by the arresting officer’s body camera. For her conduct during the arrest, Monroe was charged with felony battery on a police officer. During trial, Monroe asked the district court for jury instructions regarding two misdemeanor offenses, asserting that they were lesser included offenses of the crime charged. The district court declined to give either instruction. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Monroe guilty of the felony charge. On appeal, Monroe argued the district court erred in failing to give the requested lesser included jury instructions. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.

Idaho v. Ramos

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50470

Opinion Date: September 29, 2023

Judge: Stegner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

While on patrol, Deputy Sheriff Brock Katseanes discovered an unattended car parked in the parking lot of a public boat launch. The car was unlocked, and its trunk and front windows were open. Katseanes learned the car was registered to April Ramos. Katseanes was eventually joined by five additional officers and a canine to search the surrounding area for Ramos, but they were unsuccessful in locating her. Due to his previous encounters with Ramos, Katseanes believed the car likely contained illegal drugs. The canine conducted a drug sniff; the dog did not alert during its sniff of the car’s exterior. The officers subsequently impounded the car and then conducted an inventory search of it prior to having the car towed. During the inventory search, the officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Ramos was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. She moved to suppress all evidence found during the inventory search of the car. The district court denied her motion. Ramos conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance but retained her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. As a result of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the possession of drug paraphernalia charge. Ramos timely appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment. "Absent clear instruction from the United States Supreme Court, we decline to expand Opperman’s 'community caretaking' rationale to include potential theft or property damage to the vehicle as an acceptable reason to impound a vehicle. ... an officer’s concern that the car will be subject to theft or property damage if it is not impounded—no matter how well-founded the concern may be—is irrelevant to the analysis as to whether the decision to impound the car is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether the decision to impound Ramos’s car passed constitutional muster.

Clark v. State

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 25/22

Opinion Date: September 12, 2023

Judge: Shirley M. Watts

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's performance was deficient.

At issue was whether trial counsel's failure to object to an order prohibiting any consultation regarding the case between Petitioner and trial counsel during Petitioner's murder trial resulted in the actual denial of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held (1) prejudice was presumed under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's failure to object was objectively unreasonable.

Powers v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2017-DR-00696-SCT

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Josiah D. Coleman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury sentenced Stephen Powers to death for the attempted rape and murder of Elizabeth Lafferty. After the Mississippi Supreme Court denied post-conviction relief, Powers sought federal habeas relief at the federal district court. The district court stayed federal habeas proceedings to give the Mississippi courts an opportunity to rule on unexhausted claims. In general, Powers argued: (1) he was mentally incompetent; (2) he was denied his right to a fair, impartial jury; (3) trial counsel was ineffective during jury selection for not challenging the prosecution’s peremptory strikes based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (4) as a matter of federal due process, the attempted-rape evidence was insufficient; (5) trial and post-conviction counsel were ineffective concerning the guilt phase; (6) trial counsel’s “total dereliction” at sentencing requires application of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), not Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); (7) even if Cronic was inapplicable, trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland; and (8) cumulative error. Taking each issue raised under careful consideration, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Powers' request for postconviction relief.

State v. Harris

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC99977

Opinion Date: October 3, 2023

Judge: Zel M. Fischer

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by the State of an order and judgment dismissing with prejudice criminal charges against Defendant, holding that there was no final, appealable judgment, and therefore, the State lacked statutory authority to appeal pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 547.200.

Defendant, who was charged with second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The circuit court sustained the motion in part and dismissed the murder and robbery charges with prejudice, concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded those charges. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this was an improper appeal.

Aldape v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 42

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Kristina Pickering

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court accepting Appellant's plea of no contest to two counts of attempted lewdness with a child and imposed the special condition of probation mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q), holding subsection (q) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

Upon accepting Appellant's no contest plea the district court placed him on probation and imposed the special condition mandated by subsection (q), which prohibits a defendant on probation for a sexual offense from accessing the internet without his probation officer's permission. On appeal, Appellant argued that the mandatory internet ban failed intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the mandatory internet ban and otherwise affirmed, holding that because Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q) is both mandatory and restricts more speech than necessary to serve the government's interest with no tailoring mechanism it is facially unconstitutional.

Floyd v. State, Dep't of Correction

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 37

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Ron D. Parraguirre

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging that Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.355, Nevada's statute providing that an execution must be effectuated by injection of a lethal drug, is unconstitutional because it gives the Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections discretion to determine the process by which a lethal injection is administered, holding that there was no error.

Appellant, a death-row inmate, argued that section 176.355 lacked suitable standards because it afforded the Director complete discretion to determine the types, dosages, and sequencing of drugs to be used in the execution. The district court dismissed the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute, combined with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, provided the Director with suitable standards to determine the process by which a lethal injection is to be administered.

State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3534

Opinion Date: October 3, 2023

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment in favor of the Hocking County Common Pleas Court and Judge Dale Crawford in Appellant's action for writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims.

Appellant was found guilty of assaulting a peace officer. The court of appeals affirmed. About seven years later, Appellant filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition alleging that the trial court deprived her of her constitutional right to counsel and lacked jurisdiction to hold the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that res judicata barred this mandamus and prohibition action.

State v. Toran

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3564

Opinion Date: October 4, 2023

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions for felony charges stemming from an inventory search of an impounded truck that Defendant was driving when he was pulled over by a law enforcement officer, holding that the search was reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment.

Law enforcement performed an inventory search as to the truck at issue and found a handgun in the truck's right door panel. After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence of the gun the trial court found him guilty. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the state's evidence was insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the inventory search was lawful.

South Carolina v. Brown

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28179

Opinion Date: September 29, 2023

Judge: Donald W. Beatty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Corey Brown was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit grand larceny, armed robbery, and kidnapping. In a post-trial motion, Brown moved for a new trial on several grounds, including the State's failure to disclose its negotiations with Shadarron Evans, the State's key witness. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed. Agreeing with the State, the court of appeals reversed the grant of a new trial, concluding that no plea offer had been extended and remanded the case to the circuit court to make specific findings as to whether the evidence was material to Brown's guilt under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Brown's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals. After that review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial.

South Carolina v. Heyward

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28182

Opinion Date: October 5, 2023

Judge: Few

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

James Heyward was convicted of multiple crimes arising from the armed robbery, brutal beating, and murder of Alice Tollison during the burglary of her home. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Heyward's petition for a writ of certiorari to address the trial court's refusal to remove Heyward's leg shackles during the striking of the jury, and four evidentiary issues. As to three of the evidentiary issues, the authentication of a fingerprint card, the admission of gruesome autopsy photographs, and the State's use of Heyward's alias, the Supreme Court found the trial court acted within its discretion. As to the other evidentiary issue, a firearms expert's testimony Heyward's pistol was operational at the time of the crimes, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' ruling that if there was any error in the admission of that testimony it did not prejudice Heyward. As to the leg shackles, the Court found the trial court erred in failing to exercise its discretion in determining whether Heyward should have been required to wear leg shackles in the presence of the jury. However, because the State conclusively proved Heyward's guilt through overwhelming evidence such that no rational conclusion could have been reached other than Heyward is guilty of these crimes, the Court nevertheless affirmed.

State v. Black Cloud

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 S.D. 53

Opinion Date: October 4, 2023

Judge: Salter

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of second-degree murder and sentencing him to forty years in prison, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) as concerning the prosecutor's effort to conceal the State's involvement in Defendant's transfer proceedings, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion to neutralize any error; (2) the circuit court acted within its discretion to denying Defendant's motion for mistrial; (3) viewed in their entirety, the instructions given to the jury correctly stated the applicable law; (4) the exercise of the circuit court's discretion did not contravene Defendant's right to present a complete defense; and (5) Defendant's sentence could not be described as grossly disproportionate to his crime.

De La Rosa v. Texas

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Dockets: PD-0197-22, PD-0198-22, PD-0199-22

Opinion Date: October 4, 2023

Judge: Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Francisco De la Rosa was tried by jury for the non-consensual sexual assault and sexual assault of a child. The body of Appellant’s indictment charged him with three counts of sexual assault for non-consensual contact between his sexual organ and that of "LAM," and the abstract portion of the jury charge defined “sexual assault of a child” in terms of non-consensual sexual contact. The indictment’s caption called the counts sexual assault of a child, its application paragraph authorized conviction for sexual assault of a child, and the case was tried as if it were such a case. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold the convictions. To this, the Court concluded the appellate court did, reversed the lower court’s judgments and entered a judgment of acquittal for each count of sexual assault.

State v. Centeno

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 UT 22

Opinion Date: October 5, 2023

Judge: Pohlman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of rape, one count of aggravated assault, and two counts of domestic violence in the presence of a child, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his multiple claims of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in not withholding from jury deliberations a video exhibit of Defendant's police interview; (2) Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance of his trial counsel; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for a mistrial and a new trial arising out of a child witness's breakdown on the witness stand.

News & Notes From Google Local Services Ads: October 2023

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