United States v. Green

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-997

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: SACK

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the narcotics conspiracy count on the grounds that the classification of marijuana under Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act violates their Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. They argued that marijuana's scheduling has no rational basis because it does not meet the statutory criteria for inclusion on Schedule I. The district court denied their motion to dismiss, concluding that they incorrectly sought to tether the rational basis inquiry to the statutory criteria
 
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the Act's scheduling criteria are largely irrelevant to our constitutional review because the rational basis test asks only whether Congress could have any conceivable basis for including marijuana on the strictest schedule. Because there are other plausible considerations that could have motivated Congress's scheduling of marijuana, the court concluded that its classification does not violate Defendants’ due process or equal protection rights.

Frein v. Pennsylvania State Police

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-1830

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: Bibas

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In 2014, Frein ambushed Pennsylvania State Troopers, killing one and injuring the other. Knowing he had used a .308-caliber rifle, police got a warrant to search the home that he shared with his parents and seize that type of rifle and ammunition. They did not find a .308-caliber rifle but found 46 guns belonging to the parents. The officers got a second warrant and seized them. Frein was eventually arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. The government never used the parents' guns at trial, sentencing, or on appeal. The parents were not charged nor was it alleged that any of their guns were involved in the crime. The parents went to Pennsylvania state court and unsuccessfully asked to get their guns back, raising Second Amendment, takings, due process, excessive fines, and state-law objections.

The parents then sued under 42 U.S.C.1983, arguing that by keeping the guns, the government is violating the Takings Clause and the Second Amendment’s right to “keep" arms and that the state’s procedure for letting them reclaim their property violated procedural due process. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated in part. By keeping the parents’ guns after the criminal case ended, the officials took their property for public use without compensating them. Because the parents lawfully owned the guns, they also have a Second Amendment claim. However, they had a real chance to challenge the government’s actions and got procedural due process.

Hammoud v. Ma'at

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-50914

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Priscilla Richman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit explained that because Petitioner could have raised all his present claims in a Section 2255 motion, he may not raise them in a Section 2241 petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Section 2241 relief.
 
The court explained that Section 2255 provides for a one-year statute of limitations. All of the pieces that comprise Petitioner’s claim were in place well before that period expired. Congress had amended the statute at issue. The Supreme Court had decided the cases on which he relies. Because a Section 2255 motion could have accommodated the challenge, a Section 2241 petition is foreclosed.

Laviage v. Fite

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-20678

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff was prosecuted for knowing failure to report scrap metal transactions to the Texas Department of Public Safety, as required by state law. A jury acquitted him. Plaintiff then sued Houston Police Sergeant, claiming Defendant had provided false information that led to Plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution. The district court, concluding Defendant’s affidavit omitted material facts, denied him qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for Defendant.
 
The court explained that contrary to the district court’s ruling, C&D’s computer problems were not material to whether probable cause existed to suspect Plaintiff had violated the reporting provisions. By his own admission, Plaintiff did not submit approximately twenty-four required reports to DPS. Plaintiff also knew Scrap Dragon was failing to send reports to DPS. The court explained that one could reasonably believe Plaintiff knew that continuing to use the flawed system would result in reporting failures. He had been warned about the system’s deficiencies months before his arrest and yet failed to use the statutory safe haven. So, even had Defendant mentioned the Scrap Dragon glitch, his affidavit still would have shown probable cause. Thus, Plaintiff failed to allege a Fourth Amendment violation. Further, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, the claimed right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Menzia v. Austin Indep School Dist

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-50979

Opinion Date: August 25, 2022

Judge: Edith Brown Clement

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law

Plaintiff, a person of color and of mixed heritage, reported to school administrators that she was harassed by her peers on the basis of her race and national origin during her sixth-grade year in the Austin Independent School District. Plaintiff alleged that she was told to "go back where [she] came from" and that, in some cases, the harassment involved physical shoving. There were also incidents in which Plaintiff responded physically to verbal threats and name-calling, resulting in the school requesting she be transferred. Through her parents, Plaintiff sued the District for failure to address the harassment under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's 1983 claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the district on Plaintiff's Title VI claim.

While the Fifth Circuit took issue with some of the district court's findings, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court ultimately reached the correct result. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's 1983 claim and the court's grant of summary judgment on the Title VI claim.

Mullis v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-70008

Opinion Date: August 26, 2022

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death. He did not appeal or pursued state habeas relief. However, he subsequently filed for a Certificate of Appealability with the Fifth Circuit on several grounds. The Fifth Circuit rejected two of the grounds based on current precedent. However, the Fifth Circuit granted the Certificate of Appealability on the following issues:

(1) Did Petitioner's state habeas counsel render inadequate assistance by conceding that Petitioner was competent to waive review?

(2) Can the court reach that conclusion based on evidence consistent with Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022)?

(3) If Petitioner's state habeas counsel rendered inadequate assistance, was the inadequate assistance a cause external to Petitioner?

NextEra, et al v. D'Andrea, et al

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-50160

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: Gregg Costa

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law

Texas recently enacted such a ban on new entrants in a market with a more direct connection to interstate commerce than the drilling of oil wells: the building of transmission lines that are part of multistate electricity grids. The operator of one such multistate grid awarded Plaintiff NextEra Energy Capital Holdings, Inc. the right to build new transmission lines in an area of east Texas that is part of an interstate grid. But before NextEra obtained the necessary construction certificate from the Public Utilities Commission of Texas, the state enacted the law, SB 1938, that bars new entrants from building transmission lines. NextEra challenges the new law on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. It also argues that the law violates the Contracts Clause by upsetting its contractual expectation that it would be allowed to build the new lines
 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the dormant Commerce Clause claims should proceed past the pleading stage. But the Contracts Clause claim fails as a matter of law under the modern, narrow reading of that provision. The court explained that limiting competition based on the existence or extent of a business’s local foothold is the protectionism that the Commerce Clause guards against. Thus, the court reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the claim that the very terms of SB 1938 discriminate against interstate commerce. Further, the court held that SB 1938 did not interfere with an existing contractual right of NextEra. NextEra did not have a concrete, vested right that the law could impair. It thus fails at the threshold question for proving a modern Contracts Clause violation.

USA v. Mamoth

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-40422

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Cory T. Wilson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed his guilty plea conviction for attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2113(a). Defendant contends that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) by improperly involving itself in plea negotiations and that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Defendant, now represented by counsel, asserts that the district court violated Rule 11(c)(1) by participating in plea negotiations before the parties reached an agreement. Second, he contends that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was violated during the plea-bargaining process.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding that Defendant failed to show reversible error. The court held that the district court’s participation in negotiations here was far less egregious than that in other cases requiring reversal under the harmless error standard. Here, Defendant indicated that he understood the plea agreement, that it was voluntarily entered, and that his decision to plead guilty was based on conversations between himself, standby counsel, and the prosecution. These facts fall short of demonstrating manifest injustice.
 
Further, the court concluded, that Defendant was not deprived of his right to self-representation. From April 29, 2020, the date Defendant elected to proceed pro se, to January 8, 2021, the date of the plea discussions at issue. The court could not say Defendant was deprived of his right to self-representation by virtue of his exclusion from this one conference. At all times, Defendant maintained “actual control” over the plea negotiations.

Campbell v. Cheatham County Sheriff's Department

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-5044

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Gibbons

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Officers were dispatched to the Campbells’ residence after a 9-1-1 dispatcher received two hang-up calls from the residence. Officer Fox knocked on the door. He did not announce himself as law enforcement. Through the closed door, Mark asked “you got a gun?” and later stated, “I got one too.” Fox drew his gun. Mark opened the door. Mark says he may have had a cell phone in his hand. Both officers contend they thought Mark had a gun. Video footage does not resolve the dispute. Fox fired two shots. Mark fell to the floor and kicked the door shut. He yelled to his wife to call 9-1-1 because somebody was shooting at them. Although Fox fired eight shots, no one was hit. Other officers arrived and apprehended Mark. No firearms were found in the home. Mark was charged with aggravated assault; the charges were ultimately dismissed.

The Campbells sued Fox in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity summary judgment. Fox’s actions constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment; a reasonable person would not believe that he was free to leave a house while an officer repeatedly fired at the door. Accepting the Campbells’ version of the facts, a reasonable jury could find that Fox’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable.

Sanders v. Radtke

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1451

Opinion Date: September 1, 2022

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2011 Sanders drove a truck into his sister and her boyfriend. He was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Sanders suffered from schizophrenia and was not taking his medication. Sanders was initially found to lack the capacity to proceed or to assist in his defense. Sanders received treatment, was reevaluated, and a second report suggested he was “malingering.” Sanders entered into a plea agreement, stating he had read and understood the criminal complaint and understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Sanders’s cognitive abilities and educational level were considered, as was whether Sanders could have pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.

The day after receiving a seven-year sentence, Sanders gave notice of his intent to pursue postconviction relief and was appointed new counsel. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected that attorney’s no-merit report but dismissed the appeal, reasoning that Sanders relied on facts outside the record. On remand, Sanders moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that he did not understand the offenses to which he pleaded and that his attorney was ineffective. The court denied both motions, making extensive findings that Sanders’s trial counsel was credible and Sanders was generally not credible but was intelligent and understood the proceedings and issues. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sanders’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is procedurally defaulted. It plainly appears from Sanders’s petition and attached exhibits that he is not entitled to relief on his claim that his pleas were not knowing and voluntary.

Troogstad v. City of Chicago

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 21-3371, 21-3231, 21-3200

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Health Law

Illinois, Cook County Health and Hospitals System, Chicago, and Naperville each issued an order, policy, or directive requiring certain employees to vaccinate or regularly test for COVID-19. Employees who failed to comply would be subject to disciplinary action, including possible termination. Three district judges denied motions for preliminary injunctions against those vaccine mandates.

Consolidating the appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rejecting a claim that the regulations violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to substantive due process by interfering with their rights to bodily autonomy and privacy, the court stated that the plaintiffs failed to provide facts sufficient to show that the challenged mandates abridge a fundamental right and did not provide a textual or historical argument for their constitutional interpretation. The district judge properly applied the rational basis standard. The plaintiffs established the efficacy of natural immunity and pointed out some uncertainties associated with the COVID-19 vaccines but did not establish that the governments lack a “reasonably conceivable state of facts” to support their policies. Without specifying the process that was due, how it was withheld, and evidence for the alleged protected interest, the plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims fail. The court also rejected free exercise claims and claims under the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act.

United States v. Graham

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2373

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Police were called to a motel to break up a fight between Graham and his coconspirator, Moore. Their body cameras captured Moore in an agitated state shouting that Graham was holding and prostituting a 19-year-old. Graham was later charged with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking and related crimes stemming from his operation of an interstate commercial sex enterprise. The government played the body-camera recordings at Graham’s trial during an officer’s testimony. Moore had pleaded guilty and was on the government’s witness list. Graham’s attorney moved for a mistrial, arguing that if Moore did not testify, Graham would be denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront her about the recorded statements. The government did not call Moore as a witness. The judge agreed that a Confrontation Clause violation had occurred but declined to grant a mistrial, reasoning that a curative instruction was adequate to remedy any prejudice. The jury found Graham guilty.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no Confrontation Clause violation. Moore uttered her statements spontaneously as the officers were responding to a fight in progress and to rapidly evolving circumstances suggesting that sex trafficking might be occurring at the motel. When statements are made to law-enforcement officers under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the police encounter is to respond to an ongoing emergency, the statements are not testimonial and do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.

Crista Eggers v. Robert Evnen

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2268

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: GRUENDER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

Plaintiffs, an individual and a registered Nebraska ballot campaign committee, challenged as contrary to the Equal Protection Clause a provision in the Nebraska constitution that establishes a signature requirement for ballot initiatives. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring the Nebraska Secretary of State from enforcing the provision. The Secretary appealed.
 
The Eighth Circuit reversed explaining that because the signature distribution requirement “does not draw a suspect classification or restrict a fundamental right,” Plaintiffs must show that it cannot survive even rational-basis scrutiny. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not shown even a “fair chance” of carrying this burden. The Secretary identifies multiple legitimate government interests served by the signature distribution requirement.  A lawmaker could rationally conclude that the signature distribution requirement furthers this interest by weeding out initiatives with a small but concentrated support base.
 
The court explained that it need not decide here whether to extend this principle to requests for injunctions against the enforcement of state constitutional provisions because the balance of the remaining preliminary injunction factors weighs in the Secretary’s favor anyway. Thus, on balance, the preliminary-injunction factors clearly weigh in the Secretary’s favor. The district court abused its discretion by granting Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction

Norman Brown v. Anne Precythe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-3019

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A class of inmates who were juvenile offenders sued the state officials responsible for administering the parole process. The inmates alleged that the policies and practices of the parole officials violated their rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to due process of law under the federal and Missouri constitutions. The district court determined that the parole review practices were constitutionally deficient, and ordered the State to implement an elaborate remedial plan.
 
The State appealed, and the Eighth Circuit concluded that there is no constitutional violation. The court explained that the Supreme Court’s juvenile-specific jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment does not warrant declaring a constitutional violation and imposing on the State the elaborate set of parole procedures endorsed by the district court. A requirement to allow “some meaningful opportunity” for release, even if applicable to these juvenile homicide offenders, is satisfied here. The juvenile homicide offenders in Missouri received more process than offenders under the regular parole process: they presented more documentary evidence than adult offenders, received longer hearings than the average parole hearing, and were entitled to consideration of statutory factors that apply only to juveniles who were formerly sentenced to life without parole.

Thomas Styczinski v. Grace Arnold

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2936

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law, Constitutional Law

Appellants (the “Bullion Traders”) are a collection of in-state and out-of-state precious metal traders or representatives thereof challenging the constitutionality of Minnesota Statutes Chapter 80G, which regulates bullion transactions. The Bullion Traders argue the statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s partial grant of the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss and the district court’s partial denial of the Bullion Traders’ motion for summary judgment. On remand, the court left to the district court to decide in the first instance whether the extraterritorial provisions of Chapter 80G, as amended, are severable from the remainder of the statute.
 
The court explained that certain in-state obligations, such as a registration fee for traders doing business in Minnesota, even when calculated considering out-of-state transactions, do not control out-of-state commerce. However, Chapter 80G does not merely burden in-state dealers with a monetary obligation that considers both in-state and out-of-state transactions. Rather, it prohibits an in-state dealer who meets the $25,000 threshold from conducting any bullion transaction, including out-of-state transactions, without first registering with the Commissioner.

United States v. Muzammil Ali

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2286

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to distribute tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court (1) abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance; (2) erred by admitting into evidence portions of recordings of phone calls that Defendant made from jail; (3) permitted trial delays that violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and (4) erred at sentencing by declining to vary downward.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant has not established that the court abused its discretion. The trial occurred nearly a year after Defendant’s arrest and arraignment. Defendant replaced his attorney in August of 2020, but he still had more than five months to prepare for trial with his trial counsel’s assistance. Five months falls within a range found in cases where the court has concluded that there was adequate time.
 
Further, the court explained the delays, in this case, are not attributable to the government as they resulted from delays requested by codefendants or ordered by the court in which Defendant acquiesced. This means that the relevant period is between October 19, 2020, and January 11, 2021, the date Defendant’s trial began. Thus, the court held that the period of delay does not trigger presumptive prejudice.

CORECIVIC, INC. V. CANDIDE GROUP, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-17285

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: S.R. Thomas

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury

At issue were several statements in articles published by Morgan Simon on Forbes.com that connected CoreCivic to the detention of separated families at the U.S. border and characterized its lobbying efforts as pushing for punitive criminal and immigration laws. Simon’s firm is Candide Group. CoreCivic filed suit against Simon and Candide Group (collectively “Candide”) for defamation and defamation by implication. Candide made a special motion to strike CoreCivic’s complaint under California’s antiSLAPP Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 425.16.
 
The Ninth Circuit held that the special motion provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal court, and affirmed in part the district court’s order granting Candide Group, LLC’s motion to strike the defamation complaint. The panel held that the court’s prior precedents control. In United States ex rel. v. Lockheed Missiles &Space Co., the court held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal diversity actions because there was “no 'direct collision’” between the statute and the relevant rules, and the twin purposes of Erie favored its application.
 
The panel turned to the merits of Candide’s anti-SLAPP motion. Because CoreCivic did not contest on appeal that the suit implicated Candide’s First Amendment rights, the panel needed only to determine–applying the 12(b)(6) standard–whether CoreCivic stated a claim for defamation under California law. The panel concluded that CoreCivic failed to plausibly plead a defamation or a defamation by implication claim based on statements about its connection to the separation of immigrant families at the U.S. border, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims.

FELLOWSHIP OF CHRISTIAN ATHLET V. SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRI

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-15827

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law

The Fellowship of Christian Athletes (“FCA”) requires students serving in leadership roles to abide by a Statement of Faith, which includes the belief that sexual relations should be limited within the context of a marriage between a man and a woman. The San Jose Unified School District (the “School District”) revoked FCA’s status as an official student club at its high schools, claiming that FCA’s religious pledge requirement violated the School District’s non-discrimination policy.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction sought by a derecognized student club, the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, and directed the district court to enter an order reinstating the Fellowship as a student club within the San Jose Unified School District.
 
The panel first held that FCA National had direct organizational standing and Pioneer High School FCA had representational organizational standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. The School District’s denial of Associated Student Body (“ASB”) recognition hampered FCA National’s ability to further student engagement with the Christian faith and required it to expend significant time and resources to assist its student members.
 
Addressing the merits, the panel first held that Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction sought to maintain the status quo that existed before the School District’s novel scrutiny of FCA—a prohibitory injunction—so the district court erred in applying the heightened standard for mandatory injunctions. The panel held that Plaintiffs would likely prevail on the merits of its selective enforcement claim under the Free Exercise Clause.

JAVIER VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-55478

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Bumatay

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

At issue was whether police officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff either for reports that he followed and harassed an attorney outside a courthouse or for Plaintiff’s refusal to identify himself during an investigatory stop. Defendants asserted that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under California Penal Code Section 415(2); and (2) obstructing an officer under California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1).
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Pasadena and Pasadena police officers in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that plaintiff was unlawfully arrested. Plaintiff first argued that, because he was arrested under California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1), that means it was disputed whether probable cause existed under Section 415(2). The panel disagreed, stating first that it was well-established that if the facts support probable cause for one offense, an arrest may be lawful even if the officer invoked, as the basis for the arrest, a different offense that lacked probable cause. Second, by the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, the officers learned enough facts to believe that Plaintiff had violated Section 415(2) and therefore had probable cause to make the arrest.
 
Having found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, there was no need to proceed to the second question of the qualified immunity analysis—whether the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct was not “clearly established.” Further, the panel held that no “controlling authority” or “robust consensus of cases” prohibited the officer from arresting Plaintiff under the facts confronting him

KEVIN SIMMONS V. G. ARNETT

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-55043

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Callahan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Defendant, a prison guard, shot Plaintiff with three sponge-tipped plastic rounds during a prison fight, breaking Plaintiff’s leg and injuring his butt and thigh. Following the fight, prison nurse assessed Plaintiff’s injuries and transferred him to an emergency room without fully completing her notes or conducting a full body examination.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants in Plaintiff’s action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The panel first held that the district court correctly concluded that there was no constitutional violation. The guard’s decision to shoot Plaintiff with sponge rounds was not excessive use of force. He had a duty to keep prison staff and the prisoners in his care safe and he used the lowest level of force available to him. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there was no evidence showing that Arnett had any improper motive, let alone that he acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”
 
As to the nurse, rather than deliberate indifference, her actions seemed to reflect the conduct of a medical professional who quickly and successfully ensured that her patient received the appropriate level of care. The court held that Defendants were therefore entitled to protection under the doctrine of qualified immunity and summary judgment was properly entered in their favor.

RICHARD MANRIQUEZ V. JOEL ENSLEY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-16917

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The police officers at first complied with the requirement that a warrant includes a description of the “place to be searched,” by obtaining a warrant that listed a motel room suspected of being a hub for drug trafficking. The officers then decided to search the suspect’s home as well and asked the judge over the phone to expand the scope of the warrant to include the home. The judge agreed, but the officers did not physically amend the warrant.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The panel agreed with the district court that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment because the warrant was facially defective. While a judge had orally approved the search of the home, the text of the Fourth Amendment still requires the warrant to specify the place to be searched. But the panel held that the district court erred in denying the officers qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time that the search would violate the Fourth Amendment. An officer could have believed—based on the lack of direct case law at the time—that he or she could search the home because the court had orally approved the search, even if the officer failed to make that change on the warrant.

SEAN WRIGHT V. STATE OF ALASKA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-35543

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Murguia

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner was accused of sexually abusing two young girls and fled Alaska soon after. The State of Alaska filed an information that same year, but Petitioner was neither apprehended nor charged by indictment until 2004, when an employment background check in Minnesota alerted Alaskan authorities to Petitioner’s whereabouts, leading to his arrest and extradition. Petitioner completed his prison sentence and probation in 2016.
 
Petitioner challenged the 2009 conviction as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial because of Alaska’s delay in apprehending and indicting him after he fled. Before he filed this habeas petition, Petitioner was convicted in federal court in Tennessee for failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to its laws.
 
At issue in this appeal was whether Petitioner was “in custody pursuant to” the Alaska judgment he challenges when he filed his Section 2254 petition; if he wasn’t, the federal court lacks jurisdiction over it. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition.
 
The panel explained that Petitioner failed to establish jurisdiction under his restraint-on-liberty theory for reasons similar to the Supreme Court’s rejection of his supervised release theory, that is, because Petitioner does not demonstrate that Tennessee’s sex offender registration laws establish custody “pursuant to” the Alaska judgment. The panel noted that Petitioner in no way argued that he is significantly restrained by the sex offender registration laws of Alaska.

USA V. TALOA LATU

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-10069

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Nguyen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

Defendant, an at the Federal Detention Center (FDC) in Honolulu, repeatedly punched and kicked another inmate. The inmate suffered multiple serious injuries, including a broken jaw. Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 113(a)(6).
 
The inmate did not testify, but the district court admitted his statements—that he was assaulted and that his pain level was an eight out of ten—through the testimony of a nurse and a surgeon who treated him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a conviction for assault. The panel held that the district court properly admitted the statements made by the inmate to his medical providers, as the statements fell within the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). The panel also held that admission of these statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because their primary purpose was to evaluate and treat the inmates injuries rather than to establish past facts for trial.

WASHINGTON V. DAVID SHINN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 05-99009

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Callahan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner asserted that he is entitled to relief on several grounds, the majority of which the panel addressed in a memorandum disposition filed on January 15, 2021. In this opinion, as amended, the panel addressed Petitioner’s certified claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel— that counsel did not investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, including evidence of diffuse brain damage, childhood abuse, and substance abuse.
 
The Ninth Circuit (1) filed an amended opinion along with Judge Gould’s separate concurrence, (2) denied a petition for panel rehearing, and (3) denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition challenging his Arizona conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder.
 
Because Washington filed his habeas petition before the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the panel reviewed the claim under the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny, without the added deference required under AEDPA.
 
The panel held that Washington did not meet his burden under the first Strickland prong of showing constitutionally deficient performance by failing to obtain and review Washington’s education and incarceration records. The panel held that Washington did not meet his burden of showing that trial counsel erred by not further investigating Washington’s childhood abuse, to the extent that he could have, or by not presenting the information he did not have regarding abuse at sentencing hearing.

United States v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-3113

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Larry Johnson was convicted by a jury for possessing a firearm and possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. He sought to overturn his firearms convictions, arguing the trial court erred in instructing the jury on constructive possession. The Tenth Circuit found no plain error, finding that had the jury been given the proper instruction, it would have concluded nonetheless Johnson had both actual and constructive possession of the firearm: after police pulled Johnson over for a traffic violation, they saw a black pistol on the driver's seat where he had been sitting. "Johnson had been exerting physical control over the firearm by sitting on it." Further, the Court found Johnson was in constructive possession of the firearm based on physical contact; the fact the firearm was loaded; his previous statement admitting to possessing a firearm to aid in drug trafficking; and his simultaneous possession of drugs for distribution.

Chase Peden, et al v. Glenn Stephens, et al

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-10723

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: WILLIAM PRYOR

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiff, a sheriff’s department employee, had an affair with the wife of a county administrator. The mistress allegedly conducted a smear campaign against Plaintiff’s wife and, when the affair ended, against Plaintiff as well. The sheriff’s department fired Plaintiff and a local prosecutor declined to prosecute the mistress for harassment. Suspecting the county administrator had a hand in both actions, Plaintiffs sued the mistress, the county administrator, and a host of other county officials for violating state and federal law. The district court entered a summary judgment in favor of the officials and certified that judgment as final even though claims against the mistress remained pending.
 
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that the summary judgment warranted certification under Rule 54(b). The determination in this case that there was no just reason for delay rested on a single factual finding—that “[t]his litigation could potentially remain pending for quite a lengthy time due to the COVID-19 pandemic.” The court wrote that there is no indication that the delays here would cause anything other than inconvenience. Indeed, if pandemic-related delays alone justified an immediate appeal, Rule 54(b) certifications” would cease to “be reserved for the unusual case.

Monteria Najuda Robinson v. William Sauls, et al

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-11280

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: JILL PRYOR

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

This case arises out of the shooting death of Plaintiff’s son. It required the Eleventh Circuit to decide whether video evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether law enforcement officers used excessive force while trying to arrest Plaintiff’s son.

Plaintiff filed claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Officers Heinze, Hutchens, and Doyle, alleging that they violated her son’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in attempting to arrest him. The three Task Force officers sought summary judgment on the Bivens claims. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they used a reasonable level of force under the circumstances
 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Officer Hutchens because he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also correctly determined that Officers Doyle and Heinze were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions before the flashbang detonated. Accordingly, the court affirmed those portions of the district court’s order. The district court erred, however, by granting qualified immunity to Officers Doyle and Heinze for their actions after the flashbang exploded. The court therefore reversed the district court’s order insofar as it granted them summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that they employed excessive force after the flashbang detonated.  The court remanded for further proceedings consistent.

State of Georgia, et al v. President of the United States, et al

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-14269

Opinion Date: August 26, 2022

Judge: Grant

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Several states challenged the portion of the vaccine mandate as it pertains to employees who work on or in connection with a covered contract, or share a workplace with another employee who does. The district court determined that Plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that Plainitffs were likely to prevail on the merits. However, the court also found that the injunction’s nationwide scope was too broad. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order to the extent that it enjoins federal agencies from enforcing the mandate against the plaintiffs and to the extent that it bars the federal government from considering a bidder’s compliance with the mandate when deciding whether to grant a contract to a plaintiff or to a nonparty bidder. However, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the remaining portion of the preliminary injunction.

NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. Marcia L. Fudge

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 20-5126

Opinion Date: August 26, 2022

Judge: Srikanth Srinivasan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In 2016, the Department of Housing and Urban Development promulgated a rule prohibiting the use of lit tobacco products in HUD-subsidized public housing units and their immediate surroundings. Appellants, led by New York City Citizens Lobbying Against Smoker Harassment (C.L.A.S.H.), brought an action raising a number of statutory and constitutional challenges to the Rule. The district court rejected all of C.L.A.S.H.’s claims.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the Department did not exceed its authority in passing the rule and was not arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The Court similarly rejected C.L.A.S.H.’s constitutional claims under the Spending Clause and the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments.

Geiser v. Kuhns

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S262032

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Goodwin Liu

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal holding that a sidewalk picket purporting to protest a real estate company's business practices after the company evicted two long-term residents from their home did not constitute speech in connection with a public issue under the anti-SLAPP statute's catchall provision, holding that the sidewalk protest constituted protected activity within the meaning of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 425.16(e)(4).

The court of appeal held that the sidewalk picket at issue was beyond the scope of anti-SLAPP protection because the picket did not implicate a public issue. Rather, the court of appeal concluded that the picket concerned only a private dispute between the real estate company and the two residents. The Supreme Court reversed after applying both steps of the analysis set forth in FilmOn.com Inc v. DoubleVerify Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (2019), holding that the sidewalk protest furthered public discussion of the public issues it implicated.

People v. Tran

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S165998

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Goodwin Liu

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death but struck the enhancement that Defendant committed the murder for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, holding that there was no basis for reversing Defendant's convictions or sentence.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The jury found true the gang enhancement and the special circumstances of robbery murder and torture murder. The jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court denied Defendant's motions for a new trial, for reduced punishment, and to modify the verdict. The Supreme Court struck the gang enhancement and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) there was assumed or either found error regarding certain jury instructions, the failure to bifurcate, and the admission of hearsay and certain evidence, but each assumed or found error was harmless; (2) Defendant's gang enhancement was incorrectly imposed, but this error did not require reversal of the guilty verdicts or death judgment; and (3) there was no other basis for reversing Defendant's convictions or sentence.

California v. Cheatham

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C094175(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Elena J. Duarte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law

Over ten years ago, Prince Kurtiss Cheatham fled criminal custody after he heard nonexistent voices that led him to believe his life was in danger. After being returned to custody, he again attempted to escape after again hearing nonexistent voices because of untreated schizoaffective disorder. He was charged based on these events and, after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, was committed to a state hospital. Since that time, Cheatham took medications that largely subdued his mental health symptoms but have not resolved his symptoms entirely. Shortly before Cheatham’s anticipated release from hospital custody, the local district attorney sought to extend his commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5. After two psychologists testified at trial that Cheatham met the statute's criteria, a jury found the district attorney had proved the facts necessary to extend Cheatham’s commitment. On appeal, Cheatham argued: (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s findings; and (2) the district attorney should be barred from trying the matter again under double jeopardy principles. Although he acknowledged these principles generally applied only in criminal matters, he contended they also applied in proceedings to extend a section 1026.5 commitment per 1026.5(b)(7). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with Cheatham on both points: because of the lack of evidence supporting the required showing, the Court found the evidence insufficient to support a commitment extension under section 1026.5. Further, the Court found that, on remand, the district attorney could not again attempt to extend Cheatham’s commitment. The trial court’s order extending Cheatham’s commitment was reversed and the trial court directed to dismiss the petition to extend the commitment.

State v. Hinds

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20555

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: Alexander

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder and carrying a dangerous weapon, holding that there was no deprivation of Defendant's due process right to a fair trial in this case.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed two instances of impropriety during the State's closing and rebuttal arguments, neither of which the defense objected to at trial. The Supreme Court upheld Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the first challenged argument did not exceed the bounds of permissible argument; and (2) as to the prosecutor's second challenged argument, even if the prosecutor's remarks were improper, there was no possibility that they deprived Defendant of a fair trial.

State v. Mullens

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC19-1587

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the postconviction court partially granting Defendant's motion to vacate his first-degree murder convictions and sentences of death pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the postconviction court erred in granting a new penalty phase.

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted first-degree murder. After waiving a penalty-phase jury, Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant later filed a postconviction motion under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. The postconviction court summarily denied Defendant's four purely legal claims but granted a new penalty phase, ruling that counsel was deficient in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence, which prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant failed to establish deficient performance in any respect.

Idaho v. Moore

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48817

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In August 2020, police interviewed Dr. Daniel Lee Moore (“Moore”) concerning the murder of Dr. Brian Drake (“Drake”), who had been shot in his chiropractic office over five months earlier. Though Moore invoked his right to an attorney at least three times, the interrogation continued. Moore eventually confessed to the crime and was charged with second-degree murder. Following a defense motion, the district court suppressed the confession after finding that Moore’s Miranda rights had been violated. The district court later dismissed the case, concluding that because the State had relied on the tainted confession in the preliminary hearing, there was insufficient evidence to support a showing of probable cause. The State appealed the dismissal, conceding that there was a Miranda violation, but arguing the district court erred in dismissing the case. Although the Miranda violation rendered Moore’s statements inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief, the State maintains that the statements could still be used to impeach a claim of innocence by Moore if he were to testify at trial. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court affirmed the ruling that the confession was inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief, but reversed the ruling that the confession would also be admissible for impeachment purposes, should Moore testify at a future preliminary hearing or at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-815A. The rulings in this opinion as to the limited admissibility of Moore’s confession would govern any future prosecution of Moore related to the murder of Drake.

McCoy v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 22S-CR-00294

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Goff

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for several drug-related offenses, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence obtained during a search of Defendant's home.

Officer Cody Scott was investigating a robbery when he detained Defendant for an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The officer asked Defendant if he would escort him inside the house, and Defendant agreed to the request. After Officer Scott observed possible narcotics in the residence he obtained a search warrant, the execution of which revealed various drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's protections under Pirtle v. State, 323 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 1975), were violated in this case, and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence obtained during the search.

Payne-Elliott v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 22S-CP-00302

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Slaughter

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Contracts

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing this action under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) but modified the judgment to reflect that the dismissal was without prejudice, holding that the church-autonomy doctrine applied in this case and required its dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6).

Plaintiff sued the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., asserting intentional interference with his contract and employment with Cathedral High School. The Archdiocese moved to the dismiss the complaint and invoked three defenses under the First Amendment, including the church-autonomy defense. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal under Rule 12(B)(1) was improper but that the church-autonomy doctrine barred Plaintiff's claims.

NECEC Transmission LLC v. Bureau of Parks & Lands

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2022 ME 48

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: Stanfill

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law

On interlocutory appeal in this case involving the New England Clean Energy Connect project (Project), the Supreme Judicial Court held that retroactive application of legislation enacted by voters (the Initiative) to the Project, as required by section 6 of the Initiative, was unconstitutional.

On November 2, 2021, fifty-nine percent of Maine voters approved a ballot question through a public referendum that would result in legislation effectively precluding the Project, which is designed to transmit power generated in Quebec through Maine and into Massachusetts. Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory relief alleging that retroactive application of the Initiative to the Project was unconstitutional. The trial court reported the case to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court held that section 6 of the Initiative, as applied retroactively to the certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) issued for the Project, would infringe on Plaintiff's constitutionally-protected vested rights if Plaintiff can demonstrate that it engaged in substantial construction of the Project in good-faith reliance on the authority granted by the CPCN before Maine voters approved the initiated bill by public referendum.

Gambrill v. Bd. of Education of Dorchester County

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 34/21

Opinion Date: August 26, 2022

Judge: Booth

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this case involving violent peer conflicts between adolescents in middle school, holding that the circuit court erred.

Plaintiffs filed a five-count complaint against several school defendants and the Board of Education for Dorchester County, alleging violations of their daughter's state constitutional right to due process and other causes of action stemming from their daughter's bullying by other students. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Act does not preempt CJ § 5-518, and Plaintiffs' negligence claims against the individual school employees were not preempted by federal law; (2) the educational malpractice doctrine does not apply to Plaintiffs' negligent supervision claims; and (3) material disputes of fact precluded the entry of summary judgment.

Huggins v. State

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 59/21

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Gould

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals concluding that Appellant had waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, holding that Appellant did not waive his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

After he had been convicted of a crime of violence Appellant was indicted on charges of possessing a regulated firearm. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the gun and the loaded magazine recovered by law enforcement officers while conducting a warrantless search of his hotel room. Thereafter, the State filed a superseding indictment under a new case number to add additional charges. Appellant subsequently renewed his motion to suppress in the new case. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant was convicted of first-degree assault and other crimes. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Appellant waived his challenge to the denial o this motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further consideration, holding that defense counsel did not waive Appellant's right to appellate review of the denial of his motion to suppress.

In re 2022 Legislative Districting

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 21mo/21

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Robert N. McDonald

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

The Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' exceptions to the special magistrate's recommendation that their challenges to the most recent districting plan adopted by the General Assembly be rejected, holding that Petitioners' evidence fell short of the proof needed to establish the unconstitutionality of a redistricting plan.

Early in 2022, the General Assembly adopted a new plan for State legislative districts. After four separate petitions were filed challenging the validity of that plan, a special magistrate enlisted by the Court conducted hearing and recommended that the challenges be rejected. The Court of Appeals denied the petitions, holding that Petitioners did not rebut the presumption of validity applied the legislative redistricting.

Jedlicka v. State

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 30/21

Opinion Date: August 26, 2022

Judge: Robert N. McDonald

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that Appellant's sentencing proceeding complied with the constitutional protections recognized in recent decisions of the Supreme Court.

In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder and other crimes for his involvement in a burglary at the age of sixteen that resulted in a murder. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison with all but sixty years suspended for the murder conviction and will be eligible for parole at the time he is forty-two years old. In 2017, Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted in recent decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's sentence did not amount to a de facto sentence of life without parole, and his sentence was not grossly disproportionate.

Malvo v. State

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 29/21

Opinion Date: August 26, 2022

Judge: Robert N. McDonald

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals held that ambiguity in a sentencing court's remarks about a juvenile offender's post-offense conduct and character, when made before the Supreme Court issued its decisions governing the sentencing of a juvenile offender to life without the possibility of parole, requires that the offender receive a new sentencing hearing for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.

Petitioner was seventeen years old when he committed a series of murders. In Maryland, Petitioner pled guilty to six counts of first-degree murder. The sentencing court sentenced him to the maximum sentence of six terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole. After the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that because opposing inferences could be drawn as to whether the sentencing judge determined that Petitioner was not "the rare juvenile offender whose crimes reflects irreparable corruption" for whom the Eighth Amendment allows a sentence of life without parole.

Richardson v. State

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 46/21

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Biran

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the warrantless search of his backpack and the warranted search of his cell phone, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on appeal.

After a school resource officer broke up a fight in which Defendant was involved, Defendant's backpack dropped to the ground. When the officer picked up the backpack Defendant ran from the scene. The officer subsequently searched the backpack and discovered a stolen firearm and three cell phones. The officers obtained a warrant to search one cell phone. Thereafter, Defendant was charged with robbery and other offenses. After the trial court denied Defendant's suppression motion as to both searches Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant abandoned his backpack the warrantless search of his backpack was constitutionally permissible; and (2) the warrant authorizing the search of the cell phone did not comply with the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the fruits of the cell phone search.

Smith v. State

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 61/21

Opinion Date: August 26, 2022

Judge: Biran

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals vacated Defendant's convictions for second-degree assault and second-degree child abuse by a custodian, holding that Defendant, an Afrian American man, was prejudiced by the fact that the Sheriff's deputies who served as courtroom bailiffs during his trial wore thin blue line face masks, as required by the Sheriff.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the bailiffs' display of the thin blue line flag on their face masks violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. The court of special appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the display of the thin blue line flag did not violate Defendant's right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeals vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the bailiffs' display of the thin blue line flag and the pro-law enforcement message that it conveyed was inherently prejudicial to Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.

Lyons v. Secretary of Commonwealth

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13307

Opinion Date: August 30, 2022

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

The Supreme Judicial Court entered judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Commonwealth on all claims in Plaintiffs' complaint raising facial constitutional challenges to various aspects of the "Act fostering voter opportunities, trust, equity and security" (VOTES Act), including claims that universal early voting provisions were facially unconstitutional, and denied Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, holding that there was no merit to Plaintiffs' claims.

The VOTES Act, which was passed by the legislature on June 16, 2022 and approved by the Governor six days later, provided that any qualified voter in Massachusetts can vote early, in person or by mail, in primaries and biennial State elections. Plaintiffs, all associated with the Massachusetts Republican Party, brought this action challenging the VOTES Act, specifically the Act's requirement that the Secretary mail applications for early voting ballots to all registered voters by July 23, 2022. The court entered judgment for the Secretary on all claims, arguing that Plaintiffs' claim that the universal early voting provisions were facially unconstitutional was without merit and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their remaining claims.

State v. Pauli

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A19-1886

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: McKeig

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for four counts of possession of pornographic work involving minors, holding that, assuming that Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his online cloud storage account, the government's search of his account was lawful under the private search doctrine.

At issue in this case was the conduct of law enforcement officers who discovered digital child pornography files stores in Defendant's cloud storage account with Dropbox. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence acquired from his Dropbox account, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrantless search of Defendant's online cloud storage account did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Under the Rainbow Early Education Center v. County of Goodhue

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-1349

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: G. Barry Anderson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the tax court denying summary judgment to Rainbow Early Education Center, an early childhood center, on its claim for a tax exclusion as a seminary of learning under Minn. Const. art. X, 1 and Minn. Stat. 272.02, subd. 5, holding that the tax court did not correctly apply the standard set forth in State v. Northwestern Preparatory School, 83 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1957).

Rainbow petitioned for a property tax exemption, claiming status as a seminary of learning. Because prior decisions concerning the meaning of the phrase "seminaries of learning" centered on secondary or postsecondary institutions Rainbow cited licensure, facilities, programming, and rating by a government-administered best practices program in support of its claim that it was entitled to a property tax exemption . The tax court granted summary judgment to the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an institution is an exempt seminary of learning when it has an educational purpose, provides a broad general education, and does so in a thorough and comprehensive manner; and (2) Rainbow presented uncontroverted evidence of each element.

New Mexico v. Jesenya O.

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Citation: 2022-NMSC-014

Opinion Date: June 16, 2022

Judge: Zamora

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Child, then age seventeen, became Facebook friends with a former schoolmate, Jeremiah Erickson (Erickson), then age nineteen. The two conversed primarily through their respective Facebook Messenger accounts. Child and Erickson used Messenger to arrange in-person meetings, during which Erickson drove to Child’s house to pick her up and drive her somewhere to “hang out.” It was the second of these meetings that gave rise to the events leading to Child’s adjudication. Both Erickson and Child testified that their get-together on the night of February 24, 2020, did not end well, and each provided a different narrative as to what unfolded. At Child’s adjudication, the State sought to introduce evidence of communications between Child and Erickson the State alleged took place on Facebook Messenger the day after an incident involving Erickson’s vehicle. The State sought to authenticate the messages through Erickson’s testimony as to his personal knowledge of both the accuracy of screenshots and his history of Facebook Messenger communications with Child, as well as through the contents of the messages themselves. Child’s counsel objected to the authentication of the exhibits, arguing the screenshots did not show with certainty the messages were sent from Child’s Facebook account and emphasizing what counsel characterized as the inherent difficulty in “lay[ing a] foundation on Facebook Messenger messages because anybody can have access to somebody’s phone or Facebook account.” The district court overruled the objection, and the evidence was admitted. Child was subsequently adjudicated delinquent and appealed the district court’s judgment and disposition. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the traditional authentication standard set out in Rule 11-901 provided the appropriate legal framework for authenticating social media evidence. But the Court disagreed with appellate court's conclusion that the State failed to meet the threshold for authentication established under that rule, much less that the district court abused its discretion in finding the State had met its burden. The Supreme Court held the State’s authentication showing was sufficient under Rule 11-901 to support a finding that, more likely than not, the Facebook Messenger account used to send the messages belonged to Child and that Child was the author of the messages. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was reversed and Child’s delinquency adjudications were reinstated.

New Mexico v. Mascareno-Haidle

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Citation: 2022-NMSC-015

Opinion Date: June 30, 2022

Judge: Barbara J. Vigil

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-respondent Jesse Mascareno-Haidle was charged committing a series of burglaries of residential homes in Albuquerque. The State filed a motion for pretrial detention, and to support its motion, the State presented the investigating detective's criminal complaint-arrest warrant affidavit, the pretrial services public safety assessment (PSA) recommending that Defendant be released on his own recognizance, the results of a criminal history search pertaining to Defendant, and the register of actions in the case. At the hearing for the motion, "noticeably lacking" was any testimony from the detective and any argument that no conditions of release could protect the community from Defendant if he were released. The district court judge denied detention. The district court judge found “that the magnitude of the allegations are inherently dangerous” but “that the State has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions will reasonably protect the safety of another person or the community.” The State filed a second motion for pretrial detention. As with the first motion, the State supported its second motion with the detective's second criminal complaint-arrest warrant affidavit, an updated pretrial services PSA that again recommended Defendant’s release on his own recognizance, the results of a criminal history search, and the register of actions in the case. An arrest warrant was issued, and Defendant was arrested at his home - his required location under the existing conditions of his release. At the conclusion of a second hearing on the State's motion, the district court again denied the motion. The New Mexico Supreme Court concurred with the district court that the State failed to meet its evidentiary burden to place defendant in pretrial detention, and affirmed the appellate court's affirmance of the district court.

State v. Krouse

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 S.D. 54

Opinion Date: August 31, 2022

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of second-degree arson stemming from a fire that occurred in Defendant's home, for which she submitted a claim to her insurer seeking to recover for the damage to her home, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her claims of error.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal and that she was denied her fundamental right to due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's factual findings were legally sufficient to support a conviction of second-degree arson; (2) the circuit court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) Defendant was not denied her constitutional right to due process and a fair trial.

Vermont v. E.C.

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 VT 40

Opinion Date: August 26, 2022

Judge: Paul L. Reiber

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a consolidated appeal, petitioner E.C. challenged two trial court orders denying his requests to expunge his criminal-history records. Petitioner’s criminal-history records included several felony and misdemeanor convictions, as well as several charges that were dismissed before trial. First,hearguedthathisdismissedchargesshouldbeexpungedunder 13 V.S.A. § 7603(e)(1)(B), which directs a court to expunge a record “related to the citation or arrest of a person . . . within 60 days after the final disposition of the case if . . . the charge is dismissed with prejudice,” unless a party objects in the interests of justice. Petitioner explained that the three-year statute of limitations had expired for each of his dismissed charges, and that the dismissals therefore were with prejudice by operation of the statute and thus were eligible for expungement. Second, he argued that his convictions for offenses committed when he was seventeen years old, including misdemeanor possession of marijuana, should be expunged under 13 V.S.A. § 7602(a)(1)(B), which permits a person to request expungement if they were “convicted of an offense for which the underlying conduct is no longer prohibited by law or designated as a criminal offense.” The Vermont Supreme Court concluded Petitioner’s petitions were properly denied under the governing law and therefore affirmed, but remanded for the Windham criminal division to expunge any of petitioner’s convictions eligible under 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 31.

624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Housing Authority

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 22S-CT-00140

Opinion Date: August 29, 2022

Judge: Mark S. Massa

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the Gary Housing Authority and dismissing allegations that the Housing Authority's notice of its administrative taking of 624 Broadway, LLC's property was constitutionally deficient, holding that the deficient notice was not harmless.

The Housing Authority only provided notice of its taking of 624 Broadway's property by publication, despite knowing how to contact the LLC. After 624 Broadway unsuccessfully requested the Housing Authority to postpone the meeting to its appraiser could assess the property 624 Broadway brought this complaint, alleging that the Housing Authority violated its federal due process rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Housing Authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Housing Authority's constitutionally deficient notice to 624 Broadway was prejudicial; and (2) 624 Broadway was entitled to a damages hearing.

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Justia Team

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