Falto-de Roman v. Municipal Government of Mayaguez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 17-1653

Opinion Date: August 22, 2022

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding plaintiff Elba I. Falto De Roman only nominal damages against the Municipal Government of Mayguez and against its mayor, Jose Guillermo Rodriguez, on her complaint filed after was terminated from her position without having been afforded a due process hearing, holding that there was no error.

Plaintiff brought this action alleging, among other things, that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by terminating her without a hearing. After a trial on the issue of whether Plaintiff was entitled to damages as a result of not receiving a hearing, the jury found Defendants not liable for damages and awarded nominal damages of $1 in favor of Plaintiff. The district court denied Plaintiff's subsequently-filed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff waived her challenge to the district court's denial of her motion for judgment; and (2) Plaintiff did not meet the high bar for a new trial.

Garcia v. Orta

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-50890

Opinion Date: August 25, 2022

Judge: Leslie H. Southwick

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiff claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because he was detained without probable cause for driving while intoxicated. He brought suit under Section 1983, seeking damages from the officers who submitted an affidavit and incident reports to a magistrate to support his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The district court determined that fact issues precluded summary judgment, specifically, whether the officers made false statements that Plaintiff was “operating a motor vehicle” in violation of Texas law.

The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under Texas law, the inquiry when determining whether a person caused a vehicle to move must take into account “the totality of the circumstances [regarding whether] the defendant took action to affect the functioning of his vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle’s use.” The court explained that the officers' allegedly false statements pertained to how far the vehicle moved rather than whether it moved at all. Even if a vehicle only moved six inches, that may be sufficient to establish the operation element.

Harness v. Watson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-60632

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The issue before the en banc court was whether the current version of Miss. Const. art. 12, Section 241 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. This provision was upheld in Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998), which was binding on the district court and the panel decision here, but the court voted to reconsider Cotton en banc.
 
Plaintiffs are black men in Mississippi who were convicted, respectively, of forgery and embezzlement. Both are disenfranchised under current Mississippi law because of their convictions. They filed suit against the Mississippi Secretary of State under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to restore the voting rights of convicted felons in Mississippi. They contend that the crimes that “remain” in Section 241 from the 1890 Constitution are still tainted by the racial animus with which they were originally enacted.
 
The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that the current version of Section 241 superseded the previous provisions and removed the discriminatory taint associated with the provision adopted in 1890. Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391–92. Further, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to establish the 1968 reenactment of Section 241 was motivated by racism. The court explained that contrary to Plaintiffs’ principal assertion, the critical issue here is not the intent behind Mississippi’s 1890 Constitution, but whether the reenactment of Section 241 in 1968 was free of intentional racial discrimination. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Section 241 as it currently stands was motivated by discriminatory intent or that any other approach to demonstrating the provision’s unconstitutionality is viable.

Harris v. Clay County, MS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-60456

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: Gregg Costa

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, sued District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983 alleging that Defendants violated her son’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by unlawfully detaining him for years. The complaint also contends that, at one point, the Sheriff held Defendant down and forced him to take unwanted medication. As to Clay County, Plaintiff argued that Sheriffs were final policymakers, making the county liable under Monell. Defendants sought summary judgment; Plaintiff responded with a motion for partial summary judgment.
 
After summary judgment, the following claims remained: the detention claim against the Sheriffs and Clay County; the forced medication claim against Clay County alone. The Sheriffs and Clay County appealed. The Fifth Circuit, in treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing, granted the petition for panel rehearing. The court dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.
 
The court explained that this is not a case about jailers following court orders that turned out to be unconstitutional. These Sheriffs held Plaintiff’s son in violation of a court order that followed Jackson’s commit-or-release rule. The court wrote that it cannot be that the initial detention order in a case overrides subsequent release orders and allows jailers to indefinitely hold defendants without consequence. Thus, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated Plaintiff’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and qualified immunity thus does not protect the Sheriffs.

Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-30643

Opinion Date: August 22, 2022

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

This case involves three constitutional challenges to New Orleans’s regulation of short-term rentals (“STRs”)—the City’s term for the type of lodging offered on platforms such as Airbnb and Vrbo. The district court granted summary judgment to the City on two of those challenges but held that the third was “viable.” Both sides appealed.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and dismissed the City’s cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment on the dormant Commerce Clause claim and the Takings Clause claim. The City cross-appealed the “holding”—its term, not ours—that the prior-restraint claim is “viable.”
 
The court explained that first, the original licensing regime was explicit: An STR license is “a privilege, not a right.” Second, Plaintiffs’ interests in their licenses were not so longstanding that they can plausibly claim custom had elevated them to property interests. Together, those two factors yield one conclusion: Plaintiffs didn’t have property interests in the renewal of their licenses.  Next, the court agreed that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the City on their challenge to the residency requirement. The court explained that the district court should have asked whether the City had reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives to achieve its policy goals.

Rogers v. Hall

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-60533

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: Cory T. Wilson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff was fired from his position as the Chief of Investigation of the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman (Parchman) about three months after he testified at a probable cause hearing on behalf of one of his investigators. Rogers sued the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), then-MDOC Commissioner, and MDOC’s Corrections Investigations Division Director, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on sovereign and qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
 
The court explained that to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that the defendants violated a right that was not just arguable, but “beyond debate.” And he fails to “point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority that either answers the question Lane left open regarding sworn testimony given by a public employee within his ordinary job duties, or clearly establishes that Plaintiff’s testimony was outside his ordinary job duties as a law enforcement officer (or was otherwise protected speech). Nor does Plainitff point to record evidence demonstrating that his testimony was undisputedly outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities, as was his burden to do.

USA v. Morton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-10842

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Gregg Costa

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

State troopers arrested Defendant after finding drugs in his car during a traffic stop. Morton also had three cell phones in the car. A state judge later signed warrants authorizing searches of the phones for evidence of drug crime. The warrants allowed law enforcement to look at photos on the phones. When doing so, troopers discovered photos that appeared to be child pornography. This discovery led to a second set of search warrants. The ensuing forensic examination of the phones revealed almost 20,000 images of child pornography. This federal prosecution for receipt of child pornography followed. Defendant argues the evidence discovered during those searches should be suppressed. Defendant principally tries to defeat good faith by invoking the third exception, which involves what are commonly known as “bare bones” affidavits.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that law enforcement is usually entitled to rely on warrants and none of the exceptions that undermine good-faith reliance on a judge’s authorization applies. The court wrote that the affidavits used to search Defendant’s phones are not of this genre. Each is over three pages and fully details the facts surrounding Defendant’s arrest and the discovery of drugs and his phones. They explain where the marijuana and glass pipe was discovered, the number (16) and location of the ecstasy pills, and the affiant’s knowledge that cellphones are used for receipt and delivery of illegal narcotics. The court explained that it decides only that the officers acted in good faith when relying on the judge’s decision to issue the warrants.

USA v. Selgas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-10672

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: James L. Dennis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Tax Law, White Collar Crime

Defendants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) by interfering with its lawful functions and evasion of payment of taxes. On appeal, Defendants both challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions and raise challenges to a number of jury instructions.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court’s denial of Defendant’s last-minute continuance request was not an abuse of discretion, and Defendant was not denied the counsel of his choice. Further, because Defendant failed to meaningfully address all four prongs of plain error review either in his opening brief or in reply, his constructive amendment challenge fails.
 
Further, the court wrote, that viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed that Defendant failed to report a substantial amount of income; influenced MyMail to amend its tax return to underreport how much income it distributed to Defendant; converted at least $1 million of income into gold coins; purchased a house with gold coins and transferred it to a trust controlled by a relative; and hid his income in Co-Defendant’s trust accounts and used the concealed funds to pay his living expenses for at least a decade, including during the years that the IRS Agent was contacting Defendants, as Defendant’s IRS power-of-attorney, in an attempt to collect Defendant’s unpaid tax liabilities. Based on the foregoing evidence, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt both willfulness and an affirmative act of evasion.

Jones v. Bradshaw

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Dockets: 7-3766, 15-4308

Opinion Date: August 22, 2022

Judge: Richard Allen Griffin

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On November 17, 1997, an Ashtabula Police dispatcher advised officers that Jones, who had outstanding felony warrants, had been spotted. Days earlier, Jones had told his cousin that he “was facing a lot of time” and “was going to shoot at the police if they ever tried to arrest him.” Officer Glover found Jones, who pulled a revolver from his pocket and fired several shots at Glover. Jones kicked Glover in the chest, then fled the scene. Officers apprehended Jones and recovered the weapon, which used hollow-point bullets. Officer Glover died the following morning.

Jones was convicted of murder. During the penalty phase, Jones’s counsel presented testimony from a clinical psychologist who diagnosed Jones with Antisocial Personality Disorder and testified that Black men with this disorder (including Jones) would commit more murders—he claimed that about one in four “African-American urban males” suffered from the disorder, and the only treatment was to “throw them away, lock them up.” The jury recommended and the court imposed the death penalty. The district court denied Jones’s petition for habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The issue of whether Jones received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because his attorneys failed to prepare expert witnesses properly, as shown by the psychologist’s racialized testimony, was not procedurally defaulted. On de novo review of the merits, the court held trial counsel performed ineffectively and Jones is entitled to a new sentencing.

Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-3125

Opinion Date: August 22, 2022

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Indianapolis Police Officers went to Mikie’s Pub in Indianapolis. Both officers were off duty and in plain clothes. Bohanon argued with the bartender about his bill. The officers intervened and brutally beat Bohanon in the parking lot. Bohanon sued Indianapolis under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the officers used excessive force and that his injuries were caused by the city’s policies, which prohibit off-duty officers with any alcohol in their blood from performing law-enforcement functions subject to a narrow exception. An officer may do so only in an “extreme emergency situation[]” where police “action is required to prevent injury to the off duty [officer] or another, or to prevent the commission of a felony or other serious offense.” Bohanon argued that the city was deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk of constitutional violations. A jury awarded Bohanon $1.24 million. The judge granted Indianapolis judgment as a matter of law.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For the city to be liable, a municipal policy or custom must have caused Bohanon’s constitutional injury. The narrow exception in the city’s substance-abuse policy did not present a policy “gap” that made it glaringly obvious that off-duty officers would use excessive force. Because no extreme emergency situation existed at the time of the incident, those policies expressly prohibited the officers’ conduct and were not the “moving force” cause of Bohanon’s injury.

Flowers v. Renfro

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2675

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A man grabbed Flowers’s girlfriend in a bar. After a verbal altercation, the bar’s owner asked both men to leave. Flowers protested but left the bar accompanied by a bouncer and Davis, an off-duty police officer employed as a security guard. While Flowers waited in the parking lot for his girlfriend, he and Davis talked. Officer Renfro, another off-duty Springfield police officer employed by the bar, without warning or provocation, grabbed Flowers and slammed him to the pavement face first, knocking out Flowers’ tooth. Renfro then placed Flowers under arrest. Flowers had not verbally or physically threatened the officers and was not showing any indication that he would resist arrest. The only conduct that Renfro claims justified slamming Flowers to the ground was that Flowers questioned the command to leave the bar and turned around to face Davis within one to two feet of him. Flowers disputes that he ever turned to face Davis.

Flowers sued the city, Renfro, and Davis under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, which asserted that the officers did not violate Flowers’ civil rights and were entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court held that there are genuine issues of disputed fact, material to Flowers’ claim against Renfro; the reasonableness of that use of force would inform a decision on qualified immunity.

Munson v. Newbold

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-3500

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Inmate Munson developed sensitivity in two teeth because of poorly-fitted partial dentures. In April 2014 he went to the prison’s dental unit. One tooth was extracted. Munson declined a second extraction, so treatment was postponed. Munson’s next regular dental examination had to be rescheduled because of a lockdown. Munson asserts that on July 15, he sent a letter to Dr. Newbold, the prison’s chief dentist, complaining of pain and seeking treatment. Newbold cannot recall receiving the letter, nor did he record any such letter. Because of successive lockdowns, Munson’s regular exam was repeatedly rescheduled. Dr. Henderson saw him on August 5 but Munson left to take a call before treatment began. Munson says he wrote Newbold another letter on September 20. Newbold cannot recall receiving it. In February 2015, Henderson treated the tooth. Munson eventually received new partial dentures after his 2017 transfer.

Munson brought Eighth Amendment 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Dr. Newbold and Wexford, the corporation that provides inmate medical services. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The evidence could not support an inference that Munson’s dental problems were a serious medical need, that Dr. Newbold knew of his requests for treatment, or to attribute any delay in treatment to Dr. Newbold. Wexford could not be held liable for damages without evidence that Munson experienced any constitutional harm.

Dylan Brandt v. Leslie Rutledge

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2875

Opinion Date: August 25, 2022

Judge: Jane Louise Kelly

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Health Law

Plaintiffs, a transgender youth, their parents, and two healthcare professionals, sought to enjoin Arkansas Act 626, which prohibits healthcare professionals from providing gender transition procedures to any individual under the age of 18 or from referring any such individual to any healthcare professional for gender transition procedures. The district court enjoined the Act, and the State appealed.

The Eighth Circuit held that because a minor's sex at birth determines whether or not the minor can receive certain types of medical care under the law, Act 626 discriminates on the basis of sex. Thus, to be valid, the Act must be supported by an exceedingly persuasive justification. The Eighth Circuit determined that the Act prohibits medical treatment that conforms with the recognized standard of care for adolescent gender dysphoria and that the purpose of the Act is not to ban a treatment but to ban an outcome the State deems undesirable. Thus, the district court did not err in granting an injunction.

Ray Dansby v. Dexter Payne

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Dockets: 19-3006, 19-3105

Opinion Date: August 25, 2022

Judge: Steven M. Colloton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted by an Arkansas jury on two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. After the district court denied his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Eighth Circuit vacated the dismissal of two claims and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court denied Defendant's petition with respect to his conviction but granted relief with respect to his
sentence of death, imposing a sentence of life imprisonment. Both sides appealed.

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order affirming Defendant's conviction; however, the court reversed the district court's grant of relief. The Eighth Circuit explained that the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision concerning the scope of cross-examination of a government witness did not contravene or unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent by concluding that the balance struck by the trial court was permissible under the Sixth Amendment, and his Confrontation Clause claim did not merit relief. Defendant's other claims were procedurally barred and Defendant did not show cause of prejudice to overcome the default.

FREDDIE CRESPIN V. CHARLES RYAN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-15073

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: Hurwitz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner was charged in Arizona with first-degree murder. The crime was committed when Petitioner was sixteen years old, but the Supreme Court had not yet held that the death penalty could not be imposed on defendants younger than eighteen when the crime occurred. To avoid that possibility, he entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”).
 
After the Supreme Court decided in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that the imposition of LWOP for those convicted of a crime committed while under the age of eighteen violated the Eighth Amendment under some circumstances, Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in Arizona state court. He then filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas corpus petition, and the district court granted a conditional writ.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The panel held that the plea agreement did not waive Petitioner’s right to pursue a PCR challenge of his sentence. The panel further explained, that under Miller, a sentencer must have discretion to impose a lesser sentence than LWOP. Here, the trial judge made it clear that he did not have this discretion. Because the judge correctly recognized that his only sentencing option was LWOP, Petitioner’s sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment. The panel concluded that there was at least a reasonable possibility that a sentencing proceeding conducted in accordance with Miller’s requirements would result in a non-LWOP sentence.

GIANG NGUYEN V. SCOTT FRAUENHEIM

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-56284

Opinion Date: August 22, 2022

Judge: Milan D. Smith, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against three Hispanic women during jury selection, Petitioner raised an objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The trial court denied the challenge, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed on direct appeal. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a California state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition raising a Batson challenge to a jury conviction. The panel held that, even if a combined race and gender class such as Hispanic women is a cognizable group for purposes of Batson, that new rule would not apply to Petitioner’s case. The panel concluded that, under circuit precedent in Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2001), and Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995), the recognition of a mixed race and gender class would be a new rule. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), bars the application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to cases that were final before the new rule was announced.
 
The panel further held that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race alone because the totality of the circumstances, including a comparison between the prospective jurors the prosecutor struck and those he did not, did not raise an inference that race motivated the prosecutor to exercise a strike. Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s decision on Batson step one was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of facts.

RENO V. RON DAVIS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 17-99004

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: Callahan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The district court issued a certificate of appealability on two issues: Respondent’s due process claims regarding the destruction of police records (Claims 17 and 18); and the state trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on Cal. Penal Code Section 272, which Respondent asserted was a lesser included offense of one of the felony charges (Claim 48n).
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Respondent’s amended 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his California conviction, on retrial, and death sentence for two first-degree murders and one second-degree murder.
 
The panel held that the California Supreme Court reasonably applied Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), instead of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the record does not support Respondent’s assertion that the purged records contained material exculpatory evidence. The panel also held that the California Supreme Court did not act unreasonably when, applying Youngblood, it affirmed the trial court’s factual finding that there was no evidence that the police department acted in bad faith.
 
The panel held that the instructions in Respondent’s case—which did not give the jury “an all-or-nothing choice” between the capital first-degree murder charge and innocence, but rather gave the jury the option of finding Reno guilty of the lesser included non-capital offenses of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter—did not run afoul of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), and there was no constitutional error.

USA V. JOSE RAMIREZ-RAMIREZ

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-10127

Opinion Date: August 22, 2022

Judge: Paez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was tried for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and conspiracy to do the same during a one-day bench trial. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for findings of fact under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(c). Although he acknowledged that the motion might be untimely because the rule requires that such a motion be made “before the finding of guilty or not guilty,” Defendant argued that he had been unaware that the court intended to deliver its finding without a hearing. The district court denied the motion.
 
The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment of conviction. The panel held that the district court plainly erred by making only a written finding of guilt after trial, in violation of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The panel concluded that, although the usual remedy would be a remand to announce the finding in open court, the district court had already reiterated its finding of guilt publicly during Defendant’s sentencing, rendering such a remedy superfluous.
 
The panel further held that, because the finding of guilt was legally insufficient, the district court erred in denying as untimely Defendant’s motion for specific findings of fact. Instead, the panel vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for the district court to make specific findings of fact.

United States v. Woody

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-2007

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: David M. Ebel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In August 2019, Defendant-Appellant Francis Woody was tried and convicted of one count of aggravated sexual abuse, and two counts of abusive sexual contact. The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment on each count to run concurrently. Woody appealed his convictions, asserting that the district court should have suppressed his statements to federal agents because the agents violated his constitutional rights and, separately, should have excluded certain testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Woody also challenged his life sentence as substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no merit in these arguments and thus affirmed Woody’s convictions and sentence.

Bidi Vapor LLC v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, et al

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 21-13340, 21-13387, 21-13438, 21-13454, 21-13521, 21-13522

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: WILLIAM PRYOR

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Consumer Law

Petitioners petitioned for review concerning whether it was arbitrary and capricious for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Administration) to issue marketing denial orders to six tobacco companies for their electronic nicotine-delivery systems without considering the companies’ marketing and sales-access-restriction plans designed to minimize youth exposure and access. The Administration refused to consider the marketing and sales-access-restriction plans.
 
The Eleventh Circuit granted the petitions for review, set aside the orders of the Administration, and remanded to the Administration. The court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Administration to ignore the relevant marketing and sales-access restriction plans do not mandate a different result on remand. The court acknowledged the evidence in the record cataloged by the dissent of the serious risk to youth, and it may be that the Administration will conclude on remand that the marketing and sales-access restriction plans submitted in the tobacco companies’ applications do not outweigh those risks. The court wrote that it decides only that the Administration must at least consider the relevant evidence before it, which includes the companies’ marketing and sales-access-restriction plans.

David Freeman v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-13995

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: LAGOA

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Eleventh Circuit issued a certificate of appealability (“COA”) with respect to: “Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when at the penalty phase of trial, it failed to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation and failed to uncover and present mitigation evidence.”
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was exhausted in state court. The court explained that Petitioner’s claim in state court did not contain any factual allegations in support of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present “substantial evidence” of mitigation. His allegations remained largely unchanged in his briefing to the Alabama Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Alabama.
 
Further, the court held that Petitioner failed to make any argument that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ denial of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court.
 
Moreover, the court agreed with the district court’s determination under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) that Petitioner has not demonstrated the Alabama courts’ denial of his Strickland claims were “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”

USA v. John J. Utsick

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 16-16505

Opinion Date: August 22, 2022

Judge: MARCUS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, International Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime

Following proceedings in district court, the trial court t entered a final judgment, finding Defendant liable, ordering him to disgorge over $4,000,000 in funds, and placing two of his entities under receivership in order to sell and reorganize assets to repay investors. Later, a federal grand jury sitting in Miami returned a superseding indictment that described consistent with the district court’s findings of fact.
 
After an extradition request was filed by the United States, the Supreme Court of Brazil allowed him to be extradited. He returned to the United States, and on the eve of trial, following over a year of pretrial proceedings, Defendant entered into a plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to one count of mail fraud. The district court later sentenced Defendant to 220 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $169,177,338 in restitution.
 
On appeal, Defendant broadly argues: (1) that the custodial sentence imposed and the order of restitution violate the extradition treaty; and (2) that his guilty plea was not made freely and voluntarily. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court fully satisfied the core concerns of Rule 11, and the court could discern no reason to conclude that the district court plainly erred in finding that Defendant’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The court explained that in this case, the record fully reflects that Defendant agreed to be sentenced subject to a 20-year maximum term, and his 220-month sentence is near the low end of his agreed-upon 210-to-240-month range.

Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union v. DC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-7059

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: KATSAS

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA) governs collective bargaining by employees of the District of Columbia government. It allows officers of the Metropolitan Police Department, like other D.C. government employees, to unionize and engage in collective bargaining. They have done so and are represented by the plaintiff in this case, the Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union (FOP). The police union contends that the statute violates equal protection principles, the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
 
The DC Circuit rejected all the challenges concluding that the district court correctly concluded that the FOP’s constitutional claims lack merit. The FOP disputes that police accountability motivated the Council. The court explained that the legislature’s actual motive is “entirely irrelevant”; all that matters is whether there are “plausible reasons” to conclude that the statutory classification furthers a legitimate government interest.
 
The FOP next contends that section 116 violates the Bill of Attainder Clause. However, the court found that the union makes no serious effort to show that the Council acted beyond its discretion. And the court could discern no express or hidden intent to punish. Further, FOP contends that section 116 violates the Contract Clause. The court explained that retrospective laws violate the Contract Clause only if they “substantially” impair existing contract rights. Here, the union could not have reasonably expected to insulate itself from legal changes after the 2017 Agreement had expired by its terms.

Gordon Price v. Merrick Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-5073

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: GINSBURG

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Appellee, an independent filmmaker, filmed parts of a feature film on land administered by the National Park Service (NPS) without having obtained the requisite permit and having paid the requisite fee. The Government charged him with a misdemeanor but later dismissed the charge. Appellee then sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the permit-and-fee requirements are facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The district court agreed with Appellee, holding the permit-and-fee requirements do not satisfy the heightened scrutiny applicable to restrictions on speech in a public forum.
 
The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The court held that regulation of filmmaking on government-controlled property is subject only to a “reasonableness” standard, even when the filmmaking is conducted in a public forum. Here, the court found, that the permit-and-fee requirements are reasonable. The court explained that although filmmaking is protected by the First Amendment, the specific speech-protective rules of a public forum apply only to communicative activity. Consequently, regulations governing filmmaking on government-controlled property need only be “reasonable,” which the permit-and-fee requirements for commercial filmmaking on NPS land surely are.

People v. Ramirez

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S099844

Opinion Date: August 25, 2022

Judge: Carol Corrigan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and life sentences for first-degree murder, robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, and drug-related offenses, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error during jury selection; (2) the trial judge was neither biased nor prejudiced against Defendant nor his counsel during voir dire; (3) as to Defendant's claims of error during the guilt phase of his trial, he failed to establish that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct rendering Defendant's trial fundamentally unfair; and (5) as to the penalty phase issues raised by Defendant, there was no prejudicial error.

California v. Nieber

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D079208(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 22, 2022

Judge: Richard D. Huffman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Toren Nieber was convicted in 2017 for his role in the commission of a 2016 burglary and robbery during which one of the victims was shot and killed. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found insufficient evidence to hold Nieber over on a special circumstance allegation, and the matter proceeded to trial without that charge. Nieber appealed his conviction, arguing he should be resentenced pursuant to California Penal Code Section 1172.6 (d)(2) because the court’s decision at the preliminary hearing constituted a “prior finding by a court” that he was not a major participant in the underlying crime. The trial court, which had presided over the preliminary hearing as well as the trial, ordered an evidentiary hearing and followed the procedures outlined in subdivision (d)(3). It concluded the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Nieber was a major participant who acted with a reckless indifference to human life and was therefore ineligible for resentencing. It thus denied the petition. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Nieber argued: (1) the court improperly held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6 (d)(3) because the court’s finding at the preliminary hearing required it to resentence him under subdivision (d)(2); collateral estoppel likewise meant the court was required to follow the procedure detailed in subdivision (d)(2); and (3) the court’s conclusion that he was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life was not supported by sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeal found his contentions without merit, and affirmed.

In re J.R.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B314532(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: BENDIX

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Native American Law

Father appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating his and Mother’s parental rights and finding that the child, J.R., was adoptable. The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed that order because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the agency) violated Mother’s due process rights.

The court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., Section 1.) Except in emergent circumstances, this provision guarantees reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the state may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest. Because parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children, the due process clause requires child welfare agencies to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and notify them of dependency proceedings.
 
The court explained that this case presents a textbook example of a due process violation. DCFS initiated dependency proceedings concerning J.R. on the ground that his father physically abused him. Even though Father told the agency at the outset of the proceedings that Mother resided in El Salvador, the record does not show that DCFS made any attempt to ascertain Mother’s location in that country. The court concluded that Father has standing to assert DCFS’s violation of Mother’s due process rights.

Pollard v. Delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 280, 2021

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: Montgomery-Reeves

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2021, appellant Javon Pollard was convicted of numerous drug-related charges. Pollard appealed, arguing that the Superior Court committed plain error by not sua sponte suppressing evidence obtained during an allegedly illegal search of his vehicle in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution. To the Delaware Supreme Court, the State urged the Supreme Court not to consider Pollard’s appeal because he failed to properly raise this argument below. The State further argued that Pollard’s challenges also failed because there was sufficient probable cause to justify the search. The Supreme Court agreed Pollard did not fairly raise the argument below. Regardless, Pollard also lost on the merits because the search did not violate either the United States or Delaware Constitutions.

Covington v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Dockets: SC21-295, SC21-295

Opinion Date: August 25, 2022

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the postconviction court denying Defendant's motion to vacate his convictions and sentences, including three convictions for first-degree murder and three sentences of death, holding that Defendant was entitled to neither postconviction relief nor a writ of habeas corpus.

In 2014, Defendant pleaded guilty to murdering his girlfriend and her two children. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each murder. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Defendant appealed the court's decision and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising two claims. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) as to Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, Defendant failed to demonstrate error, deficiency, or prejudice as to any of his claims; and (2) as to Defendant's habeas corpus petition, Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims.

Adkins v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0796

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Marion Adkins, Jr. was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2019 shooting death of Latisha Gresham. He appealed, contending that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial failed to exclude all other reasonable hypotheses, such as the commission of the crime by some unknown assailant or Gresham’s possible suicide, and was therefore insufficient to support his conviction. Adkins also argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on “grave suspicion.” Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Albury v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0616

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Riki Ray Albury was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2018 stabbing death of Ronald Roach. On appeal, Albury contended the trial court erred by failing to excuse two jurors for cause and by admitting a particular autopsy photograph into evidence, and that Albury’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. Seeing no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Benton v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22G0104

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Prior to his conviction for aggravated assault in this case, Turner Benton had been found guilty of three other felony offenses. However, for the first of those offenses, he was sentenced under Georgia’s First Offender Act and placed on probation. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Benton’s petition for a writ of certiorari in this case to consider whether his first-offender sentence became a “conviction” for purposes of OCGA § 17-10-7(c) when the record shows that his probation was revoked by the court multiple times, but where there was no adjudication of guilt. The Supreme Court found that for Benton’s first offense, the court’s revocation orders served only to revoke Benton’s probation, not his status as a first offender. Thus, upon the completion of his first-offender sentence, Benton was exonerated of the underlying offense by operation of law. The Supreme Court therefore determined that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in their determinations that Benton had been convicted of three felonies prior to his conviction in this case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case with direction that Benton’s sentence be vacated and he be resentenced.

Bonner v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0789

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Aurie Bonner, III was convicted of murder in connection with the 2012 death of Christine Cook. On appeal, he contended his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed Bonner’s trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance and affirmed his conviction and sentence.

Jones v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S22A0744, S22A0745

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Samuel Jones was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2018 shooting death of Terrance Gibson. In consolidated cases, Jones argued on appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter and that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with both contentions and affirmed.

Prickett v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0531

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Carla Wong McMillian

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Santron Prickett appealed his conviction for felony murder and other charges in connection with the 2010 death of Antwan Curry. Prickett argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because: (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when his attorney failed to stipulate to his status as a felon, thereby tainting the jury with evidence of Prickett’s prior criminal conviction; (2) his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the trial was violated when the trial court conferred with counsel out of his presence 26 times during trial; and (3) the trial court failed to rebuke the prosecutor and declare a mistrial, or, in the alternative, give a curative instruction to the jury following defense counsel’s objection to an improper comment by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Because the Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in sentencing Prickett, it vacated his convictions and sentences and remanded the case for resentencing. The Court affirmed in all other respects.

Wheeler v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A1236

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Eric Wheeler appealed his convictions for murder, aggravated assault, and other crimes arising from the 2003 fatal shooting of Sonya Corbett and non-fatal shooting of Albert Carter. Wheeler’s sole contention of error was that the trial court should have suppressed evidence of a gun, an empty ammunition box, and bloody clothing that were seized as the result of an allegedly unconstitutional search. The Georgia Supreme Court determined any error was harmless, because Wheeler admitted shooting the victims. The Court thus affirmed his convictions. Wheeler’s sentence was vacated, however, because the Supreme Court noticed an issue as to two counts that the trial court purported to merge into other counts, but also entered sentences on those same counts. The matter was remanded for resentencing.

Idaho v. Garcia

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48782

Opinion Date: August 25, 2022

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After a jury found Jesus Garcia guilty on charges related to a deadly night-club incident, the district court ordered restitution against Garcia in the amount of $162,285.27. In Idaho v. Garcia, 462 P.3d 1125 (2020) (“Garcia I”), the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s restitution order after determining the district court had not properly considered Garcia’s future ability to repay that amount. On remand, the district court held a second restitution hearing, weighed evidence from before and after remand, and determined Garcia had the foreseeable ability to pay the restitution amount. The district court then reinstated the original order in full. Garcia appealed, arguing the district court’s decision ignored the Supreme Court’s restitution holding in Garcia I, and was not supported by substantial evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.

Idaho v. Pizzuto

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Dockets: 49489, 49531

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Gerald Pizzuto, Jr., was convicted of two brutal murders and sentenced to death in
1986. After the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole voted 4-3 to recommend that Pizzuto’s death sentence be commuted to life without the possibility of parole, Idaho Governor Brad Little rejected the recommendation, thereby allowing Pizzuto’s death sentence to remain in effect. Pizzuto challenged the Governor’s action by filing an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) motion to correct his sentence, and a sixth petition for post-conviction relief. The district court granted both Pizzuto’s motion and petition after finding Idaho Code section 20-1016 was unconstitutional. The State appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding Idaho Code section 20-1016 was a constitutional expression of the authority granted to the Legislature, the Supreme Court determined the district court erred in granting both Pizzuto’s Rule 35(a) motion and his petition for post-conviction relief. “Both decisions were based on the erroneous grounds that Governor Little lacked authority to reject the Commission’s clemency recommendation because Idaho Code section 20-1016 is unconstitutional. … Because the 1986 amendment to Article IV, section 7, authorizes the legislature to govern the Commission’s commutation powers 'by statute,’ and Idaho Code section 20-1016 is a proper expression of that authority, we reverse the district court’s orders and remand Pizzuto’s cases for further proceedings.”

Idaho v. Weaver

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48470

Opinion Date: August 23, 2022

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Ricky Weaver appealed his conviction for solicitation of murder. The State contended Weaver offered to pay a fellow inmate to murder his girlfriend while they were both being held in the Elmore County Detention Center. Weaver was subsequently charged and convicted by a jury. During his trial, Weaver attempted to elicit testimony from another prisoner, Michael Dean, that Wallace had told Dean that he made up the murder-for-hire story against Weaver in an attempt to try to get a “deal” from the prosecutor in his own case. The district court excluded the evidence on the grounds that Dean’s testimony was hearsay and inherently unreliable based on Dean’s own statements. On appeal, Weaver asserts the district court erred by excluding Dean’s testimony because the anticipated testimony: (1) was relevant because it tended to make it more probable that Wallace had not testified truthfully but instead had tried to set Weaver up in order to secure a “deal” from the prosecutor; (2) fit within the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule; (3) was proper impeachment of Wallace’s credibility; and (4) had probative value not outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court.

State v. Rosario

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2022 ME 46

Opinion Date: August 25, 2022

Judge: Stanfill

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, and Defendant's remaining allegations of error were unavailing.

Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) because law enforcement had probable cause to arrest Defendant, the court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not err in determining that there was no violation of the court's sequestration order; (3) there was no obvious error in the instructions given to the jury; and (4) there was no illegality in the sentence or in the court's procedure.

Spiegel v. Board of Education of Howard County

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 18/21

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: Gould

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's complaint seeking an injunction and declaratory relief to enjoin a student member on the Board of Education of Howard County from exercising any voting power and a declaration that the election process for the student member violates the Maryland Constitution, holding that there was no error.

After relying on remote learning for schooling during the Covid-19 pandemic, at the end of 2020, the Board of Education of Howard County held votes on motions to resume in-person instruction. Each motion failed by a stalemate vote, with the student member causing the stalemate. After the Board decided to continue with remote learning Petitioners brought this action seeking an injunction and a declaration that the statute creating the student member on the Board is unconstitutional. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the provisions of section 3-701 of the Education Article concerning the student member position on the Board do not violate the Maryland Constitution.

Commonwealth v. Tate

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13227

Opinion Date: August 22, 2022

Judge: Georges

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that Defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and that remand to the superior court was required for Defendant to receive a new trial.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and firearm offenses. During the trial, defense counsel disclosed confidential information to the Commonwealth regarding the location of "key incriminating evidence." Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that he had received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because he had not given his counsel his informed consent to disclose the information. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding (1) because defense counsel did not present Defendant with any other option than disclosing the existence of the incriminating evidence Defendant's purported consent to the disclosure was neither adequately informed nor voluntary; and (2) because trial counsel mistakenly believed he had a duty to disclose the incriminating evidence and did not obtain Defendant's prior consent to making that disclosure, an actual conflict of interest existed rendering the representation constitutionally ineffective.

New Jersey v. Bookman

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-32-21

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: Fuentes

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Sometime after 1:00 a.m. on November 2, 2017, New Jersey State Police officers were deployed to arrest Julian Bell on a four-month-old failure to appear warrant. When the officers arrived at Bell’s home, he was standing outside with defendant Steven Bookman. Bell and Bookman fled into a row house next door to Bell’s residence, and officers pursued Bookman to a second-floor bedroom. After an officer informed Bookman he did not have legal grounds to detain him, Bookman voluntarily told the officer he had a revolver inside his jacket pocket. The officer retrieved the handgun and arrested Bookman. Following his indictment for weapons offenses, Bookman moved to suppress the handgun based on the warrantless entry into the row house. The trial court denied the motion, finding officers were permitted to enter the residence without a warrant under the hot pursuit doctrine. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that under the totality of the circumstances reviewed here, the State Police detectives who entered the neighboring residence without a warrant did not have grounds to invoke the hot pursuit doctrine. The warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Although the Court was “disturbed” by the manner of execution of this warrant, it declined to adopt a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach to the execution of all Automated Traffic System arrest warrants.

Nation Ford Baptist Church, Inc. v. Davis

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 390A21

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: Earls

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court denying Nation Ford Baptist Church Inc.'s (Church) motion to dismiss the underlying complaint with respect to Pastor Phillip R.J. Davis's claim for a declaratory judgment, holding that certain claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Pastor Davis filed a complaint against the Church and Nation Ford's Board of Directors, arguing that the Board exceeded its authority under the Church's corporate bylaws when it purported to terminate him by vote of the Board because the governing bylaws allowed termination only by vote of the Church's congregation at a special general meeting. The trial court denied the Church's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Pastor Davis's claim for a declaratory judgment regarding the various bylaws can proceed; and (2) First Amendment principles required the dismissal of Pastor Davis's other claims.

State v. Jones

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 85PA20

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: Berger

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding the revocation of Defendant's probation, holding that Defendant's confrontation argument under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1345(e) was not preserved.

Defendant pleaded guilty to discharging a weapon into occupied property and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Later, Defendant's probation was revoked following a determination that he had committed new criminal offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him at the probation hearing. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation in this case. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the judgment below, holding (1) a defendant's arguments under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1345(e) are preserved when a defendant lodges a proper objection or the trial court does not permit confrontation and fails to make a finding of good cause; and (2) the condition requiring a finding of good cause was not satisfied in this case.

State v. Oglesby

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 683A05-3

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: Earls

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the superior court resentencing Defendant on his first-degree murder conviction to life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years and running his first-degree kidnapping sentence consecutively with his murder sentence, holding that Defendant failed to show prejudice.

Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief seeking sentencing under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The trial court allowed the motion and resentenced Defendant. On appeal, the court of appeals rejected Defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the reasoning below is rejected to the extent it incorrectly suggested that the resentencing court lacked authority to run Defendant's first-degree murder sentence concurrently with his robbery with a dangerous weapon sentences; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that Defendant could not demonstrate prejudice.

Ex parte Cedric Richardson

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0284-21

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: Yeary

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

At issue before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in this case was whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the State from prosecuting appellant Cedric Richardson for the aggravated assault of one victim after a jury acquitted him of capital murder, and aggravated robbery of a different victim. Both victims were shot by co-defendant Keoddrick Polk on the same day—and Appellant was present at the scene of both shootings. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that collateral estoppel (i.e., Double Jeopardy) did not apply in this case. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals which held to the contrary.

Lang v. Texas

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-1124-19

Opinion Date: August 24, 2022

Judge: Walker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Terri Lang was convicted of organized retail theft (ORT). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently found the evidence insufficient to support Appellant’s ORT conviction and remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the judgment of conviction should have been reformed to a lesser-included offense. The court of appeals found that reformation was not available, and the State petitioned for discretionary review. Because the existence of an owner was a statutory element of theft, but the identity of the owner was not, theft was a lesser-included offense of ORT in this case, and Appellant’s conviction met the “Thornton” reformation standards. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, modified the judgment to reflect a conviction for theft, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

Buckingham v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 WY 99

Opinion Date: August 19, 2022

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion filed under Wyo. R. App. P. 21 for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that the district court did not err by denying the motion.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault and battery, and other crimes after repeatedly confronting his estranged wife and her male friend. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant alleged that trial counsel failed properly to advise him of his right to plead not guilty by reason of mental illness. The district court denied the motion, concluding that trial counsel's performance was not deficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not meet his burden to show that prejudice resulted from trial counsel's alleged deficient performance.

The Trigger Has Been Pulled: Texas’s Criminal Ban on Abortion Takes Effect

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman describes the current status of abortion rights and access in Texas in light of the “Roe trigger ban” taking effect today, August 25, 2022. Professor Grossman explains the history of abortion in Texas and highlights the inhumanity of a law that prefers to let a pregnant woman die when a safe medical procedure would have saved her life, rather than permit her to terminate a pregnancy, even a non-viable one, unless she is on the brink of death or substantial bodily impairment.

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Announcing New Free Resources From Justia: Case Outlines for Law Students

Chris Skelton, Kara Simon

In addition to informing consumers about their rights and helping attorneys build their careers, Justia provides resources to assist current and prospective law students. Recently, we expanded our US Law Schools Center with case law outlines covering a broad range of topics. These include not only the first-year core curriculum and common bar exam subjects but also numerous electives.

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