Efreom v. McKee

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1382

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Gelpi

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that, as to counts I-IV, Plaintiffs ran afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that count V failed due to a lack of standing.

Appellants, approximately fifty members of a class of retired Rhode Island public employees, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging constitutional violations in the changes to Rhode Island's retirement benefits scheme (counts I-IV) and in a class action settlement agreement (count V) reached following litigation in state court, in which each appellant was a party. The district court dismissed the action, holding that Appellants' claims were barred by res judicata, a lack of Article III standing, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellants' due process, takings, and Contracts Clause claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (2) Appellants' First Amendment claims were nonjusticiable.

Harper v. Rettig

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1316

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Kermit Victor Lipez

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant's suit under the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 7241, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint.

Appellant brought a complaint against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and some of the IRS's agents alleging that Defendants violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and 26 U.S.C. 7609(f) by acquiring Appellant's personal financial information through a third-party summons process. The district court dismissed Appellant's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal Revenue Code, 262 U.S.C. 7421, constituted an exception to the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar Appellant's suit.

Northeast Patients Group v. United Cannabis Patients & Caregivers of Maine

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 21-1719, 21-1759

Opinion Date: August 17, 2022

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Health Law

The First Circuit affirmed the conclusion of the district court that the Maine Medical Marijuana Act's requirement that officers and directors of medical marijuana dispensaries operating in Maine be Maine residents violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, holding that that Maine residency requirement violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

Plaintiffs brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 2201 alleging that the Act's residence requirement violates the dormant Commerce Clause by permitting only in-staters to serve as officers or directors of dispensaries. The district court granted judgment for Plaintiffs. On appeal, Defendants argued that because the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., makes marijuana contraband, the residency requirement does not run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. The First Circuit disagreed, noting that "a congressional exercise of commerce power can never, merely by being in place, displace the dormant Commerce Clause." The Court then affirmed, holding that "nothing on the face of the CSA purports to bless interstate discrimination in the market for medical marijuana that continues to operate even in the face of the CSA."

McCray v. Capra

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 18-2336

Opinion Date: August 17, 2022

Judge: RICHARD J. SULLIVAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, following his conviction in New York state court for first-degree rape. Petitioner argued principally that the state trial court violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause by denying him full access to the victim-witness’s mental health records.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition. The court held the New York Court of Appeals’ application of Brady and its progeny was not unreasonable and that there is no binding Supreme Court precedent stating that a defendant’s right to confrontation extends to pretrial discovery. The court explained that Petitioner was given a wealth of information in pretrial disclosures; the victim testified about her various mental health issues in open court; and the victim was cross-examined vigorously on her mental illness, her erratic behavior, and – by extension – her reliability. The jury nonetheless credited her testimony and convicted Petitioner. Based on the entire record, the court could not say that no fair-minded jurists would agree with the New York Court of Appeals that Petitioner received a fair trial.
 
Further, the court concluded that the New York Court of Appeals’ decision concerning Petitioner’s confrontation rights was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1).

Shara v. Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist.,

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-2068

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: RICHARD J. SULLIVAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff a former bus driver for Defendant Maine-Endwell Central School District (the “School District”), appealed the dismissal of his complaint by the district court. Plaintiff contends that the School District violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for speech he purports to have made in his capacity as a union leader. In his complaint, however, Plaintiff merely alleged that he had argued with a School District mechanic – and later, a few School District officials – over the frequency with which bus safety issues should be reported. He did not allege that the School District’s existing policy permitted unsafe buses to remain on the roads, nor did he allege that daily reporting would improve public safety.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint, holding that Plaintiff failed to allege that he engaged in speech protected under the First Amendment. The court explained that the specific details of Plaintiff’s complaint suggest that Plaintiff’s arguments with fellow School District personnel were had in his capacity as a School District employee, not as a private citizen. Plaintiff’s primary argument to the contrary boils down to a series of assertions that he was speaking in his capacity as a union official. But even assuming these assertions are entitled to be assumed true, the court has expressly rejected any categorical rule that when a person speaks in his capacity as a union member, he speaks as a private citizen Accordingly, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not support a plausible inference that he spoke as a citizen, or that he spoke on a matter of public concern.

United States v. Hoskins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-842

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: POOLER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The American subsidiary of Alstom Power, Inc. (“API”), a global power and transportation services company, hired two consultants to bribe Indonesian officials to help secure a $118 million power contract. Defendant, who worked in Paris for API’s United Kingdom subsidiary, was allegedly responsible for approving the selection of the consultants and authorizing payments to them. For his role in the alleged bribery scheme, Defendant was charged in an American court with (among other things) violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act  (“FCPA”), which makes it unlawful for officers, directors, and agents “of a domestic concern” to use interstate commerce corruptly to bribe or attempt to bribe foreign officials. Defendant appealed. Defendant moved for acquittal, arguing he was not an agent within the meaning of the FCPA. The district court granted that motion; the government appealed and Defendant cross-appealed.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling holding that the district court properly acquitted Defendant under Rule 29 because there was no agency or employee relationship between Defendant and API. The court also affirmed on the cross‐appeal, finding no error in either the district court’s speedy trial analysis or its jury instructions.  
 
The court explained that while there is some evidence that Defendant supported API in his working relationship with the corporation, it is not sufficient to establish that API exercised control over the scope and duration of its relationship with Defendant. Further, the district court’s analysis of the Barker factors and dismissal of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim falls “within the range of permissible decisions.

Walker v. Schult

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-2415

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: KEARSE

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury

Defendants, federal prison officials, appealed a district court’s judgment awarding former prisoner $20,000 for mental and emotional injury requesting damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for his imprisonment in overcrowded conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious damage to his health or safety, to which Defendants were deliberately indifferent, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.

The Second Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded for dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court held first that the PLRA provision in 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(e) precludes a prisoner's recovery of compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury resulting from his conditions of confinement absent a showing of physical injury. Next, Section 1997e(e) makes physical injury an element of such a claim for mental or emotional injury and is not an affirmative defense that would be subject to waiver if not presented in Defendant's answer. In light of Section 1997e(e), the jury's finding that Plaintiff failed to prove that the prison conditions of which he complained caused him physical injury precluded an award to him of compensatory damages for such mental or emotional injury as the jury found he suffered based on the conditions it found existed.

Moreover, even if the jury's findings of fact warranted a conclusion that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated by deliberate indifference to cruel and unusual psychological punishment caused by overcrowding, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from such an award.

Williams v. MTA Bus Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-2985

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: CARNEY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case concerns the extent of an employer’s obligation to provide accommodations to a job applicant with a disability under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (incorporating the standard set forth in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act) and under generally parallel state and city law. Plaintiff alleged that MTA Bus discriminated against him on the basis of his disability when it denied him the assistance of an American Sign Language interpreter for its knowledge-based pre-employment examination. The district court ruled that Plaintiff must show that he was “otherwise qualified” for the Assistant Stockworker position to maintain his Rehabilitation Act claim and that, at summary judgment, Plaintiff had not met this requirement.

The Second Circuit affirmed. The court first considered whether an applicant who cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is “otherwise qualified” for the desired employment position can survive summary judgment on a failure-to-accommodate claim arising from the employer’s pre-employment testing protocols. Second, the court examined whether Plaintiff made such a showing as to the Assistant Stockworker position that he sought.

The court explained that there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff—entirely independent from his hearing impairment—did not have the experience required to qualify for the desired position. MTA Bus put forth evidence that Defendant was not qualified for the Associate Stockworker position and Defendant has failed to identify any material facts in rebuttal.

Nekrilov v. City of Jersey City

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-1786

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Michael A. Chagares

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

The plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging a Jersey City ordinance curtailing the ability of property owners and leaseholders to operate short-term rentals. The plaintiffs alleged that having passed an earlier zoning ordinance legalizing short-term rentals, which enticed them to invest in properties and long-term leases, the city violated their rights under the Takings Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Due Process Clauses by passing the new ordinance, which, they allege, undermined their legitimate, investment-backed expectations and injured their short-term rental businesses. The plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction. The district court dismissed the complaint.

The Third Circuit affirmed. Not every municipal act legalizing a business activity vests the business owner with a cognizable property right. The plaintiffs’ forward-looking right to pursue their short-term rental businesses is not cognizable under the Takings Clause, but the plaintiffs articulated three cognizable property rights: use and enjoyment of their purchased properties, long-term leases, and short-term rental contracts. Because the properties may still be put to multiple economically viable uses, there has been no total taking of those “properties.” Rejecting “partial takings” claims, the court noted that the plaintiffs may have relied on the previous ordinance in deciding to invest in short-term rentals but they failed to take into account the restrictions in place in that ordinance and the city’s strong interest in regulating residential housing.

Williams v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 20-2999

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Porter

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Granthon was shot dead on a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania street corner. A day earlier, Granton had purchased an ounce of crack cocaine from Burton. Granthon “was short a couple grams” and sought a refund. The evidence linking Burton to Granthon’s death was “overwhelming.” Burton was convicted of first-degree murder. Williams was also charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy, and reckless endangerment of another but the evidence was weaker. No witness recognized Williams and no cell phone records placed him near the scene that night. Williams claimed he spent the night at a casino, but offered conflicting alibi stories and never used his casino rewards card that night. Williams’s trial lawyer’s “defense theory” was that Williams was “not placed at the scene.” He did not call Rochon, a witness at Burton’s trial whose testimony allegedly indicated that Granthon also shot a gun, nor did he make the case for self-defense or voluntary manslaughter.

Williams was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. His trial attorney’s alleged negligence is not self-evident, as the attorney may have reasonably thought that self-defense arguments would detract from an alibi defense. To show his attorney was negligent, Williams would need to develop the record in district court but the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act forbids federal courts from supplementing the state court record under these circumstances.

Kesha Williams v. Stacey Kincaid

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-2030

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff, a transgender woman with gender dysphoria, spent six months incarcerated in the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center. Though prison deputies initially assigned her to women’s housing, they quickly moved her to men’s housing when they learned that she was transgender. There, she experienced delays in medical treatment for her gender dysphoria, harassment by other inmates, and persistent and intentional misgendering and harassment by prison deputies. Following her release from the detention center, Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 action against the Sheriff of Fairfax County, a prison deputy, and a prison nurse alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the United States Constitution, and state common law. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the complaint failed to state grounds for relief with respect to some claims and that the statute of limitations barred others.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the remanded the district court’s ruling. The court held that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that gender dysphoria does not fall within the ADA’s exclusion for “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments.” In addition, the court held that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint relates back to her Original Complaint and that she has stated claims of gross negligence against the Sheriff and Deputy.

Marion Bowman, Jr. v. Bryan Stirling

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-12

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: RUSHING

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During his state post-conviction relief (PCR) and federal habeas proceedings, Petitioner argued that the State of South Carolina’s failure to produce three pieces of evidence violated his due process rights because he could have used that evidence to impeach prosecution witnesses. Considering the entire record and the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, every court to address this argument has deemed the undisclosed evidence not material.

The Fourth Circuit agreed and denied Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus. The court explained that having granted every permissible assumption in Petitioner’s favor and having carefully considered all the undisclosed evidence in light of the entire record at trial, the court concluded that Petitioner has not carried his burden to prove a reasonable probability that, had he received the undisclosed evidence, the jury would not have convicted him of murder or recommended a sentence of death.

US v. Montana Barronette

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4123

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: FLOYD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellants operated for around seven years an enterprise known as “Trained to Go” (TTG) within one of West Baltimore’s neighborhoods. Appellants distributed drugs and engaged in countless acts of violence using firearms. They exercised their constitutional right to a jury trial and were convicted for their actions, including for conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). They now bring numerous challenges to their convictions and sentences, including their right to a public trial, the evidence admitted at trial, and more.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed Appellants’ convictions and sentences on all fronts, save one. The court reversed one Appellant’s Section 922(g)(1) conviction, vacated the judgment as to him, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. The court explained that Appellants contend that any RICO conspiracy was confined to a neighborhood in Baltimore. But the government must only prove a “de minimis” effect on interstate commerce. Appellants argue that the de minimis standard does not apply to their activity because it was purely intrastate activity. But the de minimis standard does in fact apply. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court made clear that “when 'a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” Construing all this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the court found there is sufficient evidence that the conspiracy affected interstate commerce.

Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-30382

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (“NYK”), incorporated and headquartered in Japan, is a major global logistics company that transports cargo by air and sea. On June 17, 2017, the ACX Crystal, a 730-foot container ship chartered by NYK, collided with the destroyer USS Fitzgerald in Japanese territorial waters. Personal representatives of the seven sailors killed sued NYK in federal court, asserting wrongful death and survival claims under the Death on the High Seas Act.  In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that NYK, a foreign corporation, is amenable to federal court jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) based on its “substantial, systematic and continuous contacts with the United States as a whole. The district court granted NYK’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Plaintiffs’ invitation to craft an atextual, novel, and unprecedented Fifth Amendment personal jurisdiction standard. The court explained that under the Supreme Court’s reigning test for personal jurisdiction, the district court did not err in absolving NYK from appearing in federal court. The court wrote that general jurisdiction over NYK does not comport with its Fifth Amendment due process rights. NYK is incorporated and headquartered in Japan. As a result, exercising general jurisdiction over NYK would require that its contacts with the United States “be so substantial and of such a nature to render [it] at home” in the United States. Here, NYK’s contacts with the United States comprise only a minor portion of its worldwide contacts.

James v. Cleveland School Dist

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-60688

Opinion Date: August 17, 2022

Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

As the result of a longstanding desegregation decree, Plaintiff’s high school was consolidated with another school before her senior year. This reshuffled the class rankings, and Plaintiff ended up third. She sued school officials, alleging she had been denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court correctly dismissed her claims. Plaintiff alleges only a property interest.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding that Plaintiff has no such property interest in her class ranking or in the points awarded for her courses. The court explained that under precedent students lack “any protected interest in the separate components of the educational process.” It follows that students lack due process interests in their class rank or in the quality points assigned to their courses. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff has no cognizable property interest in the components of her public education. Under the court’s precedent, this lack of a property interest dooms her substantive due process claim by definition.

Stramaski v. Lawley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-20607

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Leslie H. Southwick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff claimed her employment was terminated in retaliation for complaining she was going to be paid late. She filed a complaint against a department head within the Texas A&M Engineering Station in his individual capacity (“DH”), alleging he violated the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)  DH moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim because the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, and in the alternative, that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court determined that neither immunity applied.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the rejection of sovereign immunity as a defense, affirmed the denial of the defense of sovereign immunity and vacated the judgment denying the defense of qualified immunity. The court held that holding public officials individually liable for retaliation under the FLSA also is consistent with the court’s prior holdings regarding individual liability in other FLSA contexts. However, the court wrote it discovered no Fifth Circuit opinion that holds qualified immunity is a defense under the FLSA. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s claim would be barred by qualified immunity because she does not allege that DH violated a clearly established law. However, the antecedent question is whether qualified immunity applies to the FLSA to begin with. The court, therefore, remanded for the district court to decide this question in the first instance.

USA v. Crittenden

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-50635

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Gregg Costa

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A grand jury charged Defendant and co-Defendant with three offenses: conspiracy to deal methamphetamine; possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine; and conspiracy to deal marijuana. Defendant filed a motion seeking an acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court granted the second request, however, the order did not divulge the grounds for the new trial. The government had timely appealed the new trial grant. A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial.
 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the order granting a new trial, reinstated as to Count Two and the jury’s verdict on that count (possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine). The court further remanded for sentencing on that conviction. The court explained this is not one of the “exceptional cases” in which a judge had the discretion to vacate the jury’s verdict by ordering a new trial. Far from being a case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the verdict, the great weight of the evidence supports this one. The court wrote, that the district court set aside the verdict because, in its view, little evidence showed that Defendant knowingly possessed an illegal substance. But a trinity of evidence supported the knowledge element. The court explained that it is true that the “district judge, unlike us, was there throughout the trial.” But because the jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of evidence, it was an abuse of discretion to erase it.

USA v. Harbarger

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-40332

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally possessing an unregistered firearm, specifically a “destructive device,” under the National Firearms Act (“NFA”). Appealing his conviction, Defendant argues that the NFA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case and that the evidence is insufficient to support conviction.
 
The determinative issue on appeal was whether an explosive-containing device falls within the NFA when it is susceptible of both innocent and destructive uses and not clearly designed as a weapon. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction. The court explained that in this case, the government’s only evidence challenging Defendant’s testimony that his bamboo stick device was used to scare beavers and destroy their dams (and wasn’t very good even at that) was the conclusion testimony of an ATF expert. Thus, the court wrote, in light of the government’s wholly conclusory case that the bamboo device was designed as a weapon or that it had no benign or social value, the conviction cannot stand. The evidence was insufficient to prove that the bamboo stick was an illegal explosive device “designed” as a weapon.

USA v. Johnlouis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-30085

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Carl E. Stewart

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

Defendant moved to suppress narcotics evidence that the Government seized after a letter carrier’s thumb slipped through a hole in a package, initiating an allegedly illegal search. According to Defendant the Fourth Amendment per se applies to letter carriers because they are government actors subject to its warrant requirement. According to the Government, this letter carrier was not a government actor to whom the Fourth Amendment applies, and her inspection of the package did not fall within its purview. The district court agreed with the Government and denied Defendant’s motion.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Fourth Amendment does not per se apply to the letter carrier, the district court correctly concluded that she did not perform an unconstitutional warrantless search of a package that could justify the suppression of evidence. The court, therefore, did not reach Defendant’s arguments with respect to the exclusionary rule, the good faith exception, and the inevitable discovery and fruit of the poisonous tree doctrines. The court wrote that the building inspectors, firefighters, teachers, healthcare workers, and USPS employees that courts have identified as government actors to whom the Fourth Amendment applies were all carrying out law enforcement functions. The same cannot be said of the letter carrier. Her inspection of the package addressed to 109 Hogan Drive does not resemble the “arbitrary invasions by government officials” that the Fourth Amendment was ratified to protect against.

USA v. Slape

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-41085

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Kurt D. Engelhardt

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In exchange for Defendant’s guilty plea on the superseding indictment’s principal drug-dealing charge (“Count 1”), the Government dismissed all other charges. The parties stipulated to a recommended prison sentence of 240 months. The district court followed the parties’ sentencing recommendation and dismissed all remaining counts in the superseding indictment “on the motion of the United States. Some months later, the Government discovered the procedural snag at the heart of this case: the superseding indictment to which Defendant pleaded guilty had been returned by a grand jury whose term had expired. At a plea hearing in which Defendant indicated satisfaction with his trial counsel’s performance and familiarity with the “grand jury mess-up[]” that had occurred in his initial case, Defendant pleaded guilty in accordance with the new plea agreement. The district court then imposed the 144-month sentence the parties agreed to and noted for the record the key terms of the provision quoted above.
 
Without conducting a hearing, the district court accepted a magistrate’s recommendation that Defendant’s Section 2255 motion be denied. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the expired grand jury’s untimely superseding indictment in Defendant’s first criminal case was null and void when jeopardy would have otherwise attached at Defendant’s jury trial and, accordingly, could not have placed Defendant in actual legal jeopardy within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because the failure of Defendant’s trial counsel to advise Defendant of a meritless double jeopardy argument was neither deficient nor prejudicial, the district court was correct to deny Defendant’s habeas corpus petition.

Villarreal v. City of Laredo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-40359

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: James C. Ho

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff regularly reports on local crime, missing persons, community events, traffic, and local government. Plaintiff published a story about a man who committed suicide and identified the man by name and revealed that he was an agent with the U.S. Border Patrol. Two arrest warrants were issued for Plaintiff for violating Texas Penal Code Section 39.06(c). According to Plaintiff, local officials have never brought a prosecution under Section 39.06(c) in the nearly three-decade history of that provision.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her claims against the officials under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. She also appeals the dismissal of her municipal liability claims against the City of Laredo, but not her claims against Webb County.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments claims, as well as her civil conspiracy claims. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims against the City of Laredo. The court explained that it has no difficulty observing that journalists commonly ask for nonpublic information from public officials, and that Plaintiff was therefore entitled to make that same reasonable inference. Yet Defendants chose to arrest Plaintiff for violating Section 39.06(c). The court accordingly concluded that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the existence of similarly situated journalists who were not arrested for violating Section 39.06(c).

Meadows v. City of Walker, Michigan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-1548

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: John M. Rogers

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Walker Officer Dumond began pursuing Meadows after he passed Dumond on the highway while traveling nearly 90 miles per hour. During the subsequent traffic stop, which was captured on dash-camera footage, Dumond instructed Meadows to keep his hands out of his vehicle and to open the door to his vehicle. Dumond and Meadows shouted back and forth as Meadows attempted to open his door. Once Meadows exited the vehicle, Dumond grabbed Meadows and slammed him to the ground. On the ground, Dumond kneed Meadows to try and roll him over, and Officer Wietfeldt punched Meadows multiple times. Wietfeldt fractured Meadows’s wrist while handcuffing him.

Meadows sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers appealed the denial of their summary judgment motions based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court stated that on interlocutory appeal, it is bound by the district court’s determination that a reasonable jury could conclude that Dumond and Wietfeldt did not perceive Meadows as refusing to comply or resisting arrest. The dash-camera footage does not “blatantly contradict” the factual issues identified by the district court.

Dunn v. Neal

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-1169

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Dunn was convicted in Indiana state court for the Torres murder. The case against Dunn was based largely on the testimony of two pathologists. In a state court post-conviction proceeding, Dunn argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with any forensic pathologist. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed a conditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a state court post-conviction hearing, a board-certified forensic pathologist, Dr. Sozio, testified that the autopsy was substandard, missed a great deal, and that Torres’s injuries were more consistent with a fall than with being bludgeoned by a blunt object. If the defense had presented Sozio's testimony, the jury would have been presented with conflicting expert testimony regarding whether the fall alone caused the injuries. The state conceded that blood evidence effectively ruled out the use of a bat; no other weapon was found. Two eyewitnesses testified consistently that Torres was not beaten after his fall. Sozio's testimony was critical in this case to create reasonable doubt because it countered the state's scientific evidence and gave the jury reason to doubt that Torres was beaten. Dunn demonstrated prejudice under Strickland.

Helbachs Cafe LLC v. City of Madison, Wisconsin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-3338

Opinion Date: August 15, 2022

Judge: Kirsch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

After the public health department for the City of Madison and Dane County, Wisconsin issued a COVID-19 mask mandate, an owner of Helbachs Café posted a sign: “Mask Free Zone. Please remove mask before entering” and then took it down about 30 minutes later. Over the next few days, Madison’s public health officials cited Helbachs several times for violating its COVID-19 orders and set a hearing to revoke Helbachs’ food and drink license for cumulative violations. The dispute caught the public’s attention and the landlord decided not to renew Helbachs’ lease.

Helbachs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The local citations were later dismissed, and the revocation hearing was not pursued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Helbachs has standing to bring this First Amendment retaliation claim because the record shows that Helbachs suffered injury-in-fact beyond the revoked citations and the threatened, but aborted, hearing. However, Helbachs’ First Amendment claim fails under “Monell” because the defendants’ actions were not part of a larger pattern or practice of retaliation.

Williams v. Rajoli

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1963

Opinion Date: August 17, 2022

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Williams, an inmate, suffers from chronic tendinitis and has been prescribed pain medication. After injuring his finger, Williams was seen by a doctor. Williams’s finger did not require further treatment, but in an apparent error, Williams was removed from his pain medication. The next day Williams filed a “Request for Health Care” form, indicating that he was still experiencing pain and was no longer receiving his medication. Williams was seen by a nurse, who allegedly caused him further knee pain by making him do exercises while shackled. His medication was not reinstated and Williams continued to experience pain in his knee. As required by state grievance policies, Williams tried to informally resolve his complaints but Indiana’s policy requires that formal grievances be filed within 10 business days of the incident. Williams did not meet that deadline, believing that prison officials needed to respond to his informal grievance attempts before he could file a formal grievance. After Williams received a response he filed a formal grievance, but it was untimely.

In Williams's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to exhaust all available remedies in the prison’s administrative-review system before filing suit in federal court. Williams did not do so and his argument that he had good cause for his failure to timely file a formal grievance is unexhausted and waived.

Mark One Electric Company v. City of Kansas City, Missouri

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2564

Opinion Date: August 15, 2022

Judge: KELLY

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In 2020, Kansas City began restricting participation in its Minority Business Enterprises and Women’s Business Enterprises Program to those entities whose owners satisfied a personal net worth limitation. Mark One Electric Co., a woman-owned business whose owner’s personal net worth exceeds the limit, appeals the dismissal of its lawsuit challenging the Kansas City Program as unconstitutional because of the personal net worth limitation.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to survive strict scrutiny, the government must first articulate a legislative goal that is properly considered a compelling government interest, such as stopping the perpetuation of racial discrimination and remediating the effects of past discrimination in government contracting. Here, Mark One does not dispute that the City has a compelling interest in remedying the effects of race and gender discrimination on City contract opportunities for minority- and women-owned businesses. And Mark One has conceded the 2016 Disparity Study provides a strong basis in evidence for the MBE/WBE Program to further that interest.

The City’s program must be narrowly tailored, which requires that “the means chosen to accomplish the government’s asserted purpose are specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Mark One claims that its exclusion from the Program despite its status as a woman-owned business shows that the Program is unlawful Indeed, Mark One has declared that it has suffered past discrimination, as the Program requires for certification. But the City does not have a constitutional obligation to make its Program as broad as may be legally permissible, so long as it directs its resources in a rational manner not motivated by a discriminatory purpose.

Michael Klein v. Warren Steinkamp

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3039

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff sued, now retired, police officer, after an encounter that led to Klein’s arrest and a truncated prosecution. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims alleging unlawful seizure, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the seizure and arrest claims were untimely and that the malicious prosecution claim fails on the merits. The court explained that Plaintiff’s false arrest claim accrued when he was bound over for trial on June 20, 2017, and his unlawful seizure claim accrued at the time of the seizure, on June 19, 2017. The action filed on November 6, 2019, was therefore untimely as to these claims as well. The district court properly granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims alleging false arrest and unlawful seizure under both federal law and Iowa law.

Moreover, the court concluded that Defendant had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff or possession with intent to deliver more than five grams of methamphetamine, and failure to possess a tax stamp for seven grams of methamphetamine. Plaintiff argues that Defendant lacked probable cause because his search for the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. The existence of probable cause in a civil action, however, is measured based on all evidence known to the arresting officer, whether or not it would have been admissible at trial.

Sameh Said v. Mayo Clinic

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3881

Opinion Date: August 17, 2022

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff resigned from his employment as a surgeon with Mayo Clinic (“Mayo”) after an internal committee recommended his termination following an investigation into allegations of his misconduct. Plaintiff sued Mayo and his supervisor, alleging discrimination and reprisal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mayo and the supervisor.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Plaintiff argues Mayo’s recommendation to terminate his employment was based on his race, religion, and national origin. Because Said does not offer direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff must create a sufficient inference of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive summary judgment.
 
Here, Plaintiff claims another similarly situated former employee, who also received complaints, from Mayo received preferential treatment. The court concluded that even if Plaintiff was similarly situated to the other employee, the court concluded that Plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude he received disparate treatment from the other employee. The court further explained that the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that Mayo believed Plaintiff was guilty of making unwelcomed advances toward female coworkers and of other misconduct. Said fails to “create a real issue as to the genuineness of” Mayo’s perceptions. Finally, regarding Mayo’s reporting of Plaintiff’s resignation to the State Board, as already discussed, the record demonstrates Mayo believed it was required to report Plaintiff’s termination to the State Board because Plaintiff resigned during an open investigation into his misconduct. Thus, Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence showing this was a pretext for retaliatory intent.

Stacey Johnson v. Asa Hutchinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-1965

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiff and other death-row prisoners in Arkansas sued the governor and a corrections official, arguing that Arkansas’s three-drug execution protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. After a bench trial, the district court found that the prisoners failed to establish a violation, and denied a motion for new trial.
 
The prisoners argue that the district court clearly erred in finding that they failed to demonstrate that the Arkansas execution protocol creates a substantial risk of severe pain. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The prisoners cite expert testimony from Dr. Craig Stevens and Dr. Gail Van Norman that midazolam has a ceiling effect that occurs at a dose between 0.2 to 0.4 mg/kg. These experts relied on two medical studies, which are known by the names of their principal authors as the Inagaki study and the Miyake study. The court wrote that with no scientific consensus and a paucity of reliable scientific evidence concerning the effect of large doses of midazolam on humans, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the prisoners failed to demonstrate that the Arkansas execution protocol is sure or very likely to cause severe pain. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the claim under the Eighth Amendment.
 
Further, the prisoners failed to establish that the State’s existing method was sure or very likely to cause needless suffering, so the State was not required to consider alternative methods. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

United States v. Angela Garges

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 20-3687

Opinion Date: August 15, 2022

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. She reserved her right to appeal an order of the district court denying her motion to suppress evidence that police seized after conducting a protective sweep of a hotel room in which she was staying. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).

The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the officers permissibly entered and searched the hotel room. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the police lacked specific and articulable facts suggesting that a person posing a danger to the officers was located inside the hotel room. She maintains that the officers violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment by entering the hotel room without a warrant and that all evidence seized as a result of the entry should be suppressed.

The court explained that a protective sweep of the hotel room was justified here as an inspection of spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. It is undisputed that officers were positioned in the doorway to effect the arrest, and that police crossed the threshold into the room under the authority of the warrant. Accordingly, the court held that the officers observed evidence of unlawful drug activity in plain view while conducting the protective sweep did not violate Defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Brandon Hayes

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2769

Opinion Date: August 17, 2022

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(9), and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(k). The district court sentenced him to 125 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant makes several arguments: first, that the district court erred in denying his request for an entrapment instruction; second, he raises a Brady claim; and third, he argues ineffective assistance of counsel.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that factual record establishes law enforcement and its informant merely provided Defendant an opportunity to make a sale, which revealed Defendant’s unlawful possession of the firearm that he sold to the agent.  As there is no evidence of inducement, the court was not required to give entrapment instruction.
 
Further, Defendant’s assertions are too speculative to support a Brady claim. The jury heard the relevant testimony and was thus aware of the conflicting recollections of the agent and the confidential informant about the events leading to the sale. Furthermore, considering the weight of evidence against Defendant on the two counts of conviction, the failure to disclose the identity of the informant’s brother did not prejudice him. Finally, the court declined to hear Defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim. The court held that it only reviews such claims on direct appeal in “exceptional cases”, and this case is not such an instance.

United States v. Lamark Combs, Jr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3448

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Facing five child-pornography counts and one for enticing a minor, Defendant decided to enter into a plea agreement with the government. Of the six counts, he pleaded guilty to three of them: two for receiving child pornography, each from a separate victim. When the presentence investigation report said he was responsible for receiving pornographic images from two others, Minor Victim 3 and H.P., he filed a written objection. At sentencing, the fact dispute never came up. Defendant did not renew his objection, the government did not present evidence that he had received sexually explicit material from Minor Victim 3 or H.P., and the district court never made any findings. Without ever resolving the factual dispute that the presentence investigation report had flagged, the court sentenced him to 210 months in prison.

The Eighth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that agrees that Defendant specifically objected to receiving sexually explicit images from Minor Victim 3 and H.P., meaning that the district court could not rely on those facts unless the government proved them by a preponderance of the evidence. The government never did so, yet the district court sentenced Defendant as if it had. The government does not dispute that the error here was “clear or obvious.” Instead, the focus is on the next step in the plain-error analysis: whether the procedural error affected Defendant’s substantial rights. The court vacated the sentence explaining that a failure to correct the error will also seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.

United States v. Ramon Simpson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2463

Opinion Date: August 15, 2022

Judge: Steven M. Colloton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping resulting in death and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. On appeal, Defendant challenges several rulings of the district court* and the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the convictions.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements from the interviews on November 8 and 21, 2018. He contends that investigators subjected him to custodial interrogations without advising him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. The court concluded that there was no custodial interrogation of Defendant on November 8. Defendant responded to the FBI agent’s request for a conversation and agreed to let the agent come to his house for the meeting. The agent did not display a weapon or restrain Defendant in any way. The agent was dressed in plain clothes and allowed Defendant’s wife to sit nearby for the interview. Further, the court held that there is no indication that Defendant is particularly susceptible to undue influence: he is an adult of average intelligence who has earned an associate’s degree and is familiar with the protections afforded by the legal system due to an extensive criminal history.

Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Further, the court concluded that there was no error in declining to instruct the jury that the government must prove that Defendant knew in advance that death would result from the kidnapping.

DAVID DEMAREST V. CITY OF VALLEJO

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-15872

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Collins

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that the City of Vallejo violated the Fourth Amendment, by adding license checks to what was concededly a sobriety checkpoint. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants.

Reviewing a line of relevant Supreme Court decisions, the court derived a “two-step analysis” for assessing the validity of a checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment. Applying that two-step analysis to this case, the panel first held that because the City’s checkpoint did not have any impermissible primary purpose of advancing the general interest in crime control, it was not per se invalid. The panel then applied the factors for assessing reasonableness set forth in Lidster and concluded that the City’s systematic addition of driver’s license checks to an otherwise valid sobriety checkpoint was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The court held that, once Plaintiff refused to produce his license for examination at the checkpoint, the officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was committing an offense in violation of California Vehicle Code Section 12951(b), and his continued detention and arrest were therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the officer’s action of physically removing Plaintiff from his car by grabbing his arm was objectively reasonable as a matter of law given Plaintiff’s lack of cooperation with her commands up to that point and the modest nature of the force used.

JACK POTTER V. CITY OF LACEY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-35259

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Mary H. Murguia

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

In an action involving federal and state constitutional challenges to the City of Lacey’s recently passed RV Parking Ordinance, the Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Washington Supreme Court:

Is the right to intrastate travel in Washington protected under the Washington State Constitution, or other Washington law? If Washington state law protects the right to intrastate travel, does the RV Parking Ordinance codified in LMC Section 10.14.020– 045 violate Plaintiff’s intrastate travel rights? In certifying the question, the court noted that it is well established that adjudication of federal constitutional claims should be avoided when alternative state grounds are available, even when the alternative ground is one of state constitutional law.

Because this issue was complex and involved policy considerations that were best left to the State of Washington’s own courts, the court concluded that it was prudent to certify this question to the Washington Supreme Court so that it could determine its own law in the first instance.

USA V. CLEMENTE HERNANDEZ-GARCIA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-50228

Opinion Date: August 17, 2022

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant argued that the Marine Corps surveillance violated the Posse Comitatus Act, which codified the longstanding prohibition against military enforcement of civilian law. Rejecting that argument, the Ninth Circuit explained that the military may still assist civilian law enforcement agencies if Congress expressly authorized it, and here, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directed the U.S. Secretary of Defense to offer military assistance to Border Patrol in hopes of securing the southern land border. The court concluded that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant’s suppression motion based on the alleged violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. The court also denied Defendant’s Batson challenge to the prosecution’s striking two Asian jurors from the venire, concluding that Defendant failed to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons for doing so.

United States v. Gladney

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-1159

Opinion Date: August 15, 2022

Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant William Gladney was convicted in 2007 on three criminal counts: violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act; conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base; and using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Gladney was sentenced to concurrent life sentences on the RICO and drug conspiracy convictions, followed by a ten-year consecutive sentence on the firearms conviction. In 2020, Gladney filed a motion to reduce his sentence in light of changes that Congress implemented to the sentencing scheme for offenses involving cocaine base. Gladney also sought funds to hire an investigator to gather evidence to support his motion for reduction of sentence. The district court denied without prejudice Gladney’s request for funds. It then denied Gladney’s motion for reduction of sentence. Gladney appealed those rulings, arguing that the district court erred in finding him ineligible for a reduction of sentence under the First Step Act. The Tenth Circuit concluded Gladney’s arguments were largely foreclosed by its decision in United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2020). Because of Mannie, any reduction the district court could have made to the sentence on Gladney's covered offense under the First Step Act "would not actually reduce the length of [Gladney's] incarceration. The Tenth Circuit therefore concluded the district court could not redress Gladney's injury, and in turn, Gladney's motion for reduction of sentence under the First Step act "does not present a live controversy." The Court thus dismissed Gladney's appeal for lack of standing.

United States v. Gross

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-6175

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Carson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Martavious Gross was convicted for crimes relating to a road rage drive-by shooting. Defendant sat in the passenger seat of a car driving on an Oklahoma highway when A.A. cut the car off, allegedly almost hitting it. The car sped up to pull beside A.A.’s car so that Defendant could yell at and flip off A.A. The car caught up to A.A. again, and this time Defendant fired a gun at A.A.’s vehicle. The car took off afterward, and Defendant gave the gun to his brother to hide in the trunk. A.A. then followed the car to collect its description and license-plate number, along with a description of Defendant, to report to the police. The sentencing court varied upward from the Guidelines range and sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum. He appealed, challenging the sentence’s procedural and substantive reasonableness. But the waiver in his plea agreement prohibited procedural appeals. “Defendant tried to take a detour around his appeal waiver” by suggesting the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluate how the court calculated the Guidelines range as part of its substantive analysis. But a defendant cannot transform procedural arguments into a substantive challenge to avoid an appeal waiver’s plain language. For this reason, the Court enforced the waiver and dismised his appeal insofar as Defendant’s arguments bore solely upon the procedural reasonableness of his sentence.

United States v. Piette

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-7008

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Eid

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Henri Piette was convicted by jury in Oklahoma of kidnapping and traveling with intent to engage in sexual relations with a juvenile. The district court sentenced Piette to life imprisonment on the former conviction, and 360 months’ imprisonment on the latter. He sought to have his convictions overturned or his sentence reversed. After review, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err by admitting evidence of Piette’s uncharged acts of molestation, and that statutes extending the unexpired charging period for the traveling-with-intent charge did not have an impermissible retroactive effect. However, the Court concluded the district court plainly erred by misallocating the burden of proof once Piette disputed the timing of the kidnapping by arguing that the victim, Rosalynn McGinnis, consented. The Court reversed Piette’s kidnapping conviction because the Tenth Circuit found there was a difference between what happened here—Piette failing to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that McGinnis ever consented—and what the Constitution required: the government proving beyond a reasonable doubt that she never consented at a time that would cause a statute of limitations problem. Finally, the Court rejected Piette’s argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at sentencing.

United States v. Price

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-7050

Opinion Date: August 17, 2022

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner Joshua Price Jr. appealed the district court’s dismissal of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. The parties agreed that Price was eligible for a sentence modification because he was convicted of a covered offense: distribution of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841. But the parties disagreed about whether Price had standing to request a First Step Act sentence modification. Tenth Circuit precedent held that if the length of a prisoner’s sentence was determined by a concurrent non-covered offense, and that sentence exceeded the length of the covered offense, then the prisoner did not have constitutional standing for a sentence modification. The question presented here was whether the district court could modify Price’s sentence in light of the First Step Act. To this the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the district court has discretion to reduce Price’s overall sentence. Since Price’s sentence was entirely driven by the drug offenses, the Court held he was eligible for a sentence modification. "And nothing prevents the district court from reviewing the murder cross reference in considering his sentence under the now-advisory Sentencing Guidelines. Since no statutory mandatory minimum applies for the murder cross reference, during sentence modification the court is entitled to apply the traditional sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."

Fabio Ochoa v. USA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-10755

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: BRASHER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner, a Colombian native, was arrested in Colombia on drug trafficking charges and ultimately convicted in federal court. Petitioner now appeals the denial of both his amended 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his convictions and sentence and his subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. He claims that one of his pre-extradition attorneys was ineffective due to a conflict of interest. According to Petitioner, his attorney tried to convince him to pay a thirty-million-dollar bribe or kickback as part of a plea agreement, which would redound to the benefit of one of Petitioner’s other clients. But Petitioner was represented by other attorneys, and he does not allege that they were conflicted or otherwise deficient in pursuing legitimate plea agreements on Petitioner’s behalf. The district court held that the allegations in Petitioner’s motion would not establish a Sixth Amendment violation even if true.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming a conflict of interest existed, Petitioner’s claim ultimately fails because he does not sufficiently allege that the “conflict adversely affected his representation.” Although Petitioner criticizes his attorney, he does not allege that his other attorneys suffered under a conflict of interest. The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to effective assistance of “an attorney.” The Sixth Amendment does not include the right to receive good advice from every lawyer a criminal defendant consults about his case. Further, the court wrote, that because it concluded that Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits, it cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing.

Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC v. Teck Resources Limited

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-12834

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: NEWSOM

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff, a Florida LLC, sued a Canadian company, Teck Resources Limited, alleging that it had illegally trafficked in property to which Plaintiff says it has a claim. The district court granted Teck’s motion, holding that Florida’s long-arm statute didn’t provide jurisdiction over Teck and, additionally, that Teck lacked the necessary connection to the United States to establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed holding that courts should analyze personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment using the same basic standards and tests that apply under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court wrote that applying the minimum-contacts test here is relatively straightforward. The court held that Teck doesn’t have contacts with the United States sufficient to establish either specific or general personal jurisdiction over it. Plaintiff’s suit doesn’t arise out of or relate to any of Teck’s ties with the United States. And because a relationship between the defendant’s conduct within the forum and the cause of action is necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction, the lack of any such relationship here dooms Plaintiff’s effort to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Teck.

Miguel Alvarado-Linares v. USA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-14994

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: BRASHER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner participated in several shootings as a member of MS-13, a violent gang. He was convicted of one count of conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He was also convicted of four counts under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act (VICAR), 18 U.S.C. Section 1959(a). Because he used a gun in committing those offenses, he was also convicted of four corresponding counts of using a firearm in relation to each “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). For these nine convictions, he is serving three concurrent life sentences plus eighty-five years. His eighty-five-year sentence is based exclusively on the four firearms convictions.
 
Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his firearms convictions and his eighty-five-year sentence. The district court denied the motion. At issue on appeal is whether his four firearms convictions are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. The court held that Petitioner’s VICAR convictions (Counts Two, Four, Eight, and Ten), predicated on his commission of murder and attempted murder, qualify as crimes of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause. That means that his corresponding firearms convictions (Counts Three, Five, Nine, and Eleven) are still valid after Davis’s holding that the residual clause is unconstitutional. And that means that, after Petitioner completes his three concurrent life sentences, he will still have a consecutive eighty-five-year sentence left to serve.

Paul Donald Davis, et al. v. Paul Waller, et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-11333

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: MARCUS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

Plaintiff was taken hostage by a fleeing felon in rural Georgia. At the felon’s behest Plaintiff drove the truck toward seven officers gathered at the scene and showed no signs of stopping. As the logging truck struck the police vehicles lining the dirt road, several of the officers opened fire on the cab of the truck, even though they allegedly knew Plaintiff -- an innocent hostage -- was being forced to drive.
 
Plaintiff survived but was shot in his hand, his fingers, his hip, and his shoulder. He sued both Georgia State Patrol Lieutenants in their individual capacities (collectively, “Defendants”) for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment because their actions were reasonable and, even if they were not, they did not violate any clearly established law.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the fleeing felon put Plaintiff, Defendants, and the public in grave and imminent danger. Police officers like Defendants may use deadly force to dispel a threat (and, here, an imminent one) of serious physical harm or death or to prevent the escape of a very dangerous suspect who threatens that harm. Defendants made the difficult, but altogether reasonable, a decision that the fleeing felon and the logging truck had to be stopped -- and, tragically, that meant stopping Plaintiff, too.

William E. Henry v. Attorney General, State of Alabama

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-11483

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: LUCK

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The former Speaker of the House of the Alabama Legislature was the target of a grand jury investigation in Lee County, Alabama. He was accused of misusing his office for personal gain, including by funneling money into his printing business. Plaintiff was a state representative at the time of the investigation into Speaker Hubbard. Plaintiff believed that he had evidence undermining the accusations against the speaker and contacted the defense team to help them.
 
Plaintiff sued the Attorney General of Alabama in federal court. His complaint brought First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The relevant issues on appeal are: Does Alabama’s grand jury secrecy law prohibit a grand jury witness from divulging information he learned before he testified to the grand jury, and if so, does the secrecy law violate the First Amendment? And does the Alabama grand jury secrecy law’s prohibition on a witness disclosing grand jury information he learned “only by virtue of being made a witness” violate his First Amendment free speech rights?
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed, in part, and remanded. The court concluded that Alabama’s grand jury secrecy law, unlike the Florida law in Butterworth, cannot reasonably be read to prohibit a grand jury witness from divulging information he learned before he testified to the grand jury. The court also concluded that the grand jury secrecy law’s prohibition on a witness’s disclosure of grand jury information that he learned only by virtue of being made a witness does not violate the Free Speech Clause.

Altagracia Sanchez v. Office of the State Superintendent of Education

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-7014

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: SRINIVASAN

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The District of Columbia’s Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) regulates childcare facilities, including by setting minimum qualifications for their workers. OSSE issued a rule requiring many childcare workers to obtain an associate’s degree or its equivalent in a field related to early childhood education. Two childcare workers and a parent filed a lawsuit to challenge the new college requirements. They allege violations of their substantive due process and equal protection rights, as well as of the nondelegation doctrine.

On remand, the district court dismissed, this time on the merits. In rejecting Plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection claims, the court concluded that the college requirements are rational, including in the distinctions they draw between different classes of daycare workers. And in rejecting Plaintiffs’ nondelegation doctrine claim, the court held that the statute granting regulatory authority to OSSE bears an intelligible principle to guide the agency’s work.

The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under rational-basis review, the policy choices of the political branches are “not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. And here, as Plaintiffs acknowledge in their complaint, OSSE issued its regulations in part based on a report from the National Academies recommending a bachelor’s degree requirement for all educators of children ages zero to eight. Thus, the court found that a conceivably rational justification for the college requirements is readily apparent, and, in this context, that is all due process requires.

Lisa Guffey v. Roslynn Mauskopf

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 20-5183

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: WALKER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

Appellees work at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. When they are away from work, they want to express support for their preferred candidates in partisan elections. AO employees could do that for the first 79 years of the agency’s history. But since 2018, the AO has forbidden it. That prohibition violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Appellees but limited its injunction against the first seven restrictions to apply only to Appellees. The court reversed its grant of summary judgment to the AO on the other two restrictions, and the court remanded for it to enjoin their application to Appellees as well. The court explained that absent the belief that precedent directs it, there is no reason to treat driving voters to the polls and organizing political events differently from the other seven prohibited modes of political expression. They all implicate core First Amendment rights. And the AO has failed to show that they present any non-speculative threat to its operations.

Further, the court wrote, that the AO is a government entity with an independent duty to uphold the Constitution. The court explained that it trusted that upon receipt of our judgment, it will reconsider the contested restrictions for employees whose work is comparable to (or less sensitive than) the work Appellees do.

Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc v. Gina Raimondo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-5166

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: ROGERS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Environmental Law

In implementing an Omnibus Amendment that establishes industry-funded monitoring programs in New England fishery management plans, the National Marine Fisheries Service (Service) promulgated a rule that required industry to fund at-sea monitoring programs. A group of commercial herring fishing companies contend that the statute does not specify that industry may be required to bear such costs and that the process by which the Service approved the Omnibus Amendment and promulgated the Final Rule was improper.

On appeal, Appellants’ challenge to the Final Rule presents the question how clearly Congress must state an agency’s authority to adopt a course of action. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Service based on its reasonable interpretation of its authority and its adoption of the Amendment and the Rule through a process that afforded the requisite notice and opportunity to comment. The court explained that when an agency establishes regulatory requirements, regulated parties generally bear the costs of complying with them.

Here, the Act’s national standards for fishery management plans direct the Service to “minimize costs” of conservation and management measures and to minimize adverse economic impacts” of such measures on fishing communities. Those statutory admonitions to reduce costs seem to presume that the Service may impose some costs, as “minimize” does not mean eliminate entirely.

USA v. Amistad Veney

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 20-3081

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: WALKER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant was convicted of unlawfully possessing a loaded firearm. He does not dispute that the bulge of that gun in his waistband gave an arresting officer the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a stop-and-frisk that uncovered the gun. But Appellant argues he submitted to an illegal show of authority several seconds before then when the officer did not yet have a close view of the bulge in Appellant’s waistband.

The DC Circuit affirmed the finding that Appellant did not submit to a show of authority. The court explained that Appellant has not described submission to a show of authority. Because the officer’s statement (“No.”) followed Appellant’s declaration that he was “going to walk off,” Appellant could not submit while he “continued moving forward.” One cannot submit to an order not to “walk off” by walking off. Moreover, even when a show of authority does not expressly prohibit flight, it can do so implicitly. Accordingly, at no point did Appellant voluntarily submit to a show of authority. He, therefore, was not seized until the officer blocked his path. By then, the officer could see the bulge of Appellant’s gun in his waistband, and Appellant does not dispute that the bulge gave the officer the reasonable suspicion required for the stop and frisk that followed.

In Re Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-145

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Timothy B. Dyk

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Intellectual Property, Patents

Centripetal filed an infringement complaint against PAN, which then filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition for one patent and a post-grant review (PGR) petition for another. While the petitions were pending, the Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) updated its interim guidance, noting that the agency “does not accept requests for Director review of decisions on institution.” The Patent Trial and Appeal Board denied institution. PAN filed Requests for Director Rehearing. The agency responded that USPTO "does not accept requests for Director review of decisions on institution ... parties may only request Director review of final written decisions" issued in IPR and PGR and that PAN’s “rehearing requests will not revert to the Board panel and there will be no further review of the Board’s decision.”

PAN sought mandamus relief. A newly-appointed Director updated the interim guidance to state that “the Office does not accept requests for Director review of institution decisions” but that “the Director has always retained and continues to retain the authority to review such decisions sua sponte.” The Director has since exercised that authority. PAN argues that the Director’s current policy was contrary to the Appointments Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in “Arthrex,” (2021). The Federal Circuit denied the petition. That the Appointments Clause requires that a Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed officer have review authority does not mean that a principal officer, once bestowed with such authority, cannot delegate it to other agency officers.

Dunleavy, et al. v. Alaska Legislative Council, et al.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Citations: 314 P.3d 508, 425 P.3d 80, 485 P.3d 1010

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Peter J. Maassen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Alaska Legislature passed a bill in 2018 that appropriated money for public education spending for both FY2019, and FY2020. The second appropriation had a 2019 effective date. Governor Mike Dunleavy took office in December 2018, and disputed the constitutionality of the second year’s appropriation — and the general practice known as forward funding — asserting that it violated the annual appropriations model established by the Alaska Constitution. The Alaska Legislative Council, acting on behalf of the legislature, sued the governor, seeking a declaratory judgment that the governor violated his constitutional duties by failing to execute the appropriations and an injunction requiring him to do so. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court decided that the appropriations were consistent with the legislature’s duty to fund public education, that they did not violate any specific constitutional provision, and that the governor’s refusal to disburse funds pursuant to the appropriations violated his duty to faithfully execute the laws. The court awarded attorney’s fees to the Legislative Council and the advocacy group as prevailing parties. The governor appeals the court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees to the advocacy group. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court erred in its holding, and because neither the Legislative Council nor the advocacy group was prevailing party, the superior court’s attorney’s fees awards were vacated.

Office of Public Advocacy v. Berezkin f/n/a Smith et al.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Dockets: a-6, A-6

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Carney

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Legal Ethics

The Alaska Supreme Court granted the Office of Public Advocacy’s (OPA) petition for review of whether counsel provided through Alaska Legal Service Corporation’s (ALSC) pro bono program was counsel “provided by a public agency” within the meaning of Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1979) and OPA’s enabling statute. The Supreme Court concluded such counsel was indeed “provided by a public agency” and affirmed the superior court’s order appointing OPA to represent an indigent parent in a child custody case.

Willis v. Honorable Bernini

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-21-0258-PR

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Montgomery

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion seeking remand to the grand jury for a redetermination of probable cause pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.9, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Rule 12.9 motion.

A grand jury indicted Defendant for attempted second degree murder and other crimes. Defendant subsequently filed the motion at issue, arguing that the State withheld clearly exculpatory evidence of a justification defense that it was obligated to present despite the evidence not being requested by the defense. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution guarantees a person under grand jury investigation a due process right to a fair and impartial presentation of clearly exculpatory evidence, and a prosecutor has a duty to present such evidence to a grand jury even in the absence of a specific request; (2) where there is evidence relevant to a justification defense that would deter a grand jury from finding probable cause the prosecutor has an obligation to present such evidence; and (3) the State failed to present clearly exculpatory evidence in this case, denying Defendant a substantial procedural right.

Coast Community College District v. Commission on State Mandates

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S262663

Opinion Date: August 15, 2022

Judge: Groban

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court affirming the findings of the Commission on State Mandates rejecting the claims brought by Plaintiffs, several community college districts seeking reimbursement for regulations they must satisfy to avoid the possibility of having their state aid withheld, holding that the court of appeals erred.

Plaintiffs filed a claim arguing that reimbursement was required under Cal. Const. art. XIII B because (1) the regulations imposed a legal duty to satisfy the conditions described (legal compulsion), or (2) the regulations compelled compliance as a practical matter (practical compulsion). The Commission rejected the claims, and the trial court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the court of appeal chose not to address whether the districts established practical compulsion, remand was required to allow the court to evaluate that issue.

California v. Gregor

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C090171(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Duarte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Defendant Andrew Gregor, a naturalized citizen from Australia, pleaded guilty to a felony sex offense that was later reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed after early termination of probation. After he was informed he was not able to sponsor his father for a family visa due to this conviction, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7 and sought to withdraw his plea claiming he was unable to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction. The trial court denied the motion; defendant appealed. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

California v. Orosco

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D079723(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 17, 2022

Judge: Buchanan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Jesse Orosco appeals his conviction for one count of assault on a peace officer by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. He argued: (1) there was no substantial evidence the victim was a peace officer; (2) the trial court erroneously denied his request to represent himself under Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 (1975); (3) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of a peace officer and his duties; and (4) the abstract of judgment should be corrected. The Court of Appeal found as a matter of law based on the undisputed evidence that the victim was working as a peace officer at the time of the incident. The Court concluded, however, that the trial court violated Orosco’s Sixth Amendment rights by denying his Faretta request for self-representation based on a finding that he was “unable to sufficiently represent himself.” There was no substantial evidence that Orosco was mentally incompetent to represent himself under the applicable legal standard. Because the error was reversible per se, the Court reversed the judgment and did not decide the other issues raised.

California v. Salgado

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G060656(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: William W. Bedsworth

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Victor Salgado appealed a recall and resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170 (d)(1). After Salgado shot at a rival gang member but killed another, he was charged with: one count of first degree murder; one count of attempted premeditated murder; two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm; one count of possession of a firearm while on probation; and one count of street terrorism (active gang participation). Salgado argued the trial court erred in imposing a one-year determinate sentence on a gang enhancement, improperly calculated his custody credit, and requests this court correct clerical errors in the sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment. The Attorney General conceded these errors, but argued the sentencing court should have imposed higher, statutorily prescribed terms on the enhancements. While this appeal was pending, Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3) came into effect on January 1, 2022. Assem. Bill 333 “amended section 186.22 to impose new substantive and procedural requirements for gang allegations.” Additionally, on the same day, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-7) came into effect, and moved the recall and resentencing provisions of former section 1170(d), to new section 1170.03. Assem. Bill 1540 also clarified the Legislature’s intent that the resentencing court would “apply ameliorative laws . . . that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion, regardless of the date of the offense of conviction.” The Court of Appeal concluded Salgado was entitled to the benefit of Assem. Bill 333 because his criminal judgment was no longer final following the recall and resentencing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the gang offense conviction and vacated the jury’s true findings on the gang enhancement allegations. The Court remanded the matter to afford the prosecution an opportunity to retry the gang crime and related enhancements.

People v. Calvary Chapel San Jose

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H048708(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 15, 2022

Judge: Greenwood

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Health Law

In 2020, California and Santa Clara County issued public health orders intended to combat the Covid-19 pandemic, including orders restricting indoor gatherings and requiring face coverings, social distancing, and submission of a social distancing protocol by businesses, including churches. Calvary Chapel failed to comply with those orders. On November 2, 2020, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order, followed by a November 24 modified TRO, and a preliminary injunction that enjoined Calvary from holding indoor gatherings that did not comply with the restrictions on indoor gatherings and requirements that participants wear face coverings and social distance. Calvary was also enjoined from operating without submitting a social distancing protocol. Calvary violated the orders, failing to comply with any of the public health orders.

The government sought an order of contempt, which the trial court issued on December 17, 2020, ordering Calvary and its pastors to pay monetary sanctions (Code of Civil Procedure sections 177.51 and 1218(a)). The court of appeal annulled the contempt orders and reversed the sanctions. The temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are facially unconstitutional under the recent guidance of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the First Amendment’s protection of the free exercise of religion in the context of public health orders that impact religious practice.

Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20536

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Mullins

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court dismissing Petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner failed to prove his claim that his counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest.

At issue was whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's petition for certification to appeal with respect to his claim that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance during his second criminal trial by simultaneously working as defense counsel and as an active duty police officer in a different city, which Petitioner claimed was a conflict of interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that defense counsel's actions did not rise to the level of an actual conflict of interest for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.

Cousins v. Goodier

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 272, 2021

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Traynor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury

The issue this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review centered on whether the First Amendment barred claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract against a defendant who, in an email to a law firm, described as “shockingly racist” a lawsuit filed by one of the firm’s partners in his personal capacity. The suit aimed to preserve a nearby high school’s “Indian” mascot. The partner, who claimed to have lost his position with the law firm because of the email, sued his detractor, contending that the characterization of his lawsuit was demonstrably false and pled four causes of action, including defamation and tortious interference with contract. The partner’s detractor, in response, contended her statements about the partner were opinions protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The Superior Court agreed with the detractor and dismissed the partner’s tort action. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court: the statements at issue did not on their face contain demonstrably false statements of fact, nor did they imply defamatory and provably false facts. "As statements concerning an issue of public concern, moreover, they are entitled to heightened First Amendment protection and cannot form the predicate of the plaintiff’s tort claims."

Planned Parenthood v. Idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Dockets: 49615, 49817, 49899

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

The Idaho Supreme Court held a hearing on August 3, 2022 to address specific procedural matters. The only issues in dispute were whether the Court should stay the enforcement of Idaho Code section 18-622(2) (“Total Abortion Ban”) and whether it should continue to stay the enforcement of Senate Bill 1309 (“Civil Liability Law”). The Court denied Petitioners’ request to stay the enforcement of Idaho Code section 18-622 in Docket No. 49817-2022; and vacated the stay of the enforcement of Senate Bill 1309 entered by the Court on April 8, 2022 in Docket No. 49615-2022.

Idaho v. Hall

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48860

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Melanie Hall appealed a district court’s modification of a no contact order. In 2015, the State of Idaho charged Hall with felony stalking of her ex-husband, and aggravated assault. Based on the charges, the district court entered a no contact order and set it to expire in 2017. In January 2016, a jury found her guilty of felony stalking, but returned a verdict of not guilty on the aggravated assault count. In March 2016, the district court entered a judgment of conviction, sentencing Hall to a five year unified sentence with the first two fixed. The court also entered an amended no contact order prohibiting Hall from contacting her ex-husband and their two minor children. The new no contact order was sent to expire on March 28, 2021. Hall moved to amend the no contact order twice: once to allow written communication, and another to allow Hall to send Christmas presents to the children. Two days before the order was set to expire, the State moved to extend the order, explaining that Hall’s victims were concerned with the order’s expiration, and that a new charge of violating the no contact order was pending before the district court. An extension was ultimately granted, and Hall appealed, arguing the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the order because it had expired by the time the district court entered its order. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court had the authority to amend the no contact order because the State’s motion to extend the expiration date was timely filed. Accordingly, the extension was affirmed.

City of Wichita v. Trotter

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 122007

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing two of the charges against Appellant, which arose under Wichita Municipal Ordinances (W.M.O.) 3.06.030.A and 3.30.030.A, holding that W.M.O. 3.06.030.A is overbroad.

The district court fully vacated Appellant's convictions, finding W.M.O. 3.06.030.A unconstitutionally overbroad because it intrudes on several examples of "Constitutionally protected behaviors." The court of appeals reversed the lower court's conclusion that W.M.O. 3.06.030.A was unconstitutionally overbroad and sua sponte reversed the dismal of the charge arising under W.M.O. 3.30.030.A. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) W.M.O. 3.06.030.A is unconstitutionally overbroad; and (2) the court of appeals erred by sua sponte dismissing the second municipal charge.

Michigan v. Hinton

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Dockets: 162374, 162355, 162354

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Bridget Mary McCormack

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Kino Christian, Joshun Edwards, and C’Quan Hinton were convicted by jury of murder in 2007 and sentenced to life in prison. Defendants’ direct appeals were unsuccessful. In 2014, Edwards’s family filed a request under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act for documents related to the case. Among the documents provided in response to the request was a transcript of the first interview with the prosecution’s main witness, Jarylle Murphy, which the prosecution had not provided to defendants. Defendants moved for relief from judgment under MCR 6.508, arguing in part that because there were inconsistencies in the interview transcript that could have been used to impeach Murphy’s testimony at trial, the prosecution’s suppression of the transcript violated their constitutional right to exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963). The court denied the motions, ruling that although the prosecution had failed to disclose favorable evidence to defendants before trial, the evidence was not material and, therefore, reversal was not required. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding the interview transcript that the prosecution suppressed was both favorable and material to the defense. Having established both good cause for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal and actual prejudice for purposes of MCR 6.508, defendants were entitled to a new trial.

Garrett v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-KA-00754-SCT

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Beam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Ladarius Garrett was convicted by jury of burglary of a hotel room. He claimed his convictions as not supported by sufficient evidence, and that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding no merit to either claim, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Garrett’s conviction.

Green v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-KA-00617-SCT

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A probation officer improperly induced L.J. Green III to give a statement that led to the discovery of the linchpin evidence used against Green at his robbery trial. While the trial judge suppressed Green’s statement, the judge still admitted evidence that Green possessed the victim’s car keys - evidence wholly derived from Green’s excluded statement. This evidence was admitted over Green’s objection; a jury convicted Green. On appeal, both Green and the State agreed the trial judge wrongly admitted the tainted evidence. Though the State argued the error was harmless, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the evidence strongly contributed to Green’s guilty verdicts. “So its admission was not harmless error.” Judgment was therefore reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.

McDonald v. Jacobsen

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 MT 160

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Mike McGrath

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on cross-motions for summary judgment and enjoining the Montana Secretary of State from placing House Bill (HB) 325 on Montana's 2022 general election ballot, holding that the referendum proposal violates the Montana Constitution.

If approved, HB 325 will establish seven Supreme Court districts in Montana and requires that Supreme Court justices be elected district by district, rather than statewide. Plaintiffs brought this challenge to the constitutionality of the measure. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the question of the constitutionality of the referendum proposed by HB 325 is ripe for judicial resolution; and (2) the district court did not err in enjoining the Secretary from placing HB 325 on the ballot in the 2022 general election.

McDonald v. Jacobsen

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 MT 160

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Mike McGrath

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on cross-motions for summary judgment and enjoining the Montana Secretary of State from placing House Bill (HB) 325 on Montana's 2022 general election ballot, holding that the referendum proposal violates the Montana Constitution.

In approved, HB 325 will establish seven Supreme Court districts in Montana and requires that Supreme Court justices be elected district by district, rather than statewide. Plaintiffs brought this challenge to the constitutionality of the measure. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the question of the constitutionality of the referendum proposed by HB 325 is ripe for judicial resolution; and (2) the district court did not err in enjoining the Secretary from placing HB 325 on the ballot in the 2022 general election.

New Hampshire v. Bell

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0047

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendant Brim Bell was convicted by jury on four class A felony counts of theft by deception. Defendant ran a business at several New Hampshire locations restoring primarily Volkswagen vehicles. Between January 1, 2011 and November 17, 2015, each of the victims, A.M., J.M., J.K., and J.T., hired defendant to restore a vehicle. During the time defendant had their vehicles, he repeatedly asked each of the victims to send him more money, ostensibly for parts or other expenses related to the restoration of their vehicles. Each victim made a series of payments to defendant, but none of the victims received a restored car back from defendant. Defendant testified to a series of events that negatively affected his business during 2010 and 2011 and increased his debt. As a result, at the end of 2011, defendant started gambling at casinos. He testified that his “plan was to save the business.” Defendant admitted that he gambled with some of his customers’ money and that none of them gave him permission to do so. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted on four counts and acquitted on two. He argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for joinder. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions.

New Hampshire v. Donovan

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2020-0404

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Corey Donovan appealed his conviction on a single felony count of possession of a controlled substance. He argued on appeal the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. “All of these circumstances objectively communicated to the defendant that his compliance with the officers’ requests was compelled.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded defendant was seized, and that his seizure was unconstitutional, therefore the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Petition of State of New Hampshire

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-0609

Opinion Date: August 12, 2022

Judge: Donovan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In August 2019, the State of New Hampshire filed three juvenile delinquency petitions against Respondent in the family division, charging him with one count of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), one count of felonious sexual assault, and one count of indecent exposure. The AFSA petition alleged that the acts comprising the pattern offense occurred on four specific dates: June 22, 2018; August 24, 2018; September 15, 2018; and May 27, 2019. When the petitions were filed, the alleged victim was six years old and Respondent was seventeen years old. Respondent turned eighteen in November 2019 and at the time of this appeal was twenty years old. After filing the petitions, the State, pursuant to RSA 169-B:24, petitioned to certify Respondent as an adult and transfer the case to superior court. This petition was denied and the New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted the State’s Rule 11 petition to determine whether the superior court erred in denying the State’s petition to certify Respondent as an adult. Finding the superior court so erred, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

New Jersey v. A.L.A.

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-3-21

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Pierre-Louis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law

Defendant A.L.A. was the legal guardian of her four grandchildren, who ranged in age from three to seventeen years old. In August 2016, the oldest grandchild reported that defendant physically abused them. After an investigation, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency initiated an emergency removal of all four grandchildren. Defendant was tried for multiple counts of endangering the welfare of a child. The parties agreed that the court would instruct the jury on second-degree endangering, and what the parties termed a lesser included disorderly persons offense of simple assault. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the jury could have understood the affirmative defense of reasonable corporal punishment applied to both the child endangerment charge and the simple assault chard, where the reasonable corporal punishment instruction was provided only in the instructions for the child endangerment charge. The Supreme Court determined after review that the jury could not have understood the language in the instruction applied to both charges. Therefore, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, in the context of the simple assault charge, that reasonable corporal punishment was not prohibited. Because that error in instructions could have led the jury to an unjust result, the conviction was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

North Dakota v. Lyman

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 ND 160

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Dustin Lyman was convicted by jury of driving while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. On appeal, Lyman argued the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial, claiming the State’s opening statement constituted prosecutorial misconduct and violated his rights to a fair trial. Finding no such misconduct, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment.

Vogt v. North Dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 ND 163

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jason Vogt appealed the dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to gross sexual imposition. Here, Vogt claimed he was innocent and his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Further, he contended his guilty plea was made involuntarily, and his confession was coerced. Vogt presented a psychological assessment that he claimed was newly discovered evidence. The assessment was prepared after his application for relief was filed, and opined Vogt may have involuntarily waived his rights and falsely confessed. Appealing the dismissal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Vogt argued the State waived its affirmative defenses and its motion for dismissal was untimely. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Vogt’s application for relief.

State v. Whitaker

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2022-Ohio-2840

Opinion Date: August 18, 2022

Judge: Fischer

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary, vacated the finding of guilt on count three charging Defendant with felony murder during an aggravated battery, and dismissed the death penalty specifications predicated on aggravated burglary but affirmed Defendant's remaining convictions and his death sentence, holding that there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of burglary.

After a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated murder and three accompanying death-penalty specifications. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding (1) contrary to Defendant's argument on appeal, the indictment in this case was not defective; (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of aggravated burglary; (3) no plain error occurred during the prosecutor's trial-phase closing argument; and (4) there were constitutional violations in this case.

In Re Charlestown Outdoor, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 80 MAP 2021

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Wecht

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Charlestown Township, Chester County, Pennsylvania, enacted a zoning ordinance that permitted outdoor billboards in a particular district. A statewide regulation concerning roadside billboards promulgated by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) had the practical effect of barring that use. Charlestown Outdoor, LLC, (“Outdoor”) sought nonetheless to erect a billboard on property it leased in that zoning district. In pursuit of that objective, Outdoor filed a substantive-validity challenge to Charlestown Township’s ordinance, asserting that it was de facto exclusionary. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it wasn't the zoning ordinance, but rather the statewide regulation, that precluded the proposed use. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the challenged zoning ordinance was not de facto exclusionary. It therefore affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s rejection of Outdoor’s validity challenge.

Pennsylvania v. Lopez

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 27 EAP 2021

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider whether Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 706(C) required a trial court to consider a defendant’s ability to pay prior to imposing mandatory court costs at sentencing. In 2015, appellant Alexis Lopez entered a negotiated guilty plea to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced him to eleven and one-half to twenty-three months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ probation. Six months later, the trial court granted Lopez’s motion for early release on parole. Thereafter, Lopez violated the terms of his supervision three times. Prior to resentencing for his third violation, Lopez filed a “Motion for Ability-to-Pay Hearing at Sentencing to Waive Costs.” His motion contended “Pennsylvania statutes and the Rules of Criminal Procedure require that this [c]ourt consider [his] ability to pay and waive court costs due to his indigence and the burden the costs would impose on him.” The Supreme Court found that Rule 706(C) did not have a requirement as Lopez suggested, and affirmed the Superior Court.

Pennsylvania v. Reid

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 784 CAP

Opinion Date: August 16, 2022

Judge: Max Baer

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Albert Reid was convicted by jury on two counts of first-degree murder for the killings of his estranged wife, Carla Reid, and her fourteen-year-old daughter, D.M. He received two death sentences, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). The PCRA court denied the petition, and Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed in part the PCRA court’s order but remanded, while retaining jurisdiction, directing the PCRA court to provide a supplemental opinion addressing: why it denied relief on the whether appellant was incompetent to proceed to trial and represent himself; and whether prior counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and effectively this issue before trial and for failing to raise it on appeal. Upon return from the PCRA court to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court found the PCRA court erred in the manner in which it assessed Appellant’s claim that he was incompetent to stand trial, as the court’s reasoning, inter alia, failed to account for new, post-conviction evidence that potentially demonstrated that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. Accordingly, the Court vacated in part the PCRA court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.

Trump’s Recent Calls to Execute Drug Traffickers Should Be a Wake-Up Call to the Biden Administration

AUSTIN SARAT

Amherst professor Austin Sarat comments on Donald Trump’s recently repeated calls to apply the death penalty to drug dealers. Professor Sarat points out that in 2020, only 30 people were executed worldwide for drug offenses (down from 116 in 2019), and they all occurred in China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—hardly the kind of examples that any nation committed to respecting human rights should want to emulate.

Read More