Harris v. University of Massachusetts, Lowell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1770

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law, Health Law

The First Circuit dismissed this appeal from the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit filed by Plaintiffs, two college students, against Defendants, their former universities and university officials, asserting constitutional challenges to the universities' COVID-19 vaccination policies, holding that Plaintiffs' claims are moot.

The policies at issue required all students either to be vaccinated or to obtain an exemption to be allowed onto campus. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief seeking exemptions from the policies. The district court denied relief and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The First Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs' ensuing appeal, holding that where one student had graduated and the other student was no longer enrolled, Plaintiffs' claims were moot.

United States v. Staveley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1842

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit dismissed this appeal, in which Appellant sought to override an appeal waiver and to proceed with an appeal based on the alleged ineffective assistance of his counsel, holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims not raised in the district court and not within an exception to United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058 (1st Cir. 1993), are insufficient to overcome an appeal waiver.

Defendant agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and to failure to appear in court pursuant to a plea agreement that contained a waiver-of-appeal provision. After sentencing, Defendant appealed, asserting for the first time that his counsel afforded him ineffective assistance both at the time he entered his plea and at sentencing. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel allegations fell within the Mala rule and could not surmount his waiver of appeal.

Goe v. Zucker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-0537

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: CHIN

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiffs are several parents suing on behalf of themselves and their children, whose requests for medical exemptions from the school immunization requirements were largely denied. They brought this action below against Defendants, the New York State Department of Health (the "Health Department"), Health Department officials, local school districts, and local school district officials (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that the new regulations and the enforcement thereof violated their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 794 (the "Rehabilitation Act"). The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court first concluded, as a procedural matter, that the district court properly applied the motion to dismiss standards. The court then concluded, as a substantive matter, that neither the new regulations nor the enforcement thereof violated the Due Process Clause or the Rehabilitation Act. The court explained that the new regulations do not implicate a fundamental right and that therefore strict scrutiny does not apply. The court further found that there is a reasonable relationship between the delegation of authority to school districts to review and approve medical exemption requests and protecting communities from serious diseases. Finally, the court concluded that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that they were excluded from school "solely by reason of" their disabilities.

Raja v. Burns

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-945

Opinion Date: August 1, 2022

Judge: CARNEY

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff appealed from a district court’s order awarding him attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 in an amount substantially less than he sought. After Plaintiff prevailed against the City of New York on the merits of his due process claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the district court, adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, lowered the attorney’s claimed hourly rate, excluded time spent on a related concurrent administrative proceeding, struck certain billing entries and imposed a 40% across-the-board reduction to the fee request.
 
Plaintiff challenged primarily the across-the-board reduction and the exclusion of time-related to the administrative proceeding. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order, explaining that while it identified no error in the district court’s decision to exclude all hours related to that proceeding, the court found that the 40% blanket reduction was not justified on the record. The court explained that it agrees with Plaintiff that the 40% overall reduction applied by the district court was not justified: the district court was able to (and in fact did) examine the block-billed entries for reasonableness, and Plaintiff’s counsel obtained a strongly favorable result for him overall, prevailing on claims that rested on the same core set of facts as did the claims that the court dismissed. However, the court identified no error in the district court’s decision to exclude from the fee calculation the hours that Plaintiff’s counsel devoted to defending him in the OATH proceeding because Plaintiff has not shown that this work was necessary to the result achieved in the federal court.

United States v. Jones

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-3009

Opinion Date: August 1, 2022

Judge: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was indicted for knowingly producing child pornography in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress evidence gathered from his electronic devices, arguing that the government’s search warrants lacked probable cause and therefore violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s decision on his motion to suppress.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment explained that it disagrees with the district court that Defendant’s prior guilty plea to an earlier charge in Tennessee state court precludes him from challenging the search warrants in this case. But the court agreed that even assuming arguendo that the warrants are defective, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.
 
The court explained that there was at least arguable probable cause for the Tennessee Warrants, therefore, the Detective acted based on an “'objectively reasonable good-faith belief’ that [his] conduct [was] lawful.” The court further wrote that the affidavits at issue here are not so devoid of factual support because they detail allegations from State Victim 1’s mother that support the common-sense inference that her daughter told her that Defendant took nude photographs of her.

USA v. Thomas Noble

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 20-1599

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Michael A. Chagares

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was indicted for various child pornography offenses in February 2018. Defendant expressed his intention to represent himself and the district court permitted him to do so, but appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office as standby counsel. However, subsequently, Defendant announced to the court he was invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and largely refused to participate in the proceedings. After holding a hearing, the district court held that Defendant waived and forfeited his right to represent himself and appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office as his attorney. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment.

On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's determination that he waived and forfeited his right to represent himself. The court affirmed Defendant's conviction. The court explained "the right to represent oneself is not absolute, however; judges 'may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.'" Here, Defendant stopped communicating with the court, failed to open his legal mail and repeatedly violated court orders. Thus, the Third Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that "it would be impossible to conduct a fair trial with a pro se defendant who refused to cooperate or engage at all with the court."

Justice 360 v. Bryan Stirling

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-2205

Opinion Date: August 3, 2022

Judge: AGEE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

Justice 360 offers post-conviction representation to South Carolina’s death-row inmates. In the current matter, Justice 360 acts solely on its own behalf. The organization’s Amended Complaint alleges that South Carolina Code Section 24-3-580 (“Identity Statute”)— which protects against the disclosure of certain information related to the State’s execution protocols—violates its First Amendment right to counsel clients and to participate in public debate about the death penalty.

The district court rejected those assertions, and Justice 360 timely appealed, challenging only the dismissal of its claims against the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC” or the “Department”) and its director. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Justice 360 lacks standing. The court explained that granting Justice 360 the relief it seeks in its Amended Complaint would amount to no more than an impermissible advisory opinion, as the organization’s alleged injuries would remain unredressed.

Nathan Mowery v. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-2022

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: WYNN

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff sued the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency alleging religious discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained that because the alleged discrimination and retaliation arose from Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy additional security requirements and would require the court to review the merits of the security-authorization decision, the court is bound by the decision in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), to affirm the district court’s dismissal of this matter for lack of jurisdiction.
 
The court explained that it agrees that courts must exercise caution in expanding the reach of Egan. Nevertheless, the court declined to adopt the hardline position, urged by Plaintiff, that Egan’s rationale may only ever apply to determinations explicitly labeled “security clearances.” Rather, as in Foote and Sanchez, this case requires a more detailed analysis of whether the judgment at issue is of the type that Egan intended to shield from judicial review. Furhter, the court held that the CIA’s decision to stop Plaintiff’s assignee-security authorization processing is the kind of discretionary predictive judgment shielded from judicial review by Egan.

Gonzalez v. Trevino

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-50276

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: Engelhardt

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Personal Injury

Appellee brought a retaliatory arrest claim against the Mayor and Chief of Police of Castle Hills, claiming that she was arrested for engaging in protected speech. However, Appellee acknowledges that there was probable cause for her arrest. Appellants asserted a qualified immunity defense. The district court denied Appellants' motion to dismiss.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying Appellant's motion to dismiss, finding Appellee failed to establish a violation of her constitutional rights in her retaliatory arrest claim because the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest. While probable cause to arrest does not necessarily preclude a retaliatory arrest claim, Appellee failed to establish any of these exceptions.

USA v. Perez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-50945

Opinion Date: August 3, 2022

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant made two social media posts indicating that he paid another man, who was positive for COVID-19, to lick every item at a local grocery store. Defendant did not actually pay the other man, but the posts "set off alarm bells" resulting in FBI agents being dispatched to the grocery store.

Defendant was indicted and ultimately convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1038(a)(1) for orchestrating a hoax that simulated another crime. Defendant claimed on appeal that the biological-weapons statute did not extend to conduct such as licking items in a grocery store and that the terrorist-hoax statute is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. The Fifth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges, finding that although the
biological-weapons statute does contain an implied exception for local crimes, Defendant's purported conduct was serious enough to place him within the purview of federal law enforcement, and threats like Defendant's are not protected by the First Amendment.

Gabrion, II v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 18-2382

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Judge: Batchelder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for relief from his first-degree murder conviction, holding that there was no merit to any of Appellant's claims on appeal.

In his section 2255 petition, Appellant claimed that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel (IAC). The Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on Appellant's IAC claim concerning an alleged conflict of interest, a Brady claim, an IAC claim regarding the investigation at the guilt stage, and a final IAC claim regarding the presentation of mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.

Golf Village North, LLC v. City of Powell, Ohio

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-3728

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Construction Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Powell, Ohio and dismissing Golf Village North LLC's claims brought under 28 U.S.C. 1983 for violating its procedural and substantive due process rights, holding that there was no error.

Golf Village, a developer, sought to build a "residential hotel" on its property in Powell, Ohio but never filed the required zoning application. Instead, Golf Village requested that the City confirm the residential hotel was a permitted use of the property. The City directed Golf Village to file an appropriate application for "zoning Certificate approval" to receive an answer. Rather than reply, Golf Village sued the City. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Golf Village's procedural due process and substantive due process rights were not violated in this case.

Rogers v. Mays

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-5427

Opinion Date: August 3, 2022

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that, in Tennessee, ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can establish cause to excuse a defendant's procedural default of a substantive claim of ineffective assistance at the motion-for-a-new-trial stage of the proceedings.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and criminal impersonation. The jury sentenced Appellant to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a habeas petition, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court with respect to the guilt phase of Defendant's trial; (2) held that Appellant's counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase, requiring remand with instructions to grant habeas on this claim as to the penalty phase; and (3) vacated the district court's findings that Appellant failed to overcome his procedural default on certain claims; and (4) reversed the court's finding that the Martinez-Trevino exception to procedural default cannot excuse a procedural default when the underlying ineffective assistance occurred in a motion for a new trial.

Cage v. Harper

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2447

Opinion Date: August 1, 2022

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court entering summary judgment to Defendants and dismissing this complaint brought by Plaintiff, the former general counsel for Chicago State University, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings.

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several University defendants alleging that the University fired him in retaliation for reporting a potential conflict of interest in violation of the First Amendment and Illinois's State Officials and Employees Ethics Act and that Defendants violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by not paying him severance pay. The district court entered summary judgment for Defendants. The Seventh District affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's actions fell outside the Ethics Act and that Plaintiff's speech lacked protection under the First Amendment.

Hero v. Lake County Election Bd.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2793

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this action challenging the conduct of the Lake County Election Board, holding that the Election Board did not violate Joseph Hero's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Hero, a registered republican for forty years, opposed the decision of his town council to exercise its eminent-domain authority to seize the property of predominantly lower-income homeowners. Hero backed two independent candidates for town council running against two incumbent, pro-development candidates. Thereafter, the Indiana Republican Party banned Hero from the Republican Party for ten years. In 2019, Hero attempted to appear as a Republican candidate in the 2019 election, but the Election Board concluded that Hero could not run. Hero subsequently filed a complaint arguing that the Election Board violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Hero had standing to sue; and (2) the Election Board did not violate Hero's constitutional rights.

Jump v. Village of Shorewood

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2255

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Kirsch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury

In this action brought the estate of Jonah Marciniak and Marciniak's son pursuing both federal and state claims stemming from Marciniak's arrest and ensuing suicide, the Seventh District held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Village of Shorewood and three of its officers who arrested Marciniak after his roommate fell from a fourth story window, holding that there was no error.

After arresting Marciniak and placing him in a booking cell, Marciniak used his t-shirt to hang himself. Marciniak died six days later. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that the three officers falsely arrested Marciniak without probable cause and failed to provide medical care and attention and to protect from self-harm. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendants had an absolute defense of probable cause to Plaintiffs' claims; and (2) even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest for battery, they were still entitled to qualified immunity.

Lyberger v. Snider

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2541

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants and dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that three police officers unlawfully stopped, searched, and arrested them in violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights, holding that Plaintiffs could not prevail on the merits of any of their claims.

The three plaintiffs in this case were arrested after following a woman home and confronting her, but the District Attorney's office declined to pursue criminal charges. Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the arresting officers. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the officers had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and probable cause to arrest, and therefore, Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims failed; and (2) Plaintiffs were not engaged in constitutionally-protected speech, and therefore, their First Amendment retaliation claim failed.

Milchtein v. Milwaukee County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2955

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law

In this complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) relating to the custody of Plaintiffs' children, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this suit seeking damages for alleged violations of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights to familial integrity, free exercise of religion, and due process of law, holding that there was no error.

Plaintiffs brought this action seeking money damages and equitable relief for actions Defendants took with respect to three of their daughters. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their claims for money damages regarding the custody of S.M. and D.M. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the judge properly dismissed as untimely all claims relating tot he custody of S.M.; and (2) as to the remaining claims, the trial judge properly concluded that the complaint failed to allege conduct plausibly exposing Defendants to liability and that other claims were foreclosed by absolute immunity.

Miles v. Anton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2796

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Seventh Circuit reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissing this complaint brought by Plaintiff after he was fired from his commissary job while incarcerated at Indiana State Prison, holding that the district court erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) exhaustion requirement, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a).

Plaintiff was hired for a job in the commissary with the understanding that he would miss work on Fridays to attend the prison's weekly Jumu'ah Muslim prayer service. When Officer Julie Anton refused to allow Plaintiff to attend Jumu'ah and he went anyway, Anton fired Plaintiff based on a work evaluation accusing Plaintiff of theft. Plaintiff sued Anton under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint because Plaintiff did not file a formal grievance before bringing suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the prison's grievance policy excepted Plaintiff's claim from the prison's administrative process.

Smith v. Boughton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 17-2192

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision affirming Defendant's conviction did not reflect an unreasonable application of clearly established law.

Defendant moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to a detective, arguing that his statement "I don't want to talk about this" expressed an unambiguous intention to cut off all further questioning and that the detective's continued questioning violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The trial court denied the motion, after which Defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery and first-degree reckless injury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of Miranda. Thereafter, Appellant brought his habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the petition, holding that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision amounted to a reasonable application of the Supreme Court's Miranda line of cases.

United States v. Fierro

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 21-2989, 21-2730

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Joel Martin Flaum

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions for arson stemming from their participation in riots in Madison, Wisconsin following the shooting of a Black man by a police officer in Kenosha, Wisconsin, holding that the district court properly held that 18 U.S.C. 844(i) is constitutional.

Defendants Willie Johnson and Anessa Fierro moved to dismiss the indictment against them, arguing that the federal arson statute is facially unconstitutional because its enactment exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendants entered into conditional plea agreements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that section 844(i) was validly enacted pursuant to Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Norville

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2493

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Judge: Jackson-Akiwumi

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing.

A law enforcement officer stopped Defendant while he was riding a motorized bicycle and arrested him under the theory that his bicycle was a motor vehicle requiring a license. During the arrest, police searched Defendant and found various drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the government needed to establish probable cause that he was driving a motor vehicle on a revoked license. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence established that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that Defendant rolled past a stop sign, which independently supported Defendant's arrest.

Word Seed Church v. Village of Homewood

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-1965

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Judge: Jackson-Akiwumi

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the motion filed by the Word Seed Church after the district court dismissed this suit for lack of standing, holding that Word Seed failed to show exceptional circumstances warranting relief from the denial of that motion.

Word Seed and an organization to which it belonged (collectively, Word Seed) brought this action against the Village of Homewood, Illinois alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing after concluding that Word Seed did not suffer an injury and denied Word Seed's ensuing motions to reconsider. In the second motion, which the district court considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), Word Seed raised for the first an argument that could have been raised before the district court entered judgment dismissing the case. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Word Seed's Rule 60(b) motion.

Brothers and Sisters in Christ v. Zazzle, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-1917

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: KELLY

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Intellectual Property, Trademark

Brothers and Sisters in Christ, LLC (BASIC) allege that Zazzle, Inc. sold a t-shirt that infringed on BASIC’s federal trademark. The district court granted Zazzle’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that BASIC bears the burden of establishing a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Further, where the applicable federal statute, here the Lanham Act, does not authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction the existence of personal jurisdiction depends on the long-arm statute of the forum state and the federal Due Process Clause.
 
Here, the court looked to Zazzle’s contacts with Missouri related to BASIC’s claims. Aside from the single t-shirt sale, BASIC fails to allege a connection between Zazzle’s other contacts with Missouri and the underlying suit. BASIC does not allege that Zazzle’s other activities in Missouri involved trademark infringement or that Zazzle sold additional trademark-infringing goods into the state. Further, BASIC has not alleged that Zazzle took such purposeful, targeted action toward Missouri or Missouri consumers. Although Missouri has an interest in this litigation because the allegedly injured plaintiff is a Missouri company, the convenience of the parties is neutral, as Zazzle would be inconvenienced by litigation in Missouri and BASIC would likely be inconvenienced in an alternate forum. In sum, BASIC has failed to allege that Zazzle could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Missouri.

Christopher Lankford v. City of Plumerville, Arkansas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-1639

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff was severely injured when his motorcycle crashed into a police SUV while he was fleeing from police. Plaintiff sued the City of Plumerville, Arkansas (the “City”), and its police officer for use of excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment to the City and the officer.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that claims against local police for excessive force during a seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. The court wrote it consistently held deadly force is not unreasonable where an officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others. The court held that the undisputed evidence reveals that the police officer had probable cause to believe Plaintiff’s flight threatened the lives of innocent bystanders as well as police. Accordingly, the court held that the officer’s actions were reasonable. Moreover, the court found that the severity of the officer’s use of force was mitigated by the opportunity the officer gave Plaintiff to avoid the collision.
 
Finally, the court explained that it assesses the reasonableness of deadly force for Fourth Amendment purposes from the seizing officer’s perspective at the time of the incident. The court found that based on the police officer’s knowledge at the time when he was forced to make a quick judgment, the court concluded the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard gave the officer more leeway than would have the Morrilton police officers.

Clifton Odie v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2652

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, asserting that his 2000 Illinois state conviction could not qualify as a prior felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. Section 851. The district court denied Appellant the requested post-conviction relief because of his untimely filing, but it granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Appellant’s Section 2255 motion is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate the diligence required for equitable tolling. The court concluded that Appellant’s Section 2255 motion is time-barred and equitable tolling is not appropriate because Appellant failed to allege facts showing that circumstances beyond his control at the prison prevented him from timely seeking relief. The court explained it need not address whether the motion is procedurally defaulted. The court also rejected Appellant’s argument that finding his motion time-barred under Section 2255(f) poses a problem under the Suspension Clause.

Jane Doe v. Becky Guffin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3269

Opinion Date: August 1, 2022

Judge: ERICKSON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law

This case involves allegations that a teacher restrained, secluded, and abused her students as a teacher in a special education classroom. The students’ parents sued the teacher, along with Aberdeen School District (“ASD”) and a host of its administrative officials, on their children’s behalf under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court denied the teacher’s assertion of qualified immunity from claims for infringing the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of three students, identified as A.A., B.B., and C.C.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for the teacher on the students’ Fourth Amendment claims to the extent held above. In all other respects, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the teacher and the remaining ASD officials. The court explained that it found four violations of clearly established Fourth Amendment rights: (1) secluding A.A. in the little room before February 4, 2016; (2) secluding B.B. in the calm-down corner using dividers; (3) grabbing B.B.’s arms to push him into the swimming pool; and (4) pinning C.C. down to strip his clothes off. The teacher is not entitled to qualified immunity for those violations but is for all other unreasonable seizure allegations. However, the court wrote, the remaining generalized assertions of physical and verbal abuse fail to meet the high bar required for a substantive due process violation.

Manda Roberson v. The Dakota Boys & Girls Ranch

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3550

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation took full custody of a young girl, A.A.R., from her parents and placed her at the Dakota Boys & Girls Ranch, a private psychiatric facility. After only a few months there, A.A.R. committed suicide. Her parents sued the Ranch and its employees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed the Complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim that the Defendants were state actors under Section 1983.
 
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that when North Dakota took custody of A.A.R., it had a constitutional duty to provide adequate medical care to her. The court explained that Plaintiffs were legally required to comply with DJS’s choices and could not remove her from the Ranch The district court violated the motion-to-dismiss standard when it concluded that the Complaint, read in conjunction with the May 2018 Order, contains “no factual allegations that the only medical care A.A.R. could have received was that provided by the State of North Dakota.” Further, assuming North Dakota’s constitutional obligation to provide A.A.R.’s medical treatment, the Ranch became a state actor. Thus Plaintiffs state a plausible claim against it under Section 1983. The court further explained that Plaintiffs also state a plausible claim against the Ranch’s employees. Defendants do not contest that a finding of state action by the Ranch establishes state action by its employees. Because Plaintiffs plausibly allege the Ranch was a state actor, its employees were too.

United States v. Frank Sanchez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3138

Opinion Date: August 3, 2022

Judge: ERICKSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

Defendant appealed after a jury convicted him of abusive sexual contact of a minor. Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the offense occurred in Indian Country, that the district court erred by admitting uncharged conduct as propensity evidence, and that the use of acquitted conduct to increase his sentence violated his constitutional rights.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Major Crimes Act gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by an Indian within Indian Country, including abusive sexual contact. Here, the deputy superintendent of the trust for the BIA’s Yankton Agency with nearly 32 years of experience, testified that the tract was part of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in 2006. Accordingly, the court held that it would not disturb the conviction because the deputy’s testimony provided a reasonable basis for the jury to find the offense occurred in Indian Country. Further, the court wrote that in affording great weight to the district court’s balancing, it found no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence under Rules 413 and 414.

United States v. Kevin Doerr

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3216

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: KOBES

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant drove drunk through the White Earth Indian Reservation. Local residents tried to stop him, but he struck and pinned one of them, N.V., under his car. A jury convicted Defendant of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The district court varied upward from the Guidelines and sentenced Defendant to 80 months on each count, to run consecutively.
 
Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) he was too drunk to have the specific intent to assault N.V.; (2) he ran over N.V. in self-defense; (3) his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy clause; and (4) his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Because those arguments are meritless.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there was enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Defendant intended to assault N.V. The jury’s verdict was supported by evidence that: Defendant aimed his car at local residents; he attempted to jump the curb three times; he stomped on N.V.’s head after hitting him with his car, and police described his responses afterward as logical. Further, the court wrote that the jury had significant evidence that Defedenadnt was not acting in self-defense. Moreover, the court explained that Defendant’s Double Jeopardy clause argument is foreclosed by both Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent. Finally, the court saw no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentence.

United States v. Lamont White

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3076

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: Kobes

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with firearm and drug charges after an officer claimed to see a bag of drugs in Defendant's car that was in plain view. In a motion to suppress, the officer testified inconsistently with the radio call. However, the district court found the officer credible and denied Defendant's motion. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the district court should not have credited the officer's testimony.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the district court was entitled to credit the police officer's testimony over Defendant's. In finding that the drugs were in plain view, the district court implicitly credited the officer's testimony over his radio call. While the two statements were at odds, the court’s credibility determination did not amount to clear error.

United States v. Shaun Farrington

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2974

Opinion Date: August 1, 2022

Judge: GRUENDER

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections  841(a)(1) and 846. He appealed the district court’s denials of his motion to suppress evidence, his motion to strike a juror for cause, and his motion to admit a portion of a video recording.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions. Defendant argued that the seizure and detention of the lockboxes was unreasonable under United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). But “Place had nothing to do with the automobile exception and is inapposite.” See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 578 (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently “explained that automobile searches differ from other searches” and has denied the applicability of cases that “do not concern automobiles or the automobile exception” to cases involving the automobile exception). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Further, the court wrote there was no abuse of discretion because the juror stated that she could remain fair and would listen to the detective’s testimony before deciding if she believed it.
Finally, Defendant claimed that the “partial recording and the Government’s characterization of it . . . gave a misleading and unfair understanding of the meaning of Defendant’s statement to the jury.” But he offers no explanation of how the recording was misleading.

LINO CHAVEZ V. MARK BRNOVICH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-15454

Opinion Date: August 1, 2022

Judge: Bennett

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence through the PCR proceeding because pleading defendants in noncapital cases in Arizona are prohibited from taking a direct appeal. The district court found that the Arizona Court of Appeals had incorrectly determined that Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), did not apply to Arizona’s of-right PCR proceedings. The district court also determined, on de novo review, that Arizona’s PCR procedure was deficient under Anders.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of conditional habeas relief to Petitioner. The panel first explained that it was clearly established that Anders and its progeny apply to Arizona’s of-right PCR proceedings. Because the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision can be construed as finding Anders applicable and nothing clearly suggests otherwise, and a federal habeas court must give the state court of appeals the benefit of the doubt and presume that it followed the law, the panel found that the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly found Anders applies to of-right PCR proceedings. The court, therefore, reversed the district court’s contrary determination. The court held that the district court also erred in reviewing de novo whether Arizona’s of-right PCR procedure is constitutionally adequate under Anders, and should have applied the required deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

Cruz v. Farmers Insurance, et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-1069

Opinion Date: August 3, 2022

Judge: Moritz

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Michael Cruz sued defendant insurance companies alleging they terminated his contract, under which he sold defendants’ insurance products, on the basis of race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In support, Cruz relied on a statement allegedly made by his district manager, which Cruz argued represented direct evidence of discrimination, as well as circumstantial evidence. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, ruling that the district manager’s statement was inadmissible hearsay and that Cruz’s circumstantial evidence did not otherwise demonstrate discriminatory intent. Without considering Cruz’s circumstantial evidence, the Tenth Circuit reversed because the district manager’s alleged comment was not inadmissible hearsay; it was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) as a party-opponent admission made by an agent within the scope of the agency relationship. And because that admission constituted direct evidence of discrimination, the grant of summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Dansie v. Union Pacific Railroad

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-4054

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Carson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff Kelly Dansie sued Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company for terminating his employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s ADA claim but allowed the case to proceed to trial on Plaintiff’s FMLA claim. The jury then returned a verdict in Defendant’s favor. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that defendant failed to engage in the ADA mandated good-faith communications with respect to reasonable accommodations of plaintiff's disability. Given that evidence, summary judgment for Defendant was reversed on plaintiff’s ADA claim, and the issue was remanded to the district court for a trial. But the Tenth Circuit affirmed the verdict for defendant on plaintiff’s FMLA claim.

Bradley Hester v. Matthew Gentry, et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-13894

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: Logoa

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this action brought by a group of pre-trial detainees challenging the constitutionality of the Cullman County bail system, the court reversed the district court's finding that the system discriminated against indigent defendants and deprived pretrial detainees of procedural due process.

Club Madonna Inc. v. City of Miami Beach

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 17-13934, 20-14292

Opinion Date: August 1, 2022

Judge: MARCUS

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

After a thirteen-year-old victim of human trafficking performed at a City of Miami Beach (“the City”) fully nude strip club, Club Madonna, Inc. (“the Club”), the City came down hard on the Club. It enacted two closely intertwined ordinances (collectively, “the Ordinance”) that required all nude strip clubs to follow a record-keeping and identification-checking regime in order to ensure that each individual performer is at least eighteen years old.
 
The district court ruled for the City at summary judgment on the Club’s first two claims, ruled for the Club on its federal preemption claim at summary judgment, and ruled for the City on the Club’s state law preemption claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage for failure to state a claim. The Club then appealed the court’s rulings and the City cross-appealed the district court’s ruling on the Club’s federal preemption claim.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all counts. First, although the Ordinance implicates the First Amendment because it singles out an industry that engages in expressive activity for special regulation, it satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Second, the Ordinance’s warrantless-search provision does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the adult entertainment industry is a closely regulated industry for Fourth Amendment purposes, and the warrantless-search provision satisfies the administrative-search exception because it can be narrowly read to avoid Fourth Amendment concerns. Third, the Ordinance’s employment-verification requirement is preempted by federal immigration law. And finally, the Club’s state law conflict preemption claim fails because there is no Florida law that cabins the City’s ability to levy fines against the Club for violating the Ordinance’s requirements.

Steven Larrabee v. Carlos Del Toro

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-5012

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: RAO

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Military Law

Appellee, a member of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, pleaded guilty at a court-martial to the sexual assault of a civilian. In this collateral challenge to his sentence, Appellee argued that the statutory grant of military jurisdiction over Fleet Marine Reservists exceeds Congress’ authority under the “Make Rules Clause.” The district court held for Appellee and the DC Circuit reversed.
 
The court explained that whether a person may be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction turns “on one factor: the military status of the accused.” Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). Here, based on the Supreme Court’s precedents interpreting the Make Rules Clause as well as the original meaning of that Clause, the court held that a person has “military status” if he has a formal relationship with the military that includes a duty to obey military orders. As a Fleet Marine Reservist, Appellee was “actually a member or part of the armed forces,” and therefore amenable to military jurisdiction under the Make Rules Clause. The court further held that the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause did not separately bar Appellee’s court-martial.

Tyler Brennan v. Stephen Dickson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-1087

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: Cornelia Thayer Livingston Pillard

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Out of concern about the increasing use of drones and the effect they have on airspace, the FAA passed the Remote ID rule, which drones in flight to emit publicly readable radio signals reflecting certain identifying information, including their serial number, location, and
performance information. Petitioners, a drone user and drone retailer, challenged the FAA Remote ID rule on several grounds, including under the Fourth Amendment.

The D.C. Circuit denied petitioners' petition for review, finding that the Remote ID rule does not violate the Fourth Amendment because it does not authorize warrantless searches in violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.

USA v. Rodney Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-3060

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: Rao

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to travelling across state lines to sexually abuse a child. Defendant was arrested when after he communicated with an undercover officer purporting to be a man who was offering their child for illicit sexual activities. At sentencing, the district court applied an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2A3.1(b)(2)(A) because “the victim had not attained the age of twelve years.” Rather than challenge the applicability of the enhancement, trial counsel asked for a downward variance to recognize that the “victim was not real. The court declined counsel's request and Defendant was sentenced to 108 months of imprisonment and 120 months of supervised release.

Defendant appealed his sentence, claiming that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the applicability of the U.S.S.G. Sec. 2A3.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement. The court determined that, because Defendant intended to sexually assault a young child, the sentencing enhancement applied. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to its application.

Aparezuk v. Schlosser

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17974

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: Henderson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law

A married couple with two children legally separated. They agreed the father would pay the mother child support while they lived at separate residences and alternated custody of the children. This arrangement was incorporated into a separation decree. But instead of living apart, the couple continued to live together with the children at the marital home. During this time, the father paid the majority of the household expenses, but never paid the agreed-upon court-ordered child support. After three years of maintaining this arrangement, the couple divorced and the mother sought to collect the father’s accrued child support arrears. The father moved to preclude collection under Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(h)(3), and the superior court granted his motion. The mother appealed, contending that the plain language of Rule 90.3(h)(3) required an obligor-parent to exercise primary physical custody of a child before preclusion can apply. The Alaska Supreme Court noted it had previously recognized that the equitable principles underlying Rule 90.3(h)(3) could support preclusion in some circumstances that do not fit neatly within the Rule’s plain language. Because these principles applied to the unique circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order precluding collection of the arrears.

Broad Beach Geologic Hazard etc. v. 31506 Victoria Point LLC

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B304699(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 3, 2022

Judge: MANELLA

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Tax Law

The City of Malibu formed the Broad Beach Geologic Hazard Abatement District (the District), to protect the homes on the city’s Broad Beach, threatened by longstanding shoreline erosion. The District developed a plan to import sand and maintain a revetment on portions of the beach, in order to fortify the shoreline. To fund this project, it proposed a special assessment on parcels within its boundaries, and homeowners approved the assessment. Litigation ensued, in which the District filed an action seeking to validate the assessment, and the homeowners opposing the assessment claimed it violated the requirements of Proposition 218, which added article XIII D to the California Constitution, limiting local government’s ability to impose assessments.
 
The trial court ultimately agreed with the challengers on these issues and invalidated the District’s assessment. After the court’s ruling on the merits, the challengers sought attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which codified the private attorney general doctrine of attorney fees.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed the court’s judgment invalidating the assessment. The court held that Prop. 218 required the District to separate and quantify general benefits from the widened beach, regardless of whether those benefits imposed additional costs and without regard to the District’s subjective intent in designing the project. Further, the court wrote that it discerned no no error in the trial court’s determination and weighing of the challengers’ financial interest in the litigation.

Martinez v. Cot'n Wash, Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B314476(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 1, 2022

Judge: ROTHSCHILD

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff, as successor in interest to his brother, sought reversal of a judgment of dismissal following the successful demurrer of Cot’n Wash, Inc. (CW) to a complaint against CW alleging a single violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, Section 51 et seq.) (the Unruh Act). The operative complaint alleged CW violated the Unruh Act by intentionally maintaining a retail website that was inaccessible to the visually impaired because it was not fully compatible with screen reading software. On appeal, Martinez argues that the trial court erred in concluding (1) the alleged inaccessibility of CW’s website did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. Section 12111 et seq.) (the ADA), specifically Title III of the ADA (42 U.S.C. Sections 12181−12189) (Title III) and (2) the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to establish CW’s discriminatory intent, which the Unruh Act requires in the absence of an ADA violation.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of dismissal. The court held that the trial court was correct on both points. As to intentional discrimination, the California Supreme Court has held that the discriminatory effect of a facially neutral policy or action is not alone a basis for inferring intentional discrimination under the Unruh Act. As to the ADA violation theory, Plaintiff has not alleged, as he must in order for Title III of the ADA to apply, that CW’s website constitutes a “place of public accommodation.”

Ferguson v. Delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 223, 2021

Opinion Date: August 3, 2022

Judge: Vaughn

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant DeJoynay Ferguson pled guilty to one count of Murder by Abuse or Neglect in the First Degree, six counts of Child Abuse in the First Degree, and two counts of Child Abuse in the Second Degree. The plea was made pursuant to a plea agreement under which the State entered a nolle prosequi as to other remaining charges. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of life in prison. He also sentenced her to ten years at Level V on each of the Child Abuse in the First Degree charges, suspended after two years on each. He sentenced her to probation on the two counts of Child Abuse in the Second Degree. Ferguson appealed her sentences, contending the sentencing judge sentenced her for the sole purpose of retribution; that he sentenced her with a closed mind; that he was unwilling to consider the mitigation evidence and arguments she presented; and that her sentence violated her right to due process. Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court.

State v. Bates

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 122128

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: Marla J. Luckert

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search that led to the State charging Defendant with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia with the intent to distribute, holding that the district court properly denied the suppression motion.

This appeal arose after police officers detained Defendant while he sat in a minivan in an alleyway. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the seizure of the minivan violated his constitutional rights. The district court concluded that the detention was reasonable and justified under the public safety exception to the warrant requirement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the seizure of the minivan was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.

Commonwealth v. Moreau

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13168

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the trial court convicting Defendant of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI) and negligent operation of a motor vehicle, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

Defendant moved to suppress the results of a blood alcohol content (BAC) analysis conducted by a crime lab after the police obtained and executed a search warrant for Defendant's blood, arguing that he did not consent to having his blood tested. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that, in a prosecution under 24(1)(a), where the Commonwealth wishes to have admitted BAC evidence arising from testing or analysis of a defendant's blood done "by or at the direction of" police, police must first obtain the defendant's consent to the "chemical test or analysis" of his blood that may result from such evidence, regardless of whomever first drew the blood.

Michigan v. Boykin

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Dockets: 157738, 158695

Opinion Date: July 28, 2022

Judge: Bernstein

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In case no. 157738, Demariol Boykin was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony- firearm). He was initially sentenced to a mandatory term of life without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, to be served consecutively to a two-year term for felony-firearm. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), which held that sentencing an individual to mandatory life without the possibility of parole for a crime they committed before the age of 18 (a juvenile offender) violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments and that trial courts are required to consider the attributes of youth when sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole. In Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), the Supreme Court held that Miller was a substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review. The Michigan Legislature accounted for these changes by enacting MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a, which eliminated sentences of mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for all individuals who were convicted of specific crimes, including first-degree murder, for acts committed while they were juveniles. At resentencing, the prosecution did not move to seek a sentence of life without parole but instead sought a sentence of 40 to 60 years’ imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. Boykin appealed this sentence by right. In case no. 158695, Tyler Tate was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, making a false report of a felony to police, and lying to a police officer in a criminal investigation. He was sentenced under MCL 769.25, which had already become law at the time of his sentence. As with Boykin, the prosecution did not move to seek a sentence of life without the possibility of parole but instead sought the imposition of a 40- to 60-year sentence, which the trial court imposed. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that because it was unclear whether the trial courts properly considered youth to be mitigating in either of these consolidated cases, yet the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts’ sentencing decisions, the portions of both Court of Appeals opinions discussing defendants’ sentencing challenges were vacated and the cases were remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.

Michigan v. Parks

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 162086

Opinion Date: July 28, 2022

Judge: Elizabeth M. Welch

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Kemo Parks was convicted by jury for first-degree premeditated-murder. Parks was 18 years old when he aided and abetted in the murder. Parks argued that his sentence was cruel and/or unusual punishment under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Under current United States Supreme Court precedent, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded Parks’s Eighth Amendment argument failed. However, the Court held his sentence of mandatory life without parole violated the Michigan Constitution’s ban on “cruel or unusual” punishment. Specifically, his sentence lacked proportionality because it failed to take into account the mitigating characteristics of youth, specifically late-adolescent brain development. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming Parks’s sentence, vacated Parks’s life-without-parole sentence, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for resentencing proceedings.

Michigan v. Stovall

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 162425

Opinion Date: July 28, 2022

Judge: Bridget Mary McCormack

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Montez Stovall was convicted by jury for second-degree murder, a crime committed when he was a juvenile. Stovall argued that his sentence was cruel and/or unusual punishment under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Under current United States Supreme Court precedent, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded Stovall’s Eighth Amendment argument failed. However, the Court held his sentence of mandatory life without parole violated the Michigan Constitution’s ban on “cruel or unusual” punishment. Specifically, his sentence lacked proportionality because it failed to take into account the mitigating characteristics of youth, specifically late-adolescent brain development. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming Stovall’s sentence, vacated Stovall’s life-without-parole sentence, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for resentencing proceedings.

Michigan v. Taylor

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 154994

Opinion Date: July 28, 2022

Judge: Michael F. Cavanagh

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Robert Taylor was convicted by jury of first degree felony murder, carjacking, conspiracy to commit carjacking, kidnapping conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In 2009, defendant and his codefendant, Ihab Masalmani, abducted Matt Landry from outside a sandwich shop. Defendant acted as the lookout while Masalmani forced Landry into Landry’s car. The two then drove Landry away at gunpoint. Defendant and Masalmani held Landry against his will for several hours and stole money from his bank account during that time; Landry was later killed by a gunshot wound to the head. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review provided an opportunity for the Court to provide “much-needed” guidance to criminal defendants, prosecutors, and trial courts on the proper procedure for conducting MCL 769.25 sentencing hearings when a prosecutor seeks to impose a sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for a crime committed when the defendant was a juvenile. The Court held that, as the moving party at a Miller hearing, the prosecutor bears the burden to rebut a presumption that LWOP is a disproportionate sentence under the clear and convincing standard. In this case, the trial court was not operating within the framework the Supreme Court set forth here. Defendant was therefore entitled to resentencing. Because the Court of Appeals failed to address a separate constitutional issue that could be dispositive, however, the Supreme Court remanded this case to the Court of Appeals to consider that issue in the first instance before any resentencing can take place.

Wilson v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-KA-00473-SCT

Opinion Date: July 28, 2022

Judge: Griffis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A grand jury indicted Dwayne Wilson on one count of aggravated assault. The indictment charges that Wilson “unlawfully, willfully, purposely and feloniously attempt[ed] to cause or knowingly caused bodily injury to . . . Stacy Pierce[] by striking him multiple times in the ribs and mouth with a bat, a means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm[.]” Wilson pled not guilty, but he was ultimately convicted on that charge when his first trial ended in a mistrial. On appeal, Wilson contended the second trial violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Additionally, Wilson claimed the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that although the protections against double jeopardy had attached, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding manifest necessity to grant a mistrial. Further, the Court found the verdict in the second trial was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented. Accordingly, judgment and conviction were affirmed.

Stand Up Montana v. Missoula County Public Schools

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 MT 153

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: James A. Rice

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders entered by the Fourth and Eighteenth Judicial District Courts denying their requests for preliminary injunctions to enjoin the masking requirements of Defendants, school districts in Missoula and Gallatin Counties, that were adopted in response to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, holding that the district courts did not err.

Plaintiffs filed complaints and motions for preliminary injunctions shortly after Defendants' adoption of the masking policies for the 2021-2022 school year, seeking to enjoin the masking requirements based upon constitutional privacy, individual dignity, and parental rights. Both district courts denied the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district courts did not manifestly abuse their discretion by denying the preliminary injunctions.

State v. Warner

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 312 Neb. 116

Opinion Date: July 29, 2022

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest pleas to six felony charges, holding that there was no error.

After the district court accepted Defendant's no contest pleas, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his pleas, claiming that he wanted to withdraw his pleas so that he could obtain a second opinion as to his sanity at the time of the charged offenses. The district court denied the motion to withdraw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas; and (2) the record was insufficient to review Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.

North Dakota v. Netterville

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 ND 153

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Milford Netterville appealed the revocation of his probation, and his resentencing to two years’ imprisonment. In 2020, Netterville pled guilty to domestic violence, for which he was originally sentenced to 366 days’ imprisonment with credit for 99, and 18 months of supervised probation. In 2021, the State petitioned to revoke probation when Netterville failed to report to his probation officer in October and November 2021. He argued the district court entered an illegal order because the court failed to give him credit for time served and there was ambiguity in the court’s sentence. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the revocation did not take into account the credit for time served. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded with instructions for resentencing.

North Dakota v. Pendleton

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 ND 149

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Salamah Pendleton was convicted by jury on two counts of murder, two counts of attempted murder, terrorizing, reckless endangerment, and possession with intent to deliver marijuana. Pendleton argued on appeal: (1) his constitutional right to a public trial was violated; (2) his right to be physically present at trial was violated; (3) he was convicted of a non-cognizable offense; (4) juror misconduct occurred that violated his right to confrontation and an impartial jury; and (5) the court erred by not applying the ameliorating legislation of N.D.C.C. § 19.03.1-23, reducing possession with intent to deliver marijuana to a Class C felony. Finding only that the trial court miscalculated Pendleton’s sentence, the North Dakota affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

North Dakota v. Pulkrabek

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 ND 157

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In October 2018, Robert Pulkrabek was charged with driving under the influence, resisting arrest, and driving under suspension. In July 2020, he was charged with driving under suspension and failure to transfer title. In November 2020, he was charged with three counts of issuing checks without sufficient funds. In March 2021, he was charged with two counts of terrorizing. On June 1, 2021, Pulkrabek filed a request for final disposition of the pending charges within 90 days under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 29-33. If not waived or extended, the 90 day deadline expired on August 30, 2021. At the first status conference in June 2021, the district court allowed Pulkrabek’s attorney to withdraw. The court then discussed the timeline for trials with Pulkrabek and told Pulkrabek he would be assigned new counsel. The court advised Pulkrabek he was entitled to trials within 90 days but asked if he was comfortable with the trial dates already scheduled in three of the cases. Pulkrabek responded “yes” and stated “I’m comfortable with those dates.” Trials were set for October 6 and 8, 2021. A second attorney was appointed a week after the first withdrew; a continuance was granted. Due to transportation problems, Pulkrabek was unable to attend the preliminary hearing, so it was rescheduled for October 7, 2021. Pulkrabek’s second attorney moved to withdraw from the representation on September 27, 2021. At an October 2021 status conference, the district court granted the withdrawal and stated the trials and preliminary hearing would be rescheduled due to a third attorney assignment. The court advised Pulkrabek that would be the final time trials were continued. Pulkrabek told the court he was filing a motion to dismiss his pending cases. Days later, a third attorney was appointed to represent Pulkrabek. On October 15, Pulkrabek moved to dismiss the charges against me for expiration of the 90 day deadline. When that was denied, Pulkrabek subsequently entered into a global plea agreement covering all cases and pleaded guilty to the charges. On appeal of his convictions Pulkrabek argued district court committed a structural error by violating his right to counsel when asking Pulkrabek whether he agreed to trial dates outside the 90 day window in the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

Northwest Landowners Association v. State, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 ND 150

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Northwest Landowners Association filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of North Dakota Senate Bill 2344, which related to subsurface pore space. The district court granted the Association’s cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding S.B. 2344 was unconstitutional under the state and federal takings clauses. The State and Continental Resources appealed the district court’s summary judgment order and amended judgment. On appeal, the State argued S.B. 2344 did not violate the takings clauses and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift, and that the district court misapplied N.D.R. Civ.P. 56 by failing to consider evidence submitted by the State. Continental Resources argued the court erred in analyzing the Association’s facial challenge, in determining pore space had value as a matter of law, and in denying Rule 56(f) discovery. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in invalidating the entirety of S.B. 2344. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed to the extent that it declared certain portions unconstitutional, but reversed to the extent it declared the remainder of the bill inseparable and invalid.

Oregon v. Carlisle

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S067880

Opinion Date: August 4, 2022

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Zachary Carlisle challenged his conviction for misdemeanor third-degree sexual abuse, which required the state to prove that he “subject[ed] another person to sexual contact” and that “[t]he victim d[id] not consent to the sexual contact.” The question this case raised for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was which culpable mental state applied to the “victim does not consent” element of the offense. The trial court instructed the jury that the State needed to prove that defendant “knowingly” subjected the victim to sexual contact and that defendant was “criminally negligent” with respect to the fact that the victim did not consent to the sexual contact. According to defendant, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that both elements required proof of a “knowing” mental state. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the legislature did not intend that a conviction under ORS 163.415 would require proof that the defendant knew that the victim did not consent to the sexual contact. Accordingly, the trial court did not err, and defendant's convictions were affirmed.

McLinko v. Penna. Dept. of State, et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 14, 15, 17, 18 & 19 MAP 2022

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a question of whether the General Assembly overstepped its constitutional authority by enacting legislation that allowed for universal mail-in voting. Among other things, "Act 77" effected major amendments to the Pennsylvania Election Code, including universal, state-wide mail-in voting. On November 21, 2020, eight petitioners – including a Republican congressman and Republican candidates for the United States House of Representatives and the Pennsylvania House of Representatives – filed a petition for review with the Commonwealth Court seeking to halt the certification of the 2020 General Election, and including a facial challenge to the portions of Act 77 that established universal mail-in voting. The Supreme Court exercised extraordinary jurisdiction over the matter, and found a “complete failure to act with due diligence in commencing [the] facial constitutional challenge, which was ascertainable upon Act 77’s enactment[,]” as the petitioners waited until the ballots from the General Election were in the process of being tallied, and the results were becoming apparent, to raise their claim. Thus, the Court found the claim barred by the doctrine of laches. The Court found no restriction in the Pennsylvania Constitution on the General Assembly's ability to create universal mail-in voting.

JP v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 WY 94

Opinion Date: August 2, 2022

Judge: Fenn

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court adjudicating JP delinquent and the corresponding order of disposition, holding that Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed timely to demand a jury trial.

The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that seventeen-year-old JP inflicted sexual intrusion on a thirteen-year-old girl. After a hearing, the juvenile court found that JP committed a delinquent act and sentenced him to one year of juvenile probation. On appeal, JP argued that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to timely demand a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that JP failed to show the outcome of his case would have been different if it had been tried to a jury.

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