Wisconsin Constitution
Article I - Declaration Of Rights
Section 11 - Searches and seizures.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

GENERAL

Electronic eavesdropping, done with the consent of one of the parties, does not violate the U.S. constitution. State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354.

The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to criminal cases. It applies in forfeiture actions arising out of ordinance violations. Milwaukee v. Cohen, 57 Wis. 2d 38, 203 N.W.2d 633.

An inspection by police of a basement storage room accessible to the public and the observation of evidence found there in open view that was later seized under a search warrant did not amount to an improper invasion of the defendant's privacy. Watkins v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 514, 208 N.W.2d 449 (1973).

Police have a right to lock a car to protect its contents after arresting the driver, but if it is already locked they cannot enter it on the pretense of locking it and thus discover contraband. When the car was borrowed, consent by the lawful user of the car was sufficient to allow a search and any containers found could be opened and examined. Soehle v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 72, 208 N.W.2d 341.

When officers, armed with a search warrant, knocked on a door, pushed it open when the defendant opened it 2 inches, and put him under restraint before showing the warrant, they acted legally. State v. Meier, 60 Wis. 2d 452, 210 N.W.2d 685.

The observation of tools in a car by police officers did not constitute a search, and the tools could be seized and were properly admissible into evidence. Anderson v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 233, 223 N.W.2d 879.

Pertinent to the validity of an investigative stop is whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Wendricks v. State, 72 Wis. 2d 717, 242 N.W.2d 187.

When an abused child, an occupant of defendant's house, was accompanied to the house by social workers to recover the child's belongings and exhibited to the workers the instruments used to inflict punishment, a subsequent search warrant was not tainted by an unconstitutional search. State v. Killory, 73 Wis. 2d 400, 243 N.W.2d 475.

When evidence seized in an illegal search was admitted, no reversible error resulted when other evidence uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence was sufficient to convict. Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800.

The drawing and testing of blood solely for diagnostic and not government-instigated purposes was not a “search or seizure" even when the testing physician testified at a negligent homicide trial. State v. Jenkins, 80 Wis. 2d 426, 259 N.W.2d 109.

A stop and frisk was not an unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983).

A person who is lawfully in custody for a civil offense may be required to participate in a lineup for an unrelated criminal offense. State v. Wilks, 121 Wis. 2d 93, 358 N.W.2d 273 (1984).

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage once it has been routinely collected by garbage collectors. State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 367 N.W.2d 788 (1985).

An unlawful arrest does not deprive a court of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986).

Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence seized under a defective search warrant was admissible because a later inventory search would have discovered it. State v. Kennedy, 134 Wis. 2d 308, 396 N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1986).

The reasonableness of an investigative stop depends on facts and circumstances present at the time of the stop. State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).

When an officer observed a traffic violation but stopped the vehicle merely to render assistance, inadvertently discovered criminal evidence was admissible. State v. Baudhuin, 141 Wis. 2d 642, 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987).

The trial court is permitted to consider suppressed evidence at sentencing when nothing suggests consideration will encourage illegal searches. State v. Rush, 147 Wis. 2d 225, 432 N.W.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1988).

An escapee does not have a legitimate privacy expectation in premises other than the penal institution he or she is sent to. State v. Amos, 153 Wis. 2d 257, 450 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1989).

Aerial surveillance using standard binoculars and cameras with generally available standard and zoom lenses from an airplane flying no lower than 800 feet was reasonable. State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990).

The statutory privilege protecting an informer protects the contents of a communication that will tend to reveal the identity of the informant. The trial court may rely on redacted information in determining the informant's reliability and credibility in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion justifying a warrantless seizure. State v. Gordon, 159 Wis. 2d 335, 464 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1990).

Factors used to determine the extent of a home's curtilage are discussed. State v. Moley, 171 Wis. 2d 207, 490 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1992).

Bank customers have no protectable privacy interest in bank records relating to accounts. State v. Swift, 173 Wis. 2d 870, 496 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1993).

A defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a porch through which the door to the living area was visible and that was entered through an unlocked screen door. When an officer came to the defendant's residence for a legitimate purpose, observation of contraband from the porch through a window in the interior door was not a search. State v. Edgeberg, 188 Wis. 2d 339, 524 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1994).

The use of a police dog to sniff an automobile parked in a motel parking did not constitute a search. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the air space around a car in a motel parking lot. State v. Garcia, 195 Wis. 2d 68, 535 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-2573.

Although a vehicle had been improperly seized, evidence obtained in a later search of the vehicle under a warrant that was not based on information gathered from the illegal seizure was not subject to suppression. State v. Gaines, 197 Wis. 2d 102, 539 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-1225.

When executing a search warrant on private premises, the belongings of a visitor on the premises that are plausible repositories for the objects of the search, except those worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant, may be searched. State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996), 94-1888.

Presence in a high drug-trafficking area, a brief meeting of individuals on a sidewalk in the afternoon, and the officer's experience that drug transactions that take place in that neighborhood involve brief meetings on the street, without more, is not particularized suspicion justifying an investigative stop. State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0034.

A prison inmate does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in his body that permits a 4th-amendment challenge to strip searches. Prisoners convicted of crimes are protected from cruel and unusual treatment that prohibits prison officials from utilizing strip searches to punish, harass, humiliate, or intimidate inmates regardless of their status in the institution. Al Ghashhiyah v. McCaughtry, 230 Wis. 2d 587, 602 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3020.

Police failure to comply with the rule of announcement in violation of the 4th amendment and Art. I, s. 11, did not require suppression of the evidence seized when the officers relied, in objective good faith, upon the pronouncements of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as no remedial purpose would be served. State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517, 97-2008.

A curtilage determination is a question of constitutional fact subject to a 2-step review. The findings of evidentiary or historical fact are reviewed for clear error to determine if they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The ultimate determination of constitutional fact is reviewed de novo. State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552, 98-0101.

Generally a premises warrant authorizes the search of all items that are plausible receptacles of the objects of the search. When currency was an object, looking through documents for hidden currency was appropriate. When the incriminating nature of the document was apparent upon brief perusal, its seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine. State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238, 97-1219.

When a person turns material over to a 3rd party, the person who turned over the material has no 4th-amendment protection if the 3rd party reveals or conveys the material to governmental authorities, whether or not the person who turned over the material had a subjective belief that the 3rd party would not betray him or her. State v. Knight, 2000 WI 16, 232 Wis. 2d 305, 605 N.W.2d 291, 99-0368.

While the subtleties of police practice in some cases necessitate an expert witness, there is no per se requirement that there be expert testimony to prove an excessive use of force claim. Robinson v. City of West Allis, 2000 WI 126, 239 Wis. 2d 595, 619 N.W.2d 692, 98-1211.

What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject to 4th-amendment protection. An inner tube rental and campground business did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas open to the public. Float-Rite Park, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 2001 WI App 113, 244 Wis. 2d 34, 629 N.W.2d 818, 00-1610.

The use of an infrared sensing device to detect heat emanating from a residence constitutes a search requiring a warrant. State v. Lorager, 2002 WI App 5, 250 Wis. 2d 198, 640 N.W.2d 555, 00-3364.

See also Kyllo v. U.S. 533 U.S. 27, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001).

An individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public restroom stall when he or she occupies it with another individual, leaves the door slightly ajar, and evinces no indication that the stall is being used for its intended purpose. State v. Orta, 2003 WI App 93, 264 Wis. 2d 765, 663 N.W.2d 358, 02-1008.

The first sentence of this section is a statement of purpose that describes the policies to be promoted by the state and does not create an enforceable, self-executing right. Schilling v. Wisconsin Crime Victims Rights Board, 2005 WI 17, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623, 03-1855.

Although defendant's initial trip to the police station was consensual, when the defendant was left in a locked room for 5 hours, he was seized within the meaning of the 4th amendment. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to leave. Defendant's post-Miranda confession, offered within 5 minutes of the officers' first questions to the defendant after 5 hours of isolation, was insufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure and should have been suppressed. State v. Farias-Mendoza, 2006 WI App 134, 294 Wis. 2d 726, 720 N.W.2d 489, 05-0365.

For a search to be a private action not covered by the 4th amendment: 1) the police may not initiate, encourage, or participate in a private entity's search; 2) the private entity must engage in the activity to further its own ends or purpose; and 3) the private entity must not conduct the search for the purpose of assisting governmental efforts. A search may be deemed a government search when it is a “joint endeavor" between private and government actors. Once the state raises the issue, asserting that a search is a private search, the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that government involvement in a search or seizure brought it within the protections of the 4th amendment. State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548, 04-1029

When officers were met with disorderly conduct during the execution of a search warrant, they possessed the lawful authority to arrest notwithstanding the invalidity of the warrant. State v. Annina, 2006 WI App 202, 296 Wis. 2d 599, 723 N.W. 2d 708, 05-0876.

A premises warrant generally authorizes the search of all items on the premises so long as those items are plausible receptacles of the objects of the search. A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780, 06-0672.

What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject of 4th amendment protection. When affidavits were left unattended in a public hallway frequented by hundreds, there was no illegal search when a court commissioner picked up and looked at or photocopied the affidavits. State v. Russ, 2009 WI App 68, 317 Wis. 2d 764, 767 N.W.2d 629, 08-1641.

The good faith exception precludes application of the exclusionary rule where officers conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance upon clear and settled Wisconsin precedent that is later deemed unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252; 786 N.W.2d 97, 07-1894.

It is a violation of the defendant's right to due process for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's failure to consent to a warrantless search. It has long been a tenet of federal jurisprudence that a defendant's invocation of a constitutional right cannot be used to imply guilt. State v. Banks, 2010 WI App 107, 328 Wis. 2d 766, 790 N.W.2d 526, 09-1436.

Even if police use excessive force in making an arrest a defendant's remedy is a suit for damages rather than exclusion of the evidence in the defendant's criminal trial. For evidence to be suppressed there must be a causal relationship between the alleged use of unreasonable force and the evidence sought to be suppressed. State v. Herr, 2013 WI App 37, 346 Wis. 2d 603, 828 N.W.2d 896, 12-0935.

Under Nix, 467 U.S. 431, the state need not prove an absence of bad faith for the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule to apply. State v. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, 369 Wis. 2d 673, 882 N.W.2d 422, 14-2238.

Requiring the state in all inevitable discovery doctrine cases to prove active pursuit of an alternative line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation risks exclusion of evidence that the state might demonstrate that it inevitably would have discovered. Therefore, the factors in Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, and Avery, 2011 WI App 124, should be regarded as important indicia of inevitability rather than indispensable elements of proof. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the prosecution has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it inevitably would have discovered the evidence sought to be suppressed. State v. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, 369 Wis. 2d 673, 882 N.W.2d 422, 14-2238.

It was constitutionally reasonable for an emergency medical technician (EMT), as opposed to a physician, to draw an OWI suspect's blood. The important point for constitutional purposes was that the evidence demonstrated that the EMT was thoroughly trained and experienced in properly drawing blood. Also, it was not unreasonable for the blood draw to occur in the non-medical setting of the jail when the evidence indicated that the room in which the blood was drawn “was clean and as clean as a hospital emergency room,” and the EMT used a new blood draw kit containing a sterile needle. State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3, 373 Wis. 2d 1, 889 N.W.2d 423, 15-0656.

Arson investigations under s. 165.55 (9) and (10) are subject to search warrant requirements set forth in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). Consent to search discussed. 68 Atty. Gen. 225.

In-custody statements stemming from an illegal arrest are not admissible merely because Miranda warnings were given. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590.

Bank records are not private papers protected by a legitimate “expectation of privacy." United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435.

Standard procedure inventorying of any container impounded by police is a reasonable search. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364.

Standards for application of exclusionary rule to live-witness testimony are discussed. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).

A newspaper office may be searched for evidence of a crime even though the newspaper is not suspected of a crime. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).

Stopping a car for no other reason than to check the license and registration was unreasonable under the 4th amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

In-court identification of the accused was not suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).

A person has been seized within the meaning of the 4th amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).

Illegally seized evidence was properly admitted to impeach the defendant's false trial testimony, given in response to proper cross-examination, when the evidence did not squarely contradict the defendant's testimony on direct examination. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).

Arcane concepts of property law do not control the ability to claim 4th amendment protections. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).

Resemblance to a “drug courier profile" was an insufficient basis for seizure. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).

Objective facts and circumstantial evidence justified an investigative stop of a smuggler's vehicle. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).

A warrant to search premises for contraband implicitly carries with it limited authority to detain occupants during a search. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).

The automobile exception does not extend to a closed, opaque container located in the luggage compartment. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).

Police placement of a beeper in a container of precursor chemical used to manufacture an illicit drug and the subsequent surveillance of the defendant's car by monitoring beeper transmissions was not prohibited by the 4th amendment. U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).

The detention and interrogation of an airline passenger fitting a “drug courier profile" was unconstitutional. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).

Under the “independent source" doctrine, evidence discovered during a valid search was admissible regardless of whether initial entry was illegal. Segura v. U.S. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).

The “good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule allowed the admission of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, later found to be unsupported by probable cause. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

The “good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule is discussed. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).

If a “wanted flyer" has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a wanted person has committed a crime, other officers may rely on the flyer to stop and question that person. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).

In assessing whether detention is too long to be justified as an investigative stop, it is appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicions. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).

Proposed surgery under general anesthetic to recover a bullet from an accused robber's body was an unreasonable search. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).

Fingerprints were not admissible when the police transported the suspect to a station house for fingerprinting without consent, probable cause, or prior judicial authorization. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985).

Apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

When an officer stopped a car for traffic violations and reached into the car to move papers obscuring the vehicle ID number, discovered evidence was admissible. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).

The reasonable expectation of privacy was not violated when police, acting on an anonymous tip, flew over the defendant's enclosed backyard and observed marijuana plants. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).

Defendants have no reasonable privacy interest in trash left on a curb for pick-up. Therefore, a warrantless search is not prohibited under federal law. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).

The use of a roadblock to halt a suspect's automobile constituted a seizure. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989).

The impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule does not extend to the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach testimony of defense witnesses other than the defendant. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 107 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1990).

For a seizure of a person to occur there must either be an application of force, however slight, or when force is absent, submission to an officer's “show of authority." California v. Hodari D. 499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 690 (1991).

When an officer has no articulable suspicion regarding a person, but requests that person to allow the search of his luggage, there is no seizure of the person if a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's request or end the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991).

Fourth-amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures extend to civil matters. The illegal eviction of a trailer home from a private park with deputy sheriffs present to prevent interference was an unconstitutional seizure of property. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992).

Whether police must “knock and announce" prior to entering a residence in executing a warrant is part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 4th amendment. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995).

Public school students are granted lesser privacy protections than adults, and student athletes even less. Mandatory drug testing of student athletes did not violate the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. School Dist. 475 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995).

It is a violation of the 4th amendment for police to bring members of the media or other 3rd persons into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the 3rd persons in the home is not in aid of the execution of the warrant. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999).

Inherent in Summers' authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. Use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate detention in the garage outside the house being searched was reasonable when the governmental interests outweighed the marginal intrusion. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2004).

Violation of the “knock-and-announce" rule does not require the suppression of all evidence found in the search. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).

A claim of excessive force in the course of making a seizure of the person is properly analyzed under the 4th amendment's objective reasonableness standard. A police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the 4th amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).

To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter the conduct, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. The exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. When police mistakes are the result of negligence, such as here when a cancelled warrant was not removed from a database, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not pay its way. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009).

When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause for a serious offense and bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the 4th amendment. In the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause, the arrestee's expectations of privacy were not offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks for DNA. That same context of arrest gives rise to significant state interests in identifying respondent not only so that the proper name can be attached to his charges but also so that the criminal justice system can make informed decisions concerning pretrial custody. Upon these considerations, DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013).

The objective reasonableness of a particular seizure under the 4th amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's 4th amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake analyzed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. If police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. ___ , 134 S. Ct. 2012, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1056 (2014).

Facial challenges to statutes authorizing warrantless searches under the 4th amendment are not categorically barred or especially disfavored. A facial challenge is an attack on a statute itself as opposed to a particular application. While such challenges are the most difficult to mount successfully, the Supreme Court has never held that these claims cannot be brought under any otherwise enforceable provision of the Constitution. Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 192 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2015)

Search regimes where no warrant is ever required may be reasonable when special needs make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, and when the primary purpose of the searches is distinguishable from the general interest in crime control. The Supreme Court has referred to this kind of search as an administrative search. In order for an administrative search to be constitutional, the subject of the search must be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker. Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 192 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2015)

When an officer carries out a seizure that is reasonable, taking into account all relevant circumstances, there is no valid excessive force claim. A different 4th amendment violation cannot transform a later, reasonable use of force into an unreasonable seizure. County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 198 L. Ed. 2d 52 (2017).

The mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy. Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 200 L. Ed. 2d 805 (2018).

The “reasonableness" of the investigative detention: An “ad hoc" constitutional test. Wiseman. 67 MLR 641 (1984).

The exclusionary rule and the 1983-1984 term. Gammon. 68 MLR 1 (1984).

The constitutionality of the canine sniff search: From Katz to dogs. Fitzgerald. 68 MLR 57 (1984).

Analyzing the reasonableness of bodily intrusions. Sarnacki. 68 MLR 130 (1984).

The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule: The latest example of “new federalism" in the states. 71 MLR 166 (1987).

Search and seizure — abandonment. 1974 WLR 212.

Terry revisited: Critical update on recent stop-and-frisk developments. 1977 WLR 877.

The future of the exclusionary rule and the development of state constitutional law. 1987 WLR 377.

The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Wiseman. WBB Aug. 1986.

Law Enforcement in Cyberspace: Search and Seizure of Computer Data. McChrystal, Gleisner, & Kuborn. Wis. Law. Dec. 1998.

DNA Extraction on Arrest: Maryland v. King and Wisconsin's New Extraction Law. Dupuis. Wis. Law. Sept. 2013.

CONSENT AND STANDING

The fact that consent to the search of a car was given while the defendant was in custody does not establish involuntariness. It was not improper for the police to tell the defendant that if a search did not produce stolen goods he would be released. Gautreaux v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 489, 190 N.W.2d 542.

When police opened a package in the possession of an express company without a warrant or the consent of the addressee, persons later arrested in possession of the package, other than the addressee, had no standing to challenge the evidence on the ground of illegal search. Defendants would have to establish a possessory interest in the package at the time of the search. State v. Christel, 61 Wis. 2d 143, 211 N.W.2d 801.

The defendant was qualified to challenge the admissibility of evidence taken from his wife, when he and his wife were in each other's presence when arrested for the same crime, a search of her person at that time would have been at a place where the defendant had a legitimate right to be; the object of the search, incident to the arrest for robbery could only be for weapons and incriminating evidence against him and his wife; and this situation carried over into a custodial search of the wife which was thereafter conducted at the police station where the search occurred. State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 213 N.W.2d 545.

Sons of a murdered property owner did not, as such, have authority to consent to a search of the premises. Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800.

A person living in a tent in the yard of a house had no authority to grant consent to a warrantless search of the house. A police officer's observation through a window of a cigarette being passed in the house did not constitute probable cause for a warrantless search of the house for marijuana. The “plain view" doctrine discussed. State v. McGovern, 77 Wis. 2d 203, 252 N.W.2d 365.

An estranged wife had no authority to consent to the warrantless search of property she owned jointly with her defendant husband but did not occupy at that time. State v. Verhagen, 86 Wis. 2d 262, 272 N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1978).

The boyfriend of an apartment lessee who paid no rent or expenses and whose access to the apartment was at the whim of the lessee did not have even a limited reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises when away form the premises. State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981).

The impoundment and subsequent warrantless inventory search of car, including a locked glove box, were not unconstitutional. Automatic standing is discussed. State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982).

A defendant had no standing to contest the legality of search of a van because of a lack of dominion and control over the van. State v. Wisurmerski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982).

When the defendant's mother admitted police into her home to talk to her son, the subsequent arrest of the son was valid. State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 349 N.W.2d 453 (1984).

When police reentered a home to recreate a crime 45 hours after consent to enter was given, evidence seized was properly suppressed. State v. Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 365 N.W.2d 580 (1985).

A person who borrows a car with the owner's permission has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. State v. Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d 461, 501 N.W.2d 442 (1993).

In a consent search, voluntariness and freedom from coercion, not fully informed consent, must be shown. Language and cultural background are relevant in determining whether the police took advantage in gaining consent. State v. Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d 525, 504 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 1993).

A warrantless entry by uniformed officers to make arrests after undercover agents gained permissive entrance to the premises was justified under the consent exception and no exigent circumstances were required. State v. Johnston, 184 Wis. 2d 794, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994).

Evidence obtained in a consensual search of the defendant's car when the consent was given during an illegal search was admissible as the evidence was not “come at" by information learned in the interrogation. State v. Goetsch, 186 Wis. 2d 1, 519 N.W.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1994).

All occupants of a vehicle in a police-initiated stop are seized and have standing to challenge the lawfulness of the seizure. To establish lawfulness, the state must establish that the police possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize someone in the vehicle. State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 557 N.W.2d 247 (1996), 95-1595.

Whether persons have “common authority" to consent to a search of a premises depends, not on property rights, but on the relationship between the consenting party and the premises. Co-residents have “common authority" to consent to a search, but relatives of residents and property owners do not. Consent of one who possesses common authority is binding against an absent resident, but is not against a nonconsenting party who is present. State v. Kieffer, 207 Wis. 2d 462, 558 N.W.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0008.

Affirmed 217 Wis. 2d 531, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998), 96-0008.

See also, State v. St. Germaine, 2007 WI App 214, 305 Wis. 2d 511, 740 N.W.2d 148, 06-2555.

Consent to a search must be knowledgeably and voluntarily given. When consent is not requested, it cannot be knowledgeably and voluntarily given. State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2052.

Suddenly placing a police officer at each side of a vehicle just prior to asking for consent to search cannot be said to create or to be intended to create a coercive situation. State v. Stankus, 220 Wis. 2d 232, 582 N.W.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2131.

A person with no property interest who may have entered the premises legitimately but did not have permission to remain to the time of a search is without standing to challenge the search. State v. McCray, 220 Wis. 2d 705, 583 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2746.

To have standing to challenge the pre-delivery seizure of a package not addressed to the defendant, the defendant has the burden of establishing some reasonable expectation of privacy in the package, which will be determined on a case-by-case basis. State v. Ramirez, 228 Wis. 2d 561, 598 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-0996.

Non-objected to warrantless entry by police into living quarters is entry demanded under color of office granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right. If consent is granted only in acquiescence to an unlawful assertion of authority, the consent is invalid. An initial refusal to permit a search when asked militates against a finding of voluntariness. State v. Munroe, 2001 WI App 104, 244 Wis. 2d 1, 630 N.W.2d 223, 00-0260.

When officers gained entry into a motel room for the stated, but false, reason of determining whether the occupant had violated an ordinance requiring the presentation of proper identification when renting a room, any license granted by acquiescence to their entry vanished when proper identification was presented, and the officers had no authority to conduct a general search. State v. Munroe, 2001 WI App 104, 244 Wis. 2d 1, 630 N.W.2d 223, 00-0260.

In light of the reduced expectation of privacy that applies to property in an automobile, the search of a vehicle passenger's jacket based upon the driver's consent to the search of the vehicle was reasonable. State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891, 99-0070.

A social guest who is not an overnight guest may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in premises giving standing to challenge a warrantless search if the guest's relationship to the property and host is firmly rooted. State v. Trecroci, 2001 WI App 126, 246 Wis. 2d 261, 630 N.W.2d 555, 00-1079.

Warrants for administrative or regulatory searches modify the conventional understanding of probable cause requirements for warrants as the essence of the search search is that there is no probable cause to believe a search will yield evidence of a violation. Refusal of consent is not a constitutional requirement for issuing the warrant, although it may be a statutory violation. Suppression only applies to constitutional violations. State v. Jackowski, 2001 WI App 187, 247 Wis. 2d 430, 633 N.W.2d 649, 00-2851.

A visual body cavity search is more intrusive than a strip search. It is not objectively reasonable for police to conclude that consent to a strip search includes consent to scrutiny of body cavities. State v. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61, 251 Wis. 2d 625, 642 N.W.2d 549, 00-3524.

A search authorized by consent is wholly valid unless that consent is given while an individual is illegally seized. The general rule is that a seizure has occurred when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. Questioning alone does not a seizure make. That a defendant spontaneously and voluntarily responded to an officer's questions is not enough to transform an otherwise consensual exchange into an illegal seizure. State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834, 01-0463.

There is no bright-line rule that a tenant in an unlocked apartment building with at least four units does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the stairways, hallways, and basement. Whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is decided on a case-by-case basis. State v. Eskridge, 2002 WI App 158, 256 Wis. 2d 314, 647 N.W.2d 434, 01-2720.

A teenage child may have apparent common authority to consent to police entry into the family home justifying a warrantless entry. State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367, 00-3134.

Consent to a vehicle search, given following the conclusion of a traffic stop, when the police had given verbal permission for the defendant to leave but continued to ask questions, was valid. Applying a “reasonable person" test, there was no “seizure" at the time and consent to the search was not an invalid result of an illegal seizure. State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919, 00-3065.

Detaining, in handcuffs, a person who had arrived at a motel room with the person who had rented the room pending the arrival of and during the execution of a search warrant for the hotel room was reasonable. Consent to a search of the person's living quarters on completion of the search, which resulted in the seizure of illegal drugs, when the person had been repeatedly told she was being detained but was not under arrest was voluntarily given and not the product of an illegal seizure. State v. Vorburger, 2002 WI 105, 255 Wis. 2d 537, 648 N.W.2d 829, 00-0971.

Questioning the defendant's 3-year-old son outside the defendant's presence did not exceed the scope of the defendant's consent to search his home when the child was left with a police officer without any restrictions and there was no evidence of trickery, deceit, or coercion. The questioning constituted on-the-scene questioning of a potential witness in an ongoing investigation. There was no applicable prohibition against speaking with the boy about whether a gun was in the house. State v. Ragsdale, 2004 WI App 178, 276 Wis. 2d 52, 687 N.W.2d 785, 03-2795.

For a search with no probable cause made after a traffic stop to be consensual, the consent must be given under circumstances where a reasonable person granting the consent would have believed that he or she was free to leave. Some verbal or physical demonstration by the officer, or some other equivalent facts, clearly conveying to the person that the traffic matter is concluded and the person should be on his or her way is necessary. Absent that, it is a legal fiction to conclude that a reasonable person would believe that he or she is free to depart the scene. State v. Jones, 2005 WI App 26, 278 Wis. 2d 774, 693 N.W.2d 104, 03-3216.

In a traffic stop context, where the test of consent to search is whether a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business, the fact that the person's driver's license or other official documents are retained by the officer is a key factor in assessing whether the person is seized and, therefore, whether consent is voluntary. State v. Luebeck, 2006 WI App 87, 292 Wis. 2d 748, 715 N.W.2d 639, 05-1013.

Orderly submission to law enforcement officers who, in effect, incorrectly represent that they have the authority to search and seize property, is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent under the 4th amendment. When officers offered the defendant a fleeting glimpse of a subpoena signed by a judge, they suggested authority they did not possess that led the defendant to believe he could not refuse consent for the officers to search his room and seize his computer. State v. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239, 297 Wis. 2d 446, 724 N.W.2d 402, 06-0189.

But see State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, 376 Wis. 2d 685, 898 N.W.2d 499, 15-1261.

The holding of Jones, 2005 WI App 26, is inapplicable to consent to the search of a vehicle made after the defendant had been lawfully seized. State v. Hartwig, 2007 WI App 160, 302 Wis. 2d 678, 735 N.W.2d 597, 06-2804.

The holding of Angelia D.B. that searches on school grounds must be supported by reasonable suspicion extends to searches in school parking lots. A school search is legal when it satisfies a 2-prong test: 1) the search must be justified at its inception, and 2) reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. A school official has the responsibility to keep students safe on school grounds. The search here was justified at its inception because school officials were put on alert that the defendant was in possession of drugs that day and school officials must act on such a tip. When searches of the defendant's person, backpack, and locker were cleared, the search was reasonable in scope when the next step for school officials was to search the defendant's car. State v. Schloegel, 2009 WI App 85, 319 Wis. 2d 741, 769 N.W.2d 130, 08-1310.

The defendant in this case did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a package intercepted by a delivery service and later searched. While the expectation of privacy when using an alias to send or receive mail is something society may accept as reasonable, the coupling of a false name and a false address, along with an unknown sender and a statement by the defendant that the package belonged to someone else did not demonstrate that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package. State v. Earl, 2009 WI App 99, 320 Wis. 2d 639, 770 N.W.2d 755, 08-1580.

In considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding whether consent was given voluntarily the court considered: 1) whether the police used deception, trickery, or misrepresentation; 2) whether the police threatened or physically intimidated the defendant or punished him or her by the deprivation of something like food or sleep; 3) whether the conditions attending the request to search were congenial, non-threatening, and cooperative, or the opposite; (4) how the defendant responded to the request to search; (5) what characteristics the defendant had as to age, intelligence, education, physical and emotional condition, and prior experience with the police; and (6) whether the police informed the defendant that he or she could refuse consent. State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, 326 Wis. 2d 234, 784 N.W.2d 740, 08-0880.

Threatening to obtain a search warrant does not vitiate consent if “the expressed intention to obtain a warrant is genuine and not merely a pretext to induce submission. State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, 326 Wis. 2d 234, 784 N.W.2d 740, 08-0880.

Voluntary consent is less likely when the defendant answers the door to find officers with guns drawn. However, the fact that an officer has a weapon drawn at the beginning of an encounter does not prevent the situation from evolving into something non-threatening and relatively congenial. State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, 326 Wis. 2d 234, 784 N.W.2d 740, 08-0880.

A defendant's consent to a search obtained following illegal police activity may be admissible. The court must consider the temporal proximity of the misconduct to the statements by the defendant, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct. Circumstances may mitigate a short time span including congenial conditions. Meaningful intervening circumstances concerns whether the defendant acted of free will unaffected by the initial illegality. Purposefulness and flagrancy of the police conduct is particularly important because it goes to the heart of the exclusionary rule's objective of deterring unlawful police conduct. State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, 326 Wis. 2d 234, 784 N.W.2d 740, 08-0880.

The rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent, does not apply when a physically present resident is taken forcibly from the residence by law enforcement officers but remains in close physical proximity and refuses to consent after removal from the residence. When the defendant was nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy in which the defendant's co-tenant granted permission to search, the defendant did not fall within the rule stated in Randolph such that the search should have been barred and the evidence gained from it suppressed. State v. St. Martin, 2011 WI 44, 334 Wis. 2d 290, 800 N.W.2d 858, 09-1209.

Who may consent to the search of a home hinges not upon the law of property, but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. There is no rigid rule that a weekend guest may not grant consent to search. Whether an individual has the constitutional authority to invite law enforcement into the home of another is determined on a case-by-case basis. State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59, 10-3034.

Specific factors that weigh on whether an individual has the constitutional authority to invite law enforcement into the home of another include: 1) the relationship of the consenter to the defendant, not only in the familial sense, but also in terms of the social ties between the two; 2) the duration of the consenter's stay in the premises; 3) a defendant's decision to leave an individual in his or her home alone; 4) various other miscellaneous facts that may illuminate the depth of an individual's relationship to the premises, such as whether he or she has been given a key, keeps belongings in the home, or lists the residence as his or her address on a or driver's license. State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59, 10-3034. See also State v. Torres, 2018 WI App 23, 381 Wis. 2d 268, 911 N.W.2d 388, 16-1398.

To validate the search of an object within a home on consent, the government must satisfy the same requirements as apply to consent to enter, namely, that the consenter had joint access or control of the object for most purposes. State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59, 10-3034.

When consent to search a vehicle was given by the vehicle's driver, a passenger did not effectively withdraw the driver's consent to search a briefcase contained in the car when he asked “Got a warrant for that?" Police officers confronted with ambiguous statements, such as the passenger's in this case, are not under a duty to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity. State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 N.W.2d 810, 11-3007.

Involuntary consent is invalid, regardless of any prior illegality or attenuation therefrom. Attenuation analysis is not voluntariness analysis, and it is not meant to cure the involuntary waiver of rights. Rather, attenuation analysis examines whether voluntary consent is tainted by prior illegality. Attenuation analysis examines 3 factors to determine whether consent is sufficiently attenuated from illegal action to be removed from the taint of illegality: 1) the temporal proximity of the official misconduct and seizure of evidence; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124, 13-0430.

The attenuation test is the proper test to apply for analyzing voluntary consent to search a vehicle when that consent comes after the illegal extension of a traffic stop. Attenuation analysis may not be necessary in all cases; it is only appropriate where, as a threshold matter, courts determine that the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity. If the unlawful police conduct was not a “but-for" cause of the search, attenuation analysis is unnecessary because the consent is not tainted by the unlawful conduct in such a case. State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124, 13-0430.

After a traffic stop has ended, police may interact with a driver as they would with any citizen on the street. If a person is not seized, police may request consent to search even absent reasonable suspicion. State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124, 13-0430.

When after consenting to a blood draw, the defendant asked the officer if the officer needed to obtain a warrant to draw the defendant's blood and the officer shook his head no in response, the officer's response did not vitiate the voluntariness of the defendant's consent. The officer did not need a warrant because the defendant already had consented, and the officer was not obligated to explain further than he did. State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, 376 Wis. 2d 685, 898 N.W.2d 499, 15-1261.

Passengers had no “legitimate expectation of privacy" in the glove box or under the seat of a car. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).

A court may not suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a 3rd party not before court. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).

Defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own 4th-amendment rights have in fact been violated. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).

When police entered a 3rd party's house to execute an arrest warrant, evidence discovered during the search was inadmissible. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).

A prisoner has no constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).

The state need not prove that the defendant consenting to search knew of the right to withhold consent. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984).

A warrantless entry to premises is permitted under the 4th amendment when entry is based upon 3rd-party consent and officers reasonably believed the 3rd party possessed authority to consent. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990).

An officer's opening of a closed bag found on the floor of a suspect's car during a search of the car, made with suspect's consent was not unreasonable. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991).

A defendant can urge suppression of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional protections only if that defendant's rights were violated. U.S. v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 954, 123 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1993).

The 4th amendment does not require that a seized person must be advised that he is free to go before his consent to a search can be recognized as voluntary. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996).

A physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant. If a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant's permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).

When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car and its passengers are seized within the meaning of the 4th amendment and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007).

As a matter of federal law, an appellant cannot assert an alleged violation of his wife's 4th-amendment rights as a basis for suppression, at his trial, of evidence taken from his wife. Mabra v. Gray, 518 F.2d 512.

Consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search. However, a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search of his or her home is dispositive as to him or her, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant. An occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason. That the arrested occupant had made an objection to the search of the premises before his removal did not change the sufficiency of a still present occupant's subsequent consent. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 188 L. Ed. 2d 25 (2014).

Zurcher: third party searches and freedom of the press. Cantrell. 62 MLR 35 (1978).

But What of Wisconsin's Exclusionary Rule? The Wisconsin Supreme Court Accepts Apparent Authority to Consent as Grounds for Warrantless Searches. Schmidt. 83 MLR 299.

State v. Stevens: Consent by deception in the context of garbage searches. 1987 WLR 191.

PROBABLE CAUSE AND WARRANTS

Probable cause meeting constitutional requirements for issuance of the search warrant of defendant's premises was not established by testimony of a police officer that a youth found in possession of amphetamines informed the officer that a shipment of marijuana was being delivered to the defendant's premises, when it was established that the officer had had no previous dealings with the informant and could not personally attest to the informant's reliability. The warrant was invalid. State ex rel. Furlong v. Waukesha County Court, 47 Wis. 2d 515, 177 N.W.2d 333.

Probable cause for arrest without a warrant under the 4th amendment of the U.S. constitution is applicable in this state. Tests for probable cause are discussed. A citizen informer is not subject to the requirement that the officer show prior reliability of his informant. State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836.

Probable cause must exist prior to a search of body orifices. State v. Guy, 55 Wis. 2d 83, 197 N.W.2d 774.

An affidavit reciting that a reliable informant had reported seeing a large quantity of heroin in defendant's apartment was sufficient to support a search warrant. State v. Mansfield, 55 Wis. 2d 274, 198 N.W.2d 634.

Unauthorized out-of-court disclosures of private marital communications may not be used in a proceeding to obtain a search warrant. Muetze v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 117, 243 N.W.2d 393.

A search warrant designating an entire farmhouse occupied by the accused and “other persons unknown" was not invalid despite the multiple occupancy. State v. Suits, 73 Wis. 2d 352, 243 N.W.2d 206.

A warrant authorizing the search of the “entire first-floor premises" encompassed a balcony room that was part and parcel of first floor. Rainey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 189, 246 N.W.2d 529.

A search warrant obtained on an affidavit containing misrepresentations by a police officer as to the reliability of an unnamed informant is invalid. When the search was conducted within a reasonable time following an arrest based on probable cause, the search will be sustained even though it was conducted in execution of invalid warrant. Schmidt v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 370, 253 N.W.2d 204.

Affidavits for search warrants need not be drafted with technical specificity nor demonstrate the quantum of probable cause required in a preliminary examination. The usual inferences that reasonable persons draw from evidence are permissible, and doubtful or marginal cases should be resolved by the preference to be accorded to warrants. State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 260 N.W.2d 739.

Probable cause for arrest, standing alone, does not justify taking a blood sample for a blood test without first obtaining a search warrant. To be admissible, the blood test must have been required by the exigencies of the situation, and the sample must have been drawn in a reasonable manner. State v. Bentley, 92 Wis. 2d 860, 286 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1979). See also State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834, 12-0523.

A defect in a portion of a search warrant did not invalidate the entire search warrant. State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 343 N.W.2d 391 (1984).

A “no knock" warrant to search a drug dealer's house was invalid because of a lack of specific information to indicate the evidence would be destroyed otherwise. State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984).

At a “Franks hearing" challenging the veracity of a statement supporting a search warrant, the defendant must prove that a falsehood was intentional or with reckless disregard for truth and that the false statement was necessary to finding probable cause. State v. Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d 451, 406 N.W.2d 398 (1987).

Under the “independent source doctrine" the court examines whether an agent would have sought a warrant had it not been for an illegal entry, and if information obtained during the entry affected the decision to issue the warrant. State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990).

A status check of a driver's license arising out of police exercise of the community care-taker function is not a stop and does not require reasonable suspicion of a crime. State v. Ellenbecker, 159 Wis. 2d 91, 464 N.W.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1990).

Seizure of a package delivered to a 3rd party for limited investigative detention requires reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. State v. Gordon, 159 Wis. 2d 335, 464 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1990).

An evidentiary search of a person not named in a search warrant but present during the search of a residence reasonably suspected of being a drug house was reasonable. State v. Jeter, 160 Wis. 2d 333, 466 N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1991).

A probable cause determination in the face of a staleness challenge depends upon the nature of the underlying circumstances, whether the activity is of a protracted or continuous nature, the nature of the criminal activity under investigation, and the nature of what is being sought. State v. Ehnert, 160 Wis. 2d 464, 466 N.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1991).

A warrant for the seizure of film authorized the seizure, removal, and development of the undeveloped film. State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991).

Knowledge that a dealer operating an ongoing drug business was armed in his residence satisfied the requirements for a “no knock" search. A reasonable belief that the weapon will be used need not be shown. State v. Watkinson, 161 Wis. 2d 750, 468 N.W.2d 763 (Ct. App. 1991), State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992).

A warrantless search of an apartment for evidence of occupancy when the police reasonably believed that the tenant had vacated and the occupants were not legitimately on the premises was not unreasonable. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment or in property kept there. State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991).

An informant need not have a “track record" established with the police if the totality of the circumstances indicate probable cause for a search exists. State v. Hanson, 163 Wis. 2d 420, 471 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1991).

The severability rule under Noll applies when the description of the premises to be searched is overly broad. State v. Marten, 165 Wis. 2d 70, 477 N.W.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1991).

If old information contributes to an inference that probable cause exists at the time of the application for a warrant, its age is no taint. State v. Moley, 171 Wis. 2d 207, 490 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1992).

Police serving a warrant are not required to ring a doorbell before forcing entry. State v. Greene, 172 Wis. 2d 43, 491 N.W.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1992).

Use of a ruse to gain entry in the execution of warrant when “no-knock" was not authorized did not violate the announcement rule. Special authorization is not required for the use of a ruse. State v. Moss, 172 Wis. 2d 110, 492 N.W.2d 627 (1992).

Failure to comply with the announcement rule was allowable when officers reasonably believed further announcement was futile. State v. Berry, 174 Wis. 2d 28, 496 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1993).

Compliance with the announcement rule must be determined at time of execution. While advance request for “no-knock" authority is preferable if police at the time of execution have grounds, failure to seek authorization is not fatal. State v. Kerr, 174 Wis. 2d 55, 496 N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1993).

The incorrect identification of a building's address in the warrant did not render the resulting search unreasonable when the search made was of the building identified by the informant, which was otherwise correctly identified in the warrant. State v. Nicholson, 174 Wis. 2d 542, 497 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1993).

A federal magistrate's decision at a 4th amendment suppression hearing was not binding on a state trial court when the state was not a party nor in privity with a party to the federal action and the federal case did not review errors in the proceeding. State v. Mechtel, 176 Wis. 2d 87, 499 N.W.2d 662 (1993).

An investigatory stop of an automobile based solely on the fact that the vehicle bore “license applied for" plates, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, was justified by reasonable suspicion. State v. Griffin, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 515 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1994).

For a violation of the requirement that a warrant be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, actual bias and not the appearance of bias must be shown. State v. McBride, 187 Wis. 2d 408, 523 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1994).

An “anticipatory warrant" issued before the necessary events have occurred that will allow a constitutional search, is subject to the same probable cause determination as a conventional search warrant. State v. Falbo, 190 Wis. 2d 328, 526 N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1994).

That a person was a passenger in a vehicle in which cocaine was found in the trunk was not of itself sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the person for being a part of a conspiracy to possess or sell the cocaine. State v. Riddle, 192 Wis. 2d 470, 531 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1995).

A search warrant authorizing the search of certain premises and “all occupants" was not unconstitutional where there was probable cause to believe that persons on the premises were engaged in illegal activities. State v. Hayes, 196 Wis. 2d 753, 540 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-3040.

A request to perform field sobriety tests does not convert an otherwise lawful investigatory stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. County of Dane v. Campshure, 204 Wis. 2d 27, 552 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0474.

Probable cause is not required to justify a search conducted on school grounds by a police officer at the request of and in conjunction with with school authorities. A lesser “reasonable grounds" standard applies. State v. Angelia D.B. 211 Wis. 2d 140, 564 N.W.2d 682 (1997), 95-3104.

A suspect's seeming reluctance to have the front of his boxer shorts patted at or below the waist did not give rise to probable cause to search inside the shorts when no specific suspicion of a crime was focused on the suspect and no weapon or contraband had been plainly felt in a Terry pat down search. State v. Ford, 211 Wis. 2d 741, 565 N.W.2d 286 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2826.

It is not necessary that a warrant explicitly state that delivery of the sought after contraband must take place before the search is initiated when the requirement is sufficiently implied. It is not necessary to describe in the affidavit in support of the warrant the exact role the police will play in delivering the contraband. State v. Ruiz, 213 Wis. 2d 200, 570 N.W.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1610.

A no-knock search cannot be founded on generalized knowledge. Fruits of an invalid no-knock search must be suppressed. State v. Stevens, 213 Wis. 2d 324, 570 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0758.

The showing required to sustain an unannounced entry parallels the reasonable suspicion standard for justifying investigative stops. The police must have reasonable suspicions based on specific articulable facts that announcing their presence will endanger safety or present an opportunity to destroy evidence. State v. Larson, 215 Wis. 2d 155, 572 N.W.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1997), 95-1940.

There is no constitutional requirement that an anticipatory search warrant contain explicit conditional language limiting the execution of the warrant until after delivery of the contraband. State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998), 96-2243.

To dispense with the rule of announcement in executing a warrant, particular facts must be shown in each case that support an officer's reasonable suspicion that exigent circumstances exist. An officer's experience and training are valid relevant considerations. State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998), 96-2243.

Police are not prevented from ever using evidence gleaned from an illegal search in a subsequent and independent investigation. When the later investigation is not prompted by the information obtained in the earlier search, the information may be used. State v. Simmons, 220 Wis. 2d 775, 585 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-1861.

The odor of a controlled substance provides probable cause to arrest when the odor is unmistakable and may be linked to a specific person under the circumstances of the discovery of the odor. The odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle established probable cause to arrest the sole occupant of the vehicle. State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999), 97-2476.

Police have authority under a valid search warrant to enter unoccupied premises if the search is otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Knocking and announcing is not required. State v. Moslavac, 230 Wis. 2d 338, 602 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3037.

“Probable cause to believe" does not refer to a uniform degree of proof, but instead varies in degree at different stages of the proceedings. County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999), 97-3512.

The test for finding probable cause to issue a warrant is not whether the inference drawn from the supporting affidavit is the only reasonable inference. The test is whether the inference drawn is a reasonable one. State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517, 97-2008.

Marijuana plants discovered while officers, although mistaken, believed they were executing a valid search warrant of an adjacent apartment were properly admitted into evidence. Because the officers were required to cease all searching when they discovered that they were not operating within the scope of the warrant, incriminating statements and evidence obtained thereafter were properly suppressed. A warrant obtained for the second apartment based on the discovery of the marijuana plants was based on untainted evidence, and additional evidence obtained thereunder was admissible. State v. Herrmann, 2000 WI App 38, 233 Wis. 2d 135, 608 N.W.2d 406, 99-0325.

Police with an arrest warrant are authorized to enter a home if they have probable cause to believe that the person named in the warrant lives there and is present, but not to enter a 3rd-party's residence where the police believe the person to be a visitor. State v. Blanco, 2000 WI App 119, 237 Wis. 2d 395, 614 N.W.2d 512, 98-3153.

In searching a computer for items listed in a warrant, the police are entitled to examine all files to determine if their contents fall within the scope of the warrant. The first file containing evidence of other illegal activity is admissible under the plain view doctrine and is grounds for a warrant to search for more evidence of the second illegal activity. State v. Schroeder, 2000 WI App 128, 237 Wis. 2d 575, 613 N.W.2d 911, 99-1292.

Irrespective of whether the search warrant authorizes a “no-knock" entry, reasonableness is determined when the warrant is executed. State v. Davis, 2000 WI 270, 240 Wis. 2d 15, 622 N.W.2d 1, 99-2537.

A good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is adopted for when police officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a warrant that had been issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. For the exception to apply, the state must show that the process used in obtaining the search warrant included a significant investigation and a review by either a police officer trained and knowledgeable in the requirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion or a knowledgeable government attorney. State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625, 98-2595.

The constitutional validity of an unannounced entry in serving a warrant turns on whether the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing, including the facts known to the police but not included in the warrant application, was sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing, under the circumstances, would be dangerous or futile or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime. State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613, 99-2296.

Whether tenants have a reasonable expectation of privacy in stairways and halls of rental property is to be determined by assessing each case on its individual facts and depends on whether the person has exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy in the area inspected and whether society is willing to recognize the expectation as reasonable. State v. Trecroci, 2001 WI App 126, 246 Wis. 2d 261, 630 N.W.2d 555, 00-1079.

There is a presumption that a warrantless search of a private residence is per se unreasonable. A warrantless search requires probable cause, not reasonable suspicion. Although flight from an officer may constitute reasonable suspicion, it does not rise to probable cause. For probable cause there must be a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be found in a particular place. State v. Rodriguez, 2001 WI App 206, 247 Wis. 2d 734, 634 N.W.2d 844, 00-2546.

Warrants for administrative or regulatory searches modify the conventional understanding of probable cause for warrants as the essence of the search is that there is no probable cause to believe a search will yield evidence of a violation. Refusal of consent is not a constitutional requirement for issuing the warrant, although it may be a statutory violation. Suppression only applies to constitutional violations. State v. Jackowski, 2001 WI App 187, 247 Wis. 2d 430, 633 N.W.2d 649, 00-2851.

The absence of an oath or affirmation supporting the issuance of a warrant is not a mere technicality or matter of formality. Absence of an oath subjects evidence seized under the defective warrant to suppression. State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473, 99-3331.

If a telephone warrant application has not been recorded and there is no evidence of intentional or reckless misconduct on the part of law enforcement officers, a reconstructed application may serve as an equivalent of the record of the original application and can protect the defendant's right to a meaningful appeal and ability to challenge the admission of evidence. Courts should consider the time between the application and the reconstruction, the length of the reconstructed segment in relation to the entire warrant request, if there were any contemporaneous written documents used to reconstruct the record, the availability of witnesses used to reconstruct the record, and the complexity of the segment reconstructed. The issuing judge's participation may be appropriate. State v. Raflik, 2001 WI 129, 248 Wis. 2d 593, 636 N.W.2d 690, 00-1086.

Probable cause to arrest may be based on hearsay that is shown to be reliable and emanating from a credible source. Thus information from a confidential informant may supply probable cause if the police know the informant to be reliable. State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 774, 00-2803.

The timeliness of seeking a warrant depends upon the nature of the underlying circumstances and concepts. When the activity is of a protracted and continuous nature, the passage of time diminishes in significance. Factors like the nature of the criminal activity under investigation and the nature of what is being sought have a bearing on where the line between stale and fresh information should be drawn in a particular case. State v. Multaler, 2001 WI App 149, 246 Wis. 2d 752, 632 N.W.2d 89.

Affirmed, 2002 WI 35, 643 NW 2d 437, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 00-1846.

An affidavit in support of a search warrant is not a research paper or legal brief that demands citations for every proposition. An investigator's detailed listing of his sources of information and accompanying credentials, combined with his indication that his opinion was based upon his training and research provided a sufficient foundation for the opinion he gave in support of the warrant. State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437, 00-1846.

The use of an infrared sensing device to detect heat emanating from a residence constitutes a search requiring a warrant. State v. Lorager, 2002 WI App 5, 250 Wis. 2d 198, 640 N.W.2d 555, 00-3364.

See also Kyllo v. U.S. 533 U.S. 27, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001).

Under Ellenbecker, it was reasonable for an officer, who stopped a motorist whose vehicle and general appearance matched that of a criminal suspect, to make a report of the incident, even if the officer had already decided that the driver was not the suspect, and for that purpose it was reasonable to ask for the motorist's name and identification. Once the motorist stated that he had no identification, there was a reasonable ground for further detention. State v. Williams, 2002 WI App 306, 258 Wis. 2d 395, 655 N.W.2d 462, 02-0384.

An officer may perform an investigatory stop of a vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion of a non-criminal traffic violation. State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, 260 Wis. 2d 406, 659 N.W.2d 394, 01-2988.

When the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged, the state must present evidence of the circumstances at the time of warrant execution that would justify a no-knock entry. If the circumstances were described in the warrant application, the evidence might be testimony by an officer that nothing had come to the officer's attention to lead them to believe that circumstances had changed. If the warrant application is silent or lacking in regard to circumstances that might render an announced entry dangerous or futile, the state may still justify a no-knock entry by showing that the officers possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion at the time of entry. State v. Whiting, 2003 WI App 101, 264 Wis. 2d 722, 663 N.W.2d 299, 02-1721.

Otherwise innocent conduct can supply the required link in the chain to establish probable cause that a crime has or is about to be committed. Although an individual fact in a series may be innocent in itself, when considered as a whole, the facts may warrant further investigation. State v. Schaefer, 2003 WI App 164, 266 Wis. 2d 719, 668 N.W.2d 760, 01-2691.

The existence of probable cause in the context of information provided by an anonymous tipster is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. As applied to assessing the reliability of an anonymous tip, a deficiency in one factor may be compensated for by some other indicia of reliability when considered in the context of the totality-of-the-circumstances. A recognized indicia of the reliability of an anonymous tip is police corroboration of details, particularly details involving predicted behavior. Probable cause may exist even if the predicted behavior corroborated by the police is, when viewed in isolation, innocent behavior. Police themselves need not observe suspicious behavior. State v. Sherry, 2004 WI App 207, 277 Wis. 2d 194, 690 N.W.2d 435, 03-1531.

That an officer arrested the defendant for a crime that does not exist, did not make the arrest illegal. The pertinent question is whether the arrest was supported by probable cause to believe the defendant committed a crime that does exist. State v. Repenshek, 2004 WI App 229, 277 Wis. 2d 780, 691 N.W.2d 780, 03-3089

Under Leon, 68 U.S. 897, an officer cannot be expected to question a magistrate's probable-cause determination or judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient except when: 1) the magistrate in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for a reckless disregard of the truth; 2) the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; 3) when an affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or 4) when a warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878, 04-1609.

The inquiry into whether a warrant affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable," under Leon, must be different from the inquiry into whether the facts in the warrant application are “clearly insufficient to support a determination of probable cause." That the warrant application was insufficient to support the warrant-issuing judge's probable cause determination does not mean that the affidavit in support of the warrant was lacking in indicia of probable cause within the meaning of Leon. State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878, 04-1609.

Eason added two requirements that must be met before the Leon good faith exception may apply. Under Eason, a “significant investigation" does not require a showing that the investigation yielded the probable cause that would have been necessary to support the search at issue. At the same time, a significant investigation for purposes of Eason refers to more than the number of officers or hours devoted to an investigation. State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878, 04-1609.

The good faith exception under Leon is a doctrine that applies to police officers who execute a search warrant in the mistaken belief that it is valid. Good faith is not a doctrine that absolves the neutral and detached judge or magistrate from a careful, critical and independent analysis of the facts presented when exercising the responsibility of determining whether probable cause for a search warrant exists. State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, 303 Wis. 2d 438, 736 N.W.2d 189, 06-1271.

Probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime does not automatically give the police probable cause to search the person's house for evidence of that crime. State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, 303 Wis. 2d 438, 736 N.W.2d 189, 06-1271.

The use of a credit card issued to the defendant to purchase a membership to websites containing child pornography, together with customer records confirming the defendant's home address, e-mail address, and credit card information, resulted in the inference that there was a fair probability that the defendant had received or downloaded images. Details provided on the use of computers by individuals involved in child pornography found in the affidavit supporting the search of the defendant's home strengthened this inference. State v. Gralinski, 2007 WI App 233, 306 Wis. 2d 101, 743 N.W.2d 448, 06-0929.

An officer's knowledge that a vehicle's owner's license is revoked will support reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop so long as the officer remains unaware of any facts that would suggest that the owner is not driving. State v. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, 306 Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923, 06-2388.

If a search is conducted in “flagrant disregard" of the limitations in the warrant, all items seized, even items within the scope of the warrant are suppressed. When the search consisted of moving items in plain view in order to document them, the circuit court correctly concluded that the police conduct, while troubling, did not require suppression of all evidence seized during the search. State v. Pender, 2008 WI App 47, 308 Wis. 2d 428, 748 N.W.2d 471, 07-1019.

If the location to be searched is not described with sufficient particularity to inform officers which unit in a multi-unit building they are to search, the particularity required by the 4th amendment has not been satisfied. To justify a search of the whole building, there must be probable cause in the supporting affidavit to search each unit in the building, or there must be probable cause to search the entire building. State v. Jackson, 2008 WI App 109, 313 Wis. 2d 162, 756 N.W.2d 623, 07-1362.

A warrant contingent upon law enforcement officers identifying the precise unit of 3 townhouse units in which the defendant resided lacked the specificity that the 4th amendment was designed to protect against. State v. King, 2008 WI App 129, 313 Wis. 2d 673, 758 N.W.2d 131, 07-1420.

An anticipatory search warrant is not appropriate when its execution is conditioned on verification of his address as opposed to being conditioned on certain evidence of a crime being located at a specified place at some point in the future. State v. King, 2008 WI App 129, 313 Wis. 2d 673, 758 N.W.2d 131, 07-1420.

Mistakes on the face of a warrant were a technical irregularity under s. 968.22 and the warrant met the 4th amendment standard of reasonableness when although the warrant identified the car to be searched incorrectly two times, the executing officer attached and incorporated a correct affidavit that correctly identified the car 3 times, describing the correct color, make, model, and style of the car along with the correct license plate, and the information was based on the executing officer's personal knowledge from prior encounters. State v. Rogers, 2008 WI App 176, 315 Wis. 2d 60, 762 N.W.2d 795, 07-1850.

A reviewing court must conclude that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the warrant-issuing commissioner had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability that a search of the specified premises would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. When a confidential informant told a law enforcement officer what someone else had told him, the veracity of each person in the chain was relevant. State v. Romero, 2009 WI 32, 317 Wis. 2d 12, 765 N.W.2d 756, 07-1139.

The Eason good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when a police officer relies in good faith upon a search warrant's validity was applicable when an officer's good faith belief that an open felony warrant existed was based on a computer search that revealed a commitment order the officer believed to be an arrest warrant. State v. Robinson, 2009 WI App 97, 320 Wis. 2d 689, 770 N.W.2d 721, 08-0266.

When an application for a warrant contains both tainted and untainted evidence, the warrant is valid if the untainted evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to issue the warrant. There is a two-pronged approach to determine if untainted evidence provides an independent source: 1) the court determines whether, absent the illegal entry, the officer would have sought the search warrant; and 2) it asks if information illegally acquired influenced the magistrate's decision to authorize the warrant. Absent an explicit finding by the trial court, a clear inference from the facts can compel the conclusion that law enforcement agents would have sought a warrant had they not obtained tainted evidence. State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1, 07-1378.

The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to a situation in which: 1) no facts existed that would justify an arrest without a warrant; 2) the civil arrest warrant issued by a circuit judge was void ab initio because it did not comply with any statute authorizing the court to issue a warrant and it was not supported by an oath or affirmation; and 3) the court issued the warrant without the benefit of verification of the facts or scrutiny of the procedure to ensure that the judge acted as a detached and neutral magistrate. Suppressing evidence obtained as a result of the unauthorized, defective warrant is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568, 08-2231. But see State v. Kerr, 2018 WI 87, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913 N.W.2d 787, 16-2455.

An order authorizing law enforcement to install and monitor a GPS tracking device on defendant's vehicle constituted a valid warrant and the officers' execution of the warrant was reasonable when the GPS tracking device was attached to the vehicle while the car was parked in the defendant's driveway and the car was subsequently electronically monitored for a period of 35 days without the defendant's knowledge. State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, 328 Wis. 2d 369; 787 N.W.2d 317, 08-0658. See also State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 N.W.2d 568, 17-0208.

Generally, searches are subject to the “one warrant, one search" rule. However, a search conducted pursuant to a lawful warrant may last as long, and be as thorough, as reasonably necessary to fully execute the warrant. Courts have recognized an exception to the one warrant, one search rule when a subsequent entry and search are a reasonable continuation of the earlier one. The reasonable continuation rule has two requirements: 1) the subsequent entry must be a continuation of the earlier search; and 2) the decision to conduct a second entry to continue the search must be reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 124, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216, 10-0411.

The technology used in conducting a GPS search did not exceed the scope of the warrant allowing GPS tracking of the defendant's vehicle. The affidavit and warrant's language contemplated installation of a GPS device that would track the vehicle's movements. That the device provided officers with real-time updates of those movements did not alter the kind of information to be obtained under the warrant or the nature of the intrusion allowed. Police efficiency does not equate with unconstitutionality. State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369, 10-1366.

The particularity requirement under the 4th amendment provides that a warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized. While a description of the object into which a tracking device was to be placed was a factor in satisfying the particularity requirement in Sveum, there is no reason why another way of identifying a cell phone, such as by its electronic serial number, cannot serve the same function as physically placing a tracking device on the defendant's property. State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 357 Wis. 2d 172, 849 N.W.2d 798, 12-0336.

The 4th amendment parameters of search and seizure law are not necessarily inapplicable to all searches for and seizures of electronic information. Law enforcement officers have long had to separate the documents as to which seizure was authorized from other documents. That necessity has not turned an otherwise valid warrant into a “general" warrant. The court saw no constitutional imperative that would change the result simply because the object of the search is electronic data from a specific electronic file, for a reasonably specific period of time, in the custody of a specific internet service provider. State v. Rindfleisch, 2014 WI App 121, 359 Wis. 2d 147, 857 N.W.2d 456, 13-0362.

Police may properly consider prior convictions in a probable cause determination. State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26, 13-2107.

Whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant is an objective, not a subjective, test. Thus, a police officer's failure to tell the warrant-issuing court the officer's subjective viewpoint was irrelevant and was not a “critical omission" from the affidavit supporting the search warrant so as to constitute a Franks violation. State v. Kilgore, 2016 WI App 47, 370 Wis. 2d 198, 882 N.W.2d 493, 15-0997.

A tip from an electronic service provider (ESP) is properly viewed as one from an identified citizen informant, not an anonymous informant, which therefore establishes the personal reliability requirement in case law. Additionally, the affidavit in this case showed sufficient indicia of observational reliability of the ESP. State v. Silverstein, 2017 WI App 64, 378 Wis. 2d 42, 902 N.W.2d 550, 16-1464.

Suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule is not appropriate when there is no police misconduct because the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Neither judicial integrity nor judicial error is a standalone basis for suppression under the exclusionary rule. State v. Kerr, 2018 WI 87, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913 N.W.2d 787, 16-2455.

A warrant for global positioning system (GPS) tracking is not issued pursuant to a statute, but instead is issued pursuant to the court's inherent authority, and thus must comply only with the 4th amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 11, of the Wisconsin Constitution. State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 N.W.2d 568, 17-0208.

Pretrial detention can violate the 4th Amendment not only when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal case. The 4th Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause. That can happen when the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it also can occur when legal process itself goes wrong — when, for example, a judge's probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer's false statements. Legal process does not expunge a 4th Amendment claim when the process received by the defendant failed to establish what that amendment makes essential for pretrial detention — probable cause to believe the defendant committed a crime. Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 911, 197 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2017).

An anonymous telephone tip that specified a vehicle was driven by an unlicensed person did not create articulable and reasonable suspicion of illegality justifying an investigatory stop of the auto and driver. 68 Atty. Gen. 347.

When a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that an affiant's false statement, knowingly or recklessly made, was the basis of the probable cause finding, a hearing must be held. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

An “open-ended" search warrant was unconstitutional. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).

The “two-pronged" test of Aguilar and Spinelli is abandoned and replaced with a “totality of the circumstances" approach in finding probable cause based on informer's tips. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

Under the “totality of circumstances" test, an informant's tip met probable cause standards. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984).

The “good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule allowed the admission of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, later found to be unsupported by probable cause. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

Probable cause is required to invoke the plain view doctrine. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).

Evidence seized in reliance on a police record incorrectly indicating an outstanding arrest warrant was not subject to suppression when the error was made by court clerk personnel. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1994).

There is no blanket exception to the knock and announce requirement for executing warrants. To justify a no-knock entry, a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing will be dangerous or futile or will inhibit the effective investigation of a crime must exist. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997).

When the 3 occupants of a vehicle in which drugs and cash were found in a legal search all failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of the drugs or money, it was a reasonable inference that any or all 3 of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the drugs. A reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe one or more of the men possessed the drugs, either solely or jointly. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed 2d 769 (2003).

A search warrant that did not describe the items to be seized at all was so obviously deficient that the search conducted pursuant to it was considered to be warrantless. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed 2d 1068 (2004).

Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. An arresting officer's state of mind, except for the facts that he knows, is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. A rule that the offense establishing probable cause must be closely related to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest is inconsistent with these principals. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537, 125 S. Ct. 588 (2004).

For a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the 4th amendment's requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, but also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur. The triggering condition for an anticipatory search warrant need not be be set forth in the warrant itself. U.S. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 164 L. Ed. 2d 195, 126 S. Ct. 1494 (2006).

Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people unfortunately bear the cost. Officers executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are engaged in private activity; and the resulting frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation may be real, as was true here. When officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm, however, the 4th amendment is not violated. Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 167 L. Ed. 2d 974, 127 S. Ct. 1989 (2007).

To determine if the “alert" of a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle, the state need not present an exhaustive set of records. A probable-cause hearing focusing on a drug-sniffing dog's alert should proceed much like any other probable-cause hearing. The question — similar to every inquiry into probable cause — is whether all the facts surrounding a dog's alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that test. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013).

911 calls are not per se reliable. However, given the technological and regulatory developments in the 911 system, a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system. A caller's use of the 911 system in this case was one of the relevant circumstances that justified the officer's reliance on the information reported in the 911 call. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 188 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2014).

A mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a seizure under the 4th amendment. In this case, an officer stopped a vehicle because one of its two brake lights was out, but a court later determined that a single working brake light was all the law required. Because the officer's mistake about the brake-light law was reasonable, the stop in this case was lawful. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014).

The totality of the circumstances test requires courts to consider the whole picture and to determine whether a reasonable officer could conclude—considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the plausibility of the explanation itself—that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 577, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018).

WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE

An officer making an arrest at a suspect's home pursuant to a warrant, after the suspect opens the door, can arrest for a narcotics violation based on narcotics in plain sight in the room. Schill v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 473, 184 N.W.2d 858.

Police officers properly in an apartment where drugs were discovered may pat down the pockets of a stranger who walks in and may seize a large, hard object felt, in order to protect themselves. State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 198 N.W.2d 377.

After stopping and frisking the defendant properly, discovering several cartridges, the police were justified in looking under the car seat and in the glove compartment for a gun. State v. Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d 514, 206 N.W.2d 613.

When a valid arrest is made without a warrant, the officer may conduct a limited search of the premises. Leroux v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 207 N.W.2d 589.

When an officer, mistakenly believing in good faith that the occupants of a car had committed a crime, stopped the car and arrested the occupants, the arrest was illegal, but a shotgun in plain sight on the back seat could be seized and used in evidence. State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873.

When officers stopped a car containing 3 men meeting the description of robbery suspects within 7 minutes after the robbery and found a gun on one, they could properly search the car for other guns and money. State v. Russell, 60 Wis. 2d 712, 211 N.W.2d 637.

Given a valid arrest, a search is not limited to weapons or evidence of a crime, nor need it be directed to or related to the purpose of the arrest, because one who has contraband or evidence of a crime on his or her person travels at his or her own risk when he or she is validly arrested for any reason, hence the reasonableness of a search incident to the arrest no longer depends on the purpose of the search in relation to the object of the arrest. State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 213 N.W.2d 545.

Under the “open fields" doctrine, evidence that a body was found 450 feet from the defendant's house during random digging done at the direction of the sheriff acting without a warrant was properly admitted into evidence. Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d 252.

Seizure by police of a large quantity of marijuana from the defendant's 155-acre farm did not contravene their 4th-amendment rights. State v. Gedko, 63 Wis. 2d 644, 218 N.W.2d 249.

The search of the defendant's wallet after his arrest on unrelated charges that led to the discovery of a newspaper article about a crime that, after questioning, the defendant admitted to committing was proper in order to find weapons or contraband that might have been hidden there. State v. Mordeszewski, 68 Wis. 2d 649, 229 N.W.2d 642.

The seizure by police officers of a box of cartridges from under the edge of a couch on which the defendant was resting at the time of his arrest was proper under the plain-view doctrine, since if police have a prior justification to be present in a position to see an object in plain view and its discovery is inadvertent, the object may be seized, and the use of a flashlight by one of the officers did not defeat the inadvertence requirement. Sanders v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 242, 230 N.W.2d 845.

A warrantless search of 2 persons for concealed weapons was reasonable when an armed robbery with a sawed-off shotgun had been committed a short time before by two men, one of whom matched the description given for one of the robbers. Penister v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 94, 246 N.W.2d 115.

The doctrine of exigency is founded upon actions of the police that are considered reasonable. The element of reasonableness is supplied by a compelling need to assist the victim or apprehend those responsible, not the need to secure evidence. West v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 390, 246 N.W.2d 675.

A warrantless search by a probation officer was constitutionally permissible when probable cause existed for the officer to attempt to determine whether the probationer had violated the terms of probation. State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 247 N.W.2d 696.

The plain view doctrine does not apply if the observation is not made inadvertently or if the officer does not have the right to be in the place from which the observation is made. State v. Monahan, 76 Wis. 2d 387, 251 N.W.2d 421.

Warrantless searches of automobiles are discussed. Thompson v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 134, 265 N.W.2d 467 (1978).

The criteria used as justification for warrantless searches of students by teachers are discussed. Interest of L.L. v. Washington County Cir. Ct. 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1979).

A warrantless entry under the emergency rule justified a subsequent entry that did not expand the scope or nature of the original entry. La Fournier v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 61, 280 N.W.2d 746 (1979).

An investigatory stop-and-frisk for the sole purpose of discovering a suspect's identity was lawful under the facts of the case. State v. Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d 427, 285 N.W.2d 710 (1979).

Furnishing police with the bank records of a depositor who had victimized the bank was not an unlawful search and seizure. State v. Gilbertson, 95 Wis. 2d 102, 288 N.W.2d 877 (Ct. App. 1980).

Evidence obtained during a mistaken arrest is admissible as long as the arresting officer acted in good faith and had reasonable articulable grounds to believe that the suspect was the intended arrestee. State v. Lee, 97 Wis. 2d 679, 294 N.W.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1980).

A warrantless entry into the defendant's home was validated by the emergency doctrine when the officer reasonably believed lives were threatened. State v. Kraimer, 99 Wis. 2d 306, 298 N.W.2d 568 (1980).

The warrantless search of a fisherman's truck by state conservation wardens under statutory inspection authority was presumptively reasonable. State v. Erickson, 101 Wis. 2d 224, 303 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1981).

A detained suspect's inadvertent exposure of contraband was not an unreasonable search. State v. Goebel, 103 Wis. 2d 203, 307 N.W.2d 915 (1981).

Under Michigan v. Tyler, the warrantless search of an entire building on the morning after a localized fire was reasonable as it was the continuation of the prior night's investigation that had been interrupted by heat and nighttime circumstances. State v. Monosso, 103 Wis. 2d 368, 308 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1981).

A warrantless entry into a home was validated by the emergency doctrine when an official's reasonable actions were motivated solely by the perceived need to render immediate aid or assistance, not by the need or desire to obtain evidence. State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983).

Police having probable cause to believe a vehicle contains criminal evidence may search the vehicle without a warrant or exigent circumstances. State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988).

Fire fighting presents exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry. A fire fighter may contact police to inform them of the presence of illegal possessions in plain view. A subsequent warrantless search and seizure is proper. State v. Gonzalez, 147 Wis. 2d 165, 432 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1988).

A reasonable police inventory search is an exception to the warrant requirement. At issue is whether an inventory was a pretext for an investigative search. State v. Axelson, 149 Wis. 2d 339, 441 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1989).

When effecting a lawful custodial arrest of an individual in his home, a law enforcement officer may conduct a search of closed areas within the immediate area of the arrestee even though the search imposes an infringement on the arrestee's privacy interests. State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990).

Under the circumstances presented, an officer properly conducted an inventory search resulting in the discovery of contraband in a purse left in a police car because the search was conducted pursuant to proper department policy. State v. Weide, 155 Wis. 2d 537, 455 N.W.2d 899 (1990).

Police corroboration of innocent details of an anonymous tip may give rise to reasonable suspicion to make a stop under the totality of circumstances. A suspect's actions need not be inherently suspicious in and of themselves. State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).

The validity of a “Good Samaritan" stop or entry requires that the officer had the motive only to assist and not to search for evidence, had a reasonable belief that the defendant needed help, and once the entry was made absent probable cause, that objective evidence existed giving rise to the investigation of criminal behavior. State v. Dunn, 158 Wis. 2d 138, 462 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1990).

The reasonableness of a search does not come into question unless a person had a reasonable privacy expectation. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in TDD communications made from the dispatch area of a sheriff's department. State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990).

A parolee's liberty is conditional. A judicially issued warrant is not required for the seizure of an alleged parole violator in his home. State v. Pittman, 159 Wis. 2d 764, 465 N.W.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1990).

The evidentiary search of a person not named in a search warrant, but present during the search of a residence reasonably suspected of being a drug house, was reasonable. State v. Jeter, 160 Wis. 2d 333, 466 N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1991).

A warrantless search of an apartment for evidence of occupancy when the police reasonably believed the tenant had vacated and the occupants were not legitimately on the premises was not unreasonable. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment or in property kept there. State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991).

Blood may be drawn in a search incident to an arrest if police have reasonable suspicion that blood contains evidence of a crime. State v. Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d 164, 471 N.W.2d 226 (1991). But see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed 2d 560 (2016).

When a convicted defendant is awaiting sentencing for a drug related offense and probation is a sentencing option, the judge may order, without a warrant, probable cause, or individualized suspicion, that the defendant submit to urinalysis to determine if drugs are present. State v. Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992).

A blood test not taken in compliance with the implied consent law is admissible if the taking of the sample meets 4th amendment reasonableness standards. Under Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, the drawing of a blood sample against a person's will is reasonable when: 1) drawn incident to an arrest; 2) there is a clear indication that the desired evidence will be found in the blood sample; and 3) exigent circumstances exist. State v. Krause, 168 Wis. 2d 578, 484 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1992). But see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed 2d 560 (2016).

The question of whether the forcible extraction of a blood sample is a reasonable search by 4th amendment standards is not limited to whether the force is necessary to accomplish a legitimate police objective. Instead, whether the force used is excessive is determined by an evaluation of whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officers. The court judges the reasonableness of a questioned action by balancing its intrusion on the individual's 4th amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests and from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. State v. Krause, 168 Wis. 2d 578, 484 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1992).

The exception allowing the warrantless search of automobiles is not extended to a camper trailer unhitched from a towing vehicle. State v. Durbin, 170 Wis. 2d 475, 489 N.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1992).

A warrantless search of a commercial premises without the owner's consent when a licensing ordinance provided that the licensed premises “shall be open to inspection at any time" was illegal. State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992).

The frisk of a person not named in a search warrant during the execution of the warrant was reasonable when the occupants of the residence were very likely to be involved in drug trafficking. Drugs felt in a pocket during the frisk were lawfully seized when the officer had probable cause to believe there was a connection between what was felt and criminal activity. State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 492 N.W.2d 311 (1992).

A warrantless protective sweep of a residence incident to an arrest requires the police to have a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the residence harbors an individual posing a danger to the officers. State v. Kruse, 175 Wis. 2d 89, 499 N.W.2d 185 (Ct. App. 1993).

The 6-factor analysis for use in determining the reasonableness of an investigatory stop is discussed. State v. King, 175 Wis. 2d 146, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993).

The rule that a judicial determination of probable cause to support a warrantless arrest must be made within 48 hours applies to Wisconsin. The failure to comply did not require suppression of evidence not obtained because of the delay where probable cause to arrest was present. State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 499 N.W.2d 153 (1993).

Students have no reasonable privacy expectation in lockers when a school adopts a written policy retaining ownership and possessory control of the lockers. Interest of Isiah B. 176 Wis. 2d 639, 500 N.W.2d 637 (1993).

An officer's step onto the threshold of the defendant's home constituted an entry subject to constitutional protection. State v. Johnson, 177 Wis. 2d 224, 501 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1993).

A defendant under lawful arrest has a diminished privacy interest in personal property inventoried by jail authorities and a warrantless search of the property when there is probable cause to believe it contains evidence is valid. State v. Jones, 181 Wis. 2d 194, 510 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1993).

See also State v. Betterly, 183 Wis. 2d 165, 515 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1994).

A warrantless entry by uniformed officers to make arrests after undercover agents gained permissive entrance to the premises was justified under the consent exception and no exigent circumstances were required. State v. Johnston, 184 Wis. 2d 794, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994).

A non-parolee living with a parolee has a legitimate expectation of privacy in shared living quarters, but a warrantless search authorized as a condition of parole can reasonably extend to all areas in which the parolee and non-parolee enjoy common authority. Evidence found in such a search may be used against the non-parolee. State v. West, 185 Wis. 2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482 (1994).

The failure to conduct a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and not grounds for dismissal with prejudice or voiding of a subsequent conviction unless the delay prejudiced the defendant;'s right to present a defense. State v. Golden, 185 Wis. 2d 763, 519 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1994).

A determination that an area was within a defendant's immediate control at the time of arrest does not give police authority to generally search the premises. Only a limited search is justified. State v. Angiolo, 186 Wis. 2d 488, N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1994).

The plain view exception applies if the following criteria are met: 1) the officer has prior justification for being present; 2) the evidence is in plain view and its discovery inadvertent; and 3) the seized item and facts known by the officer at the time of seizure provide probable cause to believe there is a connection between a crime and the evidence. State v. Angiolo, 186 Wis. 2d 488, N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1994).

Unlike private homes, warrantless inspections of commercial premises are not necessarily unreasonable. A warrantless inspection of a dairy farm under authority of ss. 93.08, 93.15 (2), 97.12 (1) and related administrative rules made without prior notice and without the owner being present was not unconstitutional. Because the administrative rules govern operations, equipment, and processes not typically conducted in residential areas, the rules and statutes sufficiently preclude making warrantless searches of residences. Lundeen v. Dept. of Agriculture, 189 Wis. 2d 255, 525 N.W.2d 758 (1994).

An arrest warrant was not legal authority to enter and search the home of a third party based on an officer's simple belief that the subject of the warrant might be there. The mere fact that the subject could leave was not an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless search when the warrant was a pick-up warrant for failure to pay a traffic fine. State v. Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995).

Suppression of evidence is not required when a law enforcement officer obtains evidence outside his or her jurisdiction. Any jurisdictional transgression violates the appropriate jurisdiction's authority, not the defendant's rights. State v. Mieritz, 193 Wis. 2d 571, 534 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1995).

A warrantless search of a vehicle was constitutional when the defendant fled the vehicle to avoid arrest. The defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. State v. Roberts, 196 Wis. 2d 445, 538 N.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-2583.

To find a pat-down search to be reasonable requires the officer to have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed, looking at the totality of the circumstances. The officer's perception of the area as a high-crime area, the time of day, and the suspect's nervousness are all factors that may be considered. State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995), 93-2089.

A probation officer may conduct a warrantless search. That the underlying conviction is subsequently overturned does not retroactively invalidate the search. State v. Angiolo, 207 Wis. 2d 561, 558 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0099.

An initial traffic stop is not unlawfully extended by asking the defendant if he has drugs or weapons and requesting permission to search. When there is justification for the initial stop, it is the extension of the stop beyond the point reasonably justified by the stop and not the type of questions asked that render a stop unconstitutional. State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-1094.

An officer has the right to remain at an arrested person's elbow at all times. When an officer accompanied a juvenile in his custody into the juvenile's house, leaving the juvenile's “elbow" to enter a bedroom where incriminating evidence was found, monitoring of the juvenile stopped and an unconstitutional search occurred. State v. Dull, 211 Wis. 2d 652, 565 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1744.

A threat to the safety of the suspect or others is an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless entry of a residence. The mere presence of firearms does not create exigent circumstances. When conducting the unannounced warrantless entry creates the potential danger, that conduct cannot justify the warrantless entry. State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2052.

The likelihood that evidence will be destroyed is an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless entry of a residence. The mere presence of contraband does not create exigent circumstances. State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2052.

Detaining a person at his home and transporting him about one mile to the scene of an accident in which he was involved was an investigative stop and not an arrest, moved the person within the vicinity of the stop within the meaning of s. 968.24, and was a reasonable part of an ongoing accident investigation. State v. Quartana, 213 Wis. 2d 440, 570 N.W.2d 618 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0695.

The warrantless search of the defendant's purse when it was being returned to her while still in custody was authorized when the search would have been authorized at the time of the arrest and when the return of the purse could have given the defendant access to a weapon or evidence. State v. Wade, 215 Wis. 2d 684, 573 N.W.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-0193.

When a third party lacks actual common authority to consent to a search of a defendant's residence, the police may rely on the third party's apparent authority, if that reliance is reasonable. There is no presumption of common authority to consent to a search and the police must make sufficient inquiry to establish apparent authority. State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998), 96-0008.

A warrantless entry may be justified when police engage in a bona fide community caretaker activity, although the ultimate test is reasonableness, considering the degree of public interest and exigency of the situation, the circumstances surrounding the search, whether an automobile is involved, and whether there are alternatives to entry. State v. Paterson, 220 Wis. 2d 526, 583 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2066. See also State v. Ferguson, 2001 WI App 102, 244 Wis. 2d 17, 629 N.W.2d 788, 00-0038; State v. Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565, 04-2888.

Reasonable suspicion required in a Terry investigative search is a common sense test of what under the circumstances a reasonable police officer would reasonably suspect in light of his or her experience. Police in an area known for drug dealing were justified to stop a driver when at nearly the same time they observed a woman approach then turn from the driver's parked car when she seemed to notice the police and the driver immediately exited the parking lot he was in. State v. Amos, 220 Wis. 2d 793, 584 N.W.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3044.

There is an expectation of privacy in commercial property that is applicable to administrative inspections. Because administrative inspections are not supported by probable cause, they will not be reasonable if, instead of being conducted to enforce a regulatory scheme, they are conducted as a pretext to obtain evidence of criminal activity. State v. Mendoza, 220 Wis. 2d 803, 584 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-0952. Reversed on other grounds. 227 Wis. 2d 838, 596 N.W.2d 736 (1999), 97-0952.

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital emergency or operating room. An officer who was present, with the consent of hospital staff, in an operating room during an operation and collected, as evidence, cocaine removed from an unconscious defendant's intestine did not conduct a search and did not make an unreasonable search. State v. Thompson, 222 Wis. 2d 179, 585 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2744.

A warrant authorizing the search of a particularly described premises may permit the search of vehicles owned or controlled by the owner of, and found on, the premises. State v. O'Brien, 223 Wis. 2d 303, 588 N.W.2d 8 (1999), 96-3028.

The “emergency doctrine" justifies a warrantless search when an officer is actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid and a reasonable person under the circumstances would have thought an emergency existed. State v. Richter, 224 Wis. 2d 814, 592 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1332.

Reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop may be based on an anonymous tip that does not predict future behavior. The key concern is the tipster's veracity. Officers' corroboration of readily observable information supports a finding that because the tipster was correct about innocent activities, he or she is probably correct about the ultimate fact of criminal activity. State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 N.W.2d 823 (1999), 96-1821.

A traffic stop must be based on probable cause, not reasonable suspicion. If the facts support a violation only under a legal misinterpretation, no violation has occurred, and by definition there can be no probable cause that a violation has occurred. State v. Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d 1, 594 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2792.

Being in a high crime area, making brief contact with a car, and hanging around a neighborhood, each standing alone would not create reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. When these events occurred in sequence and were considered with the officers training and experience, the reputation of the neighborhood, and the time of day, there was enough to create reasonable suspicion. State v. Allen, 226 Wis. 2d 66, 593 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1690.

A picture of a mushroom on the defendant's wallet, his appearance of nervousness, and the lateness of the hour were insufficient factors to extend a stop. State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2525.

See also State v. Gammons, 2001 WI App 36, 241 Wis. 2d 296, 625 N.W.2d 623, 00-0377.

See also State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748, 06-0974.

The owner of a commercial property has a reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas immediately surrounding the property only if affirmative steps have been taken to exclude the public. State v. Yakes, 226 Wis. 2d 425, 595 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-0470.

A home's backyard and back door threshold were within the home's curtilage; an officer's warrantless entry was unlawful and evidence seized as a result of the entry was subject to suppression. State v. Wilson, 229 Wis. 2d 256, 600 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3131.

When the 2 other occupants of a vehicle had already been searched without any drugs being found, a search of the 3rd occupant based solely on the odor of marijuana was made with probable cause and was reasonable. State v. Mata, 230 Wis. 2d 567, 602 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2895.

A probation officer may search a probationer's residence without a warrant if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the terms of probation are being violated, but the officer may not conduct a warrantless search as a subterfuge to further a criminal investigation to help the police evade the usual warrant and probable cause requirements. State v. Hajicek, 230 Wis. 2d 697, 602 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3485.

The risk that evidence will be destroyed is an exigent circumstance that may justify a warrantless search. When suspects are aware of the presence of the police, that risk increases. The seriousness of the offense as determined by the overall penalty structure for all potentially chargeable offenses also affects whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search. State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621, 97-1121.

Police officers do not need to choose between completing a protective frisk and handcuffing a suspect in a field investigation. They may do both. State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795, 98-1409.

A frisk of a motor vehicle passenger that occurred 25 minutes after the initial stop that was a precautionary measure, not based on the conduct or attributes of the person frisked, was unreasonable. State v. Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, 235 Wis. 2d 220, 613 N.W.2d 186, 99-2226.

There are 4 well-recognized categories of exigent circumstances that have been held to authorize a law enforcement officer's warrantless entry into a home: 1) hot pursuit of a suspect, 2) a threat to the safety of a suspect or others, 3) a risk that evidence will be destroyed, and 4) a likelihood that the suspect will flee. The state bears the burden of proving the existence of exigent circumstances. State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29, 98-1332.

“Hot pursuit," defined as immediate or continuous pursuit of a suspect from a crime scene is an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search. An officer is not required to personally observe the crime or fleeing suspect. State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29, 98-1332.

When a vehicle passenger has been seized pursuant to a lawful traffic stop, the seizure does not become unreasonable because an officer asks the passenger for identification. The passenger is free to refuse to answer, and refusal will not justify prosecution nor give rise to reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. However, if the passenger chooses to answer falsely, the passenger can be charged with obstruction. State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72, 98-0931.

The property of a passenger in a motor vehicle may be searched when the police have validly arrested the driver but do not have a reasonable basis to detain or probable cause to arrest the passenger. State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568, 98-0896.

The search of a crawl space in a ceiling, which was located in an area where police had heard much activity, was large enough to hide a person, and was secured by screws that had to be removed with a screwdriver, was a reasonable “protective sweep" to search for persons who would pose a threat to the police as they executed an arrest warrant for a murder suspect. State v. Blanco, 2000 WI App 119, 237 Wis. 2d 395, 614 N.W.2d 512, 98-3153.

A police officer performing a Terry stop and requesting identification could perform a limited search for identifying papers when the information received by the officer was not confirmed by police records, the intrusion on the suspect was minimal, the officer observed that the suspect's pockets were bulging, and the officer had experience with persons who claimed to have no identification when in fact they did. State v. Black, 2000 WI App 175, 238 Wis. 2d 203, 617 N.W.2d 210, 99-1686.

The Paterson community caretaker exception justified a warrantless entry during an emergency detention of a mentally ill person who was threatening suicide. A protective sweep of the premises while acting as a community caretaker was reasonable. State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177, 238 Wis. 2d 347, 617 N.W.2d 508, 99-2065.

A warrantless blood draw is permissible when: 1) the blood is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested; 2) there is a clear indication evidence of intoxication will be produced; 3) the method used is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection. State v. Thorstad, 2000 WI App 199, 238 Wis. 2d 666, 618 N.W.2d 240, 99-1765. But see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed 2d 560 (2016).

That a driver stopped at a stop sign for a few seconds longer than normal, that it was late in the evening, and that there was little traffic did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was committing an unlawful act. State v. Fields, 2000 WI App 218, 239 Wis. 2d 38, 619 N.W.2d 279, 00-0694.

A warrantless entry need not be subjectively motivated solely by a perceived need to render aid and assistance in order for the “emergency doctrine" to apply. A dual motivation of investigating a potential crime and rendering aid and assistance may be present. State v. Rome, 2000 WI App 243, 239 Wis. 2d 491, 620 N.W.2d 225, 00-0796.

Whether a search is a probation search, which may be conducted without a warrant, or a police search, which may not, is a question of constitutional fact to be reviewed in a 2-step review of historical and constitutional fact. A determination of reasonableness of the search must also be made. A search is reasonable if the probation officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the probationer has contraband. Cooperation with police officers does not change a probation search into a police search. State v. Hajicek, 2001 WI 3, 240 Wis. 2d 349, 620 N.W.2d 781, 98-3485.

In light of the reduced expectation of privacy that applies to property in an automobile, the search of a vehicle passenger's jacket based upon the driver's consent to the search of the vehicle was reasonable. State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891, 99-0070.

Before the government may invade the sanctity of the home, it must demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. Reluctance to find an exigency is especially appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. State v. Kryzaniak, 2001 WI App 44, 241 Wis. 2d 358, 624 N.W.2d 389, 00-1149.

Under Florida v. J.L, an anonymous tip giving rise to reasonable suspicion must bear indicia of reliability. That the tipster's anonymity is placed at risk indicates that the informant is genuinely concerned and not a fallacious prankster. Corroborated aspects of the tip also lend credibility. The corroborated actions of the suspect must be inherently criminal in and of themselves. State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106, 96-1821.

An anonymous tip regarding erratic driving from another driver calling from a cell phone contained sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigative stop when the informant was exposed to possible identification, and therefore possible arrest if the tip proved false; the tip reported contemporaneous and verifiable observations regarding the driving, location, and vehicle; and the officer verified many of the details in the tip. That the tip reasonably suggested intoxicated driving created an exigency strongly in favor of immediate police investigation without the necessity that the officer personally observe erratic driving. State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516, 98-3541.

The state constitution does not provide greater protection under the automobile exception for warrantless searches than the 4th amendment. The warrantless search of a vehicle is allowed when there is probable cause to search the vehicle and the vehicle is mobile. The exception apples to vehicles that are not in public places. There is no requirement that obtaining a warrant be impracticable. State v. Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, 247 Wis. 2d 765, 635 N.W.2d 188, 01-0065.

Whether exigent circumstances existed justifying a warrantless entry to prevent destruction of evidence after the defendant saw, and retreated from, a plain-clothes officer was not a question of whether the defendant knew that the detective was a police officer, but whether it was reasonable for the officer to believe that he had been identified and that the suspect would destroy evidence as a consequence. State v. Garrett, 2001 WI App 240, 248 Wis. 2d 61, 635 N.W.2d 615, 00-3183.

For the warrantless search of an area made incident to the making of an arrest to be justified as a protective sweep to protect the safety of police officers where the area searched was not in the immediate vicinity of where the arrest was made, there must be articulable facts that would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to believe that the area harbored an individual posing a danger to the officers. State v. Garrett, 2001 WI App 240, 248 Wis. 2d 61, 635 N.W.2d 615, 00-3183.

When a caller identifies himself or herself by name, placing his or her anonymity at risk, and the totality of the circumstances establishes a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, the police may execute a lawful investigative stop. Whether the caller gave correct identifying information or the police ultimately could have verified the information, the caller, by providing the information, risked that his or her identity would be discovered and cannot be considered anonymous. State v. Sisk, 2001 WI App 182, 247 Wis. 2d 443, 634 N.W.2d 877, 00-2614.

The need to transport a person in a police vehicle is not an exigency that justifies a search for weapons. More specific and articulable facts must be shown to support a Terry frisk. While a routine pat-down of a person before a police officer places the person in a squad car is wholly reasonable, evidence gleaned from the search will only be admissible if there are particularized issues of safety concerns about the defendant. State v. Hart, 2001 WI App 283, 249 Wis. 2d 329, 639 N.W.2d 213, 00-1444.

Although no traffic violation occurred, a traffic stop to make contact with the defendant was reasonable when police had reasonable suspicion that the defendant had previously been involved in a crime and the defendant had intentionally avoided police attempts to engage her in voluntary conversation. State v. Olson, 2001 WI App 284, 249 N.W.2d 391, 639 N.W.21d 207, 01-0433.

It was reasonable to conduct a Terry search of a person who knocked on the door of a house while it was being searched for drugs pursuant to a warrant. State v. Kolp, 2002 WI App 17, 250 Wis. 2d 296, 640 N.W.2d 551, 01-0549.

A warrantless blood draw by a physician in a jail setting may be unreasonable if it invites an unjustified element of personal risk of pain and infection. Absent evidence of those risks, a blood draw under those circumstances was reasonable. State v. Daggett, 2002 WI App 32, 250 Wis. 2d 112, 640 N.W.2d 546, 01-1417.

Terry applies to confrontations between the police and citizens in public places only. For private residences and hotels, in the absence of a warrant, the police must have probable cause and exigent circumstances or consent to justify an entry. Reasonable suspicion is not a prerequisite to an officer's seeking consent to enter a private dwelling. If the police have lawfully entered a dwelling with valid consent and have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed, a Terry pat down for weapons is permissible. State v. Stout, 2002 WI App 41, 250 Wis. 2d 768, 641 N.W.2d 474, 01-0904.

A warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable, but exigent circumstances that militate against delay in getting a warrant can justify immediate entry and search. Whether the officers acted reasonably in entering the house without a warrant is measured against what a reasonable police officer would reasonably believe under the circumstances. State v. Londo, 2002 WI App 90, 252 Wis. 2d 731, 643 N.W.2d 869, 01-1015.

Canine sniffs are not searches within the meaning of the 4th amendment, and police are not required to have probable cause or reasonable suspicion before walking a dog around a vehicle for the purpose of detecting drugs in the vehicle's interior. A dog's alert on an object provides probable cause to search that object, provided that the dog is trained in narcotics detection and has demonstrated a sufficient level of reliability in detecting drugs in the past and the officer with the dog is familiar with how it reacted when it smelled contraband. State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 150, 256 Wis. 2d 80, 647 N.W.2d 348, 01-1993.

Evidence from a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw is admissible when: 1) the blood is drawn to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for drunk-driving; 2) there is a clear indication that the blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication; 3) the method used to take the blood sample is reasonable and is performed reasonably; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection to the blood draw. In the absence of an arrest, probable cause to believe blood currently contains evidence of a drunk-driving-related violation satisfies the first and 2nd prongs. State v. Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, 260 Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407, 01-3367. But see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed 2d 560 (2016).

A reasonable probation search is lawful even if premised, in part, on information obtained in violation of the 4th amendment by law enforcement. State v. Wheat, 2002 WI App 153, 256 Wis. 2d 270, 647 N.W.2d 441, 01-2224.

When an unlocked vehicle was not 1) involved in an accident; 2) interrupting the flow of traffic; 3) disabled or damaged; 4) violating parking ordinances; or 5) in any way jeopardizing the public safety or the efficient movement of vehicular traffic, it was unreasonable to impound and tow the vehicle to ensure that the vehicle and any property inside it would not be stolen when there were reasonable alternatives to protect the vehicle. Evidence seized in an “inventory search" of the vehicle was inadmissible. State v. Clark, 2003 WI App 121, 265 Wis. 2d 557, 666 N.W.2d 112, 02-2195.

Before the government may invade the sanctity of the home without a warrant, the government must demonstrate not only probable cause but also exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness. When a police officer placed his foot in a doorway to prevent the defendant from closing the door, the act constituted an entry into the home. A warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the suspect's blood alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. State v. Larson, 2003 WI App 150, 266 Wis. 2d 236, 668 N.W.2d 338, 02-2881.

The propriety of a warrantless search of a person's garbage outside the persons' home comes under a two-part test: 1) whether the individual by his or her conduct has exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and 2) whether that expectation is justifiable in that it is one which society will recognize as reasonable. Consideration of curtilage or open fields appropriately falls within an expectation-of-privacy analysis and is not a separate factor. The defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in a dumpster not set out for collection located down a private driveway marked “Private Property." State v. Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16, 269 Wis. 2d 234, 674 N.W.2d 894, 03-0703.

When the police are lawfully on the suspect's premises by virtue of a valid search warrant, they may make a warrantless arrest of the suspect prior to the search if the arrest is supported by probable cause. State v. Cash, 2004 WI App 63, 271 Wis. 2d 451, 677 N.W.2d 709, 03-1614.

A law enforcement officer acted reasonably when during a routine traffic stop he requested the passengers, as well as the driver, to exit the vehicle and individually asked them questions outside the scope of the initial traffic stop after officer had become aware of specific and articulable facts giving rise to the reasonable suspicion that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1, 02-2216.

To perform a protective search for weapons, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that a person may be armed and dangerous. A court may consider an officer's belief that his, her, or another's safety is threatened in finding reasonable suspicion, but such a belief is not a prerequisite to a valid search. There is no per se rule justifying a search any time an individual places his or her hands in his or her pockets contrary to police orders. The defendant's hand movements must be considered under the totality of the circumstances of the case. State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449, 02-1540.

Whether a warrantless home entry is justified based on the need to render assistance or prevent harm is judged by an objective test of whether a police officer under the circumstances known to the officer at the time of entry reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger life. In addition to the circumstances known to the police at the time of entry, a court may consider the subjective beliefs of police officers involved, but only insofar as such evidence assists the court in determining objective reasonableness. State v. Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127, 275 Wis. 2d 512, 685 N.W.2d 536, 03-0133.

Although a known citizen informer did not observe the defendant drive his truck in a manner consistent with someone who was under the influence of an intoxicant, the tip was reliable when it was based on the informer's first-hand observation that he defendant was drunk and was independently verified by the arresting officer. State v. Powers, 2004 WI App 143, 275 Wis. 2d 456, 685 N.W.2d 869, 03-2450.

The anonymous caller in this case provided predictive information that, if true, demonstrated a special familiarity with the defendant's affairs that the general public would have had no way of knowing. When the officer verified this predictive information, it was reasonable for the officer to believe that a person with access to such information also had access to reliable information about the defendant's illegal activities providing reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle. State v. Sherry, 2004 WI App 207, 277 Wis. 2d 194, 690 N.W.2d 435, 03-1531.

Under Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629, a person who did not submit to an officer's show of police authority was not seized within the meaning of the 4th amendment. Until a submission occurs, Hodari D. holds that a person is not seized for purposes of the 4th amendment and therefore the person may not assert a 4th amendment violation that evidence resulting from the encounter with the police was the fruit of an illegal seizure. State v. Young, 2004 WI App 227, 277 Wis. 2d 715, 690 N.W.2d 866, 03-2968.

Affirmed. 2006 WI 98, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729, 03-2968.

Blood may be drawn in a search incident to an arrest for a non-drunk-driving offense if the police reasonably suspect that the defendant's blood contains evidence of a crime. State v. Repenshek, 2004 WI App 229, 277 Wis. 2d 780, 691 N.W.2d 780, 03-3089. But see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed 2d 560 (2016).

An arrest immediately following a search, along with the probable cause to arrest before the search, causes the search to be lawful. A search was not unlawful because the crime arrested for immediately after the search was different than the crime for which the officer had probable cause to arrest before the search. As long as there was probable cause to arrest before the search, no additional protection from government intrusion is afforded by requiring that persons be arrested for and charged with the same crime as that for which probable cause initially existed. Whether the officer subjectively intended to arrest for the first crime is not the relevant inquiry. The relevant inquiry is whether the officer was aware of sufficient objective facts to establish probable cause to arrest before the search was conducted and whether an actual arrest was made contemporaneously with the search. State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277, 03-1234.

Under Terry, an officer is entitled not just to a patdown but to an effective patdown in which he or she can reasonably ascertain whether the subject has a weapon; where an effective patdown is not possible, the officer may take other action reasonably necessary to discover a weapon. When an officer could not tell whether a suspect had any objects hidden in his waistband because of the suspect's bulky frame and heavy clothing it was reasonable for the officer to shake the suspect's waistband by his belt loops in order to loosen any possible weapons. State v. Triplett, 2005 WI App 255, 288 Wis. 2d 505, 707 N.W.2d 881, 04-2032.

The 4th amendment neither forbids nor permits all bodily intrusions. The amendment's function is to constrain against intrusions that are not justified in the circumstances, or are made in an improper manner. Whether the warrantless administration of laxatives done to assist the police in recovering suspected swallowed heroin was a reasonable search required evaluating 3 factors: 1) the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual; 2) the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity; and 3) the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence. State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548, 04-1029.

Deciding when a seizure occurs is important because the moment of a seizure limits what facts a court may consider in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion for that seizure. The Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, test applies when the subject of police attention is either subdued by force or submits to a show of authority. Where, however, a person flees in response to a show of authority, Hodari D., 499 U.S. 279, governs when the seizure occurs. The Hodari D. test does not supersede the Mendenhall test, it supplements it. State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729, 03-2968.

An anonymous tip, whose indicia of reliability was debatable, along with behavior observed by the officer at the scene and deemed suspicious provided reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop. Terry holds that the police are not required to rule out the possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a Terry stop. Suspicious conduct by its very nature is ambiguous, and the principle function of the investigative stop is to quickly resolve that ambiguity. State v. Patton, 2006 WI App 235, 297 Wis. 2d 415, 724 N.W.2d 347, 05-3084.

There is a difference between police informers, who usually themselves are criminals, and citizen informers that calls for different means of assessing credibility. A citizen informant's reliability is subject to a much less stringent standard. Citizens who purport to have witnessed a crime are viewed as reliable, and police are allowed to act accordingly although other indicia of reliability have not yet been established. That an informant does not give some indication of how he or she knows about the suspicious or criminal activity reported bears significantly on the reliability of the information. State v. Kolk, 2006 WI App 261, 298 Wis. 2d 99, 726 N.W.2d 337, 06-0031.

To have a 4th amendment claim an individual must have standing. Standing exists when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy; which requires meeting a two-prong test: 1) whether the individual's conduct exhibited an actual, subjective, expectation of privacy in the area searched and the item seized; and 2) if the individual had the requisite expectation of privacy, whether the expectation of privacy was legitimate or justifiable. State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503, 05-1516.

In considering whether an individual's expectation of privacy was legitimate or justifiable, the following may be relevant: 1) whether the accused had a property interest in the premises; 2) whether the accused was lawfully on the premises; 3) whether the accused had complete dominion and control and the right to exclude others; 4) whether the accused took precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy; 5) whether the property was put to some private use; and 6) whether the claim of privacy was consistent with historical notions of privacy. State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503, 05-1516.

Whether an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal property found inside a vehicle that he or she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in is not governed by a bright-line rule. Principles pertinent to whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy are that: 1) personal property found in vehicles is treated differently than personal property found in dwellings, there being a lesser expectation of privacy in vehicles; 2) neither ownership nor possession of an item alone establishes a reasonable expectation of privacy; 3) an individual's expectation of privacy in the space, rather than concepts of property law, is critical. State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503, 05-1516.

When the defendant was only suspected of driving a vehicle with a suspended registration for an emissions violation and failing to signal for a turn, violations in no way linked to criminal activity or weapons possession, and when the only purported basis for a protective search was a single, partially obscured movement of the defendant in his vehicle that the officers observed from their squad car, the behavior observed by the officers was not sufficient to justify a protective search of Johnson's person and his car. State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182, 05-0573.

Weaving within a single traffic lane does not alone give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop of a vehicle. The reasonableness of a stop must be determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances. State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634, 05-2778.

A private party's discovery, and subsequent disclosure to law enforcement, of contraband is not prohibited by the 4th amendment when there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in dealings with the private party. One does not generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy when delivering property to a private shipping company, particularly when the shipping company posts a sign reserving its right to inspect parcels left with it for shipping. State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, 303 Wis. 2d 438, 736 N.W.2d 189, 06-1271.

An employee of a private company is not acting on behalf of the government and is free to disclose a package and material to law enforcement. Law enforcement, without a warrant, can properly replicate the search the employee has already conducted. By otherwise replicating the private-party search, police did not exceed the scope of the private search by conducting a field test for drugs. State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, 303 Wis. 2d 438, 736 N.W.2d 189, 06-1271.

The emergency doctrine permits officers investigating a kidnapping case to conduct a warrantless search if the officers possess an objectively reasonable belief that the particular search will result in finding the victim or evidence leading to the victim's location. Police need not delay rescue where they reasonably believe that a kidnap victim is being held and a search of the premises will lead to the victim or to information about the victim's whereabouts; time is of the essence. State v. Larsen, 2007 WI App 147, 302 Wis. 2d 718, 736 N.W.2d 211, 06-1396.

One common factor in some cases in which courts have concluded that the officers did not have a justifiable basis for conducting a protective sweep has been that the protective search takes place after the traffic investigation has been completed. A protective sweep was justified when there were specific facts that demonstrated that the officers' primary concern was indeed weapons and safety and the protective search was the first thing the officers did, and was not an afterthought. State v. Alexander, 2008 WI App 9, 307 Wis. 2d 323, 744 N.W.2d 909, 07-0403.

The fact that an officer told the defendant that she was under arrest did not necessarily establish an arrest when immediately after making that statement the officer told the defendant that she would be issued a citation and then would be free to go. Although the statements are contradictory, the assurance that the defendant would be issued a citation and released would lead a reasonable person to believe he or she was not in custody. Under those circumstances a search of the defendant was not incident to a lawful arrest and, as such, unlawful. State v. Marten-Hoye, 2008 WI App 19, 307 Wis. 2d 671, 746 N.W.2d 498, 06-1104.

The potential availability of an innocent explanation does not prohibit an investigative stop. If any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence of innocent inferences that could be drawn, officers have the right to temporarily detain an individual for the purpose of inquiry. State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, 312 Wis. 2d 174, 751 N.W.2d 877, 07-1578.

Although Terry provides only for an officer to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons that might be used to assault the officer, under the circumstances of this case, the search was properly broadened to encompass the opening of the defendant's purse, which was essentially an extension of her person where the purse was accessible by her. State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, 312 Wis. 2d 174, 751 N.W.2d 877, 07-1578.

Because of the limited intrusion resulting from a dog sniff for narcotics and the personal interests that Art. I, s. 11 were meant to protect, a dog sniff around the outside perimeter of a vehicle located in a public place is not a search under the Wisconsin Constitution. The 78 seconds during which the dog sniff occurred was not an unreasonable incremental intrusion upon the defendant's liberty. State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748, 06-0974.

The “search incident to arrest" exception to the 4th amendment warrant requirement holds that a lawful arrest creates a situation justifying a contemporaneous, warrantless search of the arrestee's person and the area within his or her immediate control. It is reasonable to search an area near the arrestee, but not an area so broad as to be unrelated to the protective purposes of the search. Although a bedroom might be considered within the defendant's immediate presence or control the search of a bedroom was not a search incident to arrest after the defendant had been removed from the home as the defendant could not have gained possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 N.W.2d 713, 06-2060.

Reasonable suspicion was not obviated by the fact that 15 minutes passed between the time of a stop and a protective search when the defendant was kept under continuous surveillance. The passage of time can be a factor in the totality of circumstances, but it is not likely to be a determinative factor in establishing or eliminating reasonable suspicion for a frisk. State v. Sumner, 2008 WI 94, 312 Wis. 2d 292, 752 N.W.2d 783, 06-0102.

The standing of a guest to challenge a search is measured by the guest's relationship to the property and the host. When a person claims guest status, the analysis examines the evidence in light of: 1) whether the guest's use of the premises was for a purely commercial purpose; 2) the duration of the guest's stay; and 3) the nature of the guest's relationship to the host. The defendant did not have standing when there was little evidence of the duration or closeness of the defendant's friendship with the property owner, the defendant did not have a long-term relationship to the place and not an overnight guest, and at the time of the search, used it largely for a commercial purpose. State v. Fox, 2008 WI App 136, 314 Wis. 2d 84, 758 N.W.2d 790, 07-0685.

The defendant did not have standing to assert a 4th amendment violation based on an officer unlocking the door of the public restroom the defendant occupied. The defendant's expectation of privacy was not reasonable when, while his initial use of the restroom was for its intended purpose, he continued to have the private use of the locked restroom for at least 25 minutes without responding to knocking and while dozing off. State v. Neitzel, 2008 WI App 143, 314 Wis. 2d 209, 758 N.W.2d 159, 07-2346.

An entry into a home was illegal when police, after seizing contraband from the defendant and seeing others on cell phones, acted on a hunch that someone would destroy evidence at the defendant's residence and entered the residence without a warrant upon the silence of the defendant's elderly mother and made a protective sweep without seizing any contraband. However, the illegality was attenuated by knowledge that contraband was seized after two hours had passed from the entry, no search for contraband took place during the entry, and the eventual search of the residence was pursuant to a valid search warrant. State v. Rogers, 2008 WI App 176, 315 Wis. 2d 60, 762 N.W.2d 795, 07-1850.

Government involvement in a search is not measured by the primary occupation of the actor, but by the capacity in which the actor acts at the time in question. An off-duty officer acting in a private capacity in making a search does not implicate the 4th amendment. When an officer opened mail that contained evidence of criminal activity that was incorrectly addressed to a person other than herself at her home address, her action was that of a private citizen. State v. Cole, 2008 WI App 178, 315 Wis. 2d 75, 762 N.W.2d 711, 07-2472.

See also State v. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, 320 Wis. 2d 209, 769 N.W.2d 110, 08-0786.

Based on the reasoning in Pallone and under the facts of this case, the police could search the personal belongings of a passenger that were found outside a motor vehicle incident to the arrest of the driver. State v. Denk, 2008 WI 130, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 N.W.2d 775, 06-1744.

A security guard's seizure, detention, and search of the defendant was not a government action that permitted the invocation of the exclusionary rule, because unless state action is involved, a defendant detained by another citizen has no right to suppress the fruits of the citizen's search. Although a citizen may detain another citizen for a misdemeanor committed in the citizen's presence and amounting to a breach of the peace, the court left for another day whether a citizen is privileged to detain another whom he or she sees breaching the peace by doing something that is not a crime, but an offense subject to a forfeiture. State v. Butler, 2009 WI App 52, 317 Wis. 2d 515, 768 N.W.2d 46, 08-1178.

During a traffic stop, a police officer may make inquiries to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions concerning weapons or other dangerous articles. The response that a person provides to an officer's inquiry, including the absence of or refusal to provide a response, may provide information that is relevant to whether a protective search is reasonable, and is therefore a factor to be considered alongside other factors that together comprise the totality of the circumstances. In this case, failure to provide an explanation effectively transformed what the defendant maintains was an innocent movement into a specific, articulable fact supporting a reasonable suspicion that the defendant posed a threat to the officers' safety. State v. Bridges, 2009 WI App 66, 319 Wis. 2d 217, 767 N.W.2d 593, 08-1207.

When officers found themselves in the middle of an unstable situation — having to decide whether to stand guard over the open door to an apartment potentially occupied by armed individuals prepared to attack them while they took the time necessary to obtain a warrant, or instead to retreat and risk the destruction of evidence, along with a continuing risk of attack — the circumstances posed the sort of special risks that required the officers to act immediately and to forego obtaining a warrant and constituted exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry. State v. Lee, 2009 WI App 96, 320 Wis. 2d 536, 771 N.W.2d 373, 07-2976.

Unlike in Johnson, 2007 WI 32, where the defendant's head and shoulder movement did not give reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of the person and car, here, the defendant after being stopped in his vehicle made 3 to 5 furtive-type movements that the trial court found were attempts to hide something. While the number of acts by itself may not be determinative of a reasonable basis, the persistence in the gesture is a specific, articulable measure of a strong intent to hide something from the police officer who made the stop. Further, when the defendant said the object seemingly being hidden was candy, it was reasonable to doubt the truthfulness of that response and it created another articulable suspicion to support the inference that the defendant was trying to hide a gun. State v. Bailey, 2009 WI App 140, 321 Wis. 2d 350, 773 N.W.2d 488, 08-3153.

The defendant, not the police, created the exigency in this case that resulted in a warrantless search when, after seeing the police outside his residence, the defendant retreated into the residence and shut the door after the police ordered him to stop. Those actions created the exigency of the risk that evidence would be destroyed. It was not necessary to delve into the appropriateness of the officers' determination after a controlled drug buy to conduct a “knock and talk" contact with the defendant or whether a knock and talk creates an exigency because in this case, a knock and talk was never actually accomplished. State v. Phillips, 2009 WI App 179, 322 Wis. 2d 576, 778 N.W.2d 157, 09-0249.

In a community caretaker context, when under the totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaker function is shown, that determination is not negated by the officer's subjective law enforcement concerns. An officer may have law enforcement concerns even when the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for performing a community caretaker function. State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598, 07-1834.

See also, State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87, 11-0813.

See also State v. Maddix, 2013 WI App 64, 348 Wis. 2d 179, 831 N.W.2d 778, 12-1632.

A three-step test is used to evaluate the reasonableness of a seizure made under the community caretaker exception: 1) that a seizure within the meaning of the 4th amendment has occurred; 2) whether the police conduct was bona fide community caretaker activity; and 3) whether the public need and interest outweighed the intrusion upon the privacy of the individual. A bona fide community caretaker activity is one that is divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598, 07-1834.

Even if no probable cause exists, a police officer may conduct a traffic stop when, under the totality of the circumstances, he or she has grounds to reasonably suspect that a crime or traffic violation has been or will be committed. The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion of the stop. The crucial question is whether the facts would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or her training and experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime. While any one fact, standing alone, might well be insufficient for reasonable suspicion, as facts accumulate, reasonable inferences about the cumulative effect can be drawn. State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569, 08-0446.

The extent to which law enforcement is permitted to rely on exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry of a home has a relationship to the seriousness of the offense. When the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor, courts should be very hesitant to find exigent circumstances. In determining the extent to which the underlying offense may support's finding of exigency, the critical factor is the penalty that may attach. Courts, in evaluating whether a warrantless entry is justified by exigent circumstances, should consider whether the underlying offense is a jailable or nonjailable offense, rather than whether the legislature has labeled that offense a felony or a misdemeanor. State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W2d 187, 07-2095.

An officer's demand that a suspect drop an object that the officer believes could be a weapon can be likened to a frisk or pat-down. The approach in Wisconsin for determining whether a pat-down is valid has been one of reasonableness. State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1, 07-1378.

Law enforcement agents are justified in seizing and continuing to hold a container if: 1) there is probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of a crime; and 2) if exigencies of the circumstances demand it. Analogizing a cell phone containing pictures to a container was appropriate. An officer who legally viewed an image of the defendant with marijuana in plain view on an open cell phone and who testified that he knew, based on his training and experience, that drug traffickers frequently personalize their cell phones with images of themselves with items acquired through drug activity, had probable cause to believe that the phone contained evidence of illegal drug activity. State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1, 07-1378.

When an officer had probable cause to seize a cell phone that he reasonably believed was a tool used in drug trafficking, exigent circumstances permitted the officer to answer an incoming call. The test for whether exigent circumstances are present focuses on whether the officer reasonably believes that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatens the destruction of evidence. The fleeting nature of a phone call is apparent; if it is not picked up, the opportunity to gather evidence is likely to be lost, as there is no guarantee or likelihood that the caller would leave a voice mail or otherwise preserve the evidence. State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1, 07-1378.

Under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect. At the same time, in a collective knowledge situation, if a defendant moves to suppress, the prosecutor must prove the collective knowledge that supports the stop. Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer. Such testimony provides no basis for the court to assess the validity of the police suspicion. The testimony contains no specific, articulable facts to which the court can apply the reasonable suspicion standard. State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5, 323 Wis. 2d 226, 779 N.W.2d 1, 08-1514.

When a temporary detention is justified, the court will still examine the circumstances of the detention to determine whether the investigative means used in a continued seizure are the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion and whether it lasted no longer than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. It was an unreasonable seizure when a suspect was handcuffed based on the bare fact that the officer knew the suspect was suspected in a prior shooting when no specific, articulable facts were presented to support that position under the collective knowledge doctrine. State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5, 323 Wis. 2d 226, 779 N.W.2d 1, 08-1514.

Although a person sharing a hotel room was found to have apparent authority over the room authorizing her to consent to a search of the room, she did not have actual or apparent authority over the inside of the safe when the safe was locked, she could not open the safe, and she did not even know it was in the room. Even if the scope of her consent to search the room included the safe, the search of the safe was unreasonable if she had no authority to grant that consent. State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5, 323 Wis. 2d 226, 779 N.W.2d 1, 08-1514.

In a search incident to an arrest, an officer may only search that area within the “immediate control" of the arrestee. In a no-arrest case, the possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always exists since the driver or passenger will be allowed to return to the vehicle when the interrogation is completed. Because the defendant was not under arrest, the officers had an immediate safety interest in verifying that that the defendant did not have a gun or other weapon under his immediate control. Therefore, the search of the defendant's vehicle console was not prohibited. State v. Williams, 2010 WI App 39, 323 Wis. 2d 460, 781 N.W.2d 495, 09-0501.

Soldal, 506 U.S. 56, recognized that there could be a seizure of property in violation of the 4th amendment even though the seizure was not preceded or accompanied by a search. Soldal also specifically recognized that a valid consent permits a lawful 4th amendment seizure. Here computers owned by one tenant were legally seized when another tenant, who had permission to use those computers, specifically gave the detective the right to “conduct a complete search of [m]y premises, and all property found therein, located at" the apartment and to take the computers away for further analysis. State v. Ramage, 2010 WI App 77, 325 Wis. 2d 483, 784 N.W.2d 746, 09-0784.

The holding of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle is adopted as the proper interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97, 07-1894.

Federal case law does not limit an officer's community caretaker functions to incidents involving automobiles, but instead counsels a cautious approach when the exception is invoked to justify law enforcement intrusion into a home. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, 08-1204.

In light of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, the broad rule adopted in Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, is no longer good law. Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. State v. Bauer, 2010 WI App 93, 327 Wis. 2d 765, 787 N.W.2d 412, 09-1367.

Police cannot conduct warrantless searches pursuant to a probation apprehension request. Warrantless searches conducted by police, as opposed to probation agents, are prohibited. State v. Bauer, 2010 WI App 93, 327 Wis. 2d 765, 787 N.W.2d 412, 09-1367.

A “knock and talk" interview at a private residence that has lost its consensual nature and has effectively become an in-home seizure or constructive entry may trigger 4th amendment scrutiny. When the situation is such that a person would not wish to leave his or her location, such as his or her home, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. City of Sheboygan v. Cesar, 2010 WI App 170, 330 Wis. 2d 760, 796 N.W.2d 429, 09-3049.

The test for exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless seizure is an objective one: whether a police officer under the circumstances known to the officer at the time reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger life or risk destruction of evidence or greatly enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape. An arrest was lawful when the urgency reasonably perceived by the officers was compelling and the danger they reasonably perceived for themselves and others if they did not move quickly was substantial. State v. Ayala, 2011 WI App 6, 331 Wis. 2d 171, 793 N.W.2d 511, 09-2690.

An officer's exercise of the bona fide community caretaker function must be reasonable as determined by the court by balancing the public interest or need that is furthered by the officers' conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion on the citizen's constitutional interest. The stronger the public need and the more minimal the intrusion upon an individual's liberty, the more likely the police conduct will be held to be reasonable. Four factors are considered: 1) the extent of the public's interest; 2) the attendant circumstances surrounding the search; 3) whether the search or seizure took place in an automobile; and 4) the alternatives that were available to the action taken. State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI App 17, 331 Wis. 2d 242, 793 N.W.2d 505, 10-0895.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the trooper's observation of the defendant's furtive movements and visible nervousness, a record of arrests for violent crimes, and a drug delivery arrest that had occurred nearby a short time before the stop constituted specific and articulable facts that, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, created reasonable suspicion and justified a protective search for the officer's safety. State v. Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, 334 Wis. 2d 379, 799 N.W.2d 775, 09-2934.

As a general matter, it is unacceptable for a member of the public to enter a home's attached garage uninvited regardless of whether an overhead or entry door is open. Thus, generally, an attached garage will never be impliedly open to public, i.e., police entry. There may be an exception to that general rule if, in a given circumstance, it reasonably appears that entry into the attached garage is the least intrusive means of attempting contact with persons inside the home. State v. Davis, 2011 WI App 74, 333 Wis. 2d 490, 798 N.W.2d 902, 10-2191.

Randolph held that in co-habitation cases, if both parties are present, a search is unlawful when one consents but the other expressly refuses to consent. Randolph did not apply when one co-habitant consented and the other did not object. State v. Pirtle, 2011 WI App 89, 334 Wis. 2d 211, 799 N.W.2d 492, 10-1363.

Under circumstances where: 1) a man in a high-crime area; 2) late at night; 3) wearing a ski mask that covered his face below his eyes; 4) wearing a hoodie; 5) had an ambiguous but “unusual"-appearing encounter with a woman walking by herself, the police reasonably and based on their experience could objectively see that further investigation was warranted to ensure that criminal activity was not afoot. State v. Matthews, 2011 WI App 92, 334 Wis. 2d 455, 799 N.W.2d 911, 10-1712.

It was reasonable for the officers to conclude that the leaseholder of a property had the authority to consent to them proceeding up the property's stairs to look for another tenant who was not present to either consent or refuse consent when: 1) a third non-leaseholder tenant refused to consent; 2) the officers were aware that the tenant granting consent was the leaseholder of the property; and 3) the person refusing consent had not previously lived there and had left the room to wake up the subject of the police inquiry after the officers arrived. State v. Lathan, 2011 WI App 104, 335 Wis. 2d 234, 801 N.W.2d 772, 10-1228.

Under Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, a lawful roadside stop “ordinarily" begins when a vehicle is pulled over for a traffic violation and ends when the police no longer have further need to control the scene, at which time the driver and passengers are free to leave. Johnson does not create a bright-line rule that police always have the authority to detain passengers for the duration of a roadside stop. Johnson leaves the door open for exceptions to the general rule that passengers are reasonably detained for the duration of a stop. Nonetheless, the stop in this case was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Salonen, 2011 WI App 157, 338 Wis. 2d 104, 808 N.W.2d 162, 10-2504.

The plain view doctrine did not justify opening opaque cylinders that were in plain view, but the contents were not, and the containers, as indicated by their size or shape, could hold a weapon. State v. Sutton, 2012 WI App 7, 338 Wis. 2d 338, 808 N.W.2d 411, 11-0036.

If a third party has mutual use of a property and joint access or control for most purposes, then the third party may consent to a search of the property regardless of whether he or she owns the property. While a mere guest in a home may not ordinarily consent to a search of the premises, the analysis is different when the guest is more than a casual visitor but instead has the run of the house. A weekend house guest who was permitted to stay in the home by herself and had the authority to receive people into the home had the authority to permit an officer to enter. Similarly, when the defendant gave his guest permission to use his computer, the guest had the authority to consent to the officer's search and seizure of that item. State v. Sutton, 2012 WI App 7, 338 Wis. 2d 338, 808 N.W.2d 411, 11-0036.

The possible use of a premises for an illicit commercial enterprise does not necessarily trump an otherwise legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises. State v. Guard, 2012 WI App 8, 338 Wis. 2d 385, 808 N.W.2d 718, 11-0072.

When police have probable cause to arrest before an unlawful entry and warrantless arrest from a defendant's home, this violation of Payton, 445 U.S. 573, does not require the suppression of evidence obtained from a defendant outside of the home. This rule applies when the only illegal police conduct is an unlawful entry and arrest in violation of Payton, not when the evidence may be tied to an unlawful search by police. State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775, 10-0346.

Under the totality of the circumstances police acted reasonably when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle that the defendant was driving based on reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot." The police had the requisite reasonable suspicion primarily based on the reliability of their final informant and the information provided by him when the information was supported by the prior tips to police. While the initial tips were of limited reliability, the final informant and his tips had significant indicia of reliability because the informant provided self-identifying information that made him more reliable than a truly anonymous informant and the final informant provided details and accurate future predictions that police were able to corroborate. State v. Miller, 2012 WI 61, 341 Wis. 2d 307, 815 N.W.2d 349, 10-0557.

Under Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115-17, an individual can retain a legitimate expectation of privacy after a private individual conducts a search. However, additional invasions of that individual's privacy by a government agent must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search. The officer's search in this case did not exceed the original search by the private individual who after discovering and reviewing child pornography, placed it in a duffel bag and invited the officer to view the contents of the bag. State v. Cameron, 2012 WI App 93, 344 Wis. 2d 101, 820 N.W.2d 433, 11-1368.

There is no bright-line rule mandating that courts exercise caution in supporting a Terry stop whenever the stop is for a “minor crime." State v. Rissley, 2012 WI App 112, 344 Wis. 2d 422, 824 N.W.2d 853, 11-1789.

Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 663, forged a list of factors to be considered in determining reasonable suspicion that a person or vehicle was the one connected to a reported crime: 1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the vehicle in which he or she fled; 2) the size of the area in which the offender might be found, as indicated by such facts as the elapsed time since the crime occurred; 3) the number of persons about in that area; 4) the known or probable direction of the offender's flight; 5) observed activity by the particular person stopped; and 6) knowledge or suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped has been involved in other criminality of the type presently under investigation. State v. Rissley, 2012 WI App 112, 344 Wis. 2d 422, 824 N.W.2d 853, 11-1789.

The administration of a preliminary breath test by a police officer, at the request and on behalf of a probation agent during a probation meeting in the probation office, for probation purposes and for no independent police purpose, was a probation search, not a police search, and was lawful. State v. Devries, 2012 WI App 119, 344 Wis. 2d 726, 824 N.W.2d 913, 10-0429.

The test applied in determining whether an officer has sufficient reasonable suspicion under Terry is objective — “would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search `warrant a man of reasonable caution' in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Backing away from a police officer is not sufficient objective evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot or that a person is a threat. A person approached by a law-enforcement officer need not answer any question put to him or her, may decline to listen to the questions, and may go on his or her way. Naming a movement that would accompany any walking away adds nothing to the calculus except a false patina of objectivity. State v. Pugh, 2013 WI App 12, 345 Wis. 2d 832, 826 N.W.2d 418, 12-0481.

Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, when a person came down the staircase between a building's upper unit and a common entrance and opened the door for the police, identified herself, expressly stated that she lived in the upper unit, granted consent to search both verbally and in writing, and acted as though she had access to the landlord by pretending to call him or her, that person had apparent authority to consent to the warrantless search of the upper unit and the police were reasonable in reaching the same conclusion. State v. Wheeler, 2013 WI App 53, 347 Wis. 2d 426, 830 N.W.2d 278, 12-1291.

A seizure following a “dog sniff" is subject to the Terry test — that a seizure is reasonable only if it is justified at its inception and is “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Here, unlike in Arias, the dog sniff attendant to defendant's seizure occurred after the initial stop had been completed and undisputed facts established that the reasons justifying the initial stop ceased to exist. The continued detention of the defendant to conduct the dog sniff was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the stop. State v. House, 2013 WI App 111, 350 Wis. 2d 478, 837 N.W.2d 645, 12-2414.

Permitting Terry stops of a person observed momentarily patting the outside of his or her clothing when the only additional facts are that the person is in a high crime area and has seen a cruising police car would expand the individualized “ reasonable suspicion" requirement so far so as to negate it. State v. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, 353 Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483, 13-1878.

When an officer parks near a person's vehicle, gets out, and knocks on the person's window, the officer has not necessarily displayed sufficient authority to cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she was not free to leave. While a person is not automatically seized by a knock on the window, or even a supplementary request, the seizure inquiry looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer has effected a detention. County of Grant v. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, 356 Wis. 2d 343, 850 N.W.2d 253, 12-1812.

The trial court's denial of the defendant's suppression motion arguing that the warrantless obtaining of of his cell phone's location data from his cell phone provider violated his 4th amendment rights was upheld by a divided court. State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, 357 Wis. 2d 41, 849 N.W.2d 748, 10-3016.

Ordinary citizens, even citizens who are subject to diminished privacy interests because they have been detained, have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of their electronic devices. This interest, however, is undercut when the electronic device in question is contraband. In this case, the defendant was prohibited from using a computer. It was irrelevant whether specific images were prohibited by the defendant's probationary terms or otherwise illegal to possess; the use of computers was itself prohibited, and the agent had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant had impermissibly used them. Thus, the probation search of the contents of the defendant's computers did not violate the 4th amendment or Article I, Section 11. State v. Purtell, 2014 WI 101, 358 Wis. 2d 212, 851 N.W.2d 417, 12-1307.

While exigent circumstances may justify entry, the fact that entry has already been made does not necessarily invalidate reliance on the exigent circumstances doctrine. In this case, the officer had already stepped into the apartment when the exigent circumstances arose. Whether or not the apartment occupants' behavior constituted consent to the officer's entry, so long as the officer was standing in the vicinity of the occupants when she received the information that they might possess a backpack with loaded weapons in it, her search for and seizure of the backpack was, at that moment, justified by exigent circumstances. State v. Kirby, 2014 WI App 74, 355 Wis. 2d 423, 851 N.W.2d 796, 13-0896.

Fourth amendment jurisprudence has evolved into two seemingly different, but somewhat interrelated, methods of identifying protectable interests relating to the home. One focuses on a person's expectation of privacy, where a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The other, known as the intrusion or trespass test, focuses on whether government agents engaged in an unauthorized physical penetration into a constitutionally protected area. Officers in this case conducted an illegal search by trespassing on the defendants' property when they, without permission, went onto the porch of the defendants' trailer to peer into a window, had no other reason for being in those areas, and acknowledged that they could not have seen what they saw within the trailer if they had not been standing in the yard or on the porch. State v. Popp, 2014 WI App 100, 357 Wis. 2d 696, 855 N.W.2d 471, 13-1916.

In light of Missouri v. McNeely, the holding in State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, that the rapid dissipation of alcohol alone constitutes an exigent circumstance sufficient for law enforcement officers to order a warrantless investigatory blood draw, is no longer an accurate interpretation of the 4th amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The rapid dissipation of alcohol alone no longer constitutes a per se exigent circumstance. Exigent circumstances, sufficient to justify a warrantless investigatory blood draw of a drunk-driving suspect, are to be determined on a case-by-case totality of the circumstances analysis. State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834, 12-0523.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the deputy reasonably responded to an accident, secured the scene, investigated the matter, and ultimately was left with a very narrow time frame in which the defendant's blood could be drawn so as to produce reliable evidence of intoxication. This sort of “now or never" moment is the epitome of an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless blood draw. State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120, 12-1593.

An arrest need not precede a warrantless blood draw. When there is probable cause for a blood draw there also is probable cause to arrest for operating while intoxicated. An arrest is not a prerequisite to a warrantless blood draw justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120, 12-1593.

The exigent circumstance exception does not require that officers observe actual destruction of evidence taking place before making entry. Officers do not impermissibly create exigent circumstances merely by knocking on a door and announcing themselves as police. State v. Parisi, 2014 WI App 129, 359 Wis. 2d 255, 857 N.W.2d 472, 14-0474.

Officers' approach to a defendant at gunpoint, use of handcuffs, and detention of the defendant in a squad car are not sufficient to transform an investigatory detention into an arrest. However, upon transportation of the defendant from the site of the stop to a hospital 10 miles away, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that he or she was in custody due to an arrest because the transportation was involuntary and the defendant had experienced a significant level of force and restraint since the initial stop. State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26, 13-2107.

When a person who is temporarily detained for investigation pursuant to a Terry stop is then moved to another location, courts conduct a two-part inquiry: First, was the person moved within the vicinity of the stop? Second, was the purpose in moving the person within the vicinity reasonable? Ten miles is too distant a transportation to be within the vicinity so long as the temporary detention is supported by no more than a reasonable suspicion. In order for the transporting of a defendant to a hospital that was not in the vicinity of the stop to have been lawful, it must have been supported by probable cause to arrest or by a reasonable exercise of the community caretaker function. State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26, 13-2107.

Nervousness, anxiety, and tremors are consistent with methamphetamine use. These characteristics may also have innocent explanations. That innocent explanations may exist for observed behavior does not preclude a finding of reasonable suspicion, but as a practical matter, police cannot expect to conduct field sobriety tests on every motorist who is shaking and nervous when stopped by an officer. State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124, 13-0430.

Reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been or is being violated is sufficient to justify all traffic stops. An objectively reasonable mistake of law by a police officer can form the basis for reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W.2d 143, 13-1581.

The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages that he had sent to and were stored in another person's cell phone. Once the defendant sent the messages, he had no control over whether the recipient saved them, deleted them, forwarded them to others or shared their content in any way. This lack of control over what is done with the text message and lack of any right to exclude others from reading it are key in the determination that the defendant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages stored in the other person's phone. State v. Tentoni, 2015 WI App 77, 365 Wis. 2d 211, 871 N.W.2d 285, 14-2387.

The statement in Popke, 2009 WI 37, that “a police officer may . . . conduct a traffic stop when, under the totality of the circumstances, he or she has grounds to reasonably suspect that a crime or traffic violation has been or will be committed," did not purport to circumscribe the universe of possible scenarios within which traffic stops permissibly may occur, or to make such limits contingent on whether the legislature has titled a particular law a “traffic regulation." A reasonable suspicion that a violation of the littering statute, s. 287.81, a non-traffic civil forfeiture offense, had occurred justified a brief and limited traffic stop. The more onerous standard of probable cause would also therefore justify a traffic stop. State v. Iverson, 2015 WI 101, 365 Wis. 2d 302, 871 N.W.2d 661, 14-0515.

In Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the curtilage of a person's home remains a constitutionally protected area without consideration of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has adopted 4 factors set forth in Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), relevant to conducting an analysis of whether an area constitutes curtilage of a home: 1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home; 2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home; 3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and 4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. These factors did not weigh in favor of curtilage designation when applied to the parking garage located beneath the defendant's apartment building. State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502, 13-0857.

There was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the defendant's parking garage located beneath a 30-unit apartment building such that it warranted 4th amendment protection against warrantless entry for arrest. The relevant test is: 1) whether the person exhibits an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the area; and 2) whether society is willing to recognize such an expectation as reasonable. In making this determination a 6-factor test is applied. State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502, 13-0857.

The 4th amendment does not inflexibly require that officers be concerned about specific, known individuals in order to be acting as community caretakers. State v. Matalonis, 2016 WI 7, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567, 14-0108.

A warrantless blood sample may be justified even when an inferior form of evidence may be available. The fact that morphine remains in the body for several hours after the ingestion of heroin does not mean that it would be unreasonable for an officer to believe that taking the time to obtain a search warrant in this case risked destruction of evidence of heroin use. That the defendant never used a car in this case did not elevate his privacy interests to such heights as to render any warrantless blood draw under exigent circumstances unreasonable. State v. Parisi, 2016 WI 10, 367 Wis. 2d 1, 875 N.W. 2d 619, 14-1267.

A blood draw from the defendant under s. 343.305 while the defendant was unconscious was permissible under the 4th amendment under the exigent circumstances doctrine when a deputy had probable cause to arrest the defendant for operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration. State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812, 14-1870.

Under Purtell, when a condition of probation prohibits the possession of a certain item, and the subject of the search knowingly breaks that condition, in most situations a probation agent would presumably have reasonable grounds to search the contents of the item. Purtell tells us that as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe a probationer has contraband, a probation agent will almost always have the right to search the contraband itself without a warrant. State v. Keller, 2017 WI App 19, 374 Wis. 2d 325, 893 N.W.2d 276, 16-0500.

When a probation agent lawfully seized a contraband computer from a probationer but did not have the ability to examine the contents of the contraband and requested the assistance of an analyst at the division of criminal investigation, independent from any law enforcement investigation, so as to examine the contents of the computer, based upon the rationale set forth in Purtell and Devries, the search was not a police search. State v. Keller, 2017 WI App 19, 374 Wis. 2d 325, 893 N.W.2d 276, 16-0500.

In cases involving warrantless community caretaker impoundments, the fundamental question is the reasonableness of the seizure. The absence of standard criteria does not by default render a warrantless community caretaker impoundment unconstitutional under the 4th Amendment reasonableness standard, nor does an officer's lack of adherence to standard criteria, if they exist, automatically render such impoundments unconstitutional. Under the reasonableness standard, an officer's discretion to impound a car is sufficiently cabined by the requirement that the decision to impound be based, at least in part, on a reasonable community caretaking concern and not exclusively on the suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 76, 376 Wis. 2d 644, 898 N.W.2d 541, 15-2052.

The danger inherent to traffic stops authorizes an officer to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his or her mission safely. When after writing traffic citations, the officer returned to the defendant's car and asked him to submit to a search, this request did not extend the stop beyond its permissible duration. Because the request related to officer safety and was negligibly burdensome, it was part of the traffic stop's mission, and so did not cause an extension. Whatever additional time the actual search consumed, or the burden it imposed, was irrelevant so long as the defendant consented to it. State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560, 15-1294.

A court is not bound by an officer's subjective reasons for a search. That a search was going to happen pursuant to law enforcement agency policy is not controlling. Rather, the question is whether the search itself was constitutionally permissible as an objective matter. The officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to search for weapons. One who reacts to a question by quieting down, becoming deflated, and responding demurely does so for a reason. A reasonably prudent officer seeing this response to a question about weapons would be suspicious and wonder if the answer was truthful. An abnormal nervousness or unusual response to interaction with law enforcement is a relevant factor in whether a person is armed and dangerous. State v. Nesbit, 2017 WI App 58, 378 Wis. 2d 65, 902 N.W.2d 266, 16-0224.

In Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, the supreme court held that exigent circumstances exist where there is a strong odor of marijuana emanating from a residence and occupants simply become aware of police outside the door. An officer could reasonably believe that a juvenile who is attempting to flee from a residence when officers are on the property and the odor of burning marijuana is in the air is more likely to also attempt to prevent evidence from being discovered by the police, including through the destruction of such evidence. State v. Torres, 2017 WI App 60, 378 Wis. 2d 201, 902 N.W.2d 543, 16-1061.

Under City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, generally, a search or seizure will be deemed unreasonable “in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” However, there are limited circumstances when special law enforcement concerns justify highway stops without individualized suspicion, such as when a suspicionless search is designed to serve special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement. The factors for determining reasonableness are the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. If the public interest aspects of the first 2 factors are not outweighed by the 4th amendment protections represented by the third factor, the protections offered by the 4th amendment are not violated. State v. Scott, 2017 WI App 74, 378 Wis. 2d 578, 904 N.W.2d 125, 16-1742.

Because a traffic stop's mission includes the ordinary inquiries, such as checking a driver's license, an officer who lawfully stops a vehicle should be able to complete that mission even if the reason for the traffic stop ended during the officer's walk to the stopped vehicle. Ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop include: checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance. State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, 379 Wis. 2d 86, 905 N.W.2d 353, 15-0756.

A police officer's act of opening a vehicle's passenger door in order to effectively communicate with a driver otherwise inaccessible due to the malfunctioning driver's door and window when the defendant appeared to be cooperating and moving toward the passenger seat, and seemed to be trying to open the passenger door, did not constitute an unreasonable search. The officer's actions, viewed objectively, would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the action taken was appropriate. State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, 379 Wis. 2d 86, 905 N.W.2d 353, 15-0756.

Despite the defendant passing field sobriety tests and the officer apparently concluding that the defendant was not impaired due to alcohol, the officer, quite reasonably, believed there was “something else going on,” though he did not know if it was a medical issue or a drug issue. From the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable inference of wrongful conduct — that the defendant had driven while under the influence of a drug or drugs — could be objectively discerned, and thus the officer had the right to continue the temporary detention of the defendant for further investigation. State v. Rose, 2018 WI App 5, 379 Wis. 2d 663, 907 N.W.2d 463, 16-2257.

Under Payton, 445 U.S. 573, police may enter a residence pursuant to an arrest warrant if the facts and circumstances present the police with a reasonable belief that: 1) the subject of the arrest warrant resides in the home; and 2) the subject of the arrest warrant is present in the home at the time entry is effected. State v. Delap, 2018 WI 64, 382 Wis. 2d 92, 913 N.W.2d 175, 16-2196.

A search occurs when a convicted recidivist sex offender who has completed his or her sentence is required to attach a monitoring device to his or her body to track his or her movements. The reasonableness of a search depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations. Under the totality of the circumstances, given the diminished nature of a defendant's privacy interest and the state's particularly strong interest in reducing recidivism through the information collected by the tracking device, the global positioning system tracking requirement for convicted sex offenders is reasonable under the 4th Amendment. Kaufman v. Walker, 2018 WI App 37, 382 Wis. 2d 774, 915 N.W.2d 193, 17-0085.

The 4th amendment's special needs doctrine applies to s. 301.48. The global positioning system (GPS) tracking program effectively serves the recognized special needs of deterring future crimes and gathering information needed to solve them. The state's interest in accomplishing these special needs in the context of sex crimes outweighs sex offenders' diminished privacy expectations. Kaufman v. Walker, 2018 WI App 37, 382 Wis. 2d 774, 915 N.W.2d 193, 17-0085.

Under Birchfield, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, it is impermissible to impose criminal penalties for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw. A lengthier jail sentence is a criminal penalty. Therefore, the circuit court in this case violated Birchfield by explicitly subjecting the defendant to a more severe criminal penalty because the defendant refused to provide a blood sample absent a warrant. State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120, 16-2483.

The expectation of privacy in digital files is governed by the same standards as the expectation of privacy in physical property. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in digital files that are publicly shared on a peer-to-peer network, including where law enforcement used non-publicly available softwear and geolocation services based on a publicly available IP address to discover the files and locate the defendant. State v. Baric, 2018 WI App 63, 384 Wis. 2d 359, 919 N.W.2d 221, 17-0185.

Whether consent is verbal or inferred from one's actions, consent must be unequivocal and specific. Leading an officer to the threshold of an apartment and then entering the apartment and closing the door does not imply consent for the officer to enter the apartment. The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the 4th amendment is that of objective reasonableness—what the typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. State v. Reed, 2018 WI 109, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56, 16-1609.

Generalized concerns for safety and risk of flight are not enough to give rise to exigent circumstances. The test is whether there are objective facts known to the officer that would reasonably lead him to believe that the delay caused by obtaining a warrant would gravely endanger life or greatly enhance the likelihood of the subject's escape. State v. Reed, 2018 WI 109, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56, 16-1609.

The 4th amendment tolerates certain investigations that are outside the scope of the mission of a traffic stop, so long as the investigations do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. When the officer questioned the defendant on whether the defendant had a valid concealed carry permit, although the questioning and a permit check were outside the mission of the traffic stop, they did not violate the 4th amendment because they did not measurably extend the duration of the stop and were conducted concurrently with mission-related activities. State v. Wright, 2019 WI 45, 386 Wis. 2d 495, 926 N.W.2d 157, 17-2006.

When an officer lawfully arrests a driver for operating while intoxicated (OWI), even if alcohol is the only substance detected in relation to the driver, a search of the interior of the vehicle, including any containers therein, is lawful because it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the offense of OWI might be found. State v. Coffee, 2019 WI App 25, 387 Wis. 2d 673, 929 N.W.2d 245, 18-1209.

An anonymous informant is considered reliable if police are able to corroborate details in the informant's tip. In this case, the record contained no information indicating the informant's identity or whether the informant had provided reliable information to police in the past, but, because the tips were corroborated, the court did not discount them entirely in its analysis. Accordingly, the corroborated tips of the unnamed informant in this case could be considered in the analysis of the totality of the circumstances, giving them such weight as they were due. State v. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 285, 17-1104.

An immediate and continuous pursuit was a hot pursuit satisfying the 4th amendment exception to the warrant requirement. The measured speed at which the pursuit occurred in no way lessened its “hot” nature. State v. Ionescu, 2019 WI App 68, 389 Wis. 2d 586, 937 N.W.2d 90, 18-1620.

A warrantless, non-exigent, felony arrest in public was constitutional despite the opportunity to obtain a warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411.

When a driver was stopped because of expired license plates, a police order to get out of the car was reasonable and a subsequent “pat down" based on an observed bulge under the driver's jacket resulted in the legal seizure of an unlicensed revolver. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).

A burning building clearly presents an exigency rendering a warrantless entry reasonable, and fire officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the fire after it is extinguished. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978)

The warrantless installation of a pen register, that recorded telephone numbers called but not the contents of the calls, did not violate the 4th amendment. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

A warrantless search of a suitcase in the trunk of a taxi was unconstitutional. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).

Police may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

That police had lawful possession of pornographic film boxes did not give them authority to search their contents. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).

An officer who accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee's residence to obtain identification properly seized contraband in plain view. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).

Officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thorough as could be authorized by warrant. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).

When an officer, after stopping a defendant's car at a routine driver's license checkpoint, saw a tied-off party balloon in plain sight, the officer had probable cause to believe the balloon contained an illicit substance. Hence, a warrantless seizure of the balloon was legal. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).

A warrantless search by arson investigators of the defendant's fire-damaged home that was not a continuation of an earlier search was unconstitutional. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984).

When a damaged shipping package was examined by company employees who discovered white powder, a subsequent warrantless field test by police was constitutional. U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).

The “open fields" doctrine is discussed. Oliver v. U.S. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).

The warrantless, nighttime entry of the defendant's home for arrest for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense was not justified under the “hot pursuit" doctrine or the preservation of evidence doctrine. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).

School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student. The legality of the search depends on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search. New Jersey v. T. L. O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

When officers were entitled to seize packages in a vehicle and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, a warrantless search of the packages 3 days later was reasonable. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).

The vehicle exception for warrantless searches applies to motor homes. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).

The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when an officer reasonably relies upon a statute allowing a warrantless administrative search that was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).

A protective sweep of a residence in conjunction with an arrest is permissible if police reasonably believe that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to officers or others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990).

Inadvertence is not a necessary condition to a “plain view" seizure. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990).

For a seizure of a person to occur there must either be an application of force, however slight, or when force is absent, submission to an officer's “show of authority." California v. Hodari D. 499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 690 (1991).

A determination of probable cause made within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest generally meets the promptness requirement. If a hearing is held more than 48 hours following the arrest the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate an emergency or extraordinary circumstances. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991).

There shall be one rule governing all automobile searches. The police may search the car and all containers within it without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained in either. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991).

If during a lawful weapons pat down an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993).

An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997).

Persons observed through a window in a home where they were not overnight guests but were present for a short period to engage in a primarily commercial illegal drug transaction, had no expectation of privacy in the home and the observation of those persons was not a constitutionally prohibited search. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998).

The issuance of a traffic citation without an arrest did not authorize a full search of the vehicle. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998).

When there is probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband officers may examine containers in the vehicle without a showing of individualized probable cause for each container. The container may be searched whether or not it's owner is present as a passenger, or otherwise, because it may contain contraband that the officers reasonably believe is in the car. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999).

Police need not obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999).

The exception to the requirement of a warrant for automobiles does not require a separate finding of exigency, in addition to a finding of probable cause. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).

When there is probable cause to search a motor vehicle, the search is not unreasonable if the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, although a warrant was not obtained. No separate finding of exigent circumstances is required. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).

There is no murder scene exception to the warrant requirement. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 145 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1999).

Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).

An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, is insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of a person. The tip must bear indicia of reliability. Reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of criminal activity, not just in its tendency to to identify a person. Florida v. J.L. 529 U.S. 266, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000).

Stopping vehicles at highway checkpoints without any individualized suspicion to interdict illegal drugs was an unreasonable seizure under the 4th amendment because the primary purpose was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, unlike checkpoints to check for drunk driving or illegal immigrants. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000).

The police acted reasonably when, with probable cause to believe that the defendant had hidden drugs in his home, they prevented the man from entering the home for about 2 hours until a search warrant could be obtained. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 148 LEd2d 838 (2001).

A state hospital could not test maternity patients for cocaine and then turn the results over to law enforcement authorities without patient consent. The interest of using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine does not justify a departure from the rule that a nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a warrant. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 525 U.S. 67, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001).

If an officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed even a very minor criminal offense that does not breach the peace, the officer may, without violating the 4th amendment, arrest the offender without the need to balance the circumstances involved in the particular situation. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001)

Obtaining, by sense-enhancing technology like infrared imaging, information regarding the interior of a home that could otherwise not be obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area is a search presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Kyllo v. U.S. 533 U.S. 27, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001).

A warrantless search of a probationer's residence founded on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and authorized as a condition of probation was reasonable. Such a search is not restricted to monitoring whether the probationer is complying with probation restrictions. U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001).

Police officers may approach bus riders at random to ask questions and to request consent to search luggage without advising the passengers of their right to not cooperate. U.S. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002).

A school district policy of requiring all participants in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing was a reasonable means of furthering the district's interest in preventing drug use among students and was not an unreasonable search. Board of Education of Independent School District. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. White, 536 U.S. 822, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002).

A highway checkpoint where police stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run was reasonable. The arrest of a drunk driver arrested when his vehicle swerved nearly hitting an officer at the checkpoint was constitutional. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed 2d 843 (2004).

When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the 4th amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest whether the officer makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, or when the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after the latter has exited the vehicle. Thornton v. U.S. 541 U.S. 615, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 158 L. Ed 2d 905 (2004).

The principles of Terry permit a state to require a suspect to disclose his or her name in the course of a Terry stop and allow imposing criminal penalties for failing to do so. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed 2d 292 (2004).

The 4th amendment does not requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop. The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2004).

Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. An action is reasonable under the 4th amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, “as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006).

The 4th amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006).

Warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the U.S. constitution, and while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the 4th amendment's protections. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008).

In a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry condition — a lawful investigatory stop — is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009).

Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. Police are authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. Consistent with Thornton, circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009).

The New Jersey v. T. L. O. concern to limit a school search to a reasonable scope requires reasonable suspicion of danger or a resort to hiding evidence of wrongdoing in underwear before a searcher can reasonably make the quantum leap from a search of outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions. Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009).

A government employer had the right, under the circumstances of the case, to read text messages sent and received on a pager the employer owned and issued to an employee. The privacy of the messages was not protected by the ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures" found in the 4th amendment. Because the search was motivated by a legitimate work related purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope, the search was reasonable. Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 560 US 746, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216 (2010).

Warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the 4th amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. The exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. When the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the 4th amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011).

The government's installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a “search." United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012).

Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken. When an alleged 4th amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner. There is a narrow exception allowing suit when it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 182 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2012).

Generally, every detainee who will be admitted to the general jail population may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed. Undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from these invasive procedures absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband. Deference must be given to the officials in charge of the jail unless there is substantial evidence demonstrating their response to the situation is exaggerated. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2012).

The categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant must be limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. A spatial constraint defined by the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched is therefore required for detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant. Limiting the rule in Summers to the area in which an occupant poses a real threat to the safe and efficient execution of a search warrant ensures that the scope of the detention incident to a search is confined to its underlying justification. Once an occupant is beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched, the search-related law enforcement interests are diminished and the intrusiveness of the detention is more severe. Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2013).

Using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the contents of the home is a “search" within the meaning of the 4th amendment. A police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is no more than any private citizen might do. But introducing a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is something else. There is no customary invitation to do that. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013).

Natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not present a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases. Consistent with general 4th amendment principles, exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013).

Police officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search of the information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested. Law enforcement officers remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon. Once an officer has secured a phone and eliminated any potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can endanger no one. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014)

In light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines, it follows that a state conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person's body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual's movements. That conclusion, however, does not decide the ultimate question of the program's constitutionality. The 4th amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 194 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2015).

A police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015).

The attenuation doctrine applies when an officer makes an unconstitutional investigatory stop; learns during that stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant; and proceeds to arrest the suspect and seize incriminating evidence during a search incident to that arrest. The evidence the officer seized as part of the search incident to arrest is admissible because the officer's discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest. Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016).

A breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving. As in all cases involving reasonable searches incident to arrest, a warrant is not needed in this situation. The 4th Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. The impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for blood alcohol content testing is great. Blood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed 2d 560 (2016).

The automobile exception to the 4th amendment does not permit a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to search a vehicle parked therein. Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018).

Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements, and an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of the individual's physical movements as captured through cell-site location information. The government conducts a search under the 4th amendment when the government accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of a user's past movements. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018).

Under the third-party doctrine, a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information the person voluntarily turns over to third parties. However, given the unique nature of cellphone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome a user's claim to 4th amendment protection. Whether the government employs its own surveillance technology or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of the individual's physical movements as captured through cell-site location information, and a warrant is required in the rare case where a suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018).

Within the meaning of the 4th amendment, domestic animals are effects and the killing of a companion dog constitutes a seizure, which is constitutional only if reasonable. Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707 (2008).

Given how slight is the incremental loss of privacy from having to wear an anklet monitor, and how valuable to society the information collected by the monitor is, s. 301.48 does not violate the 4th amendment. The terms of supervised release, probation, and parole often authorize searches by probation officers without the officers' having to obtain warrants. Such warrantless searches do not violate the 4th amendment as long as they are reasonable. Such monitoring of sex offenders is permissible if it satisfies the reasonableness test applied in parolee and special-needs cases. Wisconsin's ankle monitoring of the defendant is reasonable. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (2016).

But What of Wisconsin's Exclusionary Rule? The Wisconsin Supreme Court Accepts Apparent Authority to Consent as Grounds for Warrantless Searches. Schmidt. 83 MLR 299 (1999).

State v. Seibel: Wisconsin Police Now Need Only a Reasonable Suspicion to Search a Suspect's Blood Incident to an Arrest. Armstrong. 1993 WLR 563.

OWI Blood Draws: An Uncertain Road Ahead. Anderegg. Wis. Law. Nov. 2017.