Costs, Damages, and Penalties

Costs, Damages, and Penalties.—What costs are allowed by law is for the court to determine; an erroneous judgment of what the law allows does not deprive a party of his property without due process of law.922 Nor does a statute providing for the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees in actions on small claims subject unsuccessful defendants to any unconstitutional deprivation.923 Congress may, however, severely restrict attorney's fees in an effort to keep an administrative claims proceeding informal.924

Equally consistent with the requirements of due process is a statutory procedure whereby a prosecutor of a case is adjudged liable for costs, and committed to jail in default of payment thereof, whenever the court or jury, after according him an opportunity to present evidence of good faith, finds that he instituted the prosecution without probable cause and from malicious motives.925 Also, as a reasonable incentive for prompt settlement without suit of just demands of a class receiving special legislative treatment, such as common carriers and insurance companies together with their patrons, a State may permit harassed litigants to recover penalties in the form of attorney's fees or damages.926

By virtue of its plenary power to prescribe the character of the sentence which shall be awarded against those found guilty of crime, a State may provide that a public officer embezzling public money shall, notwithstanding that he has made restitution, suffer not only imprisonment but also pay a fine equal to double the amount embezzled, which shall operate as a judgment for the use of persons whose money was embezzled. Whatever this fine is called, whether a penalty, or punishment, or civil judgment, it comes to the convict as the result of his crime.927 On the other hand, when appellant, by its refusal to surrender certain assets, was adjudged in contempt for frustrating enforcement of a judgment obtained against it, dismissal of its appeal from the first judgment was not a penalty imposed for the contempt, but merely a reasonable method for sustaining the effectiveness of the State's judicial process.928

922 Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 259 (1907).

923 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 650 (1914).

924 Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (limitation of attorneys' fees to $10 in veterans benefit proceedings does not violate claimants' Fifth Amendment due process rights absent a showing of probability of error in the proceedings that presence of attorneys would sharply diminish). See also United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990) (upholding regulations under the Black Lung Benefits Act prohibiting contractual fee arrangements).

925 Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1896). Consider, however, the possible bearing of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) (statute allowing jury to impose costs on acquitted defendant, but containing no standards to guide discretion, violates due process).

926 Yazoo & Miss. R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1922); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U.S. 129, 139 (1921); Life & Casualty Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934).

927 Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659, 663, 665 (1907).

928 National Union v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954) (the judgment debtor had refused to post a supersedeas bond or to comply with reasonable orders designed to safeguard the value of the judgment pending decision on appeal).

To deter careless destruction of human life, a State by law may allow punitive damages to be assessed in actions against employers for deaths caused by the negligence of their employees,929 and may also allow punitive damages for fraud perpetrated by employees.930 Also constitutional is the traditional common law approach for measuring punitive damages, granting the jury wide but not unlimited discretion to consider the gravity of the offense and the need to deter similar offenses.931 The Court has indicated, however, that the amount of punitive damages are limited to those reasonably necessary to vindicate a state's interest in deterring unlawful conduct.932 These limits may be discerned by a court by examining the degree of reprehensibility of the act, the ratio between the punitive award and plaintiff's actual or potential harm, and the legislative sanctions provided for comparable misconduct.933 In addition, the “Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties …”41

929 Pizitz Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 114 (1927).

930 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).

931 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (finding sufficient constraints on jury discretion in jury instructions and in post-verdict review). See also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (striking down a provision of the Oregon Constitution limiting judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury).

932 BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that a $2 million judgement for failing to disclose to a purchaser that a "new" car had been repainted was "grossly excessive" in relation to the state's interest, as only a few of the 983 similarly re-painted cars had been sold in that same state). State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (applying BMW v. Gore guideposts to hold that a $145 million judgment for refusing to settle an insurance claim was excessive, in part because it included consideration of conduct occurring in other states as well as conduct bearing no relation to the plaintiffs’ harm). But see TXO Corp. v. Alliance Resources, 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (punitive damages of $10 million for slander of title does not violate the Due Process Clause even though the jury awarded actual damages of only $19,000).

933 BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75 (1996). The Court has suggested that awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages would be unlikely to pass scrutiny under due process, and that the greater the compensatory damages, the less this ratio should be. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424 (2003).

41 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (punitive damages award overturned because trial court had allowed jury to consider the effect of defendant’s conduct on smokers who were not parties to the lawsuit).

Pages: 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58