Procedural Due Process Civil
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Due process requires that the procedures by which laws are applied must be evenhanded, so that individuals are not subjected to the arbitrary exercise of government power.737 Exactly what procedures are needed to satisfy due process, however, will vary depending on the circumstances and subject matter involved.738 A basic threshold issue respecting whether due process is satisfied is whether the government conduct being examined is a part of a criminal or civil proceeding.739 The appropriate framework for assessing procedural rules in the field of criminal law is determining whether the procedure is offensive to the concept of fundamental fairness.740 In civil contexts, however, a balancing test is used that evaluates the government’s chosen procedure with respect to the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest under the chosen procedure, and the government interest at stake.741
Relevance of Historical Use.—The requirements of due process are determined in part by an examination of the settled usages and modes of proceedings of the common and statutory law of England during pre-colonial times and in the early years of this country.742 In other words, the antiquity of a legal procedure is a factor weighing in its favor. However, it does not follow that a procedure settled in English law and adopted in this country is, or remains, an essential element of due process of law. If that were so, the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth century would be “fastened upon American jurisprudence like a strait jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional amendment.”743 Fortunately, the states are not tied down by any provision of the Constitution to the practice and procedure that existed at the common law, but may avail themselves of the wisdom gathered by the experience of the country to make changes deemed to be necessary.744
Non-Judicial Proceedings.—A court proceeding is not a requisite of due process.745 Administrative and executive proceedings are not judicial, yet they may satisfy the Due Process Clause.746 Moreover, the Due Process Clause does not require de novo judicial review of the factual conclusions of state regulatory agencies,747 and may not require judicial review at all.748 Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit a state from conferring judicial functions upon non-judicial bodies, or from delegating powers to a court that are legislative in nature.749 Further, it is up to a state to determine to what extent its legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be kept distinct and separate.750
The Requirements of Due Process.—Although due process tolerates variances in procedure “appropriate to the nature of the case,”751 it is nonetheless possible to identify its core goals and requirements. First, “[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”752 Thus, the required elements of due process are those that “minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations” by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a state proposes to deprive them of protected interests.753 The core of these requirements is notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Due process may also require an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and for discovery; that a decision be made based on the record, and that a party be allowed to be represented by counsel.
(1) Notice. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”754 This may include an obligation, upon learning that an attempt at notice has failed, to take “reasonable followup measures” that may be available.755 In addition, notice must be sufficient to enable the recipient to determine what is being proposed and what he must do to prevent the deprivation of his interest.756 Ordinarily, service of the notice must be reasonably structured to assure that the person to whom it is directed receives it.757 Such notice, however, need not describe the legal procedures necessary to protect one’s interest if such procedures are otherwise set out in published, generally available public sources.758
(2) Hearing. “[S]ome form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property [or liberty] interest.”759 This right is a “basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment . . . .”760 Thus, the notice of hearing and the opportunity to be heard “must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”761
(3) Impartial Tribunal. Just as in criminal and quasi-criminal cases,762 an impartial decisionmaker is an essential right in civil proceedings as well.763 “The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. . . . At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.”764 Thus, a showing of bias or of strong implications of bias was deemed made where a state optometry board, made up of only private practitioners, was proceeding against other licensed optometrists for unprofessional conduct because they were employed by corporations. Since success in the board’s effort would redound to the personal benefit of private practitioners, the Court thought the interest of the board members to be sufficient to disqualify them.765
There is, however, a “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators,”766 so that the burden is on the objecting party to show a conﬂict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification of a specific officer or for disapproval of the system. Thus, combining functions within an agency, such as by allowing members of a State Medical Examining Board to both investigate and adjudicate a physician’s suspension, may raise substantial concerns, but does not by itself establish a violation of due process.767 The Court has also held that the official or personal stake that school board members had in a decision to fire teachers who had engaged in a strike against the school system in violation of state law was not such so as to disqualify them.768 Sometimes, to ensure an impartial tribunal, the Due Process Clause requires a judge to recuse himself from a case. In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. , Inc., the Court noted that “most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level,” and that “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.”769 The Court added, however, that “[t]he early and leading case on the subject” had “concluded that the Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he has ‘a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in a case.”770 In addition, although “[p]ersonal bias or prejudice ‘alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause,’” there “are circumstances ‘in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’”771 These circumstances include “where a judge had a financial interest in the outcome of a case” or “a conﬂict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding.”772 In such cases, “[t]he inquiry is an objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”773 In Caperton, a company appealed a jury verdict of $50 million, and its chairman spent $3 million to elect a justice to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia at a time when “[i]t was reasonably foreseeable . . . that the pending case would be before the newly elected justice.”774 This $3 million was more than the total amount spent by all other supporters of the justice and three times the amount spent by the justice’s own committee. The justice was elected, declined to recuse himself, and joined a 3-to-2 decision overturning the jury verdict. The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, “conclude[d] that there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate inﬂuence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”775
Subsequently, in Williams v. Pennsylvania, the Court found that the right of due process was violated when a judge on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court—who participated in case denying post-conviction relief to a prisoner convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death—had, in his former role as a district attorney, given approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.776 Relying on Caperton, which the Court viewed as having set forth an “objective standard” that requires recusal when the likelihood of bias on the part of the judge is “too high to be constitutionally tolerable,”777 the Williams Court specifically held that there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge had previously had a “significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case.”778 The Court based its holding, in part, on earlier cases which had found impermissible bias occurs when the same person serves as both “accuser” and “adjudicator” in a case, which the Court viewed as having happened in Williams.779 It also reasoned that authorizing another person to seek the death penalty represents “significant personal involvement” in a case,780 and took the view that the involvement of multiple actors in a case over many years “only heightens”—rather than mitigates—the “need for objective rules preventing the operation of bias that otherwise might be obscured.”781 As a remedy, the case was remanded for reevaluation by the reconstituted Pennsylvania Supreme Court, notwithstanding the fact that the judge in question did not cast the deciding vote, as the Williams Court viewed the judge’s participation in the multi-member panel’s deliberations as sufficient to taint the public legitimacy of the underlying proceedings and constitute reversible error.782
(4) Confrontation and Cross-Examination. “In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”783 Where the “evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealously,” the individual’s right to show that it is untrue depends on the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. “This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, . . . but also in all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny.”784
(5) Discovery. The Court has never directly confronted this issue, but in one case it did observe in dictum that “where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.”785 Some federal agencies have adopted discovery rules modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Administrative Conference has recommended that all do so.786 There appear to be no cases, however, holding they must, and there is some authority that they cannot absent congressional authorization.787
(6) Decision on the Record. Although this issue arises principally in the administrative law area,788 it applies generally. “[T]he decisionmaker’s conclusion . . . must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. To demonstrate compliance with this elementary requirement, the decisionmaker should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, though his statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.”789
(7) Counsel. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held that a government agency must permit a welfare recipient who has been denied benefits to be represented by and assisted by counsel.790 In the years since, the Court has struggled with whether civil litigants in court and persons before agencies who could not afford retained counsel should have counsel appointed and paid for, and the matter seems far from settled. The Court has established a presumption that an indigent does not have the right to appointed counsel unless his “physical liberty” is threatened.791 Moreover, that an indigent may have a right to appointed counsel in some civil proceedings where incarceration is threatened does not mean that counsel must be made available in all such cases. Rather, the Court focuses on the circumstances in individual cases, and may hold that provision of counsel is not required if the state provides appropriate alternative safeguards.792
Though the calculus may vary, cases not involving detention also are determined on a casebycase basis using a balancing standard.793
For instance, in a case involving a state proceeding to terminate the parental rights of an indigent without providing her counsel, the Court recognized the parent’s interest as “an extremely important one.” The Court, however, also noted the state’s strong interest in protecting the welfare of children. Thus, as the interest in correct fact-finding was strong on both sides, the proceeding was relatively simple, no features were present raising a risk of criminal liability, no expert witnesses were present, and no “specially troublesome” substantive or procedural issues had been raised, the litigant did not have a right to appointed counsel.794 In other due process cases involving parental rights, the Court has held that due process requires special state attention to parental rights.795 Thus, it would appear likely that in other parental right cases, a right to appointed counsel could be established.
The Procedure That Is Due Process
The Interests Protected: “Life, Liberty and Property”.— The language of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the provision of due process when an interest in one’s “life, liberty or property” is threatened.796 Traditionally, the Court made this determination by reference to the common understanding of these terms, as embodied in the development of the common law.797 In the 1960s, however, the Court began a rapid expansion of the “liberty” and “property” aspects of the clause to include such non-traditional concepts as conditional property rights and statutory entitlements. Since then, the Court has followed an inconsistent path of expanding and contracting the breadth of these protected interests. The “life” interest, on the other hand, although often important in criminal cases, has found little application in the civil context.
The Property Interest.—The expansion of the concept of “property rights” beyond its common law roots reﬂected a recognition by the Court that certain interests that fall short of traditional property rights are nonetheless important parts of people’s economic well-being. For instance, where household goods were sold under an installment contract and title was retained by the seller, the possessory interest of the buyer was deemed sufficiently important to require procedural due process before repossession could occur.798 In addition, the loss of the use of garnished wages between the time of garnishment and final resolution of the underlying suit was deemed a sufficient property interest to require some form of determination that the garnisher was likely to prevail.799 Furthermore, the continued possession of a driver’s license, which may be essential to one’s livelihood, is protected; thus, a license should not be suspended after an accident for failure to post a security for the amount of damages claimed by an injured party without affording the driver an opportunity to raise the issue of liability.800
A more fundamental shift in the concept of property occurred with recognition of society’s growing economic reliance on government benefits, employment, and contracts,801 and with the decline of the “right-privilege” principle. This principle, discussed previously in the First Amendment context,802 was pithily summarized by Justice Holmes in dismissing a suit by a policeman protesting being fired from his job: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”803 Under this theory, a finding that a litigant had no “vested property interest” in government employment,804 or that some form of public assistance was “only” a privilege,805 meant that no procedural due process was required before depriving a person of that interest.806 The reasoning was that, if a government was under no obligation to provide something, it could choose to provide it subject to whatever conditions or procedures it found appropriate.
The conceptual underpinnings of this position, however, were always in conﬂict with a line of cases holding that the government could not require the diminution of constitutional rights as a condition for receiving benefits. This line of thought, referred to as the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, held that, “even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, it may not do so on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”807 Nonetheless, the two doctrines coexisted in an unstable relationship until the 1960s, when the right-privilege distinction started to be largely disregarded.808
Concurrently with the virtual demise of the “right-privilege” distinction, there arose the “entitlement” doctrine, under which the Court erected a barrier of procedural—but not substantive—protections809 against erroneous governmental deprivation of something it had within its discretion bestowed. Previously, the Court had limited due process protections to constitutional rights, traditional rights, common law rights and “natural rights.” Now, under a new “positivist” approach, a protected property or liberty interest might be found based on any positive governmental statute or governmental practice that gave rise to a legitimate expectation. Indeed, for a time it appeared that this positivist conception of protected rights was going to displace the traditional sources.
As noted previously, the advent of this new doctrine can be seen in Goldberg v. Kelly,810 in which the Court held that, because termination of welfare assistance may deprive an eligible recipient of the means of livelihood, the government must provide a pretermination evidentiary hearing at which an initial determination of the validity of the dispensing agency’s grounds for termination may be made. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court found that such benefits “are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.”811 Thus, where the loss or reduction of a benefit or privilege was conditioned upon specified grounds, it was found that the recipient had a property interest entitling him to proper procedure before termination or revocation.
At first, the Court’s emphasis on the importance of the statutory rights to the claimant led some lower courts to apply the Due Process Clause by assessing the weights of the interests involved and the harm done to one who lost what he was claiming. This approach, the Court held, was inappropriate. “[W]e must look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of the interest at stake. . . . We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”812 To have a property interest in the constitutional sense, the Court held, it was not enough that one has an abstract need or desire for a benefit or a unilateral expectation. He must rather “have a legitimate claim of entitlement” to the benefit. “Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”813
Consequently, in Board of Regents v. Roth, the Court held that the refusal to renew a teacher’s contract upon expiration of his one-year term implicated no due process values because there was nothing in the public university’s contract, regulations, or policies that “created any legitimate claim” to reemployment.814 By contrast, in Perry v. Sindermann,815 a professor employed for several years at a public college was found to have a protected interest, even though his employment contract had no tenure provision and there was no statutory assurance of it.816 The “existing rules or understandings” were deemed to have the characteristics of tenure, and thus provided a legitimate expectation independent of any contract provision.817
The Court has also found “legitimate entitlements” in a variety of other situations besides employment. In Goss v. Lopez,818 an Ohio statute provided for both free education to all residents between five and 21 years of age and compulsory school attendance; thus, the state was deemed to have obligated itself to accord students some due process hearing rights prior to suspending them, even for such a short period as ten days. “Having chosen to extend the right to an education to people of appellees’ class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred.”819 The Court is highly deferential, however, to school dismissal decisions based on academic grounds.820
The further one gets from traditional precepts of property, the more difficult it is to establish a due process claim based on entitlements. In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,821 the Court considered whether police officers violated a constitutionally protected property interest by failing to enforce a restraining order obtained by an estranged wife against her husband, despite having probable cause to believe the order had been violated. While noting statutory language that required that officers either use “every reasonable means to enforce [the] restraining order” or “seek a warrant for the arrest of the restrained person,” the Court resisted equating this language with the creation of an enforceable right, noting a longstanding tradition of police discretion coexisting with apparently mandatory arrest statutes.822 Finally, the Court even questioned whether finding that the statute contained mandatory language would have created a property right, as the wife, with no criminal enforcement authority herself, was merely an indirect recipient of the benefits of the governmental enforcement scheme.823
In Arnett v. Kennedy,824 an incipient counter-revolution to the expansion of due process was rebuffed, at least with respect to entitlements. Three Justices sought to qualify the principle laid down in the entitlement cases and to restore in effect much of the right-privilege distinction, albeit in a new formulation. The case involved a federal law that provided that employees could not be discharged except for cause, and the Justices acknowledged that due process rights could be created through statutory grants of entitlements. The Justices, however, observed that the same law specifically withheld the procedural protections now being sought by the employees. Because “the property interest which appellee had in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest,”825 the employee would have to “take the bitter with the sweet.”826 Thus, Congress (and by analogy state legislatures) could qualify the conferral of an interest by limiting the process that might otherwise be required.
But the other six Justices, although disagreeing among themselves in other respects, rejected this attempt to formulate the issue. “This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural due process,” Justice Powell wrote. “That right is conferred not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.”827 Yet, in Bishop v. Wood,828 the Court accepted a district court’s finding that a policeman held his position “at will” despite language setting forth conditions for discharge. Although the majority opinion was couched in terms of statutory construction, the majority appeared to come close to adopting the three-Justice Arnett position, so much so that the dissenters accused the majority of having repudiated the majority position of the six Justices in Arnett. And, in Goss v. Lopez,829 Justice Powell, writing in dissent but using language quite similar to that of Justice Rehnquist in Arnett, seemed to indicate that the right to public education could be qualified by a statute authorizing a school principal to impose a ten-day suspension.830
Subsequently, however, the Court held squarely that, because “minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse action.” Indeed, any other conclusion would allow the state to destroy virtually any state-created property interest at will.831 A striking application of this analysis is found in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,832 in which a state anti-discrimination law required the enforcing agency to convene a fact-finding conference within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. Inadvertently, the Commission scheduled the hearing after the expiration of the 120 days and the state courts held the requirement to be jurisdictional, necessitating dismissal of the complaint. The Court noted that various older cases had clearly established that causes of action were property, and, in any event, Logan’s claim was an entitlement grounded in state law and thus could only be removed “for cause.” This property interest existed independently of the 120-day time period and could not simply be taken away by agency action or inaction.833
The Liberty Interest.—With respect to liberty interests, the Court has followed a similarly meandering path. Although the traditional concept of liberty was freedom from physical restraint, the Court has expanded the concept to include various other protected interests, some statutorily created and some not.834 Thus, in Ingraham v. Wright,835 the Court unanimously agreed that school children had a liberty interest in freedom from wrongfully or excessively administered corporal punishment, whether or not such interest was protected by statute. “The liberty preserved from deprivation without due process included the right ‘generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.’ . . . Among the historic liberties so protected was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.”836
The Court also appeared to have expanded the notion of “liberty” to include the right to be free of official stigmatization, and found that such threatened stigmatization could in and of itself require due process.837 Thus, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,838 the Court invalidated a statutory scheme in which persons could be labeled “excessive drinkers,” without any opportunity for a hearing and rebuttal, and could then be barred from places where alcohol was served. The Court, without discussing the source of the entitlement, noted that the governmental action impugned the individual’s reputation, honor, and integrity.839
But, in Paul v. Davis,840 the Court appeared to retreat from recognizing damage to reputation alone, holding instead that the liberty interest extended only to those situations where loss of one’s reputation also resulted in loss of a statutory entitlement. In Davis, the police had included plaintiff’s photograph and name on a list of “active shoplifters” circulated to merchants without an opportunity for notice or hearing. But the Court held that “Kentucky law does not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation which has been altered as a result of petitioners’ actions. Rather, his interest in reputation is simply one of a number which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a forum for vindication of those interest by means of damage actions.”841 Thus, unless the government’s official defamation has a specific negative effect on an entitlement, such as the denial to “excessive drinkers” of the right to obtain alcohol that occurred in Constantineau, there is no protected liberty interest that would require due process.
A number of liberty interest cases that involve statutorily created entitlements involve prisoner rights, and are dealt with more extensively in the section on criminal due process. However, they are worth noting here. In Meachum v. Fano,842 the Court held that a state prisoner was not entitled to a fact-finding hearing when he was transferred to a different prison in which the conditions were substantially less favorable to him, because (1) the Due Process Clause liberty interest by itself was satisfied by the initial valid conviction, which had deprived him of liberty, and (2) no state law guaranteed him the right to remain in the prison to which he was initially assigned, subject to transfer for cause of some sort. As a prisoner could be transferred for any reason or for no reason under state law, the decision of prison officials was not dependent upon any state of facts, and no hearing was required.
In Vitek v. Jones,843 by contrast, a state statute permitted transfer of a prisoner to a state mental hospital for treatment, but the transfer could be effectuated only upon a finding, by a designated physician or psychologist, that the prisoner “suffers from a mental disease or defect” and “cannot be given treatment in that facility.” Because the transfer was conditioned upon a “cause,” the establishment of the facts necessary to show the cause had to be done through fair procedures. Interestingly, however, the Vitek Court also held that the prisoner had a “residuum of liberty” in being free from the different confinement and from the stigma of involuntary commitment for mental disease that the Due Process Clause protected. Thus, the Court has recognized, in this case and in the cases involving revocation of parole or probation,844 a liberty interest that is separate from a statutory entitlement and that can be taken away only through proper procedures.
But, with respect to the possibility of parole or commutation or otherwise more rapid release, no matter how much the expectancy matters to a prisoner, in the absence of some form of positive entitlement, the prisoner may be turned down without observance of procedures.845 Summarizing its prior holdings, the Court recently concluded that two requirements must be present before a liberty interest is created in the prison context: the statute or regulation must contain “substantive predicates” limiting the exercise of discretion, and there must be explicit “mandatory language” requiring a particular outcome if substantive predicates are found.846 In an even more recent case, the Court limited the application of this test to those circumstances where the restraint on freedom imposed by the state creates an “atypical and significant hardship.”847
Proceedings in Which Procedural Due Process Need Not Be Observed.—Although due notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard are two fundamental protections found in almost all systems of law established by civilized countries,848 there are certain proceedings in which the enjoyment of these two conditions has not been deemed to be constitutionally necessary. For instance, persons adversely affected by a law cannot challenge its validity on the ground that the legislative body that enacted it gave no notice of proposed legislation, held no hearings at which the person could have presented his arguments, and gave no consideration to particular points of view. “Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.”849
Similarly, when an administrative agency engages in a legislative function, as, for example, when it drafts regulations of general application affecting an unknown number of persons, it need not afford a hearing prior to promulgation.850 On the other hand, if a regulation, sometimes denominated an “order,” is of limited application, that is, it affects an identifiable class of persons, the question whether notice and hearing is required and, if so, whether it must precede such action, becomes a matter of greater urgency and must be determined by evaluating the various factors discussed below.851
One such factor is whether agency action is subject to later judicial scrutiny.852 In one of the initial decisions construing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court upheld the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, acting pursuant to statute, to obtain money from a collector of customs alleged to be in arrears. The Treasury simply issued a distress warrant and seized the collector’s property, affording him no opportunity for a hearing, and requiring him to sue for recovery of his property. While acknowledging that history and settled practice required proceedings in which pleas, answers, and trials were requisite before property could be taken, the Court observed that the distress collection of debts due the crown had been the exception to the rule in England and was of long usage in the United States, and was thus sustainable.853
In more modern times, the Court upheld a procedure under which a state banking superintendent, after having taken over a closed bank and issuing notices to stockholders of their assessment, could issue execution for the amounts due, subject to the right of each stockholder to contest his liability for such an assessment by an affidavit of illegality. The fact that the execution was issued in the first instance by a governmental officer and not from a court, followed by personal notice and a right to take the case into court, was seen as unobjectionable.854
It is a violation of due process for a state to enforce a judgment against a party to a proceeding without having given him an opportunity to be heard sometime before final judgment is entered.855 With regard to the presentation of every available defense, however, the requirements of due process do not necessarily entail affording an opportunity to do so before entry of judgment. The person may be remitted to other actions initiated by him856 or an appeal may suffice. Accordingly, a surety company, objecting to the entry of a judgment against it on a supersedeas bond, without notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of liability, was not denied due process where the state practice provided the opportunity for such a hearing by an appeal from the judgment so entered. Nor could the company found its claim of denial of due process upon the fact that it lost this opportunity for a hearing by inadvertently pursuing the wrong procedure in the state courts.857 On the other hand, where a state appellate court reversed a trial court and entered a final judgment for the defendant, a plaintiff who had never had an opportunity to introduce evidence in rebuttal to certain testimony which the trial court deemed immaterial but which the appellate court considered material was held to have been deprived of his rights without due process of law.858
What Process Is Due.—The requirements of due process, as has been noted, depend upon the nature of the interest at stake, while the form of due process required is determined by the weight of that interest balanced against the opposing interests.859 The currently prevailing standard is that formulated in Mathews v. Eldridge,860 which concerned termination of Social Security benefits. “Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.”
The termination of welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly,861 which could have resulted in a “devastating” loss of food and shelter, had required a predeprivation hearing. The termination of Social Security benefits at issue in Mathews would require less protection, however, because those benefits are not based on financial need and a terminated recipient would be able to apply for welfare if need be. Moreover, the determination of ineligibility for Social Security benefits more often turns upon routine and uncomplicated evaluations of data, reducing the likelihood of error, a likelihood found significant in Goldberg. Finally, the administrative burden and other societal costs involved in giving Social Security recipients a pretermination hearing would be high. Therefore, a post-termination hearing, with full retroactive restoration of benefits, if the claimant prevails, was found satisfactory.862
Application of the Mathews standard and other considerations brought some noteworthy changes to the process accorded debtors and installment buyers. Earlier cases, which had focused upon the interests of the holders of the property in not being unjustly deprived of the goods and funds in their possession, leaned toward requiring predeprivation hearings. Newer cases, however, look to the interests of creditors as well. “The reality is that both seller and buyer had current, real interests in the property, and the definition of property rights is a matter of state law. Resolution of the due process question must take account not only of the interests of the buyer of the property but those of the seller as well.”863
Thus, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,864 which mandated predeprivation hearings before wages may be garnished, has apparently been limited to instances when wages, and perhaps certain other basic necessities, are in issue and the consequences of deprivation would be severe.865 Fuentes v. Shevin,866 which struck down a replevin statute that authorized the seizure of property (here household goods purchased on an installment contract) simply upon the filing of an ex parte application and the posting of bond, has been limited,867 so that an appropriately structured ex parte judicial determination before seizure is sufficient to satisfy due process.868 Thus, laws authorizing sequestration, garnishment, or other seizure of property of an alleged defaulting debtor need only require that (1) the creditor furnish adequate security to protect the debtor’s interest, (2) the creditor make a specific factual showing before a neutral officer or magistrate, not a clerk or other such functionary, of probable cause to believe that he is entitled to the relief requested, and (3) an opportunity be assured for an adversary hearing promptly after seizure to determine the merits of the controversy, with the burden of proof on the creditor.869
Similarly, applying the Mathews v. Eldridge standard in the context of government employment, the Court has held, albeit by a combination of divergent opinions, that the interest of the employee in retaining his job, the governmental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees, the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination combine to require the provision of some minimum pre-termination notice and opportunity to respond, followed by a full post-termination hearing, complete with all the procedures normally accorded and back pay if the employee is successful.870 Where the adverse action is less than termination of employment, the governmental interest is significant, and where reasonable grounds for such action have been established separately, then a prompt hearing held after the adverse action may be sufficient.871 In other cases, hearings with even minimum procedures may be dispensed with when what is to be established is so pro forma or routine that the likelihood of error is very small.872 In a case dealing with negligent state failure to observe a procedural deadline, the Court held that the claimant was entitled to a hearing with the agency to pass upon the merits of his claim prior to dismissal of his action.873
In Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.,874 a Court plurality applied a similar analysis to governmental regulation of private employment, determining that an employer may be ordered by an agency to reinstate a “whistle-blower” employee without an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing, but that the employer is entitled to be informed of the substance of the employee’s charges, and to have an opportunity for informal rebuttal. The principal difference with the Mathews v. Eldridge test was that here the Court acknowledged two conﬂicting private interests to weigh in the equation: that of the employer “in controlling the makeup of its workforce” and that of the employee in not being discharged for whistleblowing. Whether the case signals a shift away from evidentiary hearing requirements in the context of regulatory adjudication will depend on future developments.875
A delay in retrieving money paid to the government is unlikely to rise to the level of a violation of due process. In City of Los Angeles v. David,876 a citizen paid a $134. 50 impoundment fee to retrieve an automobile that had been towed by the city. When he subsequently sought to challenge the imposition of this impoundment fee, he was unable to obtain a hearing until 27 days after his car had been towed. The Court held that the delay was reasonable, as the private interest affected—the temporary loss of the use of the money—could be compensated by the addition of an interest payment to any refund of the fee. Further factors considered were that a 30-day delay was unlikely to create a risk of significant factual errors, and that shortening the delay significantly would be administratively burdensome for the city.
In another context, the Supreme Court applied the Mathews test to strike down a provision in Colorado’s Exoneration Act.877 That statute required individuals whose criminal convictions had been invalidated to prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence in order to recoup any fines, penalties, court costs, or restitution paid to the state as a result of the conviction.878 The Court, noting that “[a]bsent conviction of crime, one is presumed innocent,”879 concluded that all three considerations under Mathews “weigh[ed] decisively against Colorado’s scheme.”880 Specifically, the Court reasoned that (1) those affected by the Colorado statute have an “obvious interest” in regaining their funds;881 (2) the burden of proving one’s innocence by “clear and convincing” evidence unacceptably risked erroneous deprivation of those funds;882 and (3) the state had “no countervailing interests” in withholding money to which it had “zero claim of right.”883 As a result, the Court held that the state could not impose “anything more than minimal procedures” for the return of funds that occurred as a result of a conviction that was subsequently invalidated.884
In another respect, the balancing standard of Mathews has resulted in states’ having wider ﬂexibility in determining what process is required. For instance, in an alteration of previously existing law, no hearing is required if a state affords the claimant an adequate alternative remedy, such as a judicial action for damages or breach of contract.885 Thus, the Court, in passing on the inﬂiction of corporal punishment in the public schools, held that the existence of common-law tort remedies for wrongful or excessive administration of punishment, plus the context in which the punishment was administered (i. e., the ability of the teacher to observe directly the infraction in question, the openness of the school environment, the visibility of the confrontation to other students and faculty, and the likelihood of parental reaction to unreasonableness in punishment), made reasonably assured the probability that a child would not be punished without cause or excessively.886 The Court did not, however, inquire about the availability of judicial remedies for such violations in the state in which the case arose.887
The Court has required greater protection from property deprivations resulting from operation of established state procedures than from those resulting from random and unauthorized acts of state employees,888 and presumably this distinction still holds. Thus, the Court has held that post-deprivation procedures would not satisfy due process if it is “the state system itself that destroys a complainant’s property interest.”889 Although the Court brieﬂy entertained the theory that a negligent (i. e., non-willful) action by a state official was sufficient to invoke due process, and that a post-deprivation hearing regarding such loss was required,890 the Court subsequently overruled this holding, stating that “the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”891
In “rare and extraordinary situations,” where summary action is necessary to prevent imminent harm to the public, and the private interest infringed is reasonably deemed to be of less importance, government can take action with no notice and no opportunity to defend, subject to a later full hearing.892 Examples are seizure of contaminated foods or drugs or other such commodities to protect the consumer,893 collection of governmental revenues,894 and the seizure of enemy property in wartime.895 Thus, citing national security interests, the Court upheld an order, issued without notice and an opportunity to be heard, excluding a short-order cook employed by a concessionaire from a Naval Gun Factory, but the basis of the fivetofour decision is unclear.896 On the one hand, the Court was ambivalent about a right-privilege distinction;897 on the other hand, it contrasted the limited interest of the cook—barred from the base, she was still free to work at a number of the concessionaire’s other premises—with the government’s interest in conducting a high-security program.898
Generally.—Jurisdiction may be defined as the power of a government to create legal interests, and the Court has long held that the Due Process Clause limits the abilities of states to exercise this power.899 In the famous case of Pennoyer v. Neff,900 the Court enunciated two principles of jurisdiction respecting the states in a federal system901 : first, “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory,” and second, “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.”902 Over a long period of time, however, the mobility of American society and the increasing complexity of commerce led to attenuation of the second principle of Pennoyer, and consequently the Court established the modern standard of obtaining jurisdiction based upon the nature and the quality of contacts that individuals and corporations have with a state.903 This “minimum contacts” test, consequently, permits state courts to obtain power over outofstate defendants.
In Personam Proceedings Against Individuals.—How jurisdiction is determined depends on the nature of the suit being brought. If a dispute is directed against a person, not property, the proceedings are considered in personam, and jurisdiction must be established over the defendant’s person in order to render an effective decree.904 Generally, presence within the state is sufficient to create personal jurisdiction over an individual, if process is served.905 In the case of a resident who is absent from the state, domicile alone is deemed to be sufficient to keep him within reach of the state courts for purposes of a personal judgment, and process can be obtained by means of appropriate, substituted service or by actual personal service on the resident outside the state.906 However, if the defendant, although technically domiciled there, has left the state with no intention to return, service by publication, as compared to a summons left at his last and usual place of abode where his family continued to reside, is inadequate, because it is not reasonably calculated to give actual notice of the proceedings and opportunity to be heard.907
With respect to a nonresident, it is clearly established that no person can be deprived of property rights by a decree in a case in which he neither appeared nor was served or effectively made a party.908 The early cases held that the process of a court of one state could not run into another and summon a resident of that state to respond to proceedings against him, when neither his person nor his property was within the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment.909 This rule, however, has been attenuated in a series of steps.
Consent has always been sufficient to create jurisdiction, even in the absence of any other connection between the litigation and the forum. For example, the appearance of the defendant for any purpose other than to challenge the jurisdiction of the court was deemed a voluntary submission to the court’s power,910 and even a special appearance to deny jurisdiction might be treated as consensual submission to the court.911 The concept of “constructive consent” was then seized upon as a basis for obtaining jurisdiction. For instance, with the advent of the automobile, States were permitted to engage in the fiction that the use of their highways was conditioned upon the consent of drivers to be sued in state courts for accidents or other transactions arising out of such use. Thus, a state could designate a state official as a proper person to receive service of process in such litigation, and establishing jurisdiction required only that the official receiving notice communicate it to the person sued.912
Although the Court approved of the legal fiction that such jurisdiction arose out of consent, the basis for jurisdiction was really the state’s power to regulate acts done in the state that were dangerous to life or property.913 Because the state did not really have the ability to prevent nonresidents from doing business in their state,914 this extension was necessary in order to permit states to assume jurisdiction over individuals “doing business” within the state. Thus, the Court soon recognized that “doing business” within a state was itself a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, at least where the business done was exceptional enough to create a strong state interest in regulation, and service could be effectuated within the state on an agent appointed to carry out the business.915
The culmination of this trend, established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,916 was the requirement that there be “minimum contacts” with the state in question in order to establish jurisdiction. The outer limit of this test is illustrated by Kulko v. Superior Court,917 in which the Court held that California could not obtain personal jurisdiction over a New York resident whose sole relevant contact with the state was to send his daughter to live with her mother in California.918 The argument was made that the father had “caused an effect” in the state by availing himself of the benefits and protections of California’s laws and by deriving an economic benefit in the lessened expense of maintaining the daughter in New York. The Court explained that, “[l]ike any standard that requires a determination of ‘reasonableness,’ the ‘minimum contacts’ test . . . is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite ‘affiliating circumstances’ are present.”919 Although the Court noted that the “effects” test had been accepted as a test of contacts when wrongful activity outside a state causes injury within the state or when commercial activity affects state residents, the Court found that these factors were not present in this case, and any economic benefit to Kulko was derived in New York and not in California.920 As with many such cases, the decision was narrowly limited to its facts and does little to clarify the standards applicable to state jurisdiction over nonresidents.
Walden v. Fiore further articulated what “minimum contacts” are necessary to create jurisdiction as a result of the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.921 In Walden, the plaintiffs, who were residents of Nevada, sued a law enforcement officer in federal court in Nevada as a result of an incident that occurred in an airport in Atlanta as the plaintiffs were attempting to board a connecting ﬂight from Puerto Rico to Las Vegas. The Court held that the court in Nevada lacked jurisdiction because of insufficient contacts between the officer and the state relative to the alleged harm, as no part of the officer’s conduct occurred in Nevada. In so holding, the Court emphasized that the minimum contacts inquiry should not focus on the resulting injury to the plaintiffs; instead, the proper question is whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.922
Suing Out-of-State (Foreign) Corporations.—A curious aspect of American law is that a corporation has no legal existence outside the boundaries of the state chartering it.923 Thus, the basis for state court jurisdiction over an outofstate (“foreign”) corporation has been even more uncertain than that with respect to individuals. Before International Shoe Co. v. Washington,924 it was asserted that, because a corporation could not carry on business in a state without the state’s permission, the state could condition its permission upon the corporation’s consent to submit to the jurisdiction of the state’s courts, either by appointment of someone to receive process or in the absence of such designation, by accepting service upon corporate agents authorized to operate within the state.925 Further, by doing business in a state, the corporation was deemed to be present there and thus subject to service of process and suit.926 This theoretical corporate presence conﬂicted with the idea of corporations having no existence outside their state of incorporation, but it was nonetheless accepted that a corporation “doing business” in a state to a sufficient degree was “present” for service of process upon its agents in the state who carried out that business.927
Presence alone, however, does not expose a corporation to all manner of suits through the exercise of general jurisdiction. Only corporations, whose “continuous and systematic” affiliations with a forum make them “essentially at home” there, are broadly amenable to suit.928 While the paradigmatic examples of where a corporate defendant is “at home” are the corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of business,929 the Court has recognized that in “exceptional cases” general jurisdiction can be exercised by a court located where the corporate defendant’s operations are “so substantial” as to “render the corporation at home in that state.”930 Nonetheless, insubstantial instate business, in and of itself, does not suffice to permit an assertion of jurisdiction over claims that are unrelated to any activity occurring in a state.931 Without the protection of such a rule, foreign corporations would be exposed to the manifest hardship and inconvenience of defending, in any state in which they happened to be carrying on business, suits for torts wherever committed and claims on contracts wherever made.932 And if the corporation stopped doing business in the forum state before suit against it was commenced, it might well escape jurisdiction altogether.933 In early cases, the issue of the degree of activity and, in particular, the degree of solicitation that was necessary to constitute doing business by a foreign corporation, was much disputed and led to very particularistic holdings.934 In the absence of enough activity to constitute doing business, the mere presence of an agent, officer, or stockholder, who could be served, within a state’s territorial limits was not sufficient to enable the state to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.935
The touchstone in jurisdiction cases was recast by International Shoe Co. v. Washington and its “minimum contacts” analysis.936 International Shoe, an outofstate corporation, had not been issued a license to do business in the State of Washington, but it systematically and continuously employed a sales force of Washington residents to solicit therein and thus was held amenable to suit in Washington for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions for such salesmen. The Court deemed a notice of assessment served personally upon one of the local sales solicitors, and a copy of the assessment sent by registered mail to the corporation’s principal office in Missouri, sufficient to apprise the corporation of the proceeding.
To reach this conclusion, the Court not only overturned prior holdings that mere solicitation of business does not constitute a sufficient contact to subject a foreign corporation to a state’s jurisdiction,937 but also rejected the “presence” test as begging the question to be decided. “The terms ‘present’ or ‘presence,’” according to Chief Justice Stone, “are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the State which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. . . . Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the State of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system . . . , to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there; [and] . . . that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’. . . . An ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place of business is relevant in this connection.”938 As to the scope of application to be accorded this “fair play and substantial justice” doctrine, the Court concluded that “so far as . . . [corporate] obligations arise out of or are connected with activities within the State, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.”939
Extending this logic, a majority of the Court ruled that an outofstate association selling mail order insurance had developed sufficient contacts and ties with Virginia residents so that the state could institute enforcement proceedings under its Blue Sky Law by forwarding notice to the company by registered mail, notwithstanding that the Association solicited business in Virginia solely through recommendations of existing members and was represented therein by no agents whatsoever.940 The Due Process Clause was declared not to “forbid a State to protect its citizens from such injustice” of having to file suits on their claims at a far distant home office of such company, especially in view of the fact that such suits could be more conveniently tried in Virginia where claims of loss could be investigated.941
Likewise, the Court reviewed a California statute which subjected foreign mail order insurance companies engaged in contracts with California residents to suit in California courts, and which had authorized the petitioner to serve a Texas insurer by registered mail only.942 The contract between the company and the insured specified that Austin, Texas, was the place of “making” and the place where liability should be deemed to arise. The company mailed premium notices to the insured in California, and he mailed his premium payments to the company in Texas. Acknowledging that the connection of the company with California was tenuous—it had no office or agents in the state and no evidence had been presented that it had solicited anyone other than the insured for business— the Court sustained jurisdiction on the basis that the suit was on a contract which had a substantial connection with California. “The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed there and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims.”943
In making this decision, the Court noted that “[l]ooking back over the long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.”944 However, in Hanson v. Denckla, decided during the same Term, the Court found in personam jurisdiction lacking for the first time since International Shoe Co. v. Washington, pronouncing firm due process limitations. In Hanson,945 the issue was whether a Florida court considering a contested will obtained jurisdiction over corporate trustees of disputed property through use of ordinary mail and publication. The will had been entered into and probated in Florida, the claimants were resident in Florida and had been personally served, but the trustees, who were indispensable parties, were resident in Delaware. Noting the trend in enlarging the ability of the states to obtain in personam jurisdiction over absent defendants, the Court denied the exercise of nationwide in personam jurisdiction by states, saying that “it would be a mistake to assume that th[e] trend [to expand the reach of state courts] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.”946
The Court recognized in Hanson that Florida law was the most appropriate law to be applied in determining the validity of the will and that the corporate defendants might be little inconvenienced by having to appear in Florida courts, but it denied that either circumstance satisfied the Due Process Clause. The Court noted that due process restrictions do more than guarantee immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation, in that “[these restrictions] are consequences of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has the ‘minimum contacts’ with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.” The only contacts the corporate defendants had in Florida consisted of a relationship with the individual defendants. “The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. . . . The settlor’s execution in Florida of her power of appointment cannot remedy the absence of such an act in this case.”947
The Court continued to apply International Shoe principles in diverse situations. Thus, circulation of a magazine in a state was an adequate basis for that state to exercise jurisdiction over an outofstate corporate magazine publisher in a libel action. The fact that the plaintiff did not have “minimum contacts” with the forum state was not dispositive since the relevant inquiry is the relations among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.948 Or, damage done to the plaintiff’s reputation in his home state caused by circulation of a defamatory magazine article there may justify assertion of jurisdiction over the out-of-state authors of such article, despite the lack of minimum contact between the authors (as opposed to the publishers) and the state.949 Further, though there is no per se rule that a contract with an out-of-state party automatically establishes jurisdiction to enforce the contract in the other party’s forum, a franchisee who has entered into a franchise contract with an out-of-state corporation may be subject to suit in the corporation’s home state where the overall circumstances (contract terms themselves, course of dealings) demonstrate a deliberate reaching out to establish contacts with the franchisor in the franchisor’s home state.950
The Court has continued to wrestle over when a state may adjudicate a products liability claim for an injury occurring within it, at times finding the defendant’s contacts with the place of injury to be too attenuated to support its having to mount a defense there. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,951 the Court applied its “minimum contacts” test to preclude the assertion of jurisdiction over two foreign corporations that did no business in the forum state. Plaintiffs had sustained personal injuries in Oklahoma in an accident involving an alleged defect in their automobile. The car had been purchased the previous year in New York, the plaintiffs were New York residents at time of purchase, and the accident had occurred while they were driving through Oklahoma on their way to a new residence in Arizona. Defendants were the automobile retailer and its wholesaler, both New York corporations that did no business in Oklahoma. The Court found no circumstances justifying assertion by Oklahoma courts of jurisdiction over defendants. The Court found that the defendants (1) carried on no activity in Oklahoma, (2) closed no sales and performed no services there, (3) availed themselves of none of the benefits of the state’s laws, (4) solicited no business there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the state, and (5) sold no cars to Oklahoma residents or indirectly served or sought to serve the Oklahoma market. Although it might have been foreseeable that the automobile would travel to Oklahoma, foreseeability was held to be relevant only insofar as “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”952 The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. contrasted the facts of the case with the instance of a corporation “deliver[ing] its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”953
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,954 the Court addressed more closely how jurisdiction ﬂows with products downstream. The Court identified two standards for limiting jurisdiction even as products proceed to foreseeable destinations. The more general standard harked back to the fair play and substantial justice doctrine of International Shoe and requires balancing the respective interests of the parties, the prospective forum state, and alternative fora. All the Justices agreed with the legitimacy of this test in assessing due process limits on jurisdiction.955 However, four Justices would also apply a more exacting test: A defendant who placed a product in the stream of commerce knowing that the product might eventually be sold in a state will be subject to jurisdiction there only if the defendant also had purposefully acted to avail itself of the state’s market. According to Justice O’Connor, who wrote the opinion espousing this test, a defendant subjected itself to jurisdiction by targeting or serving customers in a state through, for example, direct advertising, marketing through a local sales agent, or establishing channels for providing regular advice to local customers. Action, not expectation, is key.956 In Asahi, the state was found to lack jurisdiction under both tests cited.
Doctrinal differences on the due process touchstones in streamofcommerce cases became more critical to the outcome in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.957 Justice Kennedy, writing for a four-Justice plurality, asserted that it is a defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum state that makes jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The question is not so much the fairness of a state reaching out to bring a foreign defendant before its courts as it is a matter of a foreign defendant having acted within a state so as to bring itself within the state’s limited authority. Thus, a British machinery manufacturer who targeted the U. S. market generally through engaging a nationwide distributor and attending trade shows, among other means, could not be sued in New Jersey for an industrial accident that occurred in the state. Even though at least one of its machines (and perhaps as many as four) were sold to New Jersey concerns, the defendant had not purposefully targeted the New Jersey market through, for example, establishing an office, advertising, or sending employees.958 Concurring with the plurality, Justice Breyer emphasized the outcome lay in stream-of-commerce precedents that held isolated or infrequent sales could not support jurisdiction. At the same time, Justice Breyer cautioned against adoption of the plurality’s strict active availment of the forum rule, especially because the Court had yet to consider due process requirements in the context of evolving business models, modern e-commerce in particular.959
Nonetheless, in order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, the suit must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,960 and when there is “no such connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”961 As a result, the Court, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, concluded that the California Supreme Court erred in employing a “relaxed” approach to personal jurisdiction by holding that a state court could exercise specific jurisdiction over a corporate defendant who was being sued by non-state residents for out-of-state activities solely because the defendant had “extensive forum contacts” unrelated to the claims in question.962 Concluding that California’s approach was a “loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction,”963 the Court held that without a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue,” California courts lacked jurisdiction over the corporate defendant.964
Actions In Rem: Proceeding Against Property.—In an in rem action, which is an action brought directly against a property interest, a state can validly proceed to settle controversies with regard to rights or claims against tangible or intangible property within its borders, notwithstanding that jurisdiction over the defendant was never established.965 Unlike jurisdiction in personam, a judgment entered by a court with in rem jurisdiction does not bind the defendant personally but determines the title to or status of the only property in question.966 Proceedings brought to register title to land,967 to condemn968 or confiscate969 real or personal property, or to administer a decedent’s estate970 are typical in rem actions. Due process is satisfied by seizure of the property (the “res”) and notice to all who have or may have interests therein.971 Under prior case law, a court could acquire in rem jurisdiction over nonresidents by mere constructive service of process,972 under the theory that property was always in possession of its owners and that seizure would afford them notice, because they would keep themselves apprized of the state of their property. It was held, however, that this fiction did not satisfy the requirements of due process, and, whatever the nature of the proceeding, that notice must be given in a manner that actually notifies the person being sought or that has a reasonable certainty of resulting in such notice.973
Although the Court has now held “that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the [‘minimum contacts’] standards set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,”974 it does not appear that this will appreciably change the result for in rem jurisdiction over property. “[T]he presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant’s claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State’s protection of his interest. The State’s strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in the State.”975 Thus, for “true” in rem actions, the old results are likely to still prevail.
Quasi in Rem: Attachment Proceedings.—If a defendant is neither domiciled nor present in a state, he cannot be served personally, and any judgment in money obtained against him would be unenforceable. This does not, however, prevent attachment of a defendant’s property within the state. The practice of allowing a state to attach a non-resident’s real and personal property situated within its borders to satisfy a debt or other claim by one of its citizens goes back to colonial times. Attachment is considered a form of in rem proceeding sometimes called “quasi in rem,” and under Pennoyer v. Neff976 an attachment could be implemented by obtaining a writ against the local property of the defendant and giving notice by publication.977 The judgement was then satisfied from the property attached, and if the attached property was insufficient to satisfy the claim, the plaintiff could go no further.978
This form of proceeding raised many questions. Of course, there were always instances in which it was fair to subject a person to suit on his property located in the forum state, such as where the property was related to the matter sued over.979 In others, the question was more disputed, as in the famous New York Court of Appeals case of Seider v. Roth,980 in which the property subject to attachment was the contractual obligation of the defendant’s insurance company to defend and pay the judgment. But, in Harris v. Balk,981 the facts of the case and the establishment of jurisdiction through quasi in rem proceedings raised the issue of fairness and territoriality. The claimant was a Maryland resident who was owed a debt by Balk, a North Carolina resident. The Marylander ascertained, apparently adventitiously, that Harris, a North Carolina resident who owed Balk an amount of money, was passing through Maryland, and the Marylander attached this debt. Balk had no notice of the action and a default judgment was entered, after which Harris paid over the judgment to the Marylander. When Balk later sued Harris in North Carolina to recover on his debt, Harris argued that he had been relieved of any further obligation by satisfying the judgment in Maryland, and the Supreme Court sustained his defense, ruling that jurisdiction had been properly obtained and the Maryland judgment was thus valid.982
subject983 in which the Court rejected the Delaware state court’s jurisdiction, holding that the “minimum contacts” test of International Shoe applied to all in rem and quasi in rem actions. The case involved a Delaware sequestration statute under which plaintiffs were authorized to bring actions against nonresident defendants by attaching their “property” within Delaware, the property here consisting of shares of corporate stock and options to stock in the defendant corporation. The stock was considered to be in Delaware because that was the state of incorporation, but none of the certificates representing the seized stocks were physically present in Delaware. The reason for applying the same test as is applied in in personam cases, the Court said, “is simple and straightforward. It is premised on recognition that ‘[t]he phrase ‘judicial jurisdiction’ over a thing,’ is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.”984 Thus, “[t]he recognition leads to the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising ‘jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.’”985
A further tightening of jurisdictional standards occurred in Rush v. Savchuk.986 The plaintiff was injured in a one-car accident in Indiana while a passenger in a car driven by defendant. Plaintiff later moved to Minnesota and sued defendant, still resident in Indiana, in state court in Minnesota. There were no contacts between the defendant and Minnesota, but defendant’s insurance company did business there and plaintiff garnished the insurance contract, signed in Indiana, under which the company was obligated to defend defendant in litigation and indemnify him to the extent of the policy limits. The Court refused to permit jurisdiction to be grounded on the contract; the contacts justifying jurisdiction must be those of the defendant engaging in purposeful activity related to the forum.987 Rush thus resulted in the demise of the controversial Seider v. Roth doctrine, which lower courts had struggled to save after Shaffer v. Heitner.988
Actions in Rem: Estates, Trusts, Corporations.—Generally, probate will occur where the decedent was domiciled, and, as a probate judgment is considered in rem, a determination as to assets in that state will be determinative as to all interested persons.989 Insofar as the probate affects real or personal property beyond the state’s boundaries, however, the judgment is in personam and can bind only parties thereto or their privies.990 Thus, the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not prevent an out-of-state court in the state where the property is located from reconsidering the first court’s finding of domicile, which could affect the ultimate disposition of the property.991
The difficulty of characterizing the existence of the res in a particular jurisdiction is illustrated by the in rem aspects of Hanson v. Denckla.992 As discussed earlier,993 the decedent created a trust with a Delaware corporation as trustee,994 and the Florida courts had attempted to assert both in personam and in rem jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation. Asserting the old theory that a court’s in rem jurisdiction “is limited by the extent of its power and by the coordinate authority of sister States,”995 i. e. , whether the court has jurisdiction over the thing, the Court thought it clear that the trust assets that were the subject of the suit were located in Delaware and thus the Florida courts had no in rem jurisdiction. The Court did not expressly consider whether the International Shoe test should apply to such in rem jurisdiction, as it has now held it generally must, but it did brieﬂy consider whether Florida’s interests arising from its authority to probate and construe the domiciliary’s will, under which the foreign assets might pass, were a sufficient basis of in rem jurisdiction and decided they were not.996 The effect of International Shoe in this area is still to be discerned.
The reasoning of the Pennoyer997 rule, that seizure of property and publication was sufficient to give notice to nonresidents or absent defendants, has also been applied in proceedings for the forfeiture of abandoned property. If all known claimants were personally served and all claimants who were unknown or nonresident were given constructive notice by publication, judgments in these proceedings were held binding on all.998 But, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,999 the Court, while declining to characterize the proceeding as in rem or in personam, held that a bank managing a common trust fund in favor of nonresident as well as resident beneficiaries could not obtain a judicial settlement of accounts if the only notice was publication in a local paper. Although such notice by publication was sufficient as to beneficiaries whose interests or addresses were unknown to the bank, the Court held that it was feasible to make serious efforts to notify residents and nonresidents whose whereabouts were known, such as by mailing notice to the addresses on record with the bank.1000
Notice: Service of Process.—Before a state may legitimately exercise control over persons and property, the state’s jurisdiction must be perfected by an appropriate service of process that is effective to notify all parties of proceedings that may affect their rights.1001 Personal service guarantees actual notice of the pendency of a legal action, and has traditionally been deemed necessary in actions styled in personam.1002 But “certain less rigorous notice procedures have enjoyed substantial acceptance throughout our legal history; in light of this history and the practical obstacles to providing personal service in every instance,” the Court in some situations has allowed the use of procedures that “do not carry with them the same certainty of actual notice that inheres in personal service.”1003 But, whether the action be in rem or in personam, there is a constitutional minimum; due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”1004
The use of mail to convey notice, for instance, has become quite established,1005 especially for assertion of in personam jurisdiction extraterritorially upon individuals and corporations having “minimum contacts” with a forum state, where various “long-arm” statutes authorize notice by mail.1006 Or, in a class action, due process is satisfied by mail notification of out-of-state class members, giving such members the opportunity to “opt out” but with no requirement that inclusion in the class be contingent upon affirmative response.1007 Other service devices and substitutions have been pursued and show some promise of further loosening of the concept of territoriality even while complying with minimum due process standards of notice.1008
Power of the States to Regulate Procedure
Generally.—As long as a party has been given sufficient notice and an opportunity to defend his interest, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not generally mandate the particular forms of procedure to be used in state courts.1009 The states may regulate the manner in which rights may be enforced and wrongs remedied,1010 and may create courts and endow them with such jurisdiction as, in the judgment of their legislatures, seems appropriate.1011 Whether legislative action in such matters is deemed to be wise or proves efficient, whether it works a particular hardship on a particular litigant, or perpetuates or supplants ancient forms of procedure, are issues that ordinarily do not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. The function of the Fourteenth Amendment is negative rather than affirmative1012 and in no way obligates the states to adopt specific measures of reform.1013
Commencement of Actions.—A state may impose certain conditions on the right to institute litigation. Access to the courts has been denied to persons instituting stockholders’ derivative actions unless reasonable security for the costs and fees incurred by the corporation is first tendered.1014 But, foreclosure of all access to the courts, through financial barriers and perhaps through other means as well, is subject to federal constitutional scrutiny and must be justified by reference to a state interest of suitable importance. Thus, where a state has monopolized the avenues of settlement of disputes between persons by prescribing judicial resolution, and where the dispute involves a fundamental interest, such as marriage and its dissolution, the state may not deny access to those persons unable to pay its fees.1015
Older cases, which have not been questioned by more recent ones, held that a state, as the price of opening its tribunals to a nonresident plaintiff, may exact the condition that the nonresident stand ready to answer all cross actions filed and accept any in personam judgments obtained by a resident defendant through service of process or appropriate pleading upon the plaintiff’s attorney of record.1016 For similar reasons, a requirement of the performance of a chemical analysis as a condition precedent to a suit to recover for damages resulting to crops from allegedly deficient fertilizers, while allowing other evidence, was not deemed arbitrary or unreasonable.1017
Amendment of pleadings is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and unless a gross abuse of discretion is shown, there is no ground for reversal. Accordingly, where the defense sought to be interposed is without merit, a claim that due process would be denied by rendition of a foreclosure decree without leave to file a supplementary answer is utterly without foundation.1018
Defenses.—Just as a state may condition the right to institute litigation, so may it establish terms for the interposition of certain defenses. It may validly provide that one sued in a possessory action cannot bring an action to try title until after judgment is rendered and after he has paid that judgment.1019 A state may limit the defense in an action to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent to the issue of payment and leave the tenants to other remedial actions at law on a claim that the landlord had failed to maintain the premises.1020 A state may also provide that the doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow servant do not bar recovery in certain employment-related accidents. No person has a vested right in such defenses.1021 Similarly, a nonresident defendant in a suit begun by foreign attachment, even though he has no resources or credit other than the property attached, cannot challenge the validity of a statute which requires him to give bail or security for the discharge of the seized property before permitting him an opportunity to appear and defend.1022
Costs, Damages, and Penalties.—What costs are allowed by law is for the court to determine; an erroneous judgment of what the law allows does not deprive a party of his property without due process of law.1023 Nor does a statute providing for the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees in actions on small claims subject unsuccessful defendants to any unconstitutional deprivation.1024 Congress may, however, severely restrict attorney’s fees in an effort to keep an administrative claims proceeding informal.1025
Equally consistent with the requirements of due process is a statutory procedure whereby a prosecutor of a case is adjudged liable for costs, and committed to jail in default of payment thereof, whenever the court or jury, after according him an opportunity to present evidence of good faith, finds that he instituted the prosecution without probable cause and from malicious motives.1026 Also, as a reasonable incentive for prompt settlement without suit of just demands of a class receiving special legislative treatment, such as common carriers and insurance companies together with their patrons, a state may permit harassed litigants to recover penalties in the form of attorney’s fees or damages.1027
By virtue of its plenary power to prescribe the character of the sentence which shall be awarded against those found guilty of crime, a state may provide that a public officer embezzling public money shall, notwithstanding that he has made restitution, suffer not only imprisonment but also pay a fine equal to double the amount embezzled, which shall operate as a judgment for the use of persons whose money was embezzled. Whatever this fine is called, whether a penalty, or punishment, or civil judgment, it comes to the convict as the result of his crime.1028 On the other hand, when appellant, by its refusal to surrender certain assets, was adjudged in contempt for frustrating enforcement of a judgment obtained against it, dismissal of its appeal from the first judgment was not a penalty imposed for the contempt, but merely a reasonable method for sustaining the effectiveness of the state’s judicial process.1029
To deter careless destruction of human life, a state may allow punitive damages to be assessed in actions against employers for deaths caused by the negligence of their employees,1030 and may also allow punitive damages for fraud perpetrated by employees.1031 Also constitutional is the traditional common law approach for measuring punitive damages, granting the jury wide but not unlimited discretion to consider the gravity of the offense and the need to deter similar offenses.1032 The Court has indicated, however, that, although the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment “does not apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties,”1033 a “grossly excessive” award of punitive damages violates substantive due process, as the Due Process Clause limits the amount of punitive damages to what is “reasonably necessary to vindicate the State’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.”1034 These limits may be discerned by a court by examining the degree of reprehensibility of the act, the ratio between the punitive award and plaintiff’s actual or potential harm, and the legislative sanctions provided for comparable misconduct.1035 In addition, the “Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inﬂicts upon nonparties . . . .”1036
Statutes of Limitation.—A statute of limitations does not deprive one of property without due process of law, unless, in its application to an existing right of action, it unreasonably limits the opportunity to enforce the right by suit. By the same token, a state may shorten an existing period of limitation, provided a reasonable time is allowed for bringing an action after the passage of the statute and before the bar takes effect. What is a reasonable period, however, is dependent on the nature of the right and particular circumstances.1037
Thus, where a receiver for property is appointed 13 years after the disappearance of the owner and notice is made by publication, it is not a violation of due process to bar actions relative to that property after an interval of only one year after such appointment.1038 When a state, by law, suddenly prohibits all actions to contest tax deeds which have been of record for two years unless they are brought within six months after its passage, no unconstitutional deprivation is effected.1039 No less valid is a statute which provides that when a person has been in possession of wild lands under a recorded deed continuously for 20 years and had paid taxes thereon during the same, and the former owner in that interval pays nothing, no action to recover such land shall be entertained unless commenced within 20 years, or before the expiration of five years following enactment of said provision.1040 Similarly, an amendment to a workmen’s compensation act, limiting to three years the time within which a case may be reopened for readjustment of compensation on account of aggravation of a disability, does not deny due process to one who sustained his injury at a time when the statute contained no limitation. A limitation is deemed to affect the remedy only, and the period of its operation in this instance was viewed as neither arbitrary nor oppressive.1041
Moreover, a state may extend as well as shorten the time in which suits may be brought in its courts and may even entirely remove a statutory bar to the commencement of litigation. Thus, a repeal or extension of a statute of limitations affects no unconstitutional deprivation of property of a debtor-defendant in whose favor such statute had already become a defense. “A right to defeat a just debt by the statute of limitation . . . [is not] a vested right,” such as is protected by the Constitution. Accordingly no offense against the Fourteenth Amendment is committed by revival, through an extension or repeal, of an action on an implied obligation to pay a child for the use of her property,1042 or a suit to recover the purchase price of securities sold in violation of a Blue Sky Law,1043 or a right of an employee to seek, on account of the aggravation of a former injury, an additional award out of a state-administered fund.1044
However, for suits to recover real and personal property, when the right of action has been barred by a statute of limitations and title as well as real ownership have become vested in the defendant, any later act removing or repealing the bar would be void as attempting an arbitrary transfer of title.1045 Also unconstitutional is the application of a statute of limitation to extend a period that parties to a contract have agreed should limit their right to remedies under the contract. “When the parties to a contract have expressly agreed upon a time limit on their obligation, a statute which invalidates . . . [said] agreement and directs enforcement of the contract after . . . [the agreed] time has expired” unconstitutionally imposes a burden in excess of that contracted.1046
Burden of Proof and Presumptions.—It is clearly within the domain of the legislative branch of government to establish presumptions and rules respecting burden of proof in litigation.1047 Nonetheless, the Due Process Clause does prevent the deprivation of liberty or property upon application of a standard of proof too lax to make reasonable assurance of accurate factfinding. Thus, “[t]he function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’”1048
Applying the formula it has worked out for determining what process is due in a particular situation,1049 the Court has held that a standard at least as stringent as clear and convincing evidence is required in a civil proceeding to commit an individual involuntarily to a state mental hospital for an indefinite period.1050 Similarly, because the interest of parents in retaining custody of their children is fundamental, the state may not terminate parental rights through reliance on a standard of preponderance of the evidence—the proof necessary to award money damages in an ordinary civil action— but must prove that the parents are unfit by clear and convincing evidence.1051 Further, unfitness of a parent may not simply be presumed because of some purported assumption about general characteristics, but must be established.1052
As long as a presumption is not unreasonable and is not conclusive, it does not violate the Due Process Clause. Legislative fiat may not take the place of fact in the determination of issues involving life, liberty, or property, however, and a statute creating a presumption which is entirely arbitrary and which operates to deny a fair opportunity to repel it or to present facts pertinent to one’s defense is void.1053 On the other hand, if there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is inferred, legislation declaring that the proof of one fact or group of facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of a main or ultimate fact will be sustained.1054
For a brief period, the Court used what it called the “irrebuttable presumption doctrine” to curb the legislative tendency to confer a benefit or to impose a detriment based on presumed characteristics based on the existence of another characteristic.1055 Thus, in Stanley v. Illinois,1056 the Court found invalid a construction of the state statute that presumed illegitimate fathers to be unfit parents and that prevented them from objecting to state wardship. Mandatory maternity leave rules requiring pregnant teachers to take unpaid maternity leave at a set time prior to the date of the expected births of their babies were voided as creating a conclusive presumption that every pregnant teacher who reaches a particular point of pregnancy becomes physically incapable of teaching.1057
Major controversy developed over the application of “irrebuttable presumption doctrine” in benefits cases. Thus, although a state may require that nonresidents must pay higher tuition charges at state colleges than residents, and while the Court assumed that a durational residency requirement would be permissible as a prerequisite to qualify for the lower tuition, it was held impermissible for the state to presume conclusively that because the legal address of a student was outside the state at the time of application or at some point during the preceding year he was a nonresident as long as he remained a student. The Due Process Clause required that the student be afforded the opportunity to show that he is or has become a bona fide resident entitled to the lower tuition.1058
Moreover, a food stamp program provision making ineligible any household that contained a member age 18 or over who was claimed as a dependent for federal income tax purposes the prior tax year by a person not himself eligible for stamps was voided on the ground that it created a conclusive presumption that fairly often could be shown to be false if evidence could be presented.1059 The rule which emerged for subjecting persons to detriment or qualifying them for benefits was that the legislature may not presume the existence of the decisive characteristic upon a given set of facts, unless it can be shown that the defined characteristics do in fact encompass all persons and only those persons that it was the purpose of the legislature to reach. The doctrine in effect afforded the Court the opportunity to choose between resort to the Equal Protection Clause or to the Due Process Clause in judging the validity of certain classifications,1060 and it precluded Congress and legislatures from making general classifications that avoided the administrative costs of individualization in many areas.
Use of the doctrine was curbed if not halted, however, in Weinberger v. Salfi,1061 in which the Court upheld the validity of a Social Security provision requiring that the spouse of a covered wage earner must have been married to the wage earner for at least nine months prior to his death in order to receive benefits as a spouse. Purporting to approve but to distinguish the prior cases in the line,1062 the Court imported traditional equal protection analysis into considerations of due process challenges to statutory classifications.1063 Extensions of the prior cases to government entitlement classifications, such as the Social Security Act qualification standard before it, would, said the Court, “turn the doctrine of those cases into a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.”1064 Whether the Court will now limit the doctrine to the detriment area only, exclusive of benefit programs, whether it will limit it to those areas which involve fundamental rights or suspect classifications (in the equal protection sense of those expressions)1065 or whether it will simply permit the doctrine to pass from the scene remains unsettled, but it is noteworthy that it now rarely appears on the Court’s docket.1066
Trials and Appeals.—Trial by jury in civil trials, unlike the case in criminal trials, has not been deemed essential to due process, and the Fourteenth Amendment has not been held to restrain the states in retaining or abolishing civil juries.1067 Thus, abolition of juries in proceedings to enforce liens,1068 mandamus1069 and quo warranto1070 actions, and in eminent domain1071 and equity1072 proceedings has been approved. states are also free to adopt innovations respecting selection and number of jurors. Verdicts rendered by ten out of twelve jurors may be substituted for the requirement of unanimity,1073 and petit juries containing eight rather than the conventional number of twelve members may be established.1074
If a full and fair trial on the merits is provided, due process does not require a state to provide appellate review.1075 But if an appeal is afforded, the state must not so structure it as to arbitrarily deny to some persons the right or privilege available to others.1076
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS—CRIMINAL Generally: The Principle of Fundamental Fairness
The Court has held that practically all the criminal procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights—the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments—are fundamental to state criminal justice systems and that the absence of one or the other particular guarantees denies a suspect or a defendant due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.1077 In addition, the Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects against practices and policies that violate precepts of fundamental fairness,1078 even if they do not violate specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.1079 The standard query in such cases is whether the challenged practice or policy violates “a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such government.”1080
This inquiry contains a historical component, as “recent cases . . . have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has been developing contemporaneously in England and in this country. The question thus is whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental—whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty. . . . [Therefore, the limitations imposed by the Court on the states are] not necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined but [are] fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the American States.”1081
The Elements of Due Process
Initiation of the Prosecution.—Indictment by a grand jury is not a requirement of due process; a state may proceed instead by information.1082 Due process does require that, whatever the procedure, a defendant must be given adequate notice of the offense charged against him and for which he is to be tried,1083 even aside from the notice requirements of the Sixth Amendment.1084 Where, of course, a grand jury is used, it must be fairly constituted and free from prejudicial inﬂuences.1085
Clarity in Criminal Statutes: The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine.—Criminal statutes that lack sufficient definiteness or specificity are commonly held “void for vagueness.”1086 Such legislation “may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it fails to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying those who are accused.”1087 “Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of [an] enactment.”1088 In other situations, a statute may be unconstitutionally vague because the statute is worded in a standardless way that invites arbitrary enforcement. In this vein, the Court has invalidated two kinds of laws as “void for vagueness”: (1) laws that define criminal offenses; and (2) laws that fix the permissible sentences for criminal offenses.1089 With respect to laws that define criminal offenses, the Court has required that a penal statute provide the definition of the offense with “sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”1090
For instance, the Court voided for vagueness a criminal statute providing that a person was a “gangster” and subject to fine or imprisonment if he was without lawful employment, had been either convicted at least three times for disorderly conduct or had been convicted of any other crime, and was “known to be a member of a gang of two or more persons.” The Court observed that neither common law nor the statute gave the words “gang” or “gangster” definite meaning, that the enforcing agencies and courts were free to construe the terms broadly or narrowly, and that the phrase “known to be a member” was ambiguous. The statute was held void, and the Court refused to allow specification of details in the particular indictment to save it because it was the statute, not the indictment, that prescribed the rules to govern conduct.1091
A statute may be so vague or so threatening to constitutionally protected activity that it can be pronounced wholly unconstitutional; in other words, “unconstitutional on its face.”1092 Thus, for instance, a unanimous Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville1093 struck down as invalid on its face a vagrancy ordinance that punished “dissolute persons who go about begging, . . . common night walkers, . . . common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, . . . persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting house of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children . . . .”1094 The ordinance was found to be facially invalid, according to Justice Douglas for the Court, because it did not give fair notice, it did not require specific intent to commit an unlawful act, it permitted and encouraged arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, it committed too much discretion to policemen, and it criminalized activities that by modern standards are normally innocent.1095
In FCC v. Fox, 567 U. S. ___, No. 10–1293, slip op. (2012) the Court held that the Federal Communiations Commission (FCC) had violated the Fifth Amendment due process rights of Fox Television and ABC, Inc. , because the FCC had not given fair notice that broadcasting isolated instances of expletives or brief nudity could lead to punishment. 18 U. S. C. § 1464 bans the broadcast of “any obscene, indecent, or profane language”, but the FCC had a long-standing policy that it would not consider “ﬂeeting” instances of indecency to be actionable, and had confirmed such a policy by issuance of an industry guidance. The policy was not announced until after the instances at issues in this case (two concerned isolated utterances of expletives during two live broadcasts aired by Fox Television, and a brief exposure of the nude buttocks of an adult female character by ABC). The Commission policy in place at the time of the broadcasts, therefore, gave the broadcasters no notice that a ﬂeeting instance of indecency could be actionable as indecent.
On the other hand, some less vague statutes may be held unconstitutional only in application to the defendant before the Court.1096 For instance, where the terms of a statute could be applied both to innocent or protected conduct (such as free speech) and unprotected conduct, but the valuable effects of the law outweigh its potential general harm, such a statute will be held unconstitutional only as applied.1097 Thus, in Palmer v. City of Euclid,1098 an ordinance punishing “suspicious persons” defined as “[a]ny person who wanders about the streets or other public ways or who is found abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without any visible or lawful business and who does not give satisfactory account of himself” was found void only as applied to a particular defendant. In Palmer, the Court found that the defendant, having dropped off a passenger and begun talking into a two-way radio, was engaging in conduct which could not reasonably be anticipated as fitting within the “without any visible or lawful business” portion of the ordinance’s definition.
Loitering statutes that are triggered by failure to obey a police dispersal order are suspect, and may be struck down if they leave a police officer absolute discretion to give such orders.1099 Thus, a Chicago ordinance that required police to disperse all persons in the company of “criminal street gang members” while in a public place with “no apparent purpose,” failed to meet the “requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”1100 The Court noted that “no apparent purpose” is inherently subjective because its application depends on whether some purpose is “apparent” to the officer, who would presumably have the discretion to ignore such apparent purposes as engaging in idle conversation or enjoying the evening air.1101 On the other hand, where such a statute additionally required a finding that the defendant was intent on causing inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, it was upheld against facial challenge, at least as applied to a defendant who was interfering with the ticketing of a car by the police.1102
Statutes with vague standards may nonetheless be upheld if the text of statute is interpreted by a court with sufficient clarity.1103 Thus, the civil commitment of persons of “such conditions of emotional instability . . . as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons” was upheld by the Court, based on a state court’s construction of the statute as only applying to persons who, by habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and are likely to inﬂict injury. The underlying conditions—habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters and lack of power to control impulses and likelihood of attack on others—were viewed as calling for evidence of past conduct pointing to probable consequences and as being as susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly applied in criminal proceedings.1104
Conceptually related to the problem of definiteness in criminal statutes is the problem of notice. Ordinarily, it can be said that ignorance of the law affords no excuse, or, in other instances, that the nature of the subject matter or conduct may be sufficient to alert one that there are laws which must be observed.1105 On occasion the Court has even approved otherwise vague statutes because the statute forbade only “willful” violations, which the Court construed as requiring knowledge of the illegal nature of the proscribed conduct.1106 Where conduct is not in and of itself blameworthy, however, a criminal statute may not impose a legal duty without notice.1107
The question of notice has also arisen in the context of “judge-made” law. Although the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids retroactive application of state and federal criminal laws, no such explicit restriction applies to the courts. Thus, when a state court abrogated the common law rule that a victim must die within a “year and a day” in order for homicide charges to be brought in Rogers v. Tennessee,1108 the question arose whether such rule could be applied to acts occurring before the court’s decision. The dissent argued vigorously that unlike the traditional common law practice of adapting legal principles to fit new fact situations, the court’s decision was an outright reversal of existing law. Under this reasoning, the new “law” could not be applied retrospectively. The majority held, however, that only those holdings which were “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been express prior to the conduct in issue”1109 could not be applied retroactively. The relatively archaic nature of “year and a day rule”, its abandonment by most jurisdictions, and its inapplicability to modern times were all cited as reasons that the defendant had fair warning of the possible abrogation of the common law rule.
With regard to statutes that fix criminal sentences,1110 the Court has explained that the law must specify the range of available sentences with “sufficient clarity.”1111 For example, in Johnson v. United States, after years of litigation on the meaning and scope of the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA),1112 the Court concluded that the clause in question was void for vagueness.1113 In relevant part, the ACCA imposes an increased prison term upon a felon who is in possession of a firearm, if that felon has previously been convicted for a “violent felony,” a term defined by the statute to include “burglary, arson, or extortion, [a crime that] involves use of explosives, or” crimes that fall within the residual clause—that is, crimes that “otherwise involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”1114 In Johnson, prosecutors sought an enhanced sentence for a felon found in possession of a firearm, arguing that one of the defendant’s previous crimes—unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun— qualified as a violent felony because the crime amounted to one that “involve[d] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”1115 To determine whether a crime falls within the residual clause, the Court had previously endorsed a “categorical approach”—that is, instead of looking to whether the facts of a specific offense presented a serious risk of physical injury to another, the Supreme Court had interpreted the ACCA to require courts to look to whether the underlying crime falls within a category such that the “ordinary case” of the crime would present a serious risk of physical injury.1116 The Court in Johnson concluded that the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague because the clause’s requirement that courts determine what an “ordinary case” of a crime entails led to “grave uncertainty” about (1) how to estimate the risk posed by the crime and (2) how much risk was sufficient to qualify as a violent felony.1117 For example, in determining whether attempted burglary ordinarily posed serious risks of physical injury, the Court suggested that reasonable minds could differ as to whether an attempted burglary would typically end in a violent encounter, resulting in the conclusion that the residual clause provided “no reliable way” to determine what crimes fell within its scope.1118 In so holding, the Court relied heavily on the difficulties that federal courts (including the Supreme Court) have had in establishing consistent standards to adjudge the scope of the residual clause, noting that the failure of “persistent efforts” to establish a standard can provide evidence of vagueness.1119
Entrapment.—Certain criminal offenses, because they are consensual actions taken between and among willing parties, present police with difficult investigative problems.1120 Thus, in order to deter such criminal behavior, police agents may “encourage” persons to engage in criminal behavior, such as selling narcotics or contraband,1121 or they may may seek to test the integrity of public employees, officers or public officials by offering them bribes.1122 In such cases, an “entrapment” defense is often made, though it is unclear whether the basis for the defense is the Due Process Clause, the supervisory authority of the federal courts to deter wrongful police conduct, or merely statutory construction (interpreting criminal laws to find that the legislature would not have intended to punish conduct induced by police agents).1123
The Court has employed the so-called “subjective approach” in evaluating the defense of entrapment.1124 This subjective approach follows a two-pronged analysis. First, the question is asked whether the offense was induced by a government agent. Second, if the government has induced the defendant to break the law, “the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents.”1125 If the defendant can be shown to have been ready and willing to commit the crime whenever the opportunity presented itself, the defense of entrapment is unavailing, no matter the degree of inducement.1126 On the other hand, “[w]hen the Government’s quest for conviction leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would never run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene.”1127
Criminal Identification Process.—In criminal trials, the reliability and weight to be accorded an eyewitness identification ordinarily are for the jury to decide, guided by instructions by the trial judge and subject to judicial prerogatives under the rules of evidence to exclude otherwise relevant evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact or potential to mislead. At times, however, a defendant alleges an out-of-court identification in the presence of police is so ﬂawed that it is inadmissible as a matter of fundamental justice under due process.1128 These cases most commonly challenge such police-arranged procedures as lineups, showups, photographic displays, and the like.1129 But not all cases have alleged careful police orchestration.1130
The Court generally disfavors judicial suppression of eyewitness identifications on due process grounds in lieu of having identification testimony tested in the normal course of the adversarial process.1131 Two elements are required for due process suppression. First, law enforcement officers must have participated in an identification process that was both suggestive and unnecessary.1132 Second, the identification procedures must have created a substantial prospect for misidentification. Determination of these elements is made by examining the “totality of the circumstances” of a case.1133 The Court has not recognized any per se rule for excluding an eyewitness identification on due process grounds.1134 Defendants have had difficulty meeting the Court’s standards: Only one challenge has been successful.1135
Fair Trial.—As noted, the provisions of the Bill of Rights now applicable to the states contain basic guarantees of a fair trial— right to counsel, right to speedy and public trial, right to be free from use of unlawfully seized evidence and unlawfully obtained confessions, and the like. But this does not exhaust the requirements of fairness. “Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept. . . . What is fair in one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in others.”1136 Conversely, “as applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it . . . [the Court] must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.”1137
For instance, bias or prejudice either inherent in the structure of the trial system or as imposed by external events will deny one’s right to a fair trial. Thus, in Tumey v. Ohio1138 it was held to violate due process for a judge to receive compensation out of the fines imposed on convicted defendants, and no compensation beyond his salary) “if he does not convict those who are brought before him.” Or, in other cases, the Court has found that contemptuous behavior in court may affect the impartiality of the presiding judge, so as to disqualify such judge from citing and sentencing the contemnors.1139 Due process is also violated by the participation of a biased or otherwise partial juror, although there is no presumption that all jurors with a potential bias are in fact prejudiced.1140
Public hostility toward a defendant that intimidates a jury is, or course, a classic due process violation.1141 More recently, concern with the impact of prejudicial publicity upon jurors and potential jurors has caused the Court to instruct trial courts that they should be vigilant to guard against such prejudice and to curb both the publicity and the jury’s exposure to it.1142 For instance, the impact of televising trials on a jury has been a source of some concern.1143
The fairness of a particular rule of procedure may also be the basis for due process claims, but such decisions must be based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding such procedures.1144 For instance, a court may not restrict the basic due process right to testify in one’s own defense by automatically excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony.1145 Or, though a state may require a defendant to give pretrial notice of an intention to rely on an alibi defense and to furnish the names of supporting witnesses, due process requires reciprocal discovery in such circumstances, necessitating that the state give the defendant pretrial notice of its rebuttal evidence on the alibi issue.1146 Due process is also violated when the accused is compelled to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, because it may impair the presumption of innocence in the minds of the jurors.1147
The use of visible physical restraints, such as shackles, leg irons, or belly chains, in front of a jury, has been held to raise due process concerns. In Deck v. Missouri,1148 the Court noted a rule dating back to English common law against bringing a defendant to trial in irons, and a modern day recognition that such measures should be used “only in the presence of a special need.”1149 The Court found that the use of visible restraints during the guilt phase of a trial undermines the presumption of innocence, limits the ability of a defendant to consult with counsel, and “affronts the dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.”1150 Even where guilt has already been adjudicated, and a jury is considering the application of the death penalty, the latter two considerations would preclude the routine use of visible restraints. Only in special circumstances, such as where a judge has made particularized findings that security or ﬂight risk requires it, can such restraints be used.
The combination of otherwise acceptable rules of criminal trials may in some instances deny a defendant due process. Thus, based on the particular circumstance of a case, two rules that (1) denied a defendant the right to cross-examine his own witness in order to elicit evidence exculpatory to the defendant1151 and (2) denied a defendant the right to introduce the testimony of witnesses about matters told them out of court on the ground the testimony would be hearsay, denied the defendant his constitutional right to present his own defense in a meaningful way.1152 Similarly, a questionable procedure may be saved by its combination with another. Thus, it does not deny a defendant due process to subject him initially to trial before a non-lawyer police court judge when there is a later trial de novo available under the state’s court system.1153
Prosecutorial Misconduct.—When a conviction is obtained by the presentation of testimony known to the prosecuting authorities to have been perjured, due process is violated. The clause “cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance . . . is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.”1154
The above-quoted language was dictum,1155 but the principle it enunciated has required state officials to controvert allegations that knowingly false testimony had been used to convict1156 and has upset convictions found to have been so procured.1157 Extending the principle, the Court in Miller v. Pate1158 overturned a conviction obtained after the prosecution had represented to the jury that a pair of men’s shorts found near the scene of a sex attack belonged to the defendant and that they were stained with blood; the defendant showed in a habeas corpus proceeding that no evidence connected him with the shorts and furthermore that the shorts were not in fact bloodstained, and that the prosecution had known these facts.
This line of reasoning has even resulted in the disclosure to the defense of information not relied upon by the prosecution during trial.1159 In Brady v. Maryland,1160 the Court held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” In that case, the prosecution had suppressed an extrajudicial confession of defendant’s accomplice that he had actually committed the murder.1161 “The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment. Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence.”1162
In United States v. Agurs,1163 the Court summarized and somewhat expanded the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence in his possession, even in the absence of a request, or upon a general request, by defendant. First, as noted, if the prosecutor knew or should have known that testimony given to the trial was perjured, the conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.1164 Second, as established in Brady, if the defense specifically requested certain evidence and the prosecutor withheld it,1165 the conviction must be set aside if the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.1166 Third (the new law created in Agurs), if the defense did not make a request at all, or simply asked for “all Brady material” or for “anything exculpatory,” a duty resides in the prosecution to reveal to the defense obviously exculpatory evidence. Under this third prong, if the prosecutor did not reveal the relevant information, reversal of a conviction may be required, but only if the undisclosed evidence creates a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.1167
This tripartite formulation, however, suffered from two apparent defects. First, it added a new level of complexity to a Brady inquiry by requiring a reviewing court to establish the appropriate level of materiality by classifying the situation under which the exculpating information was withheld. Second, it was not clear, if the fairness of the trial was at issue, why the circumstances of the failure to disclose should affect the evaluation of the impact that such information would have had on the trial. Ultimately, the Court addressed these issues in United States v. Bagley1168 .
In Bagley, the Court established a uniform test for materiality, choosing the most stringent requirement that evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.1169 This materiality standard, found in contexts outside of Brady inquiries,1170 is applied not only to exculpatory material, but also to material that would be relevant to the impeachment of witnesses.1171 Thus, where inconsistent earlier statements by a witness to an abduction were not disclosed, the Court weighed the specific effect that impeachment of the witness would have had on establishing the required elements of the crime and of the punishment, finally concluding that there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result.1172
The Supreme Court has also held that “Brady suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over even evidence that is ‘known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.’ . . . ‘[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.’”1173
Proof, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions.—It had long been presumed that “reasonable doubt” was the proper standard for criminal cases,1174 but, because the standard was so widely accepted, it was only relatively recently that the Court had the opportunity to pronounce it guaranteed by due process. In 1970, the Court held in In re Winship that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “[protect] the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”1175
The standard is closely related to the presumption of innocence, which helps to ensure a defendant a fair trial,1176 and requires that a jury consider a case solely on the evidence.1177 “The reasonable doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’”1178
The Court had long held that, under the Due Process Clause, it would set aside convictions that are supported by no evidence at all.1179 The holding of the Winship case, however, left open the question as to whether appellate courts should weigh the sufficiency of trial evidence. Thus, in Jackson v. Virginia,1180 the Court held that federal courts, on direct appeal of federal convictions or collateral review of state convictions, must satisfy themselves that the evidence on the record could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The question the reviewing court is to ask itself is not whether it believes the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.1181
Because due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged,1182 the Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur1183 that it was unconstitutional to require a defendant charged with murder to prove that he acted “in the heat of passion on sudden provocation” in order to reduce the homicide to manslaughter. The Court indicated that a balancing-of-interests test should be used to determine when the Due Process Clause required the prosecution to carry the burden of proof and when some part of the burden might be shifted to the defendant. The decision, however, called into question the practice in many states under which some burdens of persuasion1184 were borne by the defense, and raised the prospect that the prosecution must bear all burdens of persuasion—a significant and weighty task given the large numbers of affirmative defenses.
The Court, however, summarily rejected the argument that Mullaney means that the prosecution must negate an insanity defense,1185 and, later, in Patterson v. New York,1186 upheld a state statute that required a defendant asserting “extreme emotional disturbance” as an affirmative defense to murder1187 to prove such by a preponderance of the evidence. According to the Court, the constitutional deficiency in Mullaney was that the statute made malice an element of the offense, permitted malice to be presumed upon proof of the other elements, and then required the defendant to prove the absence of malice. In Patterson, by contrast, the statute obligated the state to prove each element of the offense (the death, the intent to kill, and the causation) beyond a reasonable doubt, while allowing the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by preponderance of the evidence that would reduce the degree of the offense.1188 This distinction has been criticized as formalistic, as the legislature can shift burdens of persuasion between prosecution and defense easily through the statutory definitions of the offenses.1189
Despite the requirement that states prove each element of a criminal offense, criminal trials generally proceed with a presumption that the defendant is sane, and a defendant may be limited in the evidence that he may present to challenge this presumption. In Clark v. Arizona,1190 the Court considered a rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arizona that prohibited the use of expert testimony regarding mental disease or mental capacity to show lack of mens rea, ruling that the use of such evidence could be limited to an insanity defense. In Clark, the Court weighed competing interests to hold that such evidence could be “channeled” to the issue of insanity due to the controversial character of some categories of mental disease, the potential of mental-disease evidence to mislead, and the danger of according greater certainty to such evidence than experts claim for it.1191
Another important distinction that can substantially affect a prosecutor’s burden is whether a fact to be established is an element of a crime or instead is a sentencing factor. Although a criminal conviction is generally established by a jury using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, sentencing factors are generally evaluated by a judge using few evidentiary rules and under the more lenient “preponderance of the evidence” standard. The Court has taken a formalistic approach to this issue, allowing states to designate essentially which facts fall under which of these two categories. For instance, the Court has held that whether a defendant “visibly possessed a gun” during a crime may be designated by a state as a sentencing factor, and determined by a judge based on the preponderance of evidence.1192
Although the Court has generally deferred to the legislature’s characterizations in this area, it limited this principle in Apprendi v. New Jersey. In Apprendi the Court held that a sentencing factor cannot be used to increase the maximum penalty imposed for the underlying crime.1193 This led, in turn, to the Court’s overruling conﬂicting prior case law that had held constitutional the use of aggravating sentencing factors by judges when imposing capital punishment.1194 These holdings are subject to at least one exception, however,1195 and the decisions might be evaded by legislatures revising criminal provisions to increase maximum penalties, and then providing for mitigating factors within the newly established sentencing range.
Another closely related issue is statutory presumptions, where proof of a “presumed fact” that is a required element of a crime, is established by another fact, the “basic fact.”1196 In Tot v. United States,1197 the Court held that a statutory presumption was valid under the Due Process Clause only if it met a “rational connection” test. In that case, the Court struck down a presumption that a person possessing an illegal firearm had shipped, transported, or received such in interstate commerce. “Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from the proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.”
In Leary v. United States,1198 this due process test was stiffened to require that, for such a “rational connection” to exist, it must “at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to ﬂow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Thus, the Court voided a provision that permitted a jury to infer from a defendant’s possession of marijuana his knowledge of its illegal importation. A lengthy canvass of factual materials established to the Court’s satisfaction that, although the greater part of marijuana consumed in the United States is of foreign origin, there was still a good amount produced domestically and there was no way to assure that the majority of those possessing marijuana have any reason to know whether their marijuana is imported.1199 The Court left open the question whether a presumption that survived the “rational connection” test “must also satisfy the criminal ‘reasonable doubt’ standard if proof of the crime charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use.”1200
In a later case, a closely divided Court drew a distinction between mandatory presumptions, which a jury must accept, and permissive presumptions, which may be presented to the jury as part of all the evidence to be considered. With respect to mandatory presumptions, “since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a presumption, unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”1201 But, with respect to permissive presumptions, “the prosecution may rely on all of the evidence in the record to meet the reasonable doubt standard. There is no more reason to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet a reasonable-doubt standard before it may be permitted to play any part in a trial than there is to require that degree of probative force for other relevant evidence before it may be admitted. As long as it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt, it need only satisfy the test described in Leary.”1202 Thus, due process was not violated by the application of the statute that provides that “the presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle.”1203 The division of the Court in these cases and in the Mullaney v. Wilbur line of cases clearly shows the unsettled nature of the issues they concern.
The Problem of the Incompetent or Insane Defendant.—It is a denial of due process to try or sentence a defendant who is insane or incompetent to stand trial.1204 When it becomes evident during the trial that a defendant is or has become insane or incompetent to stand trial, the court on its own initiative must conduct a hearing on the issue.1205 Although there is no constitutional requirement that the state assume the burden of proving a defendant competent, the state must provide the defendant with a chance to prove that he is incompetent to stand trial. Thus, a statutory presumption that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial or a requirement that the defendant bear the burden of proving incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence does not violate due process.1206
When a state determines that a person charged with a criminal offense is incompetent to stand trial, he cannot be committed indefinitely for that reason. The court’s power is to commit him to a period no longer than is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain his capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that he will not, then the state must either release the defendant or institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit any other citizen.1207
Where a defendant is found competent to stand trial, a state appears to have significant discretion in how it takes account of mental illness or defect at the time of the offense in determining criminal responsibility.1208 The Court has identified several tests that are used by states in varying combinations to address the issue: the M’Naghten test (cognitive incapacity or moral incapacity),1209 volitional incapacity,1210 and the irresistible-impulse test.1211 “[I]t is clear that no particular formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is substantially open to state choice.”1212
Commitment to a mental hospital of a criminal defendant acquitted by reason of insanity does not offend due process, and the period of confinement may extend beyond the period for which the person could have been sentenced if convicted.1213 The purpose of the confinement is not punishment, but treatment, and the Court explained that the length of a possible criminal sentence “therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of . . . commitment.”1214 Thus, the insanity-defense acquittee may be confined for treatment “until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society.”1215 It follows, however, that a state may not indefinitely confine an insanity-defense acquittee who is no longer mentally ill but who has an untreatable personality disorder that may lead to criminal conduct.1216
The Court held in Ford v. Wainwright that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the state from executing a person who is insane, and that properly raised issues of pre-execution sanity must be determined in a proceeding that satisfies the requirements of due process.1217 Due process is not met when the decision on sanity is left to the unfettered discretion of the governor; rather, due process requires the opportunity to be heard before an impartial officer or board.1218 The Court, however, left “to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences.”1219
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment also prohibits the state from executing a person who is mentally retarded, and added, “As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright with regard to insanity, ‘we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’”1220
Issues of substantive due process may arise if the government seeks to compel the medication of a person found to be incompetent to stand trial. In Washington v. Harper,1221 the Court had found that an individual has a significant “liberty interest” in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. In Sell v. United States,1222 the Court found that this liberty interest could in “rare” instances be outweighed by the government’s interest in bringing an incompetent individual to trial. First, however, the government must engage in a fact-specific inquiry as to whether this interest is important in a particular case.1223 Second, the court must find that the treatment is likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial without resulting in side effects that will interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel. Third, the court must find that less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results. Finally, the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is in the patient’s best medical interests.
Guilty Pleas.—A defendant may plead guilty instead of insisting that the prosecution prove him guilty. Often the defendant does so as part of a “plea bargain” with the prosecution, where the defendant is guaranteed a light sentence or is allowed to plead to a lesser offense.1224 Although the government may not structure its system so as to coerce a guilty plea,1225 a guilty plea that is entered voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly, even to obtain an advantage, is sufficient to overcome constitutional objections.1226 The guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important and necessary components of the criminal justice system,1227 and it is permissible for a prosecutor during such plea bargains to require a defendant to forgo his right to a trial in return for escaping additional charges that are likely upon conviction to result in a more severe penalty.1228 But the prosecutor does deny due process if he penalizes the assertion of a right or privilege by the defendant by charging more severely or recommending a longer sentence.1229
In accepting a guilty plea, the court must inquire whether the defendant is pleading voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly,1230 and “the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is that, when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”1231
Sentencing.—In the absence of errors by the sentencing judge,1232 or of sentencing jurors considering invalid factors,1233 the significance of procedural due process at sentencing is limited.1234 In Williams v. New York,1235 the Court upheld the imposition of the death penalty, despite a jury’s recommendation of mercy, where the judge acted based on information in a presentence report not shown to the defendant or his counsel. The Court viewed as highly undesirable the restriction of judicial discretion in sentencing by requiring adherence to rules of evidence which would exclude highly relevant and informative material. Further, disclosure of such information to the defense could well dry up sources who feared retribution or embarrassment. Thus, hearsay and rumors can be considered in sentencing. In Gardner v. Florida,1236 however, the Court limited the application of Williams to capital cases.1237
In United States v. Grayson,1238 a noncapital case, the Court relied heavily on Williams in holding that a sentencing judge may properly consider his belief that the defendant was untruthful in his trial testimony in deciding to impose a more severe sentence than he would otherwise have imposed. the Court declared that, under the current scheme of individualized indeterminate sentencing, the judge must be free to consider the broadest range of information in assessing the defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation; defendant’s truthfulness, as assessed by the trial judge from his own observations, is relevant information.1239
There are various sentencing proceedings, however, that so implicate substantial rights that additional procedural protections are required.1240 Thus, in Specht v. Patterson,1241 the Court considered a defendant who had been convicted of taking indecent liberties, which carried a maximum sentence of ten years, but was sentenced under a sex offenders statute to an indefinite term of one day to life. The sex offenders law, the Court observed, did not make the commission of the particular offense the basis for sentencing. Instead, by triggering a new hearing to determine whether the convicted person was a public threat, a habitual offender, or mentally ill, the law in effect constituted a new charge that must be accompanied by procedural safeguards. And in Mempa v. Rhay,1242 the Court held that, when sentencing is deferred subject to probation and the terms of probation are allegedly violated so that the convicted defendant is returned for sentencing, he must then be represented by counsel, inasmuch as it is a point in the process where substantial rights of the defendant may be affected.
Due process considerations can also come into play in sentencing if the state attempts to withhold relevant information from the jury. For instance, in Simmons v. South Carolina, the Court held that due process requires that if prosecutor makes an argument for the death penalty based on the future dangerousness of the defendant to society, the jury must then be informed if the only alternative to a death sentence is a life sentence without possibility of parole.1243 But, in Ramdass v. Angelone,1244 the Court refused to apply the reasoning of Simmons because the defendant was not technically parole ineligible at time of sentencing.
A defendant should not be penalized for exercising a right to appeal. Thus, it is a denial of due process for a judge to sentence a convicted defendant on retrial to a longer sentence than he received after the first trial if the object of the sentence is to punish the defendant for having successfully appealed his first conviction or to discourage similar appeals by others.1245 If the judge does impose a longer sentence the second time, he must justify it on the record by showing, for example, the existence of new information meriting a longer sentence.1246
Because the possibility of vindictiveness in resentencing is de minimis when it is the jury that sentences, however, the requirement of justifying a more severe sentence upon resentencing is inapplicable to jury sentencing, at least in the absence of a showing that the jury knew of the prior vacated sentence.1247 The presumption of vindictiveness is also inapplicable if the first sentence was imposed following a guilty plea. Here the Court reasoned that a trial may well afford the court insights into the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant that were not available following the initial guilty plea.1248
Corrective Process: Appeals and Other Remedies.—“An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such appeal. A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law and is not now a necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow or not to allow such a review.”1249 This holding has been reaffirmed,1250 although the Court has also held that, when a state does provide appellate review, it may not so condition the privilege as to deny it irrationally to some persons, such as indigents.1251
A state is not free, however, to have no corrective process in which defendants may pursue remedies for federal constitutional violations. In Frank v. Mangum,1252 the Court asserted that a conviction obtained in a mob-dominated trial was contrary to due process: “if the State, supplying no corrective process, carries into execution a judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced by mob domination, the State deprives the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law.” Consequently, the Court has stated numerous times that the absence of some form of corrective process when the convicted defendant alleges a federal constitutional violation contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment,1253 and the Court has held that to burden this process, such as by limiting the right to petition for habeas corpus, is to deny the convicted defendant his constitutional rights.1254
The mode by which federal constitutional rights are to be vindicated after conviction is for the government concerned to determine. “Wide discretion must be left to the States for the manner of adjudicating a claim that a conviction is unconstitutional. States are free to devise their own systems of review in criminal cases. A State may decide whether to have direct appeals in such cases, and if so under what circumstances. . . . In respecting the duty laid upon them . . . States have a wide choice of remedies. A State may provide that the protection of rights granted by the Federal Constitution be sought through the writ of habeas corpus or coram nobis. It may use each of these ancient writs in its common law scope, or it may put them to new uses; or it may afford remedy by a simple motion brought either in the court of original conviction or at the place of detention. . . . So long as the rights under the United States Constitution may be pursued, it is for a State and not for this Court to define the mode by which they may be vindicated.”1255 If a state provides a mode of redress, then a defendant must first exhaust that mode. If he is unsuccessful, or if a state does not provide an adequate mode of redress, then the defendant may petition a federal court for relief through a writ of habeas corpus.1256
When appellate or other corrective process is made available, because it is no less a part of the process of law under which a defendant is held in custody, it becomes subject to scrutiny for any alleged unconstitutional deprivation of life or liberty. At first, the Court seemed content to assume that, when a state appellate process formally appeared to be sufficient to correct constitutional errors committed by the trial court, the conclusion by the appellate court that the trial court’s sentence of execution should be affirmed was ample assurance that life would not be forfeited without due process of law.1257 But, in Moore v. Dempsey,1258 while insisting that it was not departing from precedent, the Court directed a federal district court in which petitioners had sought a writ of habeas corpus to make an independent investigation of the facts alleged by the petitioners—mob domination of their trial—notwithstanding that the state appellate court had ruled against the legal sufficiency of these same allegations. Indubitably, Moore marked the abandonment of the Supreme Court’s deference, founded upon considerations of comity, to decisions of state appellate tribunals on issues of constitutionality, and the proclamation of its intention no longer to treat as virtually conclusive pronouncements by the latter that proceedings in a trial court were fair, an abandonment soon made even clearer in Brown v. Mississippi1259 and now taken for granted.
The Court has held, however, that the Due Process Clause does not provide convicted persons a right to postconviction access to the state’s evidence for DNA testing.1260 Chief Justice Roberts, in a fivetofour decision, noted that 46 states had enacted statutes dealing specifically with access to DNA evidence, and that the Federal Government had enacted a statute that allows federal prisoners to move for court-ordered DNA testing under specified conditions. Even the states that had not enacted statutes dealing specifically with access to DNA evidence must, under the Due Process Clause, provide adequate postconviction relief procedures. The Court, therefore, saw “no reason to constitutionalize the issue.”1261 It also expressed concern that “[e]stablishing a freestanding right to access DNA evidence for testing would force us to act as policymakers . . . . We would soon have to decide if there is a constitutional obligation to preserve forensic evidence that might later be tested. If so, for how long? Would it be different for different types of evidence? Would the State also have some obligation to gather such evidence in the first place? How much, and when?”1262
Rights of Prisoners.—Until relatively recently the view prevailed that a prisoner “has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the state.”1263 This view is not now the law, and may never have been wholly correct.1264 In 1948 the Court declared that “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights”;1265 “many,” indicated less than “all,” and it was clear that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to some extent do apply to prisoners.1266 More direct acknowledgment of constitutional protection came in 1972: “[f]ederal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the constitutional rights of all ‘persons,’ which include prisoners. We are not unmindful that prison officials must be accorded latitude in the administration of prison affairs, and that prisoners necessarily are subject to appropriate rules and regulations. But persons in prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition the government for redress of grievances . . . .”1267 However, while the Court affirmed that federal courts have the responsibility to scrutinize prison practices alleged to violate the Constitution, at the same time concerns of federalism and of judicial restraint caused the Court to emphasize the necessity of deference to the judgments of prison officials and others with responsibility for administering such systems.1268
Save for challenges to conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees,1269 the Court has generally treated challenges to prison conditions as a whole under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment,1270 while challenges to particular incidents and practices are pursued under the Due Process Clause1271 or more specific provisions, such as the First Amendment’s speech and religion clauses.1272 Prior to formulating its current approach, the Court recognized several rights of prisoners. Prisoners have the right to petition for redress of grievances, which includes access to the courts for purposes of presenting their complaints,1273 and to bring actions in federal courts to recover for damages wrongfully done them by prison administrators.1274 And they have a right, circumscribed by legitimate prison administration considerations, to fair and regular treatment during their incarceration. Prisoners have a right to be free of racial segregation in prisons, except for the necessities of prison security and discipline.1275
In Turner v. Saﬂey,1276 the Court announced a general standard for measuring prisoners’ claims of deprivation of constitutional rights: “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”1277 Several considerations, the Court indicated, are appropriate in determining reasonableness of a prison regulation. First, there must be a rational relation to a legitimate, content-neutral objective, such as prison security, broadly defined. Availability of other avenues for exercise of the inmate right suggests reasonableness.1278 A further indicium of reasonableness is present if accommodation would have a negative effect on the liberty or safety of guards, other inmates,1279 or visitors.1280 On the other hand, “if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodated the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests,” it would suggest unreasonableness.1281
Fourth Amendment protection is incompatible with “the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions”; hence, a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell protecting him from “shakedown” searches designed to root out weapons, drugs, and other contraband.1282 Avenues of redress “for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs” are not totally blocked, the Court indicated; inmates may still seek protection in the Eighth Amendment or in state tort law.1283 Existence of “a meaningful postdeprivation remedy” for unauthorized, intentional deprivation of an inmate’s property by prison personnel protects the inmate’s due process rights.1284 Due process is not implicated at all by negligent deprivation of life, liberty, or property by prison officials.1285
A change of the conditions under which a prisoner is housed, including one imposed as a matter of discipline, may implicate a protected liberty interest if such a change imposes an “atypical and significant hardship” on the inmate.1286 In Wolff v. McDonnell,1287 the Court promulgated due process standards to govern the imposition of discipline upon prisoners. Due process applies, but, because prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, the full panoply of a defendant’s rights is not available. Rather, the analysis must proceed by identifying the interest in “liberty” that the clause protects. Thus, where the state provides for good-time credit or other privileges and further provides for forfeiture of these privileges only for serious misconduct, the interest of the prisoner in this degree of “liberty” entitles him to the minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances.1288 What the minimum procedures consist of is to be determined by balancing the prisoner’s interest against the valid interest of the prison in maintaining security and order in the institution, in protecting guards and prisoners against retaliation by other prisoners, and in reducing prison tensions.
The Court in Wolff held that the prison must afford the subject of a disciplinary proceeding “advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the factfindings as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the action taken.”1289 In addition, an “inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.”1290 Confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses is not required inasmuch as these would no doubt threaten valid institutional interests. Ordinarily, an inmate has no right to representation by retained or appointed counsel. Finally, only a partial right to an impartial tribunal was recognized, the Court ruling that limitations imposed on the discretion of a committee of prison officials sufficed for this purpose.1291 Revocation of good time credits, the Court later ruled, must be supported by “some evidence in the record,” but an amount that “might be characterized as meager” is constitutionally sufficient.1292
Determination whether due process requires a hearing before a prisoner is transferred from one institution to another requires a close analysis of the applicable statutes and regulations as well as a consideration of the particular harm suffered by the transferee. On the one hand, the Court found that no hearing need be held prior to the transfer from one prison to another prison in which the conditions were substantially less favorable. Because the state had not conferred any right to remain in the facility to which the prisoner was first assigned, defeasible upon the commission of acts for which transfer is a punishment, prison officials had unfettered discretion to transfer any prisoner for any reason or for no reason at all; consequently, there was nothing to hold a hearing about.1293 The same principles govern interstate prison transfers.1294
Transfer of a prisoner to a high security facility, with an attendant loss of the right to parole, gave rise to a liberty interest, although the due process requirements to protect this interest are limited.1295 On the other hand, transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital pursuant to a statute authorizing transfer if the inmate suffers from a “mental disease or defect” must, for two reasons, be preceded by a hearing. First, the statute gave the inmate a liberty interest, because it presumed that he would not be moved absent a finding that he was suffering from a mental disease or defect. Second, unlike transfers from one prison to another, transfer to a mental institution was not within the range of confinement covered by the prisoner’s sentence, and, moreover, imposed a stigma constituting a deprivation of a liberty interest.1296
The kind of hearing that is required before a state may force a mentally ill prisoner to take antipsychotic drugs against his will was at issue in Washington v. Harper.1297 There the Court held that a judicial hearing was not required. Instead, the inmate’s substantive liberty interest (derived from the Due Process Clause as well as from state law) was adequately protected by an administrative hearing before independent medical professionals, at which hearing the inmate has the right to a lay advisor but not an attorney.
Probation and Parole.—Sometimes convicted defendants are not sentenced to jail, but instead are placed on probation subject to incarceration upon violation of the conditions that are imposed; others who are jailed may subsequently qualify for release on parole before completing their sentence, and are subject to reincarceration upon violation of imposed conditions. Because both of these dispositions are statutory privileges granted by the governmental authority,1298 it was long assumed that the administrators of the systems did not have to accord procedural due process either in the granting stage or in the revocation stage. Now, both granting and revocation are subject to due process analysis, although the results tend to be disparate. Thus, in Mempa v. Rhay,1299 the trial judge had deferred sentencing and placed the convicted defendant on probation; when facts subsequently developed that indicated a violation of the conditions of probation, he was summoned and summarily sentenced to prison. The Court held that he was entitled to counsel at the deferred sentencing hearing.
In Morrissey v. Brewer1300 a unanimous Court held that parole revocations must be accompanied by the usual due process hearing and notice requirements. “[T]he revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocation . . . [But] the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inﬂicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others. It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether the parolee’s liberty is a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’ By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process, however informal.”1301 What process is due, then, turned upon the state’s interests. Its principal interest was that, having once convicted a defendant, imprisoned him, and, at some risk, released him for rehabilitation purposes, it should be “able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to abide by the conditions of his parole. Yet, the state has no interest in revoking parole without some informal procedural guarantees,” inasmuch as such guarantees will not interfere with its reasonable interests.1302
Minimal due process, the Court held, requires that at both stages of the revocation process—the arrest of the parolee and the formal revocation—the parolee is entitled to certain rights. Promptly following arrest of the parolee, there should be an informal hearing to determine whether reasonable grounds exist for revocation of parole; this preliminary hearing should be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available, and should be conducted by someone not directly involved in the case, though he need not be a judicial officer. The parolee should be given adequate notice that the hearing will take place and what violations are alleged, he should be able to appear and speak in his own behalf and produce other evidence, and he should be allowed to examine those who have given adverse evidence against him unless it is determined that the identity of such informant should not be revealed. Also, the hearing officer should prepare a digest of the hearing and base his decision upon the evidence adduced at the hearing.1303
Prior to the final decision on revocation, there should be a more formal revocation hearing at which there would be a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration whether the facts as determined warrant revocation. The hearing must take place within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody and he must be enabled to controvert the allegations or offer evidence in mitigation. The procedural details of such hearings are for the states to develop, but the Court specified minimum requirements of due process. “They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole.”1304 Ordinarily, the written statement need not indicate that the sentencing court or review board considered alternatives to incarceration,1305 but a sentencing court must consider such alternatives if the probation violation consists of the failure of an indigent probationer, through no fault of his own, to pay a fine or restitution.1306
The Court has applied a ﬂexible due process standard to the provision of counsel. Counsel is not invariably required in parole or probation revocation proceedings. The state should, however, provide the assistance of counsel where an indigent person may have difficulty in presenting his version of disputed facts without cross-examination of witnesses or presentation of complicated documentary evidence. Presumptively, counsel should be provided where the person requests counsel, based on a timely and colorable claim that he has not committed the alleged violation, or if that issue be uncontested, there are reasons in justification or mitigation that might make revocation inappropriate.1307
With respect to the granting of parole, the Court’s analysis of the Due Process Clause’s meaning in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates1308 is much more problematical. The theory was rejected that the mere establishment of the possibility of parole was sufficient to create a liberty interest entitling any prisoner meeting the general standards of eligibility to a due process protected expectation of being dealt with in any particular way. On the other hand, the Court did recognize that a parole statute could create an expectancy of release entitled to some measure of constitutional protection, although a determination would need to be made on a casebycase basis,1309 and the full panoply of due process guarantees is not required.1310 Where, however, government by its statutes and regulations creates no obligation of the pardoning authority and thus creates no legitimate expectancy of release, the prisoner may not by showing the favorable exercise of the authority in the great number of cases demonstrate such a legitimate expectancy. The power of the executive to pardon, or grant clemency, being a matter of grace, is rarely subject to judicial review.1311
The Problem of the Juvenile Offender.—All fifty states and the District of Columbia provide for dealing with juvenile offenders outside the criminal system for adult offenders.1312 Their juvenile justice systems apply both to offenses that would be criminal if committed by an adult and to delinquent behavior not recognizable under laws dealing with adults, such as habitual truancy, deportment endangering the morals or health of the juvenile or others, or disobedience making the juvenile uncontrollable by his parents. The reforms of the early part of the 20th century provided not only for segregating juveniles from adult offenders in the adjudication, detention, and correctional facilities, but they also dispensed with the substantive and procedural rules surrounding criminal trials which were mandated by due process. Justification for this abandonment of constitutional guarantees was offered by describing juvenile courts as civil not criminal and as not dispensing criminal punishment, and offering the theory that the state was acting as parens patriae for the juvenile offender and was in no sense his adversary.1313
Disillusionment with the results of juvenile reforms coupled with judicial emphasis on constitutional protection of the accused led in the 1960s to a substantial restriction of these elements of juvenile jurisprudence. After tracing in much detail this history of juvenile courts, the Court held in In re Gault1314 that the application of due process to juvenile proceedings would not endanger the good intentions vested in the system nor diminish the features of the system which were deemed desirable—emphasis upon rehabilitation rather than punishment, a measure of informality, avoidance of the stigma of criminal conviction, the low visibility of the process—but that the consequences of the absence of due process standards made their application necessary.1315
Thus, the Court in Gault required that notice of charges be given in time for the juvenile to prepare a defense, required a hearing in which the juvenile could be represented by retained or appointed counsel, required observance of the rights of confrontation and cross-examination, and required that the juvenile be protected against self-incrimination.1316 It did not pass upon the right of appeal or the failure to make transcripts of hearings. Earlier, the Court had held that before a juvenile could be “waived” to an adult court for trial, there had to be a hearing and findings of reasons, a result based on statutory interpretation but apparently constitutionalized in Gault.1317 Subsequently, the Court held that the “essentials of due process and fair treatment” required that a juvenile could be adjudged delinquent only on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt when the offense charged would be a crime if committed by an adult,1318 but still later the Court held that jury trials were not constitutionally required in juvenile trials.1319
On a few occasions the Court has considered whether rights accorded to adults during investigation of crime are to be accorded juveniles. In one such case the Court ruled that a juvenile undergoing custodial interrogation by police had not invoked a Miranda right to remain silent by requesting permission to consult with his probation officer, since a probation officer could not be equated with an attorney, but indicated as well that a juvenile’s waiver of Miranda rights was to be evaluated under the same totality-of-the-circumstances approach applicable to adults. That approach “permits— indeed it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation . . . includ[ing] evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him . . . .”1320 In another case the Court ruled that, although the Fourth Amendment applies to searches of students by public school authorities, neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause standard is appropriate.1321 Instead, a simple reasonableness standard governs all searches of students’ persons and effects by school authorities.1322
The Court ruled in Schall v. Martin1323 that preventive detention of juveniles does not offend due process when it serves the legitimate state purpose of protecting society and the juvenile from potential consequences of pretrial crime, when the terms of confinement serve those legitimate purposes and are nonpunitive, and when procedures provide sufficient protection against erroneous and unnecessary detentions. A statute authorizing pretrial detention of accused juvenile delinquents on a finding of “serious risk” that the juvenile would commit crimes prior to trial, providing for expedited hearings (the maximum possible detention was 17 days), and guaranteeing a formal, adversarial probable cause hearing within that period, was found to satisfy these requirements.
Each state has a procedure by which juveniles may be tried as adults.1324 With the Court having clarified the constitutional requirements for imposition of capital punishment, it was only a matter of time before the Court would have to determine whether states may subject juveniles to capital punishment. In Stanford v. Kentucky,1325 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit imposition of the death penalty for individuals who commit crimes at age 16 or 17; earlier the Court had invalidated a statutory scheme permitting capital punishment for crimes committed before age 16.1326 In weighing validity under the Eighth Amendment, the Court has looked to state practice to determine whether a consensus against execution exists.1327 Still to be considered by the Court are such questions as the substantive and procedural guarantees to be applied in proceedings when the matter at issue is non-criminal delinquent behavior.
The Problem of Civil Commitment.—As with juvenile offenders, several other classes of persons are subject to confinement by court processes deemed civil rather than criminal. Within this category of “protective commitment” are involuntary commitments for treatment of insanity and other degrees of mental disability, alcoholism, narcotics addiction, sexual psychopathy, and the like. In O’Connor v. Donaldson,1328 the Court held that “a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.”1329 The jury had found that Donaldson was not dangerous to himself or to others, and the Court ruled that he had been unconstitutionally confined.1330 Left to another day were such questions as “when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such a person—to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness”1331 and the right, if any, to receive treatment for the confined person’s illness. To conform to due process requirements, procedures for voluntary admission should recognize the possibility that persons in need of treatment may not be competent to give informed consent; this is not a situation where availability of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy can cure the due process violation.1332
Procedurally, it is clear that an individual’s liberty interest in being free from unjustifiable confinement and from the adverse social consequences of being labeled mentally ill requires the government to assume a greater share of the risk of error in proving the existence of such illness as a precondition to confinement. Thus, the evidentiary standard of a preponderance, normally used in litigation between private parties, is constitutionally inadequate in commitment proceedings. On the other hand, the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary because the state’s aim is not punitive and because some or even much of the consequence of an erroneous decision not to commit may fall upon the individual. Moreover, the criminal standard addresses an essentially factual question, whereas interpretative and predictive determinations must also be made in reaching a conclusion on commitment. The Court therefore imposed a standard of “clear and convincing” evidence.1333
In Parham v. J. R., the Court confronted difficult questions as to what due process requires in the context of commitment of allegedly mentally ill and mentally retarded children by their parents or by the state, when such children are wards of the state.1334 Under the challenged laws there were no formal preadmission hearings, but psychiatric and social workers did interview parents and children and reached some form of independent determination that commitment was called for. The Court acknowledged the potential for abuse but balanced this against such factors as the responsibility of parents for the care and nurture of their children and the legal presumption that parents usually act in behalf of their children’s welfare, the independent role of medical professionals in deciding to accept the children for admission, and the real possibility that the institution of an adversary proceeding would both deter parents from acting in good faith to institutionalize children needing such care and interfere with the ability of parents to assist with the care of institutionalized children.1335 Similarly, the same concerns, reﬂected in the statutory obligation of the state to care for children in its custody, caused the Court to apply the same standards to involuntary commitment by the government.1336 Left to future resolution was the question of the due process requirements for postadmission review of the necessity for continued confinement.1337
737 Thus, where a litigant had the benefit of a full and fair trial in the state courts, and his rights are measured, not by laws made to affect him individually, but by general provisions of law applicable to all those in like condition, he is not deprived of property without due process of law, even if he can be regarded as deprived of his property by an adverse result. Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).
738 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884). “Due process of law is [process which], following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever necessary to the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.” Id. at 708; Accord, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).
739 See Medina v. California 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
741 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In Nelson v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held that the Mathews test controls when evaluating state procedures governing the continuing deprivation of property after a criminal conviction has been reversed or vacated, with no prospect of reprosecution. See 581 U.S. ___, No. 15–1256, slip op. at 6 (2017).
742 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899). “A process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and this country.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 529.
743 Twining, 211 U.S. at 101.
744 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944).
745 Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 668 (1890).
746 For instance, proceedings to raise revenue by levying and collecting taxes are not necessarily judicial proceedings, yet their validity is not thereby impaired. McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 41 (1877).
747 Railroad Comm’n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941) (oil field proration order). See also Railroad Comm’n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940) (courts should not second-guess regulatory commissions in evaluating expert testimony).
748 See, e.g., Moore v. Johnson, 582 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding the preclusion of judicial review of decisions of the Veterans Administration regarding veterans’ benefits).
749 State statutes vesting in a parole board certain judicial functions, Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83–84 (1902), or conferring discretionary power upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission to carry on a trade, New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 562 (1905), or vesting in a probate court authority to appoint park commissioners and establish park districts, Ohio v. Akron Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930), are not in conﬂict with the Due Process Clause and present no federal question.
750 Carfer v. Caldwell, 200 U.S. 293, 297 (1906).
751 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
752 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). “[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
753 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). At times, the Court has also stressed the dignitary importance of procedural rights, the worth of being able to defend one’s interests even if one cannot change the result. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Nelson v. Adams, 529 U.S. 460 (2000) (amendment of judgement to impose attorney fees and costs to sole shareholder of liable corporate structure invalid without notice or opportunity to dispute).
754 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See also Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (res judicata may not apply where taxpayer who challenged a county’s occupation tax was not informed of prior case and where taxpayer interests were not adequately protected).
755 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235 (2006) (state’s certified letter, intended to notify a property owner that his property would be sold unless he satisfied a tax delinquency, was returned by the post office marked “unclaimed”; the state should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify the property owner, as it would have been practicable for it to have done so).
756 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970).
757 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1974); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
758 City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999).
759 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard.” Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
760 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972). See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170–71 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter concurring).
761 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
762 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
763 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
764 Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).
765 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Or, the conduct of deportation hearings by a person who, while he had not investigated the case heard, was also an investigator who must judge the results of others’ investigations just as one of them would some day judge his, raised a substantial problem which was resolved through statutory construction). Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
766 Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
767 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). Where an administrative officer is acting in a prosecutorial, rather than judicial or quasi-judicial role, an even lesser standard of impartiality applies. Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 248–50 (1980) (regional administrator assessing fines for child labor violations, with penalties going into fund to reimburse cost of system of enforcing child labor laws). But “traditions of prosecutorial discretion do not immunize from judicial scrutiny cases in which enforcement decisions of an administrator were motivated by improper factors or were otherwise contrary to law.” Id. at 249.
768 Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976). Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170 n.5 (1974) (Justice Powell), with id. at 196–99 (Justice White), and 216 (Justice Marshall).
769 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 6 (2009) (citations omitted).
770 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 6, quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
771 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 6 (citations omitted).
772 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 7, 9.
773 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 11 (citations omitted).
774 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 15.
775 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 14. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, dissented, asserting that “a ‘probability of bias’ cannot be defined in any limited way,” “provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required,” and “will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be.” Slip. op. at 1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The majority countered that “[t]he facts now before us are extreme in any measure.” Slip op. at 17.
776 579 U.S. ___, No. 15–5040, slip op. at 1 (2016).
777 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
778 Id. at 5–6.
779 Id. at 6 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136–37 (1955)). The Court also noted that “[n]o attorney is more integral to the accusatory process than a prosecutor who participates in a major adversary decision.” Id. at 7.
780 Id. at 9. See also id. at 10 (noting that the judge in this case had highlighted the number of capital cases in which he participated when campaigning for judicial office).
781 Id. at 8.
782 Id. at 12–13. Likewise, the Court rejected the argument that remanding the case would not cure the underlying due process violation because the disqualified judge’s views might still inﬂuence his former colleagues, as an “inability to guarantee complete relief for a constitutional violation . . . does not justify withholding a remedy altogether.” Id. at 14.
783 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). See also ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93–94 (1913). Cf. § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
784 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496–97 (1959). But see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (where authors of documentary evidence are known to petitioner and he did not subpoena them, he may not complain that agency relied on that evidence). Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343–45 (1976).
785 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959), quoted with approval in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
786 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 571 (1968–1970).
787 FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964).
788 The exclusiveness of the record is fundamental in administrative law. See § 7(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e). However, one must show not only that the agency used ex parte evidence but that he was prejudiced thereby. Market Street R.R. v. Railroad Comm’n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945) (agency decision supported by evidence in record, its decision sustained, disregarding ex parte evidence).
789 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (citations omitted).
790 397 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1970).
791 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The Court purported to draw this rule from Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no per se right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings). To introduce this presumption into the balancing, however, appears to disregard the fact that the first factor of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), upon which the Court (and dissent) relied, relates to the importance of the interest to the person claiming the right. Thus, at least in this context, the value of the first Eldridge factor is diminished. The Court noted, however, that the Mathews v. Eldridge standards were drafted in the context of the generality of cases and were not intended for case-by-case application. Cf. 424 U.S. at 344 (1976).
792 Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–10, slip op. (2011). The Turner Court denied an indigent defendant appointed counsel in a civil contempt proceeding to enforce a child support order, even though the defendant faced incarceration unless he showed an inability to pay the arrearages. The party opposing the defendant in the case was not the state, but rather the unrepresented custodial parent, nor was the case unusually complex. A five-Justice majority, though denying a right to counsel, nevertheless reversed the contempt order because it found that the procedures followed remained inadequate.
793 452 U.S. at 31–32. The balancing decision is to be made initially by the trial judge, subject to appellate review. Id. at 32
794 452 U.S. at 27–31. The decision was a five-to-four, with Justices Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in the majority, and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in dissent. Id. at 35, 59.
795 See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (indigent entitled to state-funded blood testing in a paternity action the state required to be instituted); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (imposition of higher standard of proof in case involving state termination of parental rights).
796 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1982). “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. But the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–71 (1972). Developments under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause have been interchangeable. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
797 For instance, at common law, one’s right of life existed independently of any formal guarantee of it and could be taken away only by the state pursuant to the formal processes of law, and only for offenses deemed by a legislative body to be particularly heinous. One’s liberty, generally expressed as one’s freedom from bodily restraint, was a natural right to be forfeited only pursuant to law and strict formal procedures. One’s ownership of lands, chattels, and other properties, to be sure, was highly dependent upon legal protections of rights commonly associated with that ownership, but it was a concept universally understood in Anglo-American countries.
798 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (invalidating replevin statutes which authorized the authorities to seize goods simply upon the filing of an ex parte application and the posting of bond).
799 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
800 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Compare Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977), with Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979). But see American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) (no liberty interest in worker’s compensation claim where reasonableness and necessity of particular treatment had not yet been resolved).
801 See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 685 (2d. ed) (1988).
802 Tribe, supra, at 1084–90.
803 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E.2d 517, 522 (1892).
804 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 314 U.S. 918 (1951); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
805 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
806 Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
807 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
808 See William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). Much of the old fight had to do with imposition of conditions on admitting corporations into a state. Cf. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656–68 (1981) (reviewing the cases). The right-privilege distinction is not, however, totally moribund. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108–09 (1976) (sustaining as qualification for public financing of campaign agreement to abide by expenditure limitations otherwise unconstitutional); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
809 This means that Congress or a state legislature could still simply take away part or all of the benefit. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432–33 (1982).
810 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
811 397 U.S. at 261–62. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Social Security benefits).
812 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–71 (1972).
813 408 U.S. at 577. Although property interests often arise by statute, the Court has also recognized interests established by state case law. Thus, where state court holdings required that private utilities terminate service only for cause (such as nonpayment of charges), then a utility is required to follow procedures to resolve disputes about payment or the accuracy of charges prior to terminating service. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
814 436 U.S. at 576–78. The Court also held that no liberty interest was implicated, because in declining to rehire Roth the state had not made any charges against him or taken any actions that would damage his reputation or stigmatize him. 436 at 572–75. For an instance of protection accorded a claimant on the basis of such an action, see Codd v. Vegler. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347–50 (1976); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491–94 (1980); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82–84 (1978).
815 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (finding no practice or mutually explicit understanding creating interest).
816 408 U.S. at 601–03 (1972). In contrast, a statutory assurance was found in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), where the civil service laws and regulations allowed suspension or termination “only for such cause as would promote the efficiency of the service.” 416 U.S. at 140. On the other hand, a policeman who was a “permanent employee” under an ordinance which appeared to afford him a continuing position subject to conditions subsequent was held not to be protected by the Due Process Clause because the federal district court interpreted the ordinance as providing only employment at the will and pleasure of the city, an interpretation that the Supreme Court chose not to disturb. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). “On its face,” the Court noted, “the ordinance on which [claimant relied] may fairly be read as conferring” both “a property interest in employment . . . [and] an enforceable expectation of continued public employment.” 426 U.S. at 344–45 (1976). The district court’s decision had been affirmed by an equally divided appeals court and the Supreme Court deferred to the presumed greater expertise of the lower court judges in reading the ordinance. 426 U.S. at 345 (1976).
817 408 U.S. at 601.
818 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (measure of damages for violation of procedural due process in school suspension context). See also Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (whether liberty or property interest implicated in academic dismissals and discipline, as contrasted to disciplinary actions).
819 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 574. See also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (horse trainer’s license); O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980) (statutory entitlement of nursing home residents protecting them in the enjoyment of assistance and care).
820 Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). Although the Court “assume[d] the existence of a constitutionally protectible property interest in . . . continued enrollment” in a state university, this limited constitutional right is violated only by a showing that dismissal resulted from “such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.” 474 U.S. at 225.
821 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
822 545 U.S. at 759. The Court also noted that the law did not specify the precise means of enforcement required; nor did it guarantee that, if a warrant were sought, it would be issued. Such indeterminancy is not the “hallmark of a duty that is mandatory.” Id. at 763.
823 545 U.S. at 764–65.
824 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
825 416 U.S. at 155 (Justices Rehnquist and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger).
826 416 U.S. at 154.
827 416 U.S. 167 (Justices Powell and Blackmun concurring). See 416 U.S. at 177 (Justice White concurring and dissenting), 203 (Justice Douglas dissenting), 206 (Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan dissenting).
828 426 U.S. 341 (1976). A five-to-four decision, the opinion was written by Justice Stevens, replacing Justice Douglas, and was joined by Justice Powell, who had disagreed with the theory in Arnett.See id. at 350, 353 n.4, 355 (dissenting opinions). The language is ambiguous and appears at different points to adopt both positions. But see id. at 345, 347.
829 419 U.S. 565, 573–74 (1975). See id. at 584, 586–87 (Justice Powell dissenting).
830 419 U.S. at 584, 586–87 (Justice Powell dissenting).
831 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
832 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
833 455 U.S. at 428–33 A different majority of the Court also found an equal protection denial. 455 U.S. at 438.
834 These procedural liberty interests should not, however, be confused with substantive liberty interests, which, if not outweighed by a sufficient governmental interest, may not be intruded upon regardless of the process followed. See “Fundamental Rights (Noneconomic Due Process),” supra.
835 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
836 430 U.S. at 673. The family-related liberties discussed under substantive due process, as well as the associational and privacy ones, no doubt provide a fertile source of liberty interests for procedural protection. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (natural father, with visitation rights, must be given notice and opportunity to be heard with respect to impending adoption proceedings); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father could not simply be presumed unfit to have custody of his children because his interest in his children warrants deference and protection). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
837 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
838 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
839 But see Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (posting of accurate information regarding sex offenders on state Internet website does not violate due process as the site does not purport to label the offenders as presently dangerous).
840 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
841 Here the Court, 424 U.S. at 701–10, distinguished Constantineau as being a “reputation-plus” case. That is, it involved not only the stigmatizing of one posted but it also “deprived the individual of a right previously held under state law—the right to purchase or obtain liquor in common with the rest of the citizenry.” 424 U.S. at 708. How the state law positively did this the Court did not explain. But, of course, the reputation-plus concept is now well-settled. See discussion below. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1976). In a later case, the Court looked to decisional law and the existence of common-law remedies as establishing a protected property interest. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1978).
842 427 U.S. 215 (1976). See also Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
843 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
844 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
845 Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process applies to forfeiture of good-time credits and other positivist granted privileges of prisoners).
846 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459–63 (1989) (prison regulations listing categories of visitors who may be excluded, but not creating a right to have a visitor admitted, contain “substantive predicates” but lack mandatory language).
847 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (30-day solitary confinement not atypical “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (assignment to SuperMax prison, with attendant loss of parole eligibility and with only annual status review, constitutes an “atypical and significant hardship”).
848 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908); Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261, 265 (1912).
849 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915). See also Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919). Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 445 U.S. 422, 432–33 (1982).
850 United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
851 410 U.S. at 245 (distinguishing between rule-making, at which legislative facts are in issue, and adjudication, at which adjudicative facts are at issue, requiring a hearing in latter proceedings but not in the former). See Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
852 “It is not an indispensable requirement of due process that every procedure affecting the ownership or disposition of property be exclusively by judicial proceeding. Statutory proceedings affecting property rights which, by later resort to the courts, secures to adverse parties an opportunity to be heard, suitable to the occasion, do not deny due process.” Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246–47 (1944).
853 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
854 Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
855 Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 294, 403 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
856 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65–69 (1972). However, if one would suffer too severe an injury between the doing and the undoing, he may avoid the alternative means. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
857 American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932). Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429–30, 432–33 (1982).
858 Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917).
859 “The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is inﬂuenced by the extent to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss,’ . . . and depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970), (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter concurring)). “The very nature of due process negates any concept of inﬂexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1961).
860 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
861 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
862 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976).
863 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1975). See also id. at 623 (Justice Powell concurring), 629 (Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Marshall dissenting). Justice White, who wrote Mitchell and included the balancing language in his dissent in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 99–100 (1972), did not repeat it in North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975), but it presumably underlies the reconciliation of Fuentes and Mitchell in the latter case and the application of DiChem.
864 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
865 North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601, 611 n.2 (1975) (Justice Powell concurring). The majority opinion draws no such express distinction, see id. subject due process procedural guarantees. But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614 (1974) (opinion of Court by Justice White emphasizing the wages aspect of the earlier case).
866 407 U.S. (1972).
867 Fuentes was an extension of the Sniadach principle to all “significant property interests” and thus mandated pre-deprivation hearings. Fuentes was a decision of uncertain viability from the beginning, inasmuch as it was four-to-three; argument had been heard prior to the date Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the Court, hence neither participated in the decision. See Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 616–19 (Justice Blackmun dissenting); Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 635–36 (1974) (Justice Stewart dissenting).
868 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975). More recently, the Court has applied a variant of the Mathews v. Eldridge formula in holding that Connecticut’s prejudgment attachment statute, which “fail[ed] to provide a preattachment hearing without at least requiring a showing of some exigent circumstance,” operated to deny equal protection. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). “[T]he relevant inquiry requires, as in Mathews, first, consideration of the private interest that will be affected by the prejudgment measure; second, an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures under attack and the probable value of additional or alternative safeguards; and third, in contrast to Mathews, principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater protections.” 501 U.S. at 11.
869 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 615–18 (1974) and at 623 (Justice Powell concurring). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 188 (1974) (Justice White concurring in part and dissenting in part). Efforts to litigate challenges to seizures in actions involving two private parties may be thwarted by findings of “no state action,” but there often is sufficient participation by state officials in transferring possession of property to constitute state action and implicate due process. Compare Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no state action in warehouseman’s sale of goods for nonpayment of storage, as authorized by state law), with Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (state officials’ joint participation with private party in effecting prejudgment attachment of property); and Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (probate court was sufficiently involved with actions activating time bar in “nonclaim” statute).
870 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170–71 (1974) (Justice Powell concurring), and 416 U.S. at 195–96 (Justice White concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (discharge of state government employee). In Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979), the Court held that the state interest in assuring the integrity of horse racing carried on under its auspices justified an interim suspension without a hearing once it established the existence of certain facts, provided that a prompt judicial or administrative hearing would follow suspension at which the issues could be determined was assured. See also FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (strong public interest in the integrity of the banking industry justifies suspension of indicted bank official with no pre-suspension hearing, and with 90-day delay before decision resulting from post-suspension hearing).
871 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) (no hearing required prior to suspension without pay of tenured police officer arrested and charged with a felony).
872 E.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (when suspension of driver’s license is automatic upon conviction of a certain number of offenses, no hearing is required because there can be no dispute about facts).
873 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
874 481 U.S. 252 (1987). Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice White’s opinion taking a somewhat narrower view of due process requirements but supporting the plurality’s general approach. Justices Brennan and Stevens would have required confrontation and cross-examination.
875 For analysis of the case’s implications, see Rakoff, Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., and the New Law of Regulatory Due Process, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 157.
876 538 U.S. 715 (2003).
877 See Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. ___, No. 15–1256, slip op. at 1 (2017).
878 See id. at 4–5 (describing Colorado’s Exoneration Act). Initially, the Court concluded that because the case concerned the “continuing deprivation of property after a [criminal] conviction” was reversed or vacated and “no further criminal process” was implicated by the case, the appropriate lens to examine the Exoneration Act was through the Mathews balancing test that generally applies in civil contexts. Id. at 5–6. The Court noted, however, that even under the test used to examine criminal due process rights—the fundamental fairness approach—Colorado’s Exoneration Act would still fail to provide adequate due process because the state’s procedures offend a fundamental principle of justice—the presumption of innocence. Id. at 7 n.9.
879 Id. at 1.
880 Id. at 6.
881 Id. In so concluding, the Court rejected Colorado’s argument that the money in question belonged to the state because the criminal convictions were in place at the time the funds were taken. Id. The Court reasoned that after a conviction has been reversed, the criminal defendant is presumed innocent and any funds provided to the state as a result of the conviction rightfully belong to the person who was formerly subject to the prosecution. Id. at 7 (“Colorado may not presume a person, adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty enough for monetary exactions.”) (emphasis in original).
882 Id. at 8–9. In particular, the Court noted that when a defendant seeks to recoup small amounts of money under the Exoneration Act, the costs of mounting a claim and retaining a lawyer “would be prohibitive,” amounting to “no remedy at all” for any minor assessments under the Act. Id. at 9.
883 Id. at 10.
885 See, e.g., Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 523 U.S. 189 (2001) (breach of contract suit against state contractor who withheld payment to subcontractor based on state agency determination of noncompliance with Labor Code sufficient for due process purposes).
886 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680–82 (1977).
887 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680–82 (1977). In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19–22 (1987), involving cutoff of utility service for non-payment of bills, the Court rejected the argument that common-law remedies were sufficient to obviate the pre-termination hearing requirement.
888 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 435–36 (1982). The Court emphasized that a post-deprivation hearing regarding harm inﬂicted by a state procedure would be inadequate. “That is particularly true where, as here, the State’s only post-termination process comes in the form of an independent tort action. Seeking redress through a tort suit is apt to be a lengthy and speculative process, which in a situation such as this one will never make the complainant entirely whole.” 455 U.S. 422, 436–37.
889 455 U.S. at 436.
890 More expressly adopting the tort remedy theory, the Court in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), held that the loss of a prisoner’s mail-ordered goods through the negligence of prison officials constituted a deprivation of property, but that the state’s post-deprivation tort-claims procedure afforded adequate due process. When a state officer or employee acts negligently, the Court recognized, there is no way that the state can provide a pre-termination hearing; the real question, therefore, is what kind of post-deprivation hearing is sufficient. When the action complained of is the result of the unauthorized failure of agents to follow established procedures and there is no contention that the procedures themselves are inadequate, the Due Process Clause is satisfied by the provision of a judicial remedy which the claimant must initiate. 451 U.S. at 541, 543–44. It should be noted that Parratt was a property loss case, and thus may be distinguished from liberty cases, where a tort remedy, by itself, may not be adequate process. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 680–82.
891 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (involving negligent acts by prison officials). Hence, there is no requirement for procedural due process stemming from such negligent acts and no resulting basis for suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights deriving from the Constitution. Prisoners may resort to state tort law in such circumstances, but neither the Constitution nor § 1983 provides a federal remedy.
892 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971). See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538–40 (1981). Of course, one may waive his due process rights, though as with other constitutional rights, the waiver must be knowing and voluntary. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94–96 (1972).
893 North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950). See also Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1948). Cf. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1979).
894 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931).
895 Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1921).
896 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
897 367 U.S. at 894, 895, 896 (1961).
898 367 U.S. at 896–98. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.10 (1970); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974) (plurality opinion), and 416 U.S. at 181–183 (Justice White concurring in part and dissenting in part).
899 Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 64 (1894).
900 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
901 Although these two principles were drawn from the writings of Joseph Story refining the theories of continental jurists, Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 252–62, the constitutional basis for them was deemed to be in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–35 (1878). The Due Process Clause and the remainder of the Fourteenth Amendment had not been ratified at the time of the entry of the state-court judgment giving rise to the case. This inconvenient fact does not detract from the subsequent settled use of this constitutional foundation. Pennoyer denied full faith and credit to the judgment because the state lacked jurisdiction.
902 95 U.S. at 722. The basis for the territorial concept of jurisdiction promulgated in Pennoyer and modified over the years is two-fold: a concern for “fair play and substantial justice” involved in requiring defendants to litigate cases against them far from their “home” or place of business. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 317 (1945); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm., 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), and, more important, a concern for the preservation of federalism. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). The Framers, the Court has asserted, while intending to tie the States together into a Nation, “also intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). Thus, the federalism principle is preeminent. “[T]he Due Process Clause ‘does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.’ . . . Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.” 444 U.S. at 294 (internal quotation from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
903 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). As the Court explained in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), “[w]ith this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.” See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)). The first principle, that a State may assert jurisdiction over anyone or anything physically within its borders, no matter how brieﬂy there—the so-called “transient” rule of jurisdiction— McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917), remains valid, although in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), the Court’s dicta appeared to assume it is not.
904 National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 270 (1904); Iron Cliffs Co. v. Negaunee Iron Co., 197 U.S. 463, 471 (1905).
905 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). Cf. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913). The rule has been strongly criticized but persists. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The ‘Power’ Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956). But in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), the Court held that service of process on a nonresident physically present within the state satisfies due process regardless of the duration or purpose of the nonresident’s visit.
906 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
907 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
908 Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107 (1874); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 (1915); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
909 Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889); Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 193 (1915); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927). See also Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1879); Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41 (1892).
910 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900); Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Butte & Boston Min. Co., 210 U.S. 368 (1908); Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469 (1920). See also Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (plaintiff suing defendants deemed to have consented to jurisdiction with respect to counterclaims asserted against him).
911 State legislation which provides that a defendant who comes into court to challenge the validity of service upon him in a personal action surrenders himself to the jurisdiction of the court, but which allows him to dispute where process was served, is constitutional and does not deprive him of property without due process of law. In such a situation, the defendant may ignore the proceedings as wholly ineffective, and attack the validity of the judgment if and when an attempt is made to take his property thereunder. If he desires, however, to contest the validity of the court proceedings and he loses, it is within the power of a state to require that he submit to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the merits. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); Kauffman v. Wootters, 138 U.S. 285 (1891); Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914).
912 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
913 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927).
914 274 U.S. at 355. See Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293 (1919).
915 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
916 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
917 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
918 Kulko had visited the state twice, seven and six years respectively before initiation of the present action, his marriage occurring in California on the second visit, but neither the visits nor the marriage was sufficient or relevant to jurisdiction. 436 U.S. at 92–93.
919 436 U.S. at 92.
920 436 U.S. at 96–98.
921 571 U.S. ___, No. 12–574, slip op. (2014). This type of “jurisdiction” is often referred to as “specific jurisdiction.”
922 Id. at 6–8.
923 Cf. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
924 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
925 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855); St. Clair v. Cox, 196 U.S. 350 (1882); Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
926 Presence was first independently used to sustain jurisdiction in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), although the possibility was suggested as early as St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882). See also Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (Justice Brandeis for Court).
927 E.g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
928 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, No. 11–965, slip op. at 8 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011)) (holding Daimler Chrysler, a German public stock company, could not be subject to suit in California with respect to acts taken in Argentina by Argentinian subsidiary of Daimler, notwithstanding the fact that Daimler Chrysler had a U.S. subsidiary that did business in California).
929 Id. at 18–19.
930 Id. at 20 n. 19. For example, the Court held that an Ohio court could exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant corporation that was forced to relocate temporarily from the Philippines to Ohio, making Ohio the “center” of the corporation’s activities. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952).
931 See BNSF R.R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. ___, No. 16–405, slip op. at 11–12 (2017) (holding that Montana courts could not exercise general jurisdiction over a railroad company that had over 2,000 miles of track and more than 2,000 employees in the state because the company was not incorporated or headquarted in Montana and the overall activity of the company in Montana was not “so substantial” as to render the corporation “at home” in the state).
932 E.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Simon v. S. Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 129–30 (1915); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); Old Wayne Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907). Continuous operations were sometimes sufficiently substantial and of a nature to warrant assertions of jurisdiction. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 922 (2011) (distinguishing application of stream-of-commerce analysis in specific cases of in-state injury from the degree of presence a corporation must maintain in a state to be amenable to general jurisdiction there).
933 Robert Mitchell Furn. Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213 (1921); Chipman, Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 251 U.S. 373, 379 (1920). Jurisdiction would continue, however, if a state had conditioned doing business on a firm’s agreeing to accept service through state officers should it and its agent withdraw. Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 364 (1933).
934 Solicitation of business alone was inadequate to constitute “doing business,” Green, 205 U.S. at 534, but when connected with other activities could suffice to confer jurisdiction. Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141–42 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J., providing survey of cases).
935 E.g., Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195 (1915); Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903); Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895); but see Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
936 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
937 This departure was recognized by Justice Rutledge subsequently in Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 422 (1946). Because International Shoe, in addition to having its agents solicit orders, also permitted them to rent quarters for the display of merchandise, the Court could have used International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), to find it was “present” in the state.
938 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
939 326 U.S. at 319.
940 Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). The decision was 5-to-4 with one of the majority Justices also contributing a concurring opinion. Id. at 651 (Justice Douglas). The possible significance of the concurrence is that it appears to disagree with the implication of the majority opinion, id. at 647–48, that a state’s legislative jurisdiction and its judicial jurisdiction are coextensive. Id. at 652–53 (distinguishing between the use of the state’s judicial power to enforce its legislative powers and the judicial jurisdiction when a private party is suing). See id. at 659 (dissent).
941 339 U.S. at 647–49. The holding in Minnesota Commercial Men’s Ass’n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923), that a similar mail order insurance company could not be viewed as doing business in the forum state and that the circumstances under which its contracts with forum state citizens, executed and to be performed in its state of incorporation, were consummated could not support an implication that the foreign company had consented to be sued in the forum state, was distinguished rather than formally overruled. 339 U.S. at 647. In any event, Benn could not have survived McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), below.
942 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
943 355 U.S. at 223. The Court also noticed the proposition that the insured could not bear the cost of litigation away from home as well as the insurer. See also Perkins v. Benguet Consolidating Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), a case too atypical on its facts to permit much generalization but which does appear to verify the implication of International Shoe that in personam jurisdiction may attach to a corporation even where the cause of action does not arise out of the business done by defendant in the forum state, as well as to state, in dictum, that the mere presence of a corporate official within the state on business of the corporation would suffice to create jurisdiction if the claim arose out of that business and service were made on him within the state. 342 U.S. at 444–45. The Court held that the state could, but was not required to, assert jurisdiction over a corporation owning gold and silver mines in the Philippines but temporarily (because of the Japanese occupation) carrying on a part of its general business in the forum state, including directors’ meetings, business correspondence, banking, and the like, although it owned no mining properties in the state.
944 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). An exception exists with respect to in personam jurisdiction in domestic relations cases, at least in some instances. E.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (holding that sufficient contacts afforded Nevada in personam jurisdiction over a New York resident wife for purposes of dissolving the marriage but Nevada did not have jurisdiction to terminate the wife’s claims for support).
945 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The decision was 5-to-4. See 357 U.S. at 256 (Justice Black dissenting), 262 (Justice Douglas dissenting).
946 357 U.S. at 251. In dissent, Justice Black observed that “of course we have not reached the point where state boundaries are without significance and I do not mean to suggest such a view here.” 357 U.S. at 260.
947 357 U.S. at 251, 253–54. Upon an analogy of choice of law and forum non conveniens, Justice Black argued that the relationship of the nonresident defendants and the subject of the litigation to the Florida made Florida the natural and constitutional basis for asserting jurisdiction. 357 U.S. at 251, 258–59. The Court has numerous times asserted that contacts sufficient for the purpose of designating a particular state’s law as appropriate may be insufficient for the purpose of asserting jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294–95 (1980). On the due process limits on choice of law decisions, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
948 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (holding as well that the forum state may apply “single publication rule” making defendant liable for nationwide damages).
949 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (jurisdiction over reporter and editor responsible for defamatory article which they knew would be circulated in subject’s home state).
950 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). But cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (purchases and training within state, both unrelated to cause of action, are insufficient to justify general in personam jurisdiction).
951 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
952 444 U.S. at 297.
953 444 U.S. at 298.
954 480 U.S. 102 (1987). In Asahi, a California resident sued, inter alia, a Taiwanese tire tube manufacturer for injuries caused by a blown-out motorcycle tire. After plaintiff and the tube manufacturer settled the case, which had been filed in California, the tube manufacturer sought indemnity in the California courts against Asahi Metal, the Japanese supplier of the tube’s valve assembly.
955 All the Justices also agreed that due process considerations foreclosed jurisdiction in Asahi, even though Asahi Metal could have foreseen that some of its valve assemblies would end up incorporated into tire tubes sold in the United States. Three of the Asahi Justices had been dissenters in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. Of the three dissenters, Justice Brennan had argued that the “minimum contacts” test was obsolete and that jurisdiction should be predicated upon the balancing of the interests of the forum state and plaintiffs against the actual burden imposed on defendant, 444 U.S. at 299, while Justices Marshall and Blackmun had applied the test and found jurisdiction because of the foreseeability of defendants that a defective product of theirs might cause injury in a distant state and because the defendants had entered into an interstate economic network. 444 U.S. at 313.
956 480 U.S. at 109–113 (1987). Agreeing with Justice O’Connor on this test were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia.
957 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–1343, slip op. (2011).
958 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–1343, slip op. (2011) (Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia and Thomas).
959 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–1343, slip op. (2011) (Breyer and Alito concurring).
960 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, No. 11–965, slip op. at 8 (2014).
961 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. ___, No. 16–466, slip op. at 7 (2017).
962 Id. at 7.
963 Id. A court may exercise “general” jurisdiction for any claim—even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different state—against an individual in that person’s domicile or against a corporation where the corporation is fairly regarded as “at home,” such as the company’s place of incorporation or headquarters. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919–24 (2011).
964 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., slip op. at 8.
965 Accordingly, by reason of its inherent authority over titles to land within its territorial confines, a state court could proceed to judgment respecting the ownership of such property, even though it lacked a constitutional competence to reach claimants of title who resided beyond its borders. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Pennington v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917).
966 Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 348 (1850).
967 American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911); Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (Chief Justice Holmes), appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
968 Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
969 The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1874).
970 Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942).
971 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Predeprivation notice and hearing may be required if the property is not the sort that, given advance warning, could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (notice to owner required before seizure of house by government).
972 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907); Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
973 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972).
974 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
975 433 U.S. at 207–08 (footnotes omitted). The Court also suggested that the state would usually have jurisdiction in cases such as those arising from injuries suffered on the property of an absentee owner, where the defendant’s ownership of the property is conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related to rights and duties growing out of that controversy. Id.
976 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Cf. Pennington v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917); Corn Exch. Bank v. Commissioner, 280 U.S. 218, 222 (1930); Endicott Co. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1924).
977 The theory was that property is always in possession of an owner, and that seizure of the property will inform him. This theory of notice was disavowed sooner than the theory of jurisdiction. See “Actions in Rem: Proceedings Against Property”, supra.
978 Other, quasi in rem actions, which are directed against persons, but ultimately have property as the subject matter, such as probate, Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909), and garnishment of foreign attachment proceedings, Pennington v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), might also be prosecuted to conclusion without requiring the presence of all parties in interest. The jurisdictional requirements for rendering a valid divorce decree are considered under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Art. I, § 1.
979 Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P. 2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) (debt seized in California was owed to a New Yorker, but it had arisen out of transactions in California involving the New Yorker and the California plaintiff).
980 17 N.Y. 2d 111, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 99, 216 N.E. 2d 312 (1966).
981 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
982 Compare New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916) (action purportedly against property within state, proceeds of an insurance policy, was really an in personam action against claimant and, claimant not having been served, the judgment is void). But see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
983 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
984 433 U.S. at 207 (internal quotation from RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 56, Introductory Note (1971)).
985 433 U.S. at 207. The characterization of actions in rem as being not actions against a res but against persons with interests merely reﬂects Justice Holmes’ insight in Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76–77, 55 N.E., 812, 814, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
986 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
987 444 U.S. at 328–30. In dissent, Justices Brennan and Stevens argued that what the state courts had done was the functional equivalent of direct-action statutes. Id. at 333 (Justice Stevens); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Justice Brennan). The Court, however, refused so to view the Minnesota garnishment action, saying that “[t]he State’s ability to exert its power over the ‘nominal defendant’ is analytically prerequisite to the insurer’s entry into the case as a garnishee.” Id. at 330–31. Presumably, the comment is not meant to undermine the validity of such direct-action statutes, which was upheld in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), a choice-of-law case rather than a jurisdiction case.
988 See O’Conner v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
989 Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909); McCaughey v. Lyall, 224 U.S. 558 (1912).
990 Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942).
991 315 U.S. at 353.
992 357 U.S. 235 (1957).
993 The in personam aspect of this decision is considered supra.
994 She reserved the power to appoint the remainder, after her reserved life estate, either by testamentary disposition or by inter vivos instrument. After she moved to Florida, she executed a new will and a new power of appointment under the trust, which did not satisfy the requirements for testamentary disposition under Florida law. Upon her death, dispute arose as to whether the property passed pursuant to the terms of the power of appointment or in accordance with the residuary clause of the will.
995 357 U.S. at 246.
996 357 U.S. at 247–50. The four dissenters, Justices Black, Burton, Brennan, and Douglas, believed that the transfer in Florida of $400,000 made by a domiciliary and affecting beneficiaries, almost all of whom lived in that state, gave rise to a sufficient connection with Florida to support an adjudication by its courts of the effectiveness of the transfer. 357 U.S. at 256, 262.
997 See discussion of Pennoyer, supra.
998 Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896); Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923). See also Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531 (1941).
999 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
1000 A related question is which state has the authority to escheat a corporate debt. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965). Where a state seeks to escheat intangible corporate property such as uncollected debt, the Court found that the multiplicity of states with a possible interest made a “contacts” test unworkable. Citing ease of administration rather than logic or jurisdiction, the Court held that the authority to take the uncollected claims against a corporation by escheat would be based on whether the last known address on the company’s books for the each creditor was in a particular state.
1001 “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “There . . . must be a basis for the defendant’s amenability to service of summons. Absent consent, this means there must be authorization for service of summons on the defendant.” Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
1002 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1971).
1003 Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982). See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2001) (upholding a notice of forfeiture that was delivered by certified mail to the mailroom of a prison where the individual to be served was incarcerated, even though the individual himself did not sign for the letter).
1004 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Thus, in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), the Court held that, after a state’s certified letter, intended to notify a property owner that his property would be sold unless he satisfied a tax delinquency, was returned by the post office marked “unclaimed,” the state should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify the property owner, as it would have been practicable for it to have done so. And, in Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), the Court held that, in light of substantial evidence that notices posted on the doors of apartments in a housing project in an eviction proceeding were often torn down by children and others before tenants ever saw them, service by posting did not satisfy due process. Without requiring service by mail, the Court observed that the mails “provide an ‘efficient and inexpensive means of communication’ upon which prudent men will ordinarily rely in the conduct of important affairs.” Id. at 455 (citations omitted). See also Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (personal service or notice by mail is required for mortgagee of real property subject to tax sale, Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (notice by mail or other appropriate means to reasonably ascertainable creditors of probated estate).
1005 E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass’n ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
1006 See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 409–12 (1982) (discussing New Jersey’s “long-arm” rule, under which a plaintiff must make every effort to serve process upon someone within the state and then, only if “after diligent inquiry and effort personal service cannot be made” within the state, “service may be made by mailing, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the summons and complaint to a registered agent for service, or to its principal place of business, or to its registered office.”). Cf. Velmohos v. Maren Engineering Corp., 83 N.J. 282, 416 A.2d 372 (1980), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 985 (1982).
1007 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
1008 E.g., Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (authorizing direct action against insurance carrier rather than against the insured).
1009 Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 631 (1916); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900). A state “is free to regulate procedure of its courts in accordance with it own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 263 (1904); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176, (1912). The power of a state to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them and to deny access to its courts is also subject to restrictions imposed by the Contract, Full Faith and Credit, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Constitution. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
1010 Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Iowa Central Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896); Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937). See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
1011 Cincinnati Street Ry. v. Snell, 193 U.S. 30, 36 (1904).
1012 Some recent decisions, however, have imposed some restrictions on state procedures that require substantial reorientation of process. While this is more generally true in the context of criminal cases, in which the appellate process and post-conviction remedial process have been subject to considerable revision in the treatment of indigents, some requirements have also been imposed in civil cases. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74–79 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Review has, however, been restrained with regard to details. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at 64–69.
1013 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921). Thus the Fourteenth Amendment does not constrain the states to accept modern doctrines of equity, or adopt a combined system of law and equity procedure, or dispense with all necessity for form and method in pleading, or give untrammeled liberty to amend pleadings. Note that the Supreme Court did once grant review to determine whether due process required the states to provide some form of post-conviction remedy to assert federal constitutional violations, a review that was mooted when the state enacted such a process. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965). When a state, however, through its legal system exerts a monopoly over the pacific settlement of private disputes, as with the dissolution of marriage, due process may well impose affirmative obligations on that state. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–77 (1971).
1014 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Nor did the retroactive application of this statutory requirement to actions pending at the time of its adoption violate due process as long as no new liability for expenses incurred before enactment was imposed thereby and the only effect thereof was to stay such proceedings until the security was furnished.
1015 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). See also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (state-mandated paternity suit); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (parental status termination proceeding); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (permanent termination of parental custody).
1016 Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398 (1931); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
1017 Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171 (1924).
1018 Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U.S. 154 (1903).
1019 Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915).
1020 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64–69 (1972). See also Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170 (1923) (upholding mortgage law providing for summary foreclosure of a mortgage without allowing any defense except payment)..
1021 Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29, 34 (1917); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 55 (1919); Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931). See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 280–83 (1980) (state interest in fashioning its own tort law permits it to provide immunity defenses for its employees and thus defeat recovery).
1022 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
1023 Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 259 (1907).
1024 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 650 (1914).
1025 Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (limitation of attorneys’ fees to $10 in veterans benefit proceedings does not violate claimants’ Fifth Amendment due process rights absent a showing of probability of error in the proceedings that presence of attorneys would sharply diminish). See also United States Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990) (upholding regulations under the Black Lung Benefits Act prohibiting contractual fee arrangements).
1026 Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1896). Consider, however, the possible bearing of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) (statute allowing jury to impose costs on acquitted defendant, but containing no standards to guide discretion, violates due process).
1027 Yazoo & Miss. R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1922); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U.S. 129, 139 (1921); Life & Casualty Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934).
1028 Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659, 663, 665 (1907).
1029 National Union v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954) (the judgment debtor had refused to post a supersedeas bond or to comply with reasonable orders designed to safeguard the value of the judgment pending decision on appeal).
1030 Pizitz Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 114 (1927).
1031 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
1032 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (finding sufficient constraints on jury discretion in jury instructions and in post-verdict review). See also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (striking down a provision of the Oregon Constitution limiting judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury).
1033 Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989).
1034 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (holding that a $2 million judgment for failing to disclose to a purchaser that a “new” car had been repainted was grossly excessive in relation to the state’s interest, as only a few of the 983 similarly repainted cars had been sold in that same state); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that a $145 million judgment for refusing to settle an insurance claim was excessive as it included consideration of conduct occurring in other states). But see TXO Corp. v. Alliance Resources, 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (punitive damages of $10 million for slander of title does not violate the Due Process Clause even though the jury awarded actual damages of only $19,000).
1035 BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–75 (1996). The Court has suggested that awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages would be unlikely to pass scrutiny under due process, and that the greater the compensatory damages, the less this ratio should be. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424 (2003).
1036 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (punitive damages award overturned because trial court had allowed jury to consider the effect of defendant’s conduct on smokers who were not parties to the lawsuit).
1037 Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 258 (1890); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 156 (1911). Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982) (discussing discretion of states in erecting reasonable procedural requirements for triggering or foreclosing the right to an adjudication).
1038 Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911).
1039 Turner v. New York, 168 U.S. 90, 94 (1897).
1040 Soper v. Lawrence Brothers, 201 U.S. 359 (1906). Nor is a former owner who had not been in possession for five years after and fifteen years before said enactment thereby deprived of property without due process.
1041 Mattson v. Department of Labor, 293 U.S. 151, 154 (1934).
1042 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623, 628 (1885).
1043 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
1044 Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowley, 326 U.S. 295 (1945).
1045 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623 (1885). See also Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403, 417 (1935).
1046 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 398 (1930).
1047 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 214 (1917); James-Dickinson Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 124 (1927). Congress’s power to provide rules of evidence and standards of proof in the federal courts stems from its power to create such courts. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 264–67 (1980); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976). In the absence of congressional guidance, the Court has determined the evidentiary standard in certain statutory actions. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
1048 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Justice Harlan concurring)).
1049 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
1050 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
1051 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Four Justices dissented, arguing that considered as a whole the statutory scheme comported with due process. Id. at 770 (Justices Rehnquist, White, O’Connor, and Chief Justice Burger). Application of the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard is permissible in paternity actions. Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987).
1052 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (statutory presumption of legitimacy accorded to a child born to a married woman living with her husband defeats the right of the child’s biological father to establish paternity.
1053 Presumptions were voided in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (anyone breaching personal services contract guilty of fraud); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (every bank insolvency deemed fraudulent); Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929) (collision between train and auto at grade crossing constitutes negligence by railway company); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (conclusive presumption of theft and embezzlement upon proof of failure to return a rental vehicle).
1054 Presumptions sustained include Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (person convicted of felony unfit to practice medicine); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922) (person occupying property presumed to have knowledge of still found on property); Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931) (release of natural gas into the air from well presumed wasteful); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933) (rebuttable presumption of railroad negligence for accident at grade crossing). See also Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
1055 The approach was not unprecedented, some older cases having voided tax legislation that presumed conclusively an ultimate fact. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) (deeming any gift made by decedent within six years of death to be a part of estate denies estate’s right to prove gift was not made in contemplation of death); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Hoeper v. Tax Comm’n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
1056 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
1057 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
1058 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
1059 Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
1060 Thus, on the some day Murry was decided, a similar food stamp qualification was struck down on equal protection grounds. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
1061 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
1062 Stanley and LaFleur were distinguished as involving fundamental rights of family and childbearing, 422 U.S. at 771, and Murry was distinguished as involving an irrational classification. Id. at 772. Vlandis, said Justice Rehnquist for the Court, meant no more than that when a state fixes residency as the qualification it may not deny to one meeting the test of residency the opportunity so to establish it. Id. at 771. But see id. at 802–03 (Justice Brennan dissenting).
1063 422 U.S. at 768–70, 775–77, 785 (using Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); and similar cases).
1064 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975).
1065 Vlandis, which was approved but distinguished, is only marginally in this doctrinal area, involving as it does a right to travel feature, but it is like Salfi and Murry in its benefit context and order of presumption. The Court has avoided deciding whether to overrule, retain, or further limit Vlandis. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 658–62 (1978).
1066 In Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975), decided after Salfi, the Court voided under the doctrine a statute making pregnant women ineligible for unemployment compensation for a period extending from 12 weeks before the expected birth until six weeks after childbirth. But see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1977) (provision granting benefits to miners “irrebuttably presumed” to be disabled is merely a way of giving benefits to all those with the condition triggering the presumption); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 284–85 (1979) (Congress must fix general categorization; case-by-case determination would be prohibitively costly).
1067 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917).
1068 Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 226 (1905).
1069 In re Delgado, 140 U.S. 586, 588 (1891).
1070 Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586 (1898); Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S. 201, 206 (1884).
1071 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 694 (1897).
1072 Montana Co. v. St. Louis M. & M. Co., 152 U.S. 160, 171 (1894).
1073 See Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
1074 See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
1075 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (citing cases).
1076 405 U.S. at 74–79 (conditioning appeal in eviction action upon tenant posting bond, with two sureties, in twice the amount of rent expected to accrue pending appeal, is invalid when no similar provision is applied to other cases). Cf. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) (assessment of 15% penalty on party who unsuccessfully appeals from money judgment meets rational basis test under equal protection challenge, since it applies to plaintiffs and defendants alike and does not single out one class of appellants).
1077 See analysis under the Bill of Rights, “Fourteenth Amendment,” supra.
1078 For instance, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), held that, despite the absence of a specific constitutional provision requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, such proof is required by due process. For other recurrences to general due process reasoning, as distinct from reliance on more specific Bill of Rights provisions, see, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. ___, No. 15–420, slip op. at 15–16 (2016) (holding that principles of due process did not prevent a defendant’s prior uncounseled convictions in tribal court from being used as the basis for a sentence enhancement, as those convictions complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act, which itself contained requirements that “ensure the reliability of tribal-court convictions”). See also Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) (where sentencing enhancement scheme for habitual offenders found unconstitutional, defendant’s sentence cannot be sustained, even if sentence falls within range of unenhanced sentences); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (conclusive presumptions in jury instruction may not be used to shift burden of proof of an element of crime to defendant); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (fairness of failure to give jury instruction on presumption of innocence evaluated under totality of circumstances); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (requiring, upon defense request, jury instruction on presumption of innocence); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (defendant may be required to bear burden of affirmative defense); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977) (sufficiency of jury instructions); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (a state cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (defendant may not be required to carry the burden of disproving an element of a crime for which he is charged); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (defendant may not be held to rule requiring disclosure to prosecution of an alibi defense unless defendant is given reciprocal discovery rights against the state); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (defendant may not be denied opportunity to explore confession of third party to crime for which defendant is charged).
1079 Justice Black thought the Fourteenth Amendment should be limited to the specific guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. See,e.g.,In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (dissenting). For Justice Harlan’s response, see id. at 372 n.5 (concurring).
1080 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908). The question is phrased as whether a claimed right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” whether it partakes “of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or whether it “offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses,” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
1081 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 n.14 (1968).
1082 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). The Court has also rejected an argument that due process requires that criminal prosecutions go forward only on a showing of probable cause. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (holding that there is no civil rights action based on the Fourteenth Amendment for arrest and imposition of bond without probable cause).
1083 Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (guilty plea of layman unrepresented by counsel to what prosecution represented as a charge of simple burglary but which was in fact a charge of “burglary with explosives” carrying a much lengthier sentence voided). See also Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (affirmance by appellate court of conviction and sentence on ground that evidence showed defendant guilty under a section of the statute not charged violated due process); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (disbarment in proceeding on charge which was not made until after lawyer had testified denied due process); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972) (affirmance of obscenity conviction because of the context in which a movie was shown— grounds neither covered in the statute nor listed in the charge—was invalid).
1084 See Sixth Amendment, Notice of Accusation, supra.
1085 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). On prejudicial publicity, see Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
1086 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
1087 Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948). “The vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to persons within the scope of the act . . . or in regard to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt.” Id. at 97. “Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warnings. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972), quoted in Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
1088 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1948). “The vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to persons within the scope of the act . . . or in regard to the applicable test to ascertain guilt.” Id. Cf. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). Thus, a state statute imposing severe, cumulative punishments upon contractors with the state who pay their workers less than the “current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed” was held to be “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). Similarly, a statute which allowed jurors to require an acquitted defendant to pay the costs of the prosecution, elucidated only by the judge’s instruction to the jury that the defendant should only have to pay the costs if it thought him guilty of “some misconduct” though innocent of the crime with which he was charged, was found to fall short of the requirements of due process. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
1089 See United States v. Beckles, 580 U.S. ___, No. 15–8544, slip op. at 5 (2017).
1090 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
1091 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953).
1092 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). Generally, a vague statute that regulates in the area of First Amendment guarantees will be pronounced wholly void. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509–10 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
1093 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
1094 405 U.S. at 156 n.1. Similar concerns regarding vagrancy laws had been expressed previously. See,e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 362 (1953) (Justice Black dissenting); Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966) (Justice Douglas dissenting).
1095 Similarly, an ordinance making it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assemble on a sidewalk and conduct themselves in a manner annoying to passers-by was found impermissibly vague and void on its face because it encroached on the freedom of assembly. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) (conviction under statute imposing penalty for failure to “move on” voided); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (conviction on trespass charges arising out of a sit-in at a drugstore lunch counter voided since the trespass statute did not give fair notice that it was a crime to refuse to leave private premises after being requested to do so); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (requirement that person detained in valid Terry stop provide “credible and reliable” identification is facially void as encouraging arbitrary enforcement).
1096 Where the terms of a vague statute do not threaten a constitutionally protected right, and where the conduct at issue in a particular case is clearly proscribed, then a due process challenge is unlikely to be successful. Where the conduct in question is at the margins of the meaning of an unclear statute, however, it will be struck down as applied. E.g., United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
1097 Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971); Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1982).
1098 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
1099 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
1100 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
1101 527 U.S. at 62.
1102 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
1103 See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. ___, No. 15–474, slip op. at 23 (2016) (narrowly interpreting the term “official act” to avoid a construction of the Hobbs Act and federal honest-services fraud statute that would allow public officials to be subject to prosecution without fair notice “for the most prosaic interactions” between officials and their constituents).
1104 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
1105 E.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). Persons may be bound by a novel application of a statute, not supported by Supreme Court or other “fundamentally similar” case precedent, so long as the court can find that, under the circumstance, “unlawfulness . . . is apparent” to the defendant. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271–72 (1997).
1106 E.g., Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979). Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101–03 (1945) (plurality opinion). The Court have even done so when the statute did not explicitly include such a mens rea requirement. E.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
1107 See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (invalidating a municipal code that made it a crime for anyone who had ever been convicted of a felony to remain in the city for more than five days without registering.). In Lambert, the Court emphasized that the act of being in the city was not itself blameworthy, holding that the failure to register was quite “unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed.” “Where a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process. Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community.” Id. at 228, 229–30.
1108 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
1109 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964).
1110 In United States v. Beckles, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal sentencing guidelines “do not fix the permissible range of sentences” and, therefore, are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. See 580 U.S. ___, No. 15–8544, slip op. at 5 (2017). Rather, the sentencing guidelines “merely guide the district courts’ discretion.” Id. at 8. In so concluding, the Court noted that the sentencing system that predated the use of the guidelines gave nearly unfettered discretion to judges in sentencing, and that discretion was never viewed as raising similar concerns. Id. Thus, the Court reasoned that it was “difficult to see how the present system of guided discretion” could raise vagueness concerns. Id. Moreover, the Beckles Court explained that “the advisory Guidelines . . . do not implicate the twin concerns underlying [the] vagueness doctrine—providing notice and preventing arbitrary enforcement.” Id. According to the Court, the only notice that is required regarding criminal sentences is provided to the defendant by the applicable statutory range and the guidelines. Further, the guidelines, which serve to advise courts how to exercise their discretion within the bounds set by Congress, simply do not regulate any conduct that can be arbitrarily enforced against a criminal defendant. Id. at 9.
1111 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).
1112 See, e.g., Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
1113 See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, No. 13–7120, slip op. (2015).
1114 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).
1115 Johnson, slip op. at 2–3.
1116 See James, 550 U.S. at 208.
1117 Johnson, slip op. at 5–6.
1119 See id. at 6–10 (“Nine years’ experience trying to derive meaning from the residual clause convinces us that we have embarked upon a failed enterprise.”).
1120 Some of that difficulty may be alleviated through electronic and other surveillance, which is covered by the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment, or informers may be used, which also has constitutional implications.
1121 For instance, in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446–49 (1932) and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) government agents solicited defendants to engage in the illegal activity, in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 490 (1973), the agents supplied a commonly available ingredient, and in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488–89 (1976), the agents supplied an essential and difficult to obtain ingredient.
1122 For instance, this strategy was seen in the “Abscam” congressional bribery controversy. The defense of entrapment was rejected as to all the “Abscam” defendants. E.g., United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
1123 For a thorough evaluation of the basis for and the nature of the entrapment defense, see Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 111. The Court’s first discussion of the issue was based on statutory grounds, see Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446–49 (1932), and that basis remains the choice of some Justices. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488–89 (1976) (plurality opinion of Justices Rehnquist and White and Chief Justice Burger). In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (concurring), however, Justice Frankfurter based his opinion on the supervisory powers of the courts. In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 490 (1973), however, the Court rejected the use of that power, as did a plurality in Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490. The Hampton plurality thought the Due Process Clause would never be applicable, no matter what conduct government agents engaged in, unless they violated some protected right of the defendant, and that inducement and encouragement could never do that. Justices Powell and Blackmun, on the other hand, 411 U.S. at 491, thought that police conduct, even in the case of a predisposed defendant, could be so outrageous as to violate due process. The Russell and Hampton dissenters did not clearly differentiate between the supervisory power and due process but seemed to believe that both were implicated. 411 U.S. at 495 (Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall); Russell, 411 U.S. at 439 (Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall). The Court again failed to clarify the basis for the defense in Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) (a defendant in a federal criminal case who denies commission of the crime is entitled to assert an “inconsistent” entrapment defense where the evidence warrants), and in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) (invalidating a conviction under the Child Protection Act of 1984 because government solicitation induced the defendant to purchase child pornography).
1124 An “objective approach,” although rejected by the Supreme Court, has been advocated by some Justices and recommended for codification by Congress and the state legislatures. See American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft, 1962); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702(2) (Final Draft, 1971). The objective approach disregards the defendant’s predisposition and looks to the inducements used by government agents. If the government employed means of persuasion or inducement creating a substantial risk that the person tempted will engage in the conduct, the defense would be available. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458–59 (1932) (separate opinion of Justice Roberts); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Justice Frankfurter concurring); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973) (Justice Stewart dissenting); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1976) (Justice Brennan dissenting).
1125 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1992). Here the Court held that the government had failed to prove that the defendant was initially predisposed to purchase child pornography, even though he had become so predisposed following solicitation through an undercover “sting” operation. For several years government agents had sent the defendant mailings soliciting his views on pornography and child pornography, and urging him to obtain materials in order to fight censorship and stand up for individual rights.
1126 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451–52 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376–78 (1958); Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386, 388 (1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432–36 (1973); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488–489 (1976) (plurality opinion), and id. at 491 (Justices Powell and Blackmun concurring).
1127 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553–54 (1992).
1128 A hearing by the trial judge on whether an eyewitness identification should be barred from admission is not constitutionally required to be conducted out of the presence of the jury. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
1129 E.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114–17 (1977) (only one photograph provided to witness); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196–201 (1972) (showup in which police walked defendant past victim and ordered him to speak); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (lineup); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (two lineups, in one of which the suspect was sole participant above average height, and arranged one-on-one meeting between eyewitness and suspect); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (series of group photographs each of which contained suspect); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (suspect brought to witness’s hospital room).
1130 Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–8974, slip op. (2012) (prior to being approached by police for questioning, witness by chance happened to see suspect standing in parking lot near police officer; no manipulation by police alleged).
1131 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–8974, slip op. at 6–7, 15–17 (2012).
1132 “Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). An identification process can be found to be suggestive regardless of police intent. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10– 8974, slip op. at 2 & n.1 (2012) (circumstances of identification found to be suggestive but not contrived; no due process relief). The necessity of using a particular procedure depends on the circumstances. E.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (suspect brought handcuffed to sole witness’s hospital room where it was uncertain whether witness would survive her wounds).
1133 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196–201 (1972); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114–17 (1977). The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the crime, the witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
1134 The Court eschewed a per se exclusionary rule in due process cases at least as early as Stovall. 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). In Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court evaluated application of a per se rule versus the more ﬂexible, ad hoc “totality of the circumstances” rule, and found the latter to be preferable in the interests of deterrence and the administration of justice. 432 U.S. 98, 111–14 (1977). The rule in due process cases differs from the per se exclusionary rule adopted in the Wade-Gilbert line of cases on denial of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment in subject Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel inapplicable to post-arrest police station identification made before formal initiation of criminal proceedings; due process protections remain available) and United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (right to counsel inapplicable at post-indictment display of photographs to prosecution witnesses out of defendant’s presence; record insufficient to assess possible due process claim).
1135 Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (5–4) (“[T]he pretrial confrontations [between the witness and the defendant] clearly were so arranged as to make the resulting identifications virtually inevitable.”). In a limited class of cases, pretrial identifications have been found to be constitutionally objectionable on a basis other than due process. See discussion of Assistance of Counsel under Amend. VI, “Lineups and Other Identification Situations.”
1136 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 117 (1934). See also Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1943).
1137 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
1138 273 U.S. 510, 520 (1927). See also Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). But see Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928). Similarly, in Rippo v. Baker, the Supreme Court vacated the Nevada Supreme Court’s denial of a convicted petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief based on the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself. 580 U.S. ___, No. 16–6316, slip op. (2017). During Rippo’s trial, the trial judge was the target of a federal bribery probe by the same district attorney’s office that was prosecuting Rippo. Rippo moved for the judge’s disqualification under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, arguing the “judge could not impartially adjudicate a case in which one of the parties was criminally investigating him.” Id. at 1. After the judge was indicted on federal charges, a different judge subsequently assigned to the case denied Rippo’s motion for a new trial. In vacating the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision, the Supreme Court noted that “[u]nder our precedents, the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge ‘ha[s] no actual bias.’ Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Id. at 2 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Bias or prejudice of an appellate judge can also deprive a litigant of due process. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (failure of state supreme court judge with pecuniary interest—a pending suit on an indistinguishable claim—to recuse).
1139 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 464 (1971) (“it is generally wise where the marks of unseemly conduct have left personal stings [for a judge] to ask a fellow judge to take his place”); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (where “marked personal feelings were present on both sides,” a different judge should preside over a contempt hearing). But see Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) (“We cannot assume that judges are so irascible and sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially deal with resistance to authority”). In the context of alleged contempt before a judge acting as a one-man grand jury, the Court reversed criminal contempt convictions, saying: “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
1140 Ordinarily the proper avenue of relief is a hearing at which the juror may be questioned and the defense afforded an opportunity to prove actual bias. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (juror had job application pending with prosecutor’s office during trial). See also Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (bribe offer to sitting juror); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 167–72 (1950) (government employees on jury). But, a trial judge’s refusal to question potential jurors about the contents of news reports to which they had been exposed did not violate the defendant’s right to due process, it being sufficient that the judge on voir dire asked the jurors whether they could put aside what they had heard about the case, listen to the evidence with an open mind, and render an impartial verdict. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991). Nor is it a denial of due process for the prosecution, after a finding of guilt, to call the jury’s attention to the defendant’s prior criminal record, if the jury has been given a sentencing function to increase the sentence which would otherwise be given under a recidivist statute. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). For discussion of the requirements of jury impartiality about capital punishment, see discussion under Sixth Amendment, supra.
1141 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
1142 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); But see Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
1143 Initially, the televising of certain trials was struck down on the grounds that the harmful potential effect on the jurors was substantial, that the testimony presented at trial may be distorted by the multifaceted inﬂuence of television upon the conduct of witnesses, that the judge’s ability to preside over the trial and guarantee fairness is considerably encumbered to the possible detriment of fairness, and that the defendant is likely to be harassed by his television exposure. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Subsequently, however, in part because of improvements in technology which caused much less disruption of the trial process and in part because of the lack of empirical data showing that the mere presence of the broadcast media in the courtroom necessarily has an adverse effect on the process, the Court has held that due process does not altogether preclude the televising of state criminal trials. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). The decision was unanimous but Justices Stewart and White concurred on the basis that Estes had established a per se constitutional rule which had to be overruled, id. at 583, 586, contrary to the Court’s position. Id. at 570–74.
1144 For instance, the presumption of innocence has been central to a number of Supreme Court cases. Under some circumstances it is a violation of due process and reversible error to fail to instruct the jury that the defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence, although the burden on the defendant is heavy to show that an erroneous instruction or the failure to give a requested instruction tainted his conviction. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). However, an instruction on the presumption of innocence need not be given in every case. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (reiterating that the totality of the circumstances must be looked to in order to determine if failure to so instruct denied due process). The circumstances emphasized in Taylor included skeletal instructions on burden of proof combined with the prosecutor’s remarks in his opening and closing statements inviting the jury to consider the defendant’s prior record and his indictment in the present case as indicating guilt. See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (instructing jury trying person charged with “purposely or knowingly” causing victim’s death that “law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts” denied due process because jury could have treated the presumption as conclusive or as shifting burden of persuasion and in either event state would not have carried its burden of proving guilt). See also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1973). For other cases applying Sandstrom,see Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (contradictory but ambiguous instruction not clearly explaining state’s burden of persuasion on intent does not erase Sandstrom error in earlier part of charge); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (Sandstrom error can in some circumstances constitute harmless error under principles of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004) (state courts could assume that an erroneous jury instruction was not reasonably likely to have misled a jury where other instructions made correct standard clear). Similarly, improper arguments by a prosecutor do not necessarily constitute “plain error,” and a reviewing court may consider in the context of the entire record of the trial the trial court’s failure to redress such error in the absence of contemporaneous objection. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
1145 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
1146 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
1147 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). The convicted defendant was denied habeas relief, however, because of failure to object at trial. But cf. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) (presence in courtroom of uniformed state troopers serving as security guards was not the same sort of inherently prejudicial situation); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) (effect on defendant’s fair-trial rights of private-actor courtroom conduct—in this case, members of victim’s family wearing buttons with the victim’s photograph—has never been addressed by the Supreme Court and therefore 18 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) precludes habeas relief; see Amendment 8, Limitations on Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences).
1148 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
1149 544 U.S. at 626. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970), the Court stated, in dictum, that “no person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort.”
1150 544 U.S. at 630, 631 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1151 The defendant called the witness because the prosecution would not.
1152 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 786 (1974) (refusal to permit defendant to examine prosecution witness about his adjudication as juvenile delinquent and status on probation at time, in order to show possible bias, was due process violation, although general principle of protecting anonymity of juvenile offenders was valid); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (exclusion of testimony as to circumstances of a confession can deprive a defendant of a fair trial when the circumstances bear on the credibility as well as the voluntariness of the confession); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (overturning rule that evidence of third-party guilt can be excluded if there is strong forensic evidence establishing defendant’s culpability). But see Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (state may bar defendant from introducing evidence of intoxication to prove lack of mens rea).
1153 North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
1154 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
1155 The Court dismissed the petitioner’s suit on the ground that adequate process existed in the state courts to correct any wrong and that petitioner had not availed himself of it. A state court subsequently appraised the evidence and ruled that the allegations had not been proved in Ex parte Mooney, 10 Cal. 2d 1, 73 P.2d 554 (1937), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 598 (1938).
1156 Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). See also New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688 (1943); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1914). But see Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
1157 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). In the former case, the principal prosecution witness was defendant’s accomplice, and he testified that he had received no promise of consideration in return for his testimony. In fact, the prosecutor had promised him consideration, but did nothing to correct the false testimony. See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (same). In the latter case, involving a husband’s killing of his wife because of her infidelity, a prosecution witness testified at the habeas corpus hearing that he told the prosecutor that he had been intimate with the woman but that the prosecutor had told him to volunteer nothing of it, so that at trial he had testified his relationship with the woman was wholly casual. In both cases, the Court deemed it irrelevant that the false testimony had gone only to the credibility of the witness rather than to the defendant’s guilt. What if the prosecution should become aware of the perjury of a prosecution witness following the trial? Cf. Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277 (1956). But see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 218–21 (1982) (prosecutor’s failure to disclose that one of the jurors has a job application pending before him, thus rendering him possibly partial, does not go to fairness of the trial and due process is not violated).
1158 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
1159 The Constitution does not require the government, prior to entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses against the defendant. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). Nor has it been settled whether inconsistent prosecutorial theories in separate cases can be the basis for a due process challenge. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005) (Court remanded case to determine whether death sentence was based on defendant’s role as shooter because subsequent prosecution against an accomplice proceeded on the theory that, based on new evidence, the accomplice had done the shooting).
1160 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), in the exercise of its supervisory power over the federal courts, the Court held that the defense was entitled to obtain, for impeachment purposes, statements which had been made to government agents by government witnesses during the investigatory stage. Cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 257–58 (1961). A subsequent statute modified but largely codified the decision and was upheld by the Court. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959), sustaining 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
1161 Although the state court in Brady had allowed a partial retrial so that the accomplice’s confession could be considered in the jury’s determination of whether to impose capital punishment, it had declined to order a retrial of the guilt phase of the trial. The defendant’s appeal of this latter decision was rejected, as the issue, as the Court saw it, was whether the state court could have excluded the defendant’s confessed participation in the crime on evidentiary grounds, as the defendant had confessed to facts sufficient to establish grounds for the crime charged.
1162 Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794–95 (1972) (finding Brady inapplicable because the evidence withheld was not material and not exculpatory). See also Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (1995) (per curiam) (holding no due process violation where prosecutor’s failure to disclose the result of a witness’ polygraph test would not have affected the outcome of the case). The beginning in Brady toward a general requirement of criminal discovery was not carried forward. See the division of opinion in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967). In Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–1114, slip op. at 23, 27 (2009), the Court emphasized the distinction between the materiality of the evidence with respect to guilt and the materiality of the evidence with respect to punishment, and concluded that, although the evidence that had been suppressed was not material to the defendant’s conviction, the lower courts had erred in failing to assess its effect with respect to the defendant’s capital sentence.
1163 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
1164 427 U.S. at 103–04. This situation is the Mooney v. Holohan-type of case.
1165 A statement by the prosecution that it will “open its files” to the defendant appears to relieve the defendant of his obligation to request such materials. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283–84 (1999); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 693 (2004).
1166 427 U.S. at 104–06. This the Brady situation.
1167 427 U.S. at 106–14. This was the Agurs fact situation. Similarly, there is no obligation that law enforcement officials preserve breath samples that have been used in a breath-analysis test; to meet the Agurs materiality standard, “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (negligent failure to refrigerate and otherwise preserve potentially exculpatory physical evidence from sexual assault kit does not violate a defendant’s due process rights absent bad faith on the part of the police); Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544 (2004) (per curiam) (the routine destruction of a bag of cocaine 11 years after an arrest, the defendant having ﬂed prosecution during the intervening years, does not violate due process).
1168 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
1169 473 U.S. at 682. Or, to phrase it differently, a Brady violation is established by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). Accord Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–8145, slip op. (2012) (prior inconsistent statements of sole eyewitness withheld from defendant; state lacked other evidence sufficient to sustain confidence in the verdict independently).
1170 See United States v. Malenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (testimony made unavailable by Government deportation of witnesses); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (incompetence of counsel).
1171 473 U.S. at 676–77. See also Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. ___, No. 14–10008, slip op. at 9 (2016) (per curiam) (finding that a state post-conviction court had improperly (1) evaluated the materiality of each piece of evidence in isolation, rather than cumulatively; (2) emphasized reasons jurors might disregard the new evidence, while ignoring reasons why they might not; and (3) failed to consider the statements of two impeaching witnesses).
1172 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999); see also Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. ___, No. 15–1503, slip op. at 12 (2017) (holding that, when considering the withheld evidence in the context of the entire record, the evidence was “too little, too weak, or too distant” from the central evidentiary issues in the case to meet Brady’s standards for materiality.)
1173 Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006) (per curiam), quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438, 437 (1995).
1174 Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958).
1175 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 153 (1977); Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520–24 (1979). See also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury requires a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). On the interrelationship of the reasonable doubt burden and defendant’s entitlement to a presumption of innocence, see Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483–86 (1978), and Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
1176 E.g., Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961). See also Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam) (jury instruction that explains “reasonable doubt” as doubt that would give rise to a “grave uncertainty,” as equivalent to a “substantial doubt,” and as requiring “a moral certainty,” suggests a higher degree of certainty than is required for acquittal, and therefore violates the Due Process Clause). But see Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (considered as a whole, jury instructions that define “reasonable doubt” as requiring a “moral certainty” or as equivalent to “substantial doubt” did not violate due process because other clarifying language was included.)
1177 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1897). These cases overturned Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 460 (1895), in which the Court held that the presumption of innocence was evidence from which the jury could find a reasonable doubt.
1178 397 U.S. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). Justice Harlan’s Winship concurrence, id. at 368, proceeded on the basis that, because there is likelihood of error in any system of reconstructing past events, the error of convicting the innocent should be reduced to the greatest extent possible through the use of the reasonable doubt standard.
1179 Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968). See also Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
1180 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
1181 Id. at 316, 18–19. See also Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. ___, No. 14–1095, slip op. (2016) (“When a jury finds guilt after being instructed on all elements of the charged crime plus one more element,” the fact that the government did not introduce evidence of the additional element—which was not required to prove the offense, but was included in the erroneous jury instruction—“does not implicate the principles that sufficiency review protects.”); Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991) (general guilty verdict on a multiple-object conspiracy need not be set aside if the evidence is inadequate to support conviction as to one of the objects of the conviction, but is adequate to support conviction as to another object).
1182 Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835 (2003); Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23 (1999). These cases both involved defendants convicted under state statutes that were subsequently interpreted in a way that would have precluded their conviction. The Court remanded the cases to determine if the new interpretation was in effect at the time of the previous convictions, in which case those convictions would violate due process.
1183 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520–24 (1979).
1184 The general notion of “burden of proof” can be divided into the “burden of production” (providing probative evidence on a particular issue) and a “burden of persuasion” (persuading the factfinder with respect to an issue by a standard such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 695 n.20.
1185 Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976), dismissing as not presenting a substantial federal question an appeal from a holding that Mullaney did not prevent a state from placing on the defendant the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202–05 (1977) (explaining the import of Rivera). Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger concurring in Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704, 705, had argued that the case did not require any reconsideration of the holding in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), that the defense may be required to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
1186 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
1187 Proving the defense would reduce a murder offense to manslaughter.
1188 The decisive issue, then, was whether the statute required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense. See also Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006) (requiring defendant in a federal firearms case to prove her duress defense by a preponderance of evidence did not violate due process). In Dixon, the prosecution had the burden of proving all elements of two federal firearms violations, one requiring a “willful” violation (having knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense) and the other requiring a “knowing” violation (acting with knowledge that the conduct was unlawful). Although establishing other forms of mens rea (such as “malicious intent”) might require that a prosecutor prove that a defendant’s intent was without justification or excuse, the Court held that neither of the forms of mens rea at issue in Dixon contained such a requirement. Consequently, the burden of establishing the defense of duress could be placed on the defendant without violating due process.
1189 Dissenting in Patterson, Justice Powell argued that the two statutes were functional equivalents that should be treated alike constitutionally. He would hold that as to those facts that historically have made a substantial difference in the punishment and stigma ﬂowing from a criminal act the state always bears the burden of persuasion but that new affirmative defenses may be created and the burden of establishing them placed on the defendant. 432 U.S. at 216. Patterson was followed in Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (state need not disprove defendant acted in self-defense based on honest belief she was in imminent danger, when offense is aggravated murder, an element of which is “prior calculation and design”). Justice Powell, again dissenting, urged a distinction between defenses that negate an element of the crime and those that do not. Id. at 236, 240.
1190 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
1191 548 U.S. at 770, 774.
1192 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). It should be noted that these type of cases may also implicate the Sixth Amendment, as the right to a jury extends to all facts establishing the elements of a crime, while sentencing factors may be evaluated by a judge. See discussion in “Criminal Proceedings to Which the Guarantee Applies,” supra.
1193 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (interpreting New Jersey’s “hate crime” law). It should be noted that, prior to its decision in Apprendi, the Court had held that sentencing factors determinative of minimum sentences could be decided by a judge. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). Although the vitality of McMillan was put in doubt by Apprendi,McMillan was subsequently reaffirmed in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
1194 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
1195 This limiting principle does not apply to sentencing enhancements based on recidivism. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. As enhancement of sentences for repeat offenders is traditionally considered a part of sentencing, establishing the existence of previous valid convictions may be made by a judge, despite its resulting in a significant increase in the maximum sentence available. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (deported alien reentering the United States subject to a maximum sentence of two years, but upon proof of felony record, is subject to a maximum of twenty years). See also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992) (where prosecutor has burden of establishing a prior conviction, a defendant can be required to bear the burden of challenging the validity of such a conviction).
1196 See, e.g., Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925) (upholding statute that proscribed possession of smoking opium that had been illegally imported and authorized jury to presume illegal importation from fact of possession); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (invalidating statutory presumption that every insolvency of a bank shall be deemed fraudulent).
1197 319 U.S. 463, 467–68 (1943). Compare United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (upholding presumption from presence at site of illegal still that defendant was “carrying on” or aiding in “carrying on” its operation), with United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) (voiding presumption from presence at site of illegal still that defendant had possession, custody, or control of still).
1198 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
1199 subject disapproved, it was factually distinguished as involving users of “hard” narcotics.
1200 395 U.S. at 36 n.64. The matter was also left open in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (judged by either “rational connection” or “reasonable doubt,” a presumption that the possessor of heroin knew it was illegally imported was valid, but the same presumption with regard to cocaine was invalid under the “rational connection” test because a great deal of the substance was produced domestically), and in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (under either test a presumption that possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is grounds for inferring possessor knew it was stolen satisfies due process).
1201 Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 167 (1979).
1202 442 U.S. at 167.
1203 442 U.S. at 142. The majority thought that possession was more likely than not the case from the circumstances, while the four dissenters disagreed. 442 U.S. at 168. See also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (upholding a jury instruction that, to dissenting Justices O’Connor and Stevens, id. at 75, seemed to direct the jury to draw the inference that evidence that a child had been “battered” in the past meant that the defendant, the child’s father, had necessarily done the battering).
1204 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (citing Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956)). The standard for competency to stand trial is whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), cited with approval in Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008). The fact that a defendant is mentally competent to stand trial does not preclude a court from finding him not mentally competent to represent himself at trial. Indiana v. Edwards, supra.
1205 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975) (noting the relevant circumstances that may require a trial court to inquire into the mental competency of the defendant). In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Court established that, when an indigent defendant’s mental condition is both relevant to the punishment and seriously in question, the state must provide the defendant with access to a mental health expert who is sufficiently available to the defense and independent from the prosecution to effectively “assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). While the Court has not decided whether Ake requires that the state provide a qualified mental health expert who is available exclusively to the defense team, see McWilliams v. Dunn, 582 U.S. ___, No. 16–5294, slip op. at 13 (2017), a state nevertheless deprives an indigent defendant of due process when it provides a competent psychiatrist only to examine the defendant without also requiring that an expert provide the defense with help in evaluating, preparing, and presenting its case. Id. at 15.
1206 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992). It is a violation of due process, however, for a state to require that a defendant must prove competence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
1207 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
1208 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
1209 M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), states that “[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” 8 Eng. Rep., at 722.
1210 See Queen v. Oxford, 173 Eng. Rep. 941, 950 (1840) (“If some controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power within [the defendant] which he could not resist, then he will not be responsible”).
1211 See State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871) (“If the defendant had a mental disease which irresistibly impelled him to kill his wife—if the killing was the product of mental disease in him—he is not guilty; he is innocent—as innocent as if the act had been produced by involuntary intoxication, or by another person using his hand against his utmost resistance”).
1212 Clark, 548 U.S. at 752. In Clark, the Court considered an Arizona statute, based on the M’Naghten case, that was amended to eliminate the defense of cognitive incapacity. The Court noted that, despite the amendment, proof of cognitive incapacity could still be introduced as it would be relevant (and sufficient) to prove the remaining moral incapacity test. Id. at 753.
1213 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). The fact that the affirmative defense of insanity need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, while civil commitment requires the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence, does not render the former invalid; proof beyond a reasonable doubt of commission of a criminal act establishes dangerousness justifying confinement and eliminates the risk of confinement for mere idiosyncratic behavior.
1214 463 U.S. at 368.
1215 463 U.S. at 370.
1216 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
1217 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
1218 There was no opinion of the Court on the issue of procedural requirements. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, would hold that “the ascertainment of a prisoner’s sanity calls for no less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding.” 477 U.S. at 411– 12. Concurring Justice Powell thought that due process might be met by a proceeding “far less formal than a trial,” that the state “should provide an impartial officer or board that can receive evidence and argument from the prisoner’s counsel.” Id. at 427. Concurring Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice White, emphasized Florida’s denial of the opportunity to be heard, and did not express an opinion on whether the state could designate the governor as decisionmaker. Thus Justice Powell’s opinion, requiring the opportunity to be heard before an impartial officer or board, sets forth the Court’s holding.
1219 477 U.S. at 416–17.
1220 536 U.S. at 317 (citation omitted), quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986). The Court quoted this language again in Schriro v. Smith, holding that “[t]he Ninth Circuit erred in commanding the Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve Smith’s mental retardation claim.” 546 U.S. 6, 7 (2005) (per curiam). States, the Court added, are entitled to “adopt[ ] their own measures for adjudicating claims of mental retardation,” though “those measures might, in their application, be subject to constitutional challenge.” Id.
1221 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (prison inmate could be drugged against his will if he presented a risk of serious harm to himself or others).
1222 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
1223 For instance, if the defendant is likely to remain civilly committed absent medication, this would diminish the government’s interest in prosecution. 539 U.S. at 180.
1224 There are a number of other reasons why a defendant may be willing to plead guilty. There may be overwhelming evidence against him or his sentence after trial will be more severe than if he pleads guilty.
1225 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
1226 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1971); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). A guilty plea will ordinarily waive challenges to alleged unconstitutional police practices occurring prior to the plea, unless the defendant can show that the plea resulted from incompetent counsel. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). But see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). The state can permit pleas of guilty in which the defendant reserves the right to raise constitutional questions on appeal, and federal habeas courts will honor that arrangement. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). Release-dismissal agreements, pursuant to which the prosecution agrees to dismiss criminal charges in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to release his right to file a civil action for alleged police or prosecutorial misconduct, are not per se invalid. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
1227 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
1228 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Charged with forgery, Hayes was informed during plea negotiations that if he would plead guilty the prosecutor would recommend a five-year sentence; if he did not plead guilty, the prosecutor would also seek an indictment under the habitual criminal statute under which Hayes, because of two prior felony convictions, would receive a mandatory life sentence if convicted. Hayes refused to plead, was reindicted, and upon conviction was sentenced to life. Four Justices dissented, id. at 365, 368, contending that the Court had watered down North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See also United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) (after defendant was charged with a misdemeanor, refused to plead guilty and sought a jury trial in district court, the government obtained a four-count felony indictment and conviction).
1229 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Defendant was convicted in an inferior court of a misdemeanor. He had a right to a de novo trial in superior court, but when he exercised the right the prosecutor obtained a felony indictment based upon the same conduct. The distinction the Court draws between this case and Bordenkircher and Goodwin is that of pretrial conduct, in which vindictiveness is not likely, and post-trial conduct, in which vindictiveness is more likely and is not permitted. Accord, Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984). The distinction appears to represent very fine line-drawing, but it appears to be one the Court is committed to.
1230 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the Court held that a defendant charged with first degree murder who elected to plead guilty to second degree murder had not voluntarily, in the constitutional sense, entered the plea because neither his counsel nor the trial judge had informed him that an intent to cause the death of the victim was an essential element of guilt in the second degree; consequently no showing was made that he knowingly was admitting such intent. “A plea may be involuntary either because the accused does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he is waiving . . . or because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.” Id. at 645 n.13. However, this does not mean that a court accepting a guilty plea must explain all the elements of a crime, as it may rely on counsel’s representations to the defendant. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005) (where defendant maintained that shooting was done by someone else, guilty plea to aggravated manslaughter was still valid, as such charge did not require defendant to be the shooter). See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (defendant may collaterally challenge guilty plea where defendant had been told not to allude to existence of a plea bargain in court, and such plea bargain was not honored).
1231 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Defendant and a prosecutor reached agreement on a guilty plea in return for no sentence recommendation by the prosecution. At the sentencing hearing months later, a different prosecutor recommended the maximum sentence, and that sentence was imposed. The Court vacated the judgment, holding that the prosecutor’s entire staff was bound by the promise. Prior to the plea, however, the prosecutor may withdraw his first offer, and a defendant who later pled guilty after accepting a second, less attractive offer has no right to enforcement of the first agreement. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
1232 In Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948) the Court overturned a sentence imposed on an uncounseled defendant by a judge who in reciting defendant’s record from the bench made several errors and facetious comments. “[W]hile disadvantaged by lack of counsel, this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially untrue. Such a result, whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due process of law, and such a conviction cannot stand.”
1233 In Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980), the jury had been charged in accordance with a habitual offender statute that if it found defendant guilty of the offense charged, which would be a third felony conviction, it should assess punishment at 40 years imprisonment. The jury convicted and gave defendant 40 years. Subsequently, in another case, the habitual offender statute under which Hicks had been sentenced was declared unconstitutional, but Hicks’ conviction was affirmed on the basis that his sentence was still within the permissible range open to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed. Hicks was denied due process because he was statutorily entitled to the exercise of the jury’s discretion and could have been given a sentence as low as ten years. That the jury might still have given the stiffer sentence was only conjectural. On other due process restrictions on the determination of the applicability of recidivist statutes to convicted defendants, see Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992).
1234 Due process does not impose any limitation upon the sentence that a legislature may affix to any offense; that function is in the Eighth Amendment. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 586–87 (1959). See also Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915). On recidivist statutes, see Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912); Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 488 (1908), and, under the Eighth Amendment, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
1235 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
1236 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
1237 In Gardner, the jury had recommended a life sentence upon convicting defendant of murder, but the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death, relying in part on a confidential presentence report which he did not characterize or make available to defense or prosecution. Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Powell found that because death was significantly different from other punishments and because sentencing procedures were subject to higher due process standards than when Williams was decided, the report must be made part of the record for review so that the factors motivating imposition of the death penalty may be known, and ordinarily must be made available to the defense. 430 U.S. at 357–61. All but one of the other Justices joined the result on various other bases. Justice Brennan without elaboration thought the result was compelled by due process, id. at 364, while Justices White and Blackmun thought the result was necessitated by the Eighth Amendment, id. at 362, 364, as did Justice Marshall in a different manner. Id. at 365. Chief Justice Burger concurred only in the result, id. at 362, and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 371. See also Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991) (due process denied where judge sentenced defendant to death after judge’s and prosecutor’s actions misled defendant and counsel into believing that death penalty would not be at issue in sentencing hearing).
1238 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
1239 438 U.S. at 49–52. See also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3577.
1240 See, e.g, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, 561, 563 (1966), where the Court required that before a juvenile court decided to waive jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile to an adult court it must hold a hearing and permit defense counsel to examine the probation officer’s report which formed the basis for the court’s decision. Kent was ambiguous whether it was based on statutory interpretation or constitutional analysis. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), however, appears to have constitutionalized the language.
1241 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
1242 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
1243 512 U.S. 154 (1994). See also Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. ___, No. 15–8366, slip op. at 3–4 (2016) (holding that the possibility of clemency and the potential for future “legislative reform” does not justify a departure from the rule of Simmons); Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 252 (2002) (concluding that a prosecutor need not express intent to rely on future dangerousness; logical inferences may be drawn); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (amended South Carolina law still runs afoul of Simmons).
1244 530 U.S. 156 (2000).
1245 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce was held to be nonretroactive in Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973). When a state provides a two-tier court system in which one may have an expeditious and somewhat informal trial in an inferior court with an absolute right to trial de novo in a court of general criminal jurisdiction if convicted, the second court is not bound by the rule in Pearce, because the potential for vindictiveness and inclination to deter is not present. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). But see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), discussed supra.
1246 An intervening conviction on other charges for acts committed prior to the first sentencing may justify imposition of an increased sentence following a second trial. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
1247 Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). The Court concluded that the possibility of vindictiveness was so low because normally the jury would not know of the result of the prior trial nor the sentence imposed, nor would it feel either the personal or institutional interests of judges leading to efforts to discourage the seeking of new trials. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall thought the principle was applicable to jury sentencing and that prophylactic limitations appropriate to the problem should be developed. Id. at 35, 38. Justice Douglas dissented on other grounds. Id. at 35. The Pearce presumption that an increased, judge-imposed second sentence represents vindictiveness also is inapplicable if the second trial came about because the trial judge herself concluded that a retrial was necessary due to prosecutorial misconduct before the jury in the first trial. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986).
1248 Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
1249 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). See also Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 158 (1900); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903).
1250 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); id. at 21 (Justice Frankfurter concurring), 27 (dissenting opinion); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
1251 The line of cases begins with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in which it was deemed to violate both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses for a state to deny to indigent defendants free transcripts of the trial proceedings, which would enable them adequately to prosecute appeals from convictions. See analysis under “Poverty and Fundamental Interests: The Intersection of Due Process and Equal Protection—Generally,” infra.
1252 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915).
1253 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90, 91 (1923); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935); New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688, 690 (1943); Young v. Ragan, 337 U.S. 235, 238–39 (1949).
1254 Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
1255 Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175–76 (1946).
1256 In Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) (per curiam), the Court had taken for review a case that raised the issue of whether a state could simply omit any corrective process for hearing and determining claims of federal constitutional violations, but it dismissed the case when the state in the interim enacted provisions for such process. Justices Clark and Brennan each wrote a concurring opinion.
1257 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
1258 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
1259 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
1260 District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–6 (2009).
1261 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–6, slip op. at 2.
1262 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–6, slip op. at 20 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer and in part by Justice Souter, concluded, “[T]here is no reason to deny access to the evidence and there are many reasons to provide it, not least of which is a fundamental concern in ensuring that justice has been done in this case.” Id. at 17.
1263 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871).
1264 Cf. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
1265 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
1266 “There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
1267 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (invalidating state prison mail censorship regulations).
1268 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545–548, 551, 555, 562 (1979) (federal prison); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 351–352 (1981).
1269 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–40 (1979). Persons not yet convicted of a crime may be detained by the government upon the appropriate determination of probable cause, and the government is entitled to “employ devices that are calculated to effectuate [a] detention.” Id. at 537. Nonetheless, the Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from being subject to conditions that amount to punishment, which can be demonstrated through (1) actions taken with the “express intent to punish” or (2) the use of restrictions or conditions on confinement that are not reasonably related to a legitimate goal. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538, 561. More recently, the Court clarified the standard by which the due process rights of pretrial detainees are adjudged with respect to excessive force claims. Specifically, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Court held that, in order for a pretrial detainee to prove an excessive force claim in violation of his due process rights, a plaintiff must show that an officer’s use of force was objectively unreasonable, depending on the facts and circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, see 576 U.S. ___, No. 14–6368, slip op. at 6–7 (2015), aligning the due process excessive force analysis with the standard for excessive force claims brought under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that a “free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force . . . [is] properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard”). Liability for actions taken by the government in the context of a pretrial detainee due process lawsuit does not, therefore, turn on whether a particular officer subjectively knew that the conduct being taken was unreasonable. See Kingsley, slip op. at 1.
1270 See “Prisons and Punishment,” supra.
1271 E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (prison inmate has liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs).
1272 E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). On religious practices and ceremonies, see Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
1273 Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). Prisoners must have reasonable access to a law library or to persons trained in the law. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1978). Establishing a right of access to law materials, however, requires an individualized demonstration of an inmate having been hindered in efforts to pursue a legal claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (no requirement that the state “enable [a] prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively”).
1274 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
1275 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). There was some question as to the standard to be applied to racial discrimination in prisons after Turner v. Saﬂey, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulations upheld if “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”). In Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), however, the Court held that discriminatory prison regulations would continue to be evaluated under a “strict scrutiny” standard, which requires that regulations be narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. Id. at 509–13 (striking down a requirement that new or transferred prisoners at the reception area of a correctional facility be assigned a cellmate of the same race for up to 60 days before they are given a regular housing assignment).
1276 482 U.S. 78 (1987)
1277 482 U.S. at 89 (upholding a Missouri rule barring inmate-to-inmate correspondence, but striking down a prohibition on inmate marriages absent compelling reason such as pregnancy or birth of a child). See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (upholding restrictions on prison visitation by unrelated children or children over which a prisoner’s parental rights have been terminated and visitation where a prisoner has violated rules against substance abuse).
1278 For instance, limiting who may visit prisoners is ameliorated by the ability of prisoners to communicate through other visitors, by letter, or by phone. 539 U.S. at 135.
1279 482 U.S. at 90, 92.
1280 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
1281 482 U.S. at 91.
1282 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (holding also that needs of prison security support a rule denying pretrial detainees contact visits with spouses, children, relatives, and friends).
1283 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).
1284 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that state tort law provided adequate postdeprivation remedies). But see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not “unauthorized”).
1285 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
1286 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (30-day solitary confinement not atypical “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”).
1287 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
1288 418 U.S. at 557. This analysis, of course, tracks the interest analysis discussed under “The Interests Protected: Entitlements and Positivist Recognition,” supra.
1289 418 U.S. at 563.
1290 418 U.S. at 566. However, the Court later ruled that the reasons for denying an inmate’s request to call witnesses need not be disclosed until the issue is raised in court. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491 (1985).
1291 418 U.S. at 561–72. The Court continues to adhere to its refusal to require appointment of counsel. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1980), and id. at 497– 500 (Justice Powell concurring); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
1292 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 457 (1985).
1293 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
1294 Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
1295 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (assignment to Ohio SuperMax prison, with attendant loss of parole eligibility and with only annual status review, constitutes an “atypical and significant hardship”). In Wilkinson, the Court upheld Ohio’s multi-level review process, despite the fact that a prisoner was provided only summary notice as to the allegations against him, a limited record was created, the prisoner could not call witnesses, and reevaluation of the assignment only occurred at one 30-day review and then annually. Id. at 219–20.
1296 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
1297 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
1298 Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908), held that parole is not a constitutional right but instead is a “present” from government to the prisoner. In Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935), the Court’s premise was that as a matter of grace the parolee was being granted a privilege and that he should neither expect nor seek due process. Then-Judge Burger in Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), reasoned that due process was inapplicable because the parole board’s function was to assist the prisoner’s rehabilitation and restoration to society and that there was no adversary relationship between the board and the parolee.
1299 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
1300 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
1301 408 U.S. at 480, 482.
1302 408 U.S. at 483.
1303 408 U.S. at 484–87.
1304 408 U.S. at 489.
1305 Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985).
1306 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
1307 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
1308 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Justice Powell thought that creation of a parole system did create a legitimate expectancy of fair procedure protected by due process, but, save in one respect, he agreed with the Court that the procedure followed was adequate. Id. at 18. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens argued in dissent that the Court’s analysis of the liberty interest was faulty and that due process required more than the board provided. Id. at 22.
1309 Following Greenholtz, the Court held in Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987), that a liberty interest was created by a Montana statute providing that a prisoner “shall” be released upon certain findings by a parole board. Accord Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. ___, 10–333, slip op. (2011) (per curiam).
1310 The Court in Greenholtz held that procedures designed to elicit specific facts were inappropriate under the circumstances, and minimizing the risk of error should be the prime consideration. This goal may be achieved by the board’s largely informal methods; eschewing formal hearings, notice, and specification of particular evidence in the record. The inmate in this case was afforded an opportunity to be heard and when parole was denied he was informed in what respects he fell short of qualifying. That afforded the process that was due. Accord Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. ___, 10–333, slip op. (2011) (per curiam).
1311 Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998). The mere existence of purely discretionary authority and the frequent exercise of it creates no entitlement. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981). The former case involved not parole but commutation of a life sentence, commutation being necessary to become eligible for parole. The statute gave the Board total discretion to commute, but in at least 75% of the cases prisoner received a favorable action and virtually all of the prisoners who had their sentences commuted were promptly paroled. In Van Curen, the Court made express what had been implicit in Dumschat; the “mutually explicit understandings” concept under which some property interests are found protected does not apply to liberty interests. Van Curen is also interesting because there the parole board had granted the petition for parole but within days revoked it before the prisoner was released, upon being told that he had lied at the hearing before the board.
1312 For analysis of the state laws as well as application of constitutional principles to juveniles, see SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2d ed. 2006).
1313 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12–29 (1967).
1314 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
1315 “Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the juvenile court process with which we deal in this case. A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence—and of limited practical meaning— that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a ‘receiving home’ or an ‘industrial school’ for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes ‘a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours . . . .’ Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and ‘delinquents’ confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide. In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase ‘due process.’ Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.” 387 U.S. at 27–28.
1316 387 U.S. at 31–35. Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, id. at 65, agreeing on the applicability of due process but disagreeing with the standards of the Court. Justice Stewart dissented wholly, arguing that the application of procedures developed for adversary criminal proceedings to juvenile proceedings would endanger their objectives and contending that the decision was a backward step toward undoing the reforms instituted in the past. Id. at 78.
1317 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), noted on this point in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1967).
1318 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart dissented, following essentially the Stewart reasoning in Gault. “The Court’s opinion today rests entirely on the assumption that all juvenile proceedings are ‘criminal prosecutions,’ hence subject to constitutional limitation. . . . What the juvenile court systems need is not more but less of the trappings of legal procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile system requires breathing room and ﬂexibility in order to survive, if it can survive the repeated assaults from this Court.” Id. at 375, 376. Justice Black dissented because he did not think the reasonable doubt standard a constitutional requirement at all. Id. at 377.
1319 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). No opinion was concurred in by a majority of the Justices. Justice Blackmun’s opinion of the Court, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White, reasoned that a juvenile proceeding was not “a criminal prosecution” within the terms of the Sixth Amendment, so that jury trials were not automatically required; instead, the prior cases had proceeded on a “fundamental fairness” approach and in that regard a jury was not a necessary component of fair factfinding and its use would have serious repercussions on the rehabilitative and protection functions of the juvenile court. Justice White also submitted a brief concurrence emphasizing the differences between adult criminal trials and juvenile adjudications. Id. at 551. Justice Brennan concurred in one case and dissented in another because in his view open proceedings would operate to protect juveniles from oppression in much the same way as a jury would. Id. at 553. Justice Harlan concurred because he did not believe jury trials were constitutionally mandated in state courts. Id. at 557. Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall dissented. Id. at 557.
1320 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
1321 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (upholding the search of a student’s purse to determine whether the student possessed cigarettes in violation of school rule; evidence of drug activity held admissible in a prosecution under the juvenile laws). In Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. ___, No. 08– 479 (2009), the Court found unreasonable a strip search of a 13-year-old girl suspected of possessing ibuprofen. See Fourth Amendment, “Public Schools,” supra.
1322 This single rule, the Court explained, will permit school authorities “to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense.” 469 U.S. at 343. Rejecting the suggestion of dissenting Justice Stevens, the Court was “unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules.” 469 U.S. at 342 n.9.
1323 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
1324 See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, ch. 4, Waiver of Jurisdiction (2d ed. 1989).
1325 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
1326 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
1327 See analysis of Eighth Amendment principles, under “Capital Punishment,” supra.
1328 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Court bypassed “the difficult issues of constitutional law” raised by the lower courts’ resolution of the case, that is, the right to treatment of the involuntarily committed, discussed under “Liberty Interests of People with Mental Disabilities: Commitment and Treatment,” supra.
1329 422 U.S. at 576. Prior to O’Connor v. Donaldson, only in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940), had the Court considered the issue. Other cases reﬂected the Court’s concern with the rights of convicted criminal defendants and generally required due process procedures or that the commitment of convicted criminal defendants follow the procedures required for civil commitments. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245 (1972). Cf. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
1330 422 U.S. at 576–77. The Court remanded to allow the trial court to determine whether Donaldson should recover personally from his doctors and others for his confinement, under standards formulated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
1331 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
1332 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
1333 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (transfer of prison inmate to mental hospital).
1334 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See also Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
1335 442 U.S. at 598–617. The dissenters agreed on this point. Id. at 626–37.
1336 442 U.S. at 617–20. The dissenters would have required a preconfinement hearing. Id. at 637–38.
1337 442 U.S. at 617. The dissent would have mandated a formal postadmission hearing. Id. at 625–26.