2025 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations
Chapter 980 - Sexually violent person commitments.
980.06 - Commitment.
980.06 Commitment. If a court or jury determines that the person who is the subject of a petition under s. 980.02 is a sexually violent person, the court shall order the person to be committed to the custody of the department for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person. A commitment order under this section shall specify that the person be placed in institutional care.
History: 1993 a. 479; 1995 a. 276; 1997 a. 27, 275, 284; 1999 a. 9.
In the event that there is a failure to develop an appropriate treatment program, the remedy is to obtain appropriate treatment and not supervised release. State v. Seibert, 220 Wis. 2d 308, 582 N.W.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2554.
This chapter and s. 51.61 provide the statutory basis for a court to issue an involuntary medication order for an individual who suffers from a chronic mental illness and is committed under this chapter. State v. Anthony D.B., 2000 WI 94, 237 Wis. 2d 1, 614 N.W.2d 435, 98-0576.
The incremental infringement by this section on the liberty interests of those who have a sexually violent, predatory past and are currently suffering from a mental disorder that makes them dangerous sexual predators does not violate constitutional guarantees of due process. State v. Ransdell, 2001 WI App 202, 247 Wis. 2d 613, 634 N.W.2d 871, 00-2224.
Although ch. 51 is more “lenient” with those who are subject to its provisions than is this chapter, the significant differences between the degree of danger posed by each of the two classes of persons subject to commitment under the two chapters, as well as the differences in what must be proven in order to commit under each, does not result in a violation of equal protection. State v. Williams, 2001 WI App 263, 249 Wis. 2d 1, 637 N.W.2d 791, 00-2899.
This chapter, as amended, is not a punitive criminal statute. Because whether a statute is punitive is a threshold question for both double jeopardy and ex post facto analysis, neither of those clauses is violated by this chapter. State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762, 00-0467.
The mere limitation of a committed person’s access to supervised release does not impose a restraint to the point that it violates due process. As amended, this chapter serves the legitimate and compelling state interests of providing treatment to, and protecting the public from, the dangerously mentally ill. The statute is narrowly tailored to meet those interests, and, as such, it does not violate substantive due process. State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762, 00-0467.
Commitment under this chapter does not require a separate factual finding that an individual’s mental disorder involves serious difficulty for the individual in controlling the individual’s behavior. Proof that the individual’s mental disorder predisposes the individual to engage in acts of sexual violence and establishes a substantial probability that the individual will again commit those acts necessarily and implicitly includes proof that the individual’s mental disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling the individual’s behavior. State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784, 99-3164.
This chapter does not preclude finding that a person with a sexually-related mental disorder has difficulty in controlling the person’s behavior even if that person is able to conform the person’s conduct to the requirements of the law. State v. Burgess, 2002 WI App 264, 258 Wis. 2d 548, 654 N.W.2d 81, 00-3074.
Affirmed. 2003 WI 71, 262 Wis. 2d 354, 665 N.W.2d 124, 00-3074. See also Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676 (2006).
Patients civilly committed under this chapter are not employees under federal or Wisconsin minimum wage law. State ex rel. Tran v. Speech, 2010 WI App 58, 324 Wis. 2d 567, 782 N.W.2d 107, 09-0884.
This chapter does not require the dismissal of a pending commitment petition when the individual subject to the petition is incarcerated because of the revocation of either parole or extended supervision. This section requires the circuit court to order the individual to be committed to the custody of the Department of Health Services for control, care, and treatment, but this chapter does not specify when that commitment must commence. While this section sets forth the requirements for a proper commitment order, neither this section nor any other section of this chapter contains language stating when the individual requirements of that order must be satisfied. State v. Gilbert, 2012 WI 72, 342 Wis. 2d 82, 816 N.W.2d 215, 10-0594.
To the extent that plaintiffs are uncontrollably violent and pose a danger to others, the state is entitled to hold them in segregation for that reason alone. Preserving the safety of the staff and other detainees takes precedence over medical goals. West v. Schwebke, 333 F.3d 745 (2003).
The use of polygraph tests as part of a sex offender treatment program does not violate due process. Wilson v. Watters, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (2004).
