2020 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations
Chapter 971. Criminal procedure — proceedings before and at trial.
971.31 Motions before trial.

971.31 Motions before trial.

(1) Any motion which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be made before trial.

(2) Except as provided in sub. (5), defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the proceedings, insufficiency of the complaint, information or indictment, invalidity in whole or in part of the statute on which the prosecution is founded, or the use of illegal means to secure evidence shall be raised before trial by motion or be deemed waived. The court may, however, entertain such motion at the trial, in which case the defendant waives any jeopardy that may have attached. The motion to suppress evidence shall be so entertained with waiver of jeopardy when it appears that the defendant is surprised by the state's possession of such evidence.

(3) The admissibility of any statement of the defendant shall be determined at the trial by the court in an evidentiary hearing out of the presence of the jury, unless the defendant, by motion, challenges the admissibility of such statement before trial.

(4) Except as provided in sub. (3), a motion shall be determined before trial of the general issue unless the court orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial. All issues of fact arising out of such motion shall be tried by the court without a jury.

(5)

(a) Motions before trial shall be served and filed within 10 days after the initial appearance of the defendant in a misdemeanor action or 10 days after arraignment in a felony action unless the court otherwise permits.

(b) In felony actions, motions to suppress evidence or motions under s. 971.23 or objections to the admissibility of statements of a defendant shall not be made at a preliminary examination and not until an information has been filed.

(c) In felony actions, objections based on the insufficiency of the complaint shall be made prior to the preliminary examination or waiver thereof or be deemed waived.

(6) If the court grants a motion to dismiss based upon a defect in the indictment, information or complaint, or in the institution of the proceedings, it may order that the defendant be held in custody or that the defendant's bail be continued for not more than 72 hours pending issuance of a new summons or warrant or the filing of a new indictment, information or complaint.

(7) If the motion to dismiss is based upon a misnomer, the court shall forthwith amend the indictment, information or complaint in that respect, and require the defendant to plead thereto.

(8) No complaint, indictment, information, process, return or other proceeding shall be dismissed or reversed for any error or mistake where the case and the identity of the defendant may be readily understood by the court; and the court may order an amendment curing such defects.

(9) A motion required to be served on a defendant may be served upon the defendant's attorney of record.

(10) An order denying a motion to suppress evidence or a motion challenging the admissibility of a statement of a defendant may be reviewed upon appeal from a final judgment or order notwithstanding the fact that the judgment or order was entered upon a plea of guilty or no contest to the information or criminal complaint.

(11) In actions under s. 940.225, 948.02, 948.025, 948.051, 948.085, or 948.095, or under s. 940.302 (2), if the court finds that the crime was sexually motivated, as defined in s. 980.01 (5), evidence which is admissible under s. 972.11 (2) must be determined by the court upon pretrial motion to be material to a fact at issue in the case and of sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial nature before it may be introduced at trial.

(12) In actions under s. 940.22, the court may determine the admissibility of evidence under s. 972.11 only upon a pretrial motion.

(13)

(a) A juvenile over whom the court has jurisdiction under s. 938.183 (1) (b) or (c) on a misdemeanor action may make a motion before trial to transfer jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938. The motion may allege that the juvenile did not commit the violation under the circumstances described in s. 938.183 (1) (b) or (c), whichever is applicable, or that transfer of jurisdiction would be appropriate because of all of the following:

1. If convicted, the juvenile could not receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice system.

2. Transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938 would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense.

3. Retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or other juveniles from committing the violation of which the juvenile is accused under the circumstances specified in s. 938.183 (1) (b) or (c), whichever is applicable.

(b) The court shall retain jurisdiction unless the juvenile proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she did not commit the violation under the circumstances described in s. 938.183 (1) (b) or (c), whichever is applicable, or that transfer would be appropriate because all of the factors specified in par. (a) 1., 2. and 3. are met.

History: 1975 c. 184; 1985 a. 275; 1987 a. 332 s. 64; 1993 a. 227, 486; 1995 a. 352, 387, 456; 1997 a. 205; 2005 a. 277; 2007 a. 116; 2009 a. 27.

When defense counsel refused, for strategic reasons, to pursue a motion made pro se by the defendant before trial to suppress evidence of identification at a lineup, there was a waiver of the motion. State v. McDonald, 50 Wis. 2d 534, 184 N.W.2d 886 (1971).

A claim of illegal arrest for lack of probable cause must be raised by motion before trial. Lampkins v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 564, 187 N.W.2d 164 (1971).

The waiver provision in sub. (2) is constitutional. Day v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 122, 187 N.W.2d 790.

A defendant is not required to make a motion to withdraw his plea to preserve his right to a review of an alleged error of refusal to suppress evidence. State v. Meier, 60 Wis. 2d 452, 210 N.W.2d 685 (1971).

A motion to suppress statements on the ground that they were products of an allegedly improper arrest was timely, notwithstanding failure to assert that challenge prior to arraignment, since it was made after the information was filed and prior to trial. Rinehart v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 760, 218 N.W.2d 323 (1974).

A request for a Goodchild hearing after direct testimony is concluded is not timely under sub. (2). Coleman v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 124, 218 N.W.2d 744 (1974).

The rule in sub. (2) does not apply to confessions, because sub. (2) is qualified by subs. (3) and (4). Upchurch v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 553, 219 N.W.2d 363 (1974).

A challenge to the search of one's person cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Madison v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 564, 219 N.W.2d 259 (1974).

A defendant's right to testify at a Goodchild hearing may be curtailed only for the most compelling reasons. Franklin v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 717, 247 N.W.2d 721 (1976).

When the state used a traffic citation to initiate legal proceedings and subsequently decided to prosecute the action as a crime, the trial court erred in not giving the defendant 10 days from the date of the amended charge to object to the sufficiency of the complaint. State v. Mudgett, 99 Wis. 2d 525, 299 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1980).

Sub. (6) authorizes the court to hold a defendant in custody or on bail for 72 hours pending new proceedings. State ex rel. Brockway v. Milwaukee Cty. Cir. Ct. 105 Wis. 2d 341, 313 N.W.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1981).

Factors that a court should consider when a defendant requests to be tried after a codefendant in order to secure the testimony of the codefendant are: 1) the likelihood that the codefendant will testify; 2) the likelihood that the testimony will be significant and beneficial to the defendant; 3) whether the defendant diligently attempted to secure the evidence in time for trial; 4) the length of delay requested; and 5) the burden on the trial court and prosecution. State v. Anastas, 107 Wis. 2d 270, 320 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1982).

By pleading guilty, the defendant waived the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence. State v. Nelson, 108 Wis. 2d 698, 324 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1982).

A finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect is a judgment of conviction under s. 972.13 (1) and thus sub. (10) is applicable. State v. Smith, 113 Wis. 2d 497, 335 N.W.2d 376 (1983).

Sub. (10) does not apply to civil forfeiture cases. County of Racine v. Smith, 122 Wis. 2d 431, 362 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1984).

To admit evidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault under sub. (11) and s. 972.11 (2) (b) 3., the court must be able to conclude from an offer of proof that a reasonable person could infer that the complainant made a prior untruthful allegation. “Allegation" is not restricted to allegations reported to the police. State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990).

Sub. (10) is inapplicable when the statement sought to be suppressed has no possible relevance to the charge to which the defendant pled guilty. State v. Pozo, 198 Wis. 2d 706, 544 N.W.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1995).

An evidentiary hearing need not be granted as a matter of course when requested prior to trial. The Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d 489, standards for granting an evidentiary hearing, coupled with the safeguards provided by Garner, 207 Wis. 2d 520, are applicable to a circuit court's consideration of a pretrial motion. State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 589 N.W.2d 9 (1999), 96-2430.

The harmless error approach in appeals under sub. (10) is not precluded in any way. State v. Armstrong, 225 Wis. 2d 121, 591 N.W.2d 604 (1999), 97-0925.

A Miranda-Goodchild hearing to determine voluntariness of confessions is an evidentiary hearing for the parties. It is not a soliloquy for the court. The court must not permit itself to become a witness or an advocate for one party. A defendant does not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing when the role of the prosecutor is played by the judge and the prosecutor is reduced to a bystander. State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, 262 Wis. 2d 457, 663 N.W.2d 798, 02-0153.

The defendant has no statutory subpoena right to obtain and copy police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials prior to a preliminary examination. Section 972.11 does not allow a criminal defendant access to the civil subpoena duces tecum power embodied in s. 805.07 (2). State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457, 06-1826.

In order to admit evidence of alleged prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault under sub. (11) and s. 972.11 (2) (b) 3., the circuit court must first conclude from the proffered evidence that a jury could reasonably find that the complainant made prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault. The judge must determine whether a jury, acting reasonably, could find that it is more likely than not that the complainant made prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault. State v. Ringer, 2010 WI 69, 326 Wis. 2d 351, 785 N.W.2d 448, 08-0652.

Under s. 972.11 (2) (b) 1. and sub. (11), evidence of the complainant's alleged past sexual conduct with the defendant is admissible only if the defendant makes a 3-part showing that: 1) the proffered evidence relates to sexual activities between the complainant and the defendant; 2) the evidence is material to a fact at issue; and 3) the evidence of sexual contact with the complainant is of sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial nature. In determining that evidence of prior sexual conduct has a highly prejudicial effect, the legislature crafted into the rape shield law a balancing test that assumes, absent an evidentiary showing to the contrary, that the proffered evidence is more prejudicial than probative. State v. Sarfraz, 2014 WI 78, 356 Wis. 2d 460, 851 N.W.2d 235, 12-0337.

The court is under no obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing if a defendant's motion presents nothing more than conclusory allegations and fails to show that there are any factual disputes that require a hearing. State v. Radder, 2018 WI App 36, 382 Wis. 2d 749, 915 N.W.2d 180, 16-1954.

The purpose of sub. (10) is to promote judicial economy by offering defendants an incentive to plead guilty in cases in which a crucial issue is whether the order denying a motion to suppress was proper. The statute serves this purpose because defendants are more likely to plead guilty when they know that, if it is determined on appeal that the circuit court erroneously failed to suppress evidence, their convictions will be reversed and they will be entitled to trials unless the state proves that the error was harmless. State v. Abbott, 2020 WI App 25, 392 Wis. 2d 232, 944 N.W.2d 8, 19-0021.

Under Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331 (1999), sub. (10) appeals are subject to a harmless error test. Although the manifest injustice standard applies when a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea based on an error in the plea colloquy, a plea colloquy error is not governed by sub. (10). State v. Abbott, 2020 WI App 25, 392 Wis. 2d 232, 944 N.W.2d 8, 19-0021.

The press and public have no constitutional right to attend a pretrial suppression hearing when the defendant demands closed hearing to avoid prejudicial publicity. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).