2017 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations
Chapter 948. Crimes against children.
948.03 Physical abuse of a child.
948.03 Physical abuse of a child.
(1) Definitions. In this section, “recklessly" means conduct which creates a situation of unreasonable risk of harm to and demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of the child.
(2) Intentional causation of bodily harm.
(a) Whoever intentionally causes great bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class C felony.
(b) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class H felony.
(c) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a child by conduct which creates a high probability of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class F felony.
(3) Reckless causation of bodily harm.
(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class E felony.
(b) Whoever recklessly causes bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class I felony.
(c) Whoever recklessly causes bodily harm to a child by conduct which creates a high probability of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class H felony.
(4) Failing to act to prevent bodily harm.
(a) A person responsible for the child's welfare is guilty of a Class F felony if that person has knowledge that another person intends to cause, is causing or has intentionally or recklessly caused great bodily harm to the child and is physically and emotionally capable of taking action which will prevent the bodily harm from occurring or being repeated, fails to take that action and the failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk of great bodily harm by the other person or facilitates the great bodily harm to the child that is caused by the other person.
(b) A person responsible for the child's welfare is guilty of a Class H felony if that person has knowledge that another person intends to cause, is causing or has intentionally or recklessly caused bodily harm to the child and is physically and emotionally capable of taking action which will prevent the bodily harm from occurring or being repeated, fails to take that action and the failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk of bodily harm by the other person or facilitates the bodily harm to the child that is caused by the other person.
(5) Engaging in repeated acts of physical abuse of the same child.
(a) Whoever commits 3 or more violations under sub. (2), (3), or (4) within a specified period involving the same child is guilty of the following:
1. A Class A felony if at least one violation caused the death of the child.
2. A Class B felony if at least 2 violations were violations of sub. (2) (a).
3. A Class C felony if at least one violation resulted in great bodily harm to the child.
4. A Class D felony if at least one violation created a high probability of great bodily harm to the child.
5. A Class E felony.
(b) If an action under par. (a) is tried to a jury, in order to find the defendant guilty the members of the jury must unanimously agree that at least 3 violations of sub. (2), (3), or (4) occurred within the specified period but need not agree on which acts constitute the requisite number.
(c) The state may not charge in the same action a defendant with a violation of this subsection and with a violation involving the same child under sub. (2), (3), or (4), unless the other violation occurred outside of the period applicable under par. (a). This paragraph does not prohibit a conviction for an included crime under s. 939.66 when the defendant is charged with a violation of this subsection.
(6) Treatment through prayer. A person is not guilty of an offense under this section solely because he or she provides a child with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone for healing in accordance with the religious method of healing permitted under s. 48.981 (3) (c) 4. or 448.03 (6) in lieu of medical or surgical treatment.
To obtain a conviction for aiding and abetting a violation of sub. (2) or (3), the state must prove conduct that as a matter of objective fact aids another in executing the crime. State v. Rundle, 176 Wis. 2d 985, 500 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1993).
To overcome the privilege of parental discipline in s. 939.45 (5), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that only one of the following is not met: 1) the use of force must be reasonably necessary; 2) the amount and nature of the force used must be reasonable; and 3) the force used must not be known to cause, or create a substantial risk of, great bodily harm or death. Whether a reasonable person would have believed the amount of force used was necessary and not excessive must be determined from the standpoint of the defendant at the time of the defendant's acts. The standard is what a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant's position under the circumstances that existed at the time of the alleged offense. State v. Kimberly B. 2005 WI App 115, 283 Wis. 2d 731, 699 N.W.2d 641, 04-1424.
The definition of reckless in this section is distinct from the general definition found in s. 939.24 and does not contain a state of mind element. Because the defense of mistake defense applies only to criminal charges with a state of mind element the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to give an instruction on the mistake defense. State v. Hemphill, 2006 WI App 185, 296 Wis. 2d 198, 722 N.W. 2d 393, 05-1350.
Reckless child abuse requires the defendant's actions demonstrate a conscious disregard for the safety of a child, not that the defendant was subjectively aware of that risk. In contrast, criminal recklessness under s. 939.24 (1) is defined as when the actor creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human being and the actor is aware of that risk. Thus, recklessly causing harm to a child is distinguished from criminal recklessness, because only the latter includes a subjective component. State v. Williams, 2006 WI App 212, 296 Wis. 2d 834, 723 N.W. 2d 719, 05-2282.
Testimony supporting the defendant father's assertion that he was beaten with a belt as a child was not relevant to whether the amount of force he used in spanking his daughter was objectively reasonable. A parent may not abuse his or her child and claim that conduct is reasonable based on his or her history of being similarly abused. State v. Williams, 2006 WI App 212, 296 Wis. 2d 834, 723 N.W. 2d 719, 05-2282.
The treatment-through-prayer provision under sub. (6) by its terms applies only to charges of criminal child abuse under this section. On its face, the treatment-through-prayer provision does not immunize a parent from any criminal liability other than that created by the criminal child abuse statute. No one reading the treatment-through-prayer provision should expect protection from criminal liability under any other statute. State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560, 11-1044.
The second-degree reckless homicide statute, s. 940.06, and this statute are sufficiently distinct that a parent has fair notice of conduct that is protected and conduct that is unprotected. The statutes are definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and those whose conduct is protected. A reader of the treatment-through-prayer provision, sub. (6), cannot reasonably conclude that he or she can, with impunity, use prayer treatment as protection against all criminal charges. The statutes are not unconstitutional on due process fair notice grounds. State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560, 11-1044.
This section penalizes 2 types of harm: 1) bodily harm and 2) great bodily harm. The definition of “substantial bodily harm” under s. 939.22 (38) that includes bone fractures is inapplicable to this section. Although bone fractures do not involve a risk of death, disfigurement, or a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of any part of a victim's body, they can fall under the “other serious bodily injury” segment of the “great bodily harm” definition in s. 939.22 (14). Just because all fractures meet the definition of substantial bodily harm, that does not imply that a particular fracture, or multiple fractures as is the case here, cannot be serious enough to qualify as an “other serious bodily injury” for purposes of being great bodily harm. State v. Davis, 2016 WI App 73, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 15-2030.
