2005 Missouri Revised Statutes - § 473.360. — Limitations on filing of claims--when claims barred.

473.360. 1. Except as provided in section 473.370, all claims against the estate of a deceased person, other than costs and expenses of administration, exempt property, family allowance, homestead allowance, claims of the United States and claims of any taxing authority within the United States, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise, which are not filed in the probate division of the circuit court within six months after the date of the first published notice of letters testamentary or of administration or, if notice was actually mailed to, or served upon, such creditor, within two months after the date such notice was mailed, or served, whichever later occurs, or which are not paid by the personal representative, within six months after the first published notice of letters testamentary or of administration, are forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent. No contingent claim based on any warranty made in connection with the conveyance of real estate is barred under this section. This six-month period does not extend any other applicable limitation periods.

2. Unless written notice of actions instituted or revived under section 473.363 or 473.367 is filed in the probate division within six months after the first published notice of letters, no recovery may be had in any such action on any judgment therein against the personal representative out of any assets being administered upon in the probate division or from any distributee or other person receiving the assets. Timely filing of the claim against the estate, under this section, within six months after the first published notice of letters, whether said claim is filed before or after the institution or revival of an action against the personal representative or the estate shall satisfy the requirement of written notice herein imposed.

3. Nothing in this section affects or prevents any action or proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge or other lien upon property of the estate; except that attachment, judgment, and execution liens shall be enforced as provided in this chapter and not otherwise.

(L. 1955 p. 385 139, A.L. 1957 p. 829, A.L. 1959 S.B. 305, A.L. 1969 p. 551, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1634, A.L. 1980 S.B. 637, A.L. 1989 H.B. 145, A.L. 1993 S.B. 88, A.L. 1996 S.B. 494)

Effective 5-23-96

CROSS REFERENCES: Limitations extended by death, survival, RSMo 516.240 516.250 Survival of causes of action, RSMo 431.130, 537.010, 537.020, 537.030

(1960) Where suit on personal injuries claim was filed within the nine months but notice thereof was not filed in the probate court within that time the suit would be dismissed because barred by the nonclaim statute. The 1959 amendment with respect to making the bar applicable only to assets of the estate discussed. Smith v. Maynard (Mo.), 339 S.W.2d 737.

(1960) Where claim for compensation for services as originally filed was based on alleged contract to make provision for such compensation by will, the claim could be amended after expiration of nonclaim period to proceed on quantum meruit. Reighley v. Fabricius Estate (A.), 332 S.W.2d 76.

(1961) A proceeding could be instituted in the circuit court for an accounting and distribution of an escrow fund between the parties entitled thereto notwithstanding a claim therefor had previously been filed in a probate court. Stark v. Moffit (A.), 352 S.W.2d 165.

(1962) Actions against administrator of estate for personal injuries were barred where actions had been barred under nonclaim statute prior to statute's amendment since amendment did not extend new privileges granted therein to bringing of new actions which had been extinguished prior to effective date of amendment. State ex rel. Whitaker v. hall (Mo.), 358 S.W.2d 845, Potts v. Vadnais (Mo.), S.W.2d 543.

(1963) Suit to enforce contractual right of surviving partner under partnership agreement to purchase deceased partner's interest did not constitute a claim against the deceased partner's estate within the meaning of the nonclaim statutes. Strumberg v. Mercantile Trust Co. (Mo.), 367 S.W.2d 535.

(1963) Nunc pro tunc order of probate court to correct record to show the filing of copy of petition and duplicate copy of summons in personal injury suit against administratrix of estate based solely on oral testimony of attorney that he handed instruments to probate clerk on certain date was error. In re Grooms' Estate (A.), 370 S.W.2d 709.

(1964) Where condemnation proceeding was pending at time of condemnor's death, the fact that condemnor did not file notice of the action in probate court did not call for dismissal of condemnor's exceptions to commissioners' report and payment to condemnor of difference between the commissioners' award and smaller jury verdict was not recovery on a "judgment" within meaning of this section. Condemnation damages were not assets to be administered in probate court until administrators exercised their right to draw down amount deposited. St. Louis Housing Authority v. Barnes (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 144.

(1967) This section is mandatory and its purpose is to terminate all claims, whether due, not due, or contingent. In re Estate of Bierman (A.), 410 S.W.2d 342.

(1985) Held, due process does not require any more than publication notice to a creditor that a decedent's estate is being administered and the notice provisions of sections 473.360 and 473.033, RSMo, are constitutional. Estate of Busch v. Ferrell Duncan Clinic (Mo. banc) 700 S.W.2d 87.

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