2019 Illinois Compiled Statutes
Chapter 725 - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
725 ILCS 5/ - Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
Title VI - Proceedings At Trial



(725 ILCS 5/Tit. VI heading)

TITLE VI. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL




(725 ILCS 5/Art. 115 heading)

ARTICLE 115. TRIAL


(725 ILCS 5/115-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-1)
Sec. 115-1. Method of Trial. All prosecutions except on a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill shall be tried by the court and a jury unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing.
(Source: P.A. 87-410.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-1.5)
Sec. 115-1.5. Waiver of counsel by persons under 17 years of age prohibited. A person under 17 years of age may not waive the right to the assistance of counsel in his or her defense in any judicial proceeding. This Section does not apply to a minor charged with an offense for which the penalty is a fine only. Except for violations of Sections 11-401, 11-402, 11-501, and 11-503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, this Section does not apply to proceedings involving violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
(Source: P.A. 94-345, eff. 7-26-05.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-2)
Sec. 115-2. Pleas of Guilty and guilty but mentally ill. (a) Before or during trial a plea of guilty may be accepted when:
(1) The defendant enters a plea of guilty in open court;
(2) The court has informed the defendant of the consequences of his plea and of the maximum penalty provided by law which may be imposed upon acceptance of such plea.
Upon acceptance of a plea of guilty the court shall determine the factual basis for the plea.
(b) Before or during trial a plea of guilty but mentally ill may be accepted by the court when:
(1) the defendant has undergone an examination by a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist and has waived his right to trial; and
(2) the judge has examined the psychiatric or psychological report or reports; and
(3) the judge has held a hearing, at which either party may present evidence, on the issue of the defendant's mental health and, at the conclusion of such hearing, is satisfied that there is a factual basis that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered.
(Source: P.A. 82-553.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-3)
Sec. 115-3. Trial by the Court.
(a) A trial shall be conducted in the presence of the defendant unless he waives the right to be present.
(b) Upon conclusion of the trial the court shall enter a general finding, except that, when the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented during the trial and acquittal is based solely upon the defense of insanity, the court shall enter a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. In the event of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, a hearing shall be held pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code to determine whether the defendant is subject to involuntary admission.
(c) When the defendant has asserted a defense of insanity, the court may find the defendant guilty but mentally ill if, after hearing all of the evidence, the court finds that:
(1) the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged; and

(2) the defendant has failed to prove his insanity as

required in subsection (b) of Section 3-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 and subsections (a), (b) and (e) of Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012; and

(3) the defendant has proven by a preponderance of

the evidence that he was mentally ill, as defined in subsections (c) and (d) of Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 at the time of the offense.

(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-4)
Sec. 115-4. Trial by Court and Jury.)
(a) Questions of law shall be decided by the court and questions of fact by the jury.
(b) The jury shall consist of 12 members.
(c) Upon request the parties shall be furnished with a list of prospective jurors with their addresses if known.
(d) Each party may challenge jurors for cause. If a prospective juror has a physical impairment, the court shall consider such prospective juror's ability to perceive and appreciate the evidence when considering a challenge for cause.
(e) A defendant tried alone shall be allowed 20 peremptory challenges in a capital case, 10 in a case in which the punishment may be imprisonment in the penitentiary, and 5 in all other cases; except that, in a single trial of more than one defendant, each defendant shall be allowed 12 peremptory challenges in a capital case, 6 in a case in which the punishment may be imprisonment in the penitentiary, and 3 in all other cases. If several charges against a defendant or defendants are consolidated for trial, each defendant shall be allowed peremptory challenges upon one charge only, which single charge shall be the charge against that defendant authorizing the greatest maximum penalty. The State shall be allowed the same number of peremptory challenges as all of the defendants.
(f) After examination by the court the jurors may be examined, passed upon, accepted and tendered by opposing counsel as provided by Supreme Court rules.
(g) After the jury is impaneled and sworn the court may direct the selection of 2 alternate jurors who shall take the same oath as the regular jurors. Each party shall have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror. If before the final submission of a cause a member of the jury dies or is discharged he shall be replaced by an alternate juror in the order of selection.
(h) A trial by the court and jury shall be conducted in the presence of the defendant unless he waives the right to be present.
(i) After arguments of counsel the court shall instruct the jury as to the law.
(j) Unless the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the jury shall return a general verdict as to each offense charged. When the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the court shall provide the jury not only with general verdict forms but also with a special verdict form of not guilty by reason of insanity, as to each offense charged, and in such event the court shall separately instruct the jury that a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity may be returned instead of a general verdict but such special verdict requires a unanimous finding by the jury that the defendant committed the acts charged but at the time of the commission of those acts the defendant was insane. In the event of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, a hearing shall be held pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code to determine whether the defendant is subject to involuntary admission. When the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the court, where warranted by the evidence, shall also provide the jury with a special verdict form of guilty but mentally ill, as to each offense charged and shall separately instruct the jury that a special verdict of guilty but mentally ill may be returned instead of a general verdict, but that such special verdict requires a unanimous finding by the jury that: (1) the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged; and (2) the defendant has failed to prove his insanity as required in subsection (b) of Section 3-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 and subsections (a), (b) and (e) of Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012; and (3) the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally ill, as defined in subsections (c) and (d) of Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 at the time of the offense.
(k) When, at the close of the State's evidence or at the close of all of the evidence, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding or verdict of guilty the court may and on motion of the defendant shall make a finding or direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, enter a judgment of acquittal and discharge the defendant.
(l) When the jury retires to consider its verdict an officer of the court shall be appointed to keep them together and to prevent conversation between the jurors and others; however, if any juror is deaf, the jury may be accompanied by and may communicate with a court-appointed interpreter during its deliberations. Upon agreement between the State and defendant or his counsel the jury may seal and deliver its verdict to the clerk of the court, separate, and then return such verdict in open court at its next session.
(m) In the trial of a capital or other offense, any juror who is a member of a panel or jury which has been impaneled and sworn as a panel or as a jury shall be permitted to separate from other such jurors during every period of adjournment to a later day, until final submission of the cause to the jury for determination, except that no such separation shall be permitted in any trial after the court, upon motion by the defendant or the State or upon its own motion, finds a probability that prejudice to the defendant or to the State will result from such separation.
(n) The members of the jury shall be entitled to take notes during the trial, and the sheriff of the county in which the jury is sitting shall provide them with writing materials for this purpose. Such notes shall remain confidential, and shall be destroyed by the sheriff after the verdict has been returned or a mistrial declared.
(o) A defendant tried by the court and jury shall only be found guilty, guilty but mentally ill, not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity, upon the unanimous verdict of the jury.
(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-4.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-4.1)
Sec. 115-4.1. Absence of defendant.
(a) When a defendant after arrest and an initial court appearance for a non-capital felony or a misdemeanor, fails to appear for trial, at the request of the State and after the State has affirmatively proven through substantial evidence that the defendant is willfully avoiding trial, the court may commence trial in the absence of the defendant. Absence of a defendant as specified in this Section shall not be a bar to indictment of a defendant, return of information against a defendant, or arraignment of a defendant for the charge for which bail has been granted. If a defendant fails to appear at arraignment, the court may enter a plea of "not guilty" on his behalf. If a defendant absents himself before trial on a capital felony, trial may proceed as specified in this Section provided that the State certifies that it will not seek a death sentence following conviction. Trial in the defendant's absence shall be by jury unless the defendant had previously waived trial by jury. The absent defendant must be represented by retained or appointed counsel. The court, at the conclusion of all of the proceedings, may order the clerk of the circuit court to pay counsel such sum as the court deems reasonable, from any bond monies which were posted by the defendant with the clerk, after the clerk has first deducted all court costs. If trial had previously commenced in the presence of the defendant and the defendant willfully absents himself for two successive court days, the court shall proceed to trial. All procedural rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Constitution of the State of Illinois, statutes of the State of Illinois, and rules of court shall apply to the proceedings the same as if the defendant were present in court and had not either forfeited his bail bond or escaped from custody. The court may set the case for a trial which may be conducted under this Section despite the failure of the defendant to appear at the hearing at which the trial date is set. When such trial date is set the clerk shall send to the defendant, by certified mail at his last known address indicated on his bond slip, notice of the new date which has been set for trial. Such notification shall be required when the defendant was not personally present in open court at the time when the case was set for trial.
(b) The absence of a defendant from a trial conducted pursuant to this Section does not operate as a bar to concluding the trial, to a judgment of conviction resulting therefrom, or to a final disposition of the trial in favor of the defendant.
(c) Upon a verdict of not guilty, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant. Upon a verdict of guilty, the court shall set a date for the hearing of post-trial motions and shall hear such motion in the absence of the defendant. If post-trial motions are denied, the court shall proceed to conduct a sentencing hearing and to impose a sentence upon the defendant.
(d) A defendant who is absent for part of the proceedings of trial, post-trial motions, or sentencing, does not thereby forfeit his right to be present at all remaining proceedings.
(e) When a defendant who in his absence has been either convicted or sentenced or both convicted and sentenced appears before the court, he must be granted a new trial or new sentencing hearing if the defendant can establish that his failure to appear in court was both without his fault and due to circumstances beyond his control. A hearing with notice to the State's Attorney on the defendant's request for a new trial or a new sentencing hearing must be held before any such request may be granted. At any such hearing both the defendant and the State may present evidence.
(f) If the court grants only the defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing, then a new sentencing hearing shall be held in accordance with the provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections. At any such hearing, both the defendant and the State may offer evidence of the defendant's conduct during his period of absence from the court. The court may impose any sentence authorized by the Unified Code of Corrections and is not in any way limited or restricted by any sentence previously imposed.
(g) A defendant whose motion under paragraph (e) for a new trial or new sentencing hearing has been denied may file a notice of appeal therefrom. Such notice may also include a request for review of the judgment and sentence not vacated by the trial court.
(Source: P.A. 90-787, eff. 8-14-98.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-4.5)
Sec. 115-4.5. Death of defendant. Whenever the prosecuting attorney learns of the death of the defendant prior to the entry of a final and appealable judgment in a criminal case, he or she shall promptly notify the other party and file a certificate of notice of the defendant's death with the circuit court before which the case is pending. Upon filing of the certificate, the court shall enter an order abating the proceedings ab initio.
(Source: P.A. 99-778, eff. 1-1-17.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-5)
Sec. 115-5. Business records as evidence.
(a) Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.
All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility.
The term "business," as used in this Section, includes business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind.
(b) If any business, institution, member of a profession or calling, or any department or agency of government, in the regular course of business or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of the same to be recorded, copied, or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, optical imaging, or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless its preservation is required by law. Such reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any proceeding whether the original is in existence or not and an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement, or facsimile does not preclude admission of the original. This Section shall not be construed to exclude from evidence any document or copy thereof which is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.
(c) No writing or record made in the regular course of any business shall become admissible as evidence by the application of this Section if:
(1) Such writing or record has been made by anyone in

the regular course of any form of hospital or medical business; or

(2) Such writing or record has been made by anyone

during an investigation of an alleged offense or during any investigation relating to pending or anticipated litigation of any kind, except during a hearing to revoke a sentence of probation or conditional discharge or an order of court supervision that is based on a technical violation of a sentencing order when the hearing involves a probationer or defendant who has transferred or moved from the county having jurisdiction over the original charge or sentence. For the purposes of this subsection (c), "technical violation" means a breach of a sentencing order but does not include an allegation of a subsequent criminal act asserted in a formal criminal charge.

(d) Upon request of the moving party and with reasonable notice given to the opposing party, in a criminal prosecution in which the defendant is accused of an offense under Article 16 or 17 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, the court may, after a hearing, for good cause and upon appropriate safeguards, permit live foundational testimony business records as evidence, subject to cross-examination, in open court by means of a contemporaneous audio and video transmission from outside of this State.
(Source: P.A. 98-579, eff. 1-1-14.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-5.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-5.1)
Sec. 115-5.1. In any civil or criminal action the records of the coroner's medical or laboratory examiner summarizing and detailing the performance of his or her official duties in performing medical examinations upon deceased persons or autopsies, or both, and kept in the ordinary course of business of the coroner's office, duly certified by the county coroner or chief supervisory coroner's pathologist or medical examiner, shall be received as competent evidence in any court of this State, to the extent permitted by this Section. These reports, specifically including but not limited to the pathologist's protocol, autopsy reports and toxicological reports, shall be public documents and thereby may be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts, findings, opinions, diagnoses and conditions stated therein.
A duly certified coroner's protocol or autopsy report, or both, complying with the requirements of this Section may be duly admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule as prima facie proof of the cause of death of the person to whom it relates. The records referred to in this Section shall be limited to the records of the results of post-mortem examinations of the findings of autopsy and toxicological laboratory examinations.
Persons who prepare reports or records offered in evidence hereunder may be subpoenaed as witnesses in civil or criminal cases upon the request of either party to the cause. However, if such person is dead, the county coroner or a duly authorized official of the coroner's office may testify to the fact that the examining pathologist, toxicologist or other medical or laboratory examiner is deceased and that the offered report or record was prepared by such deceased person. The witness must further attest that the medical report or record was prepared in the ordinary and usual course of the deceased person's duty or employment in conformity with the provisions of this Section.
(Source: P.A. 82-783.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-6)
Sec. 115-6. Appointment of Psychiatrist or Clinical Psychologist. If the defendant has given notice that he may rely upon the defense of insanity as defined in Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or the defendant indicates that he intends to plead guilty but mentally ill or the defense of intoxicated or drugged condition as defined in Section 6-3 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or if the facts and circumstances of the case justify a reasonable belief that the aforesaid defenses may be raised, the Court shall, on motion of the State, order the defendant to submit to examination by at least one clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, to be named by the prosecuting attorney. The Court shall also order the defendant to submit to an examination by one neurologist, one clinical psychologist and one electroencephalographer to be named by the prosecuting attorney if the State asks for one or more of such additional examinations. The Court may order additional examinations if the Court finds that additional examinations by additional experts will be of substantial value in the determination of issues of insanity or drugged conditions. The reports of such experts shall be made available to the defense. Any statements made by defendant to such experts shall not be admissible against the defendant unless he raises the defense of insanity or the defense of drugged condition, in which case they shall be admissible only on the issue of whether he was insane or drugged. The refusal of the defendant to cooperate in such examinations shall not automatically preclude the raising of the aforesaid defenses but shall preclude the defendant from offering expert evidence or testimony tending to support such defenses if the expert evidence or testimony is based upon the expert's examination of the defendant. If the Court, after a hearing, determines to its satisfaction that the defendant's refusal to cooperate was unreasonable it may, in its sound discretion, bar any or all evidence upon the defense asserted.
(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-6.1)
Sec. 115-6.1. Prostitution; affirmative defense.
(a) In prosecutions for prostitution, when the accused intends to raise at trial the affirmative defense provided in subsection (c-5) of Section 11-14 of the Criminal Code of 2012 and has reason to believe that the evidence presented in asserting that defense may jeopardize the safety of the accused, courtroom personnel, or others impacted by human trafficking, the accused may file under seal a motion for an in camera hearing to review the accused's safety concerns. Upon receipt of the motion and notice to the parties, the court shall conduct an in camera hearing, with counsel present, limited to review of potential safety concerns. The court shall cause an official record of the in camera hearing to be made, which shall be kept under seal. The court shall not consider the merits of the affirmative defense during the in camera review.
(b) If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the assertion of an affirmative defense under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-14 of the Criminal Code of 2012 by the accused in open court would likely jeopardize the safety of the accused, court personnel, or other persons, the court may clear the courtroom with the agreement of the accused, order additional in camera hearings, seal the records, prohibit court personnel from disclosing the proceedings without prior court approval, or take any other appropriate measure that in the court's discretion will enhance the safety of the proceedings and ensure the accused a full and fair opportunity to assert his or her affirmative defense.
(c) Statements made by the accused during the in camera hearing to review safety concerns shall not be admissible against the accused for the crimes charged.
(Source: P.A. 99-109, eff. 7-22-15.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-7)
Sec. 115-7. a. In prosecutions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, criminal sexual abuse, or criminal transmission of HIV; and in prosecutions for battery and aggravated battery, when the commission of the offense involves sexual penetration or sexual conduct as defined in Section 11-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012; and with the trial or retrial of the offenses formerly known as rape, deviate sexual assault, indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child, the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code is inadmissible except (1) as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code with the accused when this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which the offense is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be admitted.
b. No evidence admissible under this Section shall be introduced unless ruled admissible by the trial judge after an offer of proof has been made at a hearing to be held in camera in order to determine whether the defense has evidence to impeach the witness in the event that prior sexual activity with the defendant is denied. Such offer of proof shall include reasonably specific information as to the date, time and place of the past sexual conduct between the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code and the defendant. Unless the court finds that reasonably specific information as to date, time or place, or some combination thereof, has been offered as to prior sexual activity with the defendant, counsel for the defendant shall be ordered to refrain from inquiring into prior sexual activity between the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code and the defendant. The court shall not admit evidence under this Section unless it determines at the hearing that the evidence is relevant and the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence shall be admissible at trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies the evidence that may be admitted and areas with respect to which the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code may be examined or cross examined.
(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-7.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-7.1)
Sec. 115-7.1. Court may not order mental examination of sex victim. Except where explicitly authorized by this Code or by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois, no court may require or order a witness who is the victim of an alleged sex offense to submit to or undergo either a psychiatric or psychological examination.
(Source: P.A. 83-289.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-7.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-7.2)
Sec. 115-7.2. In a prosecution for an illegal sexual act perpetrated upon a victim, including but not limited to prosecutions for violations of Sections 11-1.20 through 11-1.60 or 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, or ritualized abuse of a child under Section 12-33 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, testimony by an expert, qualified by the court relating to any recognized and accepted form of post-traumatic stress syndrome shall be admissible as evidence.
(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-7.3)
Sec. 115-7.3. Evidence in certain cases.
(a) This Section applies to criminal cases in which:
(1) the defendant is accused of predatory criminal

sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, criminal sexual abuse, child pornography, aggravated child pornography, criminal transmission of HIV, or child abduction as defined in paragraph (10) of subsection (b) of Section 10-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012;

(2) the defendant is accused of battery, aggravated

battery, first degree murder, or second degree murder when the commission of the offense involves sexual penetration or sexual conduct as defined in Section 11-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012; or

(3) the defendant is tried or retried for any of the

offenses formerly known as rape, deviate sexual assault, indecent liberties with a child, or aggravated indecent liberties with a child.

(b) If the defendant is accused of an offense set forth in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) or the defendant is tried or retried for any of the offenses set forth in paragraph (3) of subsection (a), evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses set forth in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a), or evidence to rebut that proof or an inference from that proof, may be admissible (if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence) and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
(c) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:
(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate

offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged

or predicate offense; or

(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.
(d) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.
(e) In a criminal case in which evidence is offered under this Section, proof may be made by specific instances of conduct, testimony as to reputation, or testimony in the form of an expert opinion, except that the prosecution may offer reputation testimony only after the opposing party has offered that testimony.
(f) In prosecutions for a violation of Section 10-2, 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-3.05, 12-4, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, 12-16, or 18-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, involving the involuntary delivery of a controlled substance to a victim, no inference may be made about the fact that a victim did not consent to a test for the presence of controlled substances.
(Source: P.A. 97-1109, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13; 98-160, eff. 1-1-14.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-7.4)
Sec. 115-7.4. Evidence in domestic violence cases.
(a) In a criminal prosecution in which the defendant is accused of an offense of domestic violence as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, or first degree murder or second degree murder when the commission of the offense involves domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
(b) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:
(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate

offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged

or predicate offense; or

(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.
(c) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.
(d) In a criminal case in which evidence is offered under this Section, proof may be made by specific instances of conduct, testimony as to reputation, or testimony in the form of an expert opinion, except that the prosecution may offer reputation testimony only after the opposing party has offered that testimony.
(Source: P.A. 97-1036, eff. 8-20-12.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-8)
Sec. 115-8. A defendant may waive his right to be present during trial. However, upon motion of the State's Attorney made prior to or during trial, the court shall order the defendant to present himself in open court for the purpose of identification.
(Source: P.A. 77-1426.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-9) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-9)
Sec. 115-9. (a) In a prosecution for theft, retail theft, deceptive practice, robbery, armed robbery, burglary or residential burglary, the court shall receive as competent evidence, a photograph of property over which the accused is alleged to have exerted unauthorized control or to have otherwise obtained unlawfully, if the photograph:
(1) will serve the purpose of demonstrating the nature of the property; and
(2) is otherwise admissible into evidence under all other rules of law governing the admissibility of photographs into evidence. The fact that it is impractical to introduce into evidence the actual property for any reason, including its size, weight, or unavailability, need not be established for the court to find a photograph of that property to be competent evidence. If a photograph is found to be competent evidence under this subsection, it is admissible into evidence in place of the property and to the same extent as the property itself.
(b) A law enforcement agency that is holding as evidence property over which a person is alleged to have exerted unauthorized control or to have otherwise obtained unlawfully, shall return that property to its owner if:
(1) the property has been photographed in a manner that will serve the purpose of demonstrating the nature of the property, and if these photographs are filed with or retained by the law enforcement agency in place of the property;
(2) receipt for the property is obtained from the owner upon delivery by the law enforcement agency;
(3) the prosecuting attorney who is prosecuting a case that involves the property furnishes the law enforcement agency with a written request for return of the property to its owner; and
(4) the property may be lawfully possessed by the owner.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section a court may, if a motion so requesting is filed by defendant before expiration of the time period specified in subsection (d) of this Section, order the law enforcement agency to hold such property as evidence pending completion of trial.
(d) The time period during which the defendant may file a motion with the court for retention of the property as evidence shall be as follows:
(1) if the property was being displayed, held, stored or offered for sale to the public by a person or entity holding a Retailers Occupation Tax Number issued by the State of Illinois, the time period shall expire 14 days after the arrest of the defendant;
(2) for all other property, the time period shall expire 30 days after the filing of an information or indictment, or in the case of misdemeanor charges within 30 days after the filing of a complaint.
(Source: P.A. 83-1362.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-9.2)
Sec. 115-9.2. Currency used in undercover investigation.
(a) In a prosecution in which United States currency was used by a law enforcement officer or agency or by a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer or agency in an undercover investigation of an offense that has imprisonment as an available sentence for a violation of the offense, the court shall receive, as competent evidence, a photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy of the currency used in the undercover investigation, if:
(1) the photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy

will serve the purpose of demonstrating the nature of the currency;

(2) the individual serial numbers of the currency are

clearly visible or if the amount of currency exceeds $500 the individual serial numbers of a sample of 10% of the currency are clearly visible, and any identification marks placed on the currency by law enforcement as part of the investigation are clearly visible;

(3) the photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy

complies with federal law, rule, or regulation requirements on photographs, photostatic copies, or photocopies of United States currency; and

(4) the photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy is

otherwise admissible into evidence under all other rules of law governing the admissibility of photographs, photostatic copies, or photocopies into evidence.

(b) The fact that it is impractical to introduce into evidence the actual currency for any reason, including its size, weight, or unavailability, need not be established for the court to find a photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy of that currency to be competent evidence.
(c) If a photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy is found to be competent evidence under this Section, it is admissible into evidence in place of the currency and to the same extent as the currency itself.
(Source: P.A. 99-685, eff. 1-1-17; 100-201, eff. 8-18-17.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-10) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-10)
Sec. 115-10. Certain hearsay exceptions.
(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13, a person with an intellectual disability, a person with a cognitive impairment, or a person with a developmental disability, including, but not limited to, prosecutions for violations of Sections 11-1.20 through 11-1.60 or 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 and prosecutions for violations of Sections 10-1 (kidnapping), 10-2 (aggravated kidnapping), 10-3 (unlawful restraint), 10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint), 10-4 (forcible detention), 10-5 (child abduction), 10-6 (harboring a runaway), 10-7 (aiding or abetting child abduction), 11-9 (public indecency), 11-11 (sexual relations within families), 11-21 (harmful material), 12-1 (assault), 12-2 (aggravated assault), 12-3 (battery), 12-3.2 (domestic battery), 12-3.3 (aggravated domestic battery), 12-3.05 or 12-4 (aggravated battery), 12-4.1 (heinous battery), 12-4.2 (aggravated battery with a firearm), 12-4.3 (aggravated battery of a child), 12-4.7 (drug induced infliction of great bodily harm), 12-5 (reckless conduct), 12-6 (intimidation), 12-6.1 or 12-6.5 (compelling organization membership of persons), 12-7.1 (hate crime), 12-7.3 (stalking), 12-7.4 (aggravated stalking), 12-10 or 12C-35 (tattooing the body of a minor), 12-11 or 19-6 (home invasion), 12-21.5 or 12C-10 (child abandonment), 12-21.6 or 12C-5 (endangering the life or health of a child) or 12-32 (ritual mutilation) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or any sex offense as defined in subsection (B) of Section 2 of the Sex Offender Registration Act, the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
(1) testimony by the victim of an out of court

statement made by the victim that he or she complained of such act to another; and

(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by

the victim describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against that victim.

(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:
(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside

the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and

(2) The child or person with an intellectual

disability, a cognitive impairment, or developmental disability either:

(A) testifies at the proceeding; or
(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is

corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement; and

(3) In a case involving an offense perpetrated

against a child under the age of 13, the out of court statement was made before the victim attained 13 years of age or within 3 months after the commission of the offense, whichever occurs later, but the statement may be admitted regardless of the age of the victim at the time of the proceeding.

(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, or the intellectual capabilities of the person with an intellectual disability, a cognitive impairment, or developmental disability, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factor.
(d) The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.
(e) Statements described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall not be excluded on the basis that they were obtained as a result of interviews conducted pursuant to a protocol adopted by a Child Advocacy Advisory Board as set forth in subsections (c), (d), and (e) of Section 3 of the Children's Advocacy Center Act or that an interviewer or witness to the interview was or is an employee, agent, or investigator of a State's Attorney's office.
(f) For the purposes of this Section:
"Person with a cognitive impairment" means a person with a significant impairment of cognition or memory that represents a marked deterioration from a previous level of function. Cognitive impairment includes, but is not limited to, dementia, amnesia, delirium, or a traumatic brain injury.
"Person with a developmental disability" means a person with a disability that is attributable to (1) an intellectual disability, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or autism, or (2) any other condition that results in an impairment similar to that caused by an intellectual disability and requires services similar to those required by a person with an intellectual disability.
"Person with an intellectual disability" means a person with significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning which exists concurrently with an impairment in adaptive behavior.
(Source: P.A. 99-143, eff. 7-27-15; 99-752, eff. 1-1-17; 100-201, eff. 8-18-17.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-10.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-10.1)
Sec. 115-10.1. Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements. In all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial, and
(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
(c) the statement--
(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness had personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making of the statement either in his testimony at the hearing or trial in which the admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recording, or any other similar electronic means of sound recording.
Nothing in this Section shall render a prior inconsistent statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because such statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth herein.
(Source: P.A. 83-1042.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-10.2)
Sec. 115-10.2. Admissibility of prior statements when witness refused to testify despite a court order to testify.
(a) A statement not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as defined in subsection (c) and if the court determines that:
(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a

material fact; and

(2) the statement is more probative on the point for

which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and

(3) the general purposes of this Section and the

interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

(b) A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of the statement, including the name and address of the declarant.
(c) Unavailability as a witness is limited to the situation in which the declarant persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so.
(d) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim or lack of memory, inability or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall render a prior statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because the statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth in this Section.
(f) Prior statements are admissible under this Section only if the statements were made under oath and were subject to cross-examination by the adverse party in a prior trial, hearing, or other proceeding.
(Source: P.A. 93-413, eff. 8-5-03; 93-443, eff. 8-5-03; 94-53, eff. 6-17-05.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-10.2a)
Sec. 115-10.2a. Admissibility of prior statements in domestic violence prosecutions when the witness is unavailable to testify.
(a) In a domestic violence prosecution, a statement, made by an individual identified in Section 201 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 as a person protected by that Act, that is not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is identified as unavailable as defined in subsection (c) and if the court determines that:
(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a

material fact; and

(2) the statement is more probative on the point for

which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and

(3) the general purposes of this Section and the

interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

(b) A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of the statement, including the name and address of the declarant.
(c) Unavailability as a witness includes circumstances in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground

of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or

(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the

subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or

(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject

matter of the declarant's statement; or

(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the

hearing because of health or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or

(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of

the statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means; or

(6) is a crime victim as defined in Section 3 of the

Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act and the failure of the declarant to testify is caused by the defendant's intimidation of the declarant as defined in Section 12-6 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

(d) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall render a prior statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because the statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth in this Section.
(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-10.3)
Sec. 115-10.3. Hearsay exception regarding elder adults.
(a) In a prosecution for a physical act, abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation perpetrated upon or against an eligible adult, as defined in the Adult Protective Services Act, who has been diagnosed by a physician to suffer from (i) any form of dementia, developmental disability, or other form of mental incapacity or (ii) any physical infirmity, including but not limited to prosecutions for violations of Sections 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-3.1, 10-4, 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-11, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-3.05, 12-3.2, 12-3.3, 12-4, 12-4.1, 12-4.2, 12-4.5, 12-4.6, 12-4.7, 12-5, 12-6, 12-7.3, 12-7.4, 12-11, 12-11.1, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16, 12-21, 16-1, 16-1.3, 17-1, 17-3, 17-56, 18-1, 18-2, 18-3, 18-4, 18-5, 18-6, 19-6, 20-1.1, 24-1.2, and 33A-2, or subsection (b) of Section 12-4.4a of the Criminal Code of 2012, the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
(1) testimony by an eligible adult, of an out of

court statement made by the eligible adult, that he or she complained of such act to another; and

(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by

the eligible adult, describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a physical act, abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation perpetrated upon or against the eligible adult.

(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:
(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside

the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and

(2) The eligible adult either:
(A) testifies at the proceeding; or
(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is

corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement.

(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the condition of the eligible adult, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factor.
(d) The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of his or her intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.
(Source: P.A. 97-1108, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1109, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13; 98-49, eff. 7-1-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-10.4)
Sec. 115-10.4. Admissibility of prior statements when witness is deceased.
(a) A statement not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is deceased and if the court determines that:
(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a

material fact; and

(2) the statement is more probative on the point for

which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and

(3) the general purposes of this Section and the

interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

(b) A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of the statement, including the name of the declarant.
(c) Unavailability as a witness under this Section is limited to the situation in which the declarant is deceased.
(d) Any prior statement that is sought to be admitted under this Section must have been made by the declarant under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding and been subject to cross-examination by the adverse party.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall render a prior statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because the statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth in this Section.
(Source: P.A. 94-53, eff. 6-17-05.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-10.5)
Sec. 115-10.5. Hearsay exception regarding safe zone testimony.
(a) In any prosecution for any offense charged as a violation of Section 407 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, or Section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule any testimony by any qualified individual regarding the status of any property as:
(1) a truck stop or safety rest area, or
(2) a school or conveyance owned, leased or

contracted by a school to transport students to or from school, or

(3) residential property owned, operated, and managed

by a public housing agency, or

(4) a public park, or
(5) the real property comprising any church,

synagogue, or other building, structure, or place used primarily for religious worship, or

(6) the real property comprising any of the following

places, buildings, or structures used primarily for housing or providing space for activities for senior citizens: nursing homes, assisted-living centers, senior citizen housing complexes, or senior centers oriented toward daytime activities.

(b) As used in this Section, "qualified individual" means any person who (i) lived or worked within the territorial jurisdiction where the offense took place when the offense took place; and (ii) is familiar with various public places within the territorial jurisdiction where the offense took place when the offense took place.
(c) For the purposes of this Section, "qualified individual" includes any peace officer, or any member of any duly organized State, county, or municipal peace unit, assigned to the territorial jurisdiction where the offense took place when the offense took place.
(d) This Section applies to all prosecutions pending at the time this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly takes effect and to all prosecutions commencing on or after its effective date.
(Source: P.A. 94-556, eff. 9-11-05.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-10.6)
Sec. 115-10.6. (Repealed).
(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13. Repealed by P.A. 99-243, eff. 8-3-15.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-10.7)
Sec. 115-10.7. (Repealed).
(Source: P.A. 96-377, eff. 8-11-09. Repealed by P.A. 99-243, eff. 8-3-15.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-11) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-11)
Sec. 115-11. In a prosecution for a criminal offense defined in Article 11 or in Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15 or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, where the alleged victim of the offense is a minor under 18 years of age, the court may exclude from the proceedings while the victim is testifying, all persons, who, in the opinion of the court, do not have a direct interest in the case, except the media.
(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-11.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-11.1)
Sec. 115-11.1. Use of "Rape". The use of the word "rape", "rapist", or any derivative of "rape" by any victim, witness, State's Attorney, defense attorney, judge or other court personnel in any prosecutions of offenses in Sections 11-1.20 through 11-1.60 or 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 is not inadmissible.
(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-12) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-12)
Sec. 115-12. Substantive Admissibility of Prior Identification. A statement is not rendered inadmissible by the hearsay rule if (a) the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing, and (b) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and (c) the statement is one of identification of a person made after perceiving him.
(Source: P.A. 83-367.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-13)
Sec. 115-13. In a prosecution for violation of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15 or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, statements made by the victim to medical personnel for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-14) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-14)
Sec. 115-14. Witness Competency. (a) Every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and no person is disqualified to testify to any matter, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is:
(1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him or her; or
(2) Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.
(c) A party may move the court prior to a witness' testimony being received in evidence, requesting that the court make a determination if a witness is competent to testify. The hearing shall be conducted outside the presence of the jury and the burden of proof shall be on the moving party.
(Source: P.A. 85-1190.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-15)
Sec. 115-15. Laboratory reports.
(a) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of the Cannabis Control Act, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, a laboratory report from the Department of State Police, Division of Forensic Services, that is signed and sworn to by the person performing an analysis and that states (1) that the substance that is the basis of the alleged violation has been weighed and analyzed, and (2) the person's findings as to the contents, weight and identity of the substance, and (3) that it contains any amount of a controlled substance or cannabis is prima facie evidence of the contents, identity and weight of the substance. Attached to the report shall be a copy of a notarized statement by the signer of the report giving the name of the signer and stating (i) that he or she is an employee of the Department of State Police, Division of Forensic Services, (ii) the name and location of the laboratory where the analysis was performed, (iii) that performing the analysis is a part of his or her regular duties, and (iv) that the signer is qualified by education, training and experience to perform the analysis. The signer shall also allege that scientifically accepted tests were performed with due caution and that the evidence was handled in accordance with established and accepted procedures while in the custody of the laboratory.
(a-5) In any criminal prosecution for reckless homicide under Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, or driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination of both, in violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or in any civil action held under a statutory summary suspension or revocation hearing under Section 2-118.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, a laboratory report from the Department of State Police, Division of Forensic Services, that is signed and sworn to by the person performing an analysis, and that states that the sample of blood, other bodily substance, or urine was tested for alcohol or drugs, and contains the person's findings as to the presence and amount of alcohol or drugs and type of drug is prima facie evidence of the presence, content, and amount of the alcohol or drugs analyzed in the blood, other bodily substance, or urine. Attached to the report must be a copy of a notarized statement by the signer of the report giving the name of the signer and stating (1) that he or she is an employee of the Department of State Police, Division of Forensic Services, (2) the name and location of the laboratory where the analysis was performed, (3) that performing the analysis is a part of his or her regular duties, (4) that the signer is qualified by education, training, and experience to perform the analysis, and (5) that scientifically accepted tests were performed with due caution and that the evidence was handled in accordance with established and accepted procedures while in the custody of the laboratory.
(b) The State's Attorney shall serve a copy of the report on the attorney of record for the accused, or on the accused if he or she has no attorney, before any proceeding in which the report is to be used against the accused other than at a preliminary hearing or grand jury hearing when the report may be used without having been previously served upon the accused.
(c) The report shall not be prima facie evidence if the accused or his or her attorney demands the testimony of the person signing the report by serving the demand upon the State's Attorney within 7 days from the accused or his or her attorney's receipt of the report.
(Source: P.A. 99-697, eff. 7-29-16.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-16)
Sec. 115-16. Witness disqualification. No person shall be disqualified as a witness in a criminal case or proceeding by reason of his or her interest in the event of the case or proceeding, as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his or her having been convicted of a crime; but the interest or conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness. A defendant in a criminal case or proceeding shall only at his or her own request be deemed a competent witness, and the person's neglect to testify shall not create a presumption against the person, nor shall the court permit a reference or comment to be made to or upon that neglect.
In criminal cases, husband and wife may testify for or against each other. Neither, however, may testify as to any communication or admission made by either of them to the other or as to any conversation between them during marriage, except in cases in which either is charged with an offense against the person or property of the other, in case of spouse abandonment, when the interests of their child or children or of any child or children in either spouse's care, custody, or control are directly involved, when either is charged with or under investigation for an offense under Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 and the victim is a minor under 18 years of age in either spouse's care, custody, or control at the time of the offense, or as to matters in which either has acted as agent of the other.
(Source: P.A. 96-1242, eff. 7-23-10; 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-17)
Sec. 115-17. Clerk; issuance of subpoenas. It is the duty of the clerk of the court to issue subpoenas, either on the part of the people or of the accused, directed to the sheriff or coroner of any county of this State. An attorney admitted to practice in the State of Illinois, as an officer of the court, may also issue subpoenas in a pending action. A witness who is duly subpoenaed who neglects or refuses to attend any court, under the requisitions of the subpoena, shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of the court. Attachments against witnesses who live in a different county from that where the subpoena is returnable may be served in the same manner as warrants are directed to be served out of the county from which they issue.
(Source: P.A. 96-485, eff. 1-1-10.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-17a)
Sec. 115-17a. Subpoenas to crime victims. In a post conviction proceeding, before the crime victim may be subpoenaed by the defendant, the defendant must first petition the court and give notice to the victim. At the hearing on the petition, the victim shall be given the opportunity to appear and object to the requested subpoena. At the request of the victim, the State's Attorney shall represent the victim in the proceeding. The court shall grant the request for the subpoena only if and to the extent it determines that the subpoena seeks evidence that is material and relevant to the post conviction hearing. For the purposes of this Section, "crime victim" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 3 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act.
(Source: Incorporates P.A. 89-291, eff. 1-1-96; 89-626, eff. 8-9-96.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-17b)
Sec. 115-17b. Administrative subpoenas.
(a) Definitions. As used in this Section:
"Electronic communication services" and "remote

computing services" have the same meaning as provided in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in Chapter 121 (commencing with Section 2701) of Part I of Title 18 of the United States Code Annotated.

"Offense involving the sexual exploitation of

children" means an offense under Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-6, 11-6.5, 11-6.6, 11-9.1, 11-14.4, 11-15.1, 11-17.1, 11-18.1, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, 11-21, 11-23, 11-25, 11-26, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or any attempt to commit any of these offenses when the victim is under 18 years of age.

(b) Subpoenas duces tecum. In any criminal investigation of an offense involving the sexual exploitation of children, the Attorney General, or his or her designee, or a State's Attorney, or his or her designee, may issue in writing and cause to be served subpoenas duces tecum to providers of electronic communication services or remote computing services requiring the production of records relevant to the investigation. Any such request for records shall not extend beyond requiring the provider to disclose the information specified in 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(2). Any subpoena duces tecum issued under this Section shall be made returnable to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Circuit in which the State's Attorney resides, or his or her designee, or for subpoenas issued by the Attorney General, the subpoena shall be made returnable to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Circuit to which the investigation pertains, or his or her designee, to determine whether the documents are privileged and whether the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive.
(c) Contents of subpoena. A subpoena under this Section shall describe the records or other things required to be produced and prescribe a return date within a reasonable period of time within which the objects or records can be assembled and made available.
(c-5) Contemporaneous notice to Chief Judge. Whenever a subpoena is issued under this Section, the Attorney General or his or her designee or the State's Attorney or his or her designee shall be required to provide a copy of the subpoena to the Chief Judge of the county in which the subpoena is returnable.
(d) Modifying or quashing subpoena. At any time before the return date specified in the subpoena, the person or entity to whom the subpoena is directed may petition for an order modifying or quashing the subpoena on the grounds that the subpoena is oppressive or unreasonable or that the subpoena seeks privileged documents or records.
(e) Ex parte order. An Illinois circuit court for the circuit in which the subpoena is or will be issued, upon application of the Attorney General, or his or her designee, or State's Attorney, or his or her designee, may issue an ex parte order that no person or entity disclose to any other person or entity (other than persons necessary to comply with the subpoena) the existence of such subpoena for a period of up to 90 days.
(1) Such order may be issued upon a showing that the

things being sought may be relevant to the investigation and there is reason to believe that such disclosure may result in:

(A) endangerment to the life or physical safety

of any person;

(B) flight to avoid prosecution;
(C) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an

investigation or unduly delaying a trial.

(2) An order under this Section may be renewed for

additional periods of up to 90 days upon a showing that the circumstances described in paragraph (1) of this subsection (e) continue to exist.

(f) Enforcement. A witness who is duly subpoenaed who neglects or refuses to comply with the subpoena shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of the court. A subpoena duces tecum issued under this Section may be enforced pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings.
(g) Immunity from civil liability. Notwithstanding any federal, State, or local law, any person, including officers, agents, and employees, receiving a subpoena under this Section, who complies in good faith with the subpoena and thus produces the materials sought, shall not be liable in any court of Illinois to any customer or other person for such production or for nondisclosure of that production to the customer.
(Source: P.A. 99-642, eff. 7-28-16.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-18)
Sec. 115-18. Employee protected. No employer shall discharge or terminate, or threaten to discharge or terminate, from his or her employment, or otherwise punish or penalize his or her employee who is a witness to a crime, because of time lost from regular employment resulting from his or her attendance at a proceeding under subpoena issued in any criminal proceeding relative to the crime. An employer who knowingly or intentionally violates this Section shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of court. This Section shall not be construed as requiring an employer to pay an employee for time lost resulting from attendance at any proceeding.
(Source: P.A. 89-234, eff. 1-1-96.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-19)
Sec. 115-19. Polygraph. In the course of a criminal trial the court shall not require, request, or suggest that the defendant submit to a polygraphic detection deception test, commonly known as a lie detector test, to questioning under the effect of thiopental sodium, or to any other test or questioning by means of a mechanical device or chemical substance.
(Source: P.A. 89-234, eff. 1-1-96.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-20)
Sec. 115-20. Evidence of prior conviction.
(a) Evidence of a prior conviction of a defendant for domestic battery, aggravated battery committed against a family or household member as defined in Section 112A-3, stalking, aggravated stalking, or violation of an order of protection is admissible in a later criminal prosecution for any of these types of offenses when the victim is the same person who was the victim of the previous offense that resulted in conviction of the defendant.
(b) If the defendant is accused of an offense set forth in subsection (a) or the defendant is tried or retried for any of the offenses set forth in subsection (a), evidence of the defendant's conviction for another offense or offenses set forth in subsection (a) may be admissible (if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence) and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant if the victim is the same person who was the victim of the previous offense that resulted in conviction of the defendant.
(c) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:
(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate

offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged

or predicate offense; or

(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.
(d) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.
(e) In a criminal case in which evidence is offered under this Section, proof may be made by specific instances of conduct as evidenced by proof of conviction, testimony as to reputation, or testimony in the form of an expert opinion, except that the prosecution may offer reputation testimony only after the opposing party has offered that testimony.
(Source: P.A. 90-387, eff. 1-1-98.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-21)
Sec. 115-21. Informant testimony.
(a) For the purposes of this Section, "informant" means someone who is purporting to testify about admissions made to him or her by the accused while detained or incarcerated in a penal institution contemporaneously.
(b) This Section applies to any criminal proceeding brought under Sections 9-1, 9-1.2, 9-2, 9-2.1, 9-3, 9-3.2, 9-3.3, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, or 20-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, in which the prosecution attempts to introduce evidence of incriminating statements made by the accused to or overheard by an informant.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d-5), in any case under this Section, the prosecution shall disclose at least 30 days prior to a relevant evidentiary hearing or trial:
(1) the complete criminal history of the informant;
(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that

the offering party has made or will make in the future to the informant;

(3) the statements made by the accused;
(4) the time and place of the statements, the time

and place of their disclosure to law enforcement officials, and the names of all persons who were present when the statements were made;

(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that

testimony or statement and, if so, the time and place of the recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names of the persons who were present at the recantation;

(6) other cases in which the informant testified,

provided that the existence of such testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or statement; and

(7) any other information relevant to the informant's

credibility.

(d) Except as provided in subsection (d-5), in any case under this Section, the prosecution shall timely disclose at least 30 days prior to any relevant evidentiary hearing or trial its intent to introduce the testimony of an informant. The court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the testimony of the informant is reliable, unless the defendant waives such a hearing. If the prosecution fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the informant's testimony is reliable, the court shall not allow the testimony to be heard at trial. At this hearing, the court shall consider the factors enumerated in subsection (c) as well as any other factors relating to reliability.
(d-5) The court may permit the prosecution to disclose its intent to introduce the testimony of an informant with less notice than the 30-day notice required under subsections (c) and (d) of this Section if the court finds that the informant was not known prior to the 30-day notice period and could not have been discovered or obtained by the exercise of due diligence by the prosecution prior to the 30-day notice period. Upon good cause shown, the court may set a reasonable notice period under the circumstances or may continue the trial on its own motion to allow for a reasonable notice period, which motion shall toll the speedy trial period under Section 103-5 of this Code for the period of the continuance.
(e) If a lawful recording of an incriminating statement is made of an accused to an informant or made of a statement of an informant to law enforcement or the prosecution, including any deal, promise, inducement, or other benefit offered to the informant, the accused may request a reliability hearing under subsection (d) of this Section and the prosecution shall be subject to the disclosure requirements of subsection (c) of this Section.
(f) (Blank).
(g) This Section applies to all criminal prosecutions under subsection (b) of this Section on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly.
(Source: P.A. 100-1119, eff. 1-1-19.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-22)
Sec. 115-22. Witness inducements. When the State intends to introduce the testimony of a witness in a capital case, the State shall, before trial, disclose to the defendant and to his or her defense counsel the following information, which shall be reduced to writing:
(1) whether the witness has received or been promised

anything, including pay, immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, or personal advantage, in exchange for testimony;

(2) any other case in which the witness testified or

offered statements against an individual but was not called, and whether the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the witness received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement; provided that the existence of such testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry;

(3) whether the witness has ever changed his or her

testimony;

(4) the criminal history of the witness; and
(5) any other evidence relevant to the credibility of

the witness.

(Source: P.A. 93-605, eff. 11-19-03.)


(725 ILCS 5/115-23)
Sec. 115-23. Admissibility of cannabis. In a prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of Section 4 of the Cannabis Control Act or a municipal ordinance for possession of cannabis that is punished by only a fine, cannabis shall only be admitted into evidence based upon:
(1) a properly administered field test; or
(2) opinion testimony of a peace officer based on

the officer's training and experience as qualified by the court.

(Source: P.A. 99-697, eff. 7-29-16.)




(725 ILCS 5/Art. 116 heading)

ARTICLE 116. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS


(725 ILCS 5/116-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 116-1)
Sec. 116-1. Motion for new trial.
(a) Following a verdict or finding of guilty the court may grant the defendant a new trial.
(b) A written motion for a new trial shall be filed by the defendant within 30 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.
(c) The motion for a new trial shall specify the grounds therefor.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)


(725 ILCS 5/116-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 116-2)
Sec. 116-2. Motion in arrest of judgment. (a) A written motion in arrest of judgment shall be filed by the defendant within 30 days following the entry of a verdict or finding of guilty. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.
(b) The court shall grant the motion when:
(1) The indictment, information or complaint does not charge an offense, or
(2) The court is without jurisdiction of the cause.
(c) A motion in arrest of judgment attacking the indictment, information, or complaint on the ground that it does not charge an offense shall be denied if the indictment, information or complaint apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution out of the same conduct.
(Source: P.A. 86-391.)


(725 ILCS 5/116-2.1)
Sec. 116-2.1. Motion to vacate prostitution convictions for sex trafficking victims.
(a) A motion under this Section may be filed at any time following the entry of a verdict or finding of guilty where the conviction was under Section 11-14 (prostitution) or Section 11-14.2 (first offender; felony prostitution) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or a similar local ordinance and the defendant's participation in the offense was a result of having been a trafficking victim under Section 10-9 (involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012; or a victim of a severe form of trafficking under the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. Section 7102(13)); provided that:
(1) a motion under this Section shall state why the

facts giving rise to this motion were not presented to the trial court, and shall be made with due diligence, after the defendant has ceased to be a victim of such trafficking or has sought services for victims of such trafficking, subject to reasonable concerns for the safety of the defendant, family members of the defendant, or other victims of such trafficking that may be jeopardized by the bringing of such motion, or for other reasons consistent with the purpose of this Section; and

(2) reasonable notice of the motion shall be served

upon the State.

(b) The court may grant the motion if, in the discretion of the court, the violation was a result of the defendant having been a victim of human trafficking. Evidence of such may include, but is not limited to:
(1) certified records of federal or State court

proceedings which demonstrate that the defendant was a victim of a trafficker charged with a trafficking offense under Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, or under 22 U.S.C. Chapter 78;

(2) certified records of "approval notices" or "law

enforcement certifications" generated from federal immigration proceedings available to such victims; or

(3) a sworn statement from a trained professional

staff of a victim services organization, an attorney, a member of the clergy, or a medical or other professional from whom the defendant has sought assistance in addressing the trauma associated with being trafficked.

Alternatively, the court may consider such other evidence as it deems of sufficient credibility and probative value in determining whether the defendant is a trafficking victim or victim of a severe form of trafficking.
(c) If the court grants a motion under this Section, it must vacate the conviction and may take such additional action as is appropriate in the circumstances.
(Source: P.A. 97-267, eff. 1-1-12; 97-897, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/116-3)
Sec. 116-3. Motion for fingerprint, Integrated Ballistic Identification System, or forensic testing not available at trial or guilty plea regarding actual innocence.
(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the performance of fingerprint, Integrated Ballistic Identification System, or forensic DNA testing, including comparison analysis of genetic marker groupings of the evidence collected by criminal justice agencies pursuant to the alleged offense, to those of the defendant, to those of other forensic evidence, and to those maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial or guilty plea which resulted in his or her conviction, and:
(1) was not subject to the testing which is now

requested at the time of trial; or

(2) although previously subjected to testing, can be

subjected to additional testing utilizing a method that was not scientifically available at the time of trial that provides a reasonable likelihood of more probative results.

Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.
(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:
(1) identity was the issue in the trial or guilty

plea which resulted in his or her conviction; and

(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a

chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect.

(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable conditions designed to protect the State's interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing process upon a determination that:
(1) the result of the testing has the scientific

potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence (i) materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence when the defendant's conviction was the result of a trial, even though the results may not completely exonerate the defendant, or (ii) that would raise a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been acquitted if the results of the evidence to be tested had been available prior to the defendant's guilty plea and the petitioner had proceeded to trial instead of pleading guilty, even though the results may not completely exonerate the defendant; and

(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method

generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.

(d) If evidence previously tested pursuant to this Section reveals an unknown fingerprint from the crime scene that does not match the defendant or the victim, the order of the Court shall direct the prosecuting authority to request the Illinois State Police Bureau of Forensic Science to submit the unknown fingerprint evidence into the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AIFIS) for identification.
(e) In the court's order to allow testing, the court shall order the investigating authority to prepare an inventory of the evidence related to the case and issue a copy of the inventory to the prosecution, the petitioner, and the court.
(f) When a motion is filed to vacate based on favorable post-conviction testing results, the State may, upon request, reactivate victim services for the victim of the crime during the pendency of the proceedings, and, as determined by the court after consultation with the victim or victim advocate, or both, following final adjudication of the case.
(Source: P.A. 98-948, eff. 8-15-14.)


(725 ILCS 5/116-4)
Sec. 116-4. Preservation of evidence for forensic testing.
(a) Before or after the trial in a prosecution for a violation of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or in a prosecution for an offense defined in Article 9 of that Code, or in a prosecution for an attempt in violation of Section 8-4 of that Code of any of the above-enumerated offenses, unless otherwise provided herein under subsection (b) or (c), a law enforcement agency or an agent acting on behalf of the law enforcement agency shall preserve, subject to a continuous chain of custody, any physical evidence in their possession or control that is reasonably likely to contain forensic evidence, including, but not limited to, fingerprints or biological material secured in relation to a trial and with sufficient documentation to locate that evidence.
(b) After a judgment of conviction is entered, the evidence shall either be impounded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court or shall be securely retained by a law enforcement agency. Retention shall be permanent in cases where a sentence of death is imposed. Retention shall be until the completion of the sentence, including the period of mandatory supervised release for the offense, or January 1, 2006, whichever is later, for any conviction for an offense or an attempt of an offense defined in Article 9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or in Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or for 7 years following any conviction for any other felony for which the defendant's genetic profile may be taken by a law enforcement agency and submitted for comparison in a forensic DNA database for unsolved offenses.
(c) After a judgment of conviction is entered, the law enforcement agency required to retain evidence described in subsection (a) may petition the court with notice to the defendant or, in cases where the defendant has died, his estate, his attorney of record, or an attorney appointed for that purpose by the court for entry of an order allowing it to dispose of evidence if, after a hearing, the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) it has no significant value for forensic science

analysis and should be returned to its rightful owner, destroyed, used for training purposes, or as otherwise provided by law; or

(2) it has no significant value for forensic science

analysis and is of a size, bulk, or physical character not usually retained by the law enforcement agency and cannot practicably be retained by the law enforcement agency; or

(3) there no longer exists a reasonable basis to

require the preservation of the evidence because of the death of the defendant; however, this paragraph (3) does not apply if a sentence of death was imposed.

(d) The court may order the disposition of the evidence if the defendant is allowed the opportunity to take reasonable measures to remove or preserve portions of the evidence in question for future testing.
(d-5) Any order allowing the disposition of evidence pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) shall be a final and appealable order. No evidence shall be disposed of until 30 days after the order is entered, and if a notice of appeal is filed, no evidence shall be disposed of until the mandate has been received by the circuit court from the appellate court.
(d-10) All records documenting the possession, control, storage, and destruction of evidence and all police reports, evidence control or inventory records, and other reports cited in this Section, including computer records, must be retained for as long as the evidence exists and may not be disposed of without the approval of the Local Records Commission.
(e) In this Section, "law enforcement agency" includes any of the following or an agent acting on behalf of any of the following: a municipal police department, county sheriff's office, any prosecuting authority, the Department of State Police, or any other State, university, county, federal, or municipal police unit or police force.
"Biological material" includes, but is not limited to, any blood, hair, saliva, or semen from which genetic marker groupings may be obtained.
(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)


(725 ILCS 5/116-5)
Sec. 116-5. Motion for DNA database search (genetic marker groupings comparison analysis).
(a) Upon motion by a defendant charged with any offense where DNA evidence may be material to the defense investigation or relevant at trial, a court may order a DNA database search by the Department of State Police. Such analysis may include comparing:
(1) the genetic profile from forensic evidence that

was secured in relation to the trial against the genetic profile of the defendant,

(2) the genetic profile of items of forensic evidence

secured in relation to trial to the genetic profile of other forensic evidence secured in relation to trial, or

(3) the genetic profiles referred to in subdivisions

(1) and (2) against:

(i) genetic profiles of offenders maintained

under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, or

(ii) genetic profiles, including but not limited

to, profiles from unsolved crimes maintained in state or local DNA databases by law enforcement agencies.

(b) If appropriate federal criteria are met, the court may order the Department of State Police to request the National DNA index system to search its database of genetic profiles.
(c) If requested by the defense, a defense representative shall be allowed to view any genetic marker grouping analysis conducted by the Department of State Police. The defense shall be provided with copies of all documentation, correspondence, including digital correspondence, notes, memoranda, and reports generated in relation to the analysis.
(d) Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.
(Source: P.A. 93-605, eff. 11-19-03.)




(725 ILCS 5/Art. 117)

ARTICLE 117. PROBATION


(725 ILCS 5/117-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 117-1)
Sec. 117-1. (Repealed).
(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)


(725 ILCS 5/117-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 117-2)
Sec. 117-2. (Repealed).
(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)


(725 ILCS 5/117-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 117-3)
Sec. 117-3. (Repealed).
(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)




(725 ILCS 5/Art. 118)

ARTICLE 118. SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT


(725 ILCS 5/118-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 118-1)
Sec. 118-1. (Repealed).
(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)


(725 ILCS 5/118-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 118-2)
Sec. 118-2. (Repealed).
(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)




(725 ILCS 5/Art. 119 heading)

ARTICLE 119. EXECUTION OF SENTENCE


(725 ILCS 5/119-1)
Sec. 119-1. Death penalty abolished.
(a) Beginning on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly, notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the death penalty is abolished and a sentence to death may not be imposed.
(b) All unobligated and unexpended moneys remaining in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly shall be transferred into the Death Penalty Abolition Fund, a special fund in the State treasury, to be expended by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, for services for families of victims of homicide or murder and for training of law enforcement personnel.
(Source: P.A. 96-1543, eff. 7-1-11.)


(725 ILCS 5/119-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 119-5)
Sec. 119-5. Execution of Death Sentence.
(a)(1) A defendant sentenced to death shall be executed

by an intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent and potassium chloride or other equally effective substances sufficient to cause death until death is pronounced by a coroner who is not a licensed physician.

(2) If the execution of the sentence of death as

provided in paragraph (1) is held illegal or unconstitutional by a reviewing court of competent jurisdiction, the sentence of death shall be carried out by electrocution.

(b) In pronouncing the sentence of death the court shall set the date of the execution which shall be not less than 60 nor more than 90 days from the date sentence is pronounced.
(c) A sentence of death shall be executed at a Department of Corrections facility.
(d) The warden of the penitentiary shall supervise such execution, which shall be conducted in the presence of 6 witnesses who shall certify the execution of the sentence. The certification shall be filed with the clerk of the court that imposed the sentence.
(d-5) The Department of Corrections shall not request, require, or allow a health care practitioner licensed in Illinois, including but not limited to physicians and nurses, regardless of employment, to participate in an execution.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection (e), the identity of executioners and other persons who participate or perform ancillary functions in an execution and information contained in records that would identify those persons shall remain confidential, shall not be subject to disclosure, and shall not be admissible as evidence or be discoverable in any action of any kind in any court or before any tribunal, board, agency, or person. In order to protect the confidentiality of persons participating in an execution, the Director of Corrections may direct that the Department make payments in cash for such services. In confidential investigations by the Department of Professional Regulation, the Department of Corrections shall disclose the names and license numbers of health care practitioners participating or performing ancillary functions in an execution to the Department of Professional Regulation and the Department of Professional Regulation shall forward those names and license numbers to the appropriate disciplinary boards.
(f) The amendatory changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of 1991 are severable under Section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes.
(g) (Blank).
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any pharmaceutical supplier is authorized to dispense drugs to the Director of Corrections or his or her designee, without prescription, in order to carry out the provisions of this Section.
(i) The amendatory changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly are severable under Section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes.
(Source: P.A. 93-379, eff. 7-24-03.)




(725 ILCS 5/Art. 120 heading)

ARTICLE 120. APPEAL BY THE STATE


(725 ILCS 5/120-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-1)
Sec. 120-1. (Repealed).
(Source: Repealed by P.A. 76-1412, eff. 9-22-69.)


(725 ILCS 5/120-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-2)
Sec. 120-2. (Repealed).
(Source: Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3615.)


(725 ILCS 5/120-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-3)
Sec. 120-3. (Repealed).
(Source: Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3615.)


(725 ILCS 5/120-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-4)
Sec. 120-4. (Repealed).
(Source: Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3615.)




(725 ILCS 5/Art. 121 heading)

ARTICLE 121. APPEAL
BY DEFENDANT


(725 ILCS 5/121-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 121-1)
Sec. 121-1. Application of article.
Unless otherwise provided by Rules of the Supreme Court this Article shall govern review in all criminal cases.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)


(725 ILCS 5/121-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 121-13)
Sec. 121-13. Pauper Appeals.
(a) In any case wherein the defendant was convicted of a felony, if the court determines that the defendant desires counsel on appeal but is indigent the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender shall be appointed as counsel, unless with the consent of the defendant and for good cause shown, the court may appoint counsel other than the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender.
(b) In any case wherein the defendant was convicted of a felony and a sentence of death was not imposed in the trial court the reviewing court, upon petition of the defendant's counsel made not more frequently than every 60 days after appointment, shall determine a reasonable amount to be allowed an indigent defendant's counsel other than the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender for compensation and reimbursement of expenditures necessarily incurred in the prosecution of the appeal or review proceedings. The compensation shall not exceed $1500 in each case, except that, in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the limits herein stated may be made if the reviewing court certifies that the payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation. The reviewing court shall enter an order directing the county treasurer of the county where the case was tried to pay the amount allowed by the court. The reviewing court may order the provisional payment of sums during the pendency of the cause.
(c) In any case in which a sentence of death was imposed in the trial court, the Supreme Court, upon written petition of the defendant's counsel made not more than every 60 days after appointment, shall determine reasonable compensation for an indigent defendant's attorneys on appeal. The compensation shall not exceed $2,000 in each case, except that, in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the limits herein stated may be made if the reviewing court certifies that the payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation. The Supreme Court shall enter an order directing the county treasurer of the county where the case was tried to pay compensation and reimburse expenditures necessarily incurred in the prosecution of the appeal or review proceedings. The Supreme Court may order the provisional payment of sums during the pendency of the cause.
(Source: P.A. 86-318; 87-580.)




(725 ILCS 5/Art. 121A heading)

ARTICLE 121A. PENDING DIRECT APPEAL AFTER DEFENDANT'S DEATH
(Source: P.A. 99-778, eff. 1-1-17.)


(725 ILCS 5/121A-1)
Sec. 121A-1. Application of Article. Unless otherwise provided by Rules of the Supreme Court, this Article shall govern pending direct appeal in all criminal cases after the death of the defendant.
(Source: P.A. 99-778, eff. 1-1-17.)


(725 ILCS 5/121A-2)
Sec. 121A-2. Pending direct appeal after the defendant's death.
(a) Whenever the prosecuting attorney learns of the death of the defendant following the entry of a final and appealable judgment but prior to the conclusion of the defendant's direct appeal from the conviction, he or she shall promptly notify the other party and file a certificate of notice of the defendant's death with the reviewing court before which the direct appeal is pending.
(b) Unless the executor or administrator of the defendant's estate or other successor in interest files a verified motion to intervene in the direct appeal within 30 days of the filing of the certificate under subsection (a) of this Section, the reviewing court shall dismiss the direct appeal without disturbing the judgment of the circuit court.
(c) If the court receives a timely petition for leave to intervene by an authorized party, the reviewing court shall permit the petitioning party to intervene in the direct appeal in place of the defendant and the direct appeal shall proceed in the same manner as if the defendant were still alive. The authority to intervene shall terminate automatically upon completion of the proceedings in the direct appeal.
(d) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to authorize the filing or continued litigation of a post-conviction petition or other collateral attack on a conviction or sentence on behalf of a deceased defendant.
(Source: P.A. 99-778, eff. 1-1-17.)




(725 ILCS 5/Art. 122 heading)

ARTICLE 122. POST-CONVICTION HEARING


(725 ILCS 5/122-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-1)
Sec. 122-1. Petition in the trial court.
(a) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary may institute a proceeding under this Article if the person asserts that:
(1) in the proceedings which resulted in his or her

conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both;

(2) the death penalty was imposed and there is newly

discovered evidence not available to the person at the time of the proceeding that resulted in his or her conviction that establishes a substantial basis to believe that the defendant is actually innocent by clear and convincing evidence; or

(3) (blank).
(a-5) A proceeding under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) may be commenced within a reasonable period of time after the person's conviction notwithstanding any other provisions of this Article. In such a proceeding regarding actual innocence, if the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.
(b) The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by affidavit. Petitioner shall also serve another copy upon the State's Attorney by any of the methods provided in Rule 7 of the Supreme Court. The clerk shall docket the petition for consideration by the court pursuant to Section 122-2.1 upon his or her receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the attention of the court.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a-5), if the petitioner is under sentence of death and a petition for writ of certiorari is filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.
When a defendant has a sentence other than death, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the post-conviction petition shall be filed no later than 3 years from the date of conviction, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.
This limitation does not apply to a petition advancing a claim of actual innocence.
(d) A person seeking relief by filing a petition under this Section must specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section. A trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this Article.
(e) A proceeding under this Article may not be commenced on behalf of a defendant who has been sentenced to death without the written consent of the defendant, unless the defendant, because of a mental or physical condition, is incapable of asserting his or her own claim.
(f) Only one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article without leave of the court. Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. For purposes of this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.
(Source: P.A. 100-574, eff. 6-1-18; 101-411, eff. 8-16-19.)


(725 ILCS 5/122-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-2)
Sec. 122-2. Contents of petition.
The petition shall identify the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, give the date of the rendition of the final judgment complained of, and clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were violated. The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached. The petition shall identify any previous proceedings that the petitioner may have taken to secure relief from his conviction. Argument and citations and discussion of authorities shall be omitted from the petition.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)


(725 ILCS 5/122-2.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-2.1)
Sec. 122-2.1. (a) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section.
(1) If the petitioner is under sentence of death and

is without counsel and alleges that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so requested, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel.

(2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment

and the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.

(b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this Section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4 through 122-6. If the petitioner is under sentence of death, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration and hearing within one year of the filing of the petition. Continuances may be granted as the court deems appropriate.
(c) In considering a petition pursuant to this Section, the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding and any transcripts of such proceeding.
(Source: P.A. 93-605, eff. 11-19-03.)


(725 ILCS 5/122-2.2)
Sec. 122-2.2. Intellectual disability and post-conviction relief.
(a) In cases where no determination of an intellectual disability was made and a defendant has been convicted of first-degree murder, sentenced to death, and is in custody pending execution of the sentence of death, the following procedures shall apply:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or

rule of court, a defendant may seek relief from the death sentence through a petition for post-conviction relief under this Article alleging that the defendant was a person with an intellectual disability as defined in Section 114-15 at the time the offense was alleged to have been committed.

(2) The petition must be filed within 180 days of the

effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly or within 180 days of the issuance of the mandate by the Illinois Supreme Court setting the date of execution, whichever is later.

(b) All other provisions of this Article governing petitions for post-conviction relief shall apply to a petition for post-conviction relief alleging an intellectual disability.
(Source: P.A. 99-78, eff. 7-20-15; 99-143, eff. 7-27-15.)


(725 ILCS 5/122-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-3)
Sec. 122-3. Waiver of claims.
Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)


(725 ILCS 5/122-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-4)
Sec. 122-4. Pauper Petitions. If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to Section 122-2.1, and alleges that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the court may order that the petitioner be permitted to proceed as a poor person and order a transcript of the proceedings delivered to petitioner in accordance with Rule of the Supreme Court. If the petitioner is without counsel and alleges that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so requested, and the petition is not dismissed pursuant to Section 122-2.1, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel. A petitioner who is a prisoner in an Illinois Department of Corrections facility who files a pleading, motion, or other filing that purports to be a legal document seeking post-conviction relief under this Article against the State, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Prisoner Review Board, or any of their officers or employees in which the court makes a specific finding that the pleading, motion, or other filing that purports to be a legal document is frivolous shall not proceed as a poor person and shall be liable for the full payment of filing fees and actual court costs as provided in Article XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure.
A Circuit Court or the Illinois Supreme Court may appoint the State Appellate Defender to provide post-conviction representation in a case in which the defendant is sentenced to death. Any attorney assigned by the Office of the State Appellate Defender to provide post-conviction representation for indigent defendants in cases in which a sentence of death was imposed in the trial court may, from time to time submit bills and time sheets to the Office of the State Appellate Defender for payment of services rendered and the Office of the State Appellate Defender shall pay bills from funds appropriated for this purpose in accordance with rules promulgated by the State Appellate Defender.
The court, at the conclusion of the proceedings upon receipt of a petition by the appointed counsel, shall determine a reasonable amount to be allowed an indigent defendant's counsel other than the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender for compensation and reimbursement of expenditures necessarily incurred in the proceedings. The compensation shall not exceed $500 in each case, except that, in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the limits herein stated may be made if the trial court certifies that the payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation, and the amount is approved by the chief judge of the circuit. The court shall enter an order directing the county treasurer of the county where the case was tried to pay the amount thereby allowed by the court. The court may order the provisional payment of sums during the pendency of the cause.
(Source: P.A. 90-505, eff. 8-19-97.)


(725 ILCS 5/122-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-5)
Sec. 122-5. Proceedings on petition.) Within 30 days after the making of an order pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 122-2.1, or within such further time as the court may set, the State shall answer or move to dismiss. In the event that a motion to dismiss is filed and denied, the State must file an answer within 20 days after such denial. No other or further pleadings shall be filed except as the court may order on its own motion or on that of either party. The court may in its discretion grant leave, at any stage of the proceeding prior to entry of judgment, to withdraw the petition. The court may in its discretion make such order as to amendment of the petition or any other pleading, or as to pleading over, or filing further pleadings, or extending the time of filing any pleading other than the original petition, as shall be appropriate, just and reasonable and as is generally provided in civil cases.
(Source: P.A. 83-942.)


(725 ILCS 5/122-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-6)
Sec. 122-6. Disposition in trial court.
The court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence. In its discretion the court may order the petitioner brought before the court for the hearing. If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge as may be necessary and proper.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)


(725 ILCS 5/122-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-7)
Sec. 122-7. Any final judgment entered upon such petition shall be reviewed in a manner pursuant to the rules of the Supreme Court.
(Source: P.A. 79-917.)


(725 ILCS 5/122-8)
Sec. 122-8. (Repealed).
(Source: P.A. 83-942. Repealed by P.A. 96-1200, eff. 7-22-10.)


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