2010 Illinois Code CHAPTER 720 CRIMINAL OFFENSES 720 ILCS 5/ Criminal Code of 1961. Title II - Principles Of Criminal Liability
(720 ILCS 5/Tit. II heading)
TITLE II. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
(720 ILCS 5/Art. 4 heading)
ARTICLE 4. CRIMINAL ACT AND MENTAL STATE
(720 ILCS 5/4‑1)(from Ch. 38, par. 4‑1) Sec. 4‑1. Voluntary act. A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically capable of performing. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4‑2)(from Ch. 38, par. 4‑2) Sec. 4‑2. Possession as voluntary act. Possession is a voluntary act if the offender knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient time to have been able to terminate his possession. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4‑3)(from Ch. 38, par. 4‑3) Sec. 4‑3. Mental state. (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states described in Sections 4‑‑4 through 4‑‑7. (b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4‑‑4, 4‑‑5 or 4‑‑6 is applicable. (c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an offense, is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as such. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4‑4)(from Ch. 38, par. 4‑4) Sec. 4‑4. Intent. A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4‑5)(from Ch. 38, par. 4‑5) Sec. 4‑5. Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of: (a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or
her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.
(b) The result of his or her conduct, described by
the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.
Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the term "willfully", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning. When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally. (Source: P.A. 96‑710, eff. 1‑1‑10.)
(720 ILCS 5/4‑6)(from Ch. 38, par. 4‑6) Sec. 4‑6. Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when that person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the term "wantonly", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning. (Source: P.A. 96‑710, eff. 1‑1‑10.)
(720 ILCS 5/4‑7)(from Ch. 38, par. 4‑7) Sec. 4‑7. Negligence. A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when that person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. (Source: P.A. 96‑710, eff. 1‑1‑10.)
(720 ILCS 5/4‑8)(from Ch. 38, par. 4‑8) Sec. 4‑8. Ignorance or mistake. (a) A person's ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or law, except as provided in Section 4‑3(c) above, is a defense if it negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. (b) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute an offense is a defense if: (1) The offense is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to him, and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or (2) He acts in reliance upon a statute which later is determined to be invalid; or (3) He acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of an Illinois Appellate or Supreme Court, or a United States appellate court later overruled or reversed; (4) He acts in reliance upon an official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the offense, made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute. (c) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or reasonable belief, described in this Section 4‑‑8 is a defense to the offense charged, he may be convicted of an included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be. (d) A defense based upon this Section 4‑‑8 is an affirmative defense. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4‑9)(from Ch. 38, par. 4‑9) Sec. 4‑9. Absolute liability. A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4‑4 through 4‑7 if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $1,000, or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described. (Source: P.A. 96‑1198, eff. 1‑1‑11.)
(720 ILCS 5/Art. 5 heading)
ARTICLE 5. PARTIES TO CRIME
(720 ILCS 5/5‑1)(from Ch. 38, par. 5‑1) Sec. 5‑1. Accountability for conduct of another. A person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in Section 5‑‑2, or both. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/5‑2)(from Ch. 38, par. 5‑2) Sec. 5‑2. When accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when: (a) having a mental state described by the statute
defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state;
(b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her
so accountable; or
(c) either before or during the commission of an
offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.
When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when determining accountability. A person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if: (1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed; (2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct
was inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) before the commission of the offense, he or she
terminates his or her effort to promote or facilitate that commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly deprives his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that commission, (ii) gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
(Source: P.A. 96‑710, eff. 1‑1‑10.)
(720 ILCS 5/5‑3)(from Ch. 38, par. 5‑3) Sec. 5‑3. Separate conviction of person accountable. A person who is legally accountable for the conduct of another which is an element of an offense may be convicted upon proof that the offense was committed and that he was so accountable, although the other person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted, or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, or is not amenable to justice, or has been acquitted. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/5‑4)(from Ch. 38, par. 5‑4) Sec. 5‑4. Responsibility of corporation. (a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the commission of an offense if, but only if: (1) The offense is a misdemeanor, or is defined by Sections 11‑20, 11‑20.1 or 24‑1 of this Code, or Section 44 of the "Environmental Protection Act", approved June 29, 1970, as amended or is defined by another statute which clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation; and an agent of the corporation performs the conduct which is an element of the offense while acting within the scope of his or her office or employment and in behalf of the corporation, except that any limitation in the defining statute, concerning the corporation's accountability for certain agents or under certain circumstances, is applicable; or (2) The commission of the offense is authorized, requested, commanded, or performed, by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent who is acting within the scope of his or her employment in behalf of the corporation. (b) A corporation's proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the conduct which is the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offense, is a defense to a prosecution for any offense to which Subsection (a) (1) refers, other than an offense for which absolute liability is imposed. This Subsection is inapplicable if the legislative purpose of the statute defining the offense is inconsistent with the provisions of this Subsection. (c) For the purpose of this Section: (1) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee, or other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation. (2) "High managerial agent" means an officer of the corporation, or any other agent who has a position of comparable authority for the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision of subordinate employees in a managerial capacity. (Source: P.A. 85‑1440.)
(720 ILCS 5/5‑5)(from Ch. 38, par. 5‑5) Sec. 5‑5. Accountability for conduct of corporation. (a) A person is legally accountable for conduct which is an element of an offense and which, in the name or in behalf of a corporation, he performs or causes to be performed, to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in his own name or behalf. (b) An individual who has been convicted of an offense by reason of his legal accountability for the conduct of a corporation is subject to the punishment authorized by law for an individual upon conviction of such offense, although only a lesser or different punishment is authorized for the corporation. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/Art. 6 heading)
ARTICLE 6. RESPONSIBILITY
(720 ILCS 5/6‑1)(from Ch. 38, par. 6‑1) Sec. 6‑1. Infancy. No person shall be convicted of any offense unless he had attained his 13th birthday at the time the offense was committed. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/6‑2)(from Ch. 38, par. 6‑2) Sec. 6‑2. Insanity. (a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. (b) The terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. (c) A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill. (d) For purposes of this Section, "mental illness" or "mentally ill" means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior. (e) When the defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity. However, the burden of proof remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of each of the offenses charged, and, in a jury trial where the insanity defense has been presented, the jury must be instructed that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proving that he is not guilty by reason of insanity until and unless it has first determined that the State has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense with which he is charged. (Source: P.A. 89‑404, eff. 8‑20‑95; 90‑593, eff. 6‑19‑98.)
(720 ILCS 5/6‑3)(from Ch. 38, par. 6‑3) Sec. 6‑3. Intoxicated or drugged condition. A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally responsible for conduct unless such condition is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (Source: P.A. 92‑466, eff. 1‑1‑02.)
(720 ILCS 5/6‑4)(from Ch. 38, par. 6‑4) Sec. 6‑4. Affirmative Defense. A defense based upon any of the provisions of Article 6 is an affirmative defense except that mental illness is not an affirmative defense, but an alternative plea or finding that may be accepted, under appropriate evidence, when the affirmative defense of insanity is raised or the plea of guilty but mentally ill is made. (Source: P.A. 82‑553.)
(720 ILCS 5/Art. 7 heading)
ARTICLE 7. JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE; EXONERATION
(720 ILCS 5/7‑1)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑1) Sec. 7‑1. Use of force in defense of person. (a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony. (b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7‑4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct. (Source: P.A. 93‑832, eff. 7‑28‑04.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑2)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑2) Sec. 7‑2. Use of force in defense of dwelling. (a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a dwelling. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if: (1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent,
riotous, or tumultuous manner, and he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent an assault upon, or offer of personal violence to, him or another then in the dwelling, or
(2) He reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent the commission of a felony in the dwelling.
(b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7‑4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct. (Source: P.A. 93‑832, eff. 7‑28‑04.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑3)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑3) Sec. 7‑3. Use of force in defense of other property. (a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference with either real property (other than a dwelling) or personal property, lawfully in his possession or in the possession of another who is a member of his immediate family or household or of a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. (b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7‑4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct. (Source: P.A. 93‑832, eff. 7‑28‑04.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑4)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑4) Sec. 7‑4. Use of force by aggressor. The justification described in the preceding Sections of this Article is not available to a person who: (a) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forcible felony; or (b) Initially provokes the use of force against himself, with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or (c) Otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself, unless: (1) Such force is so great that he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or (2) In good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑5)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑5) Sec. 7‑5. Peace officer's use of force in making arrest. (a) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. However, he is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or such other person, or when he reasonably believes both that: (1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; and (2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony which involves the infliction or threatened infliction of great bodily harm or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay. (b) A peace officer making an arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if the warrant were valid, unless he knows that the warrant is invalid. (Source: P.A. 84‑1426.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑6)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑6) Sec. 7‑6. Private person's use of force in making arrest. (a) A private person who makes, or assists another private person in making a lawful arrest is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if he were summoned or directed by a peace officer to make such arrest, except that he is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or another. (b) A private person who is summoned or directed by a peace officer to assist in making an arrest which is unlawful, is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if the arrest were lawful, unless he knows that the arrest is unlawful. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑7)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑7) Sec. 7‑7. Private person's use of force in resisting arrest. A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he knows is being made either by a peace officer or by a private person summoned and directed by a peace officer to make the arrest, even if he believes that the arrest is unlawful and the arrest in fact is unlawful. (Source: P.A. 86‑1475.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑8)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑8) Sec. 7‑8. Force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. (a) Force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, within the meaning of Sections 7‑5 and 7‑6 includes: (1) The firing of a firearm in the direction of the
person to be arrested, even though no intent exists to kill or inflict great bodily harm; and
(2) The firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which
the person to be arrested is riding.
(b) A peace officer's discharge of a firearm using ammunition designed to disable or control an individual without creating the likelihood of death or great bodily harm shall not be considered force likely to cause death or great bodily harm within the meaning of Sections 7‑5 and 7‑6. (Source: P.A. 90‑138, eff. 1‑1‑98.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑9)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑9) Sec. 7‑9. Use of force to prevent escape. (a) A peace officer or other person who has an arrested person in his custody is justified in the use of such force to prevent the escape of the arrested person from custody as he would be justified in using if he were arresting such person. (b) A guard or other peace officer is justified in the use of force, including force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, which he reasonably believes to be necessary to prevent the escape from a penal institution of a person whom the officer reasonably believes to be lawfully detained in such institution under sentence for an offense or awaiting trial or commitment for an offense. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑10)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑10) Sec. 7‑10. Execution of death sentence. A public officer who, in the exercise of his official duty, puts a person to death pursuant to a sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction, is justified if he acts in accordance with the sentence pronounced and the law prescribing the procedure for execution of a death sentence. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑11)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑11) Sec. 7‑11. Compulsion. (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct that he or she performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he or she reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or her, or upon his or her spouse or child, if he or she does not perform that conduct. (b) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion, except that stated in subsection (a). (Source: P.A. 96‑710, eff. 1‑1‑10.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑12)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑12) Sec. 7‑12. Entrapment. A person is not guilty of an offense if his or her conduct is incited or induced by a public officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of that person. However, this Section is inapplicable if the person was pre‑disposed to commit the offense and the public officer or employee, or agent of either, merely affords to that person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense. (Source: P.A. 89‑332, eff. 1‑1‑96.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑13)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑13) Sec. 7‑13. Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/7‑14)(from Ch. 38, par. 7‑14) Sec. 7‑14. Affirmative defense. A defense of justifiable use of force, or of exoneration, based on the provisions of this Article is an affirmative defense. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
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