2025 Code of Georgia
Title 37 - Mental Health (Chs. 1 — 13)
Chapter 7 - Hospitalization and Treatment of Alcoholics, Drug Dependent Individuals, and Drug Abusers (Arts. 1 — 6)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Purpose of procedural safeguards contained in chapter. —

Procedural safeguards contained in O. C. G. A. § 37-7-1 et seq. are obviously for purpose of ensuring that individual rights are not eroded in name of medical expediency. Kendrick v. Metropolitan Psychiatric Ctr., Inc., 158 Ga. App. 839, 282 S. E.2d 361, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2438 (1981).

Procedural safeguards of chapter must be strictly complied with. —

O. C. G. A. § 37-7-1 et seq. involves extremely sensitive area of deprivation of liberty and requires strict compliance with all of its procedures. Kendrick v. Metropolitan Psychiatric Ctr., Inc., 158 Ga. App. 839, 282 S. E.2d 361, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2438 (1981).

Reason for requiring rigid adherence to designated procedures. —

Rigid adherence to designated procedures is especially important in light of relative ease with which one may be taken from first interview with a physician to involuntary confinement and treatment. Kendrick v. Metropolitan Psychiatric Ctr., Inc., 158 Ga. App. 839, 282 S. E.2d 361, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2438 (1981).

Provisions for contesting confinement. —

O. C. G. A. § 37-7-1 et seq. amply provides for the invocation of legal measures to contest the validity of confinement. Watkins v. Roche, 529 F. Supp. 327, 1981 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (S. D. Ga. 1981).

Rationale for limited liability of private physicians. —

Throughout the various provisions of O. C. G. A. § 37-7-1 et seq., the judgment of the private physician is sought, but is not required. Rather, it is the judgment of the state’s physicians that is determinative of the question of further examination or treatment. To open physicians to federal suit by decreeing that the physicians act for the state in making purely medical decisions would effectively chill the use, and accompanying benefit, of a private physician’s judgment in an emergency situation simply because the physician may not be willing to give it for fear of being exposed to a lawsuit. The disadvantage in this is that the statutory alternatives do not provide the immediacy of action of a physician’s certificate. Watkins v. Roche, 529 F. Supp. 327, 1981 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (S. D. Ga. 1981).

Treatment time limits. —

O. C. G. A. § 37-7-1 et seq. prescribes maximum time limits for steps leading to treatment, but no minimums. If two physicians agree that an individual needs involuntary treatment as contemplated by that chapter, the elapsed time between the patient’s arrival at the first doctor’s office or at the hospital and onset of involuntary psychiatric treatment could be no more than the time occupied by two interviews, which is the outer limits of due process and cannot be reduced by procedural safeguards any further. Kendrick v. Metropolitan Psychiatric Ctr., Inc., 158 Ga. App. 839, 282 S. E.2d 361, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2438 (1981).

Research References & Practice Aids

Cross references.

Drug Abuse Treatment and Education Act, § 26-5-1 et seq.

Disabled Adults and Elder Persons Protection Act, § 30-5-1 et seq.

Abuse or exploitation of residents in long-term care facilities, § 31-8-80 et seq.

Bill of rights for residents of long-term care facilities, § 31-8-100 et seq.

Administrative rules and regulations.

Adult Crisis Stabilization Units, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, Rule 82-3-1-.01 et seq.

Child and Adolescent Crisis Stabilization Units, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, Rule 82-4-1-.01 et seq.

Treatment, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, Patient's Right, Rule 82-5-1-.03.

Law reviews.

For article, “The Olmstead Decision: The Road to Dignity and Freedom,” see 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 651 (2010).

For article, “Olmstead’s Promise and Cohousing’s Potential,” see 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 663 (2010).

For article, “From the Inside Out: Personal Perspectives of Six Georgians on Their Institutional Experiences,” see 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 741 (2010).

For article, “The Constitutional Right to Community Services,” see 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 763 (2010).

For article, “Reconsidering Makin v. Hawaii: The Right of Medicaid Beneficiaries to Home-Based Services as an Alternative to Institutionalization,” see 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 803 (2010).

For article, “The Potential and Risks of Relying on Title II’s Integration Mandate to Close Segregated Institutions,” see 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 855 (2010).

For article, “Beyond Residential Segregation: The Application of Olmstead to Segregated Employment Settings,” see 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 875 (2010).

For article, “From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care: Lessons from Medicaid’s History,” see 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 937 (2010).

For note on 1991 amendments to this chapter, see 8 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 121 (1992).

For note, “Deinstitutionalization: Georgia’s Progress in Developing and Implementing an ‘Effectively Working Plan’ as Required by Olmstead v. L. C. ex rel,” see 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 699 (2009).

Hierarchy Notes:

O. C. G. A. Title 37