2022 Georgia Code
Title 17 - Criminal Procedure
Chapter 10 - Sentence and Punishment
Article 2 - Death Penalty Generally
§ 17-10-30. Procedure for Imposition of Death Penalty Generally

1. The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft hijacking or treason in any case.
2. In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:
   1. The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;
   2. The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary in any degree or arson in the first degree;
   3. The offender, by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping, knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
   4. The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
   5. The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor-general, or former district attorney, solicitor, or solicitor-general was committed during or because of the exercise of his or her official duties;
   6. The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person;
   7. The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;
   8. The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee, or firefighter while engaged in the performance of his official duties;
   9. The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement;
   10. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another;
   11. The offense of murder, rape, or kidnapping was committed by a person previously convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, or aggravated sexual battery; or
   12. The murder was committed during an act of domestic terrorism.
3. The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (b) of this Code section is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.

History. Code 1933, § 27-2534.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 159, § 3; Ga. L. 1996, p. 748, § 15; Ga. L. 2002, p. 660, § 4; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1259, § 11; Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 22/HB 1059; Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 8-11/HB 1176; Ga. L. 2017, p. 536, § 4-1/HB 452.

Cross references.

Time limitation on prosecutions for crimes punishable by death, § 17-3-1 .

Presentence hearings in death penalty cases, § 17-10-2 .

Code Commission notes.

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2006, the period was deleted at the end of paragraph (b)(10).

Editor’s notes.

Ga. L. 1996, p. 748, § 27, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an Act approved February 11, 1854 (Ga. L. 1854, p. 281), which abolished the office of solicitor of the City Court of Savannah, now the State Court of Chatham County, and transferred responsibility for the prosecution of criminal cases in said court to the solicitor general (now the district attorney) for the Eastern Judicial Circuit is confirmed. It shall be the duty of said district attorney to prosecute all criminal actions in said state court until otherwise specifically provided by law.”

Ga. L. 1996, p. 748, § 28, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The provisions of this Act shall not affect the powers, duties, or responsibilities of the district attorney as successor to the office of solicitor general under the constitution, statutes, and common law of this state as provided by Code Section 15-18-1.”

Ga. L. 1996, p. 748, § 29, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “Except as otherwise authorized in this Act, on and after July 1, 1996, any reference in general law or in any local Act to the solicitor of a state court shall mean and shall be deemed to mean the solicitor-general of such state court.”

Ga. L. 1996, p. 748, § 30, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “(b) The provisions of paragraph (3) of Code Section 15-18-62, relating to the qualifications for the office of solicitor-general of a state court, shall apply to any person elected or appointed to such office after July 1, 1996. Any person holding such office on July 1, 1996, may continue to hold such office for the remainder of the term to which such person was elected or appointed notwithstanding the fact that such person has not been a member of the State Bar of Georgia for three years if such person is otherwise qualified to hold the office of solicitor-general.”

Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1(a)/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense, of whatever degree or level, pursuant to this Act.”

Law reviews.

For article opposing capital punishment in Georgia, see 15 Ga. St. B.J. 159 (1979).

For article supporting capital punishment in Georgia, see 16 Ga. St. B.J. 48 (1979).

For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of evidence from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 63 (1980).

For article, “Constitutional Criminal Litigation,” see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 993 (1981).

For article, “Executing Those Who Kill Blacks: An Unusual Case Study,” see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 911 (1986).

For survey of 1985 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional criminal procedure, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1275 (1986).

For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986).

For article, “The Search for a Consistent and Constitutional Death Penalty Law in Georgia,” see 6 Ga. State U.L. Rev. 369 (1990).

For article, “Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?,” see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 695 (1991).

For article on resolving the conflict in the capital sentencing cases, see 26 Ga. L. Rev. 323 (1992).

For annual survey article, “Georgia Death Penalty Law,” see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 29 (2000).

For survey article on death penalty decisions from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 175 (2003).

For annual survey of death penalty law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 197 (2004).

For annual survey of death penalty decisions, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 139 (2005).

For review of death penalty cases, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (2006).

For annual survey of death penalty law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (2006).

For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 11 (2006).

For survey article on death penalty law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 105 (2008).

For annual survey on death penalty law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 99 (2009).

For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 290 (2012).

For annual survey on death penalty, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 93 (2013).

For article, “Death Penalty,” see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 51 (2014).

For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 17 (2017).

For comment, “Making the Murderer’s Voyeurs: The Influence of Violent Crime Exposure, Social Movements, and Desensitization on Georgia’s Treatment of the Death Penalty,” see 72 Mercer L. Rev. 883 (2021).

For note discussing statutory aggravating circumstances and the death penalty, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 1443 (1984).

For note “McCleskey v. Kemp: An Equal Protection Challenge to Capital Punishment,” see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 675 (1988).

For symposium on the death penalty, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 329 (1998).

For note, “Reviewing the Georgia Supreme Court’s Efforts at Proportionality Review,” see 39 Ga. L. Rev. 631 (2005).

For note, “Uncertain Waters: Tennard v. Dretke Provides Swells of Protection for the Mentally Deficient But May Cause Rising Tides of Frivolous Claims,” see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 1483 (2005).

For note and comment, “Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst: The Capital Defender’s Guide to Reciprocal Discovery in the Sentencing Phase of Georgia Death Penalty Trials,” see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 995 (2007).

For note, “A Promise Unfulfilled: Challenges to Georgia’s Death Penalty Statute Post Furman,” see 33 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 839 (2017).

For note, “Protecting Access to the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling, Attorney Negligence, and AEDPA,” see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 647 (2017).

For note, “Give It to Me, I’m Worth It: The Need to Amend Georgia’s Record Restriction Statute to Provide Ex-Offenders with a Second Chance in the Employment Sector,” see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 267 (2017).

For comment analyzing and criticizing the 1973 capital punishment statute in light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726 , 33 L. Ed. 2 d 346 (1972), see 24 Mercer L. Rev. 891 (1973).

For comment on Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496 , 246 S.E.2d 642 , cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991, 99 S. Ct. 593 , 58 L. Ed. 2 d 666 (1978), see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 349 (1979).

For case comment, “Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements During Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trials,” see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 1191 (1987).

For comment, “Capital Punishment: New Weapons in the Sentencing Process,” see 24 Ga. L. Rev. 423 (1990).