2022 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 8 - Offenses Involving Theft
Article 2 - Robbery
§ 16-8-41. Armed Robbery; Robbery by Intimidation; Taking Controlled Substance From Pharmacy in Course of Committing Offense

1. A person commits the offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon.  The offense of robbery by intimidation shall be a lesser included offense in the offense of armed robbery.
2. A person convicted of the offense of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years.
3. 1. The preceding provisions of this Code section notwithstanding, in any case in which the defendant commits armed robbery and in the course of the commission of the offense such person unlawfully takes a controlled substance from a pharmacy or a wholesale druggist and intentionally inflicts bodily injury upon any person, such facts shall be charged in the indictment or accusation and, if found to be true by the court or if admitted by the defendant, the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 15 years.
   2. As used in this subsection, the term:
      1. “Controlled substance” means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through V of Code Sections 16-13-25 through 16-13-29.
      2. “Pharmacy” means any place licensed in accordance with Chapter 4 of Title 26 wherein the possessing, displaying, compounding, dispensing, or retailing of drugs may be conducted, including any and all portions of any building or structure leased, used, or controlled by the licensee in the conduct of the business licensed by the State Board of Pharmacy at the address for which the license was issued. The term pharmacy shall also include any building, warehouse, physician’s office, or hospital used in whole or in part for the sale, storage, or dispensing of any controlled substance.
      3. “Wholesale druggist” means an individual, partnership, corporation, or association registered with the State Board of Pharmacy under Chapter 4 of Title 26.
4. Any person convicted under this Code section shall, in addition, be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code Sections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7.

History. Laws 1833, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 791; Ga. L. 1858, p. 98, § 1; Code 1863, §§ 4287, 4288; Code 1868, §§ 4324, 4325; Code 1873, §§ 4390, 4391; Code 1882, §§ 4390, 4391; Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 83, § 1; Penal Code 1895, §§ 152, 153; Penal Code 1910, §§ 149, 150; Code 1933, §§ 26-2502, 26-2503; Ga. L. 1937, p. 490, § 1; Ga. L. 1957, p. 261, §§ 2, 3; Code 1933, § 26-1902, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1969, p. 810, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1359, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1266, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1036, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 3; Ga. L. 1999, p. 81, § 16.

Cross references.

Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over certain crimes, § 15-3-3 .

Time limitation on prosecutions for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, § 17-3-1 .

Editor’s notes.

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 2861 , 53 L. Ed. 2 d 982 (1977), held that imposition of the death penalty where the victim is not killed is in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 8. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400 , 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977), held that the rationale of Coker must be applied also to armed robbery.

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994.’ ”

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The General Assembly declares and finds:

“(1) That persons who are convicted of certain serious violent felonies shall serve minimum terms of imprisonment which shall not be suspended, probated, stayed, deferred, or otherwise withheld by the sentencing judge; and

“(2) That sentences ordered by courts in cases of certain serious violent felonies shall be served in their entirety and shall not be reduced by parole or by any earned time, early release, work release, or other such sentence-reducing measures administered by the Department of Corrections.”

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The provisions of this Act shall apply only to those offenses committed on or after the effective date of this Act; provided, however, that any conviction occurring prior to, on, or after the effective date of this Act shall be deemed a ‘conviction’ for the purposes of this Act and shall be counted in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed for any offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act.”

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “In the event any section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase of this Act shall be declared or adjudged invalid or unconstitutional, such adjudication shall in no manner affect the other sections, subsections, sentences, clauses, or phrases of this Act, which shall remain of full force and effect as if the section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase so declared or adjudged invalid or unconstitutional were not originally a part hereof. The General Assembly declares that it would have passed the remaining parts of this Act if it had known that such part or parts hereof would be declared or adjudged invalid or unconstitutional.”

Ga. L. 1998, p. 180, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The General Assembly declares and finds: (1) That the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994,’ approved April 20, 1994 (Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959), provided that persons convicted of one of seven serious violent felonies shall serve minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment which shall not otherwise be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court; (2) That in State v. Allmond, 225 Ga. App. 509 (1997), the Georgia Court of Appeals held, notwithstanding the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994,’ that the provisions of the First Offender Act would still be available to the sentencing court, which would mean that a person who committed a serious violent felony could be sentenced to less than the minimum mandatory ten-year sentence; and (3) That, contrary to the decision in State v. Allmond, it is the expressed intent of the General Assembly that persons who commit a serious violent felony specified in the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994’ shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and shall not be eligible for first offender treatment.”

Law reviews.

For article on recidivism and convictions based on nolo contendere pleas, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (1979).

For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982).

For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 159 (1994).

For comment criticizing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S. Ct. 1977 , 36 L. Ed. 2 d 714 (1973), permitting imposition of increased sentence by jury after retrial, see 23 Emory L.J. 879 (1974).