2021 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 12 - Damages
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-12-14. Unliquidated Damages Interest Act; Procedure for Demand of Unliquidated Damages in Tort Actions; When Interest May Be Recovered

1. Where a claimant has given written notice by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery to a person against whom claim is made of a demand for an amount of unliquidated damages in a tort action and the person against whom such claim is made fails to pay such amount within 30 days from the mailing or delivering of the notice, the claimant shall be entitled to receive interest on the amount demanded if, upon trial of the case in which the claim is made, the judgment is for an amount not less than the amount demanded. However, if, at any time after the 30 days and before the claimant has withdrawn his or her demand, the person against whom such claim is made gives written notice by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery of an offer to pay the amount of the claimant's demand plus interest under this Code section through the date such notice is given, and such offer is not accepted by the person making the demand for unliquidated damages within 30 days from the mailing or delivering of such notice by the person against whom such claim is made, the claimant shall not be entitled to receive interest on the amount of the demand after the thirtieth day following the date on which the notice of the offer is mailed or delivered even if, upon trial of the case in which the claim is made, the judgment is for an amount not less than the sum demanded pursuant to this Code section.
2. Any written notice referred to in subsection (a) of this Code section shall specify that it is being given pursuant to this Code section.
3. The interest provided for by this Code section shall be at an annual rate equal to the prime rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as published in statistical release H. 15 or any publication that may supersede it, on the thirtieth day following the date of the mailing of the last written notice plus 3 percent, and shall begin to run from the thirtieth day following the date of the mailing or delivering of the written notice until the date of judgment. This subsection shall apply to all civil actions filed on or after July 1, 2003.
4. Evidence or discussion of interest on liquidated damages, as well as evidence of the offer, shall not be submitted to the jury. Interest shall be made a part of the judgment upon presentation of evidence to the satisfaction of the court that this Code section has been complied with and that the verdict of the jury or the award by the judge trying the case without a jury is equal to or exceeds the amount claimed in the notice.
5. This Code section shall be known and may be cited as the "Unliquidated Damages Interest Act."

(Ga. L. 1968, p. 1156, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 395, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 681, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1394, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3; Ga. L. 2003, p. 820, § 6.)

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2003, "July 1, 2003" was substituted for "the effective date of this subsection" at the end of subsection (c).

- Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

Ga. L. 2003, p. 820, § 9, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that this Act "shall apply to all civil actions filed on or after July 1, 2003."

- For survey of developments in the Georgia torts law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 247 (1981). For article surveying recent developments in remedies in 1984-1985, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 503 (1985). For annual survey of law of torts, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2004). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 381 (2005). For note on the 2003 amendment to this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 28 (2003).

There is no requirement that judgment debtor be given actual and personal notice. Williams v. Runion, 173 Ga. App. 44, 325 S.E.2d 441 (1984).

- These provisions of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, setting forth the manner in which a plaintiff can recover prejudgment interest on unliquidated damages in a tort suit, are in derogation of common law and therefore must be strictly construed. Resnik v. Pittman, 203 Ga. App. 835, 418 S.E.2d 116 (1992).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12. - Trial court did not err in adding interest to the award before considering whether the judgment was greater than the demand for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, as § 51-12-14 had to be construed in pari materia with O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12; post-judgment interest continued to accrue under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 until the set-off became effective under O.C.G.A. § 9-13-75. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 263 Ga. App. 525, 588 S.E.2d 319 (2003).

When statutory notice required under this section is not given, award of interest cannot stand. Georgia Ports Auth. v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 156 Ga. App. 304, 274 S.E.2d 699 (1980).

After the plaintiff sent written notice for unliquidated damages to the claims manager at the defendant's insurance company and not to the defendant, this was insufficient to authorize an award of prejudgment interest and the trial court erred by entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Resnik v. Pittman, 203 Ga. App. 835, 418 S.E.2d 116 (1992).

Notice given by an employee who sued an employer and supervisors for malicious prosecution in an effort to be entitled to prejudgment interest did not comply with a strict construction of the applicable statute. Wolf Camera, Inc. v. Royter, 253 Ga. App. 254, 558 S.E.2d 797 (2002).

Notice to a party's lawyer constitutes notice to the party under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14. Bennett v. Mullally, 263 Ga. App. 215, 587 S.E.2d 385 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 820 S.E.2d 640, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (2018).

- In an automobile accident case, after an agent of the insurance carrier controlling the defendant's defense instructed the plaintiff's attorney to direct future correspondence to the agent, the defendant was estopped from asserting that compliance with such instructions did not meet the notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 since any such failure resulted from the conduct of those acting on the defendant's behalf. Hewett v. Carter, 215 Ga. App. 429, 450 S.E.2d 843 (1994).

Plaintiff's counsel's notice to the defendant by registered mail of the client's negligence claim and a separate settlement demand sent to the defendant's insurer did not comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14. Martin v. Williams, 215 Ga. App. 649, 451 S.E.2d 822 (1994).

- In a medical malpractice action, when the plaintiffs gave written notice of their claim for prejudgment interest prior to filing the original suit, they were not required to give notice again prior to filing a renewal action. Daniel v. Causey, 220 Ga. App. 589, 469 S.E.2d 839 (1996).

- Plaintiffs, husband and wife, were not entitled to prejudgment interest when the notice of demand made reference only to the husband's personal injury claim and did not include the wife's loss of consortium claim. American Golf Corp. v. Manley, 222 Ga. App. 7, 473 S.E.2d 161 (1996).

- If subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 is to be read fairly and according to its most natural and obvious import, the terms "judgment" and "sum claimed" must be treated congruently. Bullman v. Tenneco Oil Co., 197 Ga. App. 408, 398 S.E.2d 311 (1990).

- If a judgment is less than the verdict due to setoffs for payments already received by victims from tortfeasors, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 should be construed to entitle a plaintiff to interest only if the amount of the post-setoff judgment is equal to or exceeds the amount of the settlement demand. Restina v. Crawford, 205 Ga. App. 887, 424 S.E.2d 79 (1992).

The award of prejudgment interest was not authorized since the authorized verdict did not exceed the pretrial demand. Evans v. Willis, 212 Ga. App. 335, 441 S.E.2d 770 (1994).

- An award of punitive damages may not be counted in determining whether a judgment exceeded the amount of the plaintiff's demand for unliquidated damages for the purpose of assessing prejudgment interest. GMC v. Moseley, 213 Ga. App. 875, 447 S.E.2d 302 (1994); Martin v. Williams, 215 Ga. App. 649, 451 S.E.2d 822 (1994); Peters v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 220 Ga. App. 398, 469 S.E.2d 481 (1996).

Interest on unliquidated damages may not be awarded by jury but must be awarded by trial court following compliance with notice procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14. Covington v. Saxon, 163 Ga. App. 646, 295 S.E.2d 105 (1982).

Interest should not be included as part of damages by the finder of fact, whether designated eo nomine or not, since to do so would allow the recovery of double damages where interest is claimed under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14. Barbush v. Oiler, 158 Ga. App. 625, 281 S.E.2d 359 (1981).

The jury may add to the value of property destroyed a sum equal to the interest on such value, but such sum must be found and returned as damages, not as interest. Barbush v. Oiler, 158 Ga. App. 625, 281 S.E.2d 359 (1981).

When the jury finds a specific amount and adds it to the damages in the tort action, and the court both allows this increase in the damages on the part of the fact finder plus interest on the sum claimed under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, the successful plaintiff would not only receive as damages the face amount of the plaintiff's claim, but in addition would receive a sum representing interest at 7 percent per annum from the date of loss to the date of judgment locked into the face amount of the judgment and an additional amount representing interest at 7 percent per annum from a date commencing 30 days from the plaintiff's date of notice of claim to the defendant and running also to the date of judgment. Barbush v. Oiler, 158 Ga. App. 625, 281 S.E.2d 359 (1981).

While jury may add a sum equal to interest on a loss as a part of total damages, in computing interest under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 the trial judge must consider only that part of the damages which constitute "principal" in the jury award. Williams v. Runion, 173 Ga. App. 54, 325 S.E.2d 441 (1984).

- A motion for interest, filed after expiration of the term during which a judgment had been entered, provided no vehicle for the court to add interest to the judgment already entered, when there had been no motion to set aside the judgment. Moore v. Thompson, 187 Ga. App. 672, 371 S.E.2d 111 (1988).

- When the amount at issue is fixed and certain, and so liquidated, according to O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15, the recovery of prejudgment interest is appropriate. Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359 (11th Cir. 1987).

- Since the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of the Unliquidated Damages Interest Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, the plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest and the trial court abused the court's discretion by not exercising its inherent power to amend its judgment to add such interest upon motion of the plaintiff in the same term it was entered. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Snowden, 219 Ga. App. 148, 464 S.E.2d 220 (1995).

Since the decision of an arbitrator was never confirmed by the trial court and no judgment was ever entered thereon, the imposition of prejudgment interest was error as prejudgment interest never began to accrue. Kuhl v. Shepard, 226 Ga. App. 439, 487 S.E.2d 68 (1997).

Plaintiff welder and spouse were entitled to an award of prejudgment interest, in a negligence/loss of consortium action, under Georgia's Unliquidated Damages Interest Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, when their demand letter was addressed only to defendant landowner's insurer but was also sent to the landowner, via certified mail. However, the judgment for the plaintiffs was reversed due to trial court error on a jury instruction. Long Leaf Indus., Inc. v. Mitchell, 252 Ga. App. 343, 556 S.E.2d 242 (2001).

The couple was entitled to prejudgment interest in a medical malpractice action as they made a single settlement demand to either defendant, despite sending two letters, and the payment of the settlement by either party would have ended the litigation. Kniphfer v. Mem'l Health Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 256 Ga. App. 874, 570 S.E.2d 16 (2002).

Trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest to first injured party on first injured party's motion for that interest as the statute, which had to be strictly construed because it was in derogation of the common law, required that the judgment awarded be greater than the amount the party requested in settlement and that was not the situation for the first injured party. White v. Jensen, 257 Ga. App. 560, 571 S.E.2d 544 (2002).

Driver was properly required to pay interest during the two years between the first defense verdict and the trial court's ruling on the injured party's motion for a new trial because the delay was within the driver's control; acceptance of the offer to settle for $100,000 was always within the driver's control, and there was no error in the award of prejudgment interest. Bennett v. Mullally, 263 Ga. App. 215, 587 S.E.2d 385 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 820 S.E.2d 640, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (2018).

Trial court did not err in awarding pre-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 because there remained a balance on an attorney fees award under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, that survived the appeal and that was not paid by the insurer, and was no longer subsumed in a later judgment. To the extent that Restina v. Crawford, 205 Ga. App. 887 (1992) required that set-offs of prior settlements with other joint tortfeasors had to be considered in determining if the demand had been equaled or exceeded for the imposition of pre-judgment interest, such language is disapproved. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 263 Ga. App. 525, 588 S.E.2d 319 (2003).

Appellate court's determination of the amount on which an award of prejudgment interest was to be based was error because that amount included a pretrial award of attorney fees for discovery misconduct, and pre- and post-judgment interest on that award, but the award had been vacated, and it was the law of the case that the amount of that award had to be retried, so the trial court could not, on remand, find that its attorney fees award was simply no longer subsumed in the jury's verdict. Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 278 Ga. 800, 606 S.E.2d 855 (2004).

Because a stockholder failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, and prejudgment interest was not authorized by O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15, these awards entered in favor of the stockholder were reversed. Monterrey Mexican Rest. of Wise, Inc. v. Leon, 282 Ga. App. 439, 638 S.E.2d 879 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Temple v. Hillegass, 344 Ga. App. 454, 810 S.E.2d 625 (2018).

- In a negligence suit wherein a train patron was attacked and raped while exiting a train station, the trial court erred by amending its judgment and granting the train patron pre-judgment interest as the defending public transportation authority had already filed a notice of appeal, therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to amend its judgment to include the pre-judgment interest. MARTA v. Doe, 292 Ga. App. 532, 664 S.E.2d 893 (2008).

- Compliance with O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 is not a prerequisite to an award of prejudgment interest if a claim is governed by federal law. Hardaway Constructors, Inc. v. Browning, 176 Ga. App. 530, 336 S.E.2d 579 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095, 106 S. Ct. 1491, 89 L. Ed. 2d 893 (1986).

- Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 precludes a lump sum settlement offer on multiple claims, such as personal injury and loss of consortium claims. Grissett v. Wilson, 181 Ga. App. 727, 353 S.E.2d 621 (1987).

- When the original complaint contained a prayer for recovery of expenses of litigation and the evidence in support of the claim was the defendant's bad faith in the transaction, and since written notice in the form of a demand letter expressly offered to settle the entire score with all defendants for all damages, the amount of bad faith damages was correctly included in calculating the amount of the judgment for purposes of determining the plaintiffs' entitlement to interest on unliquidated damages. Windermere v. Bettes, 211 Ga. App. 177, 438 S.E.2d 406 (1993).

- After a trial court, upon remittitur, entered judgment as directed by the Court of Appeals, the trial court erred in then finding that the losing party's argument as to prejudgment interest was barred by res judicata, since the award to the plaintiff of prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 was not clearly erroneous until the Court of Appeals had reversed the earlier judgment. City of Fairburn v. Cook, 195 Ga. App. 265, 393 S.E.2d 70, cert. denied, 195 Ga. App. 265, 393 S.E.2d 70 (1990).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12, interest on a judgment continues to accrue at the rate of 12 percent per annum until paid; such post-judgment interest is a damage that the plaintiffs recover against the defendants, and is included in calculating the recovery against it for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, because post-judgment interest at 12 percent is intended to deter post-judgment delay, motions, and appeals and to bring finality to judgments or the defendant pays the price of protracted post-judgment litigation. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 263 Ga. App. 525, 588 S.E.2d 319 (2003).

Cited in George R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior Trucking Co., 532 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1982); White v. Cline, 174 Ga. App. 448, 330 S.E.2d 386 (1985); Hodges v. Effingham County Hosp. Auth., 182 Ga. App. 173, 355 S.E.2d 104 (1987); J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. Woodard, 190 Ga. App. 727, 380 S.E.2d 282 (1989); Chapman v. Hepburn, 191 Ga. App. 909, 383 S.E.2d 352 (1989); Home Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 192 Ga. App. 551, 385 S.E.2d 736 (1989); Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Three Notch Elec. Membership Corp. v. Simpson, 208 Ga. App. 227, 430 S.E.2d 52 (1993); Hicks v. Gabor, 354 Ga. App. 714, 841 S.E.2d 42 (2020).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, § 480 et seq.

- 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 93.

- Interest on damages for period before judgment for injury to, or detention, loss, or destruction of, property, 96 A.L.R. 18; 36 A.L.R.2d 337.

Interest on recovery for period before judgment in action for money loss caused by fraud or duress, 171 A.L.R. 816.

Retrospective application and effect of statutory provision for interest or changed rate of interest, 4 A.L.R.2d 932.

Conflict of laws as to interest recoverable as part of the damages in a tort action, 68 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Recovery of prejudgment interest on wrongful death damages, 96 A.L.R.2d 1104.

Date from which interest on judgment starts running, as affected by modification of amount of judgment on appeal, 4 A.L.R.3d 1221.

Allowance of prejudgment interest on builder's recovery in action for breach of construction contract, 60 A.L.R.3d 487.

Liability of insurer for prejudgment interest in excess of policy limits for covered loss, 23 A.L.R.5th 75.

Date on which postjudgment interest, under 28 USCS sec. 1961 (a), begins to accrue on federal court's award of attorneys' fees, 111 A.L.R. Fed. 615.