2021 Georgia Code
Title 32 - Highways, Bridges, and Ferries
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 32-1-3. Definitions

As used in this title, the term:

1. "Abandon" means to close permanently to public travel or to relinquish jurisdiction of a preexisting public road by official action as required by Chapter 7 of this title, thereby foreclosing the duty of future maintenance on such preexisting public road.
2. "Board" means the State Transportation Board.
3. "Borrow pit" means land from which dirt, gravel, rock, or related material will be excavated and used for a public road purpose. Such land need not be immediately adjacent or contiguous to the road or project under construction, repair, or reconstruction.
4. "Bridge" means a structure, including the approaches thereto, erected in order:
   1. To afford unrestricted vehicular passage over any obstruction in any public road, including, but not limited to, rivers, streams, ponds, lakes, bays, ravines, gullies, railroads, public highways, and canals; or
   2. To afford unrestricted vehicular passage under or over existing railroads and public roads.
5. "Commissioner" means the commissioner of transportation.
6. "Construction" means the planning, location, surveying, designing, supervising, inspecting, and actual building of a new road; or the paving, striping, restriping, modifying for safety purposes, grading, widening, relocation, reconstruction, or other major improvement of a substantial portion of an existing public road together with all activities incident to any of the foregoing.
7. "County" means either one of the several counties, any division, department, agency, authority, instrumentality, or branch thereof, or the county governing authority, that is, the judge of the probate court, board of county commissioners, county commissioner, or other county officers in charge of the roads, bridges, and revenues of the county.
8. "Dedication" means the donation by the owner, either expressly or impliedly, and acceptance by the public of property for public road purposes, in accordance with statutory or common-law provisions.
9. "Department" means the Department of Transportation.
10. "Federal-aid systems" means those public roads in Georgia comprised of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways and the National Highway System, as those terms are defined in Section 103 of Title 23 of the United States Code.
11. "Grade crossing" means a crossing at grade of a public road intersecting a track or tracks of a railroad.
12. "Grade separation structure" means an underpass or overpass as defined in this Code section.

    (12.1) "Interstate highways" means any highway which constitutes a part of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways as used in Section 103 of Title 23 of the United States Code.

13. "Let" means to award a contract to one of several persons who have submitted competitive bids therefor in response to advertisement.
14. "Limited-access road" means a public highway, road, or street for through traffic, over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access, light, view, or air by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such limited-access highway, road, or street or for any other reason.
15. "Maintenance" means the preservation of a public road, including repairs and resurfacing not amounting to construction as defined in this Code section.
16. "Municipality" means an incorporated city, the governing body of which holds at least six regular meetings each year and which for a period of one year has levied and collected an ad valorem tax on the real property in such city or has for a one-year period performed at least two of the following municipal activities and services:
    1. Furnished water service;
    2. Furnished sewage service;
    3. Furnished garbage collection;
    4. Furnished police protection;
    5. Furnished fire protection;
    6. Assessed and collected business licenses;
    7. Furnished street lighting facilities.

       The term may also refer to any division, department, agency, authority, instrumentality, or branch of a municipality. Where the context requires or otherwise indicates, the term "municipality" may also mean the municipal governing authority, that is, the mayor and council, board of aldermen, board of commissioners, or other chief legislative body of a municipality.

17. "Negotiated contract" means a contract made without formal advertising for competitive bids.
18. "Other transportation purposes" or "other public transportation purposes" means any transportation facility designed to transport people or goods, including but not limited to railroads, port and harbor facilities, air transport and airport facilities, mass transportation facilities, as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 32-9-1, transportation projects, as defined by subsection (h) of Section 2 of an Act approved March 10, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 2243), as amended, and transportation enhancement activities, as defined in Section 101 of Title 23 of the United States Code, as amended by Public Law 102-240 as it existed on January 1, 1993.However, in no event and for no purpose shall the term "other transportation purposes" or "other public transportation purposes" be deemed to include coal slurry pipelines.
19. "Overpass" means a bridge, including the approaches thereto and all appurtenances thereof, for carrying public road traffic over a railroad or another public road or for providing pedestrian walkways over a public road.
20. "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or private organization of any character.
21. "Private road" means a privately owned road or way, including any bridge thereon, which is only open for the benefit of one or more individuals and not for the general public. This term also means a road which lies on privately owned land.
22. "Proposal guaranty" means acceptable surety furnished by a bidder as a guaranty that he will enter into a contract and will furnish contract performance and payment bonds if a contract is awarded to him.
23. "Protective devices" means gates, flashing light signals, and similar devices or combinations thereof, together with necessary appurtenances, to be installed or in operation at any grade crossing and which comply with the safety standards determined by the department as being adequate at that time for the protection of traffic.
24. "Public road" means a highway, road, street, avenue, toll road, tollway, drive, detour, or other way that either is open to the public or has been acquired as right of way, and is intended to be used for enjoyment by the public and for the passage of vehicles in any county or municipality of Georgia, including but not limited to the following public rights, structures, sidewalks, facilities, and appurtenances incidental to the construction, maintenance, and enjoyment of such rights of way:
    1. Surface, shoulders, and sides;
    2. Bridges;
    3. Causeways;
    4. Viaducts;
    5. Ferries;
    6. Overpasses;
    7. Underpasses;
    8. Railroad grade crossings;
    9. Tunnels;
    10. Signs, signals, markings, or other traffic control devices;
    11. Buildings for public equipment and personnel used for or engaged in administration, construction, or maintenance of such ways or research pertaining thereto;
    12. Wayside parks;
    13. Parking facilities;
    14. Drainage ditches;
    15. Canals and culverts;
    16. Rest areas;
    17. Truck-weighing stations or check points; and
    18. Scenic easements and easements of light, air, view, and access.
25. "Right of way" means, generally, property or any interest therein, whether or not in the form of a strip, which is acquired for or devoted to a public road.
26. "Scenic easement" means a servitude devised to permit land to remain in private ownership for its normal agricultural, residential, or other use consistent with public road purposes but at the same time placing a control over the future uses of the area to maintain its scenic, landscape, sightly, or safety values for the public road which the land adjoins.
27. "State agency" means any division, department, instrumentality, branch, or other body of the state to which state governmental functions have been delegated.

    (27.1) "State roads" or "state routes" means those roads which are defined under paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-4-1.

28. "Subcontract" means a contract by which one agrees with a party to another contract to perform all or a part of such other contract.
29. "Underpass" means a bridge, including the approaches thereto and all appurtenances thereof, which provides access for a public road underneath a railroad or another public road or for a pedestrian walkway underneath a public road.
30. "Utility" means any publicly, privately, or cooperatively owned line, facility, or system for producing, transmitting, or distributing communications, power, electricity, light, heat, gas, oil products, water, steam, clay, waste, storm water not connected with highway drainage, and other similar services and commodities, including publicly owned fire and police signals and street lighting systems, which directly or indirectly serve the public. This term also means a person, municipal corporation, county, state agency, or public authority which owns or manages a utility as defined in this paragraph.
31. "Vehicle" means a device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public road.

(Code 1933, § 95A-104, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1976, p. 775, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 267, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 973, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 590, § 4; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 23; Ga. L. 1993, p. 914, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 1/SB 160; Ga. L. 2011, p. 583, § 1/HB 137.)

- For survey article on construction law for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 85 (2003). For annual survey of local government law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1882, § 684; former Civil Code 1895, § 603; former Civil Code 1910, §§ 748, 761, 768; and former Code 1933, § 95-1001, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(24)(J) or O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2(a)(3) prevents the Georgia Department of Transportation from delegating the responsibility for designing and implementing a traffic control plan to a private contractor. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766, 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005).

Sidewalk is included in term "public roads." Broadnax v. City of Atlanta, 149 Ga. App. 611, 255 S.E.2d 86 (1979).

Unopened, undeveloped, proposed roads in a subdivision do not become "public roads" solely by virtue of the process of implied dedication and acceptance. Chatham County v. Allen, 261 Ga. 177, 402 S.E.2d 718 (1991).

County, which had accepted dedication of a subdivision road in 1962 but had not completed the road or maintained it for 50 years, due to the county's mistaken belief that the road was private, was ordered to complete and maintain the road; the county's failure to complete the road was arbitrary and capricious, given the county's acceptance of subdivision plats requiring the road. As to unopened roads in the subdivision, the roads were not public under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-21(b), and the county had no obligation to maintain those unopened roads. Burke County v. Askin, 294 Ga. 634, 755 S.E.2d 747 (2014).

Word "bridge," in this section giving a right of action against a county for defective construction, means a bridge used as an instrumentality for travel along a highway and for crossing streams or ravines. Hubbard v. County of Fulton, 144 Ga. 363, 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717, 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748 and former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

- Bridge which constitutes a portion of the public road is necessarily a public bridge. Early County v. Fain, 2 Ga. App. 288, 58 S.E. 528 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 603).

- If a person owning land on both sides of a stream built a bridge across the stream for the use of the public, and charged tolls, such a bridge is a public bridge. Dougherty County v. Tift, 75 Ga. 815 (1885) (decided under former Code 1882, § 684).

- Term "bridges" includes all the appurtenances necessary to the bridge's proper use and embraces the bridge's abutments and approaches, and that which is necessary as an approach, to connect the bridge with the highway, is an essential part of the bridge itself. Howington v. Madison County, 126 Ga. 699, 55 S.E. 941 (1906); Havird v. Richmond County, 176 Ga. 722, 168 S.E. 897, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933); Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240, 172 S.E. 673 (1934); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 603; former Civil Code 1910, § 748; and former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

Public bridge includes fill or embankment in a road which constitutes the approach to a bridge and which is necessary to make access to the bridge a part of the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933) (decided under former Code 1910, § 748).

- Contiguous embankment necessary to make access to a bridge, so as to pass over the bridge, is a part of the bridge, and title to the bridge covers such an embankment, but if the embankment is not a necessary part of the bridge, but a part of the streets of the municipality, the town, and not the county, would be bound to keep the bridge in repair. Havird v. Richmond County, 176 Ga. 722, 168 S.E. 897, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

- Culvert and a bridge are not the same even though the culvert and bridge may serve the same purpose. Hubbard v. County of Fulton, 144 Ga. 363, 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717, 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Floyd County v. Stewart, 97 Ga. App. 67, 101 S.E.2d 879 (1958) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748 and former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

- Alley and an adjoining drainage culvert and ditch in which a child drowned fell within the definition of "public road" under O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(24)(N), (O). Walden v. City of Hawkinsville, F.3d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2005).

- Piping and water boxes and culverts for drainage purposes across the public roads are not "bridges" within the meaning of the law. Montgomery County v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 41 Ga. App. 130, 152 S.E. 261 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

- Word "bridge" does not include the public road leading thereto, or a drain or opening thereunder. Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240, 172 S.E. 673 (1934) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

- Defect in a bridge, which serves as the basis for liability by a county for injuries received by reason thereof, includes any condition of the bridge which renders the bridge unsafe for travelers passing over the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3 does not create liability for counties for defects in bridges. Coweta County v. Adams, 221 Ga. App. 868, 473 S.E.2d 558 (1996).

- Although a city could be liable under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) for failure to maintain a dock that collapsed, injuring the plaintiffs, because the dock fell within the definition of "public road" in O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3, there was no evidence that the city had notice of any defect in the dock, and the plaintiffs' expert affidavit did not identify any defect. Therefore, the city was properly granted summary judgment on immunity grounds. Chatham Area Transit Auth. v. Brantley, 353 Ga. App. 197, 834 S.E.2d 593 (2019).

- Summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted in the county's action to recover money had and received by the contractor after the contractor asserted that the contract, which was for road striping and which was not opened for public bidding, was for a specialized service under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(5), an exception to the public bidding requirements under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-64; however, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(6) expressly defined road striping as a form of road construction and not as a special service. Howard v. Brantley County, 260 Ga. App. 330, 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).

- Plans or designs for striping or widening a road need only be in conformity with then existing standards for striping and widening. Plans or designs do not need to address design issues outside the scope of the moderate improvements. Murray v. DOT, 240 Ga. App. 285, 523 S.E.2d 367 (1999).

- County is liable for damages resulting from a defect in a bridge, although it may appear that jurisdiction over the highway on which the bridge was located had been assumed by the Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) under the terms of the law, and that the department and not the county was guilty of negligence in the maintenance and construction of the bridge or its approaches, which caused the injury. Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

- Trial court erred by granting mandamus relief under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 with regard to a property owner seeking to compel a county to maintain roads in a subdivision because while the county had accepted dedication of the streets, the county still was vested with the discretion to decide whether to open all of the roads or close any of the roads, and the trial court was required to determine whether the county's decisions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable or a gross abuse of discretion as nowhere in the judgment was that standard articulated. Burke County v. Askin, 291 Ga. 697, 732 S.E.2d 416 (2012).

- Court erred in limiting a property owner's right to present evidence to show that the owner's access had been substantially restricted when the road on which the business fronted was changed by construction to a limited-access road. Whether a property owner has "reasonable access" to the property under the circumstances and whether the existing access was "substantially interfered with" are questions of fact to be decided by the jury. Circle K Gen., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 196 Ga. App. 616, 396 S.E.2d 522 (1990).

- Public road running through a tract of land, which was known to the purchaser at the time of purchase, is not such an incumbrance on the land as would constitute a breach of a covenant of warranty against incumbrances. Hood v. Spruill, 242 Ga. App. 44, 528 S.E.2d 565 (2000).

- Georgia Code of Public Transportation precluded a common-law cause of action against a railroad for the failure to install adequate protective devices at a grade crossing on a public road since the railroad had not been requested to do so by the appropriate governmental entity. Southern Ry. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 188 Ga. App. 623, 373 S.E.2d 774 (1988).

Railroad was entitled to summary judgment in a survivor's action claiming damages from the survivor's decedent's fatal collision with a train because the survivor failed to show that the allegedly vision-obstructing vegetation was planted or maintained in violation of any statute, code, or local ordinance and although railroads could be liable under common law negligence principles, the failure to maintain a railroad right of way was addressed by the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, specifically by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51, and the scope of those provisions encompassed railroads. Town of Register v. Fortner, 262 Ga. App. 507, 586 S.E.2d 54 (2003).

Cited in Wiles v. State, 161 Ga. App. 473, 288 S.E.2d 271 (1982); Duncan v. City of Macon, 221 Ga. App. 710, 472 S.E.2d 455 (1996); Gilbert v. City of Jackson, 287 Ga. App. 326, 651 S.E.2d 461 (2007); Toole v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Jan. 19, 2011).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 102-103, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Bridges may be a part of city streets, county roads, or the State Aid Highways System; in each case the street or road is defined as including bridges, unless a different meaning is apparent from the context. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-64 (decided under former Code 1933, § 102-103).

Merely deeding privately owned road or driveway to county will not necessarily turn it into a public road. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-37.

- Department of Transportation may not utilize motor fuel tax funds to construct walkways on bridges for fishing. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-96 (decided under former Code 1933, § 102-103).

- Department of Transportation may expend federal and state funds on transportation enhancement activities as defined in 23 U.S.C. § 101(a) in those instances where the Code of Public Transportation gives the department the authority to expend such funds, but the Department of Transportation has no authority to expend federal or state money on historic preservation, rehabilitation, and operation of historic transportation buildings, structures, or facilities (including historic railroad facilities and canals) when such buildings, structures, or facilities are not being acquired for transportation purposes. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Establishment by user of highway running longitudinally on railroad right of way, 46 A.L.R. 893.

Extent of rights in right of way acquired for power or light line, 46 A.L.R. 1463.

Power of public utility commission to require railroad company to grant or renew leases or other privileges on its right of way, 47 A.L.R. 109.

Construction or maintenance of sewers, water pipes, or the like by public authorities in roadway, street, or alley as indicating dedication or acceptance thereof, 52 A.L.R.2d 263.

Conveyance of right of way, in connection with conveyance of another tract, as passing fee or easement, 89 A.L.R.3d 767.