2021 Georgia Code
Title 19 - Domestic Relations
Chapter 8 - Adoption
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 19-8-2. Jurisdiction and Venue of Adoption Proceedings

1. The superior courts of the several counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption.
2. All petitions for adoption under this article shall be filed in the county in which any petitioner resides, except that:
   1. Upon good cause being shown, the court may, in its discretion, allow such petition to be filed in the court of the county:
      1. Of the child's domicile;
      2. In which is located any child-placing agency having legal custody of the child;
      3. Where the child was born if such petition is filed within one year of the child's birth; or
      4. In which is located the office of the department having legal custody of the child;
   2. Any individual who is a resident of any United States army post or military reservation within this state may file such petition in any county adjacent to the United States army post or military reservation; and
   3. When a child has been placed for adoption with an individual who is a resident of another state in compliance with Chapter 4 of Title 39, relating to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children; with an individual who is a resident of another state to which the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children does not apply; or with an individual who is a resident of another country, such petition shall be filed in:
      1. The court of the county where the child was born, or resides, or was residing at the time of placement;
      2. The court of the county in which is located any child-placing agency having legal custody of the child; or
      3. Superior Court of Fulton County.

(Code 1981, §19-8-2, enacted by Ga. L. 1990, p. 1572, § 5; Ga. L. 2018, p. 19, § 1-1/HB 159; Ga. L. 2021, p. 151, § 1/HB 154.)

The 2018 amendment, effective September 1, 2018, deleted ", except such jurisdiction as may be granted to the juvenile courts" following "adoption" at the end of subsection (a); substituted "for adoption under this article" for "under this chapter" in the introductory paragraph of subsection (b); substituted the present provisions of paragraph (b)(1) for the former provisions, which read: "Upon good cause being shown, the court of the county of the child's domicile or of the county in which is located any child-placing agency having legal custody of the child sought to be adopted may, in its discretion, allow the petition to be filed in that court; and"; substituted the present provisions of paragraph (b)(2) for the former provisions, which read: "Any person who has been a resident of any United States Army post or military reservation within this state for six months next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption may file the petition in any county adjacent to the United States Army post or military reservation."; and added paragraph (b)(3).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, substituted "Children; with an individual who is a resident of another state to which the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children does not apply; or with an individual who is a resident of another country," for "Children," in paragraph (b)(3), and added ", or resides, or was residing at the time of placement" at the end of subparagraph (b)(3)(A).

- For article, "An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody," see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 275 (1973). For article surveying developments in Georgia domestic relations law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (1981). For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 74-405 and former § 19-8-2, as last amended by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1182, § 1, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

In matters of adoption, superior courts have very broad discretion which will not be controlled by appellate courts except in cases of plain abuse. Johnson v. Taylor, 153 Ga. App. 15, 264 S.E.2d 512 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Proceeding instituted under this chapter is purely statutory and does not fall within classification of any cases of which Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Criswell v. Jones, 187 Ga. 55, 199 S.E. 804 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405); Herrin v. Graham, 209 Ga. 281, 71 S.E.2d 550 (1952); Hendrix v. Hunter, 214 Ga. 722, 107 S.E.2d 195 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405);(decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Natural parent is not a party defendant to adoption proceedings. Thus, the requirement that the petition for adoption be filed in the county where the adopting parents reside, as provided for in former Code 1933, § 74-405, was not in conflict with the provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) which requires that venue in civil cases be in the county where the defendants reside. Chandler v. Cochran, 247 Ga. 184, 275 S.E.2d 23, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 872, 102 S. Ct. 342, 70 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

- Venue is proper when the adoption petition has been filed in the county in which the adopting parents reside, regardless of where the natural parents reside. Spires v. Bittick, 171 Ga. App. 914, 321 S.E.2d 407 (1984) (decided under former § 19-8-2, as last amended by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1182, § 1).

Residence or domicile of child in this state is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to adoption if adoption proceeding is brought in county of adopting parents' residence. Davey v. Evans, 156 Ga. App. 698, 275 S.E.2d 769 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

- Superior court has exclusive jurisdiction in adoption matters and had jurisdiction to entertain adoption petition notwithstanding pendency of deprivation proceedings in the juvenile court involving the same child. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 422 S.E.2d 234 (1992).

Trial court did not err in concluding that the court had jurisdiction over adoption and termination of parental rights proceeding as statutory law granted the trial court jurisdiction over adoption proceedings and other proceedings that were not granted exclusively to the juvenile courts; since the juvenile courts were granted exclusive jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings, those types of matters were to be heard by the juvenile courts, but the trial court had the authority to hear adoption and other matters, such as the adoptive parents' adoption petition filed to adopt the biological parents' minor child. Snyder v. Carter, 276 Ga. App. 426, 623 S.E.2d 241 (2005).

- Trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction in a petition for adoption because the Georgia Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq., did not govern adoption proceedings. Barr v. Gregor, 316 Ga. App. 269, 728 S.E.2d 868 (2012).

- Proceeding for termination of parental rights brought for the purpose of awarding custody to the Department of Family and Children Services so that children could be placed for adoption some time in the future was not brought in connection with a petition for adoption; therefore, jurisdiction was proper in the juvenile court. In re C.D.C., 230 Ga. App. 237, 495 S.E.2d 872 (1998).

- Court, having jurisdiction, has jurisdiction to fullest extent granted the court under adoption statute, and is confronted with one paramount question, which, in all controversies or proceedings for custody of children, is welfare and best interests of child. Herrin v. Graham, 87 Ga. App. 291, 73 S.E.2d 572 (1952), overruled on other grounds, Davey v. Evans, 156 Ga. App. 698, 275 S.E.2d 769 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

- Trial court had jurisdiction over an action to terminate a father's parental rights pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2, which granted exclusive jurisdiction to superior courts in all adoption proceedings, and made venue proper in the county in which the adopting parents reside. Rokowski v. Gilbert, 275 Ga. App. 305, 620 S.E.2d 509 (2005).

- Because the evidence showed that the child's needs could be equally met in either the mother's or the grandparent's home, the trial court abused the court's discretion in terminating the mother's parental rights under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-10(a), (b)(1), (2), and § 15-11- 94(b)(4) and granting the grandmother's and the step-grandfather's petition for adoption under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2. McCollum v. Jones, 274 Ga. App. 815, 619 S.E.2d 313 (2005).

- Trial court erred in denying an aunt and uncle's petition to adopt their nephew under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-8, and should have applied O.C.G.A. § 19-8-7 as: (1) the former was not intended to be a general rule regarding the adoption of foreign children; (2) the aunt and uncle satisfied the jurisdictional and venue requirements of O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2 by filing the adoption petition in the superior court of their county of residence; and (3) as the child's aunt and uncle, they were relatives eligible to adopt under § 19-8-7(a). In re Adoption of D.J.F.M., 284 Ga. App. 420, 643 S.E.2d 879 (2007).

- Alabama Supreme Court erred in refusing to grant full faith and credit to a Georgia court's judgment of adoption making the petitioner a legal parent of the children that the petititoner and the respondent had raised together where neither the statute upon which it relied, O.C.G.A. § 19-8-5(a), nor the Georgia courts indicated that the statute was jurisdictional and, thus, there was nothing to rebut the presumption that the Georgia judgment was issued by a court with jurisdiction. V.L. v. E.L., 577 U.S. 404, 136 S. Ct. 1017, 194 L. Ed. 2d 92 (2016).

Cited in Weems v. Saul, 52 Ga. App. 470, 183 S.E. 661 (1936); Mulligan v. Wingard, 72 Ga. App. 539, 34 S.E.2d 305 (1945); Cons v. Wipert, 207 Ga. 621, 63 S.E.2d 370 (1951); Wheeler v. Howard, 212 Ga. 553, 93 S.E.2d 723 (1956); Carpenter v. Forshee, 103 Ga. App. 758, 120 S.E.2d 786 (1961); McCall v. VanPopering, 124 Ga. App. 149, 183 S.E.2d 411 (1971); Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977); Hill v. Kaminsky, 160 Ga. App. 630, 287 S.E.2d 639 (1981).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 74-405 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Although both superior and juvenile courts have jurisdiction to terminate parent-child relationship, the superior court may do so only in conjunction with an adoption proceeding which has been filed in that court. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-52 (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

- Only juvenile court can terminate parental rights without concomitant adoption proceeding in process. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-52 (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, §§ 53, 56.

- 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Persons, § 78.

- Requirements as to residence or domicil of adoptee or adoptive parent for purposes of adoption, 33 A.L.R.3d 176.