2021 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 5 - Crimes Against the Person
Article 7 - Stalking
§ 16-5-91. Aggravated Stalking

1. A person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when such person, in violation of a bond to keep the peace posted pursuant to Code Section 17-6-110, temporary restraining order, temporary protective order, permanent restraining order, permanent protective order, preliminary injunction, good behavior bond, or permanent injunction or condition of pretrial release, condition of probation, or condition of parole in effect prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection, follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.
2. Any person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years and by a fine of not more than $10,000.00. The provisions of subsection (d) of Code Section 16-5-90 apply to sentencing for conviction of aggravated stalking.

(Code 1981, §16-5-91, enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 1534, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 911, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 885, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 862, § 1.)

- Ga. L. 1998, p. 885, § 4, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 1998 amendment was applicable to conduct occurring or allegedly occurring on or after July 1, 1998.

- For review of 1998 legislation relating to crimes and offenses, see 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 62 (1998). For note on the 1995 amendment of this Code section, see 12 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 105 (1995).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Double jeopardy.

- State may not prosecute a defendant for aggravated stalking based upon the same set of facts previously used to prosecute the same defendant for violation of a domestic violence order. Kinney v. State, 223 Ga. App. 418, 477 S.E.2d 843 (1996).

When a defendant was indicted for aggravated stalking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) in violation of a protective order issued under O.C.G.A. § 19-13-4, a criminal contempt proceeding based on the same incident could trigger the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The protective order violation contained no elements not contained in the criminal offense; furthermore, the protective order specifically enjoined the defendant from surveilling the subject of the order for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the subject as also proscribed by § 16-5-91(a). Tanks v. State, 292 Ga. App. 177, 663 S.E.2d 812 (2008).

Defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated stalking based on the defendant following and contacting the victim did not merge for sentencing purposes because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant, in violation of a protective order, both followed the victim to a hotel and then contacted the victim; the act of following was complete when the defendant arrived at the premises of the hotel because at that time the defendant violated the protective order by coming within 500 feet of a place where the victim was residing. Louisyr v. State, 307 Ga. App. 724, 706 S.E.2d 114 (2011).

Defendant was prosecuted twice for stalking when the state, with a few exceptions, relied on almost exactly the same evidence to prove the defendant's alleged harassing and intimidating course of conduct at the trials for stalking and aggravated stalking, with only the additional evidence concerning violation of the no-contact order and an encounter with the victim's family during the second trial. Ward v. State, 351 Ga. App. 490, 831 S.E.2d 199 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0004, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 192 (Ga. 2020).

- Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a motion to dismiss an indictment that charged the defendant with aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), although the language used did not mention that the defendant's actions were intended to "intimidate" the victim, as such was implicit in the indictment where acts in violation of that statute which were allegedly done unlawfully were inferred to have been done for the purpose of harassing and intimidating and the definition of "harassing and intimidating" was singular pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90(a)(1). Phillips v. State, 278 Ga. App. 198, 628 S.E.2d 631 (2006).

As to the offense of aggravated stalking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), the defendant unsuccessfully argued that because the indictment incorrectly alleged violation of a protective order, rather than a bond condition, the indictment was flawed; the type of prohibition was not material, only that defendant knew that a court order barred the defendant from following or contacting the victim. Fields v. State, 281 Ga. App. 733, 637 S.E.2d 136 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

Indictment was sufficient because the indictment closely tracked the language of the aggravated stalking statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), and clearly informed the defendant that the defendant was charged with inappropriately affirmatively contacting the victim in violation of a prior order. Gaston v. State, 303 Ga. App. 502, 693 S.E.2d 841 (2010).

There was no error on the face of the indictment because the indictment set out that the defendant's postcard and letter violated the aggravated stalking statutes, in that the defendant sent the postcard and letter in violation of a no contact order and, thus, the defendant was on reasonable notice of the crime charged, aggravated stalking, and the manner in which the crime was committed - sending the postcard and letter in violation of a court order. Carlton v. State, 356 Ga. App. 1, 846 S.E.2d 175 (2020).

- Term "contact" is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning to get in touch with or to communicate; indictment that tracked the contact language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91 was not void for vagueness. Kinney v. State, 223 Ga. App. 418, 477 S.E.2d 843 (1996).

- Given that the word "follow" in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91 is not a term of art, but instead is a word of common understanding and meaning, the term includes a person going to a place to which he or she knows or believes another has gone and at which the other person may be found. Louisyr v. State, 307 Ga. App. 724, 706 S.E.2d 114 (2011).

- Act of defendant in driving slowly by the victim's home on a dead-end street where defendant had no business constituted "contact" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91. Wright v. State, 232 Ga. App. 646, 502 S.E.2d 756 (1998).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90 and aggravated stalking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) because defendant contacted the defendant's love interest in violation of a temporary restraining order, with the requisite intent, by sending two letters that the victim received after the protection order was granted, and the state established that defendant's conduct was for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the defendant's love interest; a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that such acts were intended to harass and intimidate and reasonably placed the victim in fear for the victim's safety. Maskivish v. State, 276 Ga. App. 701, 624 S.E.2d 160 (2005).

- Victim's affirmative testimony that the defendant and the victim lived together was sufficient to support a finding that they were persons living or formerly living in the same household for purposes of the defendant's convictions for family violence battery and aggravated stalking. Butler v. State, 354 Ga. App. 473, 841 S.E.2d 162 (2020).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) because the evidence authorized the jury to find that venue in Lowndes County was properly established; the victim and the victim's family resided in Lowndes County, and the victim's mother testified that the defendant had sent the letter to their residence and that the letter was retrieved from the mailbox at their residence. Bowen v. State, 304 Ga. App. 819, 697 S.E.2d 898 (2010).

- State's proof that a no contact order had been issued against the defendant regarding the victim was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of aggravated stalking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91, as proof of actual notice of the no contact order was not required. Revere v. State, 277 Ga. App. 393, 626 S.E.2d 585 (2006).

- Under the precedents existing at the time of a petitioner's first habeas petition, a claim that the petitioner could not be convicted of aggravated stalking based solely on a single violation of a protective order could have been raised based on the language of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-90(a)(1) and16-5-91(a); therefore, the petitioner's second petition was barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51. State v. Cusack, 296 Ga. 534, 769 S.E.2d 370 (2015).

- Defendant's single violation of a permanent protective order was insufficient to prove aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), which required a showing of a pattern of harassing and intimidating conduct as defined in the simple stalking statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90(a)(1). State v. Burke, 287 Ga. 377, 695 S.E.2d 649 (2010).

- Evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant engaged in a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior, which culminated in a violation of a protective order, because the jury was entitled to find from the evidence that the defendant arranged for a family friend to contact the victim, who was the defendant's spouse, since the defendant knew the defendant was prohibited from doing so, that the men planned for the friend to lure the victim to Georgia with a false offer of assistance, and that they agreed the friend would retrieve the victim from a domestic violence shelter for the purpose of driving the spouse to a hotel; by its plain terms, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91 prohibits even a single violation of a protective order, if that violation is part of a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior. Louisyr v. State, 307 Ga. App. 724, 706 S.E.2d 114 (2011).

- When O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-90 and16-5-91, regarding aggravated stalking, were amended without including a savings clause, before a final judgment was entered on defendant's convictions under the statutes, this did not invalidate those convictions because defendant was convicted of twice contacting the victim at home in violation of a condition of pretrial release, to harass and intimidate the victim, which was a crime both under the statutes' old version and under their amended version; under the amended statutes, aggravated stalking was committed when a person, "in violation of a condition of pretrial release contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person." Daker v. Williams, 279 Ga. 782, 621 S.E.2d 449 (2005).

Phone contact may be sufficient prohibited contact to establish aggravated stalking. Murden v. State, 258 Ga. App. 585, 574 S.E.2d 657 (2002).

- Condition of a pretrial bond issued in a criminal matter providing that defendant stay away from his ex-wife and her residence was appropriate and reasonable under the facts and did not constitute an abuse of the court's discretion. Camphor v. State, 272 Ga. 408, 529 S.E.2d 121 (2000).

- Defendant's stalking convictions, based on violations of a permanent restraining order (PRO), were not invalid on grounds the PRO was issued by a magistrate judge, as the chief judge of the superior court, as authorized by O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1(b)(2), had requested magistrates to assist the superior court by hearing petitions under the Georgia Stalking Statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-94. Seibert v. State, 294 Ga. App. 202, 670 S.E.2d 109 (2008).

- Neighbors of a homeowner were properly held liable for malicious prosecution because the neighbors instigated a homeowner's arrest on charges of aggravated stalking despite the homeowner's not having any deliberate contact with the neighbors and the neighbors' admission that the homewoner did not cause the neighbors fear by walking past the neighbors to the homeowner's children's bus stop. Turnage v. Kasper, 307 Ga. App. 172, 704 S.E.2d 842 (2010).

- Trial court did not err by excluding the proffered testimony of a witness concerning allegations of abuse by the victim's son against the daughter of the defendant and the victim because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the substantive molestation allegations were not relevant to the aggravated stalking charges against the defendant; the defendant was otherwise allowed to challenge the victim's motives and truthfulness without interjecting immaterial matter at the trial. Brooks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 789, 723 S.E.2d 29 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0974, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1035 (Ga. 2012).

- Trial court did not err by limiting the testimony of a witness because the defendant did not establish that the witness's testimony was relevant to the aggravated stalking offenses as charged; the excluded evidence would have been cumulative of the defendant's trial testimony that the defendant was not personally following or watching the victim. Brooks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 789, 723 S.E.2d 29 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0974, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1035 (Ga. 2012).

- Convictions for aggravated stalking did not merge as each text the defendant sent to the victim was a separate violation or unit of prosecution. Nosratifard v. State, 320 Ga. App. 564, 740 S.E.2d 290 (2013).

- Georgia's statutory requirements for injunctions provides that an injunction shall be specific in terms and shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; to refuse to treat pertinent language in a divorce order as an injunction because it is not specifically labeled as such would impermissibly elevate form over substance. State v. Davis, 339 Ga. App. 214, 793 S.E.2d 507 (2016).

Trial court erred in dismissing the charge of aggravated stalking against the defendant because the provision in the divorce order limiting the defendant's contact with the defendant's ex-spouse and their older child for which the defendant was accused of violating constituted a permanent injunction within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a). State v. Davis, 339 Ga. App. 214, 793 S.E.2d 507 (2016).

- See Hooper v. State, 223 Ga. App. 515, 478 S.E.2d 606 (1996); Littleton v. State, 225 Ga. App. 900, 485 S.E.2d 230 (1997); Fly v. State, 229 Ga. App. 374, 494 S.E.2d 95 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 850, 119 S. Ct. 125, 142 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1998); Jones v. State, 239 Ga. App. 733, 521 S.E.2d 883 (1999); Jagat v. State, 240 Ga. App. 822, 525 S.E.2d 388 (1999); Daker v. State, 243 Ga. App. 848, 533 S.E.2d 393 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1093, 122 S. Ct. 838, 151 L. Ed. 2d 717 (2002); Davis v. State, 244 Ga. App. 715, 536 S.E.2d 603 (2000).

Evidence showing that defendant entered his ex-girlfriend's home without permission, threatened her, cut her with a knife, fled, returned later, opened her front door, threatened her, left again, and then called the victim and made more threats, all while being subject to a probation condition which required him to stay away from the victim, was sufficient to support his convictions on two counts of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a). Withers v. State, 254 Ga. App. 833, 563 S.E.2d 912 (2002).

Evidence that the defendant caused his ex-wife great distress by repeatedly contacting and threatening her, including calling her at work and home and coming to her home and workplace carrying weapons, in violation of the defendant's probation, was sufficient to establish aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a). Murden v. State, 258 Ga. App. 585, 574 S.E.2d 657 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated stalking and aggravated battery as the victim, the defendant's spouse, had just parked at a supermarket when defendant ran a vehicle into the victim's vehicle, defendant then approached the victim, threatened to kill the victim, opened the door, grabbed and twisted the victim's wrist, and punched the victim's nose, breaking it; on the date of the incident, a permanent protective order was in effect prohibiting defendant from contacting the victim or the victim's family, or touching or damaging their property. Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated stalking, as the evidence showed that defendant, without consent, engaged in conduct which was intended to harass and intimidate defendant's former love interest, including the violation of a court order, continuously telephoning the former love interest, and showing up at the former love interest's apartment uninvited. Stevens v. State, 261 Ga. App. 73, 581 S.E.2d 685 (2003).

Because defendant contacted and threatened defendant's spouse and attacked a person who was protecting the spouse from defendant, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated stalking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a). Miller v. State, 273 Ga. App. 171, 614 S.E.2d 796 (2005), cert. denied, No. S07C0249, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 90 (Ga. 2007).

Defendant's convictions of aggravated stalking, burglary, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-91,16-7-1,16-5-21, and16-5-41, were supported by sufficient evidence because, despite the victim's recantation at trial, the victim stated to police earlier that defendant broke into the victim's apartment, scratched and damaged furniture and other property, tied the victim up, locked the victim in the bedroom for several hours, harmed the victim, threatened that defendant and defendant's friends were going to lock the victim in a basement for a few months, and defendant had been waiting for the victim to arrive home. Andrews v. State, 275 Ga. App. 426, 620 S.E.2d 629 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) where the defendant had assaulted the defendant's love interest on numerous occasions and continued to show up at the victim's work place, which caused the victim to lose several jobs. Lloyd v. State, 280 Ga. 187, 625 S.E.2d 771 (2006).

Evidence sufficiently supported a conviction for aggravated stalking, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), based on consistent calls to the victim, who was the defendant's spouse, that were intended to "harass and intimidate" the spouse as those terms were defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90(a)(1), prior conduct of threats and abusiveness during their marriage; the spouse had filed for divorce and obtained a restraining order against the defendant, but the defendant continued to contact the spouse by leaving messages on the spouse's telephone at work which contained both loving messages as well as threats. Phillips v. State, 278 Ga. App. 198, 628 S.E.2d 631 (2006).

Defendant's aggravated stalking conviction was upheld on appeal, and a new trial was properly denied, as sufficient evidence of the defendant's contact with the victim, in violation of a protective order, and acts of harassment and intimidation supported the same; moreover, the failure to object to the state's of similar transaction evidence waived any consideration of the same on appeal. Kennedy v. State, 279 Ga. App. 415, 631 S.E.2d 462 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to two aggravated stalking charges, despite claims that: (1) the state failed to prove the defendant acted for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the victim; and (2) the defendant lacked the requisite intent to commit the crimes, as the former argument attacked the credibility of the witnesses, which the appeals court did not weigh, and, regarding the latter argument, the intention with which an act was committed was a jury question. Chatham v. State, 280 Ga. App. 695, 634 S.E.2d 856 (2006).

Aggravated stalking conviction was upheld on appeal, supported by sufficient evidence that the defendant continued to harass the victim and the victim's family, specifically, the victim's two daughters, despite a no contact order made part of the defendant's bond conditions, and that when coupled with a history of doing such, the defendant's actions harassed and intimidated the victims and placed them in fear for their safety. Hennessey v. State, 282 Ga. App. 857, 640 S.E.2d 362 (2006).

Because sufficient evidence existed that the defendant suddenly appeared in a public place and pointed a gun at a companion who was in the company of the defendant's wife, towards whom the defendant had expressed hostility in the past, the jury was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that this purpose was to harass and intimidate the wife; hence, an aggravated stalking charge was supported by sufficient evidence. Ford v. State, 283 Ga. App. 460, 641 S.E.2d 671 (2007).

Defendant's two aggravated stalking convictions were affirmed on appeal, given the sufficiency of the evidence demonstrating that the defendant made two harassing and threatening telephone calls to the victim that caused the victim to panic and feel afraid that the defendant was going to kidnap the defendant's son and hurt or kill the victim in the process; moreover, the admission of testimony from a state's witness on an ultimate issue was harmless, and the defendant waived any error to the introduction of an alleged autobiographical letter on authentication grounds. Shafer v. State, 285 Ga. App. 748, 647 S.E.2d 274 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1498, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 642 (Ga. 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support an aggravated stalking conviction when, despite protective orders and a no-contact order, defendant continued to communicate with defendant's spouse, causing the spouse to fear for the spouse's safety, and although defendant claimed that defendant's intent was to rekindle the parties' marriage, not to intimidate and harass, intent was a question of fact for the jury. Holmes v. State, 291 Ga. App. 196, 661 S.E.2d 603 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant entered uninvited into his ex-wife's home, kicked open the bedroom door where his ex-wife was asleep with her boyfriend, laid across the victims, grabbed their throats, and threatened them, in violation of the terms of a condition of bond issued in a previous case, was sufficient to support convictions of aggravated stalking, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) and burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). Bray v. State, 294 Ga. App. 562, 669 S.E.2d 509 (2008).

In a federal habeas corpus proceeding in which a state inmate had been convicted of stalking and aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), the inmate did not meet the burden of showing that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; the testimony presented would have permitted a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the inmate was aware that a third party was under a court order to refrain from contacting the victim, and the fact that the inmate might not have known the exact type of court order was not relevant. Carlisle v. Conway, F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 29, 2008)(Unpublished).

To convict a defendant of aggravated stalking, the state was only required to prove that the defendant's actions were done for the purpose of harassing or intimidating the victim, not that the victim actually felt either harassed or intimidated by that conduct. As the evidence allowed the jury to find that the defendant acted with the requisite intent, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of aggravated stalking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) as the defendant was on probation for making a terroristic threat against the victim when the defendant, acting through a friend, called the victim via a three-way phone call, and the victim testified that the victim had not wanted to talk to the defendant, that during the conversation, the defendant had threatened the victim, and that when the victim realized that the defendant was no longer in jail, the victim's heart dropped and the victim was fearful of going outside. Davidson v. State, 295 Ga. App. 702, 673 S.E.2d 91 (2009).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction of stalking the defendant's ex-spouse by putting a bizarre note, which the ex-spouse regarded as threatening, in the ex-spouse's mailbox and going onto the ex-spouse's property without permission, in violation of a restraining order. The fact that the ex-spouse had previously allowed the defendant on the property to visit their children did not alter the fact that on the occasions for which the defendant was prosecuted, the ex-spouse did not consent. Crane v. State, 297 Ga. App. 880, 678 S.E.2d 542 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) because evidence of the defendant's continuing unauthorized contacts with the victim and repeated violations of restraining orders established a pattern of harassing behavior; a permanent restraining order had been entered that prohibited the defendant from having any contact with the victim, but the defendant violated that order by sending a letter to the victim that caused the victim to fear for the victim's own safety and that of the victim's family. Bowen v. State, 304 Ga. App. 819, 697 S.E.2d 898 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated stalking because, after the entry of a family violence protective order, the defendant purchased a knife with a large blade, followed the victim, who was the defendant's estranged spouse, and attempted to talk with the victim, appeared at a grocery store where the victim was, yelled at the victim, and stabbed and slashed the victim multiple times, resulting in the victim's death. The defendant then waited for the police, and stated that the defendant would not hurt anyone else, that the defendant came to do what the defendant needed to do, that no one got away with hurting the defendant, and that the victim, whom the defendant called by a derogatory term, deserved it because of what the victim did to the defendant in court. Weaver v. State, 288 Ga. 540, 705 S.E.2d 627 (2011).

As the evidence showed that the defendant was prohibited from contacting a victim due to a protective order, that the defendant violated that order, and that the defendant's contact was for the purposes of harassing and intimidating the victim, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a). Herbert v. State, 311 Ga. App. 396, 715 S.E.2d 795 (2011).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) because the victim testified that the defendant had previously threatened the victim, the defendant had a history of violence against the victim, and the defendant made repeated phone calls and sent several text messages to the victim; while the defendant denied at trial that the defendant called the victim, the jury was free to reject that testimony and believe that of the victim, and the defendant did not deny sending text messages to the victim after the defendant's release from jail. Brooks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 789, 723 S.E.2d 29 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0974, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1035 (Ga. 2012).

Evidence of harassing texts the defendant sent combined with the defendant's other threatening behavior and the victim's testimony that the victim felt compelled to undertake security measures to feel safe was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated stalking. Nosratifard v. State, 320 Ga. App. 564, 740 S.E.2d 290 (2013).

Aggravated stalking conviction was supported by sufficient evidence as the jury was authorized to find a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior based on recent contacts and telephone calls the defendant made to the victim. Crumity v. State, 321 Ga. App. 768, 743 S.E.2d 455 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated stalking based on the defendant going to the victim's home uninvited and then physically attacking the victim when the victim refused the defendant's admittance to the victim's home, which followed several other incidents of unwanted contact. Gates v. State, 322 Ga. App. 383, 750 S.E.2d 683 (2013).

Conviction for aggravated stalking was supported by evidence that, in violation of a protection order, on a single day, the defendant called the victim, appeared at the victim's home, knocked on the victim's door, yelled and screamed at the victim, demanded that the victim let the defendant inside the victim's house, and refused to leave the victim's property. Oliver v. State, 325 Ga. App. 649, 753 S.E.2d 468 (2014).

Evidence that the defendant previously harassed the victim, destroyed property at the victim's residence, and returned to the residence after being served with an order barring the defendant from doing so, supported the aggravated stalking conviction. Slaughter v. State, 327 Ga. App. 593, 760 S.E.2d 609 (2014).

Evidence that the victim moved to another county and did not provide the defendant with the victim's address or inform the defendant of the victim's place of employment, but that the defendant located the victim, began threatening the victim, went to the victim's place of work and remained there until the defendant's presence was known, and vandalized the victim's car was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated stalking. Crapps v. State, 329 Ga. App. 820, 766 S.E.2d 178 (2014).

State proved that the defendant committed the crime of aggravated stalking beyond a reasonable doubt by demonstrating that, after the issuance of a protective order, the defendant approached the victim in a parking lot and spoke angrily towards the victim; that the victim became annoyed and drove off; and that the defendant followed the victim as the victim drove down the road, pulled alongside the victim's vehicle, and shot the victim in the head. McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 794 S.E.2d 118 (2016).

Evidence that, despite the temporary protective order, the defendant approached the victim at the victim's apartment and the following day while the victim was in the victim's vehicle, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated stalking. Polanco v. State, 340 Ga. App. 292, 797 S.E.2d 204 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated stalking of the defendant's former live-in girlfriend, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), because the defendant arrived unannounced at her apartment without coordinating with the Sheriff's Department after the defendant was explicitly informed that the defendant was required to contact them to assist in retrieving the defendant's property. The defendant's ambush appearance could be found harassing and intimidating based on the defendant's past threatening and physically abusive conduct. Ordelt v. State, 340 Ga. App. 258, 797 S.E.2d 167 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated stalking because, on April 18, 2011, the defendant was released from jail on bond, with the bond order including a special condition that the defendant have no contact with the victim; on January 16, 2012, the defendant entered the victim's apartment, ripped the security alarm off the wall, went into the victim's bedroom, and kissed the victim; and, even if the jury could not consider evidence of the April 2011 incident, there was other evidence from which the jury could have found a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior as the day before the defendant entered the victim's apartment the defendant violated the no-contact order twice by calling and texting the victim. McAllister v. State, 343 Ga. App. 213, 807 S.E.2d 14 (2017).

Evidence that the defendant repeatedly tried to get messages to the defendant's children, including the defendant's own phone number, in violation of court orders was sufficient to support the aggravated stalking conviction. Carlton v. State, 356 Ga. App. 1, 846 S.E.2d 175 (2020).

In an action for aggravated stalking, although the defendant denied going to the victims' house with an intent to harass or intimidate the victims, the jury did not have to find the defendant's purportedly legitimate reason for being at the victims' house credible, and in determining whether the defendant exhibited a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior, the jury was authorized to consider prior behavior toward the victims, including calls and the letters the defendant sent directly and through third parties. Frilando v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Apr. 8, 2021).

- Since the state's evidence failed to show that defendant made any contact with the victim or performed any act of an harassing or intimidating nature between the dates set forth in the indictment, the defendant's conviction for aggravated stalking was reversed. Durant v. State, 222 Ga. App. 872, 476 S.E.2d 641 (1996).

Because the evidence showed that the contact charged as the basis for an aggravated stalking offense against the defendant was initiated by the victim, and thus was with that victim's consent, the defendant's conviction of the offense had to be reversed as an element of the offense was that the charged contact had to be without the victim's consent. Bragg v. State, 285 Ga. App. 408, 646 S.E.2d 508 (2007).

Evidence did not support a conviction of aggravated stalking because the evidence did not establish that the defendant was engaged in a pattern of intimidating and harassing behavior that placed the defendant's ex-spouse in reasonable fear for the ex-spouse's safety. Although the ex-spouse revoked the ex-spouse's consent for the defendant to enter the ex-spouse's home, the ex-spouse testified to feeling fear only for a moment when the defendant wrestled a hammer from the ex-spouse; the ex-spouse never called for help from the other adults in the home; and even after the other adults separated the pair and the defendant left the residence with the hammer, the ex-spouse broke free of the ex-spouse's friend and went after the defendant. Wright v. State, 292 Ga. App. 673, 665 S.E.2d 374 (2008).

Insufficient evidence supported the defendant's aggravated stalking conviction because a divorce court order on which the prosecution relied merely barred the defendant from the home the defendant had shared with the victim, rather than prohibiting the defendant from having contact with the victim, so the order did not "in effect" prohibit the defendant from engaging in conduct that was prohibited by the statute. Keaton v. State, 311 Ga. App. 14, 714 S.E.2d 693 (2011).

- Defendant's conviction for aggravated stalking was reversed because the state failed to prove that there was actual contact with the victim, whether through a third party or otherwise, because the purported contact was a letter written by the defendant and given to the victim's attorney at the district attorney's office; thus, there was no evidence that the defendant contacted the victim at a place occupied by the victim. Seibert v. State, 321 Ga. App. 243, 739 S.E.2d 91 (2013).

- Evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to convict defendant of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a); although the victim testified at trial that the victim's struggle with defendant started because the victim attacked defendant with a knife, the jury was free to disbelieve this trial testimony and to believe instead the victim's prior inconsistent statement to a police officer who testified that, when the officer responded to a domestic violence call at the victim's residence, the victim, who was crying and upset and had facial bruises and a large ankle laceration, told the officer that defendant became angry and dragged the victim from a car, kicked the victim, and punched the victim in the face. Peek v. State, 259 Ga. App. 13, 576 S.E.2d 31 (2002).

- Conviction of aggravated stalking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91 was supported by sufficient evidence despite the fact that the victim had previously permitted the defendant on the premises after the issuance of the no contact order; the victim's previous consent was immaterial where the defendant refused the victim's order to leave on the occasion at issue. Revere v. State, 277 Ga. App. 393, 626 S.E.2d 585 (2006).

- In order to convict a defendant of aggravated stalking, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), based on assisting a codefendant stalk the victim, it was necessary to show that the defendant knew of a court order prohibiting the codefendant's contact with the victim, but not necessary to show that the defendant knew of the specific type of order which prohibited the contact; a conviction for aggravated stalking was authorized since sufficient evidence showed that the defendant knew of a bond condition prohibiting the codefendant's contact with the victim and among other things, based on a witness's testimony that a discussion with the defendant about the restraining order occurred between the date the codefendant's bond conditions were imposed and the date of the alleged stalking, it could have been inferred that the defendant had knowledge of the restraining order before the incident at issue. State v. Carlisle, 280 Ga. 770, 631 S.E.2d 347 (2006).

- Trial court did not err by not merging a defendant's aggravated stalking count into a burglary count based upon the defendant's contention that under the actual evidence test, the same factual evidence was used to prove both crimes; as to prove the burglary count, the state had to prove that the defendant entered the victim's residence without authority and with the intent to commit aggravated stalking, and to prove the aggravated stalking count, the state had to prove that the defendant surveilled and contacted the victim in violation of a condition of probation for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the victim. As such, the burglary statute required that the state show entry into the residence, which was not required by the aggravated stalking statute, and, on the other hand, the aggravated stalking statute required that the state prove that the defendant actually contacted the victim, which was not required by the burglary statute that only required that the defendant contact the victim when the defendant entered the residence. Williams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 193, 666 S.E.2d 703 (2008).

- Trial court properly exercised the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever the count of the indictment charging aggravated stalking from the counts relating to murder because evidence of the stalking offense would be admissible in a separate murder trial; evidence of the defendant's turbulent relationship with the stalking victim and the stalking of that victim was relevant to explain the defendant's animosity for the murder victim and the defendant's motive for the fatal attack. Carruth v. State, 290 Ga. 342, 721 S.E.2d 80 (2012).

- Jury instruction on the offense of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), which omitted the word "intimidating" from the charge, was not error because the trial court defined the term "harassing" in accordance with the statutory definition of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90(a)(1), and accordingly, the jury was informed of that element by way of definition; the omission was inconsequential and the charge, viewed as a whole, was not likely to mislead or confuse the jury. Phillips v. State, 278 Ga. App. 198, 628 S.E.2d 631 (2006).

- Words "harassing and intimidating," as used in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91, are not words of art but rather are words of common understanding and meaning which require no definition themselves for understanding by the jury. Therefore, in an aggravated stalking prosecution, the defendant was not entitled to a jury charge that defined these terms. Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487 (2009).

- In a prosecution on three counts of aggravated stalking, the defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on the lesser included offense of harassing telephone calls based on the fact that under the evidence presented the defendant was either guilty of the indicted offenses or was guilty of no offense whatsoever. Patterson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 780, 645 S.E.2d 38 (2007).

- Trial court did not err by failing to give the defendant's requested charges on the lesser included offenses of harassing phone calls and violation of a temporary protective order because the state's evidence was sufficient to establish all of the elements of the aggravated stalking offenses as indicted; under the evidence, either the defendant was guilty of the indicted offenses or the defendant was guilty of no offense whatsoever. Brooks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 789, 723 S.E.2d 29 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0974, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1035 (Ga. 2012).

- Defendant's conviction for violating a family violence protective order as a lesser included offense of aggravated stalking was reversed on appeal because the defendant was not indicted for the family violence protective order violation; thus, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the lesser offense. Edgecomb v. State, 319 Ga. App. 804, 738 S.E.2d 645 (2013).

- Trial court did not admit improper character evidence at trial for aggravated stalking by allowing the state to introduce evidence that, at the time defendant threatened the victim at the victim's home and over the telephone, defendant was subject to a probation condition which required defendant to stay away from the victim, as such evidence was required to prove an element of the charge of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a). Withers v. State, 254 Ga. App. 833, 563 S.E.2d 912 (2002).

- Defendant's stalking convictions were upheld on appeal, given that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to present the testimony from a second psychiatrist regarding the defendant's mental condition, as the defendant failed to show how testimony from a second psychiatrist would have aided the defense, and a request for recharge alone did not prove that the jury was confused on the issue of the defendant's mental condition or that counsel had not provided them with sufficient evidence concerning it. Albert v. State, 283 Ga. App. 79, 640 S.E.2d 670 (2006).

In a prosecution on three counts of aggravated stalking, because the defendant failed to show that trial counsel's strategic decisions in declining to subpoena certain witnesses amounted to ineffectiveness, and the evidence did not support a lesser-included offense instruction, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims failed. Patterson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 780, 645 S.E.2d 38 (2007).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not warrant a new trial in a prosecution for rape, kidnapping, aggravated stalking, and two counts of stalking; because of the limited nature of a challenged witnesses' trial testimony, defense counsel made a strategic decision not to seek recusal of the trial judge, who was the brother of the challenged witness, and counsel discussed with the defendant the reasons for not seeking recusal. Pirkle v. State, 289 Ga. App. 450, 657 S.E.2d 560 (2008).

- While the trial court misread a portion of the aggravated stalking statute during the jury recharge, the instruction did not likely affect the outcome of the trial and the misreading did not seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the proceedings because the trial court clearly explained during the recharge that the state's allegation was that the defendant had violated the condition of the bond order that the defendant have no contact with the alleged victim; thus, there was no likelihood that the recharge led the jury to believe that the jury could find guilt based on contact with a place, rather than unlawful contact with the victim. McAllister v. State, 343 Ga. App. 213, 807 S.E.2d 14 (2017).

- Discrepancy in dates between indictment for aggravated stalking and evidence was not a fatal variance since the indictment clearly put defendant on notice that the alleged act was a violation of a protective order with which defendant had been served; moreover, the date in the indictment was not alleged to be material, and actions proven by the state were within the statute of limitations. Holmes v. State, 291 Ga. App. 196, 661 S.E.2d 603 (2008).

There was no fatal variance between the aggravated stalking charges and the proof as the state presented evidence that the defendant was subject to a no-contact provision in the deprivation order as well as evidence that the juvenile court denied requests by the defendant for visitation. Carlton v. State, 356 Ga. App. 1, 846 S.E.2d 175 (2020).

- Defendant's contact with the victim was with the victim's consent since the victim testified that victim agreed to meet defendant and had a friend follow her to the location of the meeting. Bragg v. State, 285 Ga. App. 408, 646 S.E.2d 508 (2007).

- Because the sentence orally announced as to each of the three counts of aggravated stalking charged against the defendant was ten years, to be served concurrently, although originally to be served with six years and six months on probation, the sentence nevertheless remained ten years; hence, because the sentence as finally entered did not vary from that which was orally announced by the trial court and there was no increase in the defendant's sentence, no error in the sentence imposed resulted. Patterson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 780, 645 S.E.2d 38 (2007).

- District court did not err in revoking under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 the supervised release that was imposed upon defendant following defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a); admission of alleged hearsay at the revocation hearing was harmless error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) because other uncontested evidence established that defendant committed aggravated stalking of defendant's ex-spouse in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) and that the defendant left the jurisdiction without the permission of the court or the defendant's probation officer. United States v. Spence, F.3d (11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2005)(Unpublished).

- Defendant was not entitled to a sentence reduction because the aggravated assault and aggravated stalking statutes did not define the same offense and did not address the same criminal conduct, the former offense addressing assault with an object likely to result in serious bodily injury and the latter offense addressing harassment and intimidation of a victim. Myrick v. State, 325 Ga. App. 607, 754 S.E.2d 395 (2014).

Cited in Bryson v. State, 228 Ga. App. 84, 491 S.E.2d 184 (1997); Reeves v. State, 233 Ga. App. 802, 505 S.E.2d 540 (1998); Bogan v. State, 255 Ga. App. 413, 565 S.E.2d 588 (2002); Holmes v. Achor Ctr., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 882, 581 S.E.2d 390 (2003); Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 889, 592 S.E.2d 507 (2003); Newsome v. State, 289 Ga. App. 590, 657 S.E.2d 540 (2008); Presley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 528, 705 S.E.2d 870 (2011); Seibert v. Alexander, 351 Ga. App. 446, 829 S.E.2d 473 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0017, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 323 (Ga. 2020).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity of state stalking statutes, 6 A.L.R.7th 6.

Construction and application of "crime of violence" provision of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 pertaining to unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States after commission of felony offense, 68 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 55.