2021 Georgia Code
Title 15 - Courts
Chapter 11 - Juvenile Code
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 15-11-35. Appeals

In all cases of final judgments of the juvenile court, appeals shall be taken to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in the same manner as appeals from the superior court. However, no such judgment or order shall be superseded or modified except in the discretion of the trial court; rather, the judgment or order of the court shall stand until reversed or modified by the reviewing court. The appeal of an order granting a petition to terminate parental rights shall stay an adoption proceeding related to the child who is the subject of such order until such order becomes final by the conclusion of appellate proceedings or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Except for proceedings in connection with an adoption, the court shall continue to conduct hearings and issue orders in accordance with this chapter while an appeal in a case is pending.

(Code 1981, §15-11-35, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2018, p. 935, § 1/SB 131.)

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, inserted "or modified" in the middle of the second sentence and added the third and fourth sentences.

- Appeals and supersedeas, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 19.1 et seq.

- For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971). For annual survey of law on appellate practice and procedure, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 25 (2010).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-3801, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-11 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-3, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Juveniles are granted same rights of appeal as are possessed by adults. J.J. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-3801).

- Former Code 1933, § 24A-3801 provided for appeals "in all cases of final judgments of a juvenile court judge," without defining "final judgments." Former Code 1933, § 6-701 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34) provided for appeals "[w]here the judgment is final - that is to say - where the cause is no longer pending in the court below." J.T.M. v. State, 142 Ga. App. 635, 236 S.E.2d 764 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-3801).

Order of a juvenile court adjudicating a juvenile delinquent and transferring the matter to another juvenile court for disposition was a final order and was appealable without the need for a certificate of immediate review. In re T.L.C., 266 Ga. 407, 467 S.E.2d 885 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64).

Transferral order is final and therefore appealable since the order operates to transfer the case to the superior court, after which the cause is no longer pending in "the court below," the juvenile court. J.T.M. v. State, 142 Ga. App. 635, 236 S.E.2d 764 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-3801).

- Even though a transfer order was on appeal at the time the defendant was indicted, the order remained in effect at that time, and the proceedings which occurred in the superior court, pursuant to the transfer order which had not been superseded, including the indictment, were valid. Rocha v. State, 234 Ga. App. 48, 506 S.E.2d 192 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64).

Transfer of child custody case is continuation of that proceeding. Thus, a transfer order in a habeas corpus-child custody proceeding is not final and hence is not appealable without a certificate of immediate review. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs. v. Perkins, 244 Ga. 237, 259 S.E.2d 427 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-3801).

- Juvenile court, unlike a superior court dealing with the same subject matter, has the discretion to grant or deny supersedeas even though the case in the juvenile court emanated from a superior court. Elder v. Elder, 184 Ga. App. 167, 361 S.E.2d 46 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64).

- Order denying the petition to vacate the order committing the juvenile is a judicial order, subject to judicial review. Rossi v. Price, 237 Ga. 651, 229 S.E.2d 429 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-3801).

Court of appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain the state's appeal of a dismissal of a juvenile court petition. In re J.H., 228 Ga. App. 154, 491 S.E.2d 209 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64).

Order holding all charges in abeyance during a period of good behavior was not a final judgment of adjudication and disposition on allegations contained in the petition. In re M.T., 223 Ga. App. 615, 478 S.E.2d 428 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64).

- Adjudication order alone, without a dispositional order following a dispositional hearing under former Code 1933, § 24A-2401 was not a final, appealable judgment under former Code 1933, § 24A-3801 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35), nor was it made one by the provisions of former Code 1933, § 6-701 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34). M.K.H. v. State, 132 Ga. App. 143, 207 S.E.2d 645 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-3801); In re G.C.S., 186 Ga. App. 291, 367 S.E.2d 103 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64).

- Indigent parent, whose parental rights have been terminated by an order of a juvenile court on a petition filed by an agency of the state, is entitled to a paupered transcript of the proceeding in the juvenile court for use in appealing the decision of that court. Nix v. Department of Human Resources, 236 Ga. 794, 225 S.E.2d 306 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-3801).

- Defendant juvenile's appeal of an order denying a motion to reconsider, vacate, or modify the delinquent adjudication was proper because the denial of the motion was a final judgment and was directly appealable; therefore, the defendant could appeal the ruling on disposition as well as on the original finding of delinquency. An order denying a motion under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) seeking a modification based on changed circumstances in a delinquency matter is a final judgment directly appealable under O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34(a)(1) and15-11-3. In the Interest of J. L. K., 302 Ga. App. 844, 691 S.E.2d 892 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3).

- Phrase "child custody cases" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11) does not include a child deprivation proceeding in which a custody order has been entered; however, the decision to terminate reunification services is a final judgment directly appealable under O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34(a)(1) and15-11-3. In re J. N., 302 Ga. App. 631, 691 S.E.2d 396 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3).

Juvenile court did not err in dismissing a juvenile's motion to modify the commitment order on the basis that the purpose of rehabilitation was not being served because the motion was not accompanied by a written recommendation from the juvenile's Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice counselor or placement supervisor; thus, O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-32 and15-11-602 barred the juvenile court from modifying the commitment order as requested. In the Interest of D. H., 332 Ga. App. 274, 772 S.E.2d 70 (2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 120 et seq.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 246 et seq.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 59.