2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 9 - Arbitration
Article 1 - General Provisions
Part 1 - Arbitration Code
§ 9-9-13. Vacation of Award by Court; Application; Grounds; Rehearing; Appeal of Order

1. An application to vacate an award shall be made to the court within three months after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.
2. The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either participated in the arbitration or was served with a demand for arbitration if the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
   1. Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;
   2. Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral;
   3. An overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect execution of it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made;
   4. A failure to follow the procedure of this part, unless the party applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of this failure and without objection; or
   5. The arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law.
3. The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who neither participated in the arbitration nor was served with a demand for arbitration or order to compel arbitration if the court finds that:
   1. The rights of the party were prejudiced by one of the grounds specified in subsection (b) of this Code section;
   2. A valid agreement to arbitrate was not made;
   3. The agreement to arbitrate has not been complied with; or
   4. The arbitrated claim was barred by limitation of time, as provided by this part.
4. The fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
5. Upon vacating an award, the court may order a rehearing and determination of all or any of the issues either before the same arbitrators or before new arbitrators appointed as provided by this part. In any provision of an agreement limiting the time for a hearing or award, time shall be measured from the date of such order or rehearing, whichever is appropriate, or a time may be specified by the court. The court's ruling or order under this Code section shall constitute a final judgment and shall be subject to appeal in accordance with the appeal provisions of this part.

(Code 1933, § 7-314, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 2270, § 1; Code 1981, §9-9-93; Code 1981, §9-9-13, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1988, p. 903, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 820, § 2.)

- Ga. L. 2003, p. 820, § 9, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that this Act "shall apply to all civil actions filed on or after July 1, 2003."

- For article, "Recent Developments in Construction Law," see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 24 (1999). For survey article on trial practice and procedure for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 439 (2003). For article, "Georgia General Assembly Adopts 'Manifest Disregard' as a Ground for Vacating Arbitration Awards: How Will Georgia Courts Treat the New Standard?," see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 10 (2004). For article, "Comprehensive Arbitration of Domestic Relations Cases in Georgia," see 14 Ga. St. B.J. 20 (2008). For note, "The Addition of the 'Manifest Disregard of the Law' Defense to Georgia's Arbitration Code and Potential Conflicts with Federal Law," see 21 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 501 (2004). For annual survey of construction law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (2004). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2004). For article, "A Re-Evalution of Arbitration in Light of Class Actions and Appeal Rights - Is It Still Worth It?," see 11 Ga. St. B.J. 12 (2005). For survey article on construction law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 55 (2007). For survey article on local government law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 263 (2008). For annual survey on construction law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 65 (2009). For annual survey on construction law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2016). For note on the 2003 amendment to this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 28 (2003). For note, "'A Manifest Disregard of Arbitration?' An Analysis of Recent Georgia Legislation Adding 'Manifest Disregard of the Law' to the Georgia Arbitration Code as a Statutory Ground for Vacatur," see 39 Ga. L. Rev. 259 (2004). For note, "Alive But Not Well: Manifest Disregard After Hall Street," see 44 Ga. L. Rev. 285 (2009).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code Section 9-9-93 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Trial court properly vacated an arbitration award against a mart owner in the mart owner's personal capacity due to the arbitrator lacking personal jurisdiction over the mart owner as the mart owner was not a named party to the dispute, and the lessor failed to amend the demand or add the mart owner as a party. Ultra Group of Companies, Inc. v. Alli, 352 Ga. App. 71, 833 S.E.2d 751 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0336, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 421 (Ga. 2020).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b), a party seeking to set aside an award may do so under the five exclusive grounds stated in the statute; the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground for vacating or refusing to confirm an award. Doman v. Stapleton, 272 Ga. App. 114, 611 S.E.2d 673 (2005).

Country club and a lessee could not contractually expand the grounds for a court to vacate an arbitration award in their lease, as such grounds were statutorily mandated pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) and were not subject to the parties' modification. Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 287 Ga. 408, 696 S.E.2d 663 (2010).

Trial court properly denied the provider's motion to vacate the arbitration award because there was no transcript of the arbitration hearings provided or anything in the record to indicate the intent of the arbitrator in reaching the conclusion that the case was time-barred, therefore, there was an absence of evidence of a specific intent to disregard the appropriate law; thus, the final award was not subject to vacatur on the basis of manifest disregard of the law under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5). Odion v. Avesis, Inc., 355 Ga. App. 598, 845 S.E.2d 335 (2020).

In a contract dispute, the trial court erred by confirming the award because the arbitrator's explicit rejection of the rate card as the contracted-for pricing ignored the express contractual language requiring the claimants to utilize the pricing structures and by explicitly rejecting the contractual language, the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. Adventure Motorsports Reinsurance v. Interstate Nat'l Dealer Servs., Ga. App. , 846 S.E.2d 115 (2020).

- There was no statutory provision requiring clients of defendant company and owner to apply for an order compelling arbitration before seeking arbitration where such an order would have had no effect on the defendants' absence from the proceedings, and state law does not unequivocally reject ex parte arbitration. Deer Creek, Inc. v. Section 1031 Servs., Inc., 235 Ga. App. 891, 510 S.E.2d 853 (1999).

Artist who did not request that records of an arbitration proceeding be kept waived the right to rely on the absence of records as a ground for arguing that the resulting arbitration award should be vacated; therefore, since no other ground existed for vacating the award, the award would be upheld. Ghertner v. Solaimani, 254 Ga. App. 821, 563 S.E.2d 878 (2002).

Trial court did not err in denying the clients' motion to vacate an arbitration award awarding monetary damages to their home remodeling decorator in an arbitration proceeding under the Georgia Arbitration Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 et seq., as the clients' claim that the arbitrator was required to maintain a record of the arbitration proceedings and did not do so had to be rejected; the clients waived that requirement and also continued with the arbitration proceeding without further objection. Brown v. Premiere Designs, Inc., 266 Ga. App. 432, 597 S.E.2d 466 (2004).

Husband's application to vacate an arbitration award under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 should have been dismissed rather than denied since the trial court's divorce decree in which it approved the arbitration award was final on the date that it issued the decree even though the arbitration award had, in fact, not been issued on that date; thus, the husband should have filed an application for a discretionary appeal from the trial court's final judgment within 30 days of the entry of the judgment and decree under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(d) or filed a motion to set aside the judgment and decree under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60; since, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-9-15 the order confirming the arbitration award became the judgment of the trial court on the date that the trial court issued its divorce decree, all matters in litigation in the action were final on that date, including those submitted for arbitration, and the later purported arbitration award was of no effect. Ciraldo v. Ciraldo, 280 Ga. 602, 631 S.E.2d 640 (2006).

In the absence of a transcript of an arbitration hearing, the superior court erred in vacating an arbitration award in favor of a plumbing company pursuant to O.C.G.A § 9-9-13(b)(5) because nothing in the record showed that the panel had the specific intent to disregard the appropriate law; further, the arguments provided by the company did not alter this result, as its supposition did not provide viable concrete evidence that the arbitration panel purposefully intended to disregard applicable law. ABCO Builders, Inc. v. Progressive Plumbing, Inc., 282 Ga. 308, 647 S.E.2d 574 (2007).

- Although the trial court may vacate an arbitrators' award for, inter alia, "such imperfect execution of it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made," there is no mandate that the award include specific findings or reasons, or that it expressly address each and every issue and collateral issue arising in an arbitration. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nunnally Lumber Co., 176 Ga. App. 232, 335 S.E.2d 708 (1985).

- Where a general contractor presented evidence that charges which increased the cost of building a convention center had been made by local government officials, and that the government had agreed to wait until the project was complete before resolving cost increase issues, contrary to contract provisions, the trial court did not err in finding that the arbitration panel acted within its authority in awarding judgment to the contractor. City of College Park v. Batson-Cook Co., 196 Ga. App. 138, 395 S.E.2d 385 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93).

An arbitrator's decision voiding a limitation of liability clause in a home inspection agreement on the basis of O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 did not compel an inference that the arbitrator overstepped the arbitrator's authority. Amerispec Franchise v. Cross, 215 Ga. App. 669, 452 S.E.2d 188 (1994).

Where the arbitration provision covered all disputes arising as to "the interpretation, meaning or intent" of an agreement for sale of a medical practice, finding that tortious interference claims were covered was within the arbitrators' authority. Banderas v. Doman, 224 Ga. App. 198, 480 S.E.2d 252 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 864, 118 S. Ct. 170, 139 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1997).

Where the shareholders agreement plainly permitted arbitration in the event of an impasse in the management of the firm and did not require that a buy out offer be evaluated before the arbitrator could resolve the impasse, the court properly determined the shareholder failed to prove the arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority or considered matters not properly before the arbitrator. Gilbert v. Montlick, 232 Ga. App. 91, 499 S.E.2d 731 (1998).

The agreement specifically authorized the umpire to utilize measures above and beyond traditional calculations of fair market value and the umpire did not overstep the umpire's authority in awarding settlement amounts which encompassed notions of fair market value, intrinsic, denominational, and historic value, as well as replacement costs. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Trinity Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 231 Ga. App. 617, 500 S.E.2d 374 (1998).

Where it was clear from the record that the plaintiff submitted all of plaintiff's claims against the city and the department of transportation to the arbitrator, the arbitrator did not overstep the arbitrator's authority in ruling upon such issues. Ralston v. City of Dahlonega, 236 Ga. App. 386, 512 S.E.2d 300 (1999).

Where clients of defendant company sought arbitration because they were unable to contact the owner to give the notifications required to initiate a tax-free exchange and were concerned that the statutory time would expire before the owner's could be contacted to accomplish this, the trial court did not err in implicitly finding that the clients sought arbitration regarding their instructions to defendant, and the arbitrator did not overstep the arbitrator's authority. Deer Creek, Inc. v. Section 1031 Servs., Inc., 235 Ga. App. 891, 510 S.E.2d 853 (1999).

"Overstepping" of the arbitrator's authority, like other grounds for vacation of an award, is very limited in scope and refers to the addressing of issues not properly before the arbitrator. Ralston v. City of Dahlonega, 236 Ga. App. 386, 512 S.E.2d 300 (1999).

The adding of a $20 million indemnity claim to a pending $400,000 arbitration proceeding arising out of the same indemnity agreement, which was added with the consent of the arbitration panel, did not require that a separate arbitration panel be appointed to hear the new claim because the rules stipulated by the agreement authorized the panel to consider all new claims. Barge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 245 Ga. App. 112, 535 S.E.2d 837 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Jones, 333 Ga. App. 184, 775 S.E.2d 714, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 475 (2015).

Arbitrator had broad authority to consider any disputes arising out of the contract, consistent with the parties' agreement of sale for the home; the seller specifically submitted to the arbitrator its claim for the damages arising from the change orders as did the purchaser and thus, the issue was properly submitted to the arbitrator, and no ground existed for modifying the award which found that the seller was not entitled to keep the earnest money because it was in material breach but was entitled to actual damages for the approved changes. Henderson v. Millner Devs., LLC, 259 Ga. App. 709, 578 S.E.2d 289 (2003).

In a home construction dispute in which an arbitrator awarded damages to a builder, none of the statutory grounds for vacating that award under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) were shown, and the award did not improperly award pre-award interest. Marchelletta v. Seay Constr. Servs., 265 Ga. App. 23, 593 S.E.2d 64 (2004).

Client's motion to vacate an arbitration award was properly rejected, as the arbitrator did not disregard the law of the case by allowing an attorney to recover attorney fees under a quantum meruit theory or by refusing to allow the client to present defenses to liability; the appellate court found that the attorney justifiably withdrew from representation, making a quantum meruit recovery appropriate, and the attorney had a right to recover a reasonable fee. Doman v. Stapleton, 272 Ga. App. 114, 611 S.E.2d 673 (2005).

Because there was no transcript of the arbitration hearing or detailed findings of fact, the appellate court could not find that the arbitrator's award of attorney fees was unlawful; arbitration awards were not subject to vacatur under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(d) where as an award would not have been granted by a court. Ordner Constr. Co. v. Parkside Crossing, 300, LLC, 276 Ga. App. 753, 624 S.E.2d 206 (2005).

In an arbitration arising out of a construction contract, an award of payment to a subcontractor under an invoice did not overstep the arbitrator's authority under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) of the Georgia Arbitration Code, even though there was evidence that the invoice had already been paid; overstepping consisted of addressing issues not properly before the arbitrator, the subcontractor's arbitration proceeding sought amounts due under the parties' contracts, and the arbitrator's award under the invoice was grounded in an interpretation of the contract language. Johnson Real Estate Invs., LLC v. Aqua Industrials, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 638, 639 S.E.2d 589 (2006).

The trial court properly confirmed an arbitrator's award in a breach of contract action between a wastewater treatment company and a city as: (1) that part of the arbitrator's award which discussed the terms "maintenance" and "capital expenditures" was not inconsistent with the definitions contained in the contract; and (2) the award was based not only on the company's failure to make necessary repairs, but on the deterioration which resulted from that failure. Further, there was no requirement that the arbitrator's award include specific findings or reasons absent a request by the parties under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-39(a). Operations Mgmt. Int'l v. City of Forsyth, 288 Ga. App. 469, 654 S.E.2d 438 (2007).

- Trial court properly vacated the modification of an existing award under paragraph (b)(3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 after finding that the arbitration panel had overstepped its authority by modifying the merits of its award, when none of the statutory grounds for modification under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-11(a) had been met. Conmac Corp. v. Southern Diversified Dev., Inc., 245 Ga. App. 895, 539 S.E.2d 532 (2000).

- Merely pointing to adverse factual and legal findings cannot sustain an allegation of bias within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13. Faiyaz v. Dicus, 245 Ga. App. 55, 537 S.E.2d 203 (2000).

Client's motion to vacate an arbitration award was properly denied, as the trial court's finding that the arbitrator did not solicit business from an attorney's counsel was not clearly erroneous. Doman v. Stapleton, 272 Ga. App. 114, 611 S.E.2d 673 (2005).

Law client failed to show competent evidence regarding an alleged basis for vacatur of an arbitration award under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) of the Georgia Arbitration Code, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 et seq., since the clients' claim that the arbitrator did not disclose prior associations that amounted to "potential conflicts" was not supported by the record; further, "The Hennings Rules" were not placed upon the record, although the rules were relied upon, and there was no evidence that the arbitrator fell within the ambit of the Ga. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(E)(1). Phan v. Andre & Blaustein, LLP, 309 Ga. App. 191, 709 S.E.2d 863 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1339, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 61 (Ga. 2012).

- Employer asserting the failure of arbitrators to comply with statutory requirements as a basis for vacating award concerning contested value of company stock failed to make the requisite showing of prejudice under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13, such that there was no basis for reversal at the trial court. Race, Inc. v. Shell, 212 Ga. App. 587, 442 S.E.2d 767 (1994).

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(2) did not provide a basis for vacating an arbitration award; while the comments made and questions asked by the arbitration panel's chairperson were aggressive, the record showed that the chairperson was merely trying to ferret out what happened between a subcontractor and the entities that had hired the subcontractor to work on a construction project. Airtab, Inc. v. Limbach Co., LLC, 295 Ga. App. 720, 673 S.E.2d 69 (2009).

- Trial court's order denying a company's motion to vacate a class determination arbitration award was a final one under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1). Once the trial court concluded that the company did not comply with the limitation period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(a), nothing remained for the trial court's consideration; therefore, an appeal could not be considered interlocutory, and the company was not required to file an application for discretionary appeal as a prerequisite to the appellate court obtaining jurisdiction. Cypress Communs., Inc. v. Zacharias, 291 Ga. App. 790, 662 S.E.2d 857 (2008).

- Where, in a proceeding for confirmation of an arbitration award and on appeal from the judgment confirming the award, defendant made no arguments based on O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13, but limited the defendant's challenge only to a prearbitration ruling by the trial court on motions in limine that were pending when the case was referred for arbitration, defendant's claim did not state grounds for vacation of the award. Stringer v. Harkleroad & Hermance, 218 Ga. App. 701, 463 S.E.2d 152 (1995).

- The term "party" refers to a party to the arbitration agreement or some other party whose rights the arbitration award purports to affect; a stranger to the arbitration, whose rights are not affected by the award, lacks standing to attack its validity. Wachovia Bank v. Miller, 232 Ga. App. 606, 502 S.E.2d 538 (1998).

- In a child custody dispute, the trial court did not err by confirming the arbitration award and denying the father's motion to vacate because the arbitrator's decision automatically changing visitation did not violate public policy and that the award lacked evidentiary support was not a basis for vacating the arbitrator's decision. Brazzel v. Brazzel, 337 Ga. App. 758, 789 S.E.2d 626 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1889, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 146 (Ga. 2017).

- An arbitration award may be vacated only if one or more of the four statutory grounds set forth in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 is found to exist and, thus, an award could not be vacated based upon a determination that no evidence supported it; reversing Hundley v. Greene, 218 Ga. App. 193, 461 S.E.2d 250 (1995). Greene v. Hundley, 266 Ga. 592, 468 S.E.2d 350 (1996).

Because arbitration code is in derogation of common law, this provision must be strictly construed, and the four statutory bases for vacation of an arbitration award are therefore the exclusive grounds for such action. Ralston v. City of Dahlonega, 236 Ga. App. 386, 512 S.E.2d 300 (1999).

Courts cannot inquire into the merits of an arbitrable controversy, but must confine their review of an award to the statutory grounds. Ralston v. City of Dahlonega, 236 Ga. App. 386, 512 S.E.2d 300 (1999).

A showing of prejudice is required in addition to showing that the prejudice results from one of the reasons listed in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13. Bennett v. Builders II, Inc., 237 Ga. App. 756, 516 S.E.2d 808 (1999).

Absent a finding of prejudice due to one of the four statutory grounds set forth in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13, it was not error for the trial court to confirm the arbitration award. Worsham v. Krause, 272 Ga. 528, 529 S.E.2d 373 (2000).

Arbitration award cannot be set aside for mistakes of fact made by the arbitrators, but an award may only be set aside for violation of one or more of the statutory grounds set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b); the statute provides the exclusive grounds to vacate all or part of an arbitration award, and, as the Georgia Arbitration Code, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 et seq., is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed. Scana Energy Mktg., Inc. v. Cobb Energy Mgmt. Corp., 259 Ga. App. 216, 576 S.E.2d 548 (2002).

Courts must not decide the rightness or wrongness of an arbitrator's contract interpretation, only whether the decision "draws its essence" from the contract; a contract carrier's argument that an arbitrator did not correctly interpret a shipping contract did not establish one of the statutory grounds for vacating the award. U.S. Intermodal & Thunderbolt Express v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 267 Ga. App. 832, 600 S.E.2d 800 (2004).

Because the sole enumeration of error was that the arbitrators exhibited a manifest disregard of the law because there was not a valid and enforceable contract between the parties to be breached, but, there was a written document signed by both parties which was contained in the record and because no transcript of either the arbitration hearing or the hearing on the application to vacate the award was provided to the appellate court; the party failed to carry the party's burden of establishing by record evidence the statutory ground of manifest disregard of the law. Humar Props., LLLP v. Prior Tire Enters., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 306, 605 S.E.2d 926 (2004).

Trial court properly refused to vacate an arbitration award for an attorney based on an allegation that the evidence did not support the award; the client challenging the award did not allege that the award was in manifest disregard of the law. Durden v. Suggs, 271 Ga. App. 688, 610 S.E.2d 640 (2005).

Because parties' lease added to the grounds for vacatur provided in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b), and because the record exhibited no overstepping of the arbitrator's authority or manifest disregard of the law, the trial court properly denied the owner's motion to vacate the award. Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 299 Ga. App. 614, 683 S.E.2d 40 (2009), aff'd, 287 Ga. 408, 696 S.E.2d 663 (2010).

- Where the record in a case contains no showing that petitioners seeking to vacate award objected to the timeliness of the award prior to its issuance and delivery to them, their contention that the trial court erred in confirming the award is without merit. Diversified Ass'y, Inc. v. Ra-Lin & Assocs., 186 Ga. App. 904, 368 S.E.2d 786 (1988).

Facts did not support vacation of award to general contractors. See Raymer v. Foster & Cooper, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 200, 393 S.E.2d 49 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93).

Regardless of whether the arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority by considering parol evidence in this case, the superior court correctly refused to vacate the decision of the arbitrator, because when the rules applicable to contract construction are applied in this case, the arbitrator's decision is correct. Martin v. RocCorp, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 177, 441 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

- The context in which the word "corruption" was used by the legislature in promulgating subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 reveals that the word was intended to connote "corrupt or dishonest proceedings." The "corruption" required to vacate an award is an act of undue means rendering the proceedings tantamount to being dishonest. Haddon v. Shaheen & Co., 231 Ga. App. 596, 499 S.E.2d 693 (1998).

- Where the award was vacated and a "rehearing" was directed by the Court of Appeals, the trial court could properly restrict the arbitrator to the two issues found fatal to the earlier award by the Court of Appeals. Mid-American Elevator Co. v. Gemco Elevator Co., 189 Ga. App. 143, 375 S.E.2d 275 (1988).

It was prejudicial error for the trial court, in response to a judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating the original award and directing a "rehearing," to authorize the arbitrator to recompute the arbitrator's former award on the basis of the evidence before the arbitrator, without permitting either party to submit additional evidence and/or a brief, if desired. Mid-American Elevator Co. v. Gemco Elevator Co., 189 Ga. App. 143, 375 S.E.2d 275 (1988).

- In an arbitration action between a subcontractor and its general contractor, the trial court did not err in denying the subcontractor's motion to vacate the arbitration award on grounds that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in finding that, for purposes of awarding attorney fees and costs, the general subcontractor was the prevailing party, as the arbitrator concluded that the award did not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties beyond that which was previously offered by the general contractor, which was the correct legal standard. Dan J. Sheehan Co. v. McCrory Constr. Co., 284 Ga. App. 159, 643 S.E.2d 546 (2007).

- In a construction contract dispute submitted to arbitration, there was no specific finding by the arbitrator as to whether the requisite bond under the contract was submitted. Thus, it could not be determined if the arbitrator overstepped the arbitrator's authority or imperfectly executed the arbitrator's authority in either awarding interest or in establishing a date to begin computing interest. Sayler Marine Corp. v. Dixie Metal Co., 194 Ga. App. 853, 392 S.E.2d 45 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Haddon v. Shaheen & Co., 231 Ga. App. 596, 499 S.E.2d 693 (1998).

Because the arbitration proceeding was not recorded and the arbitration award did not contain detailed findings of fact, the appellate court could not review the refusal to vacate the arbitration award under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5) in which the builder alleged that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by failing to account for the contract balance stipulated by the parties. Ordner Constr. Co. v. Parkside Crossing, 300, LLC, 276 Ga. App. 753, 624 S.E.2d 206 (2005).

Fact that the arbitrators in a breach of contract action failed to provide any explanation for denying the subcontractor's request for attorney fees and interest was not a basis for vacating an arbitration award as the arbitrators were not required to enter written findings of fact or to explain the reasoning behind an award. Airtab, Inc. v. Limbach Co., LLC, 295 Ga. App. 720, 673 S.E.2d 69 (2009).

In a divorce action, the trial court did not err in vacating the arbitration award because the award did not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law as expressly required by the parties' arbitration agreement incorporated into the consent order and the husband was entitled to receive the benefit of his bargain. King v. King, 354 Ga. App. 19, 840 S.E.2d 108 (2020).

- The arbitrator overstepped the arbitrator's authority by awarding actual damages where the express terms of the contract permitted only the recovery of liquidated damages. Sweatt v. International Dev. Corp., 242 Ga. App. 753, 531 S.E.2d 192 (2000).

- Final and definite arbitration award was not made because the arbitrator refused to consider the seller's counterclaim alleging that the buyer breached the buyer's obligations under certain promissory notes. The arbitration clauses in the parties' contracts required that "any and all disputes" between the parties be determined solely by arbitration; this included the dispute raised by the seller's counterclaim. Hansen & Hansen Enters. v. SCSJ Enters., 299 Ga. App. 469, 682 S.E.2d 652 (2009).

- Trial court erred by confirming an arbitration award in favor of a supplier against a corporation owned by a Native American tribe because the corporation was an arm of the tribe entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, but was not authorized to waive tribal sovereign immunity by entering the contract containing the arbitration clause. The corporation did not waive the defense by failing to file an application to vacate the award. Churchill Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. ClearNexus, Inc., 341 Ga. App. 798, 802 S.E.2d 85 (2017).

- The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the parties' contract, and courts must not decide the rightness or wrongness of the arbitrators' contract interpretation, only whether their decision draws its essence from the contract. Southwire Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 248 Ga. App. 226, 545 S.E.2d 681 (2001).

- Trial court could not extend the time during which a natural gas marketer was permitted to accept an alternative remedy under an arbitration award as a trial court lacked the statutory authority under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) to alter an arbitrators' award. Scana Energy Mktg., Inc. v. Cobb Energy Mgmt. Corp., 259 Ga. App. 216, 576 S.E.2d 548 (2002).

As a construction company's motion to vacate an arbitration award with a store owner required a court to review whether the evidence supported particular findings of the arbitrator, such was not reviewable; factual findings of the arbitrator did not provide a ground for vacatur under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b). Barron Reed Constr. v. 430, LLC, 275 Ga. App. 884, 622 S.E.2d 83 (2005).

Trial court's order vacating an arbitrators' award for a subcontractor under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5) was reversed as there was no hearing transcript of the arbitration proceedings and the trial court could not determine from the face of the arbitration award what law the arbitrators applied or that the arbitrators deliberately ignored the applicable law. Progressive Plumbing, Inc. v. ABCO Builders, Inc., 281 Ga. App. 696, 637 S.E.2d 92 (2006), aff'd, 282 Ga. 308, 647 S.E.2d 574 (2007).

- Individual's motion for a protective order pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7026(c) and a special master's motion to quash, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, a debtor's subpoena of the special master for a deposition and document production to question the special master on the basis for an arbitration decision, were granted because: (1) Georgia law provided that arbitrators could not have been required to testify as to their rationale or the reasoning behind their awards; (2) both the debtor and the individual agreed in a consent order in a state court action that the special master's decision was final and binding, and both parties waived their rights of appeal or reconsideration; and (3) the three-month period under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 to appeal the decision had passed, and, thus, deposing the special master would have been a useless act. Silver v. Protos (In re Protos), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2004).

Attorney's objections to an attorney fee arbitration award in favor of the attorney's client's mother's estate were filed too late; the client's application to confirm the award was filed timely under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-12, but the attorney's objection was filed well outside the three-month limitation in O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-13(a) and9-9-14(a). McFarland v. Roberts, 335 Ga. App. 40, 778 S.E.2d 349 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0522, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 229 (Ga. 2016).

- Final arbitration award, which did not address the owners' breach of contract and fraud claims against a builder, barred a subsequent suit as the owners failed to timely renew their motion to vacate the award under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) after it was dismissed from a foreclosure action and the breach of contract and fraud claims had been submitted for arbitration. Witherington v. Adkins, 271 Ga. App. 837, 610 S.E.2d 561 (2005).

- Client's motion to vacate an arbitration award was properly denied as the client's claim that the arbitrator improperly awarded an attorney a fee based on distributions the client received without the attorney's assistance was a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Doman v. Stapleton, 272 Ga. App. 114, 611 S.E.2d 673 (2005).

In a case seeking to vacate an arbitration award under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b), it was evident that a seller's claims of "manifest disregard of the law" were nothing more than unreviewable factual issues; further, by failing to provide a transcript of the arbitration hearing to the appellate court, the seller was precluded from fulfilling its burden of showing by the record that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. McGill Homes, Inc. v. Weaver, 278 Ga. App. 622, 629 S.E.2d 535 (2006).

- In an arbitration arising out of a construction contract, the arbitrator's award of payment to a subcontractor under an invoice did not manifestly disregard the law under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) of the Georgia Arbitration Code even though there was evidence that a construction manager and others had paid the invoice; the award did not equate with manifest disregard of the law or provide a ground to vacate the award because it was grounded in the parties' contract in that it was intended to compensate for bad faith which the arbitrator found that a corporation, a property owner, and a construction manager had shown by failing to keep the subcontractor apprised of the work schedule and thus preventing it from accepting other work. Johnson Real Estate Invs., LLC v. Aqua Industrials, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 638, 639 S.E.2d 589 (2006).

A trial court properly denied a car dealership's motion to vacate an arbitration award in favor of a customer under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5). Whether or not the arbitrator correctly interpreted the Truth in Lending Act, the dealership did not show that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law to reach the result the arbitrator reached. Savannah Dodge, Inc. v. Bynes, 291 Ga. App. 281, 661 S.E.2d 660 (2008).

Subcontractor's assertion that the arbitrators in a breach of contract action ignored the law failed as the subcontractor failed to point to any evidence that the arbitrators ignored the subcontract or any controlling law. Airtab, Inc. v. Limbach Co., LLC, 295 Ga. App. 720, 673 S.E.2d 69 (2009).

Arbitrator's award was improperly vacated under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5) on grounds that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law of rescission as the arbitrator cited O.C.G.A. § 13-4-60 and applicable case law concerning rescission and applied that law to the circumstances of the case. Hansen & Hansen Enters. v. SCSJ Enters., 299 Ga. App. 469, 682 S.E.2d 652 (2009).

Arbitration award in favor of a home builder entitled the builder to summary judgment in the home buyers' action for breach of contract. The trial court erred in denying the builder's motion to confirm the award, because the buyers did not show that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the applicable law or the parties' contract under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5). America's Home Place, Inc. v. Cassidy, 301 Ga. App. 233, 687 S.E.2d 254 (2009).

Trial court properly denied a motion by a law client under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5) seeking to vacate an arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator disregarded and violated Henning's Rules regarding disclosure of potential conflicts as it was not shown that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the proper law applicable to the case, which involved a dispute over legal fees owed by the client. Phan v. Andre & Blaustein, LLP, 309 Ga. App. 191, 709 S.E.2d 863 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1339, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 61 (Ga. 2012).

Arbitration award was affirmed because the arbitrator included with the arbitrator's award a detailed legal memorandum in which the arbitrator considered the cases cited by the franchisees but distinguished the cases on the facts. The fact that the arbitrator rejected the franchisees' legal argument did not mean the arbitrator ignored the arguments. SCSJ Enters. v. Hansen & Hansen Enters., 319 Ga. App. 210, 734 S.E.2d 214 (2012).

Trial court erred in vacating an arbitration award in a product liability action because the buyer failed to carry the burden of establishing that the subjective prong of the test for manifest disregard was met as nothing in the arbitration order reflected that the arbitrator appreciated that apportionment of damages was improper if strict liability applied but decided to ignore that principle. Patterson v. Long, 321 Ga. App. 157, 741 S.E.2d 242 (2013).

Dismissal of law clerks' motion to confirm an arbitration award in the clerks' favor on the clerks' group-pay grievance against a county due to alleged pay disparity was not warranted as the back pay award was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; accordingly, there was no manifest disregard of the law by the arbitrator. Fulton County v. Lord, 323 Ga. App. 384, 746 S.E.2d 188 (2013).

In a dispute between the licensor of a doll brand to a licensee, an arbitrator did not manifestly disregard Georgia's parol evidence rule, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5), when the arbitrator considered extrinsic evidence of the commercial context in which the license agreements were executed in determining that the licensor could engage in the negotiation of a new license agreement in the year before the agreement expired. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Jakks Pac., Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2017)(Unpublished).

- In seeking to vacate an arbitration award to a subcontractor on the basis that the arbitrator allegedly showed manifest disregard of the law under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5), a construction manager and others failed to show any evidence that the Georgia legislature intended to adopt something other than the federally recognized concept of manifest disregard; thus, an error in interpreting the applicable law does not constitute manifest disregard, and instead, a showing must be made, other than the result obtained, that the arbitrator knew the law and expressly disregarded it. Johnson Real Estate Invs., LLC v. Aqua Industrials, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 638, 639 S.E.2d 589 (2006).

Trial court properly denied plaintiffs' motion to vacate an arbitration award in a suit asserting breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and other claims on the ground that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, because that ground, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5), only applied to claims filed after July 1, 2003, and the action was commenced in 2002. Ansley Marine Constr., Inc. v. Swanberg, 290 Ga. App. 388, 660 S.E.2d 6 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1260, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 673 (Ga. 2008).

Cited in West v. Jamison, 182 Ga. App. 565, 356 S.E.2d 659 (1987); Mid-American Elevator Co. v. Gemco Elevator Co., 183 Ga. App. 88, 357 S.E.2d 838 (1987); Thacker Constr. Co. v. A Betterway Rent-A-Car, Inc., 186 Ga. App. 660, 368 S.E.2d 178 (1988); Hardin Constr. Group, Inc. v. Fuller Enters., Inc., 265 Ga. 770, 462 S.E.2d 130 (1995); Hood v. Garland, 223 Ga. App. 45, 476 S.E.2d 827 (1996); Akintobi v. Phoenix Fire Restoration Co., 236 Ga. App. 760, 513 S.E.2d 507 (1999); Threatt v. Forsyth County, 250 Ga. App. 838, 552 S.E.2d 123 (2001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- What constitutes corruption, fraud, or undue means in obtaining arbitration award justifying avoidance of award under state law, 22 A.L.R.4th 366.

Participation in arbitration proceedings as waiver to objections to arbitrability under state law, 56 A.L.R.5th 757.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators - insurance appraisals or arbitrations, 63 A.L.R.5th 675.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators - torts, 64 A.L.R.5th 475.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrator - labor disputes, 66 A.L.R.5th 611.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators - commercial, business, or real estate transactions, 67 A.L.R.5th 179.

Construction and application of § 10(a)(4) of Federal Arbitration Act [9 USCS § 10(a)(4)] providing for vacating of arbitration awards where arbitrators exceed or imperfectly execute powers, 136 A.L.R. Fed 183.

Construction and application of § 10(a)(1)-(3) of Federal Arbitration Act [9 USCS § 10(a)(1)-(3)] providing for vacating of arbitration awards where award procured by fraud, corruption, or undue means, where arbitrators evidence partiality or corruption and where arbitrators engage in particular acts of misbehavior, 141 A.L.R. Fed 1.

Vacation on public policy grounds arbitration awards reinstating discharged employees, 142 A.L.R. Fed 387.

Refusal to enforce foreign arbitration awards on public policy grounds, 144 A.L.R. Fed. 481.

Vacating arbitration awards as contrary to National Labor Relations Act, 147 A.L.R. Fed. 77.

Application of Tribal Sovereign Immunity from Lawsuit -- U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 3 (2018).