2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 5 - Injunctions
§ 9-5-1. For What Purposes Injunctions May Be Issued

Equity, by a writ of injunction, may restrain proceedings in another or the same court, a threatened or existing tort, or any other act of a private individual or corporation which is illegal or contrary to equity and good conscience and for which no adequate remedy is provided at law.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 3137; Code 1868, § 3149; Code 1873, § 3210; Code 1882, § 3210; Civil Code 1895, § 4913; Civil Code 1910, § 5490; Code 1933, § 55-101.)

- For article, "Injunction Procedure in Georgia," see 13 Ga. B.J. 300 (1951). For article advocating consistency in statutory provisions governing review of administrative conduct in Georgia, prior to the enactment of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, see 15 Ga. B.J. 153 (1952). For article, "The 1967 Amendments to the Georgia Civil Practice Act and the Appellate Procedure Act," see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 383 (1967). For article discussing validity of ex parte injunction affecting constitutionally protected rights, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 246 (1973). For article, "State Court Injunctions in Labor Disputes," see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 559 (1974). For note advocating reassessment of state authority towards injunctions in labor disputes, see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 461 (1967). For note, "The Ongoing Royalty: What Remedy Should a Patent Holder Receive When a Permanent Injunction Is Denied," see 43 Ga. L. Rev. 543 (2009).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Applicability to Specific Cases

Equity jurisdiction as it existed at common law has been enlarged by statute in this state and it is not limited to the protection of rights of property. Sutton v. Adams, 180 Ga. 48, 178 S.E. 365 (1934).

- O.C.G.A. §§ 9-4-1,9-5-1,40-2-8,40-3-6,40-3-21, and48-2-59 provided plaintiff challenging automobile "title transfer fee" with "plain, speedy, and efficient" pre-tax and post-tax remedies by which a taxpayer might challenge the constitutional validity of a state tax, and so satisfied the criteria of the Tax Injunction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, so as to bar jurisdiction of the federal court. Johnsen v. Collins, 875 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1994).

Injunction is an extraordinary process, and the most important one which courts of equity issue; being so, it should never be granted except where there is grave danger of impending injury to person or property rights, and a mere threat or bare fear of such injury is not sufficient. Thomas v. Mayor of Savannah, 209 Ga. 866, 76 S.E.2d 796 (1953).

Each case must be determined on its particular allegations, and must be decided on the nature, extent, and kind of equitable relief sought and the relationship between the parties to the action. Newport Timber Corp. v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 535, 277 S.E.2d 646 (1981).

Injunction will restrain any act contrary to equity and good conscience, and for which no adequate remedy at law is provided. Waycross Military Ass'n v. Hiers, 209 Ga. 812, 76 S.E.2d 486 (1953).

Remedy by injunction in state court is plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. Adams v. Smith, 415 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 568 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1978).

Issuance of a stay of execution is equivalent to grant of interlocutory injunction, at least where a hearing with notice to parties is conducted on application for the stay. Zant v. Dick, 249 Ga. 799, 294 S.E.2d 508 (1982).

Remedy of injunction does not lie where one has complete and adequate remedy at law. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 196 Ga. 204, 26 S.E.2d 283 (1943).

It is error to grant an interlocutory injunction where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. Thomas v. Mayor of Savannah, 209 Ga. 866, 76 S.E.2d 796 (1953).

Universal test of jurisdiction to issue injunctions is absence of legal remedy by which the complainant might obtain the full relief to which the facts and circumstances entitle the complainant. Chadwick v. Dolinoff, 207 Ga. 702, 64 S.E.2d 76 (1951).

If court at law has full power to grant relief, there is no ground for equity's jurisdiction. Morton v. Gardner, 242 Ga. 852, 252 S.E.2d 413 (1979).

- Where all parties at interest are parties to the cause, and in which cause the rights of all parties might properly be finally adjudicated, jurisdiction in equity is not ousted because there may be pending an action at law in another court. Todd v. Conner, 220 Ga. 173, 137 S.E.2d 614 (1964).

Interlocutory injunction is device to keep parties in order, and prevent one from hurting the other while their respective rights are under adjudication. Milton Frank Allen Publications, Inc. v. Georgia Ass'n of Petro. Retailers, 223 Ga. 784, 158 S.E.2d 248 (1967).

Purpose of interlocutory injunction is preliminary and preparatory; it looks to a future final hearing, and while contemplating what the result of that hearing may be, it does not settle what it shall be. Milton Frank Allen Publications, Inc. v. Georgia Ass'n of Petro. Retailers, 223 Ga. 784, 158 S.E.2d 248 (1967).

Sole purpose for granting interlocutory injunctions is to preserve status quo of the parties pending a final adjudication of the case. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 254 S.E.2d 822 (1979).

Preliminary injunction is, by its very nature, tentative, provisional, ad interim, impermanent, mutable, not fixed or final or conclusive. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 317 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed, 441 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1971).

It is not function of preliminary injunction to decide case on merits, and the possibility that the party obtaining a preliminary injunction may not win on the merits at the trial is not determinative of the propriety or validity of the trial court's granting the preliminary injunction. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 317 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed, 441 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1971).

Temporary injunction may be granted where there is substantial controversy between parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 317 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed, 441 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1971).

- When a motion for preliminary injunction is presented to a court in advance of hearing on the merits it is called upon to exercise it discretion upon the basis of a series of estimates including among other things, the probability of the ultimate success or failure of the suit, the balancing of damage and convenience generally. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 317 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed, 441 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1971).

General Assembly has expressly repealed former Code 1933, § 55-110, which forbade mandatory injunctions. Atlanta Country Club, Inc. v. Sanders, 230 Ga. 146, 195 S.E.2d 893 (1973); Taylor v. Evans, 232 Ga. 685, 208 S.E.2d 492 (1974).

Since repeal of former Code 1933 § 55-110, mandatory injunctions may issue. Faulkner v. Georgia Power Co., 241 Ga. 168, 247 S.E.2d 80 (1978).

In proper case, mandatory injunction may issue after temporary hearing. Wheatley Grading Contractors v. DFT Invs., Inc., 244 Ga. 663, 261 S.E.2d 614 (1979).

Injunction will not be granted to restrain acts already completed. Georgia Pac. Ry. v. Mayor of Douglasville, 75 Ga. 828 (1885); Russell v. Napier, 80 Ga. 77, 4 S.E. 857 (1887); Simmons v. Lindsay, 144 Ga. 845, 88 S.E. 199 (1916); Shurley v. Black, 156 Ga. 683, 119 S.E. 618 (1923); Hapeville-Block, Inc. v. Walker, 204 Ga. 462, 50 S.E.2d 9 (1948); Blackwell v. Farrar, 209 Ga. 420, 73 S.E.2d 203 (1952); Scott v. Sherwood Mem. Gardens, Inc., 214 Ga. 25, 102 S.E.2d 556 (1958); Avis, Inc. v. Graham, 217 Ga. 330, 122 S.E.2d 245 (1961).

Courts cannot restrain that which has already been done, and where it appears from all of the allegations of the petition that the acts complained of were fully consummated, there are no grounds for injunction. Whipkey v. Turner, 206 Ga. 410, 57 S.E.2d 481 (1950).

Injunction is never a proper remedy against completed acts. Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E.2d 767 (1951).

Where a single act sought to be enjoined has been accomplished, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to grant the injunction. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 229 Ga. 689, 194 S.E.2d 98 (1972).

- Where it is shown that the very act sought to be enjoined has now been completed, a reversal of the judgment refusing to enjoin that act would be futile, and therefore the questions were moot. Story v. City of Macon, 203 Ga. 105, 45 S.E.2d 196 (1947).

Merely because defendant has done wrong in certain instances, court will not anticipate similar wrongs which are entirely separate, and will not undertake to control in a general way the acts of the defendant by granting an injunction. Felton Beauty Supply Co. v. Kline, 182 Ga. 20, 184 S.E. 703 (1935).

Mere threat of injury will not authorize injunction. Moore v. City of Tifton, 204 Ga. 599, 50 S.E.2d 595 (1948); Thomas v. Mayor of Savannah, 209 Ga. 866, 76 S.E.2d 796 (1953).

Bare threat of injury to property offers no basis for equitable relief by injunction or otherwise. Allegations based on mere apprehension of injury and general conclusions, without alleging facts to show irreparable injury, are insufficient to authorize the grant of injunctive relief. Insurance Ctr., Inc. v. Hamilton, 218 Ga. 597, 129 S.E.2d 801 (1963).

A mere apprehension of danger or injury will not require equitable relief. Ellis v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 335, 133 S.E.2d 350 (1963).

Courts of equity will not exercise power to allay mere apprehensions of injury, but only where the injury is imminent and irreparable and there is no adequate remedy at law. Morton v. Gardner, 242 Ga. 852, 252 S.E.2d 413 (1979).

One is not required to await infliction of injury before seeking to prevent it by injunction. Ellis v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 335, 133 S.E.2d 350 (1963).

Equitable relief will not be denied where solid reasons justify apprehension, especially where, had the plaintiff not acted promptly, the plaintiff might be foreclosed from full relief. Ellis v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 335, 133 S.E.2d 350 (1963).

Allegations as to past trespasses and a reasonable fear of future acts which of necessity would be continuous in nature furnish a basis for equitable relief. Ellis v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 335, 133 S.E.2d 350 (1963).

Party is not entitled to injunction when, with full knowledge, the party delays in asserting rights, and has negligently suffered large expenditures to be made by another party, on whom great injury would be inflicted by the grant of the injunction. Sandersville R.R. v. Gilmore, 212 Ga. 481, 93 S.E.2d 696 (1956), overruled on other grounds, Cox v. Zucker, 214 Ga. 44, 102 S.E.2d 580 (1958).

- No one has a right to come into a court of equity and obtain the stringent remedy of injunction against the operation of a statute which has not yet in any way been enforced against the complainants. Standard Cigar Co. v. Doyal, 175 Ga. 857, 166 S.E. 434 (1932).

- Where it does not appear that the complainant will be hurt by the action the complainant seeks to prevent, an injunction will not be granted. Pattison v. Farkas, 180 Ga. 798, 180 S.E. 831 (1935).

Injunction is not primary remedy to determine question of title to public office. Martin v. Crawford, 199 Ga. 497, 34 S.E.2d 699 (1945).

Expressed abandonment by defendant of illegal action not necessarily reason for denying injunction. Denson v. Tarver, 186 Ga. 180, 197 S.E. 242 (1938).

Residents and taxpayers of municipality may sue in equity to enjoin enforcement of ordinance, on the alleged grounds that it is void, and that the manner of its enforcement would increase the municipal taxes. And this applies to a case where a municipal ordinance exacts charges for licenses to engage in sale of "alcoholic beverages," and the action is brought to enjoin the officer whose duty it is to collect the tax, and to issue licenses, from issuing licenses; the alleged ground of relief being that the ordinance is void as being violative of the laws of the state, and that administration of the law will cause an unauthorized burden upon the taxpayers. Bagby v. Bowen, 180 Ga. 214, 178 S.E. 439 (1935).

Taxpayer may bring suit to enjoin county officials from doing unauthorized or illegal acts. Ferguson v. Randolph County, 211 Ga. 103, 84 S.E.2d 70 (1954).

- Court must have jurisdiction of the persons of defendants before an injunction other than a mere stay of the proceedings can be granted. Dowdy v. Bird, 146 Ga. 16, 90 S.E. 281 (1916).

Plaintiff cannot sue to enjoin trespass to land located in another state, although the defendants reside in this state. Laslie v. Gragg Lumber Co., 184 Ga. 794, 193 S.E. 763 (1937).

- In absence of allegations that plaintiff is not possessed of an adequate and complete remedy at law, petition fails to state a proper cause for the extraordinary equitable remedy of injunction. Chadwick v. Dolinoff, 207 Ga. 702, 64 S.E.2d 76 (1951).

Right to injunction must clearly appear, and a case which does not rest upon doubtful or disputed principles of law must be stated in the pleadings. Everett v. Tabor, 119 Ga. 128, 46 S.E. 72 (1903).

Terms of injunction should be explicit and definite. Morris Fertilizer Co. v. Boykin, 149 Ga. 673, 101 S.E. 799 (1920).

Cited in Floyd County v. Fincher, 169 Ga. 460, 150 S.E. 577 (1929); Neal Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. O'Neal ex rel. Sealy, 175 Ga. 883, 166 S.E. 647 (1932); Sutton v. Adams, 180 Ga. 48, 178 S.E. 365 (1934); Cummings v. Robinson, 194 Ga. 336, 21 S.E.2d 627 (1942); Walker Elec. Co. v. Walton, 203 Ga. 246, 46 S.E.2d 184 (1948); Davis v. Logan, 206 Ga. 524, 57 S.E.2d 568 (1950); Scarbrough v. Cook, 208 Ga. 697, 69 S.E.2d 201 (1952); Coffey v. City of Marietta, 212 Ga. 189, 91 S.E.2d 482 (1956); Oliver v. Dickerson Supply Co., 221 Ga. 146, 143 S.E.2d 632 (1965); Womble v. State Bd. of Exmrs., 221 Ga. 457, 145 S.E.2d 485 (1965); Clark's Valdosta, Inc. v. City of Valdosta, 224 Ga. 331, 161 S.E.2d 867 (1968); McDonald v. McDonald, 232 Ga. 190, 205 S.E.2d 850 (1974); Murrey v. Specialty Underwriters, Inc., 233 Ga. 804, 213 S.E.2d 668 (1975); Troop Constr. Corp. v. Davis, 249 Ga. 830, 294 S.E.2d 503 (1982); Cook v. Thomas, 175 Ga. App. 836, 334 S.E.2d 727 (1985); City of Duluth v. Riverbrooke Properties, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 46, 502 S.E.2d 806 (1998); Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 706 S.E.2d 634 (2011); Durham v. Durham, 291 Ga. 231, 728 S.E.2d 627 (2012); Rentz v. Rentz, 339 Ga. App. 66, 793 S.E.2d 112 (2016); Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265, 840 S.E.2d 423 (2020).

Applicability to Specific Cases

1. Cases Where Injunction Proper

- Even though a contract contains a provision for liquidated damages in the event of its breach, equity will enjoin the breach where the contract plainly shows that faithful performance of its covenants was intended. Insurance Ctr., Inc. v. Hamilton, 218 Ga. 597, 129 S.E.2d 801 (1963).

In a breach of contract action between an insurer and an agency, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in granting an interlocutory injunction to the agency as, after a balancing of the equities in the agency's favor, the record supported the finding that the insurer conducted itself, to the agency's detriment, as though arbitration of the dispute had been completed and it had been absolved from complying with its post-termination obligations under the underlying agency agreement between the parties. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stephen Brown Ins. Agency, Inc., 290 Ga. App. 660, 660 S.E.2d 445 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1321, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 687 (Ga. 2008).

- An injunction may issue to restrain cutting of timber where damages would be irreparable or where the trespass is a continuing one. Anderson v. Thompson, 192 Ga. 570, 15 S.E.2d 890 (1941); Prescott v. Herring, 212 Ga. 571, 94 S.E.2d 417 (1956); Ellis v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 335, 133 S.E.2d 350 (1963).

The cutting of timber may be enjoined where there are frequent acts of trespass, or the circumstances indicate that the trespasses will recur from day to day. Waycross Military Ass'n v. Hiers, 209 Ga. 812, 76 S.E.2d 486 (1953).

- Where there is no authority to hold the election, or where statutory requirements pertaining to the holding of an election are not complied with, the election is void, and injunction is a proper remedy. Kemp v. Mitchell County Democratic Executive Comm., 216 Ga. 276, 116 S.E.2d 321 (1960).

- Where upon the agreement of borrower that loan should be a first lien on property offered as security, and that, in the event lending corporation removed and discharged certain lien encumbrances from the property offered by borrower as security, lender should be subrogated to all the rights of such existing lienholders, it was not error to restrain and temporarily enjoin the holder of an execution against the property, obtained after the dates of the encumbrances which were paid by the lending corporation, from proceeding with a levy of the execution. Flournoy Plumbing Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 181 Ga. 459, 182 S.E. 507 (1935).

- Trial court did not manifestly abuse the court's discretion in granting the state a modified injunction in a suit against payday lenders because the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate the state was entitled to injunctive relief, namely, that the state would prevail at trial since a substantial judgment was issued against a lender, the lenders failed to produce financial information during discovery, and serious concerns as to the lenders insolvency existed. W. Sky Fin., LLC v. State of Ga. ex rel. Olens, 300 Ga. 340, 793 S.E.2d 357 (2016).

- Where a creditor holds a note containing a waiver of homestead exemption and assignment of property that might be set apart to a bankrupt under claim of homestead exemption, equity may afford the creditor a remedy by injunction to prevent the bankrupt from receiving property set apart on a claim of homestead exemption, and appointment of a receiver to apply to the court of bankruptcy for possession of the property to be administered by the court of equity, as necessary to collection of the debt. Lyle v. Roswell Store, Inc., 187 Ga. 386, 200 S.E. 702 (1938).

- On petition brought by the solicitor general, (now district attorney) based on an information filed by citizens of a city, alleging that proposed exhibition of moving picture shows on Sunday constituted a public nuisance and an open violation of former Code 1933, § 26-6905, the court did not err in granting an injunction. Rose Theater, Inc. v. Lilly, 185 Ga. 53, 193 S.E. 866 (1937).

- Where the evidence showed an unrevoked and unaltered resolution by the governing authorities of a municipality to continue illegal payments for a city school after it became part of the county system, it was error to refuse an injunction against such illegal expenditures. Miller v. City of Cornelia, 188 Ga. 674, 4 S.E.2d 568 (1939).

- Under proper circumstances, a county does have the power to seek an injunction enjoining the violation of the county's ordinances. Thus, the trial court properly granted a county a permanent injunction against a resident who violated property maintenance ordinances and health codes as the court found that criminal prosecutions would not adequately protect the county or be as practical and efficient to the ends of justice. Jacobs v. Chatham County, 295 Ga. App. 74, 670 S.E.2d 885 (2008).

- Acts which injure property, the use of it, or intrude upon another's physical occupancy can be enjoined. Bush v. City of Gainesville, 206 Ga. 182, 56 S.E.2d 478 (1949).

- Because the parties agreed that the owner would retain ownership of a sewer line for a year, the city was properly enjoined from issuing any permits or other form of authorization that would allow a church to connect to the sewer infrastructure installed and paid for by the owner. City of Rincon v. Sean & Ashleigh, Inc., 284 Ga. 465, 667 S.E.2d 354 (2008).

- Interlocutory injunction was proper against a for-profit health care insurance company that had allegedly pirated a non-profit health care sharing ministry's customers and funds after termination of the parties' licensing contract; the ministry's loss of status as an Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18021 et seq., approved ministry would constitute irreparable harm. Aliera Healthcare, Inc. v. Anabaptist Healthshare, 355 Ga. App. 381, 844 S.E.2d 268 (2020).

- Under the evidence there was no abuse of discretion in grant of restraining order to enjoin interference by building tenant with maintenance of advertising sign until further order of court. Haralson v. Seminole Bottling Co., 188 Ga. 600, 4 S.E.2d 452 (1939).

- Petition alleging that the plaintiff purchased a described tract of land, and at the same time acquired an easement adjacent thereto over a lane as a means of ingress and egress from the public road to the plaintiff's farm, that the plaintiff had used this lane without interruption since the date it was acquired until the defendant obstructed the same by placing a "cattle gap" across it, that such obstruction had interfered with the plaintiff's movement of cattle along said lane to a pasture, thereby causing the plaintiff much inconvenience, trouble, and injury to the plaintiff's cattle, and thereby depriving the plaintiff's family of necessary milk and food, stated a cause of action for injunctive relief. Ozbolt v. Miller, 206 Ga. 558, 57 S.E.2d 601 (1950).

In a dispute over a driveway easement between a landowner and a couple, the trial court properly granted the landowner an interlocutory injunction. Even if the landowner's deed did not incorporate by reference a plat that showed the easement, it was critical that the landowner's property could be accessed only through the easement, which gave rise to an easement by implication. Haygood v. Tilley, 295 Ga. App. 90, 670 S.E.2d 800 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0581, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 187 (Ga. 2009); cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1123, 130 S. Ct. 1077, 175 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2010).

- Insolvency of defendant and inability to respond to such damages as plaintiff might recover for breach of contract to operate mill would be ground for injunctive relief to prevent the continued interference with plaintiff's operation of the mill; if anticipated profits could not be recovered, this would tend to show irreparable injury, and would be an additional reason for injunctive relief. Tanner v. Campbell, 182 Ga. 121, 184 S.E. 705 (1936).

- A court of equity may restrain one who seeks by force to interfere with an incumbent's possession of an office. Allen v. Wise, 204 Ga. 415, 50 S.E.2d 69 (1948).

An officer de facto in possession is entitled to equitable intervention to prevent disturbance of such possession otherwise than by judicial process. Allen v. Wise, 204 Ga. 415, 50 S.E.2d 69 (1948).

Where an officer is in possession of an office, and another person, even though that person be a claimant thereto, seeks to interfere by force with such possession, a court of equity, at the instance of the incumbent, will prevent such interference until right to the office has been determined in a proper proceeding. Allen v. Wise, 204 Ga. 415, 50 S.E.2d 69 (1948).

- Where a pastor, after having been legally removed from office by the governing church authority, seeks thereafter to perform the function of pastor and as such to continue in possession of church property devoted to the use and benefit of its pastor, a court, in support of the action of the constituted church authority, may grant an order to restrain. Sanders v. Edwards, 199 Ga. 266, 34 S.E.2d 167 (1945).

- In a suit by dealer against manufacturer and several transferees, instituted before maturity of notes, on the basis of the dealer's equitable interest therein, to enjoin further payment of the notes by the makers, and for appointment of a receiver to collect the balance due on the notes and apply the proceeds after discharge of the debt due to the finance company, which the dealer had guaranteed, the judge did not err on the pleadings and the evidence, in granting an injunction and appointing a receiver. Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Capital City Supply Co., 193 Ga. 695, 19 S.E.2d 729 (1942).

- Where no question of prescriptive rights was involved in suit by a dairy farmer seeking to enjoin a manufacturing company from polluting a stream, and where there was evidence, though conflicting, that the stream was being polluted, and that the petitioner had not acquiesced or consented for the water from the defendants' sewerage disposal plant to be discharged upon the petitioner's land, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in granting an interlocutory injunction. Kingsley Mill Corp. v. Edmonds, 208 Ga. 374, 67 S.E.2d 111 (1951).

- In suit by creditors of a deceased person, against the executors and others, praying on facts alleged, to have described property decreed to be the property of the estate, and for injunction, receiver, and general relief, it being alleged in the petition that the property in question was claimed adversely to the estate by defendants, that such claim was unfounded in fact, and that without this property the estate would be insolvent, the petition stated a cause of action as against the several defendants. Benton v. Turk, 188 Ga. 710, 4 S.E.2d 580 (1939).

- An injunction will lie for the owner of land brought by a county at a tax sale to prevent the county from reselling the land before the time claimed by the owner as the expiration of the owner's redemption period where it is alleged that the county is threatening to sell the land in small tracts to numerous purchasers while the right of redemption still exists, which if done would subject the owner to a multiplicity of suits with such purchasers. Newsom v. Dade County, 177 Ga. 612, 171 S.E. 145 (1933), later appeal, 180 Ga. 403, 179 S.E. 89 (1935).

- Where evidence which the plaintiff introduced at an interlocutory hearing was sufficient to authorize a finding that the security deed which contained the power of sale the defendants were attempting to exercise was in fact a forgery, the trial judge did not abuse the judge's discretion in granting a temporary injunction to enjoin defendants from selling the owner's land at public auction. Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. George, 214 Ga. 312, 104 S.E.2d 434 (1958).

- Where purported tax fi. fa. is of an origin unauthorized by law, the taxpayer is entitled to an injunction to prevent sale of property. Vincent v. Poole, 181 Ga. 718, 184 S.E. 269 (1936).

Injunction will lie, at the instance of any taxpayer who has not estopped the taxpayer's rights, to enjoin a sale of the taxpayer's property for the collection of an unauthorized tax, for the reason that, unless authorized by statute, an affidavit of illegality is not a proper remedy to contest the illegality of an execution in the nature of a tax execution; but where one complains of the illegality of a taxing statute or collection procedure thereunder on an attempted collection of an execution issued by the State Revenue Commission, (now State Revenue Commissioner) the taxpayer has an adequate remedy at law by affidavit of illegality. Carreker v. Green & Milam, Inc., 183 Ga. 864, 189 S.E. 836 (1937).

One against whom an unlawful exaction in the form of a tax is sought to be made is entitled to an injunction to restrain its collection, if adequate remedy at law by affidavit of illegality is not provided. West Lumber Co. v. City of Atlanta, 209 Ga. 739, 76 S.E.2d 10 (1953).

- Where plaintiffs could show that Department of Revenue employees, acting for the commissioner, were engaged in a series of audits conducted solely to uncover criminal activity unrelated to tax improprieties on the part of the person audited, such conduct would be illegal and would constitute grounds for the issuance of an injunction against such employees. Willis v. Department of Revenue, 255 Ga. 649, 340 S.E.2d 591 (1986).

- Petition, seeking cancellation of a security deed, and injunction against a sale under power contained therein, alleging that the debt which the deed was given to secure had been paid, was sufficient to set forth a cause of action for the relief prayed for. Perry v. Gormley, 183 Ga. 757, 189 S.E. 850 (1937).

- Where a former employer asserted claims identical to ones that were compulsory counterclaims in earlier suits, the trial court erred in denying a plea in abatement to all but one of the former employees pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-5 and9-2-44; the trial court did not abuse its O.C.G.A. § 9-5-8 discretion in staying two prior cases pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-5-1 and9-5-3. Smith v. Tronitec, Inc., 277 Ga. 210, 586 S.E.2d 661 (2003).

- Court erred in refusing an interlocutory injunction to restrain defendant labor union and representatives from engaging in activities, begun and threatened to be continued, amounting to duress and intimidation, with the purpose of ruining the business of the plaintiff's employer unless plaintiff (no longer a union member) was discharged. Robinson v. Bryant, 181 Ga. 722, 184 S.E. 298 (1936).

- Court did not err in granting an injunction to restrain city from carrying out its purpose to sell and furnish water to persons residing outside the limits of the city and within the limits of a neighboring municipality, where city lacked charter authority to do so, and from applying proceeds of bonds to purposes other than those for which they were voted and validated. City of Cornelia v. Wells, 181 Ga. 554, 183 S.E. 66 (1935).

- Where a contract was made for the sale of a certain business, embodying a covenant that the vendor would not engage in the same kind or similar business in a stipulated time and within certain territorial limits, court properly granted injunction prohibiting vendor from acting as agent or employee of another engaged in such business. Strauss v. Phillips, 180 Ga. 641, 180 S.E. 123 (1935).

- Petition which alleged the existence of an employment contract reasonable both as to time and territory, and not otherwise unreasonable, and a violation of its restrictive covenants, stated a cause of action for injunctive relief against second defendant who, it was alleged, had knowledge of such restrictive covenants, and was aiding and abetting the defendant employee in such violation. Kirshbaum v. Jones, 206 Ga. 192, 56 S.E.2d 484 (1949), disapproved on other grounds, Fuller v. Kolb, 238 Ga. 602, 234 S.E.2d 517 (1977).

- Because a driveway was a "structure" within the common meaning of that term as well as the meaning of the restrictive covenants, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 13-2-2(2) and13-2-3, the trial court did not err in finding as a matter of law that a homeowner was required to seek the homeowner association's approval before resurfacing a driveway; consequently, the trial court properly granted the homeowner association's motion for an injunction requiring the homeowner to restore the driveway to its original condition. Mitchell v. Cambridge Prop. Owners Ass'n, 276 Ga. App. 326, 623 S.E.2d 511 (2005).

- County's interest in the determination of the county's boundaries and the duties and obligations that naturally flow therefrom is present whether the basis for challenging a municipal annexation lies in procedural deficiencies or the more substantive lack of contiguity. Therefore, a county had standing to seek an interlocutory injunction preventing a city from annexing certain property. Cherokee County v. City of Holly Springs, 284 Ga. 298, 667 S.E.2d 78 (2008).

A temporary injunction against the operation of a tattoo and body-piercing business by former employees was warranted following a determination that the employees had misappropriated their former employer's property for their own use and had profited therefrom. Owens v. Ink Wizard Tattoos, 272 Ga. 728, 533 S.E.2d 722 (2000).

- Because the amount of credit the defendant was entitled to receive was to be computed by a pre-sentence custodian, and the duty to award the credit for time served prior to trial fell upon the Department of Corrections, an appeal from an order denying the defendant clarification of an imposed sentence was not properly before the appeals court; moreover, any dissatisfaction with that relief would not be part of the defendant's direct appeal from the original conviction, but would be in a mandamus or injunction action against the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections. Smashey v. State, 282 Ga. App. 293, 638 S.E.2d 431 (2006).

- Where an owner's suit did not arise out of a title insurance company's business as an insurer, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. II, the trial court erred in finding venue under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-1(2); in addition, the grant of an interlocutory injunction was error because there was no showing that the title company had any opportunity to challenge the applicability of an amendment to add a quiet title action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-62 to the complaint. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Broadstreet, 260 Ga. App. 705, 580 S.E.2d 676 (2003).

No abuse in granting a second faction's motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the first faction from attempting to act on behalf of a Vietnamese Buddhist Temple, incorporated as a nonprofit Georgia corporation, or from holding themselves out as officers, directors, or agents of the Temple as: (1) the Temple's articles of incorporation clearly allowed it to have members; and (2) the court was authorized to find that all members of the Temple were given the requisite notice of the June, 2004 meeting, and that more than 50 percent of the members appeared at the meeting and voted unanimously to elect the second faction to the board. Nguyen v. Tran, 287 Ga. App. 888, 652 S.E.2d 881 (2007).

2. Cases Where Injunction Improper

Action to recover deficiency judgment after foreclosure sale.

- Plaintiff debtors were not entitled to injunction to enjoin action to recover a deficiency judgment after foreclosure sale, on the ground that they sought to have an accounting, as there was no involved accounting which required the granting of an injunction for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due by the plaintiffs to the defendant. Branan v. Holding Comm'n, 183 Ga. 736, 189 S.E. 593 (1937).

- As a general rule, a court of equity will not intervene to enjoin the collection of a tax where no execution has been issued and levied on any of the property of the taxpayer, even though the taxing authorities may have demanded of the taxpayer that the taxpayer pay the tax. Warren v. Suttles, 190 Ga. 311, 9 S.E.2d 172 (1940).

- The trial court did not err in denying a motion for interlocutory injunction in which the appellants sought to stay two previously filed cases under O.C.G.A. § 9-5-1; the appellants' recission claim alleged fraud in the inducement and a mistaken belief, and thus it was legal, not equitable, in nature, and state and magistrate courts had jurisdiction over it. Hann v. Harpers Boutiques Int'l, 284 Ga. App. 531, 644 S.E.2d 337 (2007).

- The writ of injunction to restrain a husband from encumbering or disposing of his property pending a divorce and alimony suit should not be granted, where the husband is neither attempting nor threatening to sell or encumber his property, and no other equitable ground for the issuance of the writ is shown to exist. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 175 Ga. 685, 165 S.E. 624 (1932).

- While a wife may, in a proper case, apply for an injunction to prevent the husband from alienating or encumbering his property to defeat her claim for alimony, where, there was no evidence that the husband was attempting or even contemplating the transfer or encumbrance of his property to defeat his wife's claim for alimony, it was error for the trial court to enjoin the defendant from disposing of his property and from changing the status thereof, and from withdrawing any funds from his bank account except in designated amounts for specific purposes. Brannen v. Brannen, 208 Ga. 88, 65 S.E.2d 161 (1951).

- Action by two members of an unincorporated political organization to enjoin defendant from representing defendant as the secretary and treasurer of the club, from collecting or receiving further contributions for the club, and for an accounting, was properly dismissed where there was no allegation that redress had been sought within the organization, or that the organization had refused to act. Bowden v. Kennedy, 186 Ga. 174, 197 S.E. 325 (1938).

- In an action for injunction to prevent the exercise of a power of sale contained in a security deed, where the plaintiff does not otherwise show sufficient cause for the grant of an interlocutory injunction, the mere pendency of an action will not require the grant of such relief upon the theory that the litigation would prevent the property from bringing its market value. Spivey v. Pope, 180 Ga. 609, 180 S.E. 118 (1935).

- In a suit by a cropper against a landlord, praying for injunction against interference by the defendant with the plaintiff in working the crops on described land, and for a judgment for damages where the defendant landlord was not insolvent, and it did not appear that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law for alleged breach of the contract of landlord and cropper, the court erred in granting an injunction. Lyles v. Watson, 189 Ga. 768, 7 S.E.2d 909 (1940).

- Trial court abused its discretion in enjoining two brothers from using their boat docks and from applying for future boat dock permits as a subdivision's restrictive covenants did not limit the number of docks on a property; since the brothers could seek, and possibly obtain, approval from the homeowners to build additional docks, it was neither illegal nor contrary to good conscience to permit them to do so; similarly, there was no basis for prohibiting the brothers' use of the docks. Danos v. Thompson, 272 Ga. App. 69, 611 S.E.2d 678 (2005).

- Court properly refused an injunction in an equitable action brought by purchasers to restrain enforcement of levy on property set apart as a homestead by bankrupt and later sold to petitioners, as the petitioners had an adequate remedy at law by filing claim to the property. Parris v. Morris Plan Co., 181 Ga. 480, 183 S.E. 61 (1935).

- Petition seeking to have contract allegedly granting a monopoly on business of transporting passengers to and from municipal airport, declared unconstitutional, and to enjoin defendants from interfering with plaintiff in the transportation of passengers from the city airport did not show an unlawful interference with the rights of the plaintiff to carry on its taxicab business upon the streets of the city under its license, and therefore failed to state a cause of action for equitable relief. Associated Cab Co. v. City of Atlanta, 204 Ga. 591, 50 S.E.2d 601 (1948).

- Heirs objecting to probate of purported will containing devise to a hospital association were mere strangers to application for revival of association's charter, and did not show that such revival would result in any hurt or damage to them, and the court did not err in refusing the prayer for interlocutory injunction. Pattison v. Farkas, 180 Ga. 798, 180 S.E. 831 (1935).

- Where a single picket was posted on highway in front of the employer's business, bearing a placard which stated that the employer was unfair to the labor union, which picket did no more than walk slowly back and forth on the public highway, and was guilty of no violence, intimidation or other misconduct, the court did not err in denying the prayer of the employer for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit such action. Hallman v. Painters Dist. Council No. 38, 203 Ga. 175, 45 S.E.2d 414 (1947).

- Where one borrows a sum of money and executes a deed to an undivided interest in certain realty to secure the repayment of the loan, the lender has a right to foreclose upon and sell the undivided interest; and a court of equity will not, unless under peculiar circumstances, enjoin the lender against enforcement of the security deed, so as to allow the debtor time to have the property partitioned. Ward v. Gerdine, 183 Ga. 722, 189 S.E. 588 (1937).

Mere suggestion than nonpayment of bond would render bondsman liable to arrest does not entitle the bondsman to the aid of the extraordinary power of injunction to restrain officers of the municipality, who have not arrested the bondsman and disclaim any intention to arrest the bondsman, and who are in no way interfering with the bondsman's person or the bondsman's property. Walden v. Sellers, 174 Ga. 774, 163 S.E. 897 (1932).

Insurer could not maintain suit for declaratory judgment and injunction preventing widow from filing suit against insurer where insurer's positions could be presented in opposition to widow's suit. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 233 Ga. 540, 212 S.E.2d 326 (1975).

- A permanent injunction was unnecessary as actions of members of a county board of commissioners in entering into an amended intergovernmental agreement to allocate funds from a Special Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST) referendum were not illegal or contrary to equity under O.C.G.A. § 9-5-1 as the new agreement accomplished the purpose of the resolution, just by a different means. Hicks v. Khoury, 283 Ga. 407, 658 S.E.2d 616 (2008).

- Trial court properly denied injunctive relief against a power company because an injunction was no longer an appropriate method for challenging an agency order after the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides a statutory right of review pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19. Fulton County Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. Ga. PSC, 287 Ga. 876, 700 S.E.2d 554 (2010).

- Trial court manifestly abused the court's discretion when the court granted equitable relief to a limited liability company (LLC) because there was no finding that the drawings a company used were trade secrets as defined by the Georgia Trade Secrets Act (GTSA), O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761, and by using O.C.G.A. § 9-5-1 to provide the LLC the same relief based on the same allegations it would have received had the drawings qualified as trade secrets, the trial court undermined the exclusivity of the GTSA; the key inquiry was whether the same factual allegations of misappropriation were being used to obtain relief outside the GTSA, and since the trial court's award of general equitable relief under O.C.G.A. § 9-5-1 was based on the same conduct as the GTSA claim, i.e, the misappropriation of the drawings, such relief was preempted by O.C.G.A. § 10-1-767(a). Robbins v. Supermarket Equip. Sales, LLC, 290 Ga. 462, 722 S.E.2d 55 (2012).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§ 1, 24.

- 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, §§ 1, 2, 21, 27 et seq., 71 et seq., 79, 95.

- Effect of injunction restraining expulsion of member from benefit society, 1 A.L.R. 169.

Right to enjoin prosecution of civil action because of matters arising pendente lite, 3 A.L.R. 1026.

Injunction to prevent establishment or maintenance of garbage or sewage disposal plant, 5 A.L.R. 920; 47 A.L.R. 1154.

Injunction to prevent one person from associating with another, 5 A.L.R. 1044.

Contempt: violation of injunction by one not a party to injunction suit, 15 A.L.R. 386.

Pendency of action in federal court as ground of injunction against action in state court, 24 A.L.R. 1084; 122 A.L.R. 1425.

Decline in market value of corporate stock or securities during injunction against their disposal as damages recoverable for wrongful injunction, 29 A.L.R. 727.

Injunction against repeated or continuing trespasses on real property, 32 A.L.R. 463; 60 A.L.R.2d 310.

Right to enjoin threatened or anticipated nuisance, 32 A.L.R. 724; 55 A.L.R. 880.

Right to enjoin enforcement of illegal tax, local assessment, or license fee, upon joinder of several affected thereby, 32 A.L.R. 1266; 156 A.L.R. 319.

Power to enjoin holding of an election, 33 A.L.R. 1376; 70 A.L.R. 733.

Meritorious defense as a condition of injunction against judgment for want of jurisdiction, 39 A.L.R. 414; 118 A.L.R. 1498.

Partial dissolution of injunction as breach of injunction bond, 40 A.L.R. 990.

Interference with easement of light, air, or view by structure in street or highway as ground for injunction at instance of abutting owner, 40 A.L.R. 1321.

Injunction against discharge of employee, 44 A.L.R. 1443.

Liability apart from bond and in absence of elements of malicious prosecution for wrongfully suing out injunction, 45 A.L.R. 1517.

Validity and enforceability of restrictive covenants in contracts of employment, 52 A.L.R. 1362; 67 A.L.R. 1002; 98 A.L.R. 963.

Right to injunction to restrain acts or course of conduct without the required permit or license from public, 53 A.L.R. 811.

Right of property owner to enjoin projection from building over street or alley, 55 A.L.R. 911.

Injunction as a proper remedy by licensor where license to use real property is revoked, 56 A.L.R. 1110.

Injunction on ground of inconvenience against prosecuting action in a particular state or district, 57 A.L.R. 77; 115 A.L.R. 237.

Mandatory injunction as remedy for breach of restrictive covenant affecting real property, 57 A.L.R. 336.

Right of citizen or taxpayer to enjoin waste or expenditure of state funds, 58 A.L.R. 588.

Right of railroad company to prevent operations for gas or oil or other mining operations on right of way, 61 A.L.R. 1068.

Injunction against enforcement of judgment rendered in foreign country or other state, 64 A.L.R. 1136.

Right to injunction in labor dispute as affected by misconduct of complainant, 66 A.L.R. 1090.

Right of bus company or street car company to enjoin taxicab driver from picking up intending passengers, 66 A.L.R. 1380.

Who, other than abutting owner, may maintain a suit to enjoin closing or obstructing street or highway, 68 A.L.R. 1285.

Injunction against bringing or prosecuting action in another state or country because of the danger that result would be different from that which would be reached in the jurisdiction whose law is the proper governing law as regards matters of substance, 69 A.L.R. 591.

Penalty as limit of liability on injunction bond, 70 A.L.R. 591.

Injunction to continue status quo pending statutory proceedings impeaching local improvements or assessments, 77 A.L.R. 717.

Bond as condition of injunction in suits by or in interest of state or other political unit or taxpayer, 83 A.L.R. 205.

Injunction as proper remedy against tax on exempt property, 84 A.L.R. 1315.

Power to enjoin bringing or prosecution of action under Federal Employers' Liability Act in another jurisdiction, 85 A.L.R. 1351; 113 A.L.R. 1444; 136 A.L.R. 1232; 146 A.L.R. 1118.

Right to enjoin practice of profession or conduct of business without a license or permit, 92 A.L.R. 173.

Right of one not a party to a combination or contract in restraint of trade to maintain a suit to enjoin the same or to recover damages he suffers by reason thereof, 92 A.L.R. 185.

Right to injunction to protect easement of light and air, 93 A.L.R. 1180.

Right to mandamus as excluding remedy by injunction, 93 A.L.R. 1495.

Injunction as proper remedy to prevent unlicensed practice of law, 94 A.L.R. 359.

Validity and effect of statutes restricting remedy by injunction in industrial disputes, 97 A.L.R. 1333; 127 A.L.R. 868.

Remedy by mandatory injunction or specific performance for breach of contract to furnish one the requirements of his business, 98 A.L.R. 421.

Right to enjoin threats of suits for alleged infringement of patent, 98 A.L.R. 671.

Power to enjoin party from prosecuting or commencing an equitable suit, 102 A.L.R. 308.

Right to injunction to protect water rights as affected by fact that party seeking injunction contemplates no immediate use of rights, or by doctrine of comparative injury, 106 A.L.R. 687.

Construction and application of statutes denying remedy by injunction against assessment or collection of tax, 108 A.L.R. 184.

Jurisdiction to enjoin trespass upon real property in another state or country, 113 A.L.R. 940.

Right to enjoin removal of or interference with trees in highways, 116 A.L.R. 95.

Right to specific performance, or injunction against breach, of lease or sublease or of contract to make lease as affected by right of complainant to cancel lease before expiration of term for which other party is bound, 117 A.L.R. 256.

Right to enjoin prosecution of action in court of limited jurisdiction because of counter-rights or claims in behalf of defendant which are beyond such limited jurisdiction, 125 A.L.R. 337.

Injunction against suit in another state or country for divorce or separation, 128 A.L.R. 1467; 54 A.L.R.2d 1240.

Injunction, rather than quo warranto, as available to restrain enforcement of tax against real property upon ground involving attack upon legal existence of municipality, or upon inclusion of property within its boundaries, 129 A.L.R. 255.

Restitution as remedy for wrongful injunction, 131 A.L.R. 878.

Taxpayer's right to maintain action to enjoin wrongful expenditure of public funds, as affected by the fact that the funds in question were not raised by taxation, 131 A.L.R. 1230.

Injunction against picketing per se, where past picketing has been accompanied by violence or other improper conduct, 132 A.L.R. 1218.

Injunction against exercise of power of eminent domain, 133 A.L.R. 11; 93 A.L.R.2d 465.

Injunction by appellate court to protect subject matter of appeal or preserve status quo as between the parties, 133 A.L.R. 1105.

Taxpayer's action to enjoin payment to one alleged to hold office or position illegally, 137 A.L.R. 631.

Injunction against legislative body of state or municipality, 140 A.L.R. 439.

Injunction against acts or conduct, in street or vicinity, tending to disparage plaintiff's business or his merchandise, 144 A.L.R. 1181.

Injunction as remedy in case of trade libel, 148 A.L.R. 853.

Reversal, modification, dismissal, dissolution, or resettlement of injunction order or judgment as affecting prior disobedience as contempt, 148 A.L.R. 1024.

Interference during labor dispute with performance by common carrier or other public utility of its duties to the public as ground for injunctive relief, 149 A.L.R. 1243.

Necessity and sufficiency of effort to settle dispute as condition of right to injunction in labor dispute under statutes restricting remedy by injunction in labor disputes, 150 A.L.R. 819.

Injunction in respect of property as covering action for rent or for use and occupation, 155 A.L.R. 844.

Specific performance or injunction as proper remedy for breach of collective bargaining agreement, 156 A.L.R. 652.

Specific performance, or injunction against breach, of contract for organization or reorganization of corporation, 158 A.L.R. 997.

What amounts to seizure and holding of employer's plant, equipment, machinery, or other property within statutory exception to inhibition on injunctions in labor disputes, 163 A.L.R. 668.

Injunction pendente lite in suit for divorce or separation, 164 A.L.R. 321.

Legality of, and injunction against, peaceable picketing by labor union, of plant whose employees are represented by another union as statutory bargaining agent, 166 A.L.R. 185.

Effect of, and remedies for, exclusion of eligible class of persons from jury list in civil case, 166 A.L.R. 1422.

Inadequacy of legal remedy as basis for equitable relief from levy of execution, 171 A.L.R. 221.

Injunction as remedy for breach of contract to employ plaintiff or give exclusive right to promote or sell defendant's product or invention, 173 A.L.R. 1198.

Power to enjoin canvassing votes and declaring result of election, 1 A.L.R.2d 588.

Capacity of taxpayers to maintain suit to enjoin submission of initiative, referendum, or recall measure to voters, 6 A.L.R.2d 557.

Injunction by state court against action in court of another state, 6 A.L.R.2d 896.

Adequacy, as regards right to injunction, of other remedy for review of order fixing public utility rates, 8 A.L.R.2d 839.

Specific performance or injunctive relief against breach of contract, other than lease or agreement thereof, or contract for services, terminable by one party but not the other, 8 A.L.R.2d 1208.

Mandatory injunction prior to hearing of case, 15 A.L.R.2d 213.

Injunctive relief against submission of constitutional amendment, statute, municipal charter, or municipal ordinance, on ground that proposed action would be unconstitutional, 19 A.L.R.2d 519.

Suspension or expulsion from social club or similar society and the remedies therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 344.

Suspension or expulsion from professional association and the remedies therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 531.

Decree granting or refusing injunction as res judicata in action for damages in relation to matter concerning which injunction was asked in first suit, 26 A.L.R.2d 446.

Mandatory injunction to compel removal of encroachments by adjoining landowner, 28 A.L.R.2d 679.

State's power to enjoin violation of collective labor contract as affected by federal labor relations acts, 32 A.L.R.2d 829.

State court's power to enjoin picketing as affected by Labor Management Relations Act, 32 A.L.R.2d 1026.

Injunction as remedy against removal of public office, 34 A.L.R.2d 554.

Bankruptcy court's injunction against mortgage or lien enforcement proceedings commenced, before bankruptcy, in another court, 40 A.L.R.2d 663.

Injunction as remedy against defamation of person, 47 A.L.R.2d 715.

Necessary parties defendant to independent action on injunction bond, 55 A.L.R.2d 545.

Duty to minimize damages for wrongful injunction, 66 A.L.R.2d 1131.

Specific performance of agreement, or provisions thereof, involving partnership at will, 70 A.L.R.2d 618.

Injunction to prevent violation of Sunday law, 76 A.L.R.2d 874; 10 A.L.R.4th 246.

Court's lack of jurisdiction of subject matter in granting injunction as a defense in action on injunction bond, 82 A.L.R.2d 1064.

Dismissal of injunction action or bill without prejudice as breach of injunction bond, 91 A.L.R.2d 1312.

Pollution control: preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting practices, 49 A.L.R.3d 1239.

Relief against school board's "busing" plan to promote desegregation, 50 A.L.R.3d 1089.

Validity, construction, and effect of "Sunday closing" or "blue" laws - modern status, 10 A.L.R.4th 246.

Recovery of damages resulting from wrongful issuance of injunction as limited to amount of bond, 30 A.L.R.4th 273.

Right of employee to injunction preventing employer from exposing employee to tobacco smoke in workplace, 37 A.L.R.4th 480.

Encroachment of trees, shrubbery, or other vegetation across boundary line, 65 A.L.R.4th 603.

What constitutes plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy under Tax Injunction Act (28 USCS § 1341), prohibiting federal district courts from interfering with assessment, levy, or collection of state business taxes, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 237.