2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 3 - Limitations of Actions
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 9-3-3. Applicability of Limitation Statutes; Equitable Bar

Universal Citation: GA Code § 9-3-3 (2020)

Unless otherwise provided by law, limitation statutes shall apply equally to all courts. In addition, courts of equity may interpose an equitable bar whenever, from the lapse of time and laches of the complainant, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.

(Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, §§ 28, 39; Code 1863, § 2865; Code 1868, § 2873; Code 1873, § 2924; Code 1882, § 2924; Civil Code 1895, § 3775; Civil Code 1910, § 4369; Code 1933, § 3-712.)

Cross references.

- Laches, § 23-1-25.

Law reviews.

- For article discussing application of the principle that he who would have equity must do equity to taxpayer's suits, see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 305 (1971).


Former Civil Code 1895, § 3775 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-3) must be construed with former Civil Code 1895, § 3939 (see now O.C.G.A. § 23-1-25) which permitted the defendant to defeat assertions of purely equitable rights by laches, even though no legal limitation bars right. Moore v. Moore, 103 Ga. 517, 30 S.E. 535 (1898).

Provisions of this section are not available to complainant. Steele v. City of Waycross, 190 Ga. 816, 10 S.E.2d 867 (1940).

Principle that stale demand will not be enforced is available to the defendant only, and cannot be employed under this section by complainant in equitable proceeding to enjoin enforcement of purely legal right. Georgia R.R. & Banking v. Wright, 124 Ga. 596, 53 S.E. 251 (1906), rev'd on other grounds, 207 U.S. 127, 28 S. Ct. 47, 52 L. Ed. 134 (1907); Steele v. City of Waycross, 190 Ga. 816, 10 S.E.2d 867 (1940).

Equitable doctrine of laches.

- Equitable doctrine as to stale demands has no application when action is a legal one and period fixed by statute of limitations for assertion of claim has not expired. Louther v. Tift, 20 Ga. App. 309, 93 S.E. 70 (1917).

Equitable doctrine of laches is not applicable to actions at law. Fletcher v. Gillespie, 201 Ga. 377, 40 S.E.2d 45 (1946); Columbus Bank & Trust Co. v. Dempsey, 120 Ga. App. 5, 169 S.E.2d 349 (1969).

Doctrine of laches is an equitable one and has no relevancy to an action when rights to be enforced rest upon legal grounds, and the statute of limitation has not run. Cosby v. A.M. Smyre Mfg. Co., 158 Ga. App. 587, 281 S.E.2d 332 (1981).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in entering an interlocutory injunction to preserve the status quo pending adjudication of the merits of the creditor's action against the debtors alleging breach of contract and fraudulent transfers in violation of the Georgia Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., because the debtors presented no evidence of harm from the creditor's delay in amending its complaint to seek an interlocutory injunction, and the delay resulted primarily from the debtors' concealment of their actions and obstruction of the creditor's efforts to discover the details. Vague assertions of harm supported by no citation to evidence in the record are insufficient to sustain a defense of laches, and there is a balance between a plaintiff's knowing that a cause of action exists and that interim injunctive relief may be needed and sitting on its rights to the prejudice of the defendant. SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1, 709 S.E.2d 267 (2011).

Laches is not a remedy for delay during litigation, but is an affirmative defense asserting an inequitable delay in instituting a proceeding. Stuckey v. Storms, 265 Ga. 491, 458 S.E.2d 344 (1995); Head v. CSX Transp., Inc., 227 Ga. App. 818, 490 S.E.2d 497 (1997).

Laches and statute of limitations distinguished.

- Defense of "laches" is different from defense of statute of limitations as in order to bar remedy because of laches there must appear, in addition to mere lapse of time, some circumstances from which the defendant or other person may be prejudiced, or there must be such lapse of time that it may be reasonably supposed that such prejudice will occur if remedy is allowed; whereas in case of statute of limitations, mere lapse of time will constitute a bar. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 69 Ga. App. 628, 26 S.E.2d 557 (1943).

Statute of limitation signifies fixed period within which action may be brought to preserve a right, while laches signifies delay independent of statute. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 69 Ga. App. 628, 26 S.E.2d 557 (1943).

Laches is not, like limitations, mere matter of time, but principally question of inequity of permitting claim to be enforced, founded on some intermediate change in conditions. Manry v. Manry, 196 Ga. 365, 26 S.E.2d 706 (1943); Cooper v. Aycock, 199 Ga. 658, 34 S.E.2d 895 (1945); Georgian Villa, Inc. v. City Nat'l Bank, 10 Bankr. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).

Laches did not bar claims that were not barred by statute of limitations.

- Trial court erred in finding that all of a a state court judge's claims to recover compensation under state law, O.C.G.A. § 15-7-22, a local law, 2006 Ga. Laws 206, and a county ordinance, were barred by laches; the judge's claims were subject to the two-year limitations period in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22, meaning the judge could pursue claims on or after October 6, 2015; however, the judge was not entitled to mandamus because the judge had received all the compensation to which the judge was entitled. Cowen v. Clayton County, 306 Ga. 698, 832 S.E.2d 819 (2019).

Applicability of doctrine of laches depends on facts of each particular case. Georgian Villa, Inc. v. City Nat'l Bank, 10 Bankr. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).

Doctrine of laches refers to neglect, for unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercise of due diligence could and should have been done earlier if at all. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 69 Ga. App. 628, 26 S.E.2d 557 (1943).

Laches may be applied when it would be inequitable to enforce rights.

- Doctrine of laches not only forbids relief to one whose long delay renders ascertainment of truth difficult, but also authorizes courts of equity to interpose equitable bar whenever, from lapse of time and laches of complainant, it would be inequitable to allow party to enforce legal rights. Goodwin v. First Baptist Church, 225 Ga. 448, 169 S.E.2d 334 (1969).

Laches did not bar enforcement of restrictive covenants.

- Purchaser of a 10-acre lot in a subdivision was bound by restrictive covenants governing the cutting of trees and dividing of lots in the subdivision; the subdivision owners were not barred by laches from enforcing the covenants after trees were cut and fences erected because there was no evidence as to when the owners discovered the violations of the covenants. Gilbert v. Canterbury Farms, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 804, 815 S.E.2d 303 (2018).

Under this section, doctrine of stale demand is purely equitable and only arises where from lapse of time and laches of plaintiff it would be inequitable to allow the plaintiff to enforce plaintiff's legal rights. Ellis v. Smith & Bussey, 112 Ga. 480, 37 S.E. 739 (1900).

Equity will not aid in enforcement of stale demands. Cannon v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 206 Ga. 609, 57 S.E.2d 917 (1950); Welch v. Welch, 215 Ga. 198, 109 S.E.2d 757 (1959).

Equity gives no relief to one whose long delay renders ascertainment of truth difficult, even though no legal limitation bars the right. Persons v. Dallas, 178 Ga. 778, 174 S.E. 699 (1934); Stephens v. Walker, 193 Ga. 330, 18 S.E.2d 537 (1942).

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand, and no one decision constitutes a precedent in strict sense; each case is to be determined according to its own particular circumstances. Manry v. Manry, 196 Ga. 365, 26 S.E.2d 706 (1943).

Criteria for determining laches.

- In determining whether there has been laches, there are various factors to be considered, including: duration of delay in asserting claim; sufficiency of excuse offered in extenuation of delay; whether plaintiff acquiesced in assertion or operation of corresponding adverse claim; character of evidence by which plaintiff's right is sought to be established; whether during delay evidence has been lost or become obscured or conditions have so changed as to render enforcement of right inequitable; whether third persons have acquired intervening rights; nature of right asserted and relief asked; nature of duty or obligation sought to be enforced, and whether plaintiff or defendant was in possession of property at issue during delay. Cooper v. Aycock, 199 Ga. 658, 34 S.E.2d 895 (1945).

In determining whether there has been laches, various factors are to be considered, including: duration of delay in asserting claim; sufficiency of excuse offered in extenuation thereof; whether during delay evidence has been lost or become obscure; whether the plaintiff or the defendant was in possession of property at issue during the delay; whether the party charged with laches had an opportunity to have acted sooner, and whether the party charged with laches acted at the first possible opportunity. Welch v. Welch, 215 Ga. 198, 109 S.E.2d 757 (1959); Ehrhart v. Brooks, 231 Ga. 272, 201 S.E.2d 464 (1973).

When from lapse of time and other circumstances it would be inequitable to grant relief to a party, the doctrine of laches will be applied. Georgian Villa, Inc. v. City Nat'l Bank, 10 Bankr. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).

For laches to apply, delay must have worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the defendant or others adversely interested; or the plaintiff must have abandoned or waived the plaintiff's right, acquiesced in assertion or operation of adverse right, or lost the plaintiff's right by estoppel; or sufficient time must have elapsed to create or justify presumption against existence or validity of the plaintiff's right, or presumption that if the plaintiff was ever possessed of a right, it has been abandoned, waived, or satisfied, or presumption that in consequence of delay adverse party would be inequitably prejudiced by enforcement of right asserted. Grant v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 229 Ga. 855, 194 S.E.2d 913 (1972).

To constitute the defense of laches, the delay must have been such as practically to preclude the court from arriving at a safe conclusion as to the truth of the matters in controversy. Georgian Villa, Inc. v. City Nat'l Bank, 10 Bankr. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).

If both parties are equally to blame for delay, neither should be allowed to invoke the rule of laches in order to gain advantage over an adversary. City of McRae v. Folsom, 191 Ga. 272, 11 S.E.2d 900 (1940).

Delay which is not beyond statute of limitation cannot be held laches sufficient to bar the action. Cosby v. A.M. Smyre Mfg. Co., 158 Ga. App. 587, 281 S.E.2d 332 (1981).

Delay is excusable when induced by adverse party; a person cannot take advantage of delay which that person personally caused or to which the person contributed. City of McRae v. Folsom, 191 Ga. 272, 11 S.E.2d 900 (1940).

If party sues substantially as soon as occasion arises for assertion of the party's rights, laches is not imputable to that party. Cooper v. Aycock, 199 Ga. 658, 34 S.E.2d 895 (1945).

Laches does not arise from mere lapse of time. Columbus Bank & Trust Co. v. Dempsey, 120 Ga. App. 5, 169 S.E.2d 349 (1969).

Mere lapse of time is not itself laches. Grant v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 229 Ga. 855, 194 S.E.2d 913 (1972).

Period from which laches is determined is fixed according to circumstances in each case. Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729, 163 S.E. 910 (1932).

Laches is equitable doctrine which is independent of statute of limitations, and as to lapse of time necessary for invoking doctrine of laches it may or may not correspond with time specified in the statute of limitations. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 69 Ga. App. 628, 26 S.E.2d 557 (1943).

Although lapse of time is an important element of laches, unless the case falls within operation of statute of limitations, there is no fixed period within which person must assert claim or be barred by laches; length of time depends on circumstances of particular case. Cooper v. Aycock, 199 Ga. 658, 34 S.E.2d 895 (1945).

Courts may use analogy to statutes of limitations.

- Prior to enactment of this section, equity courts acted by analogy to statute of limitations. McDonald v. Sims, 3 Ga. 383 (1847).

While equitable doctrine of laches operates independently of any statute of limitations, courts of equity usually act in obedience and in analogy to statutes of limitations, in cases when it would not be unjust and inequitable to do so. Cooper v. Aycock, 199 Ga. 658, 34 S.E.2d 895 (1945).

In fixing time when bar of laches may be interposed, the law did not measure altogether by the lapse of time, as was shown by former Code 1933, § 37-119 (see now O.C.G.A. § 23-1-25). Wright v. City of Metter, 192 Ga. 75, 14 S.E.2d 443 (1941).

Unreasonable delay until after death of essential witnesses, practically precluding court from arriving at safe conclusion as to truth of matters in controversy, will bar action for cancellation of deed. Stephens v. Walker, 193 Ga. 330, 18 S.E.2d 537 (1942).

Three-month delay in service.

- No abuse of discretion resulted from an order dismissing a personal injury complaint based on insufficient service of process as the trial judge properly found that the plaintiff's delay in serving the complaint almost three months after learning the defendant's whereabouts, and after the statute of limitation had expired, was attributable to a failure to exercise either reasonable diligence or the greatest possible diligence in doing so. Williams v. Wendland, 283 Ga. App. 109, 640 S.E.2d 684 (2006).

Equitable action to cancel deed on ground of fraud, which clearly shows that complainant failed to use even slightest diligence to discover fraud, fails to allege cause of action. Hillis v. Clark, 222 Ga. 604, 150 S.E.2d 922 (1966).

Long acquiescence or laches by parties out of possession is productive of much hardship and injustice to others, and cannot be excused without showing some actual hindrance or impediment caused by fraud or concealment of party in possession. Bryan v. Tate, 138 Ga. 321, 75 S.E. 205 (1912).

Minority stockholder who postpones complaint that corporate act is ultra vires or irregular for an unreasonable time, or with full knowledge allows large operations to be completed or money to be expended before the stockholder brings suit, is barred by laches and acquiescence of any right to equitable relief with respect thereto. Norris v. Osburn, 243 Ga. 483, 254 S.E.2d 860 (1979).

Twelve years was unreasonable time to bring action on ultra vires contract of corporation. Winter v. Southern Sec. Co., 155 Ga. 590, 118 S.E. 214 (1923).

Voluntary delay of three years after knowledge of fraud perpetrated seven years before was inexcusable and barred petitioner of any right of action which the petitioner might have had. Reynolds & Hamby Estate Mtg. Co. v. Martin, 116 Ga. 495, 42 S.E. 796 (1902); Bryan v. Tate, 138 Ga. 321, 75 S.E. 205 (1912).

Delay of 18 years after knowledge of fraud is laches. McWhorter v. Cheney, 121 Ga. 541, 49 S.E. 603 (1904).

Thirty-six year delay was an inordinate delay.

- When an executrix waited 36 years after certain property was titled in a brother's name to bring a constructive trust in favor of a decedent's estate under O.C.G.A. § 53-12-93(a), the delay was inordinate; therefore, the claim was barred by laches under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-3 and summary judgment was properly granted. Cagle v. Cagle, 277 Ga. 219, 586 S.E.2d 665 (2003).

Action to complete sale by sheriff was barred by laches, when two years elapsed before it was brought. Hardin v. Adair, 140 Ga. 263, 78 S.E. 1073, 47 L.R.A. (n.s.) 896 (1913).

Since an owner of property allowed street improvements to be made and enjoyed benefits thereof for several years without taking legal proceedings to prevent expenditure of money for project, the owner was estopped from enjoining sale of the owner's property to pay assessments. Raines v. Clay, 161 Ga. 574, 131 S.E. 499 (1926).

Mere failure of insured to read policy does not amount to such laches as will debar the insured from having such policy reformed for mistake therein. Southern Feed Stores, Inc. v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 182 Ga. 442, 185 S.E. 723 (1936).

Defendant's suit is properly barred by laches when defendant's claim of a resulting trust in a house is based on payments made 35 years ago to a person who is the sole record owner and is now dead. Stone v. Williams, 265 Ga. 480, 458 S.E.2d 343 (1995).

Laches does not apply to mandamus. Addis v. Smith, 226 Ga. 894, 178 S.E.2d 191 (1970).

Laches not available in legal action.

- Because defendants were timely served in a renewal action brought under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a), the defendants could not assert as a defense the fact that the defendants were served five years after the initial action, which had been dismissed following service of defendants. The equitable doctrine of laches, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-3, did not apply in a personal injury action because the action was a legal action. Boyd v. Robinson, 299 Ga. App. 795, 683 S.E.2d 862 (2009), aff'd, 288 Ga. 53, 701 S.E.2d 165 (2010).

Plaintiff's right to recover share of remainder estate is plain statutory right not subject to bar of laches. Perkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 221 Ga. 82, 143 S.E.2d 474 (1965).

Laches not applicable to recovery of land.

- Doctrine of stale demands, or laches, is purely equitable and is not applicable to complaint for recovery of land. Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 16 S.E.2d 591 (1941); Jones v. Tri-State Elec. Coop., 212 Ga. 577, 94 S.E.2d 497 (1956).

Laches will not be imputed to one in peaceable possession of property for delay in resorting to court of equity to establish right to legal title. Shirley v. Shirley, 209 Ga. 366, 72 S.E.2d 719 (1952).

While equity follows the law as to limitations of actions, neither laches nor statute of limitations will run against one in peaceable possession of property under claim of ownership for delay in resorting to courts of equity to establish one's rights. Crow v. Whitfield, 105 Ga. App. 436, 124 S.E.2d 648 (1962).

Quiet title actions.

- Trial court did not err in failing to rule that a railroad's petition to quiet title was barred by laches as no evidence was presented regarding when the railroad became aware of the contestant's affidavits of possession, the reason for the railroad's delay in filing a petition to quiet title, whether the railroad could have acted sooner than it did, and whether any evidence was lost due to the delay. Thompson v. Cent. of Ga. R.R., 282 Ga. 264, 646 S.E.2d 669 (2007).

Laches does not apply to uncollected child support.

- Judgment forgiving a father's child support arrearage based on the mother's delay in making the claim was reversed because laches does not apply to claims for uncollected child support and the dormancy statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60(a), did not apply to child support orders entered after July 1, 1997, such as the one involved in the case. Wynn v. Craven, 301 Ga. 30, 799 S.E.2d 172 (2017).

Seven-year bar for implied trusts.

- Although there is no statute fixing seven years as bar in cases of implied trusts, the court has held by analogy that the period of seven years will apply in such cases. Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729, 163 S.E. 910 (1932).

Cited in Crane v. Barry, 60 Ga. 362 (1878); Jordan v. Brown, 72 Ga. 495 (1884); Prater v. Sears, 77 Ga. 28 (1886); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Nelson, 145 Ga. 594, 89 S.E. 693 (1916); Southern Ry. v. Lancaster, 149 Ga. 434, 100 S.E. 380 (1919); Hollenshead v. Partridge, 150 Ga. 521, 104 S.E. 206 (1920); Powell v. Powell, 171 Ga. 840, 156 S.E. 677 (1931); Griffin v. Haden, 172 Ga. 478, 157 S.E. 686 (1931); Wood v. State ex rel. Boykin, 45 Ga. App. 783, 165 S.E. 908 (1932); Bass v. Mayor of Milledgeville, 180 Ga. 156, 178 S.E. 529 (1934); Pruden v. Middleton, 182 Ga. 687, 186 S.E. 732 (1936); Lee v. Holman, 184 Ga. 694, 193 S.E. 68 (1937); Kenney v. Mayor of Milledgeville, 185 Ga. 866, 196 S.E. 467 (1938); Brice v. National Bondholders Corp., 187 Ga. 511, 1 S.E.2d 426 (1939); Murphy v. Johnston, 190 Ga. 23, 8 S.E.2d 23 (1940); Miller v. Everett, 192 Ga. 26, 14 S.E.2d 449 (1941); Grant v. Hart, 192 Ga. 153, 14 S.E.2d 860 (1941); Wood v. City Bd. of Plumbing Exmrs., 192 Ga. 415, 15 S.E.2d 486 (1941); Stephens v. Walker, 193 Ga. 330, 18 S.E.2d 537 (1942); Hanleiter v. Spearman, 200 Ga. 289, 36 S.E.2d 780 (1946); Williams v. Porter, 202 Ga. 113, 42 S.E.2d 475 (1947); Cannon v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 206 Ga. 609, 57 S.E.2d 917 (1950); Hartley v. Wooten, 81 Ga. App. 506, 59 S.E.2d 325 (1950); Vinson v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 208 Ga. 813, 69 S.E.2d 866 (1952); Welch v. Welch, 215 Ga. 198, 109 S.E.2d 757 (1959); Henderson v. Henderson, 219 Ga. 310, 133 S.E.2d 251 (1963); Blackstock v. Murphy, 220 Ga. 661, 140 S.E.2d 902 (1965); Dunn v. Dunn, 221 Ga. 368, 144 S.E.2d 758 (1965); Padgett v. Bryant, 121 Ga. App. 807, 175 S.E.2d 884 (1970); Clover Realty Co. v. J.L. Todd Auction Co., 240 Ga. 124, 239 S.E.2d 682 (1977); Troup v. Loden, 266 Ga. 650, 469 S.E.2d 664 (1996); Hall v. Trubey, 269 Ga. 197, 498 S.E.2d 258 (1998); Brown v. Woodbury Banking Co. (In re Gilleland), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2004); Butler v. Gary, Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis, McManus, Watson & Sperando, P.L., 280 Ga. App. 207, 633 S.E.2d 614 (2006).


Am. Jur. 2d.

- 27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 260. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, §§ 7, 8, 90 et seq.


- 30A C.J.S., Equity, § 128. 54 C.J.S., Limitation of Actions, § 107 et seq.


- Laches: waiver or estoppel on part of government respecting obstruction to navigation, 2 A.L.R. 1694.

Laches as preventing recovery of property diverted from one religious sect or denomination to another, 18 A.L.R. 692.

Estoppel by delay, after knowledge, in disclosing forgery of commercial paper, 25 A.L.R. 177; 50 A.L.R. 1374.

Check in payment of interest or installment of principal as tolling statute of limitations, 28 A.L.R. 84; 125 A.L.R. 271.

Lapse of time as affecting rights and remedies of parties to absolute deed intended as mortgage, 28 A.L.R. 554.

Institution of suit as relieving one of charge of laches precluding relief in equity, 43 A.L.R. 921.

Effect of recovery of judgment on unfiled or abandoned claim after expiration of time allowed for filing claim against estate, 60 A.L.R. 736.

Laches of stockholders in attacking sale of corporate assets, 70 A.L.R. 53.

Estoppel against defense of limitation in tort actions, 77 A.L.R. 1044.

Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, debtor's exemption, by laches or delay, 82 A.L.R. 648.

Right to equitable relief from usury as affected by laches, 111 A.L.R. 126.

Applicability of statute of limitations or doctrine of laches as between husband and wife, 121 A.L.R. 1382.

Estoppel to rely on statute of limitations, 130 A.L.R. 8; 24 A.L.R.2d 1413.

Statute of limitations or doctrine of laches in relation to declaratory actions, 151 A.L.R. 1076.

Mandamus as subject to statute of limitations, 155 A.L.R. 1144.

Applicability of statute of nonclaim or limitation statute as between surviving partner and estate of deceased partner, 157 A.L.R. 1114.

State statute of limitations as applicable in equity suits in federal court to enforce a federally created right, 162 A.L.R. 724.

Pleading laches, 173 A.L.R. 326.

Delay in bringing suit as affecting right to divorce, 4 A.L.R.2d 1321.

Delay of stockholders in exercising their right to convert their stock into other class of stock or corporate obligation, 10 A.L.R.2d 587.

Delay as defense to action for accounting between joint adventurers, 13 A.L.R.2d 765.

Laches as precluding cancellation of or other relief against release for personal injuries, 34 A.L.R.2d 1314.

When statute of limitations starts to run against enforcement of constructive trust, 55 A.L.R.2d 220.

Right to attack validity of statute, ordinance, or regulation relating to occupational or professional license as affected by applying for, or securing license, 65 A.L.R.2d 660.

What constitutes laches barring right to relief in taxpayer's action, 71 A.L.R.2d 529.

When statute of limitations or laches commences to run against action to set aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer in fraud of creditors, 100 A.L.R.2d 1094.

Delay in asserting contractual right to arbitration as precluding enforcement thereof, 25 A.L.R.3d 1171.

Settlement negotiations as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 39 A.L.R.3d 127.

Agreement of parties as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 43 A.L.R.3d 756.

Fiduciary or confidential relationship as affecting estoppel to plead statute of limitations, 45 A.L.R.3d 630.

Delay caused by other litigation as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 45 A.L.R.3d 703.

Estoppel or laches precluding lawful spouse from asserting rights of decedent's estate as against putative spouse, 81 A.L.R.3d 110.

Attorneys at law: delay in prosecution of disciplinary proceeding as defense or mitigating circumstance, 93 A.L.R.3d 1057.

Insurer's waiver of defense of statute of limitations, 104 A.L.R.5th 331.

Estoppel of insurer to assert statute-of-limitations defense - Homeowners' insurers, 4 A.L.R.6th 509.

Proof of foreign official record under Rule 44(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 784.

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