2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 12 - Verdict and Judgment
Article 3 - Dormancy and Revival of Judgments
§ 9-12-60. When Judgment Becomes Dormant; How Dormancy Prevented; Docketing; Applicability

1. A judgment shall become dormant and shall not be enforced:
   1. When seven years shall elapse after the rendition of the judgment before execution is issued thereon and is entered on the general execution docket of the county in which the judgment was rendered;
   2. Unless entry is made on the execution by an officer authorized to levy and return the same and the entry and the date thereof are entered by the clerk on the general execution docket within seven years after issuance of the execution and its record; or
   3. Unless a bona fide public effort on the part of the plaintiff in execution to enforce the execution in the courts is made and due written notice of such effort specifying the time of the institution of the action or proceedings, the nature thereof, the names of the parties thereto, and the name of the court in which it is pending is filed by the plaintiff in execution or his attorney at law with the clerk and is entered by the clerk on the general execution docket, all at such times and periods that seven years will not elapse between such entries of such notices or between such an entry and a proper entry made as prescribed in paragraph (2) of this subsection.
2. The record of the execution made as prescribed in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section or of every entry as prescribed in paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall institute a new seven-year period within which the judgment shall not become dormant, provided that when an entry on the execution or a written notice of public effort is filed for record, the execution shall be recorded or rerecorded on the general execution docket with all entries thereon. It shall not be necessary in order to prevent dormancy that such execution be entered or such entry be recorded on any other docket.
3. When an entry on an execution or a written notice of public effort is filed for record and the original execution is recorded in a general execution docket other than the current general execution docket, the original execution shall be rerecorded in the current general execution docket with all entries thereon. When an original execution is so rerecorded, a notation shall be made upon the original execution which states that it has been rerecorded and gives the book and page number where the execution has been rerecorded. When an original execution is so rerecorded in the current general execution docket, it shall be indexed in the current general execution docket in the same manner as if it were an original execution. Nothing in this subsection shall affect the priority of any judgment or lien; and no judgment or lien shall lose any priority because an execution is rerecorded.
4. The provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply to judgments or orders for child support or spousal support.

(Laws 1823, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 498; Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, § 8; Code 1863, § 2855; Code 1868, § 2863; Code 1873, § 2914; Code 1882, § 2914; Ga. L. 1884-85, p. 95, § 1; Civil Code 1895, §§ 3761, 3762, 3763; Ga. L. 1910, p. 121, § 1; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4355, 4356, 4357; Ga. L. 1920, p. 81, §§ 1, 3; Code 1933, § 110-1001; Ga. L. 1955, p. 417, § 1; Ga. L. 1965, p. 272, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 9; Ga. L. 1984, p. 912, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1613, § 2.)

- For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 121 (1997). For note discussing the procedure for the issuance and amendment of a writ of execution, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 814 (1978). For comment as to applicability of dormancy and revival statutes to alimony judgments, in light of Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 205 S.E.2d 223 (1974), see 26 Mercer L. Rev. 356 (1974).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Entry on Execution
• Enforcement of Execution

This section applies to any judgment rendered after 1910. Clark v. Shouse, 149 Ga. 59, 99 S.E. 31 (1919).

Object of this section is to notify creditors and purchasers of the existence of the plaintiff's claim. Tanner v. Hollingsworth, 41 Ga. 133 (1870).

- Purpose and intention of the General Assembly in requiring an entry of levy or other entry effect of which would be to prevent an execution from becoming dormant is to serve as a protection to the public so that any person interested could go to the original entry of the recording of the execution and determine whether or not the execution had become dormant. Pope v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 198 Ga. 304, 31 S.E.2d 602 (1944), later appeal, 200 Ga. 69, 35 S.E.2d 899 (1945).

This section refers solely to enforceability and is unrelated to suits of any kind. Watkins v. Conway, 221 Ga. 374, 144 S.E.2d 721 (1965), aff'd, 385 U.S. 188, 87 S. Ct. 357, 17 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1966).

- This article has no reference to orders or judgments by the court of ordinary (now probate court) granting to administrators leave to sell property. Hall v. Findley, 188 Ga. 487, 4 S.E.2d 211 (1939).

- Construing together former Code 1933, §§ 92-7701, 92-7702, and 110-1001 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60,48-3-21, and48-3-22), it was the intention of the General Assembly to provide that the mere entry of a tax execution on the general execution docket within the seven-year period would prevent dormancy. Darby v. De Loach, 190 Ga. 499, 9 S.E.2d 626 (1940) (decided prior to revision by Ga. L. 1955, p. 417, § 1, and Ga. L. 1965, p. 272, § 1).

- Trial court properly found that an action to enforce a Florida judgment entered against a judgment debtor was time-barred under Georgia law, granting the judgment debtor's motion the stay enforcement of that judgment, as the statute of limitations on enforcement of the Florida judgment had run under the law of Georgia, the receiving state, when viewed from the date of rendition of the judgment in the State of Florida, the state in which the judgment originated; moreover, to run the Georgia time limitation from the date of the filing of the judgment rather than from the date of rendition of the judgment would be contrary to the language of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., and of Georgia's dormancy-of-judgment and judgment-renewal statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60 and9-12-61. Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 281 Ga. App. 361, 636 S.E.2d 39 (2006).

Corporation and two individuals could not enforce a 1985 Florida judgment, which was renewed in 2006, in Georgia pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., because by their operation in tandem, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60(a)(1) and9-12-61 created a 10-year statute of limitation for the enforcement of Georgia judgments and O.C.G.A. § 9-12-132 did not allow a Florida judgment to have a longer life than a Georgia judgment. Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 296 Ga. App. 399, 674 S.E.2d 414 (2009).

There was no evidence to support the appellant's argument that the Illinois judgment it obtained and sought to enforce in Georgia was originally obtained in 2008, rather than 2000 and, thus, was not dormant as the notice of enforcement stated that the date of the Illinois judgment was 2000 and the proposed order domesticating the judgment likewise identified the date of the original judgment as 2000. Gateway Fin. Servs., LLC v. Norrils, 345 Ga. App. 775, 815 S.E.2d 126 (2018).

An order of a court for insolvent costs was not a judgment as contemplated under former Code 1933, §§ 110-1001 - 110-1003 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60 and9-12-61) even though it was a judgment when placed on the minutes of the court. Walden v. Bale, 78 Ga. App. 226, 50 S.E.2d 844 (1948).

When the execution is not filed, the judgment will become dormant within seven years after the judgment's rendition. United States v. Jenkins, 141 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. Ga. 1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 1029, 77 S. Ct. 595, 1 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1957).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a judgment debtor in a judgment creditor's action, seeking to revive an original judgment, or to declare that a prior revival action was proper for purposes of reviving that original judgment as the original judgment became dormant seven years after the judgment was entered when the creditor had not caused execution to issue, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60, but the creditor had filed the revival action under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-61 within three years of the dormancy, which was timely; pursuant to applicable rules of statutory construction, O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(b), the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Fourth Division, concluded that the General Assembly intended that dormant judgments could be revived during a three-year period thereafter by bringing an action into existence, i.e., filing an action. Magnum Communs. Ltd. v. Samoluk, 275 Ga. App. 177, 620 S.E.2d 439 (2005).

Minority of one of the defendants does not prevent the bar from attaching, but the minor is entitled to bring an action to revive at any time within three years after the disability is removed. Williams v. Merritt, 109 Ga. 213, 34 S.E. 312 (1899). But see Betts v. Hancock, 27 Ga. App. 63, 107 S.E. 377 (1921).

- Former Code 1933, § 110-1001 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60) had no application to an action to revive a "dormant tax execution" under former Code 1933, §§ 92-7701 and 92-7702 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 48-3-21 and48-3-22). Oxford v. Generator Exch., Inc., 99 Ga. App. 290, 108 S.E.2d 174 (1959).

Trial court erred in denying the appellant's petition to domesticate and enforce a judgment that was entered by a Michigan court in its favor against the appellee because, under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., the trial court was required to treat the August 3, 2007, Michigan judgment as if it had been entered in Georgia, and, although the judgment became dormant seven years after it was entered, the trial court overlooked the fact that the appellant had an additional three years after the judgment became dormant to revive it; thus, the Michigan judgment was enforceable in Georgia because the appellant sought domestication and enforcement of the Michigan judgment in November 2016, less than 10 years after its entry. Auto. Credit Corp. v. White, 344 Ga. App. 321, 810 S.E.2d 166 (2018).

- Language of this section does not permit a distinction between enforcement by execution and enforcement by contempt. Zerblis v. Zerblis, 239 Ga. 715, 238 S.E.2d 381 (1977).

- State law afforded no reasonably applicable rule as to the proper time limitation for a union's action to enforce an arbitration award rendered under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; therefore, the six-month limitation period found in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act was adopted. Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, 755 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1985).

- This section is not applicable to an agreement between a workers' compensation claimant and the claimant's employer approved by the State Board of Workers' Compensation. Nation v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 380, 145 S.E.2d 265 (1965).

- In an action wherein a workers' compensation claimant revived a lump-sum judgment of $37,747.08 plus accrued interest, which had become dormant against an employer, the trial court properly refused to amend the 2006 judgment that revived it to provide for weekly disability payments as the term of court ended and, therefore, the trial court had no authority to amend or alter that 2006 judgment. However, the trial court should have issued a writ of execution for the payments that became due after July 27, 2000, as those payments had not become dormant. Taylor v. Peachbelt Props., 293 Ga. App. 335, 667 S.E.2d 117 (2008).

Judgment perfecting a claimed lien of a materialman is within this section. Carter-Moss Lumber Co. v. Short, 66 Ga. App. 300, 18 S.E.2d 61 (1941).

- This section will apply in an equity case, when the decree is "for the payment of money," and not for the recovery of specific property or for the performance of some act or duty, even though the decree for the collection of an unliquidated claim in the amount determined by the decree may be in rem to the extent that it creates and establishes a special lien against particular property when no such lien previously existed. Collier v. Bank of Tupelo, 190 Ga. 598, 10 S.E.2d 62 (1940).

- This section does not apply to decrees which are not for the payment of money. Wall v. Jones, 62 Ga. 725 (1879); Cain v. Farmer, 74 Ga. 38 (1884); Brown v. Parks, 190 Ga. 540, 9 S.E.2d 897 (1940).

Portion of a divorce decree, which held that the former wife held shares of stock in a "resulting trust" for the former husband, was not dormant and could be enforced by the husband's estate because O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 only applied to judgments for money. Barker v. Whittington (In re Barker), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2010).

- Trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss an ex-wife's contempt action against her ex-husband seeking to enforce his financial obligations with regard to a mortgage and a vehicle pursuant to the judgment of divorce on the basis that the parties' November 1998 divorce decree had become dormant by the time the ex-wife filed for contempt in March 2009 because the dormancy clause under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 did not apply to a judgment that required the performance of an act or duty, and the divorce decree required the ex-husband to perform specific acts and did not involve the payment of a sum of money. Baker v. Schrimsher, 291 Ga. 489, 731 S.E.2d 646 (2012).

- When, pursuant to a settlement agreement incorporated into the final divorce decree, the husband would pay the wife 50% percent of the husband's Armed Services retirement pay per month after the husband was no longer obligated to pay child support, the trial court's ruling that any and all installment payments due to the wife could not be enforced was reversed because the dormancy period did not begin to run until each installment was due as each installment payment was treated as a new and separate judgment; thus, the installments that became due within seven years preceding the issuance and recording of the execution were collectible and enforceable; and the installments that were dormant remained subject to revival. Holmes-Bracy v. Bracy, 302 Ga. 714, 808 S.E.2d 669 (2017).

Unexecuted judgment for a writ of possession was not a dormant judgment that could be revived; O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 applies only to judgments or decrees ordering the payment of a sum of money. Mathis v. Hegwood, 212 Ga. App. 335, 441 S.E.2d 766 (1994).

This section does not apply to judgments on the foreclosure of mortgages. Butt v. Maddox, 7 Ga. 495 (1849); Fowler v. Bank of Americus, 114 Ga. 417, 40 S.E. 248 (1901); Redding v. Anderson, 144 Ga. 100, 86 S.E. 241 (1915).

Specific performance decrees are excepted from this section. Conway v. Caswell, 121 Ga. 254, 48 S.E. 956, 2 Ann. Cas. 269 (1904).

Filing of an Alabama child support order in a Georgia court was not viewed as a traditional action on a foreign judgment, but was more appropriately governed by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), O.C.G.A. § 19-11-100 et seq.; in a Georgia arrearage proceeding under UIFSA, the statute of limitation under the laws of Georgia or of the issuing state, whichever was longer, governed, and since the Alabama period for dormancy of judgments was longer than that of Georgia, Alabama law applied. Bodenhamer v. Wooten, 265 Ga. App. 733, 595 S.E.2d 592 (2004).

- Subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60, which removes child support and spousal support orders from the definition of dormant judgments, will not be applied retroactively. Brown v. Brown, 269 Ga. 724, 506 S.E.2d 108 (1998).

- Judgment forgiving a father's child support arrearage based on the mother's delay in making the claim was reversed because laches does not apply to claims for uncollected child support and the dormancy statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60(a), did not apply to child support orders entered after July 1, 1997, such as the one involved in the case. Wynn v. Craven, 301 Ga. 30, 799 S.E.2d 172 (2017).

Judgments filed under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law are subject to a stay of execution if the judgments are dormant under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Williams, 237 Ga. App. 881, 517 S.E.2d 109 (1999).

This section applies to a decree for alimony in a divorce suit. Landis v. Sanner, 146 Ga. 606, 91 S.E. 688 (1917); Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 205 S.E.2d 223 (1974); Stanley v. Stanley, 138 Ga. App. 560, 226 S.E.2d 800 (1976), later appeal, 141 Ga. App. 411, 233 S.E.2d 454 (1977).

Decree for alimony payable in installments is a judgment within the provisions of this section. O'Neil v. Williams, 232 Ga. 170, 205 S.E.2d 226 (1974). But see Cleveland v. Cleveland, 197 Ga. 746, 30 S.E.2d 605 (1944).

Decree for alimony, payable in installments, is not a judgment within the meaning of this section fixing a time when judgments shall become dormant unless an execution be issued thereon; nor is it a judgment within the meaning of the statute limiting the time within which a dormant judgment may be revived by scire facias. Cleveland v. Cleveland, 197 Ga. 746, 30 S.E.2d 605 (1944). But see O'Neil v. Williams, 232 Ga. 170, 205 S.E.2d 226 (1974).

Installment-payment alimony judgments that became due within seven years preceding issuance and recording of the execution are collectible and enforceable. Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 205 S.E.2d 223 (1974); O'Neil v. Williams, 232 Ga. 170, 205 S.E.2d 226 (1974).

Portion of a divorce decree, which ordered the payment of $12,500 per month for 120 months, was not dormant because each installment was a new judgment, and not all of the obligations were more than ten years old. Barker v. Whittington (In re Barker), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2010).

Lump-sum alimony judgment is dormant after the expiration of seven years and is not subject to revival after the expiration of ten years. Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 205 S.E.2d 223 (1974).

Installment payments of alimony judgments that are dormant, having become due seven to ten years prior to the filing of a revival action, are subject to being revived through the applicable statutory revival procedure. Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 205 S.E.2d 223 (1974).

Use of contempt to enforce an alimony judgment should be as restrained as the use of execution. Zerblis v. Zerblis, 239 Ga. 715, 238 S.E.2d 381 (1977).

Former Code 1933, § 3-805 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-94) had no reference to the period of time in which a judgment became dormant when not kept in life in any manner specified by former Code 1933, § 110-1001 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60). Tift v. Bank of Tifton, 60 Ga. App. 563, 4 S.E.2d 495 (1939).

- Former Code 1933, § 3-805 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-94) related to causes of action when personal service or its legal substitute was required in the bringing of an action. It had no reference to, nor did it repeal, the plain provisions of former Code 1933, § 110-1001 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60) in respect to dormant judgments. Crawford v. Boyd, 62 Ga. App. 885, 10 S.E.2d 144 (1940).

Period of limitation as to tax executions does not begin to run until the date fixed for the issuance of the execution. Sharpe v. City of Waycross, 185 Ga. 208, 194 S.E. 522 (1937).

Claims for taxes should be enforced within seven years from the date when the taxes are due and when executions could have been issued therefor unless within such time an execution is issued and entered on the general execution docket, as in the case of judgments. Suttles v. Dickey, 192 Ga. 382, 15 S.E.2d 445 (1941).

- Before the term expires for reviving a dormant judgment it is evidence of the debt; but one which can be enforced only after revival or action of debt thereon. Williams v. Price, 21 Ga. 507 (1857); Groves v. Williams, 68 Ga. 598 (1882).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60, the existence of a valid judgment lien created a right to enforce that judgment, whereas the lapse of that lien deprived the creditor of the right to enforce the judgment; thus, any act required to renew the judgment constituted a continuation of the civil action against the debtor, and not merely the maintenance of the creditor's lien as the bankruptcy trustee contended, and the creditor was thus allowed an extension of time to renew the lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 108. Wessinger v. Raab (In re Greenberg), 288 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002).

Debtor's objection to the creditor's amended proof of claim was sustained and the creditor's claim was allowed as general unsecured since: (1) the creditor admitted that over seven years elapsed since the judgment was recorded and that the state court judgment was dormant when the debtor filed for bankruptcy; (2) by stipulation of the parties, the judgment became dormant nearly one full year before the debtor sought bankruptcy relief; (3) because the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition after the seven-year period established by O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 expired, the creditor's judgment lien was invalid and unenforceable on the filing date; (4) the automatic stay barred the creditor from renewing or reviving the creditor's lien post-petition; and (5) relief from the stay would not have resurrected the creditor's secured status because the law was clear that the lien as revived attached only as of the date of the revival. Beckham v. A & W Oil & Tire Co. (In re Beckham), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2004)(Unpublished).

- Employer's complaint alleged against one of the employer's shareholders for piercing the corporate veil was not subject to a seven-year statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 as the employee failed to first obtain a judgment against the employer and then file a separate action to pierce the corporate veil, but instead filed an amended complaint against that shareholder over six years after the original complaint was filed. Pazur v. Belcher, 272 Ga. App. 456, 612 S.E.2d 481 (2004).

One suing upon an administrator's bond makes a prima facie case by introducing a dormant judgment, binding on the estate, together with an entry of nulla bona, made prior to the dormancy. Johnson v. Huggins, 7 Ga. App. 553, 67 S.E. 217 (1910).

Judgment is the official and authentic decision of a court of justice upon the respective rights and claims of the parties to an action or suit therein litigated and submitted to its determination. Oxford v. Generator Exch., Inc., 99 Ga. App. 290, 108 S.E.2d 174 (1959).

- Statute of limitations upon the enforcement of a judgment begins to run from the time when the judgment could be first enforced, which, in the case of a judgment which is appealed to the Court of Appeals and affirmed, is the time when the remittitur from that court is filed with the clerk of the trial court. Copeland v. Pope, 90 Ga. App. 304, 83 S.E.2d 40 (1954).

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the lumber company in the company's suit against the property owner to foreclose on a materialman's lien to recover the price of materials sold to the contractor and used to construct the owner's home because the dormancy statute barred foreclosure on the lien more than seven years after the lien was perfected because, when the lumber company failed to take action on the default judgment against the contractor, and the judgment became unenforceable at the end of seven years, the lien was no longer valid and there was nothing to foreclose upon. Lang v. Brand-Vaughan Lumber Co., Inc., 339 Ga. App. 710, 792 S.E.2d 461 (2016).

- In an answer to the husband's motion for contempt, the wife did not raise dormancy as a defense to the obligation to comply with the provisions of the parties' 1988 divorce decree with regard to paying the husband a share of the marital home equity in the amount of $22,000 after the wife remarried, therefore, the wife was deemed to have waived the affirmative defense; the reviewing court found that the wife only invoked O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 after the trial court found that the wife was in contempt, when the wife filed post-judgment motions for new trial and to set aside, not when the wife answered the contempt motion. Corvin v. Debter, 281 Ga. 500, 639 S.E.2d 477 (2007).

Cited in Central Bank v. Williams, 17 Ga. 193 (1855); Darsey v. Mumpford, 58 Ga. 119 (1877); Turner v. Grubbs, 58 Ga. 278 (1877); Wall v. Jones, 62 Ga. 725 (1879); Orr v. Morrow, 91 Ga. 148, 17 S.E. 287 (1893); Formby v. Schackleford, 94 Ga. 670, 21 S.E. 711 (1894); Lewis v. Smith, 99 Ga. 603, 27 S.E. 162 (1896); Blue & Stewart v. Collins, 109 Ga. 341, 34 S.E. 598 (1899); Nowell v. Haire, 116 Ga. 386, 42 S.E. 719 (1902); Rountree v. Jones, 124 Ga. 395, 52 S.E. 325 (1905); Georgia R.R. & Banking v. Wright, 124 Ga. 596, 53 S.E. 251 (1906); Dunlap Hdwe. Co. v. Tharp, 2 Ga. App. 63, 58 S.E. 398 (1907); Aldridge v. Cole, 136 Ga. 593, 71 S.E. 891 (1911); Craven v. Martin, 140 Ga. 651, 79 S.E. 568 (1913); Ray v. Atlanta Trust & Banking Co., 147 Ga. 265, 93 S.E. 418 (1917); English v. Williams, 29 Ga. App. 467, 116 S.E. 40 (1923); Towers v. City Land Co., 31 Ga. App. 612, 121 S.E. 701 (1924); Dunson v. First Nat'l Bank, 175 Ga. 79, 164 S.E. 815 (1932); Latham & Sons v. Hester, 181 Ga. 100, 181 S.E. 573 (1935); Ryals v. Widencamp, 184 Ga. 190, 190 S.E. 353 (1937); James v. Roberts, 55 Ga. App. 755, 191 S.E. 301 (1937); Pie v. Hardin, 185 Ga. 331, 195 S.E. 165 (1938); Webb v. City of Atlanta, 186 Ga. 430, 198 S.E. 50 (1938); Page v. Jones, 186 Ga. 485, 198 S.E. 63 (1938); Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65, 5 S.E.2d 41 (1939); Interstate Bond Co. v. Cullars, 189 Ga. 283, 5 S.E.2d 756 (1939); Pope v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 200 Ga. 69, 35 S.E.2d 899 (1945); Franklin v. Mobley, 73 Ga. App. 245, 36 S.E.2d 173 (1945); Georgia Sec. Co. v. Sanders, 74 Ga. App. 295, 39 S.E.2d 570 (1946); Weatherly v. Parr, 74 Ga. App. 526, 40 S.E.2d 445 (1946); Rust v. Producers Coop. Exch., Inc., 81 Ga. App. 260, 58 S.E.2d 435 (1950); Hartley v. Wooten, 81 Ga. App. 506, 59 S.E.2d 325 (1950); Howard v. Pate, 108 Ga. App. 50, 131 S.E.2d 852 (1963); Hogan v. Scott, 109 Ga. App. 799, 137 S.E.2d 575 (1964); Anthony v. Anthony, 120 Ga. App. 261, 170 S.E.2d 273 (1969); McCreary v. Wright, 132 Ga. App. 500, 208 S.E.2d 373 (1974); Mitchell v. Chastain Fin. Co., 141 Ga. App. 512, 233 S.E.2d 829 (1977); Turner v. Wood, 162 Ga. App. 674, 292 S.E.2d 558 (1982); Cronic v. Chambers Lumber Co., 249 Ga. 722, 292 S.E.2d 852 (1982); Malloy v. First Ga. Bank, 178 Ga. App. 797, 344 S.E.2d 679 (1986); Cravey v. L'Eggs Prods., Inc., 100 Bankr. 119 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989); Sussman v. Sussman, 301 Ga. App. 397, 687 S.E.2d 644 (2009); Heard v. Ruef, 347 Ga. App. 1, 815 S.E.2d 607 (2018); Johnson v. Collins, 354 Ga. App. 589, 841 S.E.2d 189 (2020).

Entry on Execution

"Entry" must be in county in which judgment was rendered.

- Paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60, when read together and in the context of the remainder of the statute, make plain that the "entry" referred to in paragraph (a)(2) must be in the county in which the judgment was rendered, and not just any county. Bennett Elec. Co. v. Spears, 188 Ga. App. 502, 373 S.E.2d 286 (1988).

Paragraph (a)(2) of this section is mandatory; and the burden is as much upon the owner of a judgment who desires to preserve the judgment's existence to see to it that the clerk dates the entry as the clerk makes the entry as it is for owner to see to it that the clerk enters the judgment upon the proper docket. Oliver v. James, 131 Ga. 182, 62 S.E. 73 (1908).

This section requires a proper entry by an officer on the general execution docket every seven years. Hollis v. Lamb, 114 Ga. 740, 40 S.E. 751 (1902); Easterlin v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 115 Ga. 305, 41 S.E. 595 (1902).

Judgment will become dormant and unenforceable unless entry is made on the execution by an officer authorized to levy and return the judgment, and such entry and the date thereof are entered by the clerk on the general execution docket within seven years after the issuance of the execution and its record. Odum v. Peterson, 170 Ga. 666, 153 S.E. 757 (1930); A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Myers, 194 Ga. 220, 21 S.E.2d 432 (1942).

- This section operates as an absolute bar to enforcement of a judgment when ten years elapse from the date of the last entry. Johnson v. Huggins, 7 Ga. App. 553, 67 S.E. 217 (1910).

Date when the record is made on the execution docket should be clear and unequivocal, for the time of the record upon the execution docket is the all-important fact from which to determine the question of dormancy. Dunlap Hdwe. Co. v. Tharp, 2 Ga. App. 63, 58 S.E. 398 (1907).

- Entries upon an execution cannot serve to keep the judgment in life unless the entries are properly recorded. Columbus Fertilizer Co. v. Hanks, 119 Ga. 950, 47 S.E. 222 (1904); Shaw v. Walker, 25 Ga. App. 642, 104 S.E. 23, cert. denied, 25 Ga. App. 841 (1920).

- Entry of levy on an execution within seven years from the timely entry of the execution on the general execution docket of the county in which the judgment was rendered will not suffice to keep the judgment alive. In order for such an entry to be effective in preventing dormancy the entry must be entered on the general execution docket within seven years from the time of the previous effective entry on such docket. Bryant v. Freeman, 65 Ga. App. 590, 16 S.E.2d 113 (1941).

Any entry upon the execution is sufficient which will serve to charge or discharge the officer whose duty it is to execute the process. Hatcher v. A. Gammell & Co., 49 Ga. 576 (1873).

- Entries made within seven years must be recorded on the original record of the execution. This requirement is not satisfied by an entry in the same execution docket but on a page far removed from the page on which the execution is recorded. The provision of the statute in this respect is met only when such entry is recorded on the original record of the execution, which means on the same page and at the same place in the execution docket where the original record appears. A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Myers, 194 Ga. 220, 21 S.E.2d 432 (1942).

Second record of entry on the execution shall be made on the general execution docket of the date the return is filed, with the date of such record entered by the clerk, in addition to the entry which is made on the docket of the date that no such second return shall be made on the general execution docket if the date that the entry is filed is less than seven years from the date of the execution. Odum v. Peterson, 170 Ga. 666, 153 S.E. 757 (1930).

Entry by the clerk that the clerk has given the execution to the sheriff is immaterial. Daniels v. Haynes, 91 Ga. 123, 16 S.E. 649 (1983).

- Nulla bona entry or entries made by a sheriff or other levying officer and entered on the general execution docket cannot be construed to be a proceeding in the courts. Scott v. Napier, 85 Ga. App. 268, 69 S.E.2d 111 (1952).

Depositing the execution in the clerk's office and having an entry of filing made thereon is ineffective unless the execution is actually entered on the docket. Suttles v. Dickey, 192 Ga. 382, 15 S.E.2d 445 (1941).

Nulla bona entry by the sheriff on the execution will not stop the statute from running, unless it is also made on the general execution docket. General Disct. Corp. v. Chunn, 188 Ga. 128, 3 S.E.2d 65 (1939).

- Recording of a nulla bona entry, more than seven years after the original record of the execution, without re-recording the execution, was not sufficient to prevent the running of the dormancy statute. Scott v. Napier, 85 Ga. App. 268, 69 S.E.2d 111 (1952).

- Date when the recording on the docket takes place must appear from the inspection of the docket itself. Oliver v. James, 131 Ga. 182, 62 S.E. 73 (1908); Craven v. Martin, 140 Ga. 651, 79 S.E. 568 (1913).

Issuing and entry of a void execution is the same as if no execution were issued and entered on the records. Ray v. Atlanta Trust & Banking Co., 147 Ga. 265, 93 S.E. 418 (1917).

- When a judgment is obtained in a justice of the peace court, in order to prevent dormancy the execution and entries are to be recorded upon the superior court execution docket, not upon the general execution docket. Rountree v. Jones, 124 Ga. 395, 52 S.E. 325 (1905); Ingram v. Jackson Mercantile Co., 2 Ga. App. 218, 58 S.E. 372 (1907); Columbus Fertilizer Co. v. Hanks, 119 Ga. 950, 47 S.E. 222 (1940).

- Entry on the superior court execution docket is necessary to prevent the running of this section's dormancy clause even as between the parties. Smith, Barry & Co. v. Bearden, 117 Ga. 822, 45 S.E. 59 (1903). But for general execution docket, see Young v. Covington Co., 152 Ga. 803, 111 S.E. 196 (1922).

Bona fide public effort of the plaintiff to enforce the plaintiff's execution will prevent the judgment from becoming dormant. First Nat'l Bank v. McCaskill, 27 Ga. App. 391, 108 S.E. 819 (1921).

Bona fide public effort which will suffice to prevent dormancy is one which appears on the public docket of a court. Bryant v. Freeman, 65 Ga. App. 590, 16 S.E.2d 113 (1941).

- Any public act of a plaintiff going to show that the execution was still in life would be sufficient to prevent the judgment from becoming dormant. Oliver v. James, 131 Ga. 182, 62 S.E. 73 (1908).

Receipt for costs entered upon a writ of fieri facias by the magistrate is sufficient to prevent the dormancy of a judgment. Gholston v. O'Kelley, 81 Ga. 19, 7 S.E. 107 (1888).

Payment of costs and turning execution over to a levying officer were not bona fide public efforts on the part of the plaintiff as would prevent the running of the statute or the dormancy of the judgment under paragraph (a)(3) of this section. U-Driv-It Sys. v. Lyles, 71 Ga. App. 70, 30 S.E.2d 111 (1944).

When the validity of the execution was defended, the rule against dormancy was applied. Hanks v. Pearce, 96 Ga. 159, 22 S.E. 676 (1895); Smith v. Zachry, 1 Ga. App. 344, 57 S.E. 1011 (1907).

When the plaintiff defends the execution in a claim case, dormancy of the judgment is prevented. Beck v. Hamilton, 113 Ga. 273, 38 S.E. 754 (1901).

Judgment in rem, entered for enforcing a preexisting lien, is not to become dormant under this article, which relates only to liens created by the judgment. Manifestly, a lien which the judgment does not create, this article should not take away. Collier v. Bank of Tupelo, 190 Ga. 598, 10 S.E.2d 62 (1940).

Dormancy of a judgment may be taken advantage of by the defendant as against the plaintiff or the plaintiff's assigns. Columbus Fertilizer Co. v. Hanks, 119 Ga. 950, 47 S.E. 222 (1904).

Death of a claimant, pending a case will not operate to prevent dormancy of a judgment. Beck v. Hamilton, 113 Ga. 273, 38 S.E. 754 (1901).

- Action filed and never dismissed may not constitute a pending suit amounting to a bona fide public effort to enforce collection sufficient to prevent dormancy. While the filing of pleadings designed to enforce collection of the judgment may constitute a new starting point for the seven-year period, if nothing further appears of record and no attempt is made to prosecute the action for a period of more than seven years, and no sufficient legal justification for the inaction appears, this section will not be tolled by the mere existence of such pleadings. A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Myers, 194 Ga. 220, 21 S.E.2d 432 (1942).

Public acts of the plaintiff need not be entered on record. Hollis v. Lamb, 114 Ga. 740, 40 S.E. 751 (1902); First Nat'l Bank v. McCaskill, 27 Ga. App. 391, 108 S.E. 819 (1921).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Recording of second nulla bona on tax execution.

- In recording the second nulla bona on a tax execution, the execution should be recorded together with entries of both the first and second nulla bonas thereon. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 489.

- Tax lien is created by the issuance of a tax execution, or writ of fieri facias, and such lien exists for seven years but not against innocent bona fide purchasers for value while the execution is unrecorded; entry of the execution upon the general execution docket revives the lien for an additional seven-year period and is effective against all subsequent purchasers, dating from such entry or recording; a nulla bona entry made prior to the expiration of the seven-year period on such execution would revive the lien but only if such entry is also entered or reentered, as the case may be, upon the execution docket or other books upon which executions and entries are required to be entered or reentered. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-114.

As to cancellation of security deeds and writs of execution from record, see 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-79.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, § 385 et seq.

- 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 851 et seq.

- Death of one of two or more judgment creditors under a joint judgment as affecting judgment, 100 A.L.R. 814; 122 A.L.R. 752.

Construction, application, and effect of statutory provision for revival of judgment on failure of title of purchaser at execution sale, 115 A.L.R. 549.

Counterclaim or setoff as defense to proceeding to revive judgment, 131 A.L.R. 802.

Matters antecedent to, or contemporaneous with, entry of judgment, as defense to proceeding or action to revive it, 138 A.L.R. 863.

Failure to revive judgment against a number jointly, as to some of them, as making applicable the rule that a release of one is a release of all, 160 A.L.R. 678.

Ancillary proceedings as suspending or removing bar of statute of limitations as to judgment, 166 A.L.R. 767.