2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 12 - Verdict and Judgment
Article 2 - Effect of Judgments
§ 9-12-40. Judgment Conclusive Between Which Persons and on What Issues

A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 3496; Code 1868, § 3519; Code 1873, § 3577; Code 1882, § 3577; Civil Code 1895, §§ 3742, 5348; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4336, 5943; Code 1933, § 110-501.)

- For article, "Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Georgia," see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 329 (1968). For article surveying Georgia cases dealing with environment, natural resources, and land use from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 75 (1978). For annual survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 359 (1998). For article, "Construction Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 173 (2001). For survey article on domestic relations cases for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 223 (2003). For survey article on construction law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 59 (2008). For note, "Res Judicata in the Georgia Courts," see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 929 (1977). For case note, "Lynch v. Waters: Tolling Georgia's Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1493 (1987). For case comment, "Yost v. Torok and Abusive Litigation: A New Tort to Solve an Old Problem," see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1986).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Same Parties and Privies
• Law of the Case
• Res Judicata
• Estoppel by Judgment

General Consideration

Basis for laws relating to conclusiveness.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 110-501 and 110-503 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-40 and9-12-42) provide the primary basis for the laws relating to conclusiveness of judgments. Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975).

- Read together and affirmatively, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-40 and9-12-42 (judgment no bar absent decision on merits) provide that a judgment on the merits of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue, in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered, until such judgment shall be reversed or set aside. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Thrift-Mart, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 874, 285 S.E.2d 566 (1981).

- Apparent conflict between former Civil Code 1910, §§ 4336 and 5943 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40) and former Code 1910, §§ 4335, 4337, 5678, and 5679 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-44 and9-12-42) was reconciled by the fact that former Civil Code 1910, §§ 4335, 4337, 5678, and 5679 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-44 and9-12-42) have special application to estoppels by judgment, and this section applied when a plea of res adjudicata was available. Camp v. Lindsay, 176 Ga. 438, 168 S.E. 284 (1933).

- This section is operative only if the two actions are based upon the same cause of action. Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 371 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838, 95 S. Ct. 66, 42 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1974).

- In deciding whether this section operates to bar a state court claim, the Court of Appeals will consider: (a) whether there is a valid antecedent judgment; (b) whether there is identity of parties; (c) whether there is identity of issues; and (d) whether reasons of public policy militate against a strict application of this section in this case. Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446, 249 S.E.2d 270 (1978).

- Stare decisis, unlike res judicata or collateral estoppel, does not involve claim preclusion or issue preclusion; stare decisis does not work as a bar but only dictates the conclusion of law which will be made upon a given set of facts. Norris v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 254 Ga. 684, 333 S.E.2d 835 (1985).

In plaintiff consumer's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., action against defendant collection attorney, when the consumer's counsel presented to the court two unpublished opinions from Georgia trial courts as supporting an argument that the collection attorney's state court deficiency action was barred by the statute of limitations, those unpublished opinions were not persuasive authority. Almand v. Reynolds & Robin, P.C., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Ga. 2007).

- While res judicata applies only as between the same parties and upon the same cause of action to matters which were actually in issue or which under the rules of law could have been put in issue, estoppel by judgment applies as between the same parties upon any cause of action to matters which were directly decided in the former suit. Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672, 38 S.E.2d 394 (1946); Harvey v. Wright, 80 Ga. App. 232, 55 S.E.2d 835 (1949); A.R. Hudson Realty, Inc. v. Hood, 151 Ga. App. 778, 262 S.E.2d 189 (1979); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980); Roddenbery v. Roddenbery, 255 Ga. 715, 342 S.E.2d 464 (1986); Jim West Housemovers v. Cobb County, 259 Ga. 314, 380 S.E.2d 251 (1989).

Generally, res judicata bars relitigation of any matter of a cause of action that was, or could have been, put in issue and adjudicated in a prior proceeding between the same parties, while estoppel by judgment prevents relitigation in a subsequent suit (involving a different cause of action) of a matter which was actually adjudicated in a former case. Neither defense, however, is available unless the subsequent suit is between the same parties or their privies. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 168 Ga. App. 66, 308 S.E.2d 193 (1983).

- In deciding whether this section operates to bar a state court claim, it must have been based not on purely technical grounds but at least in part on the merits when under the pleadings they were or could have been involved. Sumner v. Sumner, 186 Ga. 390, 197 S.E. 833 (1938); Thompson v. Thompson, 199 Ga. 692, 35 S.E.2d 262 (1945); Powell v. Powell, 200 Ga. 379, 37 S.E.2d 191 (1946).

- Res judicata and estoppel by judgment can only be set up in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies. Owens v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 238, 73 S.E.2d 512 (1952); Walka Mt. Camp, No. 565, Woodmen of World, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 222 Ga. 249, 149 S.E.2d 365 (1966); Anderson Oil Co. v. Benton Oil Co., 246 Ga. 304, 271 S.E.2d 207 (1980).

Former judgment binds only as to the facts in issue and events existing at the time of such judgment, and does not prevent a re-examination even of the same questions between the same parties, if in the interval the material facts have so changed or such new events have occurred as to alter the legal rights or relations of the litigants; although, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the facts as the facts existed at the time of the former judgment would be presumed to continue. Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381, 26 S.E.2d 778 (1943).

- When a claimant in action conveyed property in dispute before a claim was filed, a judgment finding the property levied on not to be subject to levy is not res judicata nor a collateral estoppel in favor of one to whom the claimant conveyed the property. Goodwin v. Bowen, 184 Ga. 408, 191 S.E. 691 (1937).

- Effect of a judgment cannot be avoided by a difference in the pleadings, when those in the first case could and should have been as full as those in the second, though in fact the pleadings were not. Booker v. Booker, 107 Ga. App. 339, 130 S.E.2d 260 (1963).

Single cause of action with several elements of damage admits of but one action, when there is an identity of subject matter and of parties. Massey v. Stephens, 155 Ga. App. 243, 270 S.E.2d 796 (1980).

Plaintiff is not permitted to split a plaintiff's single cause of action to seek in successive litigation the enforcement of first one remedy and then a second. Massey v. Stephens, 155 Ga. App. 243, 270 S.E.2d 796 (1980).

Principle test for comparing causes of action is whether or not the primary right and duty, and the delict or wrong are the same in each action. Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 371 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838, 95 S. Ct. 66, 42 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1974).

- Personal judgment cannot be obtained against a person who is not named as a party defendant and properly served in the action. Nor may a judgment be rendered against a party defendant in favor of one who is not party to the case. Neither can the court grant relief as to matters not pleaded. Burgess v. Nabers, 122 Ga. App. 445, 177 S.E.2d 266 (1970).

- Judgment will not be conclusive on the trial of another case between the same parties involving the same question when a question comes collaterally before a court, and a judgment is rendered in the case, and it does not appear, except by inference from the judgment, the pleadings, and the evidence, that the question collaterally made was actually passed upon. Cravey v. Druggists Coop. Ice Cream Co., 66 Ga. App. 909, 19 S.E.2d 845 (1942).

- Judgment is not an estoppel if a judgment and extrinsic evidence leave it as a mere matter of conjecture as to what questions of fact were litigated and determined in the former action. Cravey v. Druggists Coop. Ice Cream Co., 66 Ga. App. 909, 19 S.E.2d 845 (1942).

- When the court of ordinary (now probate court) had determined an intestacy, such an adjudication is not conclusive to the same extent as other judgments. On the contrary, the question would seem to be open for future consideration in the event a will should be brought to the attention of the court in a proper manner. Walden v. Mahnks, 178 Ga. 825, 174 S.E. 538 (1934).

- Judgment of the superior court, apparently regular and legal, can only be set aside in a proper proceeding for that purpose in the court wherein the judgment was rendered. Barron v. Lovett, 207 Ga. 131, 60 S.E.2d 458 (1950).

- When a judgment is susceptible of two meanings, one of which would render the judgment illegal and the other proper, that construction will, if reasonably possible, be given the judgment that would render the judgment legal. Byrd v. Goodman, 195 Ga. 621, 25 S.E.2d 34 (1943).

Judgment on affidavit of illegality of execution is a bar to equitable relief thereafter. Cone v. Eubanks, 167 Ga. 384, 145 S.E. 652 (1928).

- Defendant in execution may not by affidavit of illegality make the defense of payment of debt, but only the payment of the execution itself. Felker v. Johnson, 189 Ga. 797, 7 S.E.2d 668 (1940).

- Petitioner cannot, after judgment, set up a settlement of the cause of action made before rendition of the judgment. Felker v. Johnson, 189 Ga. 797, 7 S.E.2d 668 (1940).

- Affirmance of the judgment without condition or direction left the trial court without jurisdiction to entertain or pass on a "special plea" filed after the judgment of affirmance. Federal Inv. Co. v. Ewing, 166 Ga. 246, 142 S.E. 890 (1928).

- When a creditor obtains a personal judgment against a trustee on a note executed by the latter for goods, merchandise, and cash obtained and used for the benefit of the cestuis que trust, and on which a nulla bona has been returned, the creditor may proceed to subject the trust property to the payment of the judgment. The judgment against the trustee does not render the subsequent proceeding res adjudicata. Faulk v. Smith, 168 Ga. 448, 148 S.E. 100 (1929).

- Judgment rendered between creditor and debtor, until set aside for fraud, accident, mistake, or other cause, was conclusive and binding between them as to the amount of the indebtedness. The agreement alleged to have been made between the parties therefore was without consideration and not binding. Creswell v. Bryant Hdwe. Co., 166 Ga. 228, 142 S.E. 885 (1928).

Since the municipal court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties and, although the defendant in that suit defended upon the ground that the plaintiff's right was an equitable one only and was cognizable only in a court of equity, the court nevertheless had jurisdiction to determine this question, the judgment against the defendant was res judicata as to the matter pled and of the plaintiff's right to recover. Hood v. Bibb Brokerage Corp., 48 Ga. App. 606, 173 S.E. 236 (1934).

One who obtained a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction will not be heard to question the judgment's validity when the court has acted within the court's jurisdiction and the proceedings are otherwise legal. Thomas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 404, 185 S.E. 922 (1936); Shaw v. Davis, 119 Ga. App. 801, 168 S.E.2d 853 (1969).

All questions between parties once and finally settled by a solemn decree must be considered an end to the litigation. Those questions cannot be relitigated in other actions directly or indirectly. Final judgment of the court cannot be reviewed between the same parties in the superior court or on writ of error to the Supreme Court. One of the prime objects of judicial procedure is to forever settle and end disputes between litigants, and courts never look with favor on the unnecessary prolongation of litigation, and particularly disapprove attempts to ignore or evade binding judgments. Lankford v. Holton, 196 Ga. 631, 27 S.E.2d 310 (1943); Rewis v. Bennett, 213 Ga. 535, 100 S.E.2d 196 (1957); Smith v. Robinson, 214 Ga. 835, 108 S.E.2d 317 (1959); Bowman v. Bowman, 215 Ga. 560, 111 S.E.2d 226 (1959).

Principle which fixes the absolute conclusiveness of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the parties and their privies applies whether the reasons upon which the judgment was based were sound or not, and even if no reasons at all were given. McRae v. Boykin, 73 Ga. App. 67, 35 S.E.2d 548 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 844, 66 S. Ct. 1024, 90 L. Ed. 1618 (1946).

Regardless of the correctness of the trial court's decision, it cannot be relitigated. Johnston v. Duncan, 227 Ga. 298, 180 S.E.2d 348 (1971).

Consent decree involving title to realty was not void for want of any description or for want of any words to furnish a key to any description of the lands when pleadings on which consent decree was based gave a complete description of the property. Bentley v. Still, 198 Ga. 743, 32 S.E.2d 814 (1945).

Consent judgment rendered to conform with a settlement agreement without a party's participation would not come within this section, there having been no judicial decision upon the merits in the absence of a true adversary proceeding. Blakely v. Couch, 129 Ga. App. 625, 200 S.E.2d 493 (1973).

- When a court having jurisdiction of condemnation proceedings enters a judgment that the lands are condemned for public purposes, the condemnee has no right to enjoin the taking and use of the lands by the condemnor, without first having the judgment of condemnation vacated or set aside. Hogg v. City of La Grange, 202 Ga. 764, 44 S.E.2d 760 (1947).

Judgment discharging an administrator relieves the administrator from further liability to those interested in the estate, unless such judgment is set aside either on motion in the court of ordinary, or by equitable proceeding in the superior court. Stanton v. Gailey, 72 Ga. App. 292, 33 S.E.2d 747 (1945).

- When a decree is offered in evidence to establish any particular state of facts, or as an adjudication upon the subject matter, such decree is admissible only when accompanied by the entire record of the suit in which the decree was rendered. Holcombe v. Jones, 197 Ga. 825, 30 S.E.2d 903 (1944).

- Judgment of a court of bankruptcy disallowing a claim on the ground that the claim was not filed within the time is not an adjudication upon the merits of the claim, and when thereafter, the holder of such claim attempts to enforce the claim by levy upon the property of the bankrupt, it is error to sustain an affidavit of illegality thereto on the ground that the judgment of the bankruptcy court was an adjudication that the judgment was not a valid lien against the property of the bankrupt. Georgia Sec. Co. v. Arnold, 56 Ga. App. 532, 193 S.E. 366 (1937).

Master and servant relationship does not ipso facto constitute privity for purposes of res judicata or estoppel by judgment. Porterfield v. Gilmer, 132 Ga. App. 463, 208 S.E.2d 295 (1974), aff'd, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975).

- Former Code 1933, § 85-1509 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-6-165), prescribing the time in which answers may be filed, must be construed in harmony with the rule as to the conclusiveness of judgments, and will not authorize parties to file objections to the return of partitioners on grounds which were adjudicated upon the hearing of the application for their appointment. Cates v. Duncan, 181 Ga. 686, 183 S.E. 797 (1936).

- Although a person asserting constitutional violations is entitled to a de novo hearing in federal court, regardless of whether the person resorted to an administrative hearing or whether such hearing purported to decide constitutional issues, when there has been state court review upholding an administrative determination, the state judicial determination is entitled to res judicata and collateral estoppel effect in the state court, and shall be given full faith and credit in federal court. Sharpley v. Davis, 786 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1986).

- When buyer purchased encumbered property upon representation that the property was unencumbered, subsequently paid the seller's debt to avoid foreclosure and assumed the creditor's cause of action against the seller, and then allowed that action to be dismissed for lack of prosecution, the buyer's action against the seller for breach of warranty and against the attorney for malpractice was not barred. Klosterman v. Tudor, 170 Ga. App. 4, 315 S.E.2d 920 (1984).

Judgment in prior proceeding found not binding in present litigation. See Shepard v. Byrd, 581 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

- Res judicata and estoppel by judgment will not bar either a motion to set aside a judgment or an extraordinary motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Herringdine v. Nalley Equip. Leasing, Ltd., 238 Ga. App. 210, 517 S.E.2d 571 (1999).

Superior court abused the court's discretion in denying a city's motion to set aside a judgment granting a police officer's demand for judgment on the Workers' Compensation Board's award because any earlier trial court orders were subject to a proper motion to set aside pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40; the city was authorized to move to set aside the superior court's order granting the demand for judgment on the Board's award on the ground of mistake under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d)(2). City of Atlanta v. Holder, 309 Ga. App. 811, 711 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

- Voluntary dismissal with prejudice of action for penalties under federal Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., as to bank merged the plaintiffs' entire cause of action, including rescission remedy, for nondisclosures and barred any subsequent action in this state against the seller for the seller's "joint and not separate" liability for failure to make the disclosures in the same transaction. Massey v. Stephens, 155 Ga. App. 243, 270 S.E.2d 796 (1980).

Dismissal with prejudice is res judicata of all questions which might have been litigated in the action and is a final disposition, barring the right to bring another action on the same claim. Hutcheson Medical Ctr. v. Scealf, 205 Ga. App. 204, 422 S.E.2d 20, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 900, 422 S.E.2d 20 (1992).

- Although, under Georgia law, the collateral estoppel effect of a judgment entered against a debtor is not diminished by the fact that the judgment resulted from a default, the federal bankruptcy court, based on policy considerations, would not apply collateral estoppel to conclude from a state default judgment in a libel and slander case that the defendant's intent in making alleged defamatory statements was willful and malicious so as to render the resulting debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Wright v. McIntyre, 57 Bankr. 961 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).

To the extent that issues relating to the fraudulent conduct of the debtor were decided in the state court fraud action, collateral estoppel bound the bankruptcy court to the determination made on those matters. Moore v. Gill, 181 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).

Since the opposing party could have, regarding a sanctions order imposed against the opposing party, raised an alleged error concerning that order in an appeal of a declaratory judgment action filed against the opposing party, but did not do so, the opposing party was precluded from arguing alleged error regarding the merits of that sanction order on the opposing party's appeal of a later contempt order for the opposing party's willful failure to comply with the sanctions order. Franklin v. Gude, 259 Ga. App. 521, 578 S.E.2d 170 (2003).

- Res judicata did not bar a secured seller's claim for conversion against the buyer of an adult novelty business because the question in a prior contempt proceeding in bankruptcy was not whether the buyer had converted any property belonging to the business, but whether the buyer had failed to comply with the Bankruptcy Court's turnover order to provide the seller with certain, specified items, including cash collateral. The Bankruptcy Court did not adjudicate any claim of civil conversion. Bearoff v. Craton, 350 Ga. App. 826, 830 S.E.2d 362 (2019).

- County board of tax assessors was collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of whether funeral vaults sold through pre-need burial packages but stored by their seller in the county were subject to ad valorem taxes under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-16 by a 2001 consent decree between the seller and the assessors that stated the vaults were not taxable. Morgan County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Vantage Prods. Corp., 323 Ga. App. 823, 748 S.E.2d 468 (2013).

Cited in Bostwick v. Perkins, Hopkins & White, 1 Ga. 136 (1846); Stroup v. Sullivan, 2 Ga. 275, 46 Am. Dec. 389 (1847); Kenan & Rockwell v. Miller, 2 Ga. 325 (1847); Puffer Mfg. Co. v. Rivers, 10 Ga. App. 154, 73 S.E. 20 (1911); Jones v. Schacter, 31 Ga. App. 709, 121 S.E. 691 (1924); Burgamy v. Holton, 165 Ga. 384, 141 S.E. 42 (1927); Lester v. Southern Sec. Co., 168 Ga. 307, 147 S.E. 529 (1929); McDonald Mtg. & Realty Co. v. Feingold, 168 Ga. 763, 149 S.E. 132 (1929); Odom v. Attaway, 41 Ga. App. 51, 152 S.E. 148 (1930); Eison v. Cocker, 45 Ga. App. 122, 163 S.E. 511 (1932); Sells v. Sells, 175 Ga. 110, 165 S.E. 1 (1932); George v. Cox, 46 Ga. App. 125, 166 S.E. 868 (1932); Walden v. Mahnks, 178 Ga. 825, 174 S.E. 538 (1934); McEntyre v. Merritt, 49 Ga. App. 416, 175 S.E. 661 (1934); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Leo, 50 Ga. App. 473, 178 S.E. 322 (1934); Rosenthal v. Langley, 180 Ga. 253, 179 S.E. 383 (1935); Atlanta Sav. Bank v. Kurfees, 181 Ga. 207, 181 S.E. 779 (1935); Key v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 181 Ga. 402, 182 S.E. 607 (1935); Rozetta v. Rozetta, 181 Ga. 494, 182 S.E. 847 (1935); Gillis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 52 Ga. App. 806, 184 S.E. 791 (1936); Woods v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 429, 186 S.E. 467 (1936); Ellis v. First Nat'l Bank, 182 Ga. 641, 186 S.E. 813 (1936); Jackson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 Ga. 659, 189 S.E. 243 (1936); Crider v. Harris, 183 Ga. 695, 189 S.E. 519 (1937); Crane v. Stratton, 185 Ga. 234, 194 S.E. 182 (1937); Sheldon & Co. v. Emory Univ., 184 Ga. 440, 191 S.E. 497 (1937); Simmons v. Williams Realty & Loan Co., 185 Ga. 154, 194 S.E. 356 (1937); Byrd v. Prudential Ins. Co., 185 Ga. 310, 195 S.E. 403 (1937); Hicks v. Wadsworth, 57 Ga. App. 529, 196 S.E. 251 (1938); United States v. Hatcher, 185 Ga. 816, 196 S.E. 773 (1938); McCollum v. Lark, 187 Ga. 292, 200 S.E. 276 (1938); Brinkley v. Newell, 188 Ga. 678, 4 S.E.2d 827 (1939); Blackwood v. Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ga. App. 149, 6 S.E.2d 126 (1939); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Childs, 189 Ga. 835, 7 S.E.2d 907 (1940); Whitfield v. Maddox, 189 Ga. 878, 8 S.E.2d 54 (1940); Loveless v. Carten, 64 Ga. App. 54, 12 S.E.2d 175 (1940); Morris v. Georgia Power Co., 65 Ga. App. 180, 15 S.E.2d 730 (1941); Moody v. McHan, 66 Ga. App. 29, 16 S.E.2d 889 (1941); Allman v. Aldredge, 193 Ga. 269, 18 S.E.2d 478 (1942); Forrester v. Pullman Co., 66 Ga. App. 745, 19 S.E.2d 330 (1942); Cravey v. Druggists Coop. Ice Cream Co., 66 Ga. App. 909, 19 S.E.2d 845 (1942); Adams v. Higginbotham, 194 Ga. 292, 21 S.E.2d 616 (1942); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 68 Ga. App. 393, 23 S.E.2d 198 (1942); Lankford v. Holton, 197 Ga. 212, 28 S.E.2d 747 (1944); Bussell v. Glenn, 197 Ga. 816, 30 S.E.2d 617 (1944); Stanton v. Gailey, 72 Ga. App. 292, 33 S.E.2d 747 (1945); Andrews v. Aderhold, 201 Ga. 132, 39 S.E.2d 61 (1946); Williams v. Brannen, 75 Ga. App. 773, 44 S.E.2d 493 (1947); McCall v. Kliros, 76 Ga. App. 89, 45 S.E.2d 72 (1947); Settle v. McWhorter, 203 Ga. 93, 45 S.E.2d 210 (1947); Griffin v. Driver, 203 Ga. 481, 46 S.E.2d 913 (1948); Maddox v. Carithers, 77 Ga. App. 280, 47 S.E.2d 888 (1948); Gamble v. Gamble, 204 Ga. 82, 48 S.E.2d 540 (1948); Miller Serv., Inc. v. Miller, 77 Ga. App. 413, 48 S.E.2d 761 (1948); Turner v. Avant, 205 Ga. 426, 54 S.E.2d 269 (1949); Otwell Motor Co. v. Hill, 79 Ga. App. 686, 54 S.E.2d 765 (1949); Walton v. City of Atlanta, 89 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Edenfield v. Lanier, 206 Ga. 696, 58 S.E.2d 188 (1950); Garr v. E.W. Banks Co., 206 Ga. 831, 59 S.E.2d 400 (1950); Morris v. Morris, 82 Ga. App. 384, 61 S.E.2d 156 (1950); Gamble v. Gamble, 207 Ga. 380, 61 S.E.2d 836 (1950); Parker v. Cherokee Bldg. Supply Co., 207 Ga. 710, 64 S.E.2d 51 (1951); McKenney v. Woodbury Banking Co., 208 Ga. 616, 68 S.E.2d 571 (1952); Carswell v. Shannon, 209 Ga. 596, 74 S.E.2d 850 (1953); Routon v. Woodbury Banking Co., 209 Ga. 706, 75 S.E.2d 561 (1953); Walker v. Hamilton, 210 Ga. 155, 78 S.E.2d 511 (1953); Brown v. Brown, 89 Ga. App. 428, 80 S.E.2d 2 (1953); Churchwell Bros. Constr. Co. v. Archie R. Briggs Constr. Co., 89 Ga. App. 550, 80 S.E.2d 212 (1954); Gaulding v. Gaulding, 210 Ga. 638, 81 S.E.2d 830 (1954); Bennett v. Bennett, 210 Ga. 721, 82 S.E.2d 653 (1954); Malcom v. Webb, 211 Ga. 449, 86 S.E.2d 489 (1955); Baker v. Decatur Lumber & Supply Co., 211 Ga. 510, 87 S.E.2d 89 (1955); Bostic v. Nesbitt, 212 Ga. 198, 91 S.E.2d 484 (1956); Threlkeld v. Whitehead, 95 Ga. App. 378, 98 S.E.2d 76 (1957); Galloway v. Merrill, 213 Ga. 633, 100 S.E.2d 443 (1957); Wells v. Keith, 213 Ga. 858, 102 S.E.2d 533 (1958); Allen v. Withrow, 215 Ga. 388, 110 S.E.2d 663 (1959); Shaw v. Miller, 215 Ga. 413, 110 S.E.2d 759 (1959); Beckanstin v. Dougherty County Council of Architects, 215 Ga. 543, 111 S.E.2d 361 (1959); Hackney v. Tench, 216 Ga. 483, 117 S.E.2d 453 (1960); Pattillo v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 216 Ga. 806, 120 S.E.2d 176 (1961); Russ Transp., Inc. v. Jones, 104 Ga. App. 612, 122 S.E.2d 282 (1961); Blanton v. Blanton, 217 Ga. 542, 123 S.E.2d 758 (1962); King Sales Co. v. McKey, 105 Ga. App. 787, 125 S.E.2d 684 (1962); Hardin v. Hardin, 218 Ga. 39, 126 S.E.2d 216 (1962); Banks v. Sirmans, 218 Ga. 413, 128 S.E.2d 66 (1962); John P. King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 218 Ga. 382, 128 S.E.2d 68 (1962); Chandler v. Chandler, 107 Ga. App. 124, 129 S.E.2d 370 (1962); Lawhorn v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 299 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1962); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Parham, 218 Ga. 640, 129 S.E.2d 868 (1963); West v. Hatcher, 219 Ga. 540, 134 S.E.2d 603 (1964); Carswell v. Cannon, 110 Ga. App. 315, 138 S.E.2d 468 (1964); Patent Scaffolding Co. v. Byers, 220 Ga. 426, 139 S.E.2d 332 (1964); Stoddard Cleaners, Inc. v. Carr, 220 Ga. 707, 141 S.E.2d 434 (1965); Sirmons v. Banks, 220 Ga. 881, 142 S.E.2d 851 (1965); Banks v. Employees Loan & Thrift Corp., 112 Ga. App. 38, 143 S.E.2d 787 (1965); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Dunbar, 112 Ga. App. 102, 143 S.E.2d 663 (1965); Horton v. Harvey, 221 Ga. 799, 147 S.E.2d 505 (1966); Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 148 S.E.2d 414 (1966); Sewell Dairy Supply Co. v. Taylor, 113 Ga. App. 729, 149 S.E.2d 540 (1966); Cromer v. Cromer, 222 Ga. 365, 149 S.E.2d 804 (1966); Adams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 276, 151 S.E.2d 177 (1966); Uddyback v. George, 223 Ga. 311, 154 S.E.2d 577 (1967); Martin v. Phelps, 115 Ga. App. 552, 155 S.E.2d 447 (1967); McDonald v. Hester, 115 Ga. App. 740, 155 S.E.2d 720 (1967); Sams v. McDonald, 223 Ga. 451, 156 S.E.2d 31 (1967); Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Gaudio, 116 Ga. App. 672, 158 S.E.2d 680 (1967); Wren Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Midland-Guardian Co., 117 Ga. App. 22, 159 S.E.2d 734 (1967); Bailey v. Louisville & N.R.R., 117 Ga. App. 185, 160 S.E.2d 245 (1968); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 Ga. 150, 160 S.E.2d 372 (1968); Swinney v. Reeves, 224 Ga. 274, 161 S.E.2d 273 (1968); Franklin v. Sea Island Bank, 120 Ga. App. 654, 171 S.E.2d 866 (1969); Miami Properties, Inc. v. Fitts, 226 Ga. 300, 175 S.E.2d 22 (1970); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 122 Ga. App. 407, 177 S.E.2d 176 (1970); Leggett v. Gibson-Hart-Durden Funeral Home, 123 Ga. App. 224, 180 S.E.2d 256 (1971); Williams v. Nuckolls, 229 Ga. 48, 189 S.E.2d 82 (1972); Brown v. Edwards, 229 Ga. 345, 191 S.E.2d 47 (1972); Bauder Finishing & Career College, Inc. v. Kettle, 230 Ga. App. 422, 197 S.E.2d 381 (1973); Hite v. Waldrop, 230 Ga. 684, 198 S.E.2d 665 (1973); Whitlock v. State, 230 Ga. 700, 198 S.E.2d 865 (1973); Myers v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 130 Ga. App. 357, 203 S.E.2d 304 (1973); Price v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 132 Ga. App. 107, 207 S.E.2d 556 (1974); Harwell v. Harwell, 233 Ga. 89, 209 S.E.2d 625 (1974); Thomas v. Home Credit Co., 133 Ga. App. 602, 211 S.E.2d 626 (1974); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harris, 133 Ga. App. 567, 211 S.E.2d 783 (1974); National Bank v. Cut Rate Auto Serv., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 635, 211 S.E.2d 895 (1974); Whitley Constr. Co. v. Whitley, 134 Ga. App. 245, 213 S.E.2d 909 (1975); Southern Motors of Savannah, Inc. v. Cleary, 134 Ga. App. 278, 213 S.E.2d 920 (1975)

Adams v. Adams, 234 Ga. 139, 214 S.E.2d 561 (1975); Ivey v. Ivey, 234 Ga. 532, 216 S.E.2d 827 (1975); Green Acres Disct., Inc. v. Freid & Appell, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 816, 219 S.E.2d 39 (1975); King v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank, 136 Ga. App. 239, 220 S.E.2d 759 (1975); Colodny v. Krause, 136 Ga. App. 379, 221 S.E.2d 239 (1975); Alcovy Realty Co. v. Stone Mt. Abstract Co., 137 Ga. App. 597, 224 S.E.2d 519 (1976); Delta Airlines v. Woods, 137 Ga. App. 693, 224 S.E.2d 763 (1976); Chilivis v. Dasher, 236 Ga. 669, 225 S.E.2d 32 (1976); Henderson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 236 Ga. 849, 225 S.E.2d 424 (1976); Taylor v. Taylor, 138 Ga. App. 284, 226 S.E.2d 84 (1976); Moore v. Rowe, 238 Ga. 373, 233 S.E.2d 355 (1977); Ross v. State, 238 Ga. 445, 233 S.E.2d 381 (1977); Rothstein v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Ga. App. 526, 233 S.E.2d 802 (1977); Tingle v. Cate, 142 Ga. App. 467, 236 S.E.2d 127 (1977); Colodny v. Dominion Mtg. & Realty Trust, 142 Ga. App. 730, 236 S.E.2d 917 (1977); International Paper Co. v. Kight, 239 Ga. 551, 238 S.E.2d 88 (1977); Lexington Developers, Inc. v. O'Neal Constr. Co., 143 Ga. App. 440, 238 S.E.2d 770 (1977); Parnell v. Etowah Bank, 144 Ga. App. 794, 242 S.E.2d 487 (1978); Dunn v. Royal Indem. Co., 145 Ga. App. 427, 243 S.E.2d 630 (1978); Paul v. Bennett, 241 Ga. 158, 244 S.E.2d 9 (1978); Smith v. Smith, 145 Ga. App. 816, 244 S.E.2d 917 (1978); Cooper v. Public Fin. Corp., 146 Ga. App. 250, 246 S.E.2d 684 (1978); Madison, Ltd. v. Price, 146 Ga. App. 837, 247 S.E.2d 523 (1978); Cooper v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 147 Ga. App. 136, 248 S.E.2d 201 (1978); Prince v. Prince, 147 Ga. App. 686, 250 S.E.2d 21 (1978); Kight v. Kight, 242 Ga. 563, 250 S.E.2d 451 (1978); P & J Truck Lines v. Canal Ins. Co., 148 Ga. App. 3, 251 S.E.2d 72 (1978); Roberts v. Tomlinson, Inc., 242 Ga. 804, 251 S.E.2d 543 (1979); McBride v. Chilivis, 149 Ga. App. 603, 255 S.E.2d 80 (1979); Pace v. Merck, 149 Ga. App. 807, 256 S.E.2d 73 (1979); Harris v. Harris, 149 Ga. App. 842, 256 S.E.2d 86 (1979); Land v. Sellers, 150 Ga. App. 83, 256 S.E.2d 629 (1979); Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 245 Ga. 130, 263 S.E.2d 138 (1980); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Windland Co., 245 Ga. 194, 264 S.E.2d 11 (1980); McCarthy v. Holloway, 245 Ga. 710, 267 S.E.2d 4 (1980); Durden v. Barron, 155 Ga. App. 529, 271 S.E.2d 667 (1980); Hill v. Wooten, 247 Ga. 737, 279 S.E.2d 227 (1981); Graves v. American Alloy Steel, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 378, 287 S.E.2d 94 (1981); Childers v. Tauber, 160 Ga. App. 713, 288 S.E.2d 5 (1981); Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 681 F.2d 1333 (11th Cir. 1982); Freeman v. Criterion Ins. Co., 693 F.2d 1021 (11th Cir. 1982); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sweat, 547 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Cole v. Jordan, 161 Ga. App. 409, 288 S.E.2d 260 (1982); Landmark First Nat'l Bank v. Schwall & Heuett, 161 Ga. App. 356, 288 S.E.2d 331 (1982); Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 291 S.E.2d 418 (1982); Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Alterman Foods, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 428, 291 S.E.2d 758 (1982); Howard v. State, 163 Ga. App. 159, 293 S.E.2d 548 (1982); East v. Pike, 163 Ga. App. 375, 294 S.E.2d 597 (1982); Butler v. Home Furnishing Co., 163 Ga. App. 825, 296 S.E.2d 121 (1982); Lowe Eng'rs, Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 164 Ga. App. 255, 297 S.E.2d 41 (1982); Whitaker v. Trust Co., 167 Ga. App. 360, 306 S.E.2d 329 (1983); McDaniel v. Colonial Mtg. Serv. Co., 167 Ga. App. 717, 307 S.E.2d 279 (1983); R.F. Parker Contracting Co. v. City of Atlanta, 168 Ga. App. 531, 309 S.E.2d 678 (1983); Willis v. Rauton, 168 Ga. App. 767, 310 S.E.2d 729 (1983); Oxendine v. Elliott, 170 Ga. App. 422, 317 S.E.2d 555 (1984); Flanders v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Ga. App. 188, 318 S.E.2d 794 (1984); Davis v. First of Ga. Ins. Managers, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 347, 319 S.E.2d 517 (1984); Walton Motor Sales, Inc. v. Ross, 736 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1984); Duncan v. Ball, 172 Ga. App. 750, 324 S.E.2d 477 (1984); Monroe v. Lubonivic, 174 Ga. App. 191, 329 S.E.2d 583 (1985); Wehunt v. Wren's Cross of Atlanta Condominium Ass'n, 175 Ga. App. 70, 332 S.E.2d 368 (1985); Citizens Exch. Bank v. Kirkland, 256 Ga. 71, 344 S.E.2d 409 (1986); Charter Medical-Fayette County, Inc. v. Health Planning Agency, Inc., 181 Ga. App. 184, 351 S.E.2d 547 (1986); Cole v. Smith, 182 Ga. App. 59, 354 S.E.2d 835 (1987); Jackson Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 257 Ga. 772, 364 S.E.2d 556 (1988); NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Charlton County, 258 Ga. 74, 365 S.E.2d 436 (1988); Byrd v. City of Atlanta, 683 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Mobley v. Hopkins, 258 Ga. 767, 373 S.E.2d 754 (1988); Yeomans v. Galbreath, 259 Ga. 261, 378 S.E.2d 864 (1989); Jones v. Powell, 190 Ga. App. 619, 379 S.E.2d 529 (1989); Jamison v. West, 191 Ga. App. 431, 382 S.E.2d 170 (1989); McCracken v. City of College Park, 259 Ga. 490, 384 S.E.2d 648 (1989); Majestic Dev. Corp. v. Ferman, 259 Ga. 859, 388 S.E.2d 701 (1990); Taylor v. Bennett, 260 Ga. 20, 389 S.E.2d 242 (1990); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 Ga. App. 14, 392 S.E.2d 574 (1990); Justus v. Justus, 198 Ga. App. 533, 402 S.E.2d 126 (1991); Hunt v. Lee, 199 Ga. App. 130, 404 S.E.2d 446 (1991); Giles v. Evans, 199 Ga. App. 616, 405 S.E.2d 511 (1991); Washington v. Department of Human Resources, 759 F. Supp. 825 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Talbot State Bank v. City of Columbus, 261 Ga. 850, 413 S.E.2d 194 (1992); Davis v. Great W. Bank, 809 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Block v. Woodbury, 211 Ga. App. 184, 438 S.E.2d 413 (1993); Pruett v. Commercial Bank, 211 Ga. App. 692, 440 S.E.2d 85 (1994); Sorrells Constr. Co. v. Chandler Armentrout & Roebuck, 214 Ga. App. 193, 447 S.E.2d 101 (1994); Austin v. Coca-Cola Co., 217 Ga. App. 621, 458 S.E.2d 409 (1995); Judkins v. State, 218 Ga. App. 767, 463 S.E.2d 362 (1995); Centrust Mtg. Corp. v. Smith & Jenkins, 220 Ga. App. 394, 469 S.E.2d 466 (1996); DOT v. Hall, 221 Ga. App. 178, 470 S.E.2d 775 (1996); Khamis Enterprises, Inc. v. Boone, 224 Ga. App. 348, 480 S.E.2d 364 (1997); Danzell v. Cannon, 224 Ga. App. 602, 481 S.E.2d 588 (1997); Mobley v. Sewell, 226 Ga. App. 866, 487 S.E.2d 398 (1997); Bradley v. Georgia Inst. of Technology, 228 Ga. App. 216, 491 S.E.2d 453 (1997); Allen v. King Plow Co., 227 Ga. App. 795, 490 S.E.2d 457 (1997); Fulton County Tax Comm'r v. GMC, 234 Ga. App. 459, 507 S.E.2d 772 (1998); Birdsong v. Enforcer Prods., Inc., 235 Ga. App. 132, 508 S.E.2d 769 (1998); Gibson v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 235 Ga. App. 160, 508 S.E.2d 788 (1998); Bellamy v. Sunflower Properties, Inc., 240 Ga. App. 647, 523 S.E.2d 659 (1999); Smith v. Airtouch Cellular of Ga., Inc., 244 Ga. App. 71, 534 S.E.2d 832 (2000); Roth v. Gulf Atl. Media of Ga., Inc., 244 Ga. App. 677, 536 S.E.2d 577 (2000); Coleman v. Grimes, 250 Ga. App. 880, 553 S.E.2d 185 (2001); Benedict v. Snead, 253 Ga. App. 749, 560 S.E.2d 278 (2002); Dalton Paving & Constr., Inc. v. South Green Constr. of Ga., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 506, 643 S.E.2d 754 (2007); Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008); QoS Networks Ltd. v. Warburg Pincus & Co., 294 Ga. App. 528, 669 S.E.2d 536 (2008); Akridge v. Silva, 298 Ga. App. 862, 681 S.E.2d 667 (2009); Jones v. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County, 312 Ga. App. 214, 718 S.E.2d 74 (2011); Rimmer v. Tinch, 324 Ga. App. 65, 749 S.E.2d 236 (2013); Sentinel Offender Svcs., LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014); Cheeley Invs., L.P. v. Zambetti, 332 Ga. App. 115, 770 S.E.2d 350 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1298, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 615 (Ga. 2015); Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna's CNN Center, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 248, 825 S.E.2d 628 (2019).

Final judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit upon the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal. Harney v. Wright, 80 Ga. App. 232, 55 S.E.2d 835 (1949); Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 371 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838, 95 S. Ct. 66, 42 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1974).

- Judgment is not conclusive as to one who was not a party to the proceeding in which the judgment was rendered, nor as to one over whom the court acquired no jurisdiction, even though the latter may be named as a party defendant in the proceeding. Colodny v. Krause, 141 Ga. App. 134, 232 S.E.2d 597, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892, 98 S. Ct. 267, 54 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1977).

Personal judgment cannot be obtained against a person who is not named as a party defendant and properly served in the action. Colodny v. Krause, 141 Ga. App. 134, 232 S.E.2d 597, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892, 98 S. Ct. 267, 54 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1977).

Issues in a second suit are concluded as between parties and their privies if they were made in the first suit or if, under the rules of pleading and evidence, they could have been put in issue. Roadway Express, Inc. v. McBroom, 61 Ga. App. 223, 6 S.E.2d 460 (1939).

- Parties are all such persons as were directly interested in the subject matter, had a right to make a defense, to adduce testimony, to cross-examine witnesses, to control the proceedings, and to appeal the judgment; privies are all persons who are represented by the parties and claim under the parties, all who are in privity with the parties, the term privity denoting mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property. Roberts v. Hill, 81 Ga. App. 185, 58 S.E.2d 465 (1950); Walka Mt. Camp, No. 565, Woodmen of World, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 222 Ga. 249, 149 S.E.2d 365 (1966).

Since an industrial authority was an instrumentality of a city, or an "agent" created by legislative enactment, that which was res judicata as to the authority was res judicata as to the city. City of Macon v. Pasco Bldg. Sys., 191 Ga. App. 48, 380 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824, 110 S. Ct. 85, 107 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1989).

Debtor's transfer of real property to the debtor's wife, a default judgment in a lawsuit, which the trustee claimed rendered the debtor insolvent, in which the wife did not participate and which was filed after the transfer did not prove the debtor's insolvency at the time of the transfer for purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 18-2-22(3); the wife's status as the debtor's wife, standing alone, did not establish privity with the debtor, and the judgment against the debtor did not bind the wife. Thurmond v. Turner (In re Turner), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2006).

Parties includes privies. Roberts v. Hill, 81 Ga. App. 185, 58 S.E.2d 465 (1950); Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. Hilley, 118 Ga. App. 293, 163 S.E.2d 438 (1968).

- Reason that verdicts and judgments bind conclusively parties and privies only is because privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law claim under the party against whom the judgment is rendered; and they claiming those rights are, of course, bound as the original is; but as to all others, judgments are not conclusively binding, because it is unjust to bind one by any proceeding in which one had no opportunity to make a defense, to offer evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, or to appeal, if one was dissatisfied with the judgment. Blakewood v. Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ga. App. 149, 6 S.E.2d 126 (1939).

- Party has been held to be in privity with a party to the former litigation when the party bears the relationship of successor to a predecessor in title, a cestui que trust to a trustee or quasi-trustee, a beneficiary in estate to an administrator, a principal to an agent or agent to a principal, a city to the city's treasurer; and in class actions, when a party is one of a group of municipal taxpayers or citizens in whose behalf expressly or by necessary implication the former suit was brought by a taxpayer or property owner "upon a matter of public and general interest to all other taxpayers of such political subdivision." College Park Land Co. v. Mayor of College Park, 48 Ga. App. 528, 173 S.E. 239 (1934).

Test of privity is to determine whether one has privity with another, not whether the other has privity with the one, and then assume that such privity is reciprocal. Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975).

General meaning of privies includes those who claim under or in right of parties. Blakewood v. Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ga. App. 149, 6 S.E.2d 126 (1939).

- If both the husband and wife are still alive, that relationship alone does not make them privies within the meaning of this section. Russ Transp., Inc. v. Jones, 104 Ga. App. 612, 122 S.E.2d 282 (1961).

- Former spouse's action to remove an attorney's lien under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 was barred by collateral estoppel under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. The issue of the lien had been fully litigated and decided in a divorce action in which the attorney represented the other spouse, and for purposes of recovering on the lien, the attorney was the other spouse's privy. Ruth v. Herrmann, 291 Ga. App. 399, 662 S.E.2d 726 (2008).

In a former client's suit seeking to remove an attorney's lien obtained against the former's clients marital property, a trial court properly granted summary judgment to the attorney since the propriety of the lien had already been litigated in the divorce action and the former client never appealed or challenged that judgment and an emergency motion to have the lien removed was denied. Ruth v. Herrmann, 291 Ga. App. 399, 662 S.E.2d 726 (May 2, 2008).

Those represented by a trustee are bound by a judgment against the trustee as such, although they were not parties to the proceeding in which the judgment was rendered. Rushing v. Sikes, 175 Ga. 124, 165 S.E. 89 (1932).

- Developer's prior action against the county board of commissioners, which the developer had dismissed, was not res judicata as to the developer's later claim seeking mandamus against two county planning officials in the officials individual capacities because the officials were not parties to the prior action nor in privity with the board of commissioners under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. Carson v. Brown, 348 Ga. App. 689, 824 S.E.2d 605 (2019).

- Judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is not conclusive as to third persons. McDonald v. Wimpy, 204 Ga. 617, 50 S.E.2d 347 (1948).

Third-party actions are viewed as separate and independent lawsuits. Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446, 249 S.E.2d 270 (1978); Usher v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 420, 278 S.E.2d 70 (1981).

Final judgments between the parties in one third-party action have been held to bar a subsequent third-party action between the same parties. A judgment adjudicating a claim between a third-party plaintiff and a third-party defendant is conclusive to the same extent as though rendered in independent litigation between them. Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446, 249 S.E.2d 270 (1978); Usher v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 420, 278 S.E.2d 70 (1981).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 does not bar subsequent litigation on a separate contract between the same parties even though the latter claim could have been joined as an independent claim in a prior action. Nationwide-Penncraft, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 249 Ga. 687, 294 S.E.2d 529 (1982).

- Individual claiming a legal interest in the subject matter of a contract between corporations had a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property as one of the contracting corporations and was therefore in privity with the corporation so as to bar the individual's claim on the contract on the grounds of res judicata. Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 298 S.E.2d 25 (1982).

- Res judicata did not operate to bar an action to collect for shipments claimed in a prior suit against a company closely associated with the defendant company although the defendant's liability was derivative because there was no benefit of a judgment in favor of the company from which the defendant's liability derived and because the earlier judgment had not been satisfied. National Carloading Corp. v. Security Van Lines, 164 Ga. App. 850, 297 S.E.2d 740 (1982).

- Punitive damages served a public interest and were intended to protect the general public, and when the state sought punitive damages in a prior suit the state did so as parens patriae, representing the interests of all Georgia citizens, including an administrator of a decedent's estate; the state and the administrator were privies in that prior case and, pursuant to res judicata, a release executed as part of a settlement of that prior case barred punitive damages in a later case brought by the administrator alleging the same products liability theory. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 280 Ga. 420, 627 S.E.2d 549 (2006).

Proceedings quasi in rem are brought to establish status, and not to set up rights in or title to property; and judgments in such proceedings are not conclusive against third persons as to their rights in, or title to, property when the third parties have no notice or opportunity to assert their rights. Elliott v. Adams, 173 Ga. 312, 160 S.E. 336 (1931).

- While an adjudication of the same subject matter in issue in a former suit between the same parties by a court of competent jurisdiction is an end of litigation, the plaintiff is not estopped by the judgment rendered in the court of ordinary (now probate court) in a proceeding to which the plaintiff was not a party, although the plaintiff appeared as a witness therein. McAfee v. Martin, 211 Ga. 14, 83 S.E.2d 605 (1954).

- In a suit for professional negligence in preparing a title examination and abstract, the trial court properly granted the defendants summary judgment because the action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a previous suit adjudicated the plaintiff's professional negligence claims, defendants were in privity with the abstract preparer sued in the previous action, and the prior suit was adjudicated on the merits ending in a dismissal. ALR Oglethorpe, LLC v. Henderson, 336 Ga. App. 739, 783 S.E.2d 187 (2016).

- Trial court correctly dismissed a shipyard owner's third civil action arising from the same set of facts under the two-dismissal rule of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)(1) and (a)(3) and the res judicata rule of O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 because, although there were additional plaintiffs in the third action, each of the three actions was based on the apparently complex initial financing for, and subsequent failure of, the shipyard. Global Ship Sys., LLC v. RiverHawk Group, LLC, 334 Ga. App. 860, 780 S.E.2d 697 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0508, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 231 (Ga. 2016).

- It was the duty of the plaintiff to put all claims the plaintiff had against any of the plaintiff's partners or to any portion of the partnership funds before the court for adjudication, knowing that a judgment is conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue, or which under rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein judgment was rendered. Camp v. Lindsay, 176 Ga. 438, 168 S.E. 284 (1933).

- While the phrase "same parties" does not mean that all of the parties on the respective sides of the litigation in the two cases shall have been identical, it does mean that those who invoke the defense and against whom the defense is invoked must be the same. A.R. Hudson Realty, Inc. v. Hood, 151 Ga. App. 778, 262 S.E.2d 189 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Merrill Lynch v. Zimmerman, 248 Ga. 580, 285 S.E.2d 181 (1981).

Verdicts and judgments rendered by consent of counsel in good faith and without any fraud or violation of express instructions given by the client to the attorney and known to the adverse party or that party's attorney are binding upon the client, the consent of counsel being in law the consent of the parties the attorneys represent. Phoenix Properties of Atlanta, Inc. v. Umstead, 245 Ga. 172, 264 S.E.2d 8 (1980).

Decree in a court of equity is conclusive on all questions raised or which could have been raised, relating to the subject matter affected by such decree, and the same will be a good cause of bar of an action subsequently brought between the same parties upon the same subject matter in a court of competent jurisdiction. Crawford v. Baker, 86 Ga. App. 855, 72 S.E.2d 790 (1952).

Parties were in sufficiently adversarial relationship in prior action to invoke the doctrine of res judicata since: (1) the defendant was a third-party defendant in the prior action, which was also commenced by the plaintiff, and filed a response to the complaint and a counterclaim against the plaintiff; and (2) the plaintiff could have asserted a claim against the defendant in the prior action, but elected not to do so. Fedeli v. UAPA Ag. Chem., Inc., 237 Ga. App. 337, 514 S.E.2d 684 (1999).

- When a limited liability company brought a tort action against a county industrial development authority after filing an exception to a special master's award in a condemnation proceeding, the trial court properly dismissed the tort action under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-5(a) and9-12-40. In both the condemnation action and the tort action, the company sought a monetary award on the ground that the condemnation rendered its contract a nullity and that the condemnation action was brought in bad faith. Coastal Water & Sewerage Co. v. Effingham County Indus. Dev. Auth., 288 Ga. App. 422, 654 S.E.2d 236 (2007).

Law of the Case

Editor's notes.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(h) abolishes the law of the case rule, generally, although providing that judgments and orders shall not be set aside or modified without just cause, and that rulings in the appellate courts shall be binding in subsequent proceedings in that case.

Decision by the Supreme Court is controlling upon the judge of the trial court, as well as upon the Supreme Court when the case reaches that court a second time. The principle in the decision may be reviewed and overruled in another case between different parties, but as between the parties the decision stands as the law of the case, even though the ruling has been disapproved by the Supreme Court in a case decided before the second appearance of the case in that court. Walden v. Nichols, 204 Ga. 532, 50 S.E.2d 105 (1948).

- When a case is brought to the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court is reversed, all questions as to pleadings and the effect of evidence adjudicated by the court are binding as the law of the case on that court and, on a second trial of the case, on the court below, unless additional pleadings and evidence prevail to change such adjudications. Parker v. State, 76 Ga. App. 238, 45 S.E.2d 692 (1947).

- When a petition seeks both legal and equitable relief, and the legal prayers are meritorious and the equitable prayers are not, it is error to dismiss the whole action on the ground that the petition sets forth no cause of action, for the equitable relief should be stricken, leaving a cause of action for legal relief. Under this principle, the plaintiff, in a prior action, should have excepted to the court's dismissal of the whole action. Having failed to so except, that judgment became the law of the case, to the effect that the petition alleged neither an equitable nor a legal cause of action, and constitutes a bar to the present action for the legal relief only. Zeagler v. Zeagler, 192 Ga. 453, 15 S.E.2d 478 (1941); Owens v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 238, 73 S.E.2d 512 (1952); Ferrell v. Bell, 90 Ga. App. 573, 83 S.E.2d 616 (1954); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Tyler, 104 Ga. App. 707, 122 S.E.2d 591 (1961).

Judgment of a trial court, which after a writ of error stands unreversed, or to which no exception has been taken, is the law of the case. Ballard v. Harmon, 202 Ga. 603, 44 S.E.2d 260 (1947); Poore v. Rigsby, 207 Ga. 238, 60 S.E.2d 239 (1950); Oliver v. Central of Ga. Ry., 210 Ga. 597, 81 S.E.2d 793 (1954); Seymour v. State, 210 Ga. 571, 81 S.E.2d 808 (1954).

- If a plaintiff in error relies on a so-called extraordinary motion for new trial as a proper procedure to vacate and set aside existing judgments, the plaintiff is confronted with the rule that a motion for new trial is not the proper remedy to correct an alleged error in any judgment or decree entered by a trial court and the plaintiff's motion will be denied. Sumner v. Sumner, 186 Ga. 390, 197 S.E. 833 (1938); Ballard v. Harmon, 202 Ga. 603, 44 S.E.2d 260 (1947).

- Trial court at a hearing to modify child support erred in relying on the father's tax returns showing his income around the time the father and mother divorced, which supported his argument that his income had not changed much in the five years between entry of the divorce decree and the mother's filing of her petition to modify child support, as the trial court's determination at the time the divorce decree was filed that the father was making considerably less than what his tax return evidence showed was conclusive on the issue of what the father's income was at the time of the divorce, especially since that figure had not been reversed or set aside since it was entered. Hulett v. Sutherland, 276 Ga. 596, 581 S.E.2d 11 (2003).

Res Judicata

Relation to common-law rule.

- In this state, the common-law rule that res adjudicata does not extend to the trial of habeas corpus proceedings is not of force and such proceedings are subject to the provisions of this section. Mitchem v. Balkcom, 219 Ga. 47, 131 S.E.2d 562 (1963); Balkcom v. Townsend, 219 Ga. 708, 135 S.E.2d 399, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1009, 84 S. Ct. 1939, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1964).

O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 is a codification of Georgia's common-law rule of res judicata. Lawson v. Watkins, 261 Ga. 147, 401 S.E.2d 719 (1991).

O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-40 and9-12-42 set out the basic principles of res judicata in Georgia. Norris v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 254 Ga. 684, 333 S.E.2d 835 (1985).

Georgia does not unswervingly adhere to a rule of mutuality as it relates to res judicata. Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975).

- Res judicata is designed to foreclose collateral attack and to insure the integrity of judgments rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction. Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 371 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838, 95 S. Ct. 66, 42 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1974).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 does not require appellate review of a judgment before the statute can act as a bar to a later action and, therefore, because the superior court in the certiorari action had adjudicated the dispute, all the prerequisites for res judicata were met, and the action was barred. McCracken v. City of College Park, 259 Ga. 490, 384 S.E.2d 648 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1028, 110 S. Ct. 1475, 108 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1990).

- Trial court's order granting summary judgment to a former wife on claims by a former husband and his corporate entities that the wife stole funds in 2006 was vacated and remanded for the trial court to consider the issue of res judicata in the first instance because the claims were not actually litigated and determined in the prior contempt action, and the record on appeal was incomplete with regard to those claims; while the final judgment and decree of divorce indicated that the settlement agreement between the wife and husband addressed the division of property, the copy of the settlement agreement included in the record on appeal as part of the parties' record appendix was missing the second page, which apparently contained the property-related provisions, and it was unclear from the record whether the trial court, in resolving the wife's motion for summary judgment, had a complete copy of the settlement agreement before the court or was likewise missing the second page. Ga. Neurology & Rehab., P.C. v. Hiller, 310 Ga. App. 202, 712 S.E.2d 611 (2011).

- Unappealed order denying the debtor's motion to set aside a default judgment was res judicata as to the debtor and creditor in a subsequent garnishment proceeding. Halkirk Cos. v. Dirt Busters, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 460, 379 S.E.2d 173, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 897, 379 S.E.2d 173 (1989).

Res judicata is to be applied only when the cause of action is the same. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 190 Ga. 229, 9 S.E.2d 70 (1940); Forrester v. Southern Ry., 268 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ga. 1967).

- When the plaintiff sought to recover various amounts allegedly due under the lease between the parties including unpaid rent, property taxes, insurance premiums, and amounts for construction change orders, but each of these items constituted amounts for which the plaintiff could have obtained judgment in a prior dispossessory action, there was an identity of cause of action between the two cases. Atlanta J's, Inc. v. Houston Foods, Inc., 237 Ga. App. 415, 514 S.E.2d 216 (1999).

After the appeals court found that both the magistrate action and the action on appeal concerned a condominium association's failure to maintain the condominium complex in accordance with its bylaws and standards, and a claim for injunctive relief, because any related claim for injunctive relief later filed against the association could have been asserted before the magistrate, res judicata applied to the related claim, and the fact that the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to provide equitable relief was immaterial. Green v. Bd. of Dirs. of Park Cliff Unit Owners Ass'n, 279 Ga. App. 567, 631 S.E.2d 769 (2006).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of res judicata as to the plaintiff's claim of constructive discharge under the Georgia Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4, because the doctrine of res judicata did not apply as there was not an identity of causes of action in both the federal and Georgia cases. Rintoul v. Tolbert, 341 Ga. App. 688, 802 S.E.2d 56 (2017).

- As the plaintiff clearly could have pursued a claim for past due rents and other amounts due under the lease between the parties in a prior dispossessory action, but elected not to do so, the final judgment of the magistrate court in the prior action operated as an adjudication on the merits of such claim for purposes of res judicata. Atlanta J's, Inc. v. Houston Foods, Inc., 237 Ga. App. 415, 514 S.E.2d 216 (1999).

Because a commercial landlord had dismissed its prior dispossession action against a tenant upon payment by the tenant pursuant to a settlement of the amount due and owing and such dismissal did not indicate that it was with prejudice, it was deemed without prejudice and was accordingly not an adjudication on the merits pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(b); accordingly, it was error for the trial court to have barred the landlord's claim for common area maintenance charges in the landlord's second action on the ground of res judicata as the requirement of a previous adjudication on the merits of the claim was not met pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. Rafizadeh v. KR Snellville, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 613, 634 S.E.2d 406 (2006).

Dismissal of a complaint for want of prosecution was not an adjudication on the merits; thus, collateral estoppel and res judicata did not bar a subsequent complaint. Valdez v. R. Constr., Inc., 285 Ga. App. 373, 646 S.E.2d 329 (2007).

Because a prior order entered in a suit between a payor and a payee was a final adjudication of the payee's quantum meruit claim, and the payee did not appeal from that aspect of the order, that order acted as res judicata and could not be raised again in the instant suit. ChoicePoint Servs. v. Hiers, 284 Ga. App. 640, 644 S.E.2d 456 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1166, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 499 (Ga. 2007).

In an action by a client against the client's former attorney, the client was estopped by res judicata from seeking further judicial review of a 2005 order; the client filed an application for discretionary review of the 2005 order, which the Supreme Court of Georgia denied on its merits. Hook v. Bergen, 286 Ga. App. 258, 649 S.E.2d 313 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 697 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of a grantor's grandsons in an action filed by the grantor's wife, daughter, and granddaughter challenging the validity of a quitclaim deed because res judicata compelled summary judgment on the counts alleging cloud on title, undue influence, and mistake of fact since there was an identity of the parties, and a decision of the court of appeals in a prior appeal upholding the trial court's grant of summary judgment constituted an adjudication on the merits; the causes of action raised in the amended complaint were matters put in issue or which under the rules of law could have been put in issue in the original complaint. Smith v. Lockridge, 288 Ga. 180, 702 S.E.2d 858 (2010).

Because the counterclaim-plaintiffs in the second-dismissed case were not plaintiffs in the first-dismissed case, the second dismissal did not operate as an adjudication upon the merits under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)(3). Consequently, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 did not preclude the instant action, and the trial court erred in dismissing the action on that ground. Dillard Land Invs., LLC v. S. Fla. Invs., LLC, 320 Ga. App. 209, 739 S.E.2d 696 (2013).

Drug store's voluntary dismissal of the store's inverse condemnation suit with prejudice barred the store's damages claim against a state agency in a direct condemnation action based on res judicata and the purported mistake of dismissing with prejudice was not subject to correction under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60. DOT v. Revco Disc. Drug Ctrs., Inc., 322 Ga. App. 873, 746 S.E.2d 631 (2013).

Summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants on the plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duties in a partnership venture claim because the plaintiff never argued during the summary judgment phase that a confidential relationship existed between the parties as partners. Laymac v. Kushner, 349 Ga. App. 727, 824 S.E.2d 768 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1091, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 871 (Ga. 2019).

In a landfill's suit against a county and the county's commission asserting an open meetings violation, the trial court did not err in dismissing the landfill's as applied claims on res judicata grounds because the record showed that the merits of the landfill's allegations against the county commission were previously adjudicated as evidenced by the Georgia Supreme Court's holding from the prior litigation. Sweet City Landfill, LLC v. Lyon, 352 Ga. App. 824, 835 S.E.2d 764 (2019).

- Plaintiff's action, seeking to litigate whether the defendant had valid title to property from a tax sale, was not barred by res judicata because under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-9 the plaintiff did not have the opportunity in the prior dispossessory proceeding in magistrate court to litigate title issues. Myers v. North Ga. Title & Tax Free Exchange, LLC, 241 Ga. App. 379, 527 S.E.2d 212 (1999).

Brokerage service account owner's assignee's claims against the service that it had unlawfully allowed disbursement of the funds in the account, pursuant to a garnishment judgment, after the owner had sought to close the account, were barred by res judicata under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 since it was noted that the owner had filed a traverse in the garnishment proceeding and, accordingly, the owner could have raised the same issues at that time, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-4-93. The owner, as the debtor in the garnishment proceeding, was required to assert any claim that the owner's right to the funds was superior to that of the judgment creditor, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-4-95. Lamb v. First Union Brokerage Servs., 263 Ga. App. 733, 589 S.E.2d 300 (2003).

Buyer had no separate right to counterclaims which the buyer had asserted in a prior suit since the buyer had filed bankruptcy since the time the counterclaims were asserted; the counterclaims thus belonged to the buyer's bankruptcy estate and so the bankruptcy trustee was authorized to dismiss them; res judicata barred the buyer from asserting the same claims in a later suit based on the dismissal of the counterclaims in the prior suit by the bankruptcy trustee. Lee v. Owenby & Assocs., 279 Ga. App. 446, 631 S.E.2d 478 (2006).

Superior court properly upheld a second ALJ's ruling that an employer was foreclosed from raising a claim for a credit for 20 weeks of wages already paid to the claimant, under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-243, as the employer was entitled to raise the issue no later than ten days prior to the original compensation hearing, and that issue could and should have been adjudicated, but was not, making the issue res judicata. Vought Aircraft Indus. v. Faulds, 281 Ga. App. 338, 636 S.E.2d 75 (2006).

Claim by a company for fraud against a debtor brought for the first time in an adversary proceeding was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the claim could have been brought in an earlier district court proceeding involving the same parties and the same facts. Omega Cotton Co. v. Sutton (In re Sutton), Bankr. (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2008).

Doctrine of res judicata, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40, did not preclude a wife from bringing an action for damages based on her former husband's breach of a settlement agreement that had been incorporated into a court order because such a claim was separate and apart from a contempt action she brought based on his violation of the order. Jacob-Hopkins v. Jacob, 304 Ga. App. 604, 697 S.E.2d 284 (2010).

In a dispute between members of a car wash LLC, a member's action was not barred by res judicata because the instant case's issues against the managing member were arguable breaches of the managerial duties as established in a settlement agreement arising from a lender's earlier action; because the first member could not have put these matters at issue in their cross-claims in the lender's action, they were not barred from raising the matters in this action. McCabe v. Rainey, 343 Ga. App. 480, 806 S.E.2d 867 (2017).

- Question of res judicata must be raised by a plea to that effect and cannot be raised by demurrer (now motion to dismiss) when the facts do not appear in the petition. Owens v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 238, 73 S.E.2d 512 (1952).

Certified copies of record portions are required for proof of res judicata. Mayer v. Wylie, 229 Ga. App. 282, 494 S.E.2d 60 (1997).

Under res judicata, a proper court's judgment is conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered, until such judgment is reversed or set aside. Camp v. Lindsay, 176 Ga. 438, 168 S.E. 284 (1933); Scarborough v. Edgar, 176 Ga. 574, 168 S.E. 592 (1933), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Dean, 188 Ga. 319, 3 S.E.2d 894 (1939); Miles v. Johnson, 193 Ga. 492, 18 S.E.2d 831 (1942); Hubbard v. Whatley, 200 Ga. 751, 38 S.E.2d 738 (1946); C. Schomburg & Son v. Schaefer, 218 Ga. 659, 129 S.E.2d 854 (1963); Booker v. Booker, 107 Ga. App. 339, 130 S.E.2d 260 (1963); Williams v. Metropolitan Home Imp. Co., 110 Ga. App. 770, 140 S.E.2d 56 (1964); Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 371 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838, 95 S. Ct. 66, 42 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1974). Patrick v. Simon, 237 Ga. 742, 229 S.E.2d 746 (1976).

- It is fundamental that the legal liability of one person to another person can be ascertained only in an action brought against such person by the other in a court of competent jurisdiction. Colodny v. Krause, 141 Ga. App. 134, 232 S.E.2d 597, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892, 98 S. Ct. 267, 54 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1977).

- It is not required that all the parties in the two cases shall have been identical, but it is sufficient as to identity of parties if those by and against whom the defense of res judicata is invoked in the latter case were real parties at interest or privies as to the controversy in the former case. Darling Stores Corp. v. Beatus, 199 Ga. 215, 33 S.E.2d 701 (1945); Waggaman v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 565, 458 S.E.2d 826 (1995).

Trial court erred in granting a limited liability company summary judgment in the company's ejectment action against a property owner on the ground of res judicata under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 because there remained a question of fact regarding whether the owner was a party to the prior action; the owner asserted and presented affidavit evidence supporting the claim that the trial court in the quiet title action lacked personal jurisdiction over the owner, thus creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the owner was a party to the earlier litigation. James v. Intown Ventures, LLC, 290 Ga. 813, 725 S.E.2d 213 (2012).

- In a suit brought by the plaintiff alleging a violation of the Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., the trial court erred in finding that the doctrine of res judicata barred the plaintiff's action because there was no privity between the plaintiffs in the prior lawsuit and the current action. Sampson v. Ga. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 328 Ga. App. 733, 760 S.E.2d 203 (2014).

To prove a res judicata defense, a litigant need introduce only those parts of the record of the prior proceeding which are necessary to prove the defense. Boozer v. Higdon, 252 Ga. 276, 313 S.E.2d 100 (1984); Waggaman v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 565, 458 S.E.2d 826 (1995).

Application of doctrine of res judicata may benefit plaintiff; if, for instance, the unsuccessful defendant in the prior suit wants to contest liability upon the judgment there rendered, and the plaintiff sets up the doctrine of res judicata and the conclusiveness of the judgment. Usher v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 420, 278 S.E.2d 70 (1981).

- When the issue of interest on past due child support was not put in issue and decided in a prior contempt proceeding related to a father's failure to pay child support, res judicata did not bar a subsequent judgment for interest on the past due child support amounts; it is undisputed that O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12.1 applies retroactively. Dial v. Adkins, 265 Ga. App. 650, 595 S.E.2d 332 (2004).

- Georgia law of res judicata bars a second suit between the same parties involving not only those issues that were actually litigated, but in addition all issues which could have been litigated in the first suit between the parties. Wilson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1986).

- Res judicata did not bar a bank's action against guarantors to recover the outstanding balances owed on promissory notes a development company executed because the subject matters in the bank's action and an action condominium owners filed against the company and the bank, which filed a third-party-complaint against the guarantors, were not identical; the owners' action concerned the company's breach of the company's obligations under mortgage documents, which triggered the guarantors' obligation to indemnify the bank for the cost of the litigation, and the bank's action concerned the guarantors' breach of their contractual obligation to repay the company's debt. Baxter v. Fairfield Fin. Servs., 307 Ga. App. 286, 704 S.E.2d 423 (2010).

Claim for wrongful foreclosure was logically related to out-of-state action to collect on the same note, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to file the plaintiff's compulsory counterclaim in that court, and the plaintiff's failure to do so precluded the plaintiff from attempting to recover in Georgia, the plaintiff's claim correctly being determined by the trial court to be barred by res judicata. Willis v. National Mtg. Co., 235 Ga. App. 544, 509 S.E.2d 403 (1998).

- Trial court properly granted the bank's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure claims under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs' previous litigation against the bank could have included the plaintiffs' new claims and, thus, were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Harris v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838, 792 S.E.2d 111 (2016).

- Doctrine of res judicata will not permit one who first sought, unsuccessfully, to recover for a wrong under a contractual theory to later seek to employ a tort theory to recover for that same wrong. Garrett v. Transus, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 844, 341 S.E.2d 494 (1986); Helmuth v. Life Ins. Co., 391 Ga. App. 574, 391 S.E.2d 412 (1990); Garrett v. Life Ins. Co., 221 Ga. App. 315, 471 S.E.2d 262 (1996).

When victims of a fraudulent scheme who sued the perpetrator of the fraud under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., had previously unsuccessfully sued the perpetrator for fraud and related claims, judgment n.o.v. was properly entered in favor of the perpetrator because the victims' claim was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel as it should have been raised in their previous suits against the perpetrator which involved the same parties and the same subject matter. Austin v. Cohen, 268 Ga. App. 650, 602 S.E.2d 146 (2004).

Despite a payee's argument that a reformation claim could not have previously been filed because neither party foresaw that a contract claim could have been disposed of as it was, the argument was rejected as spurious, and because this argument ignored the fact that the payee filed a prior quantum meruit claim, which was predicated on the lack of an enforceable contract; hence, the payor obviously anticipated that the contract might not be entirely enforceable, and having done so, could have recognized the need to bring a reformation claim in the earlier action. ChoicePoint Servs. v. Hiers, 284 Ga. App. 640, 644 S.E.2d 456 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1166, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 499 (Ga. 2007).

In order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, or for a party to take advantage of the doctrine in a subsequent suit brought against that party after the termination of the first, there are three prerequisites to which the situation must conform. They are: (1) identity of parties; (2) identity of the cause of action; and (3) adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction. All of these elements must concur. House v. Benton, 42 Ga. App. 97, 155 S.E. 47 (1930); Edwards v. Carlton, 98 Ga. App. 230, 105 S.E.2d 372 (1958); Lewis v. Price, 104 Ga. App. 473, 122 S.E.2d 129 (1961); Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 122 Ga. App. 344, 145 S.E.2d 63 (1965); Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. Hilley, 118 Ga. App. 293, 163 S.E.2d 438 (1968); Lowe v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 132 Ga. App. 572, 208 S.E.2d 585 (1974); Janelle v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 524 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1975); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980); Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 186 Ga. App. 187, 366 S.E.2d 822 (1988); Crowe v. Congress Fin. Corp., 196 Ga. App. 36, 395 S.E.2d 321 (1990); Akin v. PAFEC Ltd., 991 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1993).

In order for the principles of res judicata to apply so as to bind a plaintiff as to any theory of the plaintiff's claim, the cause of action in both cases must be the same. Greyhound Lines v. Cobb County, 523 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff 'd, 681 F.2d 1327 (11th Cir. 1982).

One must assert all claims for relief concerning the same subject matter in one lawsuit, and any claims for relief concerning that same subject matter which are not raised will be res judicata pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. Lawson v. Watkins, 261 Ga. 147, 401 S.E.2d 719 (1991); Norman v. Farm Fans, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 97, 416 S.E.2d 374 (1992).

- Trial court did not err in ruling that a church's prior quia timet action under the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., barred an heir's action against the church seeking title to the property because the prior action settled the church's ownership interest in the property. Cartwright v. First Baptist Church of Keysville, Inc., 316 Ga. App. 299, 728 S.E.2d 893 (2012).

- Principle of res judicata contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 applies to the rulings and findings of habeas courts. Martin v. State, 228 Ga. App. 548, 492 S.E.2d 307 (1997).

Judgment of the trial court denying the defendant's motion for new trial and the court's conclusion that affidavits were not newly discovered evidence but were cumulative of evidence presented at trial and the amended motion for new trial was res judicata and binding on the habeas court. Walker v. Penn, 271 Ga. 609, 523 S.E.2d 325 (1999).

- Doctrine of res judicata will bar an action even if some new factual allegations have been made. Williams v. Summit Psychiatric Ctrs., 185 Ga. App. 264, 363 S.E.2d 794 (1987), cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 911, 363 S.E.2d 794 (1988).

- Rules governing res judicata do not compel one to join separate causes of action in order to escape the penalties of that doctrine. In order for the principles of res judicata to apply so as to bind a plaintiff as to any theory of the plaintiff's claim whether invoked or not, the cause of action in both cases must be the same. Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672, 38 S.E.2d 394 (1946).

When a plaintiff has multiple dealings with a defendant, the law does not require that the plaintiff assert every separate claim for relief that the plaintiff may have against the defendant in one single lawsuit or risk losing the claim for relief forever, as would be the case if the joinder statute provided for mandatory rather than permissive joinder. Instead, the law requires that such a plaintiff must bring every claim for relief the plaintiff has concerning the same subject matter in one lawsuit. The plaintiff may join several claims for relief arising out of different subject matters in one lawsuit but the plaintiff is not required to do so and will not be penalized for making a strategic decision to the contrary. Lawson v. Watkins, 261 Ga. 147, 401 S.E.2d 719 (1991).

- Doctrine of res judicata will not be applied on the theory of virtual representation when the original action is brought by a stranger to the subsequent action solely on the stranger's own behalf to protect the stranger's individual rights. Humthlett v. Reeves, 211 Ga. 210, 85 S.E.2d 25 (1954).

- When a judgment is regular on the judgment's face, the presumption is that there was sufficient evidence to authorize the judgment, and the judgment is conclusive as to the subject matter which it purports to decide until it is reversed or impeached for fraud; it cannot be attacked collaterally on account of any error or want of regularity in its exercise. Rowell v. Rowell, 214 Ga. 377, 105 S.E.2d 19 (1958).

- When a court has jurisdiction, the court has a right to decide every question which occurs in the cause, and whether the court's decision is correct or otherwise, the court's judgment until reversed is regarded as binding in every other court. McRae v. Boykin, 73 Ga. App. 67, 35 S.E.2d 548 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 844, 66 S. Ct. 1024, 90 L. Ed. 1618 (1946); Mitchell v. Arnall, 203 Ga. 384, 47 S.E.2d 258 (1948); Bentley v. Buice, 102 Ga. App. 101, 115 S.E.2d 706 (1960).

Judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, however irregular or erroneous, is binding until set aside. Morgan v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 166 Ga. App. 611, 305 S.E.2d 130 (1983).

- Irregular judgment is one that is entered contrary to the manner of practice and procedure allowed by law in some material respect; after jurisdiction is once attached, mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings, although they may render the judgment erroneous and subject to be set aside in a proper proceeding for that purpose, will not render the judgment void. Rowell v. Rowell, 214 Ga. 377, 105 S.E.2d 19 (1958).

- Issues which are made, or which under the rules of law could have been made in the cause, cease to be res judicata when the judgment therein rendered is set aside in a court of competent jurisdiction. Saliba v. Saliba, 202 Ga. 279, 42 S.E.2d 748 (1947).

- When a defendant is served, appears, and pleads in the original suit, a defendant cannot inquire into the merits of the original judgment on a writ to revive the judgment. It is not error to sustain a demurrer (now motion to dismiss) and strike the defendant's answer in such a proceeding. McRae v. Boykin, 73 Ga. App. 67, 35 S.E.2d 548 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 844, 66 S. Ct. 1024, 90 L. Ed. 1618 (1946).

- On the general principle of res adjudicata, which applies equally to proceedings by scire facias as to any other action, and on the further ground that this method of reviving a judgment is merely a supplementary step in the original action, the defendant is absolutely precluded from going behind the judgment and offering in defense to the scire facias any matter which existed before the rendition of the original judgment and might have been presented in the former proceeding. McRae v. Boykin, 73 Ga. App. 67, 35 S.E.2d 548 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 844, 66 S. Ct. 1024, 90 L. Ed. 1618 (1946).

- State courts are competent to decide federal constitutional questions and a state court determination upon the merits of such issues is res judicata absent an appeal through the state appellate system and ultimately to the United States Supreme Court. Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 371 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838, 95 S. Ct. 66, 42 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1974).

State court's foreclosure of the constitutional issue is res judicata upon the merits of the substantive issue as well as the procedural question concerning the method of entry of judgment. Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 371 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838, 95 S. Ct. 66, 42 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1974).

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case arising from a traffic accident in which a driver had previously filed a state case, a federal district court did not err by granting summary judgment on the driver's claims on the basis of res judicata under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. The state court had issued a decision on the merits of the driver's claims, the driver conceded that the state court was a court of competent jurisdiction that could have decided the § 1983 claims, and the driver's contention that a litigant was not required to assert federal claims in state court was without merit. Endsley v. City of Macon, F.3d (11th Cir. Nov. 20, 2008)(Unpublished).

- If a federal court would have retained jurisdiction of a pendent state claim had the claim been raised, then a subsequent action in state court would be barred by res judicata. Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 240 S.E.2d 241 (1977); Hardy v. Georgia Baptist Health Care Sys., 239 Ga. App. 596, 521 S.E.2d 632 (1999).

- After a brokerage firm was found not guilty of violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in a federal action, subsequent claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty brought in a state court are barred under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 as these claims ought to have been litigated in the federal action. NcNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 249 Ga. 662, 293 S.E.2d 331 (1982).

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a city in a police officer's suit on the basis that, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, a prior federal action by the police officer barred the police officer's claims regarding the city's failure to promote the police officer on two occasions in 2004 promotions; however, the police officer's claims based on the failure to promote in December 2005 and November 2006 were not barred by res judicata because the city did not meet the city's burden of affirmatively establishing that the police officer could have raised these claims, which were based on separate events, in the federal case. Thus, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the city as to the 2005 and 2006 promotions. Neely v. City of Riverdale, 298 Ga. App. 884, 681 S.E.2d 677 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1925, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 28 (Ga. 2010).

- When it does not apply the res judicata statute, the court must be convinced that the underlying purposes of the res judicata rule are advanced rather than defeated by not applying the rule. Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 240 S.E.2d 241 (1977).

- When state claims which "could have been raised" in federal litigation would have been pendent had they been presented to the federal court, the state court, in applying its res judicata statute, will use the same rules that the federal court would have used in determining whether it would exercise pendent jurisdiction. Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 240 S.E.2d 241 (1977).

- Federal district court's dismissal of a case with prejudice, on the grounds that a federal antidiscrimination statute cannot be applied against the states, is an adjudication on the merits, and not a jurisdictional disposition. Accordingly, the litigant is barred from relitigating the matter in state court. Similarly, a claim against the state alleging a violation of the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, because it could and should have been presented to the original federal court. Morgan v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 166 Ga. App. 611, 305 S.E.2d 130 (1983).

- Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq., 1983, is not a vehicle for attack upon final state court judgments. Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 371 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838, 95 S. Ct. 66, 42 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1974).

- Under doctrine of res judicata, a party is not estopped from questioning the validity of an earlier judgment granting temporary alimony when the original judgment, rendered in a previous litigation between the same parties, was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent proceeding for contempt. Powell v. Powell, 200 Ga. 379, 37 S.E.2d 191 (1946).

Party is not estopped from questioning the validity of an earlier judgment granting temporary alimony under the doctrine of res judicata since the original judgment, rendered in previous litigation between the same parties, was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent proceeding for contempt. Powell v. Powell, 200 Ga. 379, 37 S.E.2d 191 (1946).

- Party who has once filed an action for divorce on the ground of cruel treatment, which suit resulted in a verdict and decree adverse to the libelant, is not barred from thereafter filing a second petition on the same ground, but based on different acts, all of which were committed since the date of the former trial. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 190 Ga. 229, 9 S.E.2d 70 (1940).

- When custody of a minor child was vested in the mother by prior judgment, it was conclusive against the father and was res judicata in habeas corpus proceeding by father. Levens v. Edge, 217 Ga. 418, 122 S.E.2d 728 (1961).

- Unappealed deprivation orders of the juvenile court may be used to establish that the children were deprived (now "dependent") within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(i) (see now O.C.G.A. § /15 11-310); since the parents did not appeal the deprivation decision regarding their children, they were bound by the determination that their children were deprived (now "dependent") under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-40 and9-12-42. In the Interest of C.M., 258 Ga. App. 387, 574 S.E.2d 433 (2002).

- Legitimacy of a child is a matter for decision during the divorce proceedings. This issue is res judicata and cannot be raised in a subsequent proceeding to modify the divorce decree. Roberson v. Fooster, 234 Ga. 444, 216 S.E.2d 273 (1975).

When the legitimacy of a child was recognized in prior divorce proceedings, from which no appeal was taken, that issue was res judicata and could not be raised by the mother in a paternity action in which she sought adjudication that a man other than her former husband was the father of the child. Macuch v. Pettey, 170 Ga. App. 467, 317 S.E.2d 262 (1984).

When a divorce decree reflected a finding that the defendant was the child's natural father, the issue of paternity could not be relitigated in a subsequent contempt action against a defendant to recover child support arrearage. Department of Human Resources v. Hambrick, 216 Ga. App. 606, 455 S.E.2d 120 (1995).

- Paternity action, where blood tests appeared to establish that the prospective father was the biological father of the child was not barred by a prior adjudication in an action brought by the Department of Human Resources to recover the sum expended on behalf of the child, in which a third party acknowledged paternity of the child, under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Miller v. Charles, 211 Ga. App. 386, 439 S.E.2d 88 (1993).

When an order of dismissal entered in a previous Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Action expressly stated that the issue of paternity was not decided, the issue was not res judicata. Department of Human Resources v. Gelinas, 216 Ga. App. 561, 455 S.E.2d 76 (1995).

- When a final judgment and decree entered in a divorce action established that the defendant was the father of the minor child and set forth visitation rights and child support obligations, this prior judgment constituted a binding determination of paternity so that the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from again litigating the issue of paternity. Department of Human Resources v. Hurst, 208 Ga. App. 792, 432 S.E.2d 236 (1993).

In a child custody dispute that occurred six years after the parties' divorce, the mother was estopped from challenging the father's paternity of the child, and the trial court erred by granting the mother's motion for genetic testing for the purpose of challenging the father's paternity. Brooks v. Lopez, 350 Ga. App. 390, 829 S.E.2d 470 (2019).

- Res judicata applied to bar husband's action seeking reformation of a life insurance policy to show him as owner when the husband had the opportunity to litigate that issue in the divorce proceeding wherein the policy was awarded to his wife. Waggaman v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 565, 458 S.E.2d 826 (1995).

- Party litigant who accepts benefits under a divorce decree is estopped to set the decree aside. Guess v. Guess, 242 Ga. 786, 248 S.E.2d 528 (1979).

- A court is not authorized to settle the issue raised in a proper plea of res adjudicata without the intervention of a jury, though, in a proper case, it might direct a verdict. Davenport v. Southern Ry., 42 Ga. App. 160, 155 S.E. 340 (1930).

Court properly sustained a plea of res judicata when in a former suit between the same parties in the same court, concerning the same cause of action, a petition identical in language was dismissed on general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) on the ground that the petition set forth no cause of action, and the judgment sustaining the demurrer in the previous case was not excepted to. Sudderth v. Harris, 51 Ga. App. 654, 181 S.E. 122 (1935); Smith v. Bird, 189 Ga. 105, 5 S.E.2d 336 (1939); Owens v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 238, 73 S.E.2d 512 (1952); Smith v. Southeastern Courts, Inc., 89 Ga. App. 789, 81 S.E.2d 226 (1954); Dykes v. Dykes, 214 Ga. 288, 104 S.E.2d 430 (1958).

Res judicata barred a teacher's second action against a school district arising from the teacher's claims that the district breached the parties' agreement as to the teacher's resignation and that the agreement was fraudulently induced by the district, as there was identity of parties and subject matter between the two actions, and the teacher had an opportunity in the first action to fully litigate the issues on the merits; although the first action named the "Rome City Schools," the school system had vigorously defended that action and there was identity with the school district, which was the named party in the second action. Kaylor v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 267 Ga. App. 647, 600 S.E.2d 723 (2004).

Widower could not relitigate claims for compensatory and punitive damages, based on the claim that the father-in-law had broken the verbal promise to give the widower a portion of life insurance proceeds to help defray the deceased wife's burial costs, as the matter had been previously resolved by summary judgment in favor of the father-in-law, which decision was affirmed on appeal; such a decision was binding, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(h), in the subsequent trial with respect to whether a promise had been made and broken as to the disposition of the life insurance proceeds and the widower was barred from raising the issues relating to those damages by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. Hardwick v. Williams, 272 Ga. App. 680, 613 S.E.2d 215 (2005).

One who objects to setting a part of the statutory homestead by a referee in bankruptcy is not, by reason of that fact, estopped by res judicata from enforcing the lien of a judgment in one's favor, based upon a note waiving the benefits of one's homestead exemption. Rosenthal v. Langley, 180 Ga. 253, 179 S.E. 383, appeal dismissed, 295 U.S. 720, 55 S. Ct. 916, 79 L. Ed. 1674 (1935).

- When in first suit the landlord merely sought and won judgment for past due rent, the first suit did not act as res judicata of the landlord's second suit for rent becoming due after the first suit. Lowenberg v. Ford & Assocs., 165 Ga. App. 753, 302 S.E.2d 433 (1983).

- Prior verdict and decree of cotenancy did not estop the defendant from applying for a partition, no such question being involved in the original suit. Roberts v. Federal Land Bank, 180 Ga. 832, 181 S.E. 180 (1935).

- When matters of alimony and property interests between the parties are decided in a divorce, by consent or otherwise, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 operates to bar subsequent litigation between the parties as cotenants of a claim for rents which accrued prior to the divorce. White v. Lee, 250 Ga. 688, 300 S.E.2d 517 (1983).

- When a prison inmate's motion for return of personal property in the inmate's criminal case had been denied and appealed directly, the ruling was res judicata, and the inmate was estopped from seeking return of that property in any other court action involving the same defendants. Hooper v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 651, 512 S.E.2d 312 (1999).

Order confirming or refusing to confirm a judicial sale, if unexcepted to, is a final and conclusive judgment to the same extent as any other adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction. Hurt Bldg., Inc. v. Atlanta Trust Co., 181 Ga. 274, 182 S.E. 187 (1935).

- Judgment in an equitable action for cancellation of a deed alleged to have been obtained by fraud did not bar a later action to establish a lost security deed and note and to foreclose the deed and note. Eaton v. Weatherby, 239 Ga. 795, 239 S.E.2d 8 (1977).

- When a judgment in a prior action determined only that the plaintiff's petition set out no cause of action for equitable accounting, but did not consider whether the defendant had a valid cause of action on account against the plaintiff, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to the filing of such cross action by the defendant. Eubanks v. Electrical Wholesalers, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 56, 156 S.E.2d 502 (1967).

Defamation action was precluded by res judicata because the plaintiff could have raised the claims in a prior action in which the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant for breach of agreements concerning the plaintiff's purchase of the defendant's medical practice and for tortious interference with the plaintiff's practice. Doman v. Banderas, 231 Ga. App. 229, 499 S.E.2d 98 (1998).

- Res judicata was not applicable to suits involving real property tax assessments brought in separate years. Henry County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Bunn, 217 Ga. App. 350, 457 S.E.2d 256 (1995).

Judgment of a court of another jurisdiction in the same cause of action between the same parties is res judicata of all questions that could have been heard and determined in the case in which the judgment was rendered. Gillis v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 52 Ga. App. 806, 184 S.E. 791 (1936).

Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in Tennessee, if properly proved, may have the effect of former adjudication in matters pending in the courts of this state. Roadway Express, Inc. v. McBroom, 61 Ga. App. 233, 6 S.E.2d 460 (1939).

- Homeowner's nuisance action against a county based on the county's failure to maintain a deteriorating retaining wall was not barred by res judicata based on the owner's prior nuisance action for diminution in value arising out of a failure to maintain a storm water drainage system because the present suit was for a continuing nuisance. DeKalb County v. Heath, 331 Ga. App. 179, 770 S.E.2d 269 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1110, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 424 (Ga. 2015).

- Trial court correctly determined that res judicata barred an action against the defendant; the present action and the Tennessee action both sought damages against the defendant for alleged breach of contract for sale of the plaintiff's carpet business, both actions named the defendant as a party defendant, and the defendant made an appearance in the Tennessee action to contest jurisdiction. Chrison v. H & H Interiors, Inc., 232 Ga. App. 45, 500 S.E.2d 41 (1998).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40, the trial court correctly dismissed the shareholders' second corporate derivative action against the corporation and two of the corporation's officers on the basis of res judicata because the second action was the same as the first, the parties were the same, except that the corporation, which had been a real party in interest in the first case, had been added as a party-defendant, the first case was decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the first case was decided on the merits adversely to the shareholders since the shareholders failed to exhaust the corporation's internal corporate remedies. Grable v. Warren Hawkins Post of the Am. Legion, 264 Ga. App. 843, 592 S.E.2d 502 (2003).

Former employee's federal claims against a former employer were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, even though the state court in the employee's prior action did not hold a hearing before dismissing the employee's complaint under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(d)(1) because the employee completely ignored the employer's discovery requests, failed to respond to the employer's properly served motion for sanctions, and failed to request a hearing on the motion; thus, the state court was not required to hold a hearing before imposing the sanction of dismissal. Moten v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

Because an agent's complaint against a city arose out of their roles in a sludge disposal program and because the agent forewent an opportunity to file a permissive cross-claim in the property owners' original litigation against the city and the agent, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40, res judicata barred the agent from bringing the claims in a subsequent action. Sani-Agri Servs. v. City of Albany, 278 Ga. App. 432, 629 S.E.2d 15 (2006).

Appeals court agreed with the trial court that the doctrine of res judicata barred the negligence and breach of contract claims asserted by two property owners against a contractor as: (1) the claims were essentially identical to the allegations in a counterclaim filed in a prior Cherokee County action; (2) the parties in the two cases were identical for purposes of res judicata; and (3) the Cherokee County suit resulted in an adjudication on the merits. Perrett v. Sumner, 286 Ga. App. 379, 649 S.E.2d 545 (2007).

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case arising from a traffic accident in which the driver had filed an earlier state case that was decided on the merits, the driver's federal claims were barred by res judicata under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 even though the driver had added a police chief and deleted a police department from the federal case. The driver's claims against the police chief were predicated on the same operative facts relating to the traffic accident, and the driver could not avoid the application of res judicata by adding new parties. Endsley v. City of Macon, F.3d (11th Cir. Nov. 20, 2008)(Unpublished).

Renter's suit asserting that the renter's due process rights were violated in connection with the renter's eviction after a bank's foreclosure on the property the renter was leasing was barred under the doctrine of res judicata pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 because the renter had already filed numerous suits against the bank and the other defendants, the claims in the instant suit arose out of the same nucleus of operative fact as the claims asserted in the earlier suits, the suits involved the same parties, and the decisions of the state and federal courts that ruled in those actions constituted final judgments on the merits. Vereen v. Everett, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2009).

Plaintiffs' claims against a limited liability company (LLC) and the company's owners were res judicata and were barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 because the claims involved the same subject matter as the claims the plaintiffs raised in the plaintiffs' second civil action against the LLC and the owners, the temporary termination of their water supply; thus, the LLC was entitled to summary judgment. Adams v. Tricord, LLC, 299 Ga. App. 310, 682 S.E.2d 588 (2009).

Issues of fact remained as to whether title had not vested in transferees of real property from the debtor until within the reach-back period of 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 548, and a prior state court ruling did not have preclusive effect pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 or former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-42 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-42). Boudreaux v. Holloway (In re Holloway), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2012).

Trial court correctly granted family members' motion for summary judgment on the issue of res judicata as to any claim for an accounting prior to the date of a superior court judgment because the question of an accounting was previously litigated. Evans v. Dunkley, 316 Ga. App. 204, 728 S.E.2d 832 (2012).

Superior court erred in granting a mother's motion to dismiss a former partner's petition to adopt the mother's child because a judgment denying the mother's motion to set aside the adoption decree was res judicata as to the validity of the adoption decree and the superior court that dismissed the partner's petition for custody was not entitled to revisit the validity of the decree; although a superior court ultimately denied the mother's motion to set aside as untimely, the application of the time bar set out in O.C.G.A. § 19-8-18(e) presupposed that the adoption was one authorized by and entered in accordance with § 19-8-18(b). Bates v. Bates, 317 Ga. App. 339, 730 S.E.2d 482 (2012).

Trial court properly granted a homeowner's association summary judgment and dismissed a development company's third-party complaint asserting indemnity because in the main litigation the indemnity agreement was invalidated under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b); thus, the third-party complaint was barred by res judicata. Kennedy Dev. Co. v. Newton's Crest Homeowners' Ass'n, 322 Ga. App. 39, 743 S.E.2d 600 (2013).

Dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit brought under the Georgia False Medicaid Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 49-4-168 et seq., was affirmed because the suit was barred by res judicta based on an earlier-filed federal suit against the same pharmaceutical companies for similar claims. Jordan v. State of Ga., 336 Ga. App. 345, 785 S.E.2d 27 (2016).

Because the judgment of the state court was a valid, final judgment under Georgia law, res judicata barred the re-litigation of the claim the judgment addressed, namely, whether the bankruptcy automatic stay barred the bank's discovery requests. Bank of N. Ga. v. Vanbrocklin (In re Vanbrocklin), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 16, 2016).

Trial court should have granted the adoption petitioner's motion to dismiss the claims for abusive litigation because the claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata as there was sufficient identity of parties and issues and an adjudication on the merits. Stapler v. Boling, 347 Ga. App. 79, 815 S.E.2d 602 (2018).

- Grant or denial of an ordinary motion for new trial upon evidentiary grounds may, like other decisions, form the basis of res judicata. Sumner v. Sumner, 186 Ga. 390, 197 S.E. 833 (1938).

Doctrine of res adjudicata applies to claim cases as well as to other cases if the claim case in which such previous judgment was rendered involved the same cause of action as the pending litigation. Cox v. Hargrove, 205 Ga. 12, 52 S.E.2d 312 (1949).

- Res judicata was inapplicable to a fraudulent concealment case brought by lawyers against clients as the case was completely different from an earlier case brought by the lawyers against the clients in which the lawyers sued one of the clients for failing to pay attorney fees pursuant to a contract; in the current case, the lawyers sued the clients for fraudulently concealing assets so that the lawyers were unable to collect the judgment obtained in the first case, while in the current case, the lawyers were not making a claim for unpaid attorney's fees, which was the subject of the lawyer's first suit, but instead, were making a claim for fraud regarding the alleged asset concealment, and the clients were not able to establish the first prerequisite for application of the doctrine of res judicata, which was identity of cause of action. Gerschick & Assocs., P.C. v. Pounds, 266 Ga. App. 852, 598 S.E.2d 522 (2004).

- Res judicata did not apply to require dismissal of a criminal action because the same issues had allegedly been raised in a prior civil case. Carter v. State, 231 Ga. App. 42, 497 S.E.2d 812 (1998).

Defendant's second motion to vacate a void judgment was properly denied as the motion was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 since the defendant could have challenged the sufficiency of the indictment against the defendant on the defendant's direct appeal, and since the defendant's arguments mirrored the arguments that the defendant had raised previously. Rehberger v. State, 267 Ga. App. 778, 600 S.E.2d 635 (2004).

When a defendant filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus while the defendant's request to file an out-of-time motion for a new trial was pending, the defendant's decision to go forward with the habeas action precluded the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 from later relitigating an ineffective assistance claim at the hearing on the motion for a new trial. Spiller v. State, 282 Ga. 351, 647 S.E.2d 64 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079, 128 S. Ct. 812, 169 L. Ed. 2d 612 (2007).

- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to an estate executor in a suit asserting fraud and other claims brought by two siblings as the trial court incorrectly determined that the privileges set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 51-5-7(2) and51-5-8 applied to the fraud claims and neither collateral estoppel nor res judicata barred the action since a prior probate court proceeding did not involve the same issues. Further, the probate court would have had no jurisdiction over the fraud and intentional interference with a gift claims. Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 663 S.E.2d 714 (2008).

Court of appeals did not err in holding that res judicata barred a daughter's complaint for breach of contract against a widow because the relevant facts pled in the daughter's prior attempt to set aside the year's support granted to the widow on the basis of fraud were identical to those the daughter alleged in support of the breach of contract claim; the daughter's fraud claim was determined on the merits on appeal to the superior court, and the daughter had a full and fair opportunity to have litigated any related claims against the widow in the action the daughter initially filed in the probate court. Crowe v. Elder, 290 Ga. 686, 723 S.E.2d 428 (2012).

- Doctrine of res adjudicata is not available as a bar to a subsequent action if the judgment in the former action was rendered because of a misconception of the remedy available or of the proper form of proceedings, and unless the former judgment was based upon the merits. Densmore v. Brown, 83 Ga. App. 366, 64 S.E.2d 78 (1951).

- If one is pursuing at the same time in different courts the same cause of action against the same defendant, an adjudication on the merits of one would conclude further action on the other. Jones v. Rich's, Inc., 81 Ga. App. 841, 60 S.E.2d 402 (1950).

- When the liability, if any, of the master to a third person is purely derivative and dependent entirely upon the principle of respondeat superior, a judgment on the merits in favor of the agent or servant is res judicata in favor of the principal or master though not a party to the action. This rule is an exemplification of the broader rule by which one whose liability is wholly derivative may claim the benefit of a judgment in favor of the person from whom the liability is derived, if not based on grounds applicable only to the latter. Roadway Express, Inc. v. McBroom, 61 Ga. App. 223, 6 S.E.2d 460 (1939); Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975).

Though a judgment in favor of a servant against a third party is res judicata in favor of the master, this is not to say that the master is bound by the servant's judgment in order to use it as res judicata, for the master can still sue the third person for damages to the master's vehicle or other property damaged in a collision, certainly if the former adjudication favored the servant and even when it went against the servant. Due process of law requires that the master, not having been a party to the prior adjudication, have the master's day in court. Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975).

- Although a master has privity with a servant and can claim the benefit of an adjudication in favor of the servant, a servant is not in privity with the master so as to be able to claim the benefit of an adjudication in favor of the master. Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975).

- Determination in bankruptcy judgment that corporation had not committed a fraud did not flow with the assets of the company to the company's successors in interest, president, majority shareholder, and a new company, especially when fraud in that transfer on the part of such successors, who were not parties to the first suit, was alleged, and they could assert prior judgment as a bar to suit. Anderson Oil Co. v. Benton Oil Co., 246 Ga. 304, 271 S.E.2d 207 (1980).

- At an interlocutory hearing, the court has no authority to dispose of a plea of res judicata and if evidence was otherwise sufficient to warrant the exercise of the court's discretion in granting the interlocutory injunction, the plaintiffs were entitled to such relief, even though the court, after the introduction of evidence at the trial term on the plea of res judicata, might be authorized to direct a verdict in favor of such plea. Perry v. Gormley, 183 Ga. 757, 189 S.E. 850 (1937).

- When there is an honest difference of opinion between parties, touching a disputed claim, and especially if the difference is of such a nature as to render it at all doubtful as to who is correct, any settlement or compromise of these differences will be enforced by the courts, and neither party will be allowed to defend by showing that the party was right in the party's original contention. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Morris, 120 Ga. App. 525, 171 S.E.2d 378 (1969).

- Even though the plaintiff was not technically a party to a prior arbitration proceeding in which an award was made in connection with a home construction contract, because the plaintiff was a co-owner of the property and actively participated in the arbitration proceeding, the plaintiff, as well as the plaintiff's spouse, was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from proceeding upon a lawsuit based upon the same facts. Bennett v. Cotton, 244 Ga. App. 784, 536 S.E.2d 802 (2000).

Court of Appeals erroneously held that the arbitrator, and not the court, should have decided whether arbitration was barred by res judicata as: (1) no presumption existed that an arbitrator was in a better position than a court to apply a legal doctrine such as res judicata; (2) the parties did not expressly reserve the issue for arbitration; and (3) there was no presumption under Georgia law that the application of a procedural bar such as res judicata was a matter to be determined exclusively by an arbitrator. Bryan County v. Yates Paving & Grading Co., 281 Ga. 361, 638 S.E.2d 302 (2006).

Claims arising out of a county's termination of a construction contract that the contractor sought to have arbitrated were barred by the res judicata effect of a previous arbitration; by agreeing to defer a claim for lost income and then moving to confirm the arbitration award, the contractor waived the lost income claims. Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Bryan County, 287 Ga. App. 802, 652 S.E.2d 851 (2007).

- Denial of plaintiff 's workers' compensation claim by Board of Workers' Compensation based on no liability stipulation and settlement entered into by the plaintiff and the plaintiff 's employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier did not constitute res judicata as to whether the plaintiff 's injury was compensable under the "Workers' Compensation Act" in plaintiff 's action to recover on the plaintiff 's medical insurance policy which denied coverage for injuries compensable under the "Workers' Compensation Act". Cantrell v. Home Sec. Life Ins. Co., 165 Ga. App. 670, 302 S.E.2d 415 (1983).

- When the defendant, in answer to the plaintiff's petition, fails to file a plea of res judicata at the appropriate time, but relies upon res judicata as a ground for a motion to set aside a judgment, it should be overruled, since such matters are purely defensive and do not afford grounds to vacate or set aside the judgment. Walthour v. Mock, 102 Ga. App. 811, 117 S.E.2d 885 (1960).

County residents' challenge to a school board candidate's residency qualification under O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1(1) and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II, was barred by res judicata because another challenger had raised the same challenge, and the challenge had been resolved against the challenger by the county's board of elections. Lilly v. Heard, 295 Ga. 399, 761 S.E.2d 46 (2014).

- When a protestant in a processioning proceeding pleads the defense of res judicata and moves for summary judgment on this ground, supporting the motion with the record of a prior processioning proceeding between the same parties concerning the same issue of boundary and in which the protestant obtained judgment in the protestant 's favor, and the applicant made no contrary showing, a motion for summary judgment is properly granted. Souther v. Kichline, 124 Ga. App. 111, 183 S.E.2d 87 (1971).

Trial court erred by granting family members summary judgment based on res judicata to the extent the children's action sought an accounting with respect to management of property after the prior judgment because the children's prior suit for an accounting of funds received and expended while managing the property was different. Evans v. Dunkley, 316 Ga. App. 204, 728 S.E.2d 832 (2012).

- When the plaintiffs filed the plaintiffs' negligence lawsuit in the superior court of one county and that court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the circuit court in the county to which the lawsuit was transferred did not err in reconsidering the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granting the motion because nothing limits the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment and res judicata does not apply to a denial of a motion for summary judgment. Hubbard v. DOT, 256 Ga. App. 342, 568 S.E.2d 559 (2002).

- Prior judgments have res judicata applicability, even if they had been outright default or summary judgments, and the application of the doctrine of res judicata in this manner does not deprive a litigant of the litigant 's right to "a day in court." Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446, 249 S.E.2d 270 (1978).

Doctrine of res judicata applies even if the earlier judgment is a default judgment or a summary adjudication. Morgan v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 166 Ga. App. 611, 305 S.E.2d 130 (1983); Quarterman v. Memorial Medical Ctr., 176 Ga. App. 92, 335 S.E.2d 589 (1985).

- If the demurrer (now motion to dismiss) that was sustained in a former suit went to the merits of the case, it may be relied on under a plea of res judicata. Avery v. Southern Ry., 47 Ga. App. 722, 171 S.E. 456 (1933); Sudderth v. Harris, 51 Ga. App. 654, 181 S.E. 122 (1935); Gamble v. Gamble, 204 Ga. 82, 48 S.E.2d 540 (1948), later appeal, 207 Ga. 380, 61 S.E.2d 836 (1950); Dixon v. Dixon, 211 Ga. 122, 84 S.E.2d 37 (1954); Vidalia Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Durrence, 94 Ga. App. 368, 94 S.E.2d 609 (1956); Smith v. Bank of Acworth, 111 Ga. App. 112, 140 S.E.2d 888 (1965); General Shoe Corp. v. Hood, 121 Ga. App. 444, 174 S.E.2d 212 (1970).

- When a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) that does not go to the merits of the cause of action is sustained, the judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action will not be res adjudicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same cause of action. Buie v. Waters, 209 Ga. 608, 74 S.E.2d 883 (1953).

In a client's fraud claim against an attorney, neither appellate opinions that the client could pursue that claim without filing the expert affidavit required under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b) (now (e)) in professional malpractice claims, nor the trial court's subsequent denial of the attorney's summary judgment motion, asserting a failure to show a false representation or detrimental reliance, established the law of the case precluding the trial court from subsequently granting the attorney's summary judgment motion based on the client's failure to prove damages. Hopkinson v. Labovitz, 263 Ga. App. 702, 589 S.E.2d 255 (2003).

Trial court did not err in ruling for a creditor in the creditor's action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-231 to foreclose on personal property and to recover monies lent and unpaid because the doctrine of res judicata did not apply when the merits of the creditor's claims for foreclosure and monies lent had not been previously adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction; the issue before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Office of State Administrative Hearing was limited to whether the Georgia Department of Revenue acted properly in cancelling the creditor's certificate of title to a vehicle, and in denying the creditor's motion for reconsideration, the ALJ specifically stated that the issue of whether the creditor would be reflected on the certificate of title to the vehicle as lienholder was not before the court. Allen v. Santana, 303 Ga. App. 844, 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010).

- In an action in which a former inmate, in a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 attached to the complaint a copy of a June 29, 2004, Ante Litem Notice provided by an attorney to the Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, the Chairman, Sumter County Board of Commissioners, and the Department of Administrative Services for the Risk Management Department detailing the inmate's 2003 accident and medical care thereafter, and announced an intention to file a lawsuit if the case was not settled, the inmate was ordered to file a supplemental complaint because the court could not determine whether the earlier action was filed and whether this case should be dismissed as res judicata. Bray v. Ingram, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Oct. 27, 2005).

Trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata in an action by a city seeking an injunction to require a company to remove billboards which were erected in violation of city ordinances because, even though a valid antecedent judgment existed which arose out of a case involving the same parties and in which the same matters either were in issue or could have been put in issue, the doctrine could not be applied to prevent the city from enforcing the city's ordinances. City of Statham v. Diversified Dev. Co., 250 Ga. App. 846, 550 S.E.2d 410 (2001).

- Defendant who voluntarily dismissed without prejudice a compulsory counterclaim could not renew the counterclaim as an original action under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 after the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed with prejudice the main claim without objection by the defendant because renewal of the counterclaim was barred by res judicata. Robinson v. Stokes, 229 Ga. App. 25, 493 S.E.2d 5 (1997).

- Voluntary dismissal with prejudice, although without order or approval of the trial court, is considered a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata. Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 405 S.E.2d 678 (1991), rev'g Vineyard v. Fowler, 197 Ga. App. 453, 398 S.E.2d 709 (1990).

Judgment on demurrer (now motion to dismiss), until reversed, concludes the parties on all questions necessarily or actually involved in the decision, but is not conclusive of any other issue. Byrd v. Goodman, 195 Ga. 621, 25 S.E.2d 34 (1943).

- When the court, on demurrer (now motion to dismiss), holds that the transaction upon which a recovery is sought does not, as it is alleged in the petition, constitute a cause of action, and dismisses the action on this ground, the judgment operates as a res adjudicata, and bars a subsequent suit between the parties on the same transaction, though in the first case the facts were untruly or improperly stated, and if the facts had been truly and properly stated, a cause of action would have been disclosed. Woods v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 429, 186 S.E. 467 (1936); Redwine v. Frizzell, 186 Ga. 296, 197 S.E. 805 (1938); Hughes v. Henderson, 61 Ga. App. 743, 7 S.E.2d 317 (1940); Owens v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 238, 73 S.E.2d 512 (1952).

- As to those matters to which a dismissal constitutes an adjudication on the merits, the defense of res judicata will lie and summary judgment may be had thereon. Liner v. North, 194 Ga. App. 175, 390 S.E.2d 263 (1990); Head v. Head, 199 Ga. App. 104, 403 S.E.2d 835 (1991).

Res judicata does affect an attack on a garnishment order issuing from the original judgment. Georgia Farm Bldgs., Inc. v. Willard, 169 Ga. App. 394, 313 S.E.2d 112, aff'd, 253 Ga. 649, 325 S.E.2d 591 (1984).

- Trial court properly granted a bank summary judgment in a suit for conversion against the bank brought by a debtor because the debtor's claim was barred by res judicata since the debtor failed to raise any challenge in the garnishment proceeding wherein the bank was a garnishee. Copeland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 317 Ga. App. 669, 732 S.E.2d 536 (2012), cert. denied, No. S13C0189, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 124 (Ga. 2013).

- Federal district court judgment for the state bar, concluding that an attorney's action for reinstatement was barred by res judicata resulting from prior litigation in a state court, was res judicata in a subsequent state court action for reinstatement. State Bar v. Beazley, 256 Ga. 561, 350 S.E.2d 422 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016, 107 S. Ct. 1894, 95 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1987).

Litigating existence of additional terms of same lease in subsequent action was impermissible since the parties had the opportunity and the obligation in the first action to ensure that all terms of the lease were included in the court's judgment. Lay Bros. v. Tahamtan, 236 Ga. App. 435, 511 S.E.2d 262 (1999).

- Since an insured's counterclaim for property damage against a tortfeasor, which the insured later withdrew, was a compulsory counterclaim, under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(a), the insurer was barred by res judicata and O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 from reasserting that claim in a subsequent suit in which the insurer sought to recover from the tortfeasor for damages it paid to the insured. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Welch, 259 Ga. App. 71, 576 S.E.2d 57 (2003).

- In a federal declaratory judgment action to construe a tenant's repair, replacement, and maintenance obligations under a lease, the landlord's counterclaim for damages for breach of the duty to repair was barred by res judicata as the claim could have been raised in an earlier state action by the landlord alleging breach of contract by the tenant for, inter alia, the tenant's violation of the maintenance and repair provisions of the lease. Capitol Funds, Inc. v. Arlen Realty, Inc., 755 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1985).

- Although a dismissal without prejudice will not, standing alone, carry any res judicata effect, the entry of a judgment on a counterclaim asserted in that action does have res judicata effect. Moate v. Moate, 265 Ga. 418, 456 S.E.2d 502 (1995).

- Res judicata bars party who foregoes opportunity to file permissive cross-claim from bringing the claim in a subsequent action. Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 405 S.E.2d 678 (1991).

- Cross-claims for indemnification and contribution, and a later personal injury claim, both arising out of the same traffic accident, involve an identity of subject matter for purposes of res judicata. Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 405 S.E.2d 678 (1991).

- Federal district court erroneously interpreted Georgia law when the court gave res judicata effect to a declaratory judgment of the state superior court, which was not final because various counterclaims and cross claims were still pending. Cable Holdings of Battlefield, Inc. v. Cooke, 764 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1985).

When the second action merely involved new or different pleadings, a former federal action barred a second state action, although in denying leave to amend because of prejudicial delay and dismissing the first action, the federal judge stated, "this action would not be considered a 'prior action based on the same set of facts' for purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata in a subsequent suit." Walker v. Kroger Co., 181 Ga. App. 745, 353 S.E.2d 551 (1987).

- When each of the victims of a fraudulent scheme sued the perpetrator for fraud and related claims, the victims could have also sued the perpetrator under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., in the same action, and the victims should have raised such a claim in those actions because, when the victims did not and lost the victims' suits against the perpetrator, the victims were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata from filing RICO claims against the perpetrator at a later time. Austin v. Cohen, 268 Ga. App. 650, 602 S.E.2d 146 (2004).

Prior action in magistrate court for wrongful garnishment barred a later wrongful garnishment claim asserted in state court under the doctrine of res judicata. Brinson v. First Am. Bank, 200 Ga. App. 552, 409 S.E.2d 50 (1991).

Order rendered by responding court in Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19, proceeding is not res judicata in a subsequent action for arrearage under the original support order, subject to a setoff of any such arrearages already paid to prevent a double recovery. State ex rel. Brookins v. Brookins, 257 Ga. 205, 357 S.E.2d 77 (1987).

- When a wife's prior cause of action for the wrongful death of her husband was a separate and distinct cause of action from a subsequent action for pain and suffering she brought in her capacity as administratrix of her husband's estate, a judgment against her in the prior action did not bar the subsequent claim for pain and suffering on grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 197 Ga. App. 852, 399 S.E.2d 708 (1990), aff'd, 261 Ga. 697, 409 S.E.2d 847 (1991).

- When a trial court, upon remittitur, entered a judgment as directed by the Court of Appeals, the trial court erred in then finding that the losing party's argument as to prejudgment interest was barred by res judicata since the award to the plaintiff of prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 was not clearly erroneous until the Court of Appeals had reversed the earlier judgment. City of Fairburn v. Cook, 195 Ga. App. 265, 393 S.E.2d 70 (1990).

- Since the claim could have been raised in a suit on a note and security deed, a claim for contractual attorney's fees was barred by the doctrine of res judicata under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. Kauka Farms, Inc. v. Scott, 256 Ga. 642, 352 S.E.2d 373 (1987).

- Res judicata applied to bar the executor's action against the decedent's brother seeking to cancel a prior deed and to impose a constructive trust upon the property since the three criteria of O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 were properly met. McIver v. Jones, 209 Ga. App. 670, 434 S.E.2d 504 (1993).

Because the employer did not raise the issue of credit for disability plan payments and did not appeal from the award of benefits by an administrative law judge at a workers' compensation hearing, the award was res judicata on the issue of credit for disability plan payments. Webb v. City of Atlanta, 228 Ga. App. 278, 491 S.E.2d 492 (1997).

Res judicata barred the plaintiff 's second petition to be appointed executor of plaintiff 's parent 's estate. In re Estate of Bagley, 239 Ga. App. 877, 522 S.E.2d 281 (1999).

Res judicata precluded the patient from bringing a second action for medical malpractice, breach of contract, and failure to secure informed consent against the appellants since the first action was against the same defendant, there was an adjudication on the merits, and the patient had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the first action. Simon v. Gunby, 260 Ga. App. 3, 578 S.E.2d 482 (2003).

- Res judicata did not preclude the trial court from considering the wife's petition to modify child support as an action for modification is not identical to an original divorce action and the settlement agreement, which addressed child support, did not preclude modification of a child support award. Odom v. Odom, 291 Ga. 811, 733 S.E.2d 741 (2012).

- Bank assigned a note and a deed to secure debt to the borrowers' friend, who assigned them to a third party, which foreclosed on the borrowers' home and filed a successful dispossessory action against them. The borrowers' fraud and conversion claims against the bank were not barred by res judicata under OCGA § 9-12-40 or collateral estoppel as the bank was not a privy to the party involved in the dispossessory action. Dennis v. First Nat'l Bank of the S., 293 Ga. App. 890, 668 S.E.2d 479 (2008).

- Whether the city could be held liable for failure to maintain the drainage system was decided in the city's favor in the initial suit; therefore, in a subsequent suit, a claim for a declaratory judgment against the city regarding the city's responsibility for maintaining the system was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Macko v. City of Lawrenceville, 231 Ga. App. 671, 499 S.E.2d 707 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Kleber v. City of Atlanta, 291 Ga. App. 146, 661 S.E.2d 195 (2008).

Res judicata doctrine did not bar the corporation's counterclaim that the corporation had easement rights in the parking deck of a building the corporation purchased from the law school as the prior litigation it was involved in with the law school over who was the building's rightful owner and whether the law school was required to give the corporation a limited warranty deed after the law school reacquired the property did not involve the same issue in the subsequent litigation between the limited liability company, whose sole member was the law school, and the corporation; indeed, the issue of easement rights did not come up until after that prior litigation ended. Parking Deck LLC v. Anvil Corp., 259 Ga. App. 1, 576 S.E.2d 24 (2002).

Trial court properly dismissed an injured person's premises liability complaint against a store owner on the basis of res judicata since the injured person's earlier action against the store owner on the identical claim was dismissed because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; as this was a decision on the merits, the doctrine of res judicata barred a subsequent lawsuit on this claim. Brown v. J. H. Harvey Co., 268 Ga. App. 322, 601 S.E.2d 808 (2004).

Franchisor's claim for the present value of the future fees, including unpaid royalty and advertising fees, from its franchisee was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the franchisor elected to treat the franchisee's repudiation as a breach of the entire franchise agreement and was able to immediately sue to recover damages for such breach, including the present value of the future fees; thus, even if the franchisor's breach-of-contract counterclaim in the first suit did not explicitly seek damages for the future fees, the franchisor could have sought such fees based upon the franchisee's repudiation of the entire contract, and the franchisor could have, and should have, obtained a judgment on those claims in the first suit. Legacy Academy, Inc. v. Doles-Smith Enters., 344 Ga. App. 805, 812 S.E.2d 72 (2018).

- It is the general rule that a judgment sought to be used as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata must be a final judgment. Reid v. Reid, 201 Ga. App. 530, 411 S.E.2d 754 (1991).

- Judgment is not final, for purposes of res judicata, while an appeal is pending. Thomas v. Brown, 708 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga. 1989).

Because a dispossessory court never ruled upon or resolved a landlord's claims for past due rent and other damages, and because the dispossessory court lacked jurisdiction over the defaulting tenants, who were served by "nail and mail" service under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51(a), the landlord's claims were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 or subject to a plea of abatement under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-5(a) and9-2-44(a). Bhindi Bros. v. Patel, 275 Ga. App. 143, 619 S.E.2d 814 (2005).

- Homeowners' complaint against a homeowners' association was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim because the complaint challenged a prior judgment obtained by the association against the homeowners from which the homeowners did not appeal. That prior judgment was therefore res judicata. Laosebikan v. Lakemont Cmty. Ass'n, 302 Ga. App. 220, 690 S.E.2d 505 (2010).

Issuance of a writ of possession constituted "final judgment" of the magistrate court since the only relief requested by the plaintiff was the issuance of the writ and the plaintiff expressly declined to seek judgment for any amounts due under the lease between the parties. Atlanta J's, Inc. v. Houston Foods, Inc., 237 Ga. App. 415, 514 S.E.2d 216 (1999).

- Res judicata required the subject matter of the causes of action at issue to be identical; the dismissal of a patient's malpractice suit against a doctor based on the first of three surgeries relating to the patient's breast implants did not bar a second suit based on the two later surgeries, although all three surgeries were related to one another. Gunby v. Simon, 277 Ga. 698, 594 S.E.2d 342 (2004).

Estoppel by Judgment

Meaning of term.

- Estoppel by judgment occurs when the issue determined in the prior proceeding is the same as that in the subsequent proceeding. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

Doctrine of estoppel by judgment has reference to previous litigation between the same parties based upon a different cause of action. Usher v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 420, 278 S.E.2d 70 (1981).

Plea of estoppel by judgment stems from the doctrine of res judicata and is available when there has been a former adjudication of the same issues by the parties or their privies, even though the adjudication may not have been upon the same cause of action. House v. Benton, 42 Ga. App. 97, 155 S.E. 47 (1930); Thompson v. Thompson, 199 Ga. 692, 35 S.E.2d 262 (1945); Powell v. Powell, 200 Ga. 379, 37 S.E.2d 191 (1946); Blakely v. Couch, 129 Ga. App. 625, 200 S.E.2d 493 (1973); Price v. Winn, 142 Ga. App. 790, 237 S.E.2d 409 (1977).

- Different rule from that in this section applies in regard to estoppel by judgment. Scarborough v. Edgar, 176 Ga. 574, 168 S.E. 592 (1933), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Dean, 188 Ga. 319, 3 S.E.2d 894 (1939).

Collateral estoppel prevented issues decided in federal action from being relitigated in the state court action against the defendants. Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga. App. 313, 509 S.E.2d 378 (1998).

Because the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals expressly ruled that a sheriff's deputy had probable cause for the traffic stop and arrest of a driver based upon a tag light violation, had probable cause for arrest based upon the driver's acts of obstruction, and had not used excessive force in making the arrest, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Court of Appeals of Georgia was compelled to hold that the issues as to the lawfulness of the deputy's actions, probable cause, and excessive force could not be relitigated; thus, the deputy was properly granted summary judgment as to these claims in the state court. Draper v. Reynolds, 278 Ga. App. 401, 629 S.E.2d 476 (2006).

- Estoppel by judgment can arise by virtue of a judgment authorized by the pleadings, rendered in previous litigation between the same parties, based upon an altogether different cause of action. Capps v. Toccoa Falls Light & Power Co., 46 Ga. App. 268, 167 S.E. 530 (1933).

- To create estoppel by judgment the parties must be the same or in privy. Forrester v. Southern Ry., 268 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ga. 1967); National Hills Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 308 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ga. 1970).

- There is one general rule, which is applicable alike to estoppel by record, by deed, and to equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais: that is, that estoppels must be mutual. Strangers can neither take advantage of, nor be bound by an estoppel; its binding effect is between the immediate parties, their privies in blood, in law, and by estate. Porterfield v. Gilmer, 132 Ga. App. 463, 208 S.E.2d 295 (1974), aff'd, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975).

- There is an estoppel by judgment only as to such matters within the scope of the previous pleadings as necessarily had to be adjudicated in order for the previous judgment to be rendered, or as to such matters within the scope of the pleadings as might or might not have been adjudicated, but which are shown by outside proof to have been actually litigated and determined. Powell v. Powell, 200 Ga. 379, 37 S.E.2d 191 (1946); Usher v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 420, 278 S.E.2d 70 (1981).

- Any claims for damages allegedly occurring after the first suit were barred by collateral estoppel to the extent that such claims were premised upon the homeowner's assertions that the city was responsible for maintaining the subdivision's drainage system since the first suit found that the city did not exert control over the drainage system. Macko v. City of Lawrenceville, 231 Ga. App. 671, 499 S.E.2d 707 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Kleber v. City of Atlanta, 291 Ga. App. 146, 661 S.E.2d 195 (2008).

In finding that a debtor had committed waste, mismanaged the funds of the debtor's ward, and failed to account for those funds, a probate court actually litigated the issue of defalcation for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and the court's order was given collateral estoppel effect in the dischargeability proceeding. Clark v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 315 Bankr. 630 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2004).

Denial of a sister's and an executrix's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict were reversed as a constructive trust could not be imposed over the proceeds of a condemnation since: (1) a mother did not make any agreement with her children regarding the quitclaim deeds or the proceeds of the condemnation; (2) the documents signed by the siblings were unequivocal and unrestricted; (3) the mother did not make any promise with the intent not to carry it out; (4) there was nothing to indicate that when the mother obtained a certificate of deposit and opened a money market account in her and the executrix's and the sister's names as joint tenants with right of survivorship, she meant to do anything other than that; and (5) the siblings did not raise the issue of a constructive trust in the condemnation proceedings and were collaterally estopped from raising the issue in a later action. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 281 Ga. App. 756, 637 S.E.2d 56 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0281, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 87 (Ga. 2007).

Collateral estoppel applied to bar the debtor from relitigating the issue of a default judgment for the debtor's liability for fraud, wrongful eviction, and punitive damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (6), as well as pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40; thus, judgment in the amount of $222,833 was granted. Hebbard v. Camacho (In re Camacho), 411 Bankr. 496 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2009).

- Party who chooses not to assert his or her claim for contribution as a counterclaim is not barred from bringing a separate suit for contribution after a judgment has been entered in the original tort action. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin, 201 Ga. App. 30, 410 S.E.2d 154 (1991).

Question must have been one of the "ultimate" questions or facts in issue as opposed to a supporting evidentiary or "mediate" question. Forrester v. Southern Ry., 268 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ga. 1967).

- If a question comes collaterally before a court and is only incidentally considered, the judgment or decree is no estoppel. Mortgage Bond & Trust Co. v. Colonial Hill Co., 175 Ga. 150, 165 S.E. 25 (1932).

- When a judgment is claimed as an estoppel, the burden is upon the party relying thereon to show that the particular matter in controversy was necessarily or actually determined in the party's favor in the former litigation; and if it appears from the record introduced in support of such claim that several issues were involved in the previous litigation, and the verdict and judgment therein do not clearly show that the particular issue was then decided, before such claim can be sustained the uncertainty must be removed by extrinsic evidence showing that the issue was then decided in favor of the party relying upon such adjudication or estoppel. Gormley v. Cleveland, 187 Ga. 457, 200 S.E. 793 (1939); Gunnin v. Carlile, 195 Ga. 861, 25 S.E.2d 652 (1943).

Upon the party setting up an estoppel by judgment rests the burden of proving it, and it matters not how numerous the questions involved in the suit may be, provided they were tried and decided for the judgment is conclusive not only of the thing directly decided, but of every fact which was essential to the adjudication; any conclusion which the court or jury must evidently have arrived at in order to reach the judgment or verdict rendered will be fully concluded. Usher v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 420, 278 S.E.2d 70 (1981).

- Since a divorce action did not as originally filed pray for alimony or for the recovery of other property, it follows that as first brought that action was based on a different cause of action from the one in the subsequent action, which sought among other things to recover property wrongfully taken from the spouse before the action for divorce was filed. Thompson v. Thompson, 199 Ga. 692, 35 S.E.2d 262 (1945).

- When a party, in temporary alimony proceedings, contends that he is not subject to a judgment therefor because he had made a final alimony settlement with his wife by contract, under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, he is concluded in a subsequent contempt proceeding from contending that the judgment awarding temporary alimony was void because he was never his wife's lawful husband. Powell v. Powell, 200 Ga. 379, 37 S.E.2d 191 (1946).

Administrative decision may act as an estoppel in a judicial proceeding involving the same parties only if the issue decided by the administrative body is the same as that involved in the litigation. Epps Air Serv., Inc. v. Lampkin, 229 Ga. 792, 194 S.E.2d 437 (1972).

- Finding against a party, either upon final hearing or demurrer (now motion to dismiss), that the party's cause of action as shown by the party is barred by the statute of limitations or by laches is a decision upon the merits, concluding the right of action. Gamble v. Gamble, 204 Ga. 82, 48 S.E.2d 540 (1948), later appeal, 207 Ga. 380, 61 S.E.2d 836 (1950); Capps v. Toccoa Falls Light & Power Co., 46 Ga. App. 268, 167 S.E. 530 (1933); College Park Land Co. v. Mayor of College Park, 48 Ga. App. 528, 173 S.E. 239 (1934); Slaughter v. Slaughter, 190 Ga. 229, 9 S.E.2d 70 (1940); Thompson v. Thompson, 199 Ga. 692, 35 S.E.2d 262 (1945); Powell v. Powell, 200 Ga. 379, 37 S.E.2d 191 (1946); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

- Child was not collaterally estopped from asserting that she was the daughter of the deceased in an action for her share of an intestate estate despite the fact that a divorce decree between her mother and a third party provided for her support and visitation; the mother's interests at the time of the divorce were not in privy with those of her child and the child was not estopped from raising the issue of her paternity. Pinkard v. Morris, 215 Ga. App. 297, 450 S.E.2d 330 (1994).

- Estoppel by judgment prevented a parent from relitigating a custody issue which was decided by the juvenile court in a prior contempt action brought by the parent against the other parent. Williams v. Stepler, 227 Ga. App. 591, 490 S.E.2d 167 (1997).

When a mother filed a motion for change of custody in the father's home county (Fulton), and the Fulton court ruled there was a material change in circumstances, and the father then filed a motion for change of custody in the mother's county (DeKalb), the Fulton ruling had a preclusive effect on the material change of circumstances issue under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. However, the mother could present evidence of facts arising after that judgment. Allen v. McGuire, 339 Ga. App. 219, 793 S.E.2d 151 (2016).

- Action by a parent for recovery of child support, the gravamen of which was that the obligated parent misrepresented income to the Department of Human Resources in an earlier proceeding, was barred on the basis that the consent judgment entered in the earlier proceeding was res judicata and binding until reversed or set aside, and that it was too late to set it aside because a motion to set aside a judgment for fraud must be brought within three years from entry of the judgment. Turner v. Butler, 245 Ga. App. 250, 537 S.E.2d 703 (2000).

- Since under Georgia law a default judgment is a decision on the merits for purposes of estoppel by judgment, the default judgment has preclusive effect in determining whether the judgment debt fell within the fraud exception to dischargeability in bankruptcy. League v. Graham, 191 Bankr. 489 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).

Trial court did not err in granting a lender's motion for summary judgment because the doctrine of res judicata barred a debtor's suit alleging that the lender incorrectly charged interest on the debtor's unsecured revolving line of credit; the same matters were already litigated between the same parties in an action previously adjudicated on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Rose v. Household Fin. Corp., 316 Ga. App. 282, 728 S.E.2d 879 (2012).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 125 et seq.

46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, § 444 et seq.

15 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Judgments, §§ 55, 273.

- 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 926 et seq.

- Judgment against less than all parties to contract as bar to action against others, 1 A.L.R. 1601.

Judgment in favor of less than all parties to contract as bar to action against other parties, 2 A.L.R. 124.

Application of doctrine of res judicata to item of single cause of action omitted from issues through ignorance, mistake, or fraud, 2 A.L.R. 534; 142 A.L.R. 905.

Judgment against executor or administrator qualified in one state as binding upon an executor or administrator of the same decedent, qualified in another, 3 A.L.R. 64.

Judgment against claim based on original form of indebtedness as res judicata as to claim based on new or substituted obligation, 4 A.L.R. 1173.

Rule against collateral attack as applicable to temporary injunction, 12 A.L.R. 1165.

Judgment on claim as bar to action to recover amount of payment which was not litigated in previous action, 13 A.L.R. 1151.

Right of infant to set aside consent judgment in action for personal injuries, 15 A.L.R. 667; 20 A.L.R. 1249.

Judgment in an action for death as a bar to another action for the same death in another jurisdiction or under another statute, 26 A.L.R. 984; 53 A.L.R. 1275.

Judgment in action on commercial paper as affecting party to the paper who was not a party to the suit, 34 A.L.R. 152.

Effect, in subsequent proceedings, of paternity findings or implications in divorce or annulment decree or in support or custody order made incidental thereto, 39 A.L.R. 1215; 78 A.L.R.3d 846.

Judgment for rent for particular period as bar to action for rent for subsequent period, 42 A.L.R. 128.

Conclusiveness of decree assessing stockholders of insolvent corporation as against nonresident stockholders not personally served within the state in which it was rendered, 48 A.L.R. 669; 175 A.L.R. 1419.

Judgment in action for services of physician or surgeon as bar to action against him for malpractice, 49 A.L.R. 551.

Suit in one state or country to enforce a contract as regards real property therein as a bar to suit in another state or country to enforce the contract as regards the property therein, 52 A.L.R. 180.

Judgment in action between assignee and third person as res judicata in action arising out of same transaction as assigned claim between assignor and third person, 55 A.L.R. 1037.

Conclusiveness of officer's return of service of process on which judgment in sister state was rendered, 59 A.L.R. 1398.

Judgment in favor of defendant in action by personal representative for damage to estate by injury resulting in death as bar to action in behalf of statutory beneficiaries, 64 A.L.R. 446.

Judgment in favor of defendant or respondent in an action or proceeding involving a matter of public right or interest as a bar to a subsequent action or proceeding by a different plaintiff or relator, 64 A.L.R. 1262.

Rendition of judgment against one not a formal party, who has assumed the defense, 65 A.L.R. 1134.

Judgment in replevin as bar to action by plaintiff for consequential damages for wrongful seizure or conversion of property, 69 A.L.R. 655.

Error in excluding recovery for future or permanent damages as affecting the operation of judgment as bar or res judicata in subsequent action to recover future damages, 69 A.L.R. 1004.

Judgment in action on accident or health policy as res judicata or estoppel in subsequent action involving same accident or sickness, 70 A.L.R. 1457.

Judgment in action or proceeding involving an installment of an assessment for a public improvement as res judicata as regards other installments of assessments, 74 A.L.R. 880.

Right of assignee of judgment against joint tort-feasors as between whom there is no right of contribution, 75 A.L.R. 1468.

Necessity of verdict against servant or agent as condition of verdict against master or principal for tort of servant or agent, 78 A.L.R. 365.

Successful defense by one codefendant, or a finding for "defendants," as inuring to benefit of defaulting defendant, 78 A.L.R. 938.

Conclusiveness of judgment against foreign corporation as to jurisdictional fact of doing business within state where that fact was contested, 80 A.L.R. 719.

Reversal of judgment as affecting another judgment based on the reversed judgment and rendered pending the appeal, 81 A.L.R. 712.

Judgment in action in which matter was asserted as a defense without seeking affirmative relief as precluding use of such matter as basis of an independent action, offset, or counterclaim, 83 A.L.R. 642.

Divorce decree as res judicata in respect of community property, 85 A.L.R. 339.

Distinction between judgment as bar to cause of action and as estoppel as to particular fact, 88 A.L.R. 574.

Denial of motion to dissolve temporary restraining order, temporary or preliminary injunction, or injunction pendente lite as res judicata so as to negative action on bond, 92 A.L.R. 273.

Change of former decisions by court of last resort as ground of relief from decrees or orders rendered or entered in the interval in other cases, 95 A.L.R. 708.

Judgment as res judicata of usury notwithstanding question as to usury was not raised, 98 A.L.R. 1027.

Judgment in favor of defendant in action for personal injuries as bar to suit for death caused by such injuries, and vice versa, 99 A.L.R. 1091.

Judgment for plaintiff in action in tort or contract against codefendants, as conclusive in subsequent action between codefendants as to the liability of both or the liability of one and nonliability of the other, 101 A.L.R. 104; 142 A.L.R. 727.

Homestead exemption as exception to rule that judgment is conclusive as to defenses which might have been but were not raised, 103 A.L.R. 934.

Judgment in action for personal injuries as res judicata or estoppel as to negligence and contributory negligence in action for damages to property in same accident and vice versa, 104 A.L.R. 973.

Judgment or order upholding prior judgment in the same state against direct attack upon ground of lack of jurisdiction, as conclusive in another state under the full faith and credit provision or doctrine of res judicata, 104 A.L.R. 1187.

Judgment in action for personal injuries to or death of one person as res judicata or conclusive of matters there litigated in subsequent action for personal injury to or death of another person in the same accident, 104 A.L.R. 1476.

Findings or order upon application for alimony pendente lite in action for divorce or separation as res judicata, 105 A.L.R. 1406.

Conclusiveness of judgment on demurrer, 106 A.L.R. 437.

Judgment in action for conversion or to recover possession of personal property, resulting from defalcation or misappropriation, as res judicata of subsequent action for conversion or to recover possession, 106 A.L.R. 1425.

When finding or adjudication as to one's mental condition by official or body not clearly judicial is conclusive evidence or has effect of a judgment as regards legal mental status, 108 A.L.R. 47.

Decree in suit by judgment creditor to set aside conveyance in fraud of creditors as bar to another suit for same purpose in respect of another conveyance, 108 A.L.R. 699.

Advantage which the original trier of facts enjoyed over reviewing court from opportunity of seeing and hearing witnesses, 111 A.L.R. 742.

Judgment for plaintiff in negligence action as available to one who was not a party to that action but who is made defendant in a subsequent action as derivatively responsible, 112 A.L.R. 404.

Tort damaging real property as creating a single cause of action or multiple causes of action in respect of different portions of land of the same owner affected thereby, 117 A.L.R. 1216.

Adjudication in fixing inheritance, succession, or estate tax, as conclusive for other purposes, 117 A.L.R. 1227.

Judgment or order in connection with appointment of executor or administrator as res judicata, as law of the case, or as evidence, on questions other than the validity of the appointment, 119 A.L.R. 594.

Judgment in action for personal injury or death as res judicata as to negligence or contributory negligence in subsequent action for death in same accident of person whose estate was represented by defendant in first action, 119 A.L.R. 1469.

Pleading waiver, estoppel, and res judicata, 120 A.L.R. 8.

Judgment against tort-feasor's insurer in action by injured person as res judicata in similar action by another person injured in same accident, 121 A.L.R. 890.

Res judicata as regards decisions or awards under workmen's compensation acts, 122 A.L.R. 550.

Judgment in action by third person against insured as res judicata in favor of indemnity or liability insurer which was not a nominal party, 123 A.L.R. 708.

Power, in absence of reservation by statute or decree, to modify provision in decree of divorce or separation as to alimony or separate maintenance, 127 A.L.R. 741.

Judgment in action between property owner and public improvement district or its officer as res judicata as against certificate holders who were not parties, 128 A.L.R. 392.

Doctrine of res judicata as applied to judgments by default, 128 A.L.R. 472; 77 A.L.R.2d 1410.

Judgment in action by or against corporation as res judicata in action by or against stockholder or officer of corporation, 129 A.L.R. 1041.

Doctrine of res judicata in income tax cases, 130 A.L.R. 374; 140 A.L.R. 797.

Decree of court of domicil respecting validity or construction of will, or admitting it or denying its admission to probate, as conclusive as regards real estate in another state devised by will, 131 A.L.R. 1023.

Judgment in action growing out of accident as res judicata, as to negligence or contributory negligence, in later action growing out of same accident by or against one not a party to earlier action, 133 A.L.R. 181; 23 A.L.R.2d 710.

Necessity, as condition of effectiveness of express finding on a matter in issue to prevent relitigation of question in later case, that judgment in former action shall have rested thereon, 133 A.L.R. 840.

Ruling on creditor's claim in bankruptcy as res judicata in subsequent proceeding by trustee to recover voidable preference or transfer, 134 A.L.R. 1191; 165 A.L.R. 1413.

Allowance or rejection of claim in bankruptcy proceedings as res judicata in independent action or proceeding between the claimant and another creditor, 135 A.L.R. 695.

Rule of res judicata as applied to judicial construction of will, 136 A.L.R. 1180.

Judgment as res judicata or conclusive as to party's attorney who was not himself a party, 137 A.L.R. 586.

Decree in suit for separation as res judicata in subsequent suit for divorce or annulment, 138 A.L.R. 346; 90 A.L.R.2d 745.

Judgment as conclusive as against, or in favor of one not a party of record or privy to a party, who prosecuted or defended suit on behalf and in the name of party, or assisted him or participated with him in its prosecution or defense, 139 A.L.R. 9.

Judgment as res judicata as to whether insured is "permanently disabled" within contemplation of insurance policy, 142 A.L.R. 1170.

Res judicata as affected by limitation of jurisdiction of court which rendered judgment, 147 A.L.R. 196; 83 A.L.R.2d 977.

Finality, for purposes of appeal, of judgment in federal court which disposes of plaintiff's claim, but not of defendant's counterclaim, or vice versa, 147 A.L.R. 583.

Conclusiveness as to merits of judgment of court of foreign country, 148 A.L.R. 991.

Judgment in wrongful death action as res judicata in a subsequent action in same jurisdiction for the same death under same statute brought by or for benefit of statutory beneficiary whose status as such was ignored in the former action, 148 A.L.R. 1346.

Res judicata as affected by newly discovered evidence after judgment, 149 A.L.R. 1195.

Judgment in tax cases in respect of one period as res judicata in respect of another period, 150 A.L.R. 5; 162 A.L.R. 1204.

Domestic decree of divorce based upon a finding of invalidity of a previous divorce in another state, as estopping party to the domestic suit to assert, in a subsequent litigation, the validity of the divorce decree in the other state, 150 A.L.R. 465.

Validity and effect of former judgment or decree as proper subject for consideration in declaratory action, 154 A.L.R. 740.

Judgment in action for damages to real property situated in another state or county as conclusive in respect of title, 158 A.L.R. 362.

Judgment based on construction of instrument as res judicata of its validity, 164 A.L.R. 873.

Reversal upon appeal by, or grant of new trial to, one coparty defendant against whom judgment was rendered, as affecting judgment in favor of other coparty defendants, 166 A.L.R. 563.

Validity and effect of judgment based upon erroneous view as to constitutionality or validity of a statute or ordinance going to the merits, 167 A.L.R. 517.

Judgment for or against person in fiduciary capacity as res judicata for or against him in his individual or a different fiduciary capacity, or vice versa, 170 A.L.R. 1180.

Conclusiveness of allowance of account of trustee or personal representative as respects self-dealing in assets of estate, 1 A.L.R.2d 1060.

Denial of divorce in sister state or foreign country as res judicata in another suit for divorce between the same parties, 4 A.L.R.2d 107.

Privity as between lessor or bailor and lessee or bailee of personal property as regards effect of judgment in third person's action for damages against lessee or bailee as res judicata in lessor's or bailor's subsequent action against third person for damage to the property, or vice versa, 4 A.L.R.2d 1378.

Judgment as res judicata pending appeal or motion for a new trial, or during the time allowed therefor, 9 A.L.R.2d 984.

Judgment in suit for cancellation of restrictive covenant on ground of change in neighborhood as res judicata in suit for injunction against enforcement of covenant on that ground, and vice versa, 10 A.L.R.2d 357.

Extent to which principles of res judicata are applicable to judgments in actions for declaratory relief, 10 A.L.R.2d 782.

Judgment for or against partner as res judicata in favor of or against copartner not a party to the judgment, 11 A.L.R.2d 847.

Judgment avoiding indemnity or liability policy for fraud as barring recovery from insurer by or on behalf of third person, 18 A.L.R.2d 891.

Judgment denying validity of will because of undue influence, lack of mental capacity, or the like, as res judicata as to validity of another will, deed, or other instrument, 25 A.L.R.2d 657.

Decree granting or refusing injunction as res judicata in action for damages in relation to matter concerning which injunction was asked in first suit, 26 A.L.R.2d 446.

Divorce decree as res judicata in independent action involving property settlement agreement, 32 A.L.R.2d 1145.

Judgment in bastardy proceeding as conclusive of issues in subsequent bastardy proceeding, 37 A.L.R.2d 836.

Acquittal on homicide charge as bar to subsequent prosecution for assault and battery, or vice versa, 37 A.L.R.2d 1068.

Effect of verdict "for plaintiff" in action against multiple defendants, 47 A.L.R.2d 803.

Applicability of res judicata to decrees or judgments in adoption proceedings, 52 A.L.R.2d 406.

Dismissal of civil action for want of prosecution as res judicata, 54 A.L.R.2d 473.

Judgment involving real property against one spouse as binding against other spouse not a party to the proceeding, 58 A.L.R.2d 701.

Conviction from which appeal is pending as bar to another prosecution for same offense, 61 A.L.R.2d 1224.

Judgment determining question of coverage of automobile liability policy as between insurer and one claiming to be insured as res judicata in subsequent action by injured person against insurer, 69 A.L.R.2d 858.

Doctrine of res judicata as applied to default judgments, 77 A.L.R.2d 1410.

Judgment in action by or against stockholder or corporate officer as res judicata in action by or against corporation, 81 A.L.R.2d 1323.

Res judicata as affected by limitation of jurisdiction of court which rendered judgment, 83 A.L.R.2d 977.

Judgment in false imprisonment action as res judicata in later malicious prosecution action, or vice versa, 86 A.L.R.2d 1385.

Erroneous decision as law of the case on subsequent appellate review, 87 A.L.R.2d 271.

Decree in suit for "separation" as res judicata in subsequent suit for divorce or annulment, 90 A.L.R.2d 745.

Circumstances under which court may abate a prior action and permit parties to proceed in subsequent action, 6 A.L.R.3d 468.

Modern status of doctrine of res judicata in criminal cases, 9 A.L.R.3d 203.

Judgment in spouse's action for personal injuries as binding, as regards loss of consortium and similar resulting damage, upon other spouse not a party to the action, 12 A.L.R.3d 933.

Judgment in action against codefendants for injury or death of person, or for damage to property, as res judicata in subsequent action between codefendants as to their liability inter se, 24 A.L.R.3d 318.

Liability insurer's right to open or set aside, or contest matters relating to merits of, judgment against insured, entered in action in which insurer did not appear or defend, 27 A.L.R.3d 350.

Mutuality of estoppel as prerequisite of availability of doctrine of collateral estoppel to a stranger to the judgment, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044.

Judgment in action against seller or supplier of product as res judicata in action against manufacturer for injury from defective product, or vice versa, 34 A.L.R.3d 518.

Judgment in action on express contract for labor or services as precluding, as a matter of res judicata, subsequent action on implied contract (quantum meruit) or vice versa, 35 A.L.R.3d 874.

Decree allowing or denying specific performance of contract as precluding, as a matter or res judicata, subsequent action for money damages for breach, 38 A.L.R.3d 323.

Judgment against parents in action for loss of minor's services as precluding minor's action for personal injuries, 41 A.L.R.3d 536.

When does jeopardy attach in a nonjury trial?, 49 A.L.R.3d 1039.

Acquittal in criminal proceeding as precluding revocation of probation on same charge, 76 A.L.R.3d 564.

Acquittal as bar to prosecution of accused for perjury committed at trial, 89 A.L.R.3d 1098.

Modern views of state courts as to whether consent judgment is entitled to res judicata or collateral estoppel effect, 91 A.L.R.3d 1170.

Judgment in death action as precluding subsequent personal injury action by potential beneficiary of death action, or vice versa, 94 A.L.R.3d 676.

Right to probate subsequently discovered will as affected by completed prior proceedings in intestate administration, 2 A.L.R.4th 1315.

Doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel as barring relitigation in state criminal proceedings of issues previously decided in administrative proceedings, 30 A.L.R.4th 856.

Construction and application of two-dismissal rule under federal law, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 4.